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Landlock LSM

PATCH Superseded Mickaël Salaün 1 participant 11 messages Apr 16, 2020

Subsystems (21)
Documentation Arm (32-bit) x86 VFS +17 more subsystems

v16 of 34 Superseded Latest is v34 →

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Mickaël Salaün

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

v16 cover Landlock LSM

Hi,

This new patch series brings some improvements while simplifying the code, fixes some bugs and adds more tests:

Use a bitfield of layers to properly manage superset and subset of access rights, whatever their order in the stack of layers [1].

Allow to open pipes and similar special files through /proc/self/fd, as well as internal filesystems such as nsfs through /proc/self/ns, because disconnected path cannot be evaluated. Such special filesystems could be handled with a future evolution.

For the sake of simplicity, forbid reparenting when linking or renaming to protect against possible privilege escalation. This could happen by changing the hierarchy of a file or directory in relation to an enforced access policy (from the set of layers). This will be relaxed in the future with more complex code.

Rename the unlink and rmdir access rights to a more generic ones:
remove_dir and remove_file. Indeed it makes sense to also use them for the action of renaming a file or a directory, which may lead to the removal of the source file or directory. Replace the link_to, rename_from and rename_to access rights with remove_file, remove_dir and make_* .

Add multiple tests to check semantic, and improve test coverage for security/landlock to 94.1% of lines (best possible with deterministic user space tests).

Add current limitations to documentation: file renaming and linking, OverlayFS and special filesystems (e.g. nsfs).

The previously identified memory accounting limitation can already be solved with the (kernel) Memory Resource Controller from cgroup.

The SLOC count is 1267 for security/landlock/ and 1643 for tools/testing/selftest/landlock/ .

The compiled documentation is available here:
https://landlock.io/linux-doc/landlock-v16/security/landlock/index.html

This series can be applied on top of v5.7-rc1. This can be tested with CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK and CONFIG_SAMPLE_LANDLOCK. This patch series can be found in a Git repository here:
https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/commits/landlock-v16
I would really appreciate constructive comments on this patch series.

# Landlock LSM

The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable LSM [2], it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves.

Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD Pledge/Unveil.

Previous version:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

Regards,

Mickaël Salaün (10):
landlock: Add object management
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control
landlock: Add syscall implementation
arch: Wire up landlock() syscall
selftests/landlock: Add initial tests samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation

 Documentation/security/index.rst              |    1 +
 Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst     |   18 +
 Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst    |   69 +
 Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst      |  268 +++
 MAINTAINERS                                   |   12 +
 arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl        |    1 +
 arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl                    |    1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h               |    2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h             |    2 +
 arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl         |    1 +
 arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl         |    1 +
 arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl   |    1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl     |    1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl     |    1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl     |    1 +
 arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl       |    1 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl      |    1 +
 arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl         |    1 +
 arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl           |    1 +
 arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl        |    1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl        |    1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl        |    1 +
 arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl       |    1 +
 fs/super.c                                    |    2 +
 include/linux/fs.h                            |    5 +
 include/linux/landlock.h                      |   22 +
 include/linux/syscalls.h                      |    3 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h             |    4 +-
 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h                 |  296 +++
 kernel/sys_ni.c                               |    3 +
 samples/Kconfig                               |    7 +
 samples/Makefile                              |    1 +
 samples/landlock/.gitignore                   |    1 +
 samples/landlock/Makefile                     |   15 +
 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c                  |  228 +++
 security/Kconfig                              |   11 +-
 security/Makefile                             |    2 +
 security/landlock/Kconfig                     |   18 +
 security/landlock/Makefile                    |    4 +
 security/landlock/common.h                    |   20 +
 security/landlock/cred.c                      |   46 +
 security/landlock/cred.h                      |   58 +
 security/landlock/fs.c                        |  601 ++++++
 security/landlock/fs.h                        |   42 +
 security/landlock/object.c                    |   66 +
 security/landlock/object.h                    |   91 +
 security/landlock/ptrace.c                    |  120 ++
 security/landlock/ptrace.h                    |   14 +
 security/landlock/ruleset.c                   |  344 ++++
 security/landlock/ruleset.h                   |  161 ++
 security/landlock/setup.c                     |   39 +
 security/landlock/setup.h                     |   18 +
 security/landlock/syscall.c                   |  501 +++++
 tools/testing/selftests/Makefile              |    1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore   |    4 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile     |   29 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h     |   42 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config       |    5 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c  |  156 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c    | 1696 +++++++++++++++++
 .../testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c  |  291 +++
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c       |    5 +
 62 files changed, 5353 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst
 create mode 100644 include/linux/landlock.h
 create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
 create mode 100644 samples/landlock/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 samples/landlock/Makefile
 create mode 100644 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/common.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/cred.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/cred.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/setup.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/setup.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/syscall.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c
Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v16 1/10 landlock: Add object management

A Landlock object enables to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode). A Landlock rule is a set of access rights allowed on an object. Rules are grouped in rulesets that may be tied to a set of processes (i.e. subjects) to enforce a scoped access-control (i.e. a domain).

Because Landlock's goal is to empower any process (especially unprivileged ones) to sandbox themselves, we can't rely on a system-wide object identification such as file extended attributes. Indeed, we need innocuous, composable and modular access-controls.

