4.19.118-rc1 review
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 4.19.118-rc1 review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.118 release. There are 64 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Fri, 24 Apr 2020 09:48:23 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.118-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.19.118-rc1
Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
bpf: fix buggy r0 retval refinement for tracing helpers
Waiman Long <[email protected]>
KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore
Wen Yang <[email protected]>
mtd: phram: fix a double free issue in error path
Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
mtd: lpddr: Fix a double free in probe()
Frieder Schrempf <[email protected]>
mtd: spinand: Explicitly use MTD_OPS_RAW to write the bad block marker to OOB
Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
locktorture: Print ratio of acquisitions, not failures
Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]>
tty: evh_bytechan: Fix out of bounds accesses
Maxime Roussin-Bélanger <[email protected]>
iio: si1133: read 24-bit signed integer for measurement
Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
fbdev: potential information leak in do_fb_ioctl()
Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Fix overflow checks
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix to wait all node page writeback
Adrian Huang <[email protected]>
iommu/amd: Fix the configuration of GCR3 table root pointer
Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
libnvdimm: Out of bounds read in __nd_ioctl()
Jeffery Miller <[email protected]>
power: supply: axp288_fuel_gauge: Broaden vendor check for Intel Compute Sticks.
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
ext2: fix debug reference to ext2_xattr_cache
Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
ext2: fix empty body warnings when -Wextra is used
Jacob Pan <[email protected]>
iommu/vt-d: Fix mm reference leak
Nicolas Saenz Julienne <[email protected]>
drm/vc4: Fix HDMI mode validation
Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix NULL pointer dereference in f2fs_write_begin()
Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
NFS: Fix memory leaks in nfs_pageio_stop_mirroring()
Jack Zhang <[email protected]>
drm/amdkfd: kfree the wrong pointer
Qian Cai <[email protected]>
x86: ACPI: fix CPU hotplug deadlock
David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
KVM: s390: vsie: Fix possible race when shadowing region 3 tables
Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
compiler.h: fix error in BUILD_BUG_ON() reporting
Qian Cai <[email protected]>
percpu_counter: fix a data race at vm_committed_as
Steven Price <[email protected]>
include/linux/swapops.h: correct guards for non_swap_entry()
Long Li <[email protected]>
cifs: Allocate encryption header through kmalloc
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>
um: ubd: Prevent buffer overrun on command completion
Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
ext4: do not commit super on read-only bdev
Thomas Richter <[email protected]>
s390/cpum_sf: Fix wrong page count in error message
Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
powerpc/maple: Fix declaration made after definition
Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
s390/cpuinfo: fix wrong output when CPU0 is offline
Misono Tomohiro <[email protected]>
NFS: direct.c: Fix memory leak of dreq when nfs_get_lock_context fails
Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
NFSv4/pnfs: Return valid stateids in nfs_layout_find_inode_by_stateid()
Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>
rtc: 88pm860x: fix possible race condition
Lucas Stach <[email protected]>
soc: imx: gpc: fix power up sequencing
Sowjanya Komatineni <[email protected]>
clk: tegra: Fix Tegra PMC clock out parents
Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>
power: supply: bq27xxx_battery: Silence deferred-probe error
Claudiu Beznea <[email protected]>
clk: at91: usb: continue if clk_hw_round_rate() return zero
Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
x86/Hyper-V: Report crash data in die() when panic_on_oops is set
Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
x86/Hyper-V: Report crash register data when sysctl_record_panic_msg is not set
Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
x86/Hyper-V: Trigger crash enlightenment only once during system crash.
Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
x86/Hyper-V: Free hv_panic_page when fail to register kmsg dump
Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
x86/Hyper-V: Unload vmbus channel in hv panic callback
Magnus Karlsson <[email protected]>
xsk: Add missing check on user supplied headroom size
Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
rbd: call rbd_dev_unprobe() after unwatching and flushing notifies
Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
rbd: avoid a deadlock on header_rwsem when flushing notifies
Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
video: fbdev: sis: Remove unnecessary parentheses and commented code
[email protected] <[email protected]>
lib/raid6: use vdupq_n_u8 to avoid endianness warnings
Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
x86/Hyper-V: Report crash register data or kmsg before running crash kernel
Frank Rowand <[email protected]>
of: overlay: kmemleak in dup_and_fixup_symbol_prop()
Frank Rowand <[email protected]>
of: unittest: kmemleak in of_unittest_overlay_high_level()
Frank Rowand <[email protected]>
of: unittest: kmemleak in of_unittest_platform_populate()
Frank Rowand <[email protected]>
of: unittest: kmemleak on changeset destroy
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda: Don't release card at firmware loading error
Zenghui Yu <[email protected]>
irqchip/mbigen: Free msi_desc on device teardown
Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
netfilter: nf_tables: report EOPNOTSUPP on unsupported flags/object type
Martin Fuzzey <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: imx6: Use gpc for FEC interrupt controller to fix wake on LAN.
Luke Nelson <[email protected]>
arm, bpf: Fix bugs with ALU64 {RSH, ARSH} BPF_K shift by 0
Michael Walle <[email protected]>
watchdog: sp805: fix restart handler
Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
ext4: use non-movable memory for superblock readahead
Li Bin <[email protected]>
scsi: sg: add sg_remove_request in sg_common_write
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
objtool: Fix switch table detection in .text.unlikely
Luke Nelson <[email protected]>
arm, bpf: Fix offset overflow for BPF_MEM BPF_DW
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi | 5 +-- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qp.dtsi | 1 - arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c | 52 +++++++++++++++-------- arch/powerpc/platforms/maple/setup.c | 34 +++++++-------- arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/processor.c | 5 ++- arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 1 + arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c | 4 +- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 6 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cstate.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 10 +++++ drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c | 7 --- drivers/block/rbd.c | 25 +++++++---- drivers/clk/at91/clk-usb.c | 3 ++ drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra-pmc.c | 12 +++--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device.c | 4 +- drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c | 20 +++++++-- drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 3 ++ drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++------- drivers/iio/light/si1133.c | 37 ++++++++++------ drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h | 2 +- drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c | 7 +-- drivers/irqchip/irq-mbigen.c | 8 +++- drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c | 15 ++++--- drivers/mtd/lpddr/lpddr_cmds.c | 1 - drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c | 1 + drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c | 9 ++-- drivers/nvdimm/bus.c | 6 ++- drivers/of/overlay.c | 2 + drivers/of/unittest.c | 16 +++++-- drivers/power/supply/axp288_fuel_gauge.c | 4 +- drivers/power/supply/bq27xxx_battery.c | 5 ++- drivers/rtc/rtc-88pm860x.c | 14 +++--- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 4 +- drivers/soc/imx/gpc.c | 24 ++++++----- drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c | 21 +++++++-- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 2 +- drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c | 4 +- drivers/watchdog/sp805_wdt.c | 4 ++ fs/buffer.c | 11 +++++ fs/cifs/transport.c | 28 +++++++----- fs/ext2/xattr.c | 8 ++-- fs/ext4/inode.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/super.c | 5 ++- fs/f2fs/node.c | 7 +-- fs/f2fs/super.c | 5 ++- fs/nfs/callback_proc.c | 2 + fs/nfs/direct.c | 2 + fs/nfs/pagelist.c | 17 ++++---- include/acpi/processor.h | 8 ++++ include/keys/big_key-type.h | 2 +- include/keys/user-type.h | 3 +- include/linux/buffer_head.h | 8 ++++ include/linux/compiler.h | 2 +- include/linux/key-type.h | 2 +- include/linux/percpu_counter.h | 4 +- include/linux/swapops.h | 3 +- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 45 +++++++++++++++----- kernel/locking/locktorture.c | 8 ++-- lib/raid6/neon.uc | 5 +-- lib/raid6/recov_neon_inner.c | 7 +-- net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 4 +- net/rxrpc/key.c | 27 ++++-------- net/xdp/xdp_umem.c | 5 +-- security/keys/big_key.c | 11 ++--- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 7 ++- security/keys/keyctl.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- security/keys/keyring.c | 6 +-- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 7 ++- security/keys/trusted.c | 14 +----- security/keys/user_defined.c | 5 +-- sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 19 +++------ tools/objtool/check.c | 5 +-- 76 files changed, 508 insertions(+), 309 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/64 arm, bpf: Fix offset overflow for BPF_MEM BPF_DW
From: Luke Nelson <[email protected]>
commit 4178417cc5359c329790a4a8f4a6604612338cca upstream.
This patch fixes an incorrect check in how immediate memory offsets are computed for BPF_DW on arm.
For BPF_LDX/ST/STX + BPF_DW, the 32-bit arm JIT breaks down an 8-byte access into two separate 4-byte accesses using off+0 and off+4. If off fits in imm12, the JIT emits a ldr/str instruction with the immediate and avoids the use of a temporary register. While the current check off <= 0xfff ensures that the first immediate off+0 doesn't overflow imm12, it's not sufficient for the second immediate off+4, which may cause the second access of BPF_DW to read/write the wrong address.
This patch fixes the problem by changing the check to off <= 0xfff - 4 for BPF_DW, ensuring off+4 will never overflow.
A side effect of simplifying the check is that it now allows using negative immediate offsets in ldr/str. This means that small negative offsets can also avoid the use of a temporary register.
This patch introduces no new failures in test_verifier or test_bpf.c.
--- arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c +24 -16
@@ -993,21 +993,35 @@ static inline void emit_a32_mul_r64(consarm_bpf_put_reg32 (dst_hi, rd[0 ], ctx); } +static bool is_ldst_imm (s16 off,const u8 size) +{ +s16 off_max =0 ; + +switch (size) { +case BPF_B : +case BPF_W : + off_max =0xfff ; +break ; +case BPF_H : + off_max =0xff ; +break ; +case BPF_DW : +/* Need to make sure off+4 does not overflow. */ + off_max =0xfff -4 ; +break ; + } +return -off_max <= off && off <= off_max; +} +/* *(size *)(dst + off) = src */ static inline void emit_str_r (const s8 dst,const s8 src[], -s32 off,struct jit_ctx *ctx,const u8 sz){ +s16 off,struct jit_ctx *ctx,const u8 sz){const s8 *tmp = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_1 ]; -s32 off_max;s8 rd; rd =arm_bpf_get_reg32 (dst, tmp[1 ], ctx); -if (sz ==BPF_H ) - off_max =0xff ; -else - off_max =0xfff ; - -if (off <0 || off > off_max) { +if (!is_ldst_imm (off, sz)) {emit_a32_mov_i (tmp[0 ], off, ctx);emit (ARM_ADD_R (tmp[0 ], tmp[0 ], rd), ctx); rd = tmp[0 ];
@@ -1036,18 +1050,12 @@ static inline void emit_str_r(const s8 d/* dst = *(size*)(src + off) */ static inline void emit_ldx_r (const s8 dst[],const s8 src, -s32 off,struct jit_ctx *ctx,const u8 sz){ +s16 off,struct jit_ctx *ctx,const u8 sz){const s8 *tmp = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_1 ];const s8 *rd =is_stacked (dst_lo) ? tmp : dst;s8 rm = src; -s32 off_max; - -if (sz ==BPF_H ) - off_max =0xff ; -else - off_max =0xfff ; -if (off <0 || off > off_max) { +if (!is_ldst_imm (off, sz)) {emit_a32_mov_i (tmp[0 ], off, ctx);emit (ARM_ADD_R (tmp[0 ], tmp[0 ], src), ctx); rm = tmp[0 ];
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/64 objtool: Fix switch table detection in .text.unlikely
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
commit b401efc120a399dfda1f4d2858a4de365c9b08ef upstream.
If a switch jump table's indirect branch is in a ".cold" subfunction in .text.unlikely, objtool doesn't detect it, and instead prints a false warning:
drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.o: warning: objtool: v4l_print_format.cold()+0xd6: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame drivers/hwmon/max6650.o: warning: objtool: max6650_probe.cold()+0xa5: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame drivers/media/dvb-frontends/drxk_hard.o: warning: objtool: init_drxk.cold()+0x16f: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame
Fix it by comparing the function, instead of the section and offset.
--- tools/objtool/check.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
tools/objtool/check.c +1 -4
@@ -938,10 +938,7 @@ static struct rela *find_switch_table(st* it. */ for (; - &insn->list != &file->insn_list && - insn->sec == func->sec && - insn->offset >= func->offset; - + &insn->list != &file->insn_list && insn->func && insn->func->pfunc == func; insn = insn->first_jump_src ?:list_prev_entry (insn, list)) {if (insn != orig_insn && insn->type ==INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/64 scsi: sg: add sg_remove_request in sg_common_write
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Li Bin <[email protected]>
commit 849f8583e955dbe3a1806e03ecacd5e71cce0a08 upstream.
If the dxfer_len is greater than 256M then the request is invalid and we need to call sg_remove_request in sg_common_write.
--- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/sg.c +3 -1
@@ -808,8 +808,10 @@ sg_common_write(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request"sg_common_write: scsi opcode=0x%02x, cmd_size=%d\n" , (int) cmnd[0], (int) hp->cmd_len)); -if (hp->dxfer_len >=SZ_256M ) +if (hp->dxfer_len >=SZ_256M ) { +sg_remove_request (sfp, srp);return -EINVAL ; + } k =sg_start_req (srp, cmnd);if (k) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/64 ext4: use non-movable memory for superblock readahead
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
commit d87f639258a6a5980183f11876c884931ad93da2 upstream.
Since commit a8ac900b8163 ("ext4: use non-movable memory for the superblock") buffers for ext4 superblock were allocated using the sb_bread_unmovable() helper which allocated buffer heads out of non-movable memory blocks. It was necessarily to not block page migrations and do not cause cma allocation failures.
However commit 85c8f176a611 ("ext4: preload block group descriptors") broke this by introducing pre-reading of the ext4 superblock. The problem is that __breadahead() is using __getblk() underneath, which allocates buffer heads out of movable memory.
It resulted in page migration failures I've seen on a machine with an ext4 partition and a preallocated cma area.
Fix this by introducing sb_breadahead_unmovable() and __breadahead_gfp() helpers which use non-movable memory for buffer head allocations and use them for the ext4 superblock readahead.
--- fs/buffer.c | 11 +++++++++++ fs/ext4/inode.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/super.c | 2 +- include/linux/buffer_head.h | 8 ++++++++ 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/buffer.c +11 -0
@@ -1336,6 +1336,17 @@ void __breadahead(struct block_device *b }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__breadahead); +void __breadahead_gfp (struct block_device *bdev,sector_t block,unsigned size, +gfp_t gfp) +{ +struct buffer_head *bh =__getblk_gfp (bdev, block, size, gfp); +if (likely (bh)) { +ll_rw_block (REQ_OP_READ ,REQ_RAHEAD ,1 , &bh); +brelse (bh); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__breadahead_gfp); +/** * __bread_gfp() - reads a specified block and returns the bh * @bdev: the block_device to read from
fs/ext4/inode.c +1 -1
@@ -4690,7 +4690,7 @@ make_io:if (end > table) end = table;while (b <= end) -sb_breadahead (sb, b++); +sb_breadahead_unmovable (sb, b++); }/*
fs/ext4/super.c +1 -1
@@ -4207,7 +4207,7 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_/* Pre-read the descriptors into the buffer cache */ for (i =0 ; i < db_count; i++) { block =descriptor_loc (sb, logical_sb_block, i); -sb_breadahead (sb, block); +sb_breadahead_unmovable (sb, block); }for (i =0 ; i < db_count; i++) {
include/linux/buffer_head.h +8 -0
@@ -189,6 +189,8 @@ struct buffer_head *__getblk_gfp(structvoid __brelse (struct buffer_head *);void __bforget (struct buffer_head *);void __breadahead (struct block_device *,sector_t block,unsigned int size); +void __breadahead_gfp (struct block_device *,sector_t block,unsigned int size, +gfp_t gfp);struct buffer_head *__bread_gfp (struct block_device *,sector_t block,unsigned size,gfp_t gfp);void invalidate_bh_lrus (void );
@@ -319,6 +321,12 @@ sb_breadahead(struct super_block *sb, se__breadahead (sb->s_bdev, block, sb->s_blocksize); } +static inline void +sb_breadahead_unmovable (struct super_block *sb,sector_t block) +{ +__breadahead_gfp (sb->s_bdev, block, sb->s_blocksize,0 ); +} +static inline struct buffer_head *sb_getblk (struct super_block *sb,sector_t block) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/64 watchdog: sp805: fix restart handler
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Michael Walle <[email protected]>
commit ea104a9e4d3e9ebc26fb78dac35585b142ee288b upstream.
The restart handler is missing two things, first, the registers has to be unlocked and second there is no synchronization for the write_relaxed() calls.
This was tested on a custom board with the NXP LS1028A SoC.
