arm64: Always force a branch protection mode when the compiler has one
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 arm64: Always force a branch protection mode when the compiler has one
Compilers with branch protection support can be configured to enable it by default, it is likely that distributions will do this as part of deploying branch protection system wide. As well as the slight overhead from having some extra NOPs for unused branch protection features this can cause more serious problems when the kernel is providing pointer authentication to userspace but not built for pointer authentication itself. In that case our switching of keys for userspace can affect the kernel unexpectedly, causing pointer authentication instructions in the kernel to corrupt addresses.
To ensure that we get consistent and reliable behaviour always explicitly initialise the branch protection mode, ensuring that the kernel is built the same way regardless of the compiler defaults.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/Makefile | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +4 -0
@@ -1537,6 +1537,10 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH This feature works with FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER option only if DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS is enabled. +config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_NONE + # GCC 9 or later, clang 8 or later + def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none) + config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET # GCC 9 or later, clang 8 or later def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf)
arch/arm64/Makefile +6 -1
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 include/generated/asm-offsets.h)) endif +# Ensure that if the compiler supports branch protection we default it +# off, this will be overridden if we are using branch protection. +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_NONE) := -mbranch-protection=none + ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf
@@ -73,9 +77,10 @@ branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pa # we pass it only to the assembler. This option is utilized only in case of non # integrated assemblers. branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_AS_HAS_PAC) += -Wa,-march=armv8.3-a -KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) endif +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) + ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN), y) KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -mbig-endian CHECKFLAGS += -D__AARCH64EB__
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Quoted 9 lines · Mark Brown
Compilers with branch protection support can be configured to enable it by default, it is likely that distributions will do this as part of deploying branch protection system wide. As well as the slight overhead from having some extra NOPs for unused branch protection features this can cause more serious problems when the kernel is providing pointer authentication to userspace but not built for pointer authentication itself. In that case our switching of keys for userspace can affect the kernel unexpectedly, causing pointer authentication instructions in the kernel to corrupt addresses.
Quoted 7 lines
To ensure that we get consistent and reliable behaviour always explicitly initialise the branch protection mode, ensuring that the kernel is built the same way regardless of the compiler defaults.
Fixes 7503197562567 (arm64: add basic pointer authentication support)Reported-by Szabolcs Nagy <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mark Brown <[email protected]>
-Kees
Quoted 51 lines
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/Makefile | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/arm64/Kconfig +4
-0@@ -1537,6 +1537,10 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH This feature works with FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER option only if DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS is enabled. +config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_NONE + # GCC 9 or later, clang 8 or later + def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none) + config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET # GCC 9 or later, clang 8 or later def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf)arch/arm64/Makefile +6
-1@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 include/generated/asm-offsets.h)) endif +# Ensure that if the compiler supports branch protection we default it +# off, this will be overridden if we are using branch protection. +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_NONE) := -mbranch-protection=none + ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf@@ -73,9 +77,10 @@ branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pa # we pass it only to the assembler. This option is utilized only in case of non # integrated assemblers. branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_AS_HAS_PAC) += -Wa,-march=armv8.3-a -KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) endif +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) + ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN), y) KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -mbig-endian CHECKFLAGS += -D__AARCH64EB__Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Quoted 9 lines · Mark Brown
Compilers with branch protection support can be configured to enable it by default, it is likely that distributions will do this as part of deploying branch protection system wide. As well as the slight overhead from having some extra NOPs for unused branch protection features this can cause more serious problems when the kernel is providing pointer authentication to userspace but not built for pointer authentication itself. In that case our switching of keys for userspace can affect the kernel unexpectedly, causing pointer authentication instructions in the kernel to corrupt addresses.
Quoted 8 lines
To ensure that we get consistent and reliable behaviour always explicitly initialise the branch protection mode, ensuring that the kernel is built the same way regardless of the compiler defaults.
Fixes 7503197562567 (arm64: add basic pointer authentication support)Reported-by Szabolcs Nagy <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Mark.