The main challenge with these constraints is to identify kernel objects while this identification is useful (i.e. when a security policy makes use of this object). But this identification data should be freed once no policy is using it. This ephemeral tagging should not and may not be written in the filesystem. We then need to manage the lifetime of a rule according to the lifetime of its object. To avoid a global lock, this implementation make use of RCU and counters to safely reference objects.

A following commit uses this generic object management for inodes.

Cc James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>

---

Changes since v14:
* Simplify the object, rule and ruleset management at the expense of a less aggressive memory freeing (contributed by Jann Horn, with additional modifications):
- Remove object->list aggregating the rules tied to an object.
- Remove landlock_get_object(), landlock_drop_object(), {get,put}_object_cleaner() and landlock_rule_is_disabled().
- Rewrite landlock_put_object() to use a more simple mechanism (no tricky RCU).
- Replace enum landlock_object_type and landlock_release_object() with

    landlock_object_underops->release()

- Adjust unions and Sparse annotations.
Cf. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez21bEn0wL1bbmTiiu8j9jP5iEWtHOwz4tURUJ+ki0ydYw@mail.gmail.com/
* Merge struct landlock_rule into landlock_ruleset_elem to simplify the
rule management.
* Constify variables.
* Improve kernel documentation.
* Cosmetic variable renames.
* Remove the "default" in the Kconfig (suggested by Jann Horn).
* Only use refcount_inc() through getter helpers.
* Update Kconfig description.

Changes since v13:
* New dedicated implementation, removing the need for eBPF.

Previous changes:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 MAINTAINERS                | 10 +++++
 security/Kconfig           |  1 +
 security/Makefile          |  2 +
 security/landlock/Kconfig  | 18 ++++++++
 security/landlock/Makefile |  3 ++
 security/landlock/object.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/object.h | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 191 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.h
MAINTAINERS +10 -0
index e64e5db31497..527062ba139b 100644
@@ -9483,6 +9483,16 @@ F:	net/core/sock_map.c
 F:	net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c
 F:	net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c
 
+LANDLOCK SECURITY MODULE
+M:	Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
+L:	[email protected]
+W:	https://landlock.io
+T:	git https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux.git
+S:	Supported
+F:	security/landlock/
+K:	landlock
+K:	LANDLOCK
+
 LANTIQ / INTEL Ethernet drivers
 M:	Hauke Mehrtens <[email protected]>
 L:	[email protected]
security/Kconfig +1 -0
index cd3cc7da3a55..582fd777a757 100644
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
 source "security/yama/Kconfig"
 source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
 source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
+source "security/landlock/Kconfig"
 
 source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
 
security/Makefile +2 -0
index 22e73a3482bd..b8380650bfb1 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN)	+= loadpin
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID)    += safesetid
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM)	+= lockdown
 subdir-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM)		+= bpf
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK)		+= landlock
 
 # always enable default capabilities
 obj-y					+= commoncap.o
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN)		+= loadpin/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID)       += safesetid/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM)	+= lockdown/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK)	+= landlock/
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM)			+= bpf/
 
security/landlock/Kconfig new file +18 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9ec7593a534a
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+config SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+	bool "Landlock support"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	select SECURITY_PATH
+	help
+	  Landlock is a safe sandboxing mechanism which enables processes to
+	  restrict themselves (and their future children) by gradually
+	  enforcing tailored access control policies.  A security policy is a
+	  set of access rights (e.g. open a file in read-only, make a
+	  directory) tied to a file hierarchy.  The configuration can be set by
+	  any processes, including unprivileged ones, thanks to the landlock()
+	  system call.
+
+	  See Documentation/security/landlock/ for further information.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
security/landlock/Makefile new file +3 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cb6deefbf4c0
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
+
+landlock-y := object.o
security/landlock/object.c new file +66 -0

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security/landlock/object.h new file +91 -0

91 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH v16 2/10 landlock: Add ruleset and domain management

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

A Landlock ruleset is mainly a red-black tree with Landlock rules as nodes. This enables quick update and lookup to match a requested access e.g., to a file. A ruleset is usable through a dedicated file descriptor (cf. following commit implementing the syscall) which enables a process to create and populate a ruleset with new rules.

A domain is a ruleset tied to a set of processes. This group of rules define the security policy enforced on these processes and their future children. A domain can transition to a new domain which is the intersection of all its constraints and those of a ruleset provided by the current process. This modification only impact the current process. This means that a process can only gain more constraints (i.e. lose accesses) over time.

Cc James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>

---

Changes since v15:
* Replace layer_levels and layer_depth with a bitfield of layers, cf. filesystem commit.
* Rename the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_{UNLINK,RMDIR} with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_{FILE,DIR} because it makes sense to use them for the action of renaming a file or a directory, which may lead to the removal of the source file or directory. Removes the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_{LINK_TO,RENAME_FROM,RENAME_TO} which are now replaced with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_{FILE,DIR} and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_* .
* Update the documentation accordingly and highlight how the access rights are taken into account.
* Change nb_rules from atomic_t to u32 because it is not use anymore by show_fdinfo().
* Add safeguard for level variables types.
* Check max number of rules.
* Replace struct landlock_access (self and beneath bitfields) with one bitfield.
* Remove useless variable.
* Add comments.