--- drivers/watchdog/sp805_wdt.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/watchdog/sp805_wdt.c +4 -0
@@ -137,10 +137,14 @@ wdt_restart(struct watchdog_device *wdd, {struct sp805_wdt *wdt =watchdog_get_drvdata (wdd); +writel_relaxed (UNLOCK , wdt->base +WDTLOCK );writel_relaxed (0 , wdt->base +WDTCONTROL );writel_relaxed (0 , wdt->base +WDTLOAD );writel_relaxed (INT_ENABLE |RESET_ENABLE , wdt->base +WDTCONTROL ); +/* Flush posted writes. */ +readl_relaxed (wdt->base +WDTLOCK ); +return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/64 arm, bpf: Fix bugs with ALU64 {RSH, ARSH} BPF_K shift by 0
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Luke Nelson <[email protected]>
commit bb9562cf5c67813034c96afb50bd21130a504441 upstream.
The current arm BPF JIT does not correctly compile RSH or ARSH when the immediate shift amount is 0. This causes the "rsh64 by 0 imm" and "arsh64 by 0 imm" BPF selftests to hang the kernel by reaching an instruction the verifier determines to be unreachable.
The root cause is in how immediate right shifts are encoded on arm. For LSR and ASR (logical and arithmetic right shift), a bit-pattern of 00000 in the immediate encodes a shift amount of 32. When the BPF immediate is 0, the generated code shifts by 32 instead of the expected behavior (a no-op).
This patch fixes the bugs by adding an additional check if the BPF immediate is 0. After the change, the above mentioned BPF selftests pass.
--- arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c +10 -2
@@ -930,7 +930,11 @@ static inline void emit_a32_rsh_i64(cons rd =arm_bpf_get_reg64 (dst, tmp, ctx);/* Do LSR operation */ -if (val <32 ) { +if (val ==0 ) { +/* An immediate value of 0 encodes a shift amount of 32 +* for LSR. To shift by 0, don't do anything. +*/ + }else if (val <32 ) {emit (ARM_MOV_SI (tmp2[1 ], rd[1 ],SRTYPE_LSR , val), ctx);emit (ARM_ORR_SI (rd[1 ], tmp2[1 ], rd[0 ],SRTYPE_ASL ,32 - val), ctx);emit (ARM_MOV_SI (rd[0 ], rd[0 ],SRTYPE_LSR , val), ctx);
@@ -956,7 +960,11 @@ static inline void emit_a32_arsh_i64(con rd =arm_bpf_get_reg64 (dst, tmp, ctx);/* Do ARSH operation */ -if (val <32 ) { +if (val ==0 ) { +/* An immediate value of 0 encodes a shift amount of 32 +* for ASR. To shift by 0, don't do anything. +*/ + }else if (val <32 ) {emit (ARM_MOV_SI (tmp2[1 ], rd[1 ],SRTYPE_LSR , val), ctx);emit (ARM_ORR_SI (rd[1 ], tmp2[1 ], rd[0 ],SRTYPE_ASL ,32 - val), ctx);emit (ARM_MOV_SI (rd[0 ], rd[0 ],SRTYPE_ASR , val), ctx);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/64 ARM: dts: imx6: Use gpc for FEC interrupt controller to fix wake on LAN.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Martin Fuzzey <[email protected]>
commit 4141f1a40fc0789f6fd4330e171e1edf155426aa upstream.
In order to wake from suspend by ethernet magic packets the GPC must be used as intc does not have wakeup functionality.
But the FEC DT node currently uses interrupt-extended, specificying intc, thus breaking WoL.
This problem is probably fallout from the stacked domain conversion as intc used to chain to GPC.
So replace "interrupts-extended" by "interrupts" to use the default parent which is GPC.
--- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi | 5 ++--- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qp.dtsi | 1 - 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi +2 -3
@@ -1013,9 +1013,8 @@ compatible = "fsl,imx6q-fec"; reg = <0x02188000 0x4000>; interrupt-names = "int0", "pps"; - interrupts-extended = - <&intc 0 118 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, - <&intc 0 119 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; + interrupts = <0 118 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, + <0 119 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; clocks = <&clks IMX6QDL_CLK_ENET>, <&clks IMX6QDL_CLK_ENET>, <&clks IMX6QDL_CLK_ENET_REF>;
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qp.dtsi +0 -1
@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ }; &fec { - /delete-property/interrupts-extended; interrupts = <0 118 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, <0 119 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/64 netfilter: nf_tables: report EOPNOTSUPP on unsupported flags/object type
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
commit d9583cdf2f38d0f526d9a8c8564dd2e35e649bc7 upstream.
EINVAL should be used for malformed netlink messages. New userspace utility and old kernels might easily result in EINVAL when exercising new set features, which is misleading.
--- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +2 -2
@@ -3450,7 +3450,7 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct net *NFT_SET_INTERVAL |NFT_SET_TIMEOUT |NFT_SET_MAP |NFT_SET_EVAL | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) - return -EINVAL; + return -EOPNOTSUPP;/* Only one of these operations is supported */ if ((flags & (NFT_SET_MAP |NFT_SET_OBJECT )) == (NFT_SET_MAP |NFT_SET_OBJECT ))
@@ -3488,7 +3488,7 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct net * objtype =ntohl (nla_get_be32 (nla[NFTA_SET_OBJ_TYPE ]));if (objtype ==NFT_OBJECT_UNSPEC || objtype >NFT_OBJECT_MAX ) -return -EINVAL ; +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }else if (flags &NFT_SET_OBJECT )return -EINVAL ;else
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/64 irqchip/mbigen: Free msi_desc on device teardown
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Zenghui Yu <[email protected]>
commit edfc23f6f9fdbd7825d50ac1f380243cde19b679 upstream.
Using irq_domain_free_irqs_common() on the irqdomain free path will leave the MSI descriptor unfreed when platform devices get removed. Properly free it by MSI domain free function.
--- drivers/irqchip/irq-mbigen.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/irqchip/irq-mbigen.c +7 -1
@@ -231,10 +231,16 @@ static int mbigen_irq_domain_alloc(strucreturn 0 ; } +static void mbigen_irq_domain_free (struct irq_domain *domain,unsigned int virq, +unsigned int nr_irqs) +{ +platform_msi_domain_free (domain, virq, nr_irqs); +} +static const struct irq_domain_ops mbigen_domain_ops = { .translate = mbigen_domain_translate, .alloc = mbigen_irq_domain_alloc, - .free = irq_domain_free_irqs_common, + .free = mbigen_irq_domain_free, }; static int mbigen_of_create_domain(struct platform_device *pdev,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/64 ALSA: hda: Dont release card at firmware loading error
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 25faa4bd37c10f19e4b848b9032a17a3d44c6f09 upstream.
At the error path of the firmware loading error, the driver tries to release the card object and set NULL to drvdata. This may be referred badly at the possible PM action, as the driver itself is still bound and the PM callbacks read the card object.
Instead, we continue the probing as if it were no option set. This is often a better choice than the forced abort, too.
--- sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 19 +++++-------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c +5 -14
@@ -2076,24 +2076,15 @@ static void azx_firmware_cb(const struct {struct snd_card *card = context;struct azx *chip = card->private_data; -struct pci_dev *pci = chip->pci; -if (!fw) { -dev_err (card->dev,"Cannot load firmware, aborting\n" ); - goto error; - } - - chip->fw = fw; +if (fw) + chip->fw = fw; +else +dev_err (card->dev,"Cannot load firmware, continue without patching\n" );if (!chip->disabled) {/* continue probing */ -if (azx_probe_continue (chip)) - goto error; +azx_probe_continue (chip); } -return ;/* OK */ - - error: -snd_card_free (card); -pci_set_drvdata (pci,NULL ); }#endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/64 of: unittest: kmemleak on changeset destroy
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Frank Rowand <[email protected]>
commit b3fb36ed694b05738d45218ea72cf7feb10ce2b1 upstream.
kmemleak reports several memory leaks from devicetree unittest. This is the fix for problem 1 of 5.
of_unittest_changeset() reaches deeply into the dynamic devicetree functions. Several nodes were left with an elevated reference count and thus were not properly cleaned up. Fix the reference counts so that the memory will be freed.
--- drivers/of/unittest.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/of/unittest.c +4 -0
@@ -772,6 +772,10 @@ static void __init of_unittest_changesetunittest (!of_changeset_revert (&chgset),"revert failed\n" );of_changeset_destroy (&chgset); + +of_node_put (n1); +of_node_put (n2); +of_node_put (n21);#endif }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/64 of: unittest: kmemleak in of_unittest_platform_populate()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Frank Rowand <[email protected]>
commit 216830d2413cc61be3f76bc02ffd905e47d2439e upstream.
kmemleak reports several memory leaks from devicetree unittest. This is the fix for problem 2 of 5.
of_unittest_platform_populate() left an elevated reference count for grandchild nodes (which are platform devices). Fix the platform device reference counts so that the memory will be freed.
--- drivers/of/unittest.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/of/unittest.c +5 -2
@@ -1059,10 +1059,13 @@ static void __init of_unittest_platform_of_platform_populate (np, match,NULL , &test_bus->dev);for_each_child_of_node (np, child) { -for_each_child_of_node (child, grandchild) -unittest (of_find_device_by_node (grandchild), +for_each_child_of_node (child, grandchild) { + pdev =of_find_device_by_node (grandchild); +unittest (pdev,"Could not create device for node '%pOFn'\n" , grandchild); +of_dev_put (pdev); + } }of_platform_depopulate (&test_bus->dev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/64 of: unittest: kmemleak in of_unittest_overlay_high_level()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Frank Rowand <[email protected]>
commit 145fc138f9aae4f9e1331352e301df28e16aed35 upstream.
kmemleak reports several memory leaks from devicetree unittest. This is the fix for problem 3 of 5.
of_unittest_overlay_high_level() failed to kfree the newly created property when the property named 'name' is skipped.
--- drivers/of/unittest.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/of/unittest.c +4 -1
@@ -2448,8 +2448,11 @@ static __init void of_unittest_overlay_h goto err_unlock; }if (__of_add_property (of_symbols, new_prop)) { +kfree (new_prop->name); +kfree (new_prop->value); +kfree (new_prop);/* "name" auto-generated by unflatten */ -if (!strcmp (new_prop->name,"name" )) +if (!strcmp (prop->name,"name" ))continue ;unittest (0 ,"duplicate property '%s' in overlay_base node __symbols__" , prop->name);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/64 of: overlay: kmemleak in dup_and_fixup_symbol_prop()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Frank Rowand <[email protected]>
commit 478ff649b1c8eb2409b1a54fb75eb46f7c29f140 upstream.
kmemleak reports several memory leaks from devicetree unittest. This is the fix for problem 4 of 5.
target_path was not freed in the non-error path.
--- drivers/of/overlay.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/of/overlay.c +2 -0
@@ -261,6 +261,8 @@ static struct property *dup_and_fixup_syof_property_set_flag (new_prop,OF_DYNAMIC ); +kfree (target_path); +return new_prop; err_free_new_prop:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/64 x86/Hyper-V: Report crash register data or kmsg before running crash kernel
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
commit a11589563e96bf262767294b89b25a9d44e7303b upstream.
We want to notify Hyper-V when a Linux guest VM crash occurs, so
there is a record of the crash even when kdump is enabled. Butcrash_kexec_post_notifiers defaults to "false", so the kdump kernel runs before the notifiers and Hyper-V never gets notified. Fix this by always setting crash_kexec_post_notifiers to be true for Hyper-V VMs.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +10 -0
@@ -250,6 +250,16 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platfocpuid_eax (HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES ); } +/* +* Hyper-V expects to get crash register data or kmsg when +* crash enlightment is available and system crashes. Set +* crash_kexec_post_notifiers to be true to make sure that +* calling crash enlightment interface before running kdump +* kernel. +*/ +if (ms_hyperv.misc_features &HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE ) + crash_kexec_post_notifiers = true; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC if (ms_hyperv.features &HV_X64_ACCESS_FREQUENCY_MSRS && ms_hyperv.misc_features &HV_FEATURE_FREQUENCY_MSRS_AVAILABLE ) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/64 lib/raid6: use vdupq_n_u8 to avoid endianness warnings
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: [email protected] <[email protected]>
commit 1ad3935b39da78a403e7df7a3813f866c731bc64 upstream.
Clang warns: vector initializers are not compatible with NEON intrinsics in big endian mode [-Wnonportable-vector-initialization]
While this is usually the case, it's not an issue for this case since we're initializing the uint8x16_t (16x uint8_t's) with the same value.
Instead, use vdupq_n_u8 which both compilers lower into a single movi
instruction: https://godbolt.org/z/vBrgzt
This avoids the static storage for a constant value.
--- lib/raid6/neon.uc | 5 ++--- lib/raid6/recov_neon_inner.c | 7 ++----- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
lib/raid6/neon.uc +2 -3
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ typedef uint8x16_t unative_t; -#define NBYTES(x) ((unative_t){x,x,x,x, x,x,x,x, x,x,x,x, x,x,x,x}) #define NSIZE sizeof(unative_t) /*
@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ void raid6_neon$#_gen_syndrome_real(int int d, z, z0; register unative_t wd$$, wq$$, wp$$, w1$$, w2$$; - const unative_t x1d = NBYTES(0x1d); + const unative_t x1d = vdupq_n_u8(0x1d); z0 = disks - 3; /* Highest data disk */ p = dptr[z0+1]; /* XOR parity */
@@ -92,7 +91,7 @@ void raid6_neon$#_xor_syndrome_real(int int d, z, z0; register unative_t wd$$, wq$$, wp$$, w1$$, w2$$; - const unative_t x1d = NBYTES(0x1d); + const unative_t x1d = vdupq_n_u8(0x1d); z0 = stop; /* P/Q right side optimization */ p = dptr[disks-2]; /* XOR parity */
lib/raid6/recov_neon_inner.c +2 -5
@@ -10,11 +10,6 @@#include <arm_neon.h> -static const uint8x16_t x0f = { -0x0f ,0x0f ,0x0f ,0x0f ,0x0f ,0x0f ,0x0f ,0x0f , -0x0f ,0x0f ,0x0f ,0x0f ,0x0f ,0x0f ,0x0f ,0x0f , -}; -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM /* * AArch32 does not provide this intrinsic natively because it does not
@@ -41,6 +36,7 @@ void __raid6_2data_recov_neon(int bytes,uint8x16_t pm1 =vld1q_u8 (pbmul +16 );uint8x16_t qm0 =vld1q_u8 (qmul);uint8x16_t qm1 =vld1q_u8 (qmul +16 ); +uint8x16_t x0f =vdupq_n_u8 (0x0f );/* * while ( bytes-- ) {
@@ -87,6 +83,7 @@ void __raid6_datap_recov_neon(int bytes, {uint8x16_t qm0 =vld1q_u8 (qmul);uint8x16_t qm1 =vld1q_u8 (qmul +16 ); +uint8x16_t x0f =vdupq_n_u8 (0x0f );/* * while (bytes--) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 17/64 video: fbdev: sis: Remove unnecessary parentheses and commented code
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
commit 864eb1afc60cb43e7df879b97f8ca0d719bbb735 upstream.
Clang warns when multiple pairs of parentheses are used for a single conditional statement.
drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c:851:42: warning: equality comparison with extraneous parentheses [-Wparentheses-equality]
} else if((SiS_Pr->SiS_IF_DEF_LVDS == 1) /* ||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c:851:42: note: remove extraneous parentheses around the comparison to silence this warning
} else if((SiS_Pr->SiS_IF_DEF_LVDS == 1) /* ||
~ ^ ~drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c:851:42: note: use '=' to turn this equality comparison into an assignment
} else if((SiS_Pr->SiS_IF_DEF_LVDS == 1) /* ||
^~
=1 warning generated.
Remove the parentheses and while we're at it, clean up the commented code, which has been here since the beginning of git history.
--- drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c +1 -3
@@ -848,9 +848,7 @@ SiS_PanelDelay(struct SiS_Private *SiS_PSiS_DDC2Delay (SiS_Pr,0x4000 ); } - }else if ((SiS_Pr->SiS_IF_DEF_LVDS ==1 )/* || -(SiS_Pr->SiS_CustomT == CUT_COMPAQ1280) || -(SiS_Pr->SiS_CustomT == CUT_CLEVO1400) */ ) {/* 315 series, LVDS; Special */ + }else if (SiS_Pr->SiS_IF_DEF_LVDS ==1 ) {/* 315 series, LVDS; Special */ if (SiS_Pr->SiS_IF_DEF_CH70xx ==0 ) { PanelID =SiS_GetReg (SiS_Pr->SiS_P3d4,0x36 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 18/64 rbd: avoid a deadlock on header_rwsem when flushing notifies
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0e4e1de5b63fa423b13593337a27fd2d2b0bcf77 ]
rbd_unregister_watch() flushes notifies and therefore cannot be called under header_rwsem because a header update notify takes header_rwsem to synchronize with "rbd map". If mapping an image fails after the watch is established and a header update notify sneaks in, we deadlock when erroring out from rbd_dev_image_probe().
