drivers/ininiband: Use get_random_u32()
RFC PATCH 42/50 drivers/ininiband: Use get_random_u32()
There's no need to get_random_bytes() into a temporary buffer.
This is not a no-brainer change; get_random_u32() has slightly weaker security guarantees, but code like this is the classic example of when it's appropriate: the random value is stored in the kernel for as long as it's valuable.
TODO: Could any of the call sites be further weakened to prandom_u32()? If we're randomizing to avoid collisions with a *cooperating* (as opposed to malicious) partner, we don't need cryptographic strength.
--- drivers/infiniband/core/cm.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c | 3 +-- drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/i40iw/i40iw_verbs.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_mem.c | 9 ++------- drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_verbs.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 3 +-- 7 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/core/cm.c +1 -1
@@ -4449,7 +4449,7 @@ static int __init ib_cm_init(void) cm.remote_qp_table =RB_ROOT ; cm.remote_sidr_table =RB_ROOT ;xa_init_flags (&cm.local_id_table,XA_FLAGS_ALLOC |XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ ); -get_random_bytes (&cm.random_id_operand,sizeof cm.random_id_operand); + cm.random_id_operand = (__force __be32 )get_random_u32 ();INIT_LIST_HEAD (&cm.timewait_list); ret =class_register (&cm_class);
drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c +1 -2
@@ -873,9 +873,8 @@ struct rdma_cm_id *__rdma_create_id(struct net *net,mutex_init (&id_priv->handler_mutex);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&id_priv->listen_list);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&id_priv->mc_list); -get_random_bytes (&id_priv->seq_num,sizeof id_priv->seq_num); + id_priv->seq_num =get_random_u32 () &0x00ffffff ; id_priv->id.route.addr.dev_addr.net =get_net (net); - id_priv->seq_num &=0x00ffffff ;return &id_priv->id; }
drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c +1 -1
@@ -2426,7 +2426,7 @@ int ib_sa_init(void) {int ret; -get_random_bytes (&tid,sizeof tid); + tid =get_random_u32 ();atomic_set (&ib_nl_sa_request_seq,0 );
drivers/infiniband/hw/i40iw/i40iw_verbs.c +1 -1
@@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@ static u32 i40iw_create_stag(struct i40iw_device *iwdev)u8 consumer_key;int ret; -get_random_bytes (&random,sizeof (random)); + random =get_random_u32 (); consumer_key = (u8 )random; driver_key = random & ~iwdev->mr_stagmask;
drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_mem.c +2 -7
@@ -21,10 +21,7 @@int siw_mem_add (struct siw_device *sdev,struct siw_mem *m) {struct xa_limit limit =XA_LIMIT (1 ,0x00ffffff ); -u32 id, next; - -get_random_bytes (&next,4 ); - next &=0x00ffffff ; +u32 id, next =get_random_u32 () &0x00ffffff ;if (xa_alloc_cyclic (&sdev->mem_xa, &id, m, limit, &next,GFP_KERNEL ) <0 )
@@ -107,9 +104,7 @@ int siw_mr_add_mem(struct siw_mr *mr, struct ib_pd *pd, void *mem_obj,kref_init (&mem->ref); mr->mem = mem; - -get_random_bytes (&next,4 ); - next &=0x00ffffff ; + next =get_random_u32 () &0x00ffffff ;if (xa_alloc_cyclic (&sdev->mem_xa, &id, mem, limit, &next,GFP_KERNEL ) <0 ) {
drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_verbs.c +1 -1
@@ -1139,7 +1139,7 @@ int siw_create_cq(struct ib_cq *base_cq, const struct ib_cq_init_attr *attr, rv = -ENOMEM ; goto err_out; } -get_random_bytes (&cq->id,4 ); + cq->id =get_random_u32 ();siw_dbg (base_cq->device,"new CQ [%u]\n" , cq->id);spin_lock_init (&cq->lock);
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +1 -2
@@ -903,8 +903,7 @@ static int srp_send_req(struct srp_rdma_ch *ch, uint32_t max_iu_len, req->ib_param.primary_path = &ch->ib_cm.path; req->ib_param.alternate_path =NULL ; req->ib_param.service_id = target->ib_cm.service_id; -get_random_bytes (&req->ib_param.starting_psn,4 ); - req->ib_param.starting_psn &=0xffffff ; + req->ib_param.starting_psn =get_random_u32 () &0xffffff ; req->ib_param.qp_num = ch->qp->qp_num; req->ib_param.qp_type = ch->qp->qp_type; req->ib_param.local_cm_response_timeout = subnet_timeout +2 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.0
Quoted 6 lines · George Spelvin
There's no need to
get_random_bytes()into a temporary buffer.This is not a no-brainer change;
get_random_u32()has slightly weaker security guarantees, but code like this is the classic example of when it's appropriate: the random value is stored in the kernel for as long as it's valuable.
The mechanical transformation looks OK, but can someone who knows the RNG confirm this statement?