Changes since v14:
* Simplify the object, rule and ruleset management at the expense of a
less aggressive memory freeing (contributed by Jann Horn, with
additional modifications):
- Make a domain immutable (remove the opportunistic cleaning).
- Remove RCU pointers.
- Merge struct landlock_ref and struct landlock_ruleset_elem into
landlock_rule: get ride of rule's RCU.
- Adjust union.
- Remove the landlock_insert_rule() check about a new object with the
same address as a previously disabled one, because it is not
possible to disable a rule anymore.
Cf. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez21bEn0wL1bbmTiiu8j9jP5iEWtHOwz4tURUJ+ki0ydYw@mail.gmail.com/
* Fix nested domains by implementing a notion of layer level and depth:
- Update landlock_insert_rule() to manage such layers.
- Add an inherit_ruleset() helper to properly create a new domain.
- Rename landlock_find_access() to landlock_find_rule() and return a
full rule reference.
- Add a layer_level and a layer_depth fields to struct landlock_rule.
- Add a top_layer_level field to struct landlock_ruleset.
* Remove access rights that may be required for FD-only requests:
truncate, getattr, lock, chmod, chown, chgrp, ioctl. This will be
handle in a future evolution of Landlock, but right now the goal is to
lighten the code to ease review.
* Remove LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPEN and rename
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_{READ,WRITE} with a FILE suffix.
* Rename LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READDIR to match the *_FILE pattern.
* Remove LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAP which was useless.
* Fix memory leak in put_hierarchy() (reported by Jann Horn).
* Fix user-after-free and rename free_ruleset() (reported by Jann Horn).
* Replace the for loops with rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe().
* Constify variables.
* Only use refcount_inc() through getter helpers.
* Change Landlock_insert_ruleset_access() to
Landlock_insert_ruleset_rule().
* Rename landlock_put_ruleset_enqueue() to landlock_put_ruleset_deferred().
* Improve kernel documentation and add a warning about the unhandled
access/syscall families.
* Move ABI check to syscall.c .

Changes since v13:
* New implementation, inspired by the previous inode eBPF map, but agnostic to the underlying kernel object.

Previous changes:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 MAINTAINERS                   |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h |  78 ++++++++
 security/landlock/Makefile    |   2 +-
 security/landlock/ruleset.c   | 344 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/ruleset.h   | 161 ++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 585 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.h
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
index 527062ba139b..b8b726a0a0f0 100644
@@ -9489,6 +9489,7 @@ L:	[email protected]
 W:	https://landlock.io
 T:	git https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux.git
 S:	Supported
+F:	include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
 F:	security/landlock/
 K:	landlock
 K:	LANDLOCK
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h new file +78 -0

78 lines not on this page · raw message

security/landlock/Makefile +1 -1
index cb6deefbf4c0..d846eba445bb 100644
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
 
-landlock-y := object.o
+landlock-y := object.o ruleset.o
security/landlock/ruleset.c new file +344 -0

344 lines not on this page · raw message

security/landlock/ruleset.h new file +161 -0

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Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH v16 3/10 landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

A process credentials point to a Landlock domain, which is underneath implemented with a ruleset. In the following commits, this domain is used to check and enforce the ptrace and filesystem security policies. A domain is inherited from a parent to its child the same way a thread inherits a seccomp policy.

Cc James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>

---

Changes since v15:
* Optimize landlocked() for current thread.
* Display the greeting message when everything is initialized.

Changes since v14:
* Uses pr_fmt from common.h .
* Constify variables.
* Remove useless NULL initialization.

Changes since v13:
* totally get ride of the seccomp dependency
* only keep credential management and LSM setup.

Previous changes:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 security/Kconfig           | 10 +++----
 security/landlock/Makefile |  3 +-
 security/landlock/common.h | 20 +++++++++++++
 security/landlock/cred.c   | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/cred.h   | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/setup.c  | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/setup.h  | 16 +++++++++++
 7 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/common.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/cred.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/cred.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/setup.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/setup.h
security/Kconfig +5 -5
index 582fd777a757..a96ee1c7fd25 100644
@@ -278,11 +278,11 @@ endchoice
 
 config LSM
 	string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
-	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
-	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
-	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
-	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
-	default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf"
+	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
+	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf"
 	help
 	  A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
 	  Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be
security/landlock/Makefile +2 -1
index d846eba445bb..041ea242e627 100644
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
 
-landlock-y := object.o ruleset.o
+landlock-y := setup.o object.o ruleset.o \
+	cred.o
security/landlock/common.h new file +20 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5dc0fe15707d
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Common constants and helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H
+
+#define LANDLOCK_NAME "landlock"
+
+#ifdef pr_fmt
+#undef pr_fmt
+#endif
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) LANDLOCK_NAME ": " fmt
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H */
security/landlock/cred.c new file +46 -0

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security/landlock/cred.h new file +58 -0

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security/landlock/setup.c new file +31 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..39ee1766f175
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Security framework setup
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "cred.h"
+#include "setup.h"
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security),
+};
+
+static int __init landlock_init(void)
+{
+	landlock_add_hooks_cred();
+	pr_info("Up and running.\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(LANDLOCK_NAME) = {
+	.name = LANDLOCK_NAME,
+	.init = landlock_init,
+	.blobs = &landlock_blob_sizes,
+};
security/landlock/setup.h new file +16 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9fdbf33fcc33
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Security framework setup
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H
+
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH v16 4/10 landlock: Add ptrace restrictions

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead to a privilege escalation. Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing malicious activities. Thanks to ptrace_may_access(), various part of the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee.

A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target process' rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer).

Cc James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>

---

Changes since v14:
* Constify variables.

Changes since v13:
* Make the ptrace restriction mandatory, like in the v10.
* Remove the eBPF dependency.