Move watch registration and unregistration out of the critical section. The only reason they were put there was to make header_rwsem management slightly more obvious.
--- drivers/block/rbd.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/block/rbd.c +13 -4
@@ -3427,6 +3427,10 @@ static void cancel_tasks_sync(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev)cancel_work_sync (&rbd_dev->unlock_work); } +/* +* header_rwsem must not be held to avoid a deadlock with +* rbd_dev_refresh() when flushing notifies. +*/ static void rbd_unregister_watch (struct rbd_device *rbd_dev) {WARN_ON (waitqueue_active (&rbd_dev->lock_waitq));
@@ -5732,6 +5736,9 @@ static void rbd_dev_image_release(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev)* device. If this image is the one being mapped (i.e., not a * parent), initiate a watch on its header object before using that * object to get detailed information about the rbd image. +* +* On success, returns with header_rwsem held for write if called +* with @depth == 0. */ static int rbd_dev_image_probe (struct rbd_device *rbd_dev,int depth) {
@@ -5764,6 +5771,9 @@ static int rbd_dev_image_probe(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev, int depth) } } +if (!depth) +down_write (&rbd_dev->header_rwsem); + ret =rbd_dev_header_info (rbd_dev);if (ret) goto err_out_watch;
@@ -5814,6 +5824,8 @@ static int rbd_dev_image_probe(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev, int depth) err_out_probe:rbd_dev_unprobe (rbd_dev); err_out_watch: +if (!depth) +up_write (&rbd_dev->header_rwsem);if (!depth)rbd_unregister_watch (rbd_dev); err_out_format:
@@ -5872,12 +5884,9 @@ static ssize_t do_rbd_add(struct bus_type *bus, goto err_out_rbd_dev; } -down_write (&rbd_dev->header_rwsem); rc =rbd_dev_image_probe (rbd_dev,0 ); -if (rc <0 ) { -up_write (&rbd_dev->header_rwsem); +if (rc <0 ) goto err_out_rbd_dev; - }/* If we are mapping a snapshot it must be marked read-only */ if (rbd_dev->spec->snap_id !=CEPH_NOSNAP )
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 19/64 rbd: call rbd_dev_unprobe() after unwatching and flushing notifies
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 952c48b0ed18919bff7528501e9a3fff8a24f8cd ]
rbd_dev_unprobe() is supposed to undo most of rbd_dev_image_probe(), including rbd_dev_header_info(), which means that rbd_dev_header_info() isn't supposed to be called after rbd_dev_unprobe().
However, rbd_dev_image_release() calls rbd_dev_unprobe() before rbd_unregister_watch(). This is racy because a header update notify can sneak in:
"rbd unmap" thread ceph-watch-notify worker
rbd_dev_image_release()
rbd_dev_unprobe()
free and zero out header
rbd_watch_cb()
rbd_dev_refresh()
rbd_dev_header_info()
read in header
The same goes for "rbd map" because rbd_dev_image_probe() calls rbd_dev_unprobe() on errors. In both cases this results in a memory leak.
--- drivers/block/rbd.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/block/rbd.c +4 -4
@@ -5723,9 +5723,10 @@ static int rbd_dev_header_name(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev)static void rbd_dev_image_release (struct rbd_device *rbd_dev) { -rbd_dev_unprobe (rbd_dev);if (rbd_dev->opts)rbd_unregister_watch (rbd_dev); + +rbd_dev_unprobe (rbd_dev); rbd_dev->image_format =0 ;kfree (rbd_dev->spec->image_id); rbd_dev->spec->image_id =NULL ;
@@ -5776,7 +5777,7 @@ static int rbd_dev_image_probe(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev, int depth) ret =rbd_dev_header_info (rbd_dev);if (ret) - goto err_out_watch; + goto err_out_probe;/* * If this image is the one being mapped, we have pool name and
@@ -5822,12 +5823,11 @@ static int rbd_dev_image_probe(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev, int depth)return 0 ; err_out_probe: -rbd_dev_unprobe (rbd_dev); -err_out_watch:if (!depth)up_write (&rbd_dev->header_rwsem);if (!depth)rbd_unregister_watch (rbd_dev); +rbd_dev_unprobe (rbd_dev); err_out_format: rbd_dev->image_format =0 ;kfree (rbd_dev->spec->image_id);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/64 xsk: Add missing check on user supplied headroom size
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Magnus Karlsson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 99e3a236dd43d06c65af0a2ef9cb44306aef6e02 ]
Add a check that the headroom cannot be larger than the available space in the chunk. In the current code, a malicious user can set the headroom to a value larger than the chunk size minus the fixed XDP headroom. That way packets with a length larger than the supported size in the umem could get accepted and result in an out-of-bounds write.
--- net/xdp/xdp_umem.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/xdp/xdp_umem.c +2 -3
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem *umem, struct xdp_umem_reg *mr)u32 chunk_size = mr->chunk_size, headroom = mr->headroom;unsigned int chunks, chunks_per_page;u64 addr = mr->addr, size = mr->len; -int size_chk, err, i; +int err, i;if (chunk_size <XDP_UMEM_MIN_CHUNK_SIZE || chunk_size >PAGE_SIZE ) {/* Strictly speaking we could support this, if:
@@ -295,8 +295,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem *umem, struct xdp_umem_reg *mr) headroom =ALIGN (headroom,64 ); - size_chk = chunk_size - headroom -XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM ; -if (size_chk <0 ) +if (headroom >= chunk_size -XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM )return -EINVAL ; umem->address = (unsigned long )addr;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/64 x86/Hyper-V: Unload vmbus channel in hv panic callback
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 74347a99e73ae00b8385f1209aaea193c670f901 ]
When kdump is not configured, a Hyper-V VM might still respond to network traffic after a kernel panic when kernel parameter panic=0. The panic CPU goes into an infinite loop with interrupts enabled, and the VMbus driver interrupt handler still works because the VMbus connection is unloaded only in the kdump path. The network responses make the other end of the connection think the VM is still functional even though it has panic'ed, which could affect any failover actions that should be taken.
Fix this by unloading the VMbus connection during the panic process. vmbus_initiate_unload() could then be called twice (e.g., by hyperv_panic_event() and hv_crash_handler(), so reset the connection state in vmbus_initiate_unload() to ensure the unload is done only once.
--- drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 3 +++ drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c +3 -0
@@ -849,6 +849,9 @@ void vmbus_initiate_unload(bool crash) {struct vmbus_channel_message_header hdr; +if (xchg (&vmbus_connection.conn_state,DISCONNECTED ) ==DISCONNECTED ) +return ; +/* Pre-Win2012R2 hosts don't support reconnect */ if (vmbus_proto_version <VERSION_WIN8_1 )return ;
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +13 -6
@@ -63,9 +63,12 @@ static int hyperv_panic_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val, {struct pt_regs *regs; - regs =current_pt_regs (); +vmbus_initiate_unload (true); -hyperv_report_panic (regs, val); +if (ms_hyperv.misc_features &HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE ) { + regs =current_pt_regs (); +hyperv_report_panic (regs, val); + }return NOTIFY_DONE ; }
@@ -1228,10 +1231,16 @@ static int vmbus_bus_init(void) }register_die_notifier (&hyperv_die_block); -atomic_notifier_chain_register (&panic_notifier_list, - &hyperv_panic_block); } +/* +* Always register the panic notifier because we need to unload +* the VMbus channel connection to prevent any VMbus +* activity after the VM panics. +*/ +atomic_notifier_chain_register (&panic_notifier_list, + &hyperv_panic_block); +vmbus_request_offers ();return 0 ;
@@ -1875,7 +1884,6 @@ static void hv_kexec_handler(void) {hv_synic_clockevents_cleanup ();vmbus_initiate_unload (false); - vmbus_connection.conn_state =DISCONNECTED ;/* Make sure conn_state is set as hv_synic_cleanup checks for it */ mb ();cpuhp_remove_state (hyperv_cpuhp_online);
@@ -1890,7 +1898,6 @@ static void hv_crash_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)* doing the cleanup for current CPU only. This should be sufficient * for kdump. */ - vmbus_connection.conn_state =DISCONNECTED ;hv_synic_cleanup (smp_processor_id ());hyperv_cleanup (); };
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/64 x86/Hyper-V: Free hv_panic_page when fail to register kmsg dump
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7f11a2cc10a4ae3a70e2c73361f4a9a33503539b ]
If kmsg_dump_register() fails, hv_panic_page will not be used anywhere. So free and reset it.
--- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +5 -2
@@ -1222,9 +1222,13 @@ static int vmbus_bus_init(void) hv_panic_page = (void *)get_zeroed_page (GFP_KERNEL );if (hv_panic_page) { ret =kmsg_dump_register (&hv_kmsg_dumper); -if (ret) +if (ret) {pr_err ("Hyper-V: kmsg dump register " "error 0x%x\n" , ret); +free_page ( + (unsigned long )hv_panic_page); + hv_panic_page =NULL ; + } }else pr_err ("Hyper-V: panic message page memory " "allocation failed" );
@@ -1252,7 +1256,6 @@ static int vmbus_bus_init(void)hv_remove_vmbus_irq ();bus_unregister (&hv_bus); -free_page ((unsigned long )hv_panic_page);unregister_sysctl_table (hv_ctl_table_hdr); hv_ctl_table_hdr =NULL ;return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/64 x86/Hyper-V: Trigger crash enlightenment only once during system crash.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 73f26e526f19afb3a06b76b970a76bcac2cafd05 ]
When a guest VM panics, Hyper-V should be notified only once via the crash synthetic MSRs. Current Linux code might write these crash MSRs twice during a system panic:
1) hyperv_panic/die_event() calling hyperv_report_panic()
2) hv_kmsg_dump() calling hyperv_report_panic_msg()
Fix this by not calling hyperv_report_panic() if a kmsg dump has been successfully registered. The notification will happen later via hyperv_report_panic_msg().
--- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +14 -2
@@ -65,7 +65,13 @@ static int hyperv_panic_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,vmbus_initiate_unload (true); -if (ms_hyperv.misc_features &HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE ) { +/* +* Hyper-V should be notified only once about a panic. If we will be +* doing hyperv_report_panic_msg() later with kmsg data, don't do +* the notification here. +*/ +if (ms_hyperv.misc_features &HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE + && !hv_panic_page) { regs =current_pt_regs ();hyperv_report_panic (regs, val); }
@@ -78,7 +84,13 @@ static int hyperv_die_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,struct die_args *die = (struct die_args *)args;struct pt_regs *regs = die->regs; -hyperv_report_panic (regs, val); +/* +* Hyper-V should be notified only once about a panic. If we will be +* doing hyperv_report_panic_msg() later with kmsg data, don't do +* the notification here. +*/ +if (!hv_panic_page) +hyperv_report_panic (regs, val);return NOTIFY_DONE ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 24/64 x86/Hyper-V: Report crash register data when sysctl_record_panic_msg is not set
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 040026df7088c56ccbad28f7042308f67bde63df ]
When sysctl_record_panic_msg is not set, the panic will not be reported to Hyper-V via hyperv_report_panic_msg(). So the crash should be reported via hyperv_report_panic().
--- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +14 -9
@@ -58,6 +58,18 @@ static int hyperv_cpuhp_online;static void *hv_panic_page; +/* +* Boolean to control whether to report panic messages over Hyper-V. +* +* It can be set via /proc/sys/kernel/hyperv/record_panic_msg +*/ +static int sysctl_record_panic_msg =1 ; + +static int hyperv_report_reg (void ) +{ +return !sysctl_record_panic_msg || !hv_panic_page; +} +static int hyperv_panic_event (struct notifier_block *nb,unsigned long val,void *args) {
@@ -71,7 +83,7 @@ static int hyperv_panic_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,* the notification here. */ if (ms_hyperv.misc_features &HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE - && !hv_panic_page) { + &&hyperv_report_reg ()) { regs =current_pt_regs ();hyperv_report_panic (regs, val); }
@@ -89,7 +101,7 @@ static int hyperv_die_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,* doing hyperv_report_panic_msg() later with kmsg data, don't do * the notification here. */ -if (!hv_panic_page) +if (hyperv_report_reg ())hyperv_report_panic (regs, val);return NOTIFY_DONE ; }
@@ -1103,13 +1115,6 @@ static void vmbus_isr(void)add_interrupt_randomness (HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR ,0 ); } -/* -* Boolean to control whether to report panic messages over Hyper-V. -* -* It can be set via /proc/sys/kernel/hyperv/record_panic_msg -*/ -static int sysctl_record_panic_msg =1 ; -/* * Callback from kmsg_dump. Grab as much as possible from the end of the kmsg * buffer and call into Hyper-V to transfer the data.
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 25/64 x86/Hyper-V: Report crash data in die() when panic_on_oops is set
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f3a99e761efa616028b255b4de58e9b5b87c5545 ]
When oops happens with panic_on_oops unset, the oops thread is killed by die() and system continues to run. In such case, guest should not report crash register data to host since system still runs. Check panic_on_oops and return directly in hyperv_report_panic() when the function is called in the die() and panic_on_oops is unset. Fix it.
--- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 6 +++++- arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 2 +- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c +5 -1
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@#include <linux/clockchips.h> #include <linux/hyperv.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/cpuhotplug.h> #ifdef CONFIG_HYPERV_TSCPAGE
@@ -427,11 +428,14 @@ void hyperv_cleanup(void) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hyperv_cleanup); -void hyperv_report_panic (struct pt_regs *regs,long err) +void hyperv_report_panic (struct pt_regs *regs,long err,bool in_die) {static bool panic_reported;u64 guest_id; +if (in_die && !panic_on_oops) +return ; +/* * We prefer to report panic on 'die' chain as we have proper * registers to report, but if we miss it (e.g. on BUG()) we need
arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h +1 -1
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static inline int cpumask_to_vpset(struct hv_vpset *vpset,void __init hyperv_init (void );void hyperv_setup_mmu_ops (void ); -void hyperv_report_panic (struct pt_regs *regs,long err); +void hyperv_report_panic (struct pt_regs *regs,long err,bool in_die);void hyperv_report_panic_msg (phys_addr_t pa,size_t size);bool hv_is_hyperv_initialized (void );void hyperv_cleanup (void );
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +3 -2
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#include <linux/kdebug.h> #include <linux/efi.h> #include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include "hyperv_vmbus.h" struct vmbus_dynid {
@@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ static int hyperv_panic_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,if (ms_hyperv.misc_features &HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE &&hyperv_report_reg ()) { regs =current_pt_regs (); -hyperv_report_panic (regs, val); +hyperv_report_panic (regs, val, false); }return NOTIFY_DONE ; }
@@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ static int hyperv_die_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,* the notification here. */ if (hyperv_report_reg ()) -hyperv_report_panic (regs, val); +hyperv_report_panic (regs, val, true);return NOTIFY_DONE ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 26/64 clk: at91: usb: continue if clk_hw_round_rate() return zero
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Claudiu Beznea <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b0ecf1c6c6e82da4847900fad0272abfd014666d ]
clk_hw_round_rate() may call round rate function of its parents. In case of SAM9X60 two of USB parrents are PLLA and UPLL. These clocks are controlled by clk-sam9x60-pll.c driver. The round rate function for this driver is sam9x60_pll_round_rate() which call in turn sam9x60_pll_get_best_div_mul(). In case the requested rate is not in the proper range (rate < characteristics->output[0].min &&
rate > characteristics->output[0].max) the sam9x60_pll_round_rate() will return a negative number to its caller (called by clk_core_round_rate_nolock()). clk_hw_round_rate() will return zero in case a negative number is returned by clk_core_round_rate_nolock(). With this, the USB clock will continue its rate computation even caller of clk_hw_round_rate() returned an error. With this, the USB clock on SAM9X60 may not chose the best parent. I detected this after a suspend/resume cycle on SAM9X60.
--- drivers/clk/at91/clk-usb.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/clk/at91/clk-usb.c +3 -0
@@ -78,6 +78,9 @@ static int at91sam9x5_clk_usb_determine_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, tmp_parent_rate = req->rate * div; tmp_parent_rate =clk_hw_round_rate (parent, tmp_parent_rate); +if (!tmp_parent_rate) +continue ; + tmp_rate =DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST (tmp_parent_rate, div);if (tmp_rate < req->rate) tmp_diff = req->rate - tmp_rate;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 27/64 power: supply: bq27xxx_battery: Silence deferred-probe error
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 583b53ece0b0268c542a1eafadb62e3d4b0aab8c ]
The driver fails to probe with -EPROBE_DEFER if battery's power supply (charger driver) isn't ready yet and this results in a bit noisy error message in KMSG during kernel's boot up. Let's silence the harmless error message.