Many of these places are being used in network related contexts, I suspect the value here is often less about secrecy, more about unguessability.
Jason
Quoted 10 lines · Jason Gunthorpe
Quoted 6 lines · George Spelvin
There's no need to
get_random_bytes()into a temporary buffer.This is not a no-brainer change;
get_random_u32()has slightly weaker security guarantees, but code like this is the classic example of when it's appropriate: the random value is stored in the kernel for as long as it's valuable.The mechanical transformation looks OK, but can someone who knows the RNG confirm this statement?
You might find commit 92e507d21613 ("random: document get_random_int() family") informative.
Quoted 3 lines
Many of these places are being used in network related contexts, I suspect the value here is often less about secrecy, more about unguessability.
The significant difference is backtrackability. Each get_random_bytes() call has a final anti-backtracking step, to ensure that the random number just generated cannot be recovered from the subsequent kernel state. This is appropriate for encryption keys or asymmetric keys.
The get_random_{int,long,u32,u64} functions omit this step, which means they only need one ChaCha20 crypto operation per 64 bytes of output, not a minimum of one per call.
One good way of distinguishing the cases is to look for calls to memzero_explicit(). If you need to ensure the random bytes are securely destroyed, you need antibacktracking. If your application doesn't care if anyone learns your session authentication keys after the session has been closed, you don't need it.
-----"George Spelvin" <[email protected]> wrote: -----
Quoted 165 lines
To: [email protected], [email protected]
From: "George Spelvin" <[email protected]>
Date: 03/28/2020 05:43PM
Cc: "Doug Ledford" <[email protected]>, "Jason Gunthorpe" <[email protected]>, [email protected], "Faisal Latif" <[email protected]>, "Shiraz Saleem" <[email protected]>, "Bart Van Assche" <[email protected]>, "Bernard Metzler" <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [RFC PATCH v1 42/50]drivers/ininiband: Useget_random_u32()There's no need to
get_random_bytes()into a temporary buffer.This is not a no-brainer change;
get_random_u32()has slightly weaker security guarantees, but code like this is the classic example of when
it's appropriate: the random value is stored in the kernel for as long
as it's valuable.TODO: Could any of the call sites be further weakened to
prandom_u32()?
If we're randomizing to avoid collisions with a *cooperating* (as opposed
to malicious) partner, we don't need cryptographic strength.Signed-off-by George Spelvin <[email protected]>Cc Doug Ledford <[email protected]>Cc Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>Cc Faisal Latif <[email protected]>Cc Shiraz Saleem <[email protected]>Cc Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>Cc Bernard Metzler <[email protected]>---
drivers/infiniband/core/cm.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c | 3 +-- drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/i40iw/i40iw_verbs.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_mem.c | 9 ++------- drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_verbs.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 3 +-- 7 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)drivers/infiniband/core/cm.c +1
-1@@ -4449,7 +4449,7 @@ static int __init ib_cm_init(void) cm.remote_qp_table =RB_ROOT ; cm.remote_sidr_table =RB_ROOT ;xa_init_flags (&cm.local_id_table,XA_FLAGS_ALLOC |XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ ); -get_random_bytes (&cm.random_id_operand,sizeof cm.random_id_operand); + cm.random_id_operand = (__force __be32 )get_random_u32 ();INIT_LIST_HEAD (&cm.timewait_list);ret = class_register(&cm_class);drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c +1
-2@@ -873,9 +873,8 @@ struct rdma_cm_id *__rdma_create_id(struct net *net,mutex_init (&id_priv->handler_mutex);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&id_priv->listen_list);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&id_priv->mc_list); -get_random_bytes (&id_priv->seq_num,sizeof id_priv->seq_num); + id_priv->seq_num =get_random_u32 () &0x00ffffff ; id_priv->id.route.addr.dev_addr.net =get_net (net); - id_priv->seq_num &=0x00ffffff ;return &id_priv->id;}
drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c +1
-1@@ -2426,7 +2426,7 @@ int ib_sa_init(void) {int ret; -get_random_bytes (&tid,sizeof tid); + tid =get_random_u32 ();atomic_set (&ib_nl_sa_request_seq,0 );drivers/infiniband/hw/i40iw/i40iw_verbs.c +1
-1@@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@ static u32 i40iw_create_stag(struct i40iw_device *iwdev) u8 consumer_key;int ret; -get_random_bytes (&random,sizeof (random)); + random =get_random_u32 (); consumer_key = (u8 )random;driver_key = random & ~iwdev->mr_stagmask;drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_mem.c +2