Previous changes:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 security/landlock/Makefile |   2 +-
 security/landlock/ptrace.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/ptrace.h |  14 +++++
 security/landlock/setup.c  |   2 +
 4 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.h
security/landlock/Makefile +1 -1
index 041ea242e627..f1d1eb72fa76 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
 
 landlock-y := setup.o object.o ruleset.o \
-	cred.o
+	cred.o ptrace.o
security/landlock/ptrace.c new file +120 -0

120 lines not on this page · raw message

security/landlock/ptrace.h new file +14 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6740c6a723de
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Ptrace hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
+ * Copyright © 2019 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H
+
+__init void landlock_add_hooks_ptrace(void);
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H */
security/landlock/setup.c +2 -0
index 39ee1766f175..5e7540fdeefa 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
 #include "common.h"
 #include "cred.h"
+#include "ptrace.h"
 #include "setup.h"
 
 struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 static int __init landlock_init(void)
 {
 	landlock_add_hooks_cred();
+	landlock_add_hooks_ptrace();
 	pr_info("Up and running.\n");
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH v16 5/10 fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

Thanks to the Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to identify inodes according to a process's domain. To enable an unprivileged process to express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a directory (or a file) and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through landlock(2). When checking if a file access request is allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following the different mount layers. The access to each "tagged" inodes are collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create access to the requested file hierarchy. This makes possible to identify a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user has from the filesystem.

Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>

---

Changes since v15:
* Replace layer_levels and layer_depth with a bitfield of layers: this enables to properly manage superset and subset of access rights, whatever their order in the stack of layers.
Cf. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
* Allow to open pipes and similar special files through /proc/self/fd/.
* Properly handle internal filesystems such as nsfs: always allow these kind of roots because disconnected path cannot be evaluated.
* Remove the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_LINK_TO and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RENAME_{TO,FROM}, but use the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_{FILE,DIR} and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_* instead. Indeed, it is not possible for now (and not really useful) to express the semantic of a source and a destination.
* Check access rights to remove a directory or a file with rename(2).
* Forbid reparenting when linking or renaming. This is needed to easily protect against possible privilege escalation by changing the place of a file or directory in relation to an enforced access policy (from the set of layers). This will be relaxed in the future.
* Update hooks to take into account replacement of the object's self and beneath access bitfields with one. Simplify the code.
* Check file related access rights.
* Check d_is_negative() instead of !d_backing_inode() in check_access_path_continue(), and continue the path walk while there is no mapped inode e.g., with rename(2).
* Check private inode in check_access_path().
* Optimize get_file_access() when dealing with a directory.
* Add missing atomic.h .

Changes since v14:
* Simplify the object, rule and ruleset management at the expense of a
less aggressive memory freeing (contributed by Jann Horn, with
additional modifications):
- Rewrite release_inode() to use inode->sb->s_landlock_inode_refs.
- Remove useless checks in landlock_release_inodes(), clean object
pointer according to the new struct landlock_object and wait for all
iput() to complete.
- Rewrite get_inode_object() according to the new struct
landlock_object. If there is a race-condition when cleaning up an
object, we retry until the concurrent thread finished the object
cleaning.
Cf. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez21bEn0wL1bbmTiiu8j9jP5iEWtHOwz4tURUJ+ki0ydYw@mail.gmail.com/
* Fix nested domains by implementing a notion of layer level and depth:
- Check for matching level ranges when walking through a file path.
- Only allow access if every layer granted the access request.
* Handles files without mount points (e.g. pipes).
* Hardens path walk by checking inode pointer values.
* Prefetches d_parent when walking to the root directory.
* Remove useless inode_alloc_security hook() (suggested by Jann Horn):
already initialized by lsm_inode_alloc().
* Remove the inode_free_security hook.
* Remove access checks that may be required for FD-only requests:
truncate, getattr, lock, chmod, chown, chgrp, ioctl. This will be
handle in a future evolution of Landlock, but right now the goal is to
lighten the code to ease review.
* Constify variables.
* Move ABI checks into syscall.c .
* Cosmetic variable renames.

Changes since v11:
* Add back, revamp and make a fully working filesystem access-control based on paths and inodes.
* Remove the eBPF dependency.

Previous changes:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 MAINTAINERS                |   1 +
 fs/super.c                 |   2 +
 include/linux/fs.h         |   5 +
 include/linux/landlock.h   |  22 ++
 security/landlock/Makefile |   2 +-
 security/landlock/fs.c     | 601 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/fs.h     |  42 +++
 security/landlock/setup.c  |   6 +
 security/landlock/setup.h  |   2 +
 9 files changed, 682 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/landlock.h
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.h
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
index b8b726a0a0f0..4b58dd195ddd 100644
@@ -9489,6 +9489,7 @@ L:	[email protected]
 W:	https://landlock.io
 T:	git https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux.git
 S:	Supported
+F:	include/linux/landlock.h
 F:	include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
 F:	security/landlock/
 K:	landlock
fs/super.c +2 -0
index cd352530eca9..4ad6a64a1706 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <linux/cleancache.h>
 #include <linux/fscrypt.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/landlock.h>
 #include <linux/lockdep.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
@@ -454,6 +455,7 @@ void generic_shutdown_super(struct super_block *sb)
 		evict_inodes(sb);
 		/* only nonzero refcount inodes can have marks */
 		fsnotify_sb_delete(sb);
+		landlock_release_inodes(sb);
 