--- drivers/power/supply/bq27xxx_battery.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/power/supply/bq27xxx_battery.c +4 -1
@@ -1887,7 +1887,10 @@ int bq27xxx_battery_setup(struct bq27xxx_device_info *di) di->bat =power_supply_register_no_ws (di->dev, psy_desc, &psy_cfg);if (IS_ERR (di->bat)) { -dev_err (di->dev,"failed to register battery\n" ); +if (PTR_ERR (di->bat) == -EPROBE_DEFER ) +dev_dbg (di->dev,"failed to register battery, deferring probe\n" ); +else +dev_err (di->dev,"failed to register battery\n" );return PTR_ERR (di->bat); }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 28/64 clk: tegra: Fix Tegra PMC clock out parents
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sowjanya Komatineni <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6fe38aa8cac3a5db38154331742835a4d9740788 ]
Tegra PMC clocks clk_out_1, clk_out_2, and clk_out_3 supported parents are osc, osc_div2, osc_div4 and extern clock.
Clock driver is using incorrect parents clk_m, clk_m_div2, clk_m_div4 for PMC clocks.
This patch fixes this.
--- drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra-pmc.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra-pmc.c +6 -6
@@ -60,16 +60,16 @@ struct pmc_clk_init_data {static DEFINE_SPINLOCK (clk_out_lock); -static const char *clk_out1_parents[] = {"clk_m" ,"clk_m_div2" , -"clk_m_div4" ,"extern1" , +static const char *clk_out1_parents[] = {"osc" ,"osc_div2" , +"osc_div4" ,"extern1" , }; -static const char *clk_out2_parents[] = {"clk_m" ,"clk_m_div2" , -"clk_m_div4" ,"extern2" , +static const char *clk_out2_parents[] = {"osc" ,"osc_div2" , +"osc_div4" ,"extern2" , }; -static const char *clk_out3_parents[] = {"clk_m" ,"clk_m_div2" , -"clk_m_div4" ,"extern3" , +static const char *clk_out3_parents[] = {"osc" ,"osc_div2" , +"osc_div4" ,"extern3" , };static struct pmc_clk_init_data pmc_clks[] = {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 29/64 soc: imx: gpc: fix power up sequencing
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Lucas Stach <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e0ea2d11f8a08ba7066ff897e16c5217215d1e68 ]
Currently we wait only until the PGC inverts the isolation setting before disabling the peripheral clocks. This doesn't ensure that the reset is properly propagated through the peripheral devices in the power domain.
Wait until the PGC signals that the power up request is done and wait a bit for resets to propagate before disabling the clocks.
--- drivers/soc/imx/gpc.c | 24 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/imx/gpc.c +13 -11
@@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ static int imx6_pm_domain_power_off(struct generic_pm_domain *genpd)static int imx6_pm_domain_power_on (struct generic_pm_domain *genpd) {struct imx_pm_domain *pd =to_imx_pm_domain (genpd); -int i, ret, sw, sw2iso; -u32 val; +int i, ret; +u32 val, req;if (pd->supply) { ret =regulator_enable (pd->supply);
@@ -113,17 +113,18 @@ static int imx6_pm_domain_power_on(struct generic_pm_domain *genpd)regmap_update_bits (pd->regmap, pd->reg_offs +GPC_PGC_CTRL_OFFS ,0x1 ,0x1 ); -/* Read ISO and ISO2SW power up delays */ -regmap_read (pd->regmap, pd->reg_offs +GPC_PGC_PUPSCR_OFFS , &val); - sw = val &0x3f ; - sw2iso = (val >>8 ) &0x3f ; -/* Request GPC to power up domain */ - val =BIT (pd->cntr_pdn_bit +1 ); -regmap_update_bits (pd->regmap,GPC_CNTR , val, val); + req =BIT (pd->cntr_pdn_bit +1 ); +regmap_update_bits (pd->regmap,GPC_CNTR , req, req); -/* Wait ISO + ISO2SW IPG clock cycles */ -udelay (DIV_ROUND_UP (sw + sw2iso, pd->ipg_rate_mhz)); +/* Wait for the PGC to handle the request */ + ret =regmap_read_poll_timeout (pd->regmap,GPC_CNTR , val, !(val & req), +1 ,50 ); +if (ret) +pr_err ("powerup request on domain %s timed out\n" , genpd->name); + +/* Wait for reset to propagate through peripherals */ +usleep_range (5 ,10 );/* Disable reset clocks for all devices in the domain */ for (i =0 ; i < pd->num_clks; i++)
@@ -345,6 +346,7 @@ static const struct regmap_config imx_gpc_regmap_config = { .rd_table = &access_table, .wr_table = &access_table, .max_register = 0x2ac, + .fast_io = true, };static struct generic_pm_domain *imx_gpc_onecell_domains[] = {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 30/64 rtc: 88pm860x: fix possible race condition
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9cf4789e6e4673d0b2c96fa6bb0c35e81b43111a ]
The RTC IRQ is requested before the struct rtc_device is allocated, this may lead to a NULL pointer dereference in the IRQ handler.
To fix this issue, allocating the rtc_device struct before requesting the RTC IRQ using devm_rtc_allocate_device, and use rtc_register_device to register the RTC device.
Also remove the unnecessary error message as the core already prints the info.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-88pm860x.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-88pm860x.c +8 -6
@@ -341,6 +341,10 @@ static int pm860x_rtc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) info->dev = &pdev->dev;dev_set_drvdata (&pdev->dev, info); + info->rtc_dev =devm_rtc_allocate_device (&pdev->dev); +if (IS_ERR (info->rtc_dev)) +return PTR_ERR (info->rtc_dev); + ret =devm_request_threaded_irq (&pdev->dev, info->irq,NULL , rtc_update_handler,IRQF_ONESHOT ,"rtc" , info);
@@ -382,13 +386,11 @@ static int pm860x_rtc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) } } - info->rtc_dev =devm_rtc_device_register (&pdev->dev,"88pm860x-rtc" , - &pm860x_rtc_ops,THIS_MODULE ); - ret =PTR_ERR (info->rtc_dev); -if (IS_ERR (info->rtc_dev)) { -dev_err (&pdev->dev,"Failed to register RTC device: %d\n" , ret); + info->rtc_dev->ops = &pm860x_rtc_ops; + + ret =rtc_register_device (info->rtc_dev); +if (ret)return ret; - }/* * enable internal XO instead of internal 3.25MHz clock since it can
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 31/64 NFSv4/pnfs: Return valid stateids in nfs_layout_find_inode_by_stateid()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d911c57a19551c6bef116a3b55c6b089901aacb0 ]
Make sure to test the stateid for validity so that we catch instances where the server may have been reusing stateids in nfs_layout_find_inode_by_stateid().
--- fs/nfs/callback_proc.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/nfs/callback_proc.c +2 -0
@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ static struct inode *nfs_layout_find_inode_by_stateid(struct nfs_client *clp,list_for_each_entry_rcu (server, &clp->cl_superblocks, client_link) {list_for_each_entry (lo, &server->layouts, plh_layouts) { +if (!pnfs_layout_is_valid (lo)) +continue ;if (stateid !=NULL && !nfs4_stateid_match_other (stateid, &lo->plh_stateid))continue ;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 32/64 NFS: direct.c: Fix memory leak of dreq when nfs_get_lock_context fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Misono Tomohiro <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8605cf0e852af3b2c771c18417499dc4ceed03d5 ]
When dreq is allocated by nfs_direct_req_alloc(), dreq->kref is initialized to 2. Therefore we need to call nfs_direct_req_release() twice to release the allocated dreq. Usually it is called in nfs_file_direct_{read, write}() and nfs_direct_complete().
However, current code only calls nfs_direct_req_relese() once if nfs_get_lock_context() fails in nfs_file_direct_{read, write}(). So, that case would result in memory leak.
Fix this by adding the missing call.
--- fs/nfs/direct.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/nfs/direct.c +2 -0
@@ -600,6 +600,7 @@ ssize_t nfs_file_direct_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) l_ctx =nfs_get_lock_context (dreq->ctx);if (IS_ERR (l_ctx)) { result =PTR_ERR (l_ctx); +nfs_direct_req_release (dreq); goto out_release; } dreq->l_ctx = l_ctx;
@@ -1023,6 +1024,7 @@ ssize_t nfs_file_direct_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) l_ctx =nfs_get_lock_context (dreq->ctx);if (IS_ERR (l_ctx)) { result =PTR_ERR (l_ctx); +nfs_direct_req_release (dreq); goto out_release; } dreq->l_ctx = l_ctx;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 33/64 s390/cpuinfo: fix wrong output when CPU0 is offline
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 872f27103874a73783aeff2aac2b41a489f67d7c ]
/proc/cpuinfo should not print information about CPU 0 when it is offline.
--- arch/s390/kernel/processor.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/s390/kernel/processor.c +4 -1
@@ -157,8 +157,9 @@ static void show_cpu_mhz(struct seq_file *m, unsigned long n)static int show_cpuinfo (struct seq_file *m,void *v) {unsigned long n = (unsigned long ) v -1 ; +unsigned long first =cpumask_first (cpu_online_mask); -if (!n) +if (n == first)show_cpu_summary (m, v);if (!machine_has_cpu_mhz)return 0 ;
@@ -171,6 +172,8 @@ static inline void *c_update(loff_t *pos) {if (*pos) *pos =cpumask_next (*pos -1 , cpu_online_mask); +else + *pos =cpumask_first (cpu_online_mask);return *pos < nr_cpu_ids ? (void *)*pos +1 :NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 34/64 powerpc/maple: Fix declaration made after definition
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit af6cf95c4d003fccd6c2ecc99a598fb854b537e7 ]
When building ppc64 defconfig, Clang errors (trimmed for brevity):
arch/powerpc/platforms/maple/setup.c:365:1: error: attribute declaration must precede definition [-Werror,-Wignored-attributes] machine_device_initcall(maple, maple_cpc925_edac_setup); ^
machine_device_initcall expands to __define_machine_initcall, which in turn has the macro machine_is used in it, which declares mach_##name with an __attribute__((weak)). define_machine actually defines mach_##name, which in this file happens before the declaration, hence the warning.
To fix this, move define_machine after machine_device_initcall so that the declaration occurs before the definition, which matches how machine_device_initcall and define_machine work throughout arch/powerpc.
While we're here, remove some spaces before tabs.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/maple/setup.c | 34 ++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/maple/setup.c +17 -17
@@ -299,23 +299,6 @@ static int __init maple_probe(void)return 1 ; } -define_machine (maple) { - .name = "Maple", - .probe = maple_probe, - .setup_arch = maple_setup_arch, - .init_IRQ = maple_init_IRQ, - .pci_irq_fixup = maple_pci_irq_fixup, - .pci_get_legacy_ide_irq = maple_pci_get_legacy_ide_irq, - .restart = maple_restart, - .halt = maple_halt, - .get_boot_time = maple_get_boot_time, - .set_rtc_time = maple_set_rtc_time, - .get_rtc_time = maple_get_rtc_time, - .calibrate_decr = generic_calibrate_decr, - .progress = maple_progress, - .power_save = power4_idle, -}; -#ifdef CONFIG_EDAC /* * Register a platform device for CPC925 memory controller on
@@ -372,3 +355,20 @@ static int __init maple_cpc925_edac_setup(void) }machine_device_initcall (maple, maple_cpc925_edac_setup);#endif + +define_machine (maple) { + .name = "Maple", + .probe = maple_probe, + .setup_arch = maple_setup_arch, + .init_IRQ = maple_init_IRQ, + .pci_irq_fixup = maple_pci_irq_fixup, + .pci_get_legacy_ide_irq = maple_pci_get_legacy_ide_irq, + .restart = maple_restart, + .halt = maple_halt, + .get_boot_time = maple_get_boot_time, + .set_rtc_time = maple_set_rtc_time, + .get_rtc_time = maple_get_rtc_time, + .calibrate_decr = generic_calibrate_decr, + .progress = maple_progress, + .power_save = power4_idle, +};
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 35/64 s390/cpum_sf: Fix wrong page count in error message
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Thomas Richter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4141b6a5e9f171325effc36a22eb92bf961e7a5c ]
When perf record -e SF_CYCLES_BASIC_DIAG runs with very high frequency, the samples arrive faster than the perf process can save them to file. Eventually, for longer running processes, this leads to the siutation where the trace buffers allocated by perf slowly fills up. At one point the auxiliary trace buffer is full and the CPU Measurement sampling facility is turned off. Furthermore a warning is printed to the kernel log buffer:
cpum_sf: The AUX buffer with 0 pages for the diagnostic-sampling
mode is full
The number of allocated pages for the auxiliary trace buffer is shown as zero pages. That is wrong.
Fix this by saving the number of allocated pages before entering the work loop in the interrupt handler. When the interrupt handler processes the samples, it may detect the buffer full condition and stop sampling, reducing the buffer size to zero.
Print the correct value in the error message:
cpum_sf: The AUX buffer with 256 pages for the diagnostic-sampling
mode is full
--- arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c +1 -0
@@ -1537,6 +1537,7 @@ static void hw_collect_aux(struct cpu_hw_sf *cpuhw)perf_aux_output_end (handle, size); num_sdb = aux->sfb.num_sdb; + num_sdb = aux->sfb.num_sdb;while (!done) {/* Get an output handle */ aux =perf_aux_output_begin (handle, cpuhw->event);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 36/64 ext4: do not commit super on read-only bdev
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c96e2b8564adfb8ac14469ebc51ddc1bfecb3ae2 ]
Under some circumstances we may encounter a filesystem error on a read-only block device, and if we try to save the error info to the superblock and commit it, we'll wind up with a noisy error and backtrace, i.e.:
[ 3337.146838] EXT4-fs error (device pmem1p2): ext4_get_journal_inode:4634: comm mount: inode #0: comm mount: iget: illegal inode # ------------[ cut here ]------------ generic_make_request: Trying to write to read-only block-device pmem1p2 (partno 2) WARNING: CPU: 107 PID: 115347 at block/blk-core.c:788 generic_make_request_checks+0x6b4/0x7d0
...
To avoid this, commit the error info in the superblock only if the block device is writable.
--- fs/ext4/super.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/super.c +2 -1
@@ -388,7 +388,8 @@ static void save_error_info(struct super_block *sb, const char *func, unsigned int line) {__save_error_info (sb, func, line); -ext4_commit_super (sb,1 ); +if (!bdev_read_only (sb->s_bdev)) +ext4_commit_super (sb,1 ); }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 37/64 um: ubd: Prevent buffer overrun on command completion
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6e682d53fc1ef73a169e2a5300326cb23abb32ee ]
On the hypervisor side, when completing commands and the pipe is full, we retry writing only the entries that failed, by offsetting io_req_buffer, but we don't reduce the number of bytes written, which can cause a buffer overrun of io_req_buffer, and write garbage to the pipe.
--- arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c +3 -1
@@ -1574,7 +1574,9 @@ int io_thread(void *arg) written =0 ; do { - res = os_write_file(kernel_fd, ((char *) io_req_buffer) + written, n); + res = os_write_file(kernel_fd, + ((char *) io_req_buffer) + written, + n - written); if (res >= 0) { written += res; } else {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 38/64 cifs: Allocate encryption header through kmalloc
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Long Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3946d0d04bb360acca72db5efe9ae8440012d9dc ]
When encryption is used, smb2_transform_hdr is defined on the stack and is passed to the transport. This doesn't work with RDMA as the buffer needs to be DMA'ed.
Fix it by using kmalloc.
--- fs/cifs/transport.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/transport.c +17 -11
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ smb_send_rqst(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst, struct smb_rqst *rqst, int flags) {struct kvec iov; -struct smb2_transform_hdr tr_hdr; +struct smb2_transform_hdr *tr_hdr;struct smb_rqst cur_rqst[MAX_COMPOUND ];int rc;
@@ -402,28 +402,34 @@ smb_send_rqst(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst,if (num_rqst >MAX_COMPOUND -1 )return -ENOMEM ; -memset (&cur_rqst[0 ],0 ,sizeof (cur_rqst)); -memset (&iov,0 ,sizeof (iov)); -memset (&tr_hdr,0 ,sizeof (tr_hdr)); - - iov.iov_base = &tr_hdr; - iov.iov_len =sizeof (tr_hdr); - cur_rqst[0 ].rq_iov = &iov; - cur_rqst[0 ].rq_nvec =1 ; -if (!server->ops->init_transform_rq) {cifs_dbg (VFS ,"Encryption requested but transform callback " "is missing\n" );return -EIO ; } + tr_hdr =kmalloc (sizeof (*tr_hdr),GFP_NOFS ); +if (!tr_hdr) +return -ENOMEM ; + +memset (&cur_rqst[0 ],0 ,sizeof (cur_rqst)); +memset (&iov,0 ,sizeof (iov)); +memset (tr_hdr,0 ,sizeof (*tr_hdr)); + + iov.iov_base = tr_hdr; + iov.iov_len =sizeof (*tr_hdr); + cur_rqst[0 ].rq_iov = &iov; + cur_rqst[0 ].rq_nvec =1 ; + rc = server->ops->init_transform_rq (server, num_rqst +1 , &cur_rqst[0 ], rqst);if (rc) -return rc; + goto out; rc =__smb_send_rqst (server, num_rqst +1 , &cur_rqst[0 ]);smb3_free_compound_rqst (num_rqst, &cur_rqst[1 ]); +out: +kfree (tr_hdr);return rc; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 39/64 include/linux/swapops.h: correct guards for non_swap_entry()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Steven Price <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3f3673d7d324d872d9d8ddb73b3e5e47fbf12e0d ]
If CONFIG_DEVICE_PRIVATE is defined, but neither CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE nor CONFIG_MIGRATION, then non_swap_entry() will return 0, meaning that the condition (non_swap_entry(entry) && is_device_private_entry(entry)) in zap_pte_range() will never be true even if the entry is a device private one.