-7@@ -21,10 +21,7 @@int siw_mem_add (struct siw_device *sdev,struct siw_mem *m) {struct xa_limit limit =XA_LIMIT (1 ,0x00ffffff ); -u32 id, next; - -get_random_bytes (&next,4 ); - next &=0x00ffffff ; +u32 id, next =get_random_u32 () &0x00ffffff ;if (xa_alloc_cyclic (&sdev->mem_xa, &id, m, limit, &next,GFP_KERNEL ) <0 )@@ -107,9 +104,7 @@ int siw_mr_add_mem(struct siw_mr *mr, struct ib_pd *pd, void *mem_obj,kref_init (&mem->ref); mr->mem = mem; - -get_random_bytes (&next,4 ); - next &=0x00ffffff ; + next =get_random_u32 () &0x00ffffff ; if (xa_alloc_cyclic(&sdev->mem_xa, &id, mem, limit, &next,GFP_KERNEL) < 0) {drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_verbs.c +1
-1@@ -1139,7 +1139,7 @@ int siw_create_cq(struct ib_cq *base_cq, conststruct ib_cq_init_attr *attr, rv = -ENOMEM ; goto err_out; } -get_random_bytes (&cq->id,4 ); + cq->id =get_random_u32 ();siw_dbg (base_cq->device,"new CQ [%u]\n" , cq->id);spin_lock_init(&cq->lock);drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +1
-2@@ -903,8 +903,7 @@ static int srp_send_req(struct srp_rdma_ch *ch,uint32_t max_iu_len, req->ib_param.primary_path = &ch->ib_cm.path; req->ib_param.alternate_path =NULL ; req->ib_param.service_id = target->ib_cm.service_id; -get_random_bytes (&req->ib_param.starting_psn,4 ); - req->ib_param.starting_psn &=0xffffff ; + req->ib_param.starting_psn =get_random_u32 () &0xffffff ; req->ib_param.qp_num = ch->qp->qp_num; req->ib_param.qp_type = ch->qp->qp_type;
Quoted 5 lines
req->ib_param.local_cm_response_timeout = subnet_timeout + 2;Signature · 1 line
2.26.0
Speaking for the siw driver only, these two changes are looking good to me. What is needed is a pseudo-random number, not to easy to guess for the application. get_random_u32() provides that.
Thanks!
Quoted 2 lines · Bernard Metzler
-----"George Spelvin" <[email protected]> wrote: -----
Quoted 1 line
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [RFC PATCH v1 42/50]
drivers/ininiband: Use
get_random_u32()
Quoted 41 lines
Quoted 35 lines
There's no need to
get_random_bytes()into a temporary buffer.This is not a no-brainer change;
get_random_u32()has slightly weaker security guarantees, but code like this is the classic example of when it's appropriate: the random value is stored in the kernel for as long as it's valuable.TODO: Could any of the call sites be further weakened to
prandom_u32()? If we're randomizing to avoid collisions with a *cooperating* (as opposed to malicious) partner, we don't need cryptographic strength.Signed-off-by George Spelvin <[email protected]>Cc Doug Ledford <[email protected]>Cc Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>Cc Faisal Latif <[email protected]>Cc Shiraz Saleem <[email protected]>Cc Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>Cc Bernard Metzler <[email protected]>drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_verbs.c +1
-1@@ -1139,7 +1139,7 @@ int siw_create_cq(struct ib_cq *base_cq, conststruct ib_cq_init_attr *attr, rv = -ENOMEM ; goto err_out; } -get_random_bytes (&cq->id,4 ); + cq->id =get_random_u32 ();siw_dbg (base_cq->device,"new CQ [%u]\n" , cq->id);Quoted 1 line
spin_lock_init(&cq->lock);Speaking for the siw driver only, these two changes are looking good to me. What is needed is a pseudo-random number, not to easy to guess for the application.
get_random_u32()provides that.
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks!
Reviewed-by Bernard Metzler <[email protected]>
Just so you know, get_random_u32() is still crypto-strength: it is unguessable even to a resourceful attacker with access to large amounts of other get_random_u32() output.
prandom_u32() is much cheaper, but although well seeded and distributed (so equally resistant to accidental collisions), *is* guessable if someone really wants to work at it.
Many intra-machine networks (like infiniband) are specifically not designed to be robust in the face of malicious actors on the network. A random transaction ID is sent in the clear, and a malicious actor wanting to interfere could simply copy it.
In such cases, there's no need for crypto-grade numbers, because the network already assumes that nobody's actively trying to create collisions.
You seem to be saying that the siw driver could use prandom_u32().
Quoted 2 lines · George Spelvin
Many intra-machine networks (like infiniband) are specifically not designed to be robust in the face of malicious actors on the network.
This is not really true at all..
Jason
Quoted 6 lines · Jason Gunthorpe
Quoted 2 lines · George Spelvin
Many intra-machine networks (like infiniband) are specifically not designed to be robust in the face of malicious actors on the network.
This is not really true at all..
Eep, this came out wrong! Let me clarify:
Many intra-machine networks like SCSI, LPC, HyperTransport, QuickPath, and I2C are specifically not designed to be robust in the face of malicious actors on the network/bus.
I don't know, *and was wondering*, whether this is true of Infiniband.
Does that make more sense?