 		if (sb->s_dio_done_wq) {
 			destroy_workqueue(sb->s_dio_done_wq);
include/linux/fs.h +5 -0
index 4f6f59b4f22a..384d705ddef3 100644
@@ -1517,6 +1517,11 @@ struct super_block {
 	/* Pending fsnotify inode refs */
 	atomic_long_t s_fsnotify_inode_refs;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+	/* References to Landlock underlying objects */
+	atomic_long_t s_landlock_inode_refs;
+#endif
+
 	/* Being remounted read-only */
 	int s_readonly_remount;
 
include/linux/landlock.h new file +22 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0fb16d130b0a
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - public kernel headers
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2019 Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_LANDLOCK_H
+#define _LINUX_LANDLOCK_H
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+extern void landlock_release_inodes(struct super_block *sb);
+#else
+static inline void landlock_release_inodes(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
security/landlock/Makefile +1 -1
index f1d1eb72fa76..92e3d80ab8ed 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
 
 landlock-y := setup.o object.o ruleset.o \
-	cred.o ptrace.o
+	cred.o ptrace.o fs.o
security/landlock/fs.c new file +601 -0

601 lines not on this page · raw message

security/landlock/fs.h new file +42 -0

42 lines not on this page · raw message

security/landlock/setup.c +6 -0
index 5e7540fdeefa..0bafa94fb2a6 100644
@@ -11,17 +11,23 @@
 
 #include "common.h"
 #include "cred.h"
+#include "fs.h"
 #include "ptrace.h"
 #include "setup.h"
 
+bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false;
+
 struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security),
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct landlock_inode_security),
 };
 
 static int __init landlock_init(void)
 {
 	landlock_add_hooks_cred();
 	landlock_add_hooks_ptrace();
+	landlock_add_hooks_fs();
+	landlock_initialized = true;
 	pr_info("Up and running.\n");
 	return 0;
 }
security/landlock/setup.h +2 -0
index 9fdbf33fcc33..1daffab1ab4b 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
 
 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 
+extern bool landlock_initialized;
+
 extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
 
 #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH v16 6/10 landlock: Add syscall implementation

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

This system call, inspired from seccomp(2) and bpf(2), is designed to be used by unprivileged processes to sandbox themselves. It has the same usage restrictions as seccomp(2): the caller must have the no_new_privs attribute set or have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current user namespace.

Here are the motivations for this new syscall:
* A sandboxed process may not have access to file systems, including /dev, /sys or /proc, but it should still be able to add more restrictions to itself.
* Neither prctl(2) nor seccomp(2) (which was used in a previous version) fit well with the current definition of a Landlock security policy.
* It is quite easy to whitelist this syscall with seccomp-bpf to enable all processes to use it. It is also easy to filter specific commands or options to restrict a process to a subset of Landlock features.

There is currently four commands:
* LANDLOCK_CMD_GET_FEATURES: Gets the supported features (required for backward compatibility and best-effort security).
* LANDLOCK_CMD_CREATE_RULESET: Creates a ruleset and returns its file descriptor.
* LANDLOCK_CMD_ADD_RULE: Adds a rule (e.g. file hierarchy access) to a ruleset, identified by the dedicated file descriptor.
* LANDLOCK_CMD_ENFORCE_RULESET: Enforces a ruleset on the current thread and its future children (similar to seccomp).

See the user and code documentation for more details (provided by a following commit): Documentation/security/landlock/

Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>

---

Changes since v15:
* Do not add file descriptors referring to internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs) in a ruleset.
* Replace is_user_mountable() with in-place clean checks.
* Replace EBADR with EBADFD in get_ruleset_from_fd() and get_path_from_fd().
* Remove ruleset's show_fdinfo() for now.

Changes since v14:
* Remove the security_file_open() check in get_path_from_fd(): an opened FD should not be restricted here, and even less with this hook. As a result, it is now allowed to add a path to a ruleset even if the access to this path is not allowed (without O_PATH). This doesn't change the fact that enforcing a ruleset can't grant any right, only remove some rights. The new layer levels add more consistent restrictions.
* Check minimal landlock_attr_* size/content. This fix the case when no data was provided and e.g., FD 0 was interpreted as ruleset_fd. Now this leads to a returned -EINVAL.
* Fix credential double-free error case.
* Complete struct landlock_attr_size with size_attr_enforce.
* Fix undefined reference to syscall when Landlock is not selected.
* Remove f.file->f_path.mnt check (suggested by Al Viro).
* Add build-time checks.
* Move ABI checks from fs.c .
* Constify variables.
* Fix spelling.
* Add comments.

Changes since v13:
* New implementation, replacing the dependency on seccomp(2) and bpf(2).

---
 include/linux/syscalls.h      |   3 +
 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 218 +++++++++++++++
 kernel/sys_ni.c               |   3 +
 security/landlock/Makefile    |   2 +-
 security/landlock/syscall.c   | 501 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 726 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/syscall.c
include/linux/syscalls.h +3 -0
index 1815065d52f3..beaadcf4ef77 100644
@@ -1003,6 +1003,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig,
 				       siginfo_t __user *info,
 				       unsigned int flags);
 asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_getfd(int pidfd, int fd, unsigned int flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_landlock(unsigned int command, unsigned int options,
+			     size_t attr1_size, void __user *attr1_ptr,
+			     size_t attr2_size, void __user *attr2_ptr);
 
 /*
  * Architecture-specific system calls
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +218 -0