Equally any other code depending on non_swap_entry() will not function as expected.
I originally spotted this just by looking at the code, I haven't actually observed any problems.
Looking a bit more closely it appears that actually this situation (currently at least) cannot occur:
DEVICE_PRIVATE depends on ZONE_DEVICEZONE_DEVICE depends on MEMORY_HOTREMOVEMEMORY_HOTREMOVE depends on MIGRATION
--- include/linux/swapops.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/swapops.h +2 -1
@@ -368,7 +368,8 @@ static inline void num_poisoned_pages_inc(void) }#endif -#if defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE ) || defined(CONFIG_MIGRATION ) +#if defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE ) || defined(CONFIG_MIGRATION ) || \ + defined(CONFIG_DEVICE_PRIVATE )static inline int non_swap_entry (swp_entry_t entry) {return swp_type (entry) >=MAX_SWAPFILES ;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 40/64 percpu_counter: fix a data race at vm_committed_as
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Qian Cai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7e2345200262e4a6056580f0231cccdaffc825f3 ]
"vm_committed_as.count" could be accessed concurrently as reported by KCSAN,
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __vm_enough_memory / percpu_counter_add_batch
write to 0xffffffff9451c538 of 8 bytes by task 65879 on cpu 35:
percpu_counter_add_batch+0x83/0xd0 percpu_counter_add_batch at lib/percpu_counter.c:91 __vm_enough_memory+0xb9/0x260 dup_mm+0x3a4/0x8f0 copy_process+0x2458/0x3240 _do_fork+0xaa/0x9f0 __do_sys_clone+0x125/0x160 __x64_sys_clone+0x70/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb05 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
read to 0xffffffff9451c538 of 8 bytes by task 66773 on cpu 19:
__vm_enough_memory+0x199/0x260 percpu_counter_read_positive at include/linux/percpu_counter.h:81 (inlined by) __vm_enough_memory at mm/util.c:839 mmap_region+0x1b2/0xa10 do_mmap+0x45c/0x700 vm_mmap_pgoff+0xc0/0x130 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x6e/0x300 __x64_sys_mmap+0x33/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb05 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The read is outside percpu_counter::lock critical section which results in a data race. Fix it by adding a READ_ONCE() in percpu_counter_read_positive() which could also service as the existing compiler memory barrier.
--- include/linux/percpu_counter.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/percpu_counter.h +2 -2
@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ static inline s64 percpu_counter_read(struct percpu_counter *fbc)*/ static inline s64 percpu_counter_read_positive (struct percpu_counter *fbc) { -s64 ret = fbc->count; +/* Prevent reloads of fbc->count */ +s64 ret =READ_ONCE (fbc->count); -barrier ();/* Prevent reloads of fbc->count */ if (ret >=0 )return ret;return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 41/64 compiler.h: fix error in BUILD_BUG_ON() reporting
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit af9c5d2e3b355854ff0e4acfbfbfadcd5198a349 ]
compiletime_assert() uses __LINE__ to create a unique function name. This means that if you have more than one BUILD_BUG_ON() in the same source line (which can happen if they appear e.g. in a macro), then the error message from the compiler might output the wrong condition.
For this source file:
#include <linux/build_bug.h>
#define macro() \
BUILD_BUG_ON(1); \
BUILD_BUG_ON(0);
void foo()
{
macro();
}gcc would output:
./include/linux/compiler.h:350:38: error: call to `__compiletime_assert_9' declared with attribute error: BUILD_BUG_ON failed: 0
_compiletime_assert(condition, msg, __compiletime_assert_, __LINE__)
However, it was not the BUILD_BUG_ON(0) that failed, so it should say 1 instead of 0. With this patch, we use __COUNTER__ instead of __LINE__, so each BUILD_BUG_ON() gets a different function name and the correct condition is printed:
./include/linux/compiler.h:350:38: error: call to `__compiletime_assert_0' declared with attribute error: BUILD_BUG_ON failed: 1
_compiletime_assert(condition, msg, __compiletime_assert_, __COUNTER__)
--- include/linux/compiler.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/compiler.h +1 -1
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static inline void *offset_to_ptr(const int *off)* compiler has support to do so. */ #define compiletime_assert (condition, msg) \ - _compiletime_assert(condition, msg, __compiletime_assert_, __LINE__) + _compiletime_assert(condition, msg, __compiletime_assert_, __COUNTER__)#define compiletime_assert_atomic_type (t) \ compiletime_assert(__native_word(t), \
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 42/64 KVM: s390: vsie: Fix possible race when shadowing region 3 tables
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1493e0f944f3c319d11e067c185c904d01c17ae5 ]
We have to properly retry again by returning -EINVAL immediately in case somebody else instantiated the table concurrently. We missed to add the goto in this function only. The code now matches the other, similar shadowing functions.
We are overwriting an existing region 2 table entry. All allocated pages are added to the crst_list to be freed later, so they are not lost forever. However, when unshadowing the region 2 table, we wouldn't trigger unshadowing of the original shadowed region 3 table that we replaced. It would get unshadowed when the original region 3 table is modified. As it's not connected to the page table hierarchy anymore, it's not going to get used anymore. However, for a limited time, this page table will stick around, so it's in some sense a temporary memory leak.
Identified by manual code inspection. I don't think this classifies as stable material.
--- arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/s390/mm/gmap.c +1 -0
@@ -1838,6 +1838,7 @@ int gmap_shadow_r3t(struct gmap *sg, unsigned long saddr, unsigned long r3t, goto out_free; }else if (*table & _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN) { rc = -EAGAIN ;/* Race with shadow */ + goto out_free; }crst_table_init (s_r3t, _REGION3_ENTRY_EMPTY);/* mark as invalid as long as the parent table is not protected */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 43/64 x86: ACPI: fix CPU hotplug deadlock
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Qian Cai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 696ac2e3bf267f5a2b2ed7d34e64131f2287d0ad ]
Similar to commit 0266d81e9bf5 ("acpi/processor: Prevent cpu hotplug deadlock") except this is for acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe():
"The problem is that the work is scheduled on the current CPU from the hotplug thread associated with that CPU.
It's not required to invoke these functions via the workqueue because the hotplug thread runs on the target CPU already.
Check whether current is a per cpu thread pinned on the target CPU and invoke the function directly to avoid the workqueue."
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
------------------------------------------------------
cpuhp/1/15 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffc90003447a28 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x4c6/0x630
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffffafa1c0e8 (cpuidle_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cpuidle_pause_and_lock+0x17/0x20
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
cpus_read_lock+0x3e/0xc0 irq_calc_affinity_vectors+0x5f/0x91 __pci_enable_msix_range+0x10f/0x9a0 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0x13e/0x1f0 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity at drivers/pci/msi.c:1208 pqi_ctrl_init+0x72f/0x1618 [smartpqi] pqi_pci_probe.cold.63+0x882/0x892 [smartpqi] local_pci_probe+0x7a/0xc0 work_for_cpu_fn+0x2e/0x50 process_one_work+0x57e/0xb90 worker_thread+0x363/0x5b0 kthread+0x1f4/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
-> #0 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x2244/0x32a0 lock_acquire+0x1a2/0x680 __flush_work+0x4e6/0x630 work_on_cpu+0x114/0x160 acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe+0x129/0x250 acpi_processor_evaluate_cst+0x4c8/0x580 acpi_processor_get_power_info+0x86/0x740 acpi_processor_hotplug+0xc3/0x140 acpi_soft_cpu_online+0x102/0x1d0 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x197/0x1120 cpuhp_thread_fun+0x252/0x2f0 smpboot_thread_fn+0x255/0x440 kthread+0x1f4/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&wfc.work) --> cpuhp_state-up --> cpuidle_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(cpuidle_lock);
lock(cpuhp_state-up);
lock(cpuidle_lock);lock((work_completion)(&wfc.work));
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by cpuhp/1/15:
#0: ffffffffaf51ab10 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x69/0x2f0 #1: ffffffffaf51ad40 (cpuhp_state-up){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x69/0x2f0 #2: ffffffffafa1c0e8 (cpuidle_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cpuidle_pause_and_lock+0x17/0x20
Call Trace: dump_stack+0xa0/0xea print_circular_bug.cold.52+0x147/0x14c check_noncircular+0x295/0x2d0 __lock_acquire+0x2244/0x32a0 lock_acquire+0x1a2/0x680 __flush_work+0x4e6/0x630 work_on_cpu+0x114/0x160 acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe+0x129/0x250 acpi_processor_evaluate_cst+0x4c8/0x580 acpi_processor_get_power_info+0x86/0x740 acpi_processor_hotplug+0xc3/0x140 acpi_soft_cpu_online+0x102/0x1d0 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x197/0x1120 cpuhp_thread_fun+0x252/0x2f0 smpboot_thread_fn+0x255/0x440 kthread+0x1f4/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
--- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cstate.c | 3 ++- drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c | 7 ------- include/acpi/processor.h | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cstate.c +2 -1
@@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ int acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe(unsigned int cpu,/* Make sure we are running on right CPU */ - retval =work_on_cpu (cpu, acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe_cpu, cx); + retval =call_on_cpu (cpu, acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe_cpu, cx, + false);if (retval ==0 ) {/* Use the hint in CST */ percpu_entry->states[cx->index].eax = cx->address;
drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c +0 -7
@@ -910,13 +910,6 @@ static long __acpi_processor_get_throttling(void *data)return pr->throttling.acpi_processor_get_throttling (pr); } -static int call_on_cpu (int cpu,long (*fn)(void *),void *arg,bool direct) -{ -if (direct || (is_percpu_thread () && cpu ==smp_processor_id ())) -return fn (arg); -return work_on_cpu (cpu, fn, arg); -} -static int acpi_processor_get_throttling (struct acpi_processor *pr) {if (!pr)
include/acpi/processor.h +8 -0
@@ -293,6 +293,14 @@ static inline void acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_enter(struct acpi_processor_cx }#endif +static inline int call_on_cpu (int cpu,long (*fn)(void *),void *arg, +bool direct) +{ +if (direct || (is_percpu_thread () && cpu ==smp_processor_id ())) +return fn (arg); +return work_on_cpu (cpu, fn, arg); +} +/* in processor_perflib.c */ #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_FREQ
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 44/64 drm/amdkfd: kfree the wrong pointer
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jack Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3148a6a0ef3cf93570f30a477292768f7eb5d3c3 ]
Originally, it kfrees the wrong pointer for mem_obj. It would cause memory leak under stress test.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device.c +2 -2
@@ -921,9 +921,9 @@ int kfd_gtt_sa_allocate(struct kfd_dev *kfd, unsigned int size,return 0 ; kfd_gtt_no_free_chunk: -pr_debug ("Allocation failed with mem_obj = %p\n" , mem_obj); +pr_debug ("Allocation failed with mem_obj = %p\n" , *mem_obj);mutex_unlock (&kfd->gtt_sa_lock); -kfree (mem_obj); +kfree (*mem_obj);return -ENOMEM ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 45/64 NFS: Fix memory leaks in nfs_pageio_stop_mirroring()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 862f35c94730c9270833f3ad05bd758a29f204ed ]
If we just set the mirror count to 1 without first clearing out the mirrors, we can leak queued up requests.
--- fs/nfs/pagelist.c | 17 ++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/pagelist.c +8 -9
@@ -865,15 +865,6 @@ static void nfs_pageio_setup_mirroring(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio, pgio->pg_mirror_count = mirror_count; } -/* -* nfs_pageio_stop_mirroring - stop using mirroring (set mirror count to 1) -*/ -void nfs_pageio_stop_mirroring (struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio) -{ - pgio->pg_mirror_count =1 ; - pgio->pg_mirror_idx =0 ; -} -static void nfs_pageio_cleanup_mirroring (struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio) { pgio->pg_mirror_count =1 ;
@@ -1302,6 +1293,14 @@ void nfs_pageio_cond_complete(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *desc, pgoff_t index) } } +/* +* nfs_pageio_stop_mirroring - stop using mirroring (set mirror count to 1) +*/ +void nfs_pageio_stop_mirroring (struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio) +{ +nfs_pageio_complete (pgio); +} +int __init nfs_init_nfspagecache (void ) { nfs_page_cachep = kmem_cache_create("nfs_page",
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 46/64 f2fs: fix NULL pointer dereference in f2fs_write_begin()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 62f63eea291b50a5677ae7503ac128803174698a ]
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:f2fs_write_begin+0x823/0xb90 [f2fs] Call Trace: f2fs_quota_write+0x139/0x1d0 [f2fs] write_blk+0x36/0x80 [quota_tree] get_free_dqblk+0x42/0xa0 [quota_tree] do_insert_tree+0x235/0x4a0 [quota_tree] do_insert_tree+0x26e/0x4a0 [quota_tree] do_insert_tree+0x26e/0x4a0 [quota_tree] do_insert_tree+0x26e/0x4a0 [quota_tree] qtree_write_dquot+0x70/0x190 [quota_tree] v2_write_dquot+0x43/0x90 [quota_v2] dquot_acquire+0x77/0x100 f2fs_dquot_acquire+0x2f/0x60 [f2fs] dqget+0x310/0x450 dquot_transfer+0x7e/0x120 f2fs_setattr+0x11a/0x4a0 [f2fs] notify_change+0x349/0x480 chown_common+0x168/0x1c0 do_fchownat+0xbc/0xf0 __x64_sys_fchownat+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x220 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Passing fsdata parameter to .write_{begin,end} in f2fs_quota_write(), so that if quota file is compressed one, we can avoid above NULL pointer dereference when updating quota content.
--- fs/f2fs/super.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/super.c +3 -2
@@ -1648,6 +1648,7 @@ static ssize_t f2fs_quota_write(struct super_block *sb, int type,int offset = off & (sb->s_blocksize -1 );size_t towrite = len;struct page *page; +void *fsdata =NULL ;char *kaddr;int err =0 ;int tocopy;
@@ -1657,7 +1658,7 @@ static ssize_t f2fs_quota_write(struct super_block *sb, int type, towrite); retry: err = a_ops->write_begin (NULL , mapping, off, tocopy,0 , - &page,NULL ); + &page, &fsdata);if (unlikely (err)) {if (err == -ENOMEM ) {congestion_wait (BLK_RW_ASYNC ,HZ /50 );
@@ -1672,7 +1673,7 @@ static ssize_t f2fs_quota_write(struct super_block *sb, int type,flush_dcache_page (page); a_ops->write_end (NULL , mapping, off, tocopy, tocopy, - page,NULL ); + page, fsdata); offset =0 ; towrite -= tocopy; off += tocopy;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 47/64 drm/vc4: Fix HDMI mode validation
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b1e7396a1d0e6af6806337fdaaa44098d6b3343c ]
Current mode validation impedes setting up some video modes which should be supported otherwise. Namely 1920x1200@60Hz.
Fix this by lowering the minimum HDMI state machine clock to pixel clock ratio allowed.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c +16 -4
@@ -698,11 +698,23 @@ static enum drm_mode_status vc4_hdmi_encoder_mode_valid(struct drm_encoder *crtc, const struct drm_display_mode *mode) { -/* HSM clock must be 108% of the pixel clock. Additionally, -* the AXI clock needs to be at least 25% of pixel clock, but -* HSM ends up being the limiting factor. +/* +* As stated in RPi's vc4 firmware "HDMI state machine (HSM) clock must +* be faster than pixel clock, infinitesimally faster, tested in +* simulation. Otherwise, exact value is unimportant for HDMI +* operation." This conflicts with bcm2835's vc4 documentation, which +* states HSM's clock has to be at least 108% of the pixel clock. +* +* Real life tests reveal that vc4's firmware statement holds up, and +* users are able to use pixel clocks closer to HSM's, namely for +* 1920x1200@60Hz. So it was decided to have leave a 1% margin between +* both clocks. Which, for RPi0-3 implies a maximum pixel clock of +* 162MHz. +* +* Additionally, the AXI clock needs to be at least 25% of +* pixel clock, but HSM ends up being the limiting factor. */ -if (mode->clock >HSM_CLOCK_FREQ / (1000 *108 /100 )) +if (mode->clock >HSM_CLOCK_FREQ / (1000 *101 /100 ))return MODE_CLOCK_HIGH ;return MODE_OK ;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 48/64 iommu/vt-d: Fix mm reference leak
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jacob Pan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 902baf61adf6b187f0a6b789e70d788ea71ff5bc ]
Move canonical address check before mmget_not_zero() to avoid mm reference leak.
--- drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c +4 -3
@@ -620,14 +620,15 @@ static irqreturn_t prq_event_thread(int irq, void *d)* any faults on kernel addresses. */ if (!svm->mm) goto bad_req; -/* If the mm is already defunct, don't handle faults. */ -if (!mmget_not_zero (svm->mm)) - goto bad_req;/* If address is not canonical, return invalid response */ if (!is_canonical_address (address)) goto bad_req; +/* If the mm is already defunct, don't handle faults. */ +if (!mmget_not_zero (svm->mm)) + goto bad_req; +down_read (&svm->mm->mmap_sem); vma =find_extend_vma (svm->mm, address);if (!vma || address < vma->vm_start)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 49/64 ext2: fix empty body warnings when -Wextra is used
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 44a52022e7f15cbaab957df1c14f7a4f527ef7cf ]
When EXT2_ATTR_DEBUG is not defined, modify the 2 debug macros to use the no_printk() macro instead of <nothing>. This fixes gcc warnings when -Wextra is used:
../fs/ext2/xattr.c:252:42: warning: suggest braces around empty body in an ‘if’ statement [-Wempty-body] ../fs/ext2/xattr.c:258:42: warning: suggest braces around empty body in an ‘if’ statement [-Wempty-body] ../fs/ext2/xattr.c:330:42: warning: suggest braces around empty body in an ‘if’ statement [-Wempty-body] ../fs/ext2/xattr.c:872:45: warning: suggest braces around empty body in an ‘else’ statement [-Wempty-body]
I have verified that the only object code change (with gcc 7.5.0) is the reversal of some instructions from 'cmp a,b' to 'cmp b,a'.
--- fs/ext2/xattr.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext2/xattr.c +3 -2
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@#include <linux/buffer_head.h> #include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/printk.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/mbcache.h> #include <linux/quotaops.h>
@@ -84,8 +85,8 @@printk ("\n" ); \ } while (0) #else -# define ea_idebug(f...) -# define ea_bdebug(f...) +# define ea_idebug(inode, f...) no_printk(f) +# define ea_bdebug(bh, f...) no_printk(f)#endif static int ext2_xattr_set2(struct inode *, struct buffer_head *,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 50/64 ext2: fix debug reference to ext2_xattr_cache
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 32302085a8d90859c40cf1a5e8313f575d06ec75 ]
Fix a debug-only build error in ext2/xattr.c:
When building without extra debugging, (and with another patch that uses no_printk() instead of <empty> for the ext2-xattr debug-print macros, this build error happens:
../fs/ext2/xattr.c: In function ‘ext2_xattr_cache_insert’:../fs/ext2/xattr.c:869:18: error: ‘ext2_xattr_cache’ undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean ‘ext2_xattr_list’?
atomic_read(&ext2_xattr_cache->c_entry_count));
Fix the problem by removing cached entry count from the debug message since otherwise we'd have to export the mbcache structure just for that.
--- fs/ext2/xattr.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext2/xattr.c +1 -2
@@ -839,8 +839,7 @@ ext2_xattr_cache_insert(struct mb_cache *cache, struct buffer_head *bh) error =mb_cache_entry_create (cache,GFP_NOFS , hash, bh->b_blocknr,1 );if (error) {if (error == -EBUSY ) { -ea_bdebug (bh,"already in cache (%d cache entries)" , -atomic_read (&ext2_xattr_cache->c_entry_count)); +ea_bdebug (bh,"already in cache" ); error =0 ; } }else
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 51/64 power: supply: axp288_fuel_gauge: Broaden vendor check for Intel Compute Sticks.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jeffery Miller <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e42fe5b29ac07210297e75f36deefe54edbdbf80 ]
The Intel Compute Stick STK1A32SC can have a system vendor of "Intel(R) Client Systems".
Broaden the Intel Compute Stick DMI checks so that they match "Intel Corporation" as well as "Intel(R) Client Systems".
This fixes an issue where the STK1A32SC compute sticks were still exposing a battery with the existing blacklist entry.
--- drivers/power/supply/axp288_fuel_gauge.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/power/supply/axp288_fuel_gauge.c +2 -2
@@ -718,14 +718,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id axp288_fuel_gauge_blacklist[] = { { /* Intel Cherry Trail Compute Stick, Windows version */ .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel Corporation"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel"), DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "STK1AW32SC"), }, }, { /* Intel Cherry Trail Compute Stick, version without an OS */ .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel Corporation"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel"), DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "STK1A32SC"), }, },
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 52/64 libnvdimm: Out of bounds read in __nd_ioctl()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f84afbdd3a9e5e10633695677b95422572f920dc ]
The "cmd" comes from the user and it can be up to 255. It it's more than the number of bits in long, it results out of bounds read when we check test_bit(cmd, &cmd_mask). The highest valid value for "cmd" is ND_CMD_CALL (10) so I added a compare against that.
--- drivers/nvdimm/bus.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/nvdimm/bus.c +4 -2
@@ -984,8 +984,10 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm,return -EFAULT ; } -if (!desc || (desc->out_num + desc->in_num ==0 ) || - !test_bit (cmd, &cmd_mask)) +if (!desc || + (desc->out_num + desc->in_num ==0 ) || + cmd >ND_CMD_CALL || + !test_bit (cmd, &cmd_mask))return -ENOTTY ;/* fail write commands (when read-only) */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 53/64 iommu/amd: Fix the configuration of GCR3 table root pointer
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Adrian Huang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c20f36534666e37858a14e591114d93cc1be0d34 ]
The SPA of the GCR3 table root pointer[51:31] masks 20 bits. However, this requires 21 bits (Please see the AMD IOMMU specification). This leads to the potential failure when the bit 51 of SPA of the GCR3 table root pointer is 1'.
--- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h +1 -1
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@#define DTE_GCR3_VAL_A (x) (((x) >> 12) & 0x00007ULL)#define DTE_GCR3_VAL_B (x) (((x) >> 15) & 0x0ffffULL) -#define DTE_GCR3_VAL_C (x) (((x) >> 31) & 0xfffffULL) +#define DTE_GCR3_VAL_C (x) (((x) >> 31) & 0x1fffffULL)#define DTE_GCR3_INDEX_A 0#define DTE_GCR3_INDEX_B 1
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 54/64 f2fs: fix to wait all node page writeback
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit dc5a941223edd803f476a153abd950cc3a83c3e1 ]
There is a race condition that we may miss to wait for all node pages writeback, fix it.
- fsync() - shrink
- f2fs_do_sync_file
- __write_node_page
- set_page_writeback(page#0) : remove DIRTY/TOWRITE flag
- f2fs_fsync_node_pages
: won't find page #0 as TOWRITE flag was removeD
- f2fs_wait_on_node_pages_writeback
: wont' wait page #0 writeback as it was not in fsync_node_list list.
- f2fs_add_fsync_node_entry
--- fs/f2fs/node.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/node.c +4 -3
@@ -1559,15 +1559,16 @@ static int __write_node_page(struct page *page, bool atomic, bool *submitted,if (atomic && !test_opt (sbi,NOBARRIER )) fio.op_flags |=REQ_PREFLUSH |REQ_FUA ; -set_page_writeback (page); -ClearPageError (page); - +/* should add to global list before clearing PAGECACHE status */ if (f2fs_in_warm_node_list (sbi, page)) { seq =f2fs_add_fsync_node_entry (sbi, page);if (seq_id) *seq_id = seq; } +set_page_writeback (page); +ClearPageError (page); + fio.old_blkaddr = ni.blk_addr;f2fs_do_write_node_page (nid, &fio);set_node_addr (sbi, &ni, fio.new_blkaddr,is_fsync_dnode (page));
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 55/64 net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Fix overflow checks
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
commit d0802dc411f469569a537283b6f3833af47aece9 upstream.
Commit f949a12fd697 ("net: dsa: bcm_sf2: fix buffer overflow doing set_rxnfc") tried to fix the some user controlled buffer overflows in bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_set() and bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_del() but the fix was using CFP_NUM_RULES, which while it is correct not to overflow the bitmaps, is not representative of what the device actually supports. Correct that by using bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_size() instead.
The latter subtracts the number of rules by 1, so change the checks from greater than or equal to greater than accordingly.
--- drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c +3 -6
@@ -742,17 +742,14 @@ static int bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_set(struct d fs->m_ext.data[1]))return -EINVAL ; -if (fs->location !=RX_CLS_LOC_ANY && fs->location >=CFP_NUM_RULES ) +if (fs->location !=RX_CLS_LOC_ANY && + fs->location >bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_size (priv))return -EINVAL ;if (fs->location !=RX_CLS_LOC_ANY &&test_bit (fs->location, priv->cfp.used))return -EBUSY ; -if (fs->location !=RX_CLS_LOC_ANY && - fs->location >bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_size (priv)) -return -EINVAL ; -/* This rule is a Wake-on-LAN filter and we must specifically * target the CPU port in order for it to be working. */
@@ -839,7 +836,7 @@ static int bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_del(struct bu32 next_loc =0 ;int ret; -if (loc >=CFP_NUM_RULES ) +if (loc >bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_size (priv))return -EINVAL ;/* Refuse deleting unused rules, and those that are not unique since
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 56/64 fbdev: potential information leak in do_fb_ioctl()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit d3d19d6fc5736a798b118971935ce274f7deaa82 upstream.
The "fix" struct has a 2 byte hole after ->ywrapstep and the "fix = info->fix;" assignment doesn't necessarily clear it. It depends on the compiler. The solution is just to replace the assignment with an memcpy().
--- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +1 -1
@@ -1122,7 +1122,7 @@ static long do_fb_ioctl(struct fb_info *case FBIOGET_FSCREENINFO :if (!lock_fb_info (info))return -ENODEV ; - fix = info->fix; +memcpy (&fix, &info->fix,sizeof (fix));unlock_fb_info (info); ret =copy_to_user (argp, &fix,sizeof (fix)) ? -EFAULT :0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 57/64 iio: si1133: read 24-bit signed integer for measurement
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Maxime Roussin-Bélanger <[email protected]>
commit 328b50e9a0ad1fe8accdf8c19923deebab5e0c01 upstream.
The chip is configured in 24 bit mode. The values read from it must always be treated as is. This fixes the issue by replacing the previous 16 bits value by a 24 bits buffer.
This changes affects the value output by previous version of the driver, since the least significant byte was missing. The upper half of 16 bit values previously output are now the upper half of a 24 bit value.
--- drivers/iio/light/si1133.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/light/si1133.c +24 -13
@@ -102,6 +102,9 @@#define SI1133_INPUT_FRACTION_LOW 15#define SI1133_LUX_OUTPUT_FRACTION 12#define SI1133_LUX_BUFFER_SIZE 9 +#define SI1133_MEASURE_BUFFER_SIZE 3 + +#define SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX 23static const int si1133_scale_available[] = {1 ,2 ,4 ,8 ,16 ,32 ,64 ,128 };
@@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ static const struct si1133_lux_coeff lux } }; -static int si1133_calculate_polynomial_inner (u32 input,u8 fraction,u16 mag, +static int si1133_calculate_polynomial_inner (s32 input,u8 fraction,u16 mag,s8 shift) {return ((input << fraction) / mag) << shift; } -static int si1133_calculate_output (u32 x,u32 y,u8 x_order,u8 y_order, +static int si1133_calculate_output (s32 x,s32 y,u8 x_order,u8 y_order,u8 input_fraction,s8 sign,const struct si1133_coeff *coeffs) {
@@ -276,7 +279,7 @@ static int si1133_calculate_output(u32 x* The algorithm is from: * https://siliconlabs.github.io/Gecko_SDK_Doc/efm32zg/html/si1133_8c_source.html#l00716 */ -static int si1133_calc_polynomial (u32 x,u32 y,u8 input_fraction,u8 num_coeff, +static int si1133_calc_polynomial (s32 x,s32 y,u8 input_fraction,u8 num_coeff,const struct si1133_coeff *coeffs) {u8 x_order, y_order;
@@ -614,7 +617,7 @@ static int si1133_measure(struct si1133_ {int err; -__be16 resp; +u8 buffer[SI1133_MEASURE_BUFFER_SIZE ]; err =si1133_set_adcmux (data,0 , chan->channel);if (err)
@@ -625,12 +628,13 @@ static int si1133_measure(struct si1133_if (err)return err; - err =si1133_bulk_read (data,SI1133_REG_HOSTOUT (0 ),sizeof (resp), - (u8 *)&resp); + err =si1133_bulk_read (data,SI1133_REG_HOSTOUT (0 ),sizeof (buffer), + buffer);if (err)return err; - *val =be16_to_cpu (resp); + *val =sign_extend32 ((buffer[0 ] <<16 ) | (buffer[1 ] <<8 ) | buffer[2 ], +SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX );return err; }
@@ -704,9 +708,9 @@ static int si1133_get_lux(struct si1133_ {int err;int lux; -u32 high_vis; -u32 low_vis; -u32 ir; +s32 high_vis; +s32 low_vis; +s32 ir;u8 buffer[SI1133_LUX_BUFFER_SIZE ];/* Activate lux channels */
@@ -719,9 +723,16 @@ static int si1133_get_lux(struct si1133_if (err)return err; - high_vis = (buffer[0 ] <<16 ) | (buffer[1 ] <<8 ) | buffer[2 ]; - low_vis = (buffer[3 ] <<16 ) | (buffer[4 ] <<8 ) | buffer[5 ]; - ir = (buffer[6 ] <<16 ) | (buffer[7 ] <<8 ) | buffer[8 ]; + high_vis = +sign_extend32 ((buffer[0 ] <<16 ) | (buffer[1 ] <<8 ) | buffer[2 ], +SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX ); + + low_vis = +sign_extend32 ((buffer[3 ] <<16 ) | (buffer[4 ] <<8 ) | buffer[5 ], +SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX ); + + ir =sign_extend32 ((buffer[6 ] <<16 ) | (buffer[7 ] <<8 ) | buffer[8 ], +SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX );if (high_vis >SI1133_ADC_THRESHOLD || ir >SI1133_ADC_THRESHOLD ) lux = si1133_calc_polynomial(high_vis, ir,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 58/64 tty: evh_bytechan: Fix out of bounds accesses
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]>
commit 3670664b5da555a2a481449b3baafff113b0ac35 upstream.
ev_byte_channel_send() assumes that its third argument is a 16 byte array. Some places where it is called it may not be (or we can't easily tell if it is). Newer compilers have started producing warnings about this, so make sure we actually pass a 16 byte array.
There may be more elegant solutions to this, but the driver is quite old and hasn't been updated in many years.