Quoted 50 lines
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/Makefile | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/arm64/Kconfig +4
-0@@ -1537,6 +1537,10 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH This feature works with FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER option only if DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS is enabled. +config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_NONE + # GCC 9 or later, clang 8 or later + def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none) + config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET # GCC 9 or later, clang 8 or later def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf)arch/arm64/Makefile +6
-1@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 include/generated/asm-offsets.h)) endif +# Ensure that if the compiler supports branch protection we default it +# off, this will be overridden if we are using branch protection. +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_NONE) := -mbranch-protection=none + ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf@@ -73,9 +77,10 @@ branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pa # we pass it only to the assembler. This option is utilized only in case of non # integrated assemblers. branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_AS_HAS_PAC) += -Wa,-march=armv8.3-a -KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) endif +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) + ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN), y) KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -mbig-endian CHECKFLAGS += -D__AARCH64EB__Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Catalin Marinas
maintainerQuoted 6 lines · Mark Brown
Compilers with branch protection support can be configured to enable it by default, it is likely that distributions will do this as part of deploying branch protection system wide. As well as the slight overhead from having some extra NOPs for unused branch protection features this can cause more serious problems when the kernel is providing pointer authentication to userspace but not built for pointer authentication itself.
With 5.7 you won't be able to configure user and kernel PAC support independently. So, I guess that's something only for prior kernel versions.
Quoted 22 lines
In that case our
switching of keys for userspace can affect the kernel unexpectedly, causing pointer authentication instructions in the kernel to corrupt addresses.To ensure that we get consistent and reliable behaviour always explicitly initialise the branch protection mode, ensuring that the kernel is built the same way regardless of the compiler defaults.
Fixes 7503197562567 (arm64: add basic pointer authentication support)Reported-by Szabolcs Nagy <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mark Brown <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/Makefile | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-0
arch/arm64/Kconfig config ARM64_PTR_AUTH · line 1542
Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig +3
-0@@ -1537,6 +1537,10 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH This feature works with FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER option only if DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS is enabled. +config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_NONE + # GCC 9 or later, clang 8 or later + def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none)
I don't think we need to bother with a Kconfig entry here. We did it for the other options since CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH has a dependency on them.
Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1
-0+ config CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET # GCC 9 or later, clang 8 or later def_bool $(cc-option,-mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf)arch/arm64/Makefile +0
-0
arch/arm64/Makefile stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 · line 70
Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm64/Makefile +3
-0@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ stack_protector_prepare: prepare0 include/generated/asm-offsets.h)) endif +# Ensure that if the compiler supports branch protection we default it +# off, this will be overridden if we are using branch protection. +branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_NONE) := -mbranch-protection=none
And a $(call cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none) here.
branch-prot-flags-y is only introduced in 5.7, so backporting may look slightly weirder.
arch/arm64/Makefile branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pa · line 82
Quoted 12 lines
arch/arm64/Makefile +2
-1+ ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y) branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf@@ -73,9 +77,10 @@ branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pa # we pass it only to the assembler. This option is utilized only in case of non # integrated assemblers. branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_AS_HAS_PAC) += -Wa,-march=armv8.3-a -KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y) endif +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y)
Or just use an else clause here with:
KBUILD_CFLAGS += ($call cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none).
On backports, we just drop else/endif since they don't exist.
Not a strong preference really, just looking to have backports resemble upstream better. I can fix it up locally, whichever variant we go for (or even this one).
Signature · 1 line
Catalin
Quoted 11 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 6 lines · Mark Brown
Compilers with branch protection support can be configured to enable it by default, it is likely that distributions will do this as part of deploying branch protection system wide. As well as the slight overhead from having some extra NOPs for unused branch protection features this can cause more serious problems when the kernel is providing pointer authentication to userspace but not built for pointer authentication itself.
With 5.7 you won't be able to configure user and kernel PAC support independently. So, I guess that's something only for prior kernel versions.
Yes, it's really for the benefit of stable at this point - hence the Cc. Going forward it's hopefully more for defensiveness than anything else, it's possible something similar might come up with some future stuff but ideally not.