224 lines not on this page · raw message

kernel/sys_ni.c +3 -0
index 3b69a560a7ac..70cea36eb7ce 100644
@@ -264,6 +264,9 @@ COND_SYSCALL(request_key);
 COND_SYSCALL(keyctl);
 COND_SYSCALL_COMPAT(keyctl);
 
+/* security/landlock/syscall.c */
+COND_SYSCALL(landlock);
+
 /* arch/example/kernel/sys_example.c */
 
 /* mm/fadvise.c */
security/landlock/Makefile +1 -1
index 92e3d80ab8ed..4388494779ec 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
 
-landlock-y := setup.o object.o ruleset.o \
+landlock-y := setup.o syscall.o object.o ruleset.o \
 	cred.o ptrace.o fs.o
security/landlock/syscall.c new file +501 -0

501 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH v16 7/10 arch: Wire up landlock() syscall

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

Wire up the landlock() system call for all architectures.

Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>

---

Changes since v14:
* Add all architectures.

Changes since v13:
* New implementation.

---
 arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl      | 1 +
 arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl                  | 1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h             | 2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h           | 2 ++
 arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl       | 1 +
 arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl       | 1 +
 arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl   | 1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl   | 1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl   | 1 +
 arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl     | 1 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl    | 1 +
 arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl       | 1 +
 arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl         | 1 +
 arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl      | 1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl      | 1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl      | 1 +
 arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl     | 1 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h           | 4 +++-
 19 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 36d42da7466a..424f1f7f4ea8 100644
@@ -477,3 +477,4 @@
 # 545 reserved for clone3
 547	common	openat2				sys_openat2
 548	common	pidfd_getfd			sys_pidfd_getfd
+549	common	landlock			sys_landlock
arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 4d1cf74a2caa..46b49724da4a 100644
@@ -451,3 +451,4 @@
 435	common	clone3				sys_clone3
 437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
 438	common	pidfd_getfd			sys_pidfd_getfd
+439	common	landlock			sys_landlock
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -1
index 803039d504de..3b859596840d 100644
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 #define __ARM_NR_compat_set_tls		(__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 5)
 #define __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END		(__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 0x800)
 
-#define __NR_compat_syscalls		439
+#define __NR_compat_syscalls		440
 #endif
 
 #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h +2 -0
index c1c61635f89c..a24fe33f7c0d 100644
@@ -883,6 +883,8 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_clone3, sys_clone3)
 __SYSCALL(__NR_openat2, sys_openat2)
 #define __NR_pidfd_getfd 438
 __SYSCALL(__NR_pidfd_getfd, sys_pidfd_getfd)
+#define __NR_landlock 439
+__SYSCALL(__NR_landlock, sys_landlock)
 
 /*
  * Please add new compat syscalls above this comment and update
arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 042911e670b8..c311696e0f5f 100644
@@ -358,3 +358,4 @@
 # 435 reserved for clone3
 437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
 438	common	pidfd_getfd			sys_pidfd_getfd
+439	common	landlock			sys_landlock
arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index f4f49fcb76d0..d73a43d235d3 100644
@@ -437,3 +437,4 @@
 435	common	clone3				__sys_clone3
 437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
 438	common	pidfd_getfd			sys_pidfd_getfd
+439	common	landlock			sys_landlock
arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 4c67b11f9c9e..f3927af7716f 100644
@@ -443,3 +443,4 @@
 435	common	clone3				sys_clone3
 437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
 438	common	pidfd_getfd			sys_pidfd_getfd
+439	common	landlock			sys_landlock
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl +1 -0
index 1f9e8ad636cc..e467033ec474 100644
@@ -376,3 +376,4 @@
 435	n32	clone3				__sys_clone3
 437	n32	openat2				sys_openat2
 438	n32	pidfd_getfd			sys_pidfd_getfd
+439	n32	landlock			sys_landlock
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl +1 -0
index c0b9d802dbf6..1930ba6c75b7 100644
@@ -352,3 +352,4 @@
 435	n64	clone3				__sys_clone3
 437	n64	openat2				sys_openat2
 438	n64	pidfd_getfd			sys_pidfd_getfd
+439	n64	landlock			sys_landlock
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl +1 -0
index ac586774c980..0a66f190ae3d 100644
@@ -425,3 +425,4 @@
 435	o32	clone3				__sys_clone3
 437	o32	openat2				sys_openat2
 438	o32	pidfd_getfd			sys_pidfd_getfd
+439	o32	landlock			sys_landlock
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 52a15f5cd130..93ddc36a660e 100644
@@ -435,3 +435,4 @@
 435	common	clone3				sys_clone3_wrapper
 437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
 438	common	pidfd_getfd			sys_pidfd_getfd
+439	common	landlock			sys_landlock
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 220ae11555f2..34ca2cd82d4e 100644
@@ -527,3 +527,4 @@
 435	spu	clone3				sys_ni_syscall
 437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
 438	common	pidfd_getfd			sys_pidfd_getfd
+439	common	landlock			sys_landlock
arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index bd7bd3581a0f..b4233c9c7421 100644
@@ -440,3 +440,4 @@
 435  common	clone3			sys_clone3			sys_clone3
 437  common	openat2			sys_openat2			sys_openat2
 438  common	pidfd_getfd		sys_pidfd_getfd			sys_pidfd_getfd
+439  common	landlock		sys_landlock			sys_landlock
arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index c7a30fcd135f..49fd37c18528 100644
@@ -440,3 +440,4 @@
 # 435 reserved for clone3
 437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
 438	common	pidfd_getfd			sys_pidfd_getfd
+439	common	landlock			sys_landlock
arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index f13615ecdecc..33e2a9d55bdd 100644
@@ -483,3 +483,4 @@
 # 435 reserved for clone3
 437	common	openat2			sys_openat2
 438	common	pidfd_getfd			sys_pidfd_getfd
+439	common	landlock			sys_landlock
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1 -0
index 54581ac671b4..b350580405b3 100644
@@ -442,3 +442,4 @@
 435	i386	clone3			sys_clone3
 437	i386	openat2			sys_openat2
 438	i386	pidfd_getfd		sys_pidfd_getfd
+439	i386	landlock		sys_landlock
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
index 37b844f839bc..b6efdd813978 100644
@@ -359,6 +359,7 @@
 435	common	clone3			sys_clone3
 437	common	openat2			sys_openat2
 438	common	pidfd_getfd		sys_pidfd_getfd
+439	common	landlock		sys_landlock
 