The warnings (from a powerpc allyesconfig build) are:
In file included from include/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:5,
from arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/byteorder.h:14,
from include/asm-generic/bitops/le.h:6,
from arch/powerpc/include/asm/bitops.h:250,
from include/linux/bitops.h:29,
from include/linux/kernel.h:12,
from include/asm-generic/bug.h:19,
from arch/powerpc/include/asm/bug.h:109,
from include/linux/bug.h:5,
from include/linux/mmdebug.h:5,
from include/linux/gfp.h:5,
from include/linux/slab.h:15,
from drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c:24:
drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c: In function ‘ehv_bc_udbg_putc’:
arch/powerpc/include/asm/epapr_hcalls.h:298:20: warning: array subscript 1 is outside array bounds of ‘const char[1]’ [-Warray-bounds]
298 | r6 = be32_to_cpu(p[1]);
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:40:51: note: in definition of macro ‘__be32_to_cpu’
40 | #define __be32_to_cpu(x) ((__force __u32)(__be32)(x))
| ^
arch/powerpc/include/asm/epapr_hcalls.h:298:7: note: in expansion of macro ‘be32_to_cpu’
298 | r6 = be32_to_cpu(p[1]);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c:166:13: note: while referencing ‘data’
166 | static void ehv_bc_udbg_putc(char c)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--- drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c +18 -3
@@ -136,6 +136,21 @@ static int find_console_handle(void)return 1 ; } +static unsigned int local_ev_byte_channel_send (unsigned int handle, +unsigned int *count, +const char *p) +{ +char buffer[EV_BYTE_CHANNEL_MAX_BYTES ]; +unsigned int c = *count; + +if (c <sizeof (buffer)) { +memcpy (buffer, p, c); +memset (&buffer[c],0 ,sizeof (buffer) - c); + p = buffer; + } +return ev_byte_channel_send (handle, count, p); +} +/*************************** EARLY CONSOLE DRIVER ***************************/ #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_EARLY_DEBUG_EHV_BC
@@ -154,7 +169,7 @@ static void byte_channel_spin_send(constdo { count =1 ; - ret =ev_byte_channel_send (CONFIG_PPC_EARLY_DEBUG_EHV_BC_HANDLE , + ret =local_ev_byte_channel_send (CONFIG_PPC_EARLY_DEBUG_EHV_BC_HANDLE , &count, &data); }while (ret ==EV_EAGAIN ); }
@@ -221,7 +236,7 @@ static int ehv_bc_console_byte_channel_swhile (count) { len = min_t(unsigned int, count, EV_BYTE_CHANNEL_MAX_BYTES);do { - ret =ev_byte_channel_send (handle, &len, s); + ret =local_ev_byte_channel_send (handle, &len, s); }while (ret ==EV_EAGAIN ); count -= len; s += len;
@@ -401,7 +416,7 @@ static void ehv_bc_tx_dequeue(struct ehvCIRC_CNT_TO_END (bc->head, bc->tail,BUF_SIZE ), EV_BYTE_CHANNEL_MAX_BYTES); - ret =ev_byte_channel_send (bc->handle, &len, bc->buf + bc->tail); + ret =local_ev_byte_channel_send (bc->handle, &len, bc->buf + bc->tail);/* 'len' is valid only if the return code is 0 or EV_EAGAIN */ if (!ret || (ret ==EV_EAGAIN ))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 59/64 locktorture: Print ratio of acquisitions, not failures
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
commit 80c503e0e68fbe271680ab48f0fe29bc034b01b7 upstream.
The __torture_print_stats() function in locktorture.c carefully initializes local variable "min" to statp[0].n_lock_acquired, but then compares it to statp[i].n_lock_fail. Given that the .n_lock_fail field should normally be zero, and given the initialization, it seems reasonable to display the maximum and minimum number acquisitions instead of miscomputing the maximum and minimum number of failures. This commit therefore switches from failures to acquisitions.
And this turns out to be not only a day-zero bug, but entirely my own fault. I hate it when that happens!
--- kernel/locking/locktorture.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/locking/locktorture.c +4 -4
@@ -710,10 +710,10 @@ static void __torture_print_stats(char *if (statp[i].n_lock_fail) fail = true; sum += statp[i].n_lock_acquired; -if (max < statp[i].n_lock_fail) - max = statp[i].n_lock_fail; -if (min > statp[i].n_lock_fail) - min = statp[i].n_lock_fail; +if (max < statp[i].n_lock_acquired) + max = statp[i].n_lock_acquired; +if (min > statp[i].n_lock_acquired) + min = statp[i].n_lock_acquired; } page += sprintf(page, "%s: Total: %lld Max/Min: %ld/%ld %s Fail: %d %s\n",
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 60/64 mtd: spinand: Explicitly use MTD_OPS_RAW to write the bad block marker to OOB
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Frieder Schrempf <[email protected]>
commit 621a7b780bd8b7054647d53d5071961f2c9e0873 upstream.
When writing the bad block marker to the OOB area the access mode should be set to MTD_OPS_RAW as it is done for reading the marker. Currently this only works because req.mode is initialized to MTD_OPS_PLACE_OOB (0) and spinand_write_to_cache_op() checks for req.mode != MTD_OPS_AUTO_OOB.
Fix this by explicitly setting req.mode to MTD_OPS_RAW.
--- drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c +1 -0
@@ -670,6 +670,7 @@ static int spinand_markbad(struct nand_d .ooboffs = 0, .ooblen = sizeof(marker), .oobbuf.out = marker, + .mode = MTD_OPS_RAW, };int ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 61/64 mtd: lpddr: Fix a double free in probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit 4da0ea71ea934af18db4c63396ba2af1a679ef02 upstream.
This function is only called from lpddr_probe(). We free "lpddr" both here and in the caller, so it's a double free. The best place to free "lpddr" is in lpddr_probe() so let's delete this one.
--- drivers/mtd/lpddr/lpddr_cmds.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mtd/lpddr/lpddr_cmds.c +0 -1
@@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ struct mtd_info *lpddr_cmdset(struct map shared =kmalloc_array (lpddr->numchips,sizeof (struct flchip_shared ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!shared) { -kfree (lpddr);kfree (mtd);return NULL ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 62/64 mtd: phram: fix a double free issue in error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Wen Yang <[email protected]>
commit 49c64df880570034308e4a9a49c4bc95cf8cdb33 upstream.
The variable 'name' is released multiple times in the error path, which may cause double free issues.
This problem is avoided by adding a goto label to release the memory uniformly. And this change also makes the code a bit more cleaner.
--- drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c +9 -6
@@ -240,22 +240,25 @@ static int phram_setup(const char *val) ret =parse_num64 (&start, token[1 ]);if (ret) { -kfree (name);parse_err ("illegal start address\n" ); + goto error; } ret =parse_num64 (&len, token[2 ]);if (ret) { -kfree (name);parse_err ("illegal device length\n" ); + goto error; } ret =register_device (name, start, len); -if (!ret) -pr_info ("%s device: %#llx at %#llx\n" , name, len, start); -else -kfree (name); +if (ret) + goto error; +pr_info ("%s device: %#llx at %#llx\n" , name, len, start); +return 0 ; + +error: +kfree (name);return ret; }
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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 63/64 KEYS: Dont write out to userspace while holding key semaphore
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
commit d3ec10aa95819bff18a0d936b18884c7816d0914 upstream.
A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a keyutils test:
[12537.027242] ======================================================
[12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE --------- - -
[12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------
[12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock:
[12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12537.208365]
[12537.208365] but task is already holding lock:
[12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12537.270476]
[12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[12537.270476]
[12537.307209]
[12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[12537.340754]
[12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}:
[12537.367434] down_write+0x4d/0x110
[12537.385202] __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280
[12537.405232] request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70
[12537.427221] request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.444839] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.468445] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.496731] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.519418] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.546263] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.573551] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.601045] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.617906] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.636225]
[12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}:
[12537.664525] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.683734] request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70
[12537.705640] request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.723304] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.746773] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.775607] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.798322] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.823369] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.847262] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.873477] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.890281] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.908649]
[12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}:
[12537.935225] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.954450] cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs]
[12537.977250] smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs]
[12538.000659] cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs]
[12538.023920] read_pages+0xf5/0x560
[12538.041583] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0
[12538.067047] ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10
[12538.092069] filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830
[12538.111637] __do_fault+0x82/0x260
[12538.129216] do_fault+0x419/0xfb0
[12538.146390] __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0
[12538.167408] handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550
[12538.187401] __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60
[12538.207395] do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0
[12538.225777] page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[12538.243010]
[12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}:
[12538.267875] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12538.286848] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12538.306006] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12538.327936] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12538.352154] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12538.370558] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12538.391470] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12538.410511] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
[12538.435535]
[12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this:
[12538.435535]
[12538.472829] Chain exists of:
[12538.472829] &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class
[12538.472829]
[12538.524820] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[12538.524820]
[12538.551431] CPU0 CPU1
[12538.572654] ---- ----
[12538.595865] lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.613737] lock(root_key_user.cons_lock);
[12538.644234] lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.672410] lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
[12538.687758]
[12538.687758] *** DEADLOCK ***
[12538.687758]
[12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598:
[12538.732097] #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12538.770573]
[12538.770573] stack backtrace:
[12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
[12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015
[12538.881963] Call Trace:
[12538.892897] dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0
[12538.907908] print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279
[12538.932891] ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250
[12538.948979] check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0
[12538.971643] ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190
[12538.992738] ? check_usage+0x550/0x550
[12539.009845] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
[12539.025484] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0
[12539.043555] __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0
[12539.061551] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10
[12539.080554] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12539.100330] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.119079] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12539.135869] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.153234] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12539.172787] ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110
[12539.190059] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12539.211526] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12539.227561] ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0
[12539.249076] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12539.266660] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12539.283091] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdfOne way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead, an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding the lock.
That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace write helpers. That is,
1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy.
2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy().
3) All the fault handling code is removed.
Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch.
--- include/keys/big_key-type.h | 2 include/keys/user-type.h | 3 - include/linux/key-type.h | 2 net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 2 net/rxrpc/key.c | 27 +++-------- security/keys/big_key.c | 11 +--- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 7 +- security/keys/keyctl.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- security/keys/keyring.c | 6 -- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 7 +- security/keys/trusted.c | 14 ----- security/keys/user_defined.c | 5 -- 12 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
include/keys/big_key-type.h +1 -1
@@ -21,6 +21,6 @@ extern void big_key_free_preparse(structextern void big_key_revoke (struct key *key);extern void big_key_destroy (struct key *key);extern void big_key_describe (const struct key *big_key,struct seq_file *m); -extern long big_key_read (const struct key *key,char __user *buffer,size_t buflen); +extern long big_key_read (const struct key *key,char *buffer,size_t buflen);#endif /* _KEYS_BIG_KEY_TYPE_H */
include/keys/user-type.h +1 -2
@@ -45,8 +45,7 @@ extern int user_update(struct key *key,extern void user_revoke (struct key *key);extern void user_destroy (struct key *key);extern void user_describe (const struct key *user,struct seq_file *m); -extern long user_read (const struct key *key, -char __user *buffer,size_t buflen); +extern long user_read (const struct key *key,char *buffer,size_t buflen);static inline const struct user_key_payload *user_key_payload_rcu (const struct key *key) {
include/linux/key-type.h +1 -1
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ struct key_type {* much is copied into the buffer * - shouldn't do the copy if the buffer is NULL */ -long (*read)(const struct key *key,char __user *buffer,size_t buflen); +long (*read)(const struct key *key,char *buffer,size_t buflen);/* handle request_key() for this type instead of invoking * /sbin/request-key (optional)
net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +1 -1
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static void dns_resolver_describe(const* - the key's semaphore is read-locked */ static long dns_resolver_read (const struct key *key, -char __user *buffer,size_t buflen) +char *buffer,size_t buflen) {int err =PTR_ERR (key->payload.data[dns_key_error]);
net/rxrpc/key.c +9 -18
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static void rxrpc_free_preparse_s(structstatic void rxrpc_destroy (struct key *);static void rxrpc_destroy_s (struct key *);static void rxrpc_describe (const struct key *,struct seq_file *); -static long rxrpc_read (const struct key *,char __user *,size_t ); +static long rxrpc_read (const struct key *,char *,size_t );/* * rxrpc defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
@@ -1044,12 +1044,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_get_null_key);* - this returns the result in XDR form */ static long rxrpc_read (const struct key *key, -char __user *buffer,size_t buflen) +char *buffer,size_t buflen) {const struct rxrpc_key_token *token;const struct krb5_principal *princ;size_t size; -__be32 __user *xdr, *oldxdr; +__be32 *xdr, *oldxdr;u32 cnlen, toksize, ntoks, tok, zero;u16 toksizes[AFSTOKEN_MAX ];int loop;
@@ -1126,30 +1126,25 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct keyif (!buffer || buflen < size)return size; - xdr = (__be32 __user *) buffer; + xdr = (__be32 *)buffer; zero =0 ;#define ENCODE (x) \ do { \ - __be32 y = htonl(x); \ - if (put_user(y, xdr++) < 0) \ - goto fault; \ + *xdr++ = htonl(x); \ } while(0)#define ENCODE_DATA (l, s) \ do { \ u32 _l = (l); \ ENCODE(l); \ - if (copy_to_user(xdr, (s), _l) != 0) \ - goto fault; \ - if (_l & 3 && \ - copy_to_user((u8 __user *)xdr + _l, &zero, 4 - (_l & 3)) != 0) \ - goto fault; \ + memcpy(xdr, (s), _l); \ + if (_l & 3) \ + memcpy((u8 *)xdr + _l, &zero, 4 - (_l & 3)); \ xdr += (_l + 3) >> 2; \ } while(0)#define ENCODE64 (x) \ do { \ __be64 y = cpu_to_be64(x); \ - if (copy_to_user(xdr, &y, 8) != 0) \ - goto fault; \ + memcpy(xdr, &y, 8); \ xdr += 8 >> 2; \ } while(0)#define ENCODE_STR (s) \
@@ -1240,8 +1235,4 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key ASSERTCMP((char __user *) xdr - buffer, ==, size);_leave (" = %zu" , size);return size; - -fault: -_leave (" = -EFAULT" ); -return -EFAULT ; }
security/keys/big_key.c +4 -7
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key ** read the key data * - the key's semaphore is read-locked */ -long big_key_read (const struct key *key,char __user *buffer,size_t buflen) +long big_key_read (const struct key *key,char *buffer,size_t buflen) {size_t datalen = (size_t )key->payload.data[big_key_len];long ret;
@@ -395,9 +395,8 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, ret = datalen; -/* copy decrypted data to user */ -if (copy_to_user (buffer, buf->virt, datalen) !=0 ) - ret = -EFAULT ; +/* copy out decrypted data */ +memcpy (buffer, buf->virt, datalen); err_fput:fput (file);
@@ -405,9 +404,7 @@ error:big_key_free_buffer (buf); }else { ret = datalen; -if (copy_to_user (buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], - datalen) !=0 ) - ret = -EFAULT ; +memcpy (buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen); }return ret;
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +3 -4
@@ -895,14 +895,14 @@ out: }/* -* encrypted_read - format and copy the encrypted data to userspace +* encrypted_read - format and copy out the encrypted data * * The resulting datablob format is: * <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv> <encrypted data> * * On success, return to userspace the encrypted key datablob size. */ -static long encrypted_read (const struct key *key,char __user *buffer, +static long encrypted_read (const struct key *key,char *buffer,size_t buflen) {struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
@@ -950,8 +950,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const structkey_put (mkey);memzero_explicit (derived_key,sizeof (derived_key)); -if (copy_to_user (buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len) !=0 ) - ret = -EFAULT ; +memcpy (buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len);kzfree (ascii_buf);return asciiblob_len;
security/keys/keyctl.c +57 -16
115 lines not on this page · raw message
security/keys/keyring.c +1 -5
@@ -432,7 +432,6 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const v {struct keyring_read_iterator_context *ctx = data;const struct key *key =keyring_ptr_to_key (object); -int ret;kenter ("{%s,%d},,{%zu/%zu}" , key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->buflen);
@@ -440,10 +439,7 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const vif (ctx->count >= ctx->buflen)return 1 ; - ret =put_user (key->serial, ctx->buffer); -if (ret <0 ) -return ret; - ctx->buffer++; + *ctx->buffer++ = key->serial; ctx->count +=sizeof (key->serial);return 0 ; }
security/keys/request_key_auth.c +3 -4
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static int request_key_auth_instantiate(static void request_key_auth_describe (const struct key *,struct seq_file *);static void request_key_auth_revoke (struct key *);static void request_key_auth_destroy (struct key *); -static long request_key_auth_read (const struct key *,char __user *,size_t ); +static long request_key_auth_read (const struct key *,char *,size_t );/* * The request-key authorisation key type definition.
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(co* - the key's semaphore is read-locked */ static long request_key_auth_read (const struct key *key, -char __user *buffer,size_t buflen) +char *buffer,size_t buflen) {struct request_key_auth *rka =get_request_key_auth (key);size_t datalen;
@@ -102,8 +102,7 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(constif (buflen > datalen) buflen = datalen; -if (copy_to_user (buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen) !=0 ) - ret = -EFAULT ; +memcpy (buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen); }return ret;
security/keys/trusted.c +2 -12
@@ -1135,11 +1135,10 @@ out:* trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex. * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size. */ -static long trusted_read (const struct key *key,char __user *buffer, +static long trusted_read (const struct key *key,char *buffer,size_t buflen) {const struct trusted_key_payload *p; -char *ascii_buf;char *bufp;int i;
@@ -1148,18 +1147,9 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct kereturn -EINVAL ;if (buffer && buflen >=2 * p->blob_len) { - ascii_buf =kmalloc_array (2 , p->blob_len,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!ascii_buf) -return -ENOMEM ; - - bufp = ascii_buf; + bufp = buffer;for (i =0 ; i < p->blob_len; i++) bufp =hex_byte_pack (bufp, p->blob[i]); -if (copy_to_user (buffer, ascii_buf,2 * p->blob_len) !=0 ) { -kzfree (ascii_buf); -return -EFAULT ; - } -kzfree (ascii_buf); }return 2 * p->blob_len; }
security/keys/user_defined.c +2 -3
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_describe);* read the key data * - the key's semaphore is read-locked */ -long user_read (const struct key *key,char __user *buffer,size_t buflen) +long user_read (const struct key *key,char *buffer,size_t buflen) {const struct user_key_payload *upayload;long ret;
@@ -185,8 +185,7 @@ long user_read(const struct key *key, chif (buflen > upayload->datalen) buflen = upayload->datalen; -if (copy_to_user (buffer, upayload->data, buflen) !=0 ) - ret = -EFAULT ; +memcpy (buffer, upayload->data, buflen); }return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 64/64 bpf: fix buggy r0 retval refinement for tracing helpers
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
[ no upstream commit ]
See the glory details in 100605035e15 ("bpf: Verifier, do_refine_retval_range may clamp umin to 0 incorrectly") for why 849fa50662fb ("bpf/verifier: refine retval R0 state for bpf_get_stack helper") is buggy. The whole series however is not suitable for stable since it adds significant amount [0] of verifier complexity in order to add 32bit subreg tracking. Something simpler is needed.
