ovl: make sure that real fid is 32bit aligned in memory
Subsystems (2)
Hello Amir Goldstein,
The patch cbe7fba8edfc: "ovl: make sure that real fid is 32bit aligned in memory" from Nov 15, 2019, leads to the following static checker warning:
fs/overlayfs/export.c:791 ovl_fid_to_fh() warn: check that subtract can't underflow
fs/overlayfs/export.c
775 static struct ovl_fh *ovl_fid_to_fh(struct fid *fid, int buflen, int fh_type) 776 {
777 struct ovl_fh *fh;
778
779 /* If on-wire inner fid is aligned - nothing to do */
780 if (fh_type == OVL_FILEID_V1)
781 return (struct ovl_fh *)fid;
782
783 if (fh_type != OVL_FILEID_V0)
784 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
785
786 fh = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
787 if (!fh)
788 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
789
790 /* Copy unaligned inner fh into aligned buffer */
791 memcpy(&fh->fb, fid, buflen - OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET);
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 792 return fh;
793 }
Samtch thinks buflen can be "0,4-128". OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET is 3. The problem is that 0 - 3 is a negative and the memcpy() will crash.
In do_handle_to_path() we do:
handle_dwords = handle->handle_bytes >> 2;
Handle ->handle_bytes is non-zero but when it's >> 2 then it can become zero. It's a round down. In ovl_fh_to_dentry() we do:
int len = fh_len << 2;
If we rounded down to zero then "len" is still zero. Obviously one