 #
 # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 85a9ab1bc04d..84fc6db485ef 100644
@@ -408,3 +408,4 @@
 435	common	clone3				sys_clone3
 437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
 438	common	pidfd_getfd			sys_pidfd_getfd
+439	common	landlock			sys_landlock
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +3 -1
index 3a3201e4618e..31d5814ddb13 100644
@@ -855,9 +855,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_clone3, sys_clone3)
 __SYSCALL(__NR_openat2, sys_openat2)
 #define __NR_pidfd_getfd 438
 __SYSCALL(__NR_pidfd_getfd, sys_pidfd_getfd)
+#define __NR_landlock 439
+__SYSCALL(__NR_landlock, sys_landlock)
 
 #undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 439
+#define __NR_syscalls 440
 
 /*
  * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH v16 8/10 selftests/landlock: Add initial tests

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

Test landlock syscall, ptrace hooks semantic and filesystem access-control.

Test coverage for security/landlock is 94.1% of lines. The code not covered only deals with internal kernel errors (e.g. memory allocation) and race conditions.

Cc James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc Shuah Khan <[email protected]>

---

Changes since v14:
* Add new tests:
- superset: check new layer bitmask.
- max_layers: check maximum number of layers.
- release_inodes: check that umount work well.
- empty_or_same_ruleset.
- inconsistent_attr: checks copy_to_user limits.
- in ruleset_rw.inval to check ruleset FD.
- proc_unlinked_file: check file access through /proc/self/fd .
- file_access_rights: check that a file can only get consistent access rights.
- unpriv: check that NO_NEW_PRIVS or CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required.
- check pipe access through /proc/self/fd .
- check move_mount(2).
- check ruleset file descriptor properties.
- proc_nsfs: extend to check that internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs) are allowed.
* Double-check read and write effective actions.
* Fix potential desynchronization between the kernel sources and installed headers by overriding the build step in the Makefile. This also enable to build with Clang.
* Add two files in the test directories (for link test and rename test).
* Remove test for ruleset's show_fdinfo().
* Replace EBADR with EBADFD.
* Update tests accordingly to the changes of rename and link rights.
* Fix (now) illegal access rights tied to files.
* Update rename and link tests.
* Remove superfluous '\n' in TH_LOG() calls.
* Make assert calls consistent and readable.
* Fix the execute test.
* Make tests future-proof.
* Cosmetic fixes.

Changes since v14:
* Add new tests:
- Compatibility: empty_attr_{ruleset,path_beneath,enforce} to check minimal attr size.
- Access types: link_to, rename_from, rename_to, rmdir, unlink, make_char, make_block, make_reg, make_sock, make_fifo, make_sym, make_dir, chroot, execute.
- Test privilege escalation prevention by enforcing a nested rule, on a parent directory, with less restrictions than one on a child directory.
- Test for empty and more than 32-bits allowed_access
* Merge the two test mount hierarchies.
* Complete relative path tests by combining chdir and chroot.
* Adjust tests:
- Remove the layout1/extend_ruleset_with_denied_path test.
- Extend layout1/whitelist test with checks on file.
- Add and use create_dir_and_file().
* Only use read/write checks but not stat(2) for tests.
* Rename test.h to common.h and improve it.
* Rename path name to make them more consistent, easy to understand and make them in a common directory.
* Make create_ruleset() more generic.
* Constify variables.
* Re-add static global variables.
* Remove useless openat(2).
* Fix and complete kernel config.
* Set umask and clean up file modes.
* Clean up open flags.
* Improve Makefile.
* Fix spelling.
* Improve comments and error messages.

Changes since v13:
* Add back the filesystem tests (from v10) and extend them.
* Add tests for the new syscall.