Unfortunately, reverting 849fa50662fb ("bpf/verifier: refine retval R0 state for bpf_get_stack helper") or just cherry-picking 100605035e15 ("bpf: Verifier, do_refine_retval_range may clamp umin to 0 incorrectly") is not an option since it will break existing tracing programs badly (at least those that are using bpf_get_stack() and bpf_probe_read_str() helpers). Not fixing it in stable is also not an option since on 4.19 kernels an error will cause a soft-lockup due to hitting dead-code sanitized branch since we don't hard-wire such branches in old kernels yet. But even then for 5.x 849fa50662fb ("bpf/verifier: refine retval R0 state for bpf_get_stack helper") would cause wrong bounds on the verifier simluation when an error is hit.
In one of the earlier iterations of mentioned patch series for upstream there was the concern that just using smax_value in do_refine_retval_range() would nuke bounds by subsequent <<32 >>32 shifts before the comparison against 0 [1] which eventually led to the 32bit subreg tracking in the first place. While I initially went for implementing the idea [1] to pattern match the two shift operations, it turned out to be more complex than actually needed, meaning, we could simply treat do_refine_retval_range() similarly to how we branch off verification for conditionals or under speculation, that is, pushing a new reg state to the stack for later verification. This means, instead of verifying the current path with the ret_reg in [S32MIN, msize_max_value] interval where later bounds would get nuked, we split this into two: i) for the success case where ret_reg can be in [0, msize_max_value], and ii) for the error case with ret_reg known to be in interval [S32MIN, -1]. Latter will preserve the bounds during these shift patterns and can match reg < 0 test. test_progs also succeed with this approach.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158507130343.15666.8018068546764556975.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158015334199.28573.4940395881683556537.stgit@john-XPS-13-9370/T/#m2e0ad1d5949131014748b6daa48a3495e7f0456d
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +34 -11
@@ -188,8 +188,7 @@ struct bpf_call_arg_meta {bool pkt_access;int regno;int access_size; -s64 msize_smax_value; -u64 msize_umax_value; +u64 msize_max_value; };static DEFINE_MUTEX (bpf_verifier_lock);
@@ -2076,8 +2075,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_ver/* remember the mem_size which may be used later * to refine return values. */ - meta->msize_smax_value = reg->smax_value; - meta->msize_umax_value = reg->umax_value; + meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value;/* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check * happens using its boundaries.
@@ -2448,21 +2446,44 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_return 0 ; } -static void do_refine_retval_range (struct bpf_reg_state *regs,int ret_type, -int func_id, -struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) +static int do_refine_retval_range (struct bpf_verifier_env *env, +struct bpf_reg_state *regs,int ret_type, +int func_id,struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) {struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0 ]; +struct bpf_reg_state tmp_reg = *ret_reg; +bool ret;if (ret_type !=RET_INTEGER || (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack && func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str)) -return ; +return 0 ; + +/* Error case where ret is in interval [S32MIN, -1]. */ + ret_reg->smin_value =S32_MIN ; + ret_reg->smax_value =-1 ; - ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_smax_value; - ret_reg->umax_value = meta->msize_umax_value;__reg_deduce_bounds (ret_reg);__reg_bound_offset (ret_reg); +__update_reg_bounds (ret_reg); + + ret =push_stack (env, env->insn_idx +1 , env->insn_idx, false); +if (!ret) +return -EFAULT ; + + *ret_reg = tmp_reg; + +/* Success case where ret is in range [0, msize_max_value]. */ + ret_reg->smin_value =0 ; + ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; + ret_reg->umin_value = ret_reg->smin_value; + ret_reg->umax_value = ret_reg->smax_value; + +__reg_deduce_bounds (ret_reg); +__reg_bound_offset (ret_reg); +__update_reg_bounds (ret_reg); + +return 0 ; } static int
@@ -2617,7 +2638,9 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_return -EINVAL ; } -do_refine_retval_range (regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); + err =do_refine_retval_range (env, regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); +if (err) +return err; err =check_map_func_compatibility (env, meta.map_ptr, func_id);if (err)
Hello Greg,
Quoted 8 lines
From: [email protected] <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Greg Kroah-Hartman
Sent: 22 April 2020 10:57This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.118 release. There are 64 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
No build/boot issues seen for CIP configs for Linux 4.19.118-rc1 (b5f03cd61ab6).
Build/test pipeline/logs: https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/pipelines/138626535
GitLab CI pipeline: https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-cip-pipelines/-/blob/master/trees/linux-4.19.y.yml
Relevant LAVA jobs: https://lava.ciplatform.org/scheduler/alljobs?length=25&search=b5f03cd61#table
Kind regards, Chris
Quoted 300 lines
Responses should be made by Fri, 24 Apr 2020 09:48:23 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-
4.19.118-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.19.118-rc1Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
bpf: fix buggy r0 retval refinement for tracing helpersWaiman Long <[email protected]>
KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphoreWen Yang <[email protected]>
mtd: phram: fix a double free issue in error pathDan Carpenter <[email protected]>
mtd: lpddr: Fix a double free inprobe()Frieder Schrempf <[email protected]>
mtd: spinand: Explicitly useMTD_OPS_RAWto write the bad block marker to
OOBPaul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
locktorture: Print ratio of acquisitions, not failuresStephen Rothwell <[email protected]>
tty:evh_bytechan: Fix out of bounds accessesMaxime Roussin-Bélanger <[email protected]>
iio: si1133: read 24-bit signed integer for measurementDan Carpenter <[email protected]>
fbdev: potential information leak indo_fb_ioctl()Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
net: dsa:bcm_sf2: Fix overflow checksChao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix to wait all node page writebackAdrian Huang <[email protected]>
iommu/amd: Fix the configuration of GCR3 table root pointerDan Carpenter <[email protected]>
libnvdimm: Out of bounds read in__nd_ioctl()Jeffery Miller <[email protected]>
power: supply:axp288_fuel_gauge: Broaden vendor check for Intel Compute
Sticks.Jan Kara <[email protected]>
ext2: fix debug reference toext2_xattr_cacheRandy Dunlap <[email protected]>
ext2: fix empty body warnings when -Wextra is usedJacob Pan <[email protected]>
iommu/vt-d: Fix mm reference leakNicolas Saenz Julienne <[email protected]>
drm/vc4: Fix HDMI mode validationChao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix NULL pointer dereference inf2fs_write_begin()Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
NFS: Fix memory leaks innfs_pageio_stop_mirroring()Jack Zhang <[email protected]>
drm/amdkfd: kfree the wrong pointerQian Cai <[email protected]>
x86: ACPI: fix CPU hotplug deadlockDavid Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
KVM: s390: vsie: Fix possible race when shadowing region 3 tablesVegard Nossum <[email protected]>
compiler.h: fix error inBUILD_BUG_ON()reportingQian Cai <[email protected]>
percpu_counter: fix a data race atvm_committed_asSteven Price <[email protected]>
include/linux/swapops.h: correct guards fornon_swap_entry()Long Li <[email protected]>
cifs: Allocate encryption header through kmallocGabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>
um: ubd: Prevent buffer overrun on command completionEric Sandeen <[email protected]>
ext4: do not commit super on read-only bdevThomas Richter <[email protected]>
s390/cpum_sf: Fix wrong page count in error messageNathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
powerpc/maple: Fix declaration made after definitionAlexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
s390/cpuinfo: fix wrong output when CPU0 is offlineMisono Tomohiro <[email protected]>
NFS:direct.c: Fix memory leak of dreq whennfs_get_lock_contextfailsTrond Myklebust <[email protected]>
NFSv4/pnfs: Return valid stateids innfs_layout_find_inode_by_stateid()Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>
rtc: 88pm860x: fix possible race conditionLucas Stach <[email protected]>
soc: imx: gpc: fix power up sequencingSowjanya Komatineni <[email protected]>
clk: tegra: Fix Tegra PMC clock out parentsDmitry Osipenko <[email protected]>
power: supply:bq27xxx_battery: Silence deferred-probe errorClaudiu Beznea <[email protected]>
clk: at91: usb: continue ifclk_hw_round_rate()return zeroTianyu Lan <[email protected]>
x86/Hyper-V: Report crash data indie()whenpanic_on_oopsis setTianyu Lan <[email protected]>
x86/Hyper-V: Report crash register data whensysctl_record_panic_msgis not
setTianyu Lan <[email protected]>
x86/Hyper-V: Trigger crash enlightenment only once during system crash.Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
x86/Hyper-V: Freehv_panic_pagewhen fail to register kmsg dumpTianyu Lan <[email protected]>
x86/Hyper-V: Unload vmbus channel in hv panic callbackMagnus Karlsson <[email protected]>
xsk: Add missing check on user supplied headroom sizeIlya Dryomov <[email protected]>
rbd: callrbd_dev_unprobe()after unwatching and flushing notifiesIlya Dryomov <[email protected]>
rbd: avoid a deadlock onheader_rwsemwhen flushing notifiesNathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
video: fbdev: sis: Remove unnecessary parentheses and commented code[email protected] <[email protected]>
lib/raid6: usevdupq_n_u8to avoid endianness warningsTianyu Lan <[email protected]>
x86/Hyper-V: Report crash register data or kmsg before running crash kernelFrank Rowand <[email protected]>
of: overlay: kmemleak indup_and_fixup_symbol_prop()Frank Rowand <[email protected]>
of: unittest: kmemleak inof_unittest_overlay_high_level()Frank Rowand <[email protected]>
of: unittest: kmemleak inof_unittest_platform_populate()Frank Rowand <[email protected]>
of: unittest: kmemleak on changeset destroyTakashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda: Don't release card at firmware loading errorZenghui Yu <[email protected]>
irqchip/mbigen: Freemsi_descon device teardownPablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
netfilter:nf_tables: report EOPNOTSUPP on unsupported flags/object typeMartin Fuzzey <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: imx6: Use gpc for FEC interrupt controller to fix wake on LAN.Luke Nelson <[email protected]>
arm, bpf: Fix bugs with ALU64 {RSH, ARSH}BPF_Kshift by 0Michael Walle <[email protected]>
watchdog: sp805: fix restart handlerRoman Gushchin <[email protected]>
ext4: use non-movable memory for superblock readaheadLi Bin <[email protected]>
scsi: sg: addsg_remove_requestinsg_common_writeJosh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
objtool: Fix switch table detection in .text.unlikelyLuke Nelson <[email protected]>
arm, bpf: Fix offset overflow forBPF_MEMBPF_DW-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi | 5 +-- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qp.dtsi | 1 - arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c | 52 +++++++++++++++-------- arch/powerpc/platforms/maple/setup.c | 34 +++++++-------- arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/processor.c | 5 ++- arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 1 + arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c | 4 +- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 6 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cstate.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 10 +++++ drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c | 7 --- drivers/block/rbd.c | 25 +++++++---- drivers/clk/at91/clk-usb.c | 3 ++ drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra-pmc.c | 12 +++--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device.c | 4 +- drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c | 20 +++++++-- drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 3 ++ drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++------- drivers/iio/light/si1133.c | 37 ++++++++++------ drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h | 2 +- drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c | 7 +-- drivers/irqchip/irq-mbigen.c | 8 +++- drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c | 15 ++++--- drivers/mtd/lpddr/lpddr_cmds.c | 1 - drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c | 1 + drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c | 9 ++-- drivers/nvdimm/bus.c | 6 ++- drivers/of/overlay.c | 2 + drivers/of/unittest.c | 16 +++++-- drivers/power/supply/axp288_fuel_gauge.c | 4 +- drivers/power/supply/bq27xxx_battery.c | 5 ++- drivers/rtc/rtc-88pm860x.c | 14 +++--- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 4 +- drivers/soc/imx/gpc.c | 24 ++++++----- drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c | 21 +++++++-- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 2 +- drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c | 4 +- drivers/watchdog/sp805_wdt.c | 4 ++ fs/buffer.c | 11 +++++ fs/cifs/transport.c | 28 +++++++----- fs/ext2/xattr.c | 8 ++-- fs/ext4/inode.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/super.c | 5 ++- fs/f2fs/node.c | 7 +-- fs/f2fs/super.c | 5 ++- fs/nfs/callback_proc.c | 2 + fs/nfs/direct.c | 2 + fs/nfs/pagelist.c | 17 ++++---- include/acpi/processor.h | 8 ++++ include/keys/big_key-type.h | 2 +- include/keys/user-type.h | 3 +- include/linux/buffer_head.h | 8 ++++ include/linux/compiler.h | 2 +- include/linux/key-type.h | 2 +- include/linux/percpu_counter.h | 4 +- include/linux/swapops.h | 3 +- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 45 +++++++++++++++----- kernel/locking/locktorture.c | 8 ++-- lib/raid6/neon.uc | 5 +-- lib/raid6/recov_neon_inner.c | 7 +-- net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 4 +- net/rxrpc/key.c | 27 ++++-------- net/xdp/xdp_umem.c | 5 +-- security/keys/big_key.c | 11 ++--- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 7 ++- security/keys/keyctl.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- security/keys/keyring.c | 6 +-- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 7 ++- security/keys/trusted.c | 14 +----- security/keys/user_defined.c | 5 +-- sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 19 +++------ tools/objtool/check.c | 5 +-- 76 files changed, 508 insertions(+), 309 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · Chris Paterson
Hello Greg,
Quoted 8 lines
From: [email protected] <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Greg Kroah-Hartman
Sent: 22 April 2020 10:57This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.118 release. There are 64 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 5 lines
No build/boot issues seen for CIP configs for Linux 4.19.118-rc1 (
b5f03cd61ab6).Build/test pipeline/logs: https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/pipelines/138626535
GitLab CI pipeline: https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-cip-pipelines/-/blob/master/trees/linux-4.19.y.yml
Relevant LAVA jobs: https://lava.ciplatform.org/scheduler/alljobs?length=25&search=b5f03cd61#table
Thanks for testing 2 of these and letting me know.
greg k-h
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.118 release. There are 64 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Fri, 24 Apr 2020 09:48:23 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build results:
total: 155 pass: 155 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 418 pass: 418 fail: 0
Guenter
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.118 release. There are 64 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Fri, 24 Apr 2020 09:48:23 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.118-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Note:
The platform specific issue on qualcomm dragonboard 410c has been reported. Which started happening from 4.19.115-rc1.
https://lore.kernel.org/stable/OSAPR01MB36677B25C6FE12897832B3DD92D20@OSAPR01MB3667.jpnprd01.prod.outlook.com/T/#u
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.19.118-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.19.y
git commit: b5f03cd61ab67da20381e80c220d6727b914c3bb
git describe: v4.19.117-65-gb5f03cd61ab6
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.19-oe/build/v4.19.117-65-gb5f03cd61ab6
No regressions (compared to build v4.19.117)
No fixes (compared to build v4.19.117)
Ran 33561 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- juno-r2-compat
- juno-r2-kasan
- nxp-ls2088
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
- x86-kasan
Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* install-android-platform-tools-r2800
* kselftest
* kselftest/drivers
* kselftest/filesystems
* kselftest/net
* kselftest/networking
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* v4l2-compliance
* kvm-unit-tests
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* network-basic-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native/drivers
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native/filesystems
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native/net
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native/networking
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none/drivers
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none/filesystems
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none/net
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none/networking
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
Jon Hunter
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.118 release. There are 64 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Fri, 24 Apr 2020 09:48:23 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.118-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
All tests are passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v4.19:
11 builds: 11 pass, 0 fail
22 boots: 22 pass, 0 fail
32 tests: 32 pass, 0 failLinux version: 4.19.118-rc1-gb5f03cd61ab6
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,
tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04Cheers
Jon
Signature · 1 line
nvpublic
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.118 release. There are 64 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Fri, 24 Apr 2020 09:48:23 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.118-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah