net: stricter validation of untrusted gso packets
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 net: stricter validation of untrusted gso packets
From: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Syzkaller again found a path to a kernel crash through bad gso input:
a packet with transport header extending beyond skb_headlen(skb).
Tighten validation at kernel entry:
- Verify that the transport header lies within the linear section.
To avoid pulling linux/tcp.h, verify just sizeof tcphdr. tcp_gso_segment will call pskb_may_pull (th->doff * 4) before use.
- Match the gso_type against the ip_proto found by the flow dissector.
--- include/linux/virtio_net.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/virtio_net.h +24 -2
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@#define _LINUX_VIRTIO_NET_H#include <linux/if_vlan.h> +#include <uapi/linux/tcp.h> +#include <uapi/linux/udp.h> #include <uapi/linux/virtio_net.h> static inline int virtio_net_hdr_set_proto(struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -28,17 +30,25 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, bool little_endian) {unsigned int gso_type =0 ; +unsigned int thlen =0 ; +unsigned int ip_proto;if (hdr->gso_type !=VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE ) {switch (hdr->gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN ) {case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 : gso_type =SKB_GSO_TCPV4 ; + ip_proto =IPPROTO_TCP ; + thlen =sizeof (struct tcphdr );break ;case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6 : gso_type =SKB_GSO_TCPV6 ; + ip_proto =IPPROTO_TCP ; + thlen =sizeof (struct tcphdr );break ;case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP : gso_type =SKB_GSO_UDP ; + ip_proto =IPPROTO_UDP ; + thlen =sizeof (struct udphdr );break ;default :return -EINVAL ;
@@ -57,16 +67,22 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,if (!skb_partial_csum_set (skb, start, off))return -EINVAL ; + +if (skb_transport_offset (skb) + thlen >skb_headlen (skb)) +return -EINVAL ; }else {/* gso packets without NEEDS_CSUM do not set transport_offset. * probe and drop if does not match one of the above types. */ if (gso_type && skb->network_header) { +struct flow_keys_basic keys; +if (!skb->protocol)virtio_net_hdr_set_proto (skb, hdr); retry: -skb_probe_transport_header (skb); -if (!skb_transport_header_was_set (skb)) { +if (!skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic (NULL , skb, &keys, +NULL ,0 ,0 ,0 , +0 )) {/* UFO does not specify ipv4 or 6: try both */ if (gso_type &SKB_GSO_UDP && skb->protocol ==htons (ETH_P_IP )) {
@@ -75,6 +91,12 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, }return -EINVAL ; } + +if (keys.control.thoff + thlen >skb_headlen (skb) || + keys.basic.ip_proto != ip_proto) +return -EINVAL ; + +skb_set_transport_header (skb, keys.control.thoff); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2.526.g744177e7f7-goog
David Miller
maintainerFrom: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 12:48:54 -0400
Quoted 9 lines
From: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Syzkaller again found a path to a kernel crash through bad gso input:
a packet with transport header extending beyondskb_headlen(skb).Tighten validation at kernel entry:
- Verify that the transport header lies within the linear section.
Quoted 8 lines
To avoid pulling
linux/tcp.h, verify just sizeof tcphdr.tcp_gso_segmentwill callpskb_may_pull(th->doff* 4) before use.- Match the
gso_typeagainst theip_protofound by the flow dissector.Fixes bfd5f4a3d605 ("packet: Add GSO/csum offload support.")Reported-by syzbot <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Applied and queued up for -stable, thanks.