Previous changes:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 tools/testing/selftests/Makefile              |    1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore   |    4 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile     |   29 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h     |   42 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config       |    5 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c  |  156 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c    | 1696 +++++++++++++++++
 .../testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c  |  291 +++
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c       |    5 +
 9 files changed, 2229 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile +1 -0
index 2ff68702fd41..725611ca8dfd 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ TARGETS += ir
 TARGETS += kcmp
 TARGETS += kexec
 TARGETS += kvm
+TARGETS += landlock
 TARGETS += lib
 TARGETS += livepatch
 TARGETS += lkdtm
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore new file +4 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fd081d6ef7c0
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+/test_base
+/test_fs
+/test_ptrace
+/true
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile new file +29 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b28afbc74e98
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+test_src := $(wildcard test_*.c)
+
+TEST_GEN_PROGS := $(test_src:.c=)
+
+TEST_GEN_PROGS_EXTENDED := true
+
+KSFT_KHDR_INSTALL := 1
+OVERRIDE_TARGETS := 1
+include ../lib.mk
+
+# Cf. tools/testing/selftests/arm64/Makefile
+ifeq ($(KBUILD_OUTPUT),)
+khdr_dir = $(top_srcdir)/usr/include
+else
+khdr_dir = $(KBUILD_OUTPUT)/kselftest/usr/include
+endif
+
+CFLAGS += -Wall -O2
+
+$(khdr_dir)/linux/landlock.h: khdr
+	@:
+
+$(OUTPUT)/true: true.c
+	$(LINK.c) $< $(LDLIBS) -o $@ -static
+
+$(OUTPUT)/test_%:test_%.c $(khdr_dir)/linux/landlock.h ../kselftest_harness.h common.h
+	$(LINK.c) $< $(LDLIBS) -o $@ -lcap -I$(khdr_dir)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h new file +42 -0

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tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config new file +5 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..042298105821
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY=y
+CONFIG_SHMEM=y
+CONFIG_TMPFS=y
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c new file +156 -0

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tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c new file +1696 -0

1,696 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c new file +291 -0

291 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c new file +5 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3f9ccbf52783
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+int main(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH v16 9/10 samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

Add a basic sandbox tool to launch a command which can only access a whitelist of file hierarchies in a read-only or read-write way.

Cc James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>

---

Changes since v15:
* Update access right names.
* Properly assign access right to files according to the new related syscall restriction.
* Replace "select" with "depends on" HEADERS_INSTALL (suggested by Randy Dunlap).

Changes since v14:
* Fix Kconfig dependency.
* Remove access rights that may be required for FD-only requests:
mmap, truncate, getattr, lock, chmod, chown, chgrp, ioctl.
* Fix useless hardcoded syscall number.
* Use execvpe().
* Follow symlinks.
* Extend help with common file paths.
* Constify variables.
* Clean up comments.
* Improve error message.

Changes since v11:
* Add back the filesystem sandbox manager and update it to work with the new Landlock syscall.

Previous changes:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 samples/Kconfig              |   7 ++
 samples/Makefile             |   1 +
 samples/landlock/.gitignore  |   1 +
 samples/landlock/Makefile    |  15 +++
 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 228 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 252 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 samples/landlock/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 samples/landlock/Makefile
 create mode 100644 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
samples/Kconfig +7 -0
index 9d236c346de5..5ec43a732b10 100644
@@ -120,6 +120,13 @@ config SAMPLE_HIDRAW
 	bool "hidraw sample"
 	depends on HEADERS_INSTALL
 
+config SAMPLE_LANDLOCK
+	bool "Build Landlock sample code"
+	depends on HEADERS_INSTALL
+	help
+	  Build a simple Landlock sandbox manager able to launch a process
+	  restricted by a user-defined filesystem access-control security policy.
+
 config SAMPLE_PIDFD
 	bool "pidfd sample"
 	depends on HEADERS_INSTALL
samples/Makefile +1 -0
index f8f847b4f61f..61a2bd216f53 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KDB)		+= kdb/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KFIFO)		+= kfifo/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KOBJECT)		+= kobject/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KPROBES)		+= kprobes/
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_LANDLOCK)	+= landlock
 obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_LIVEPATCH)		+= livepatch/
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_PIDFD)		+= pidfd
 obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_QMI_CLIENT)		+= qmi/
samples/landlock/.gitignore new file +1 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f43668b2d318
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/sandboxer
samples/landlock/Makefile new file +15 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9dfb571641ba
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+
+hostprogs-y := sandboxer
+
+always := $(hostprogs-y)
+
+KBUILD_HOSTCFLAGS += -I$(objtree)/usr/include
+
+.PHONY: all clean
+
+all:
+	$(MAKE) -C ../.. samples/landlock/
+
+clean:
+	$(MAKE) -C ../.. M=samples/landlock/ clean
samples/landlock/sandboxer.c new file +228 -0

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Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH v16 10/10 landlock: Add user and kernel documentation

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

This documentation can be built with the Sphinx framework.

---

Changes since v15:
* Add current limitations.

Changes since v14:
* Fix spelling (contributed by Randy Dunlap).
* Extend documentation about inheritance and explain layer levels.
* Remove the use of now-removed access rights.
* Use GitHub links.
* Improve kernel documentation.
* Add section for tests.
* Update example.

Changes since v13:
* Rewrote the documentation according to the major revamp.

Previous changes:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 Documentation/security/index.rst           |   1 +
 Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst  |  18 ++
 Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst |  69 ++++++
 Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst   | 268 +++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 356 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst
Documentation/security/index.rst +1 -0
index fc503dd689a7..4d213e76ddf4 100644
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ Security Documentation
    self-protection
    siphash
    tpm/index
+   landlock/index
Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst new file +18 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2520f8f33f5e
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+=========================================
+Landlock LSM: unprivileged access control
+=========================================
+
+:Author: Mickaël Salaün
+
+The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.  global
+filesystem access) for a set of processes.  Because Landlock is a stackable
+LSM, it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers
+in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox
+is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or
+unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers
+any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves.
+
+.. toctree::
+
+    user
+    kernel
Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst new file +69 -0

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Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst new file +268 -0

268 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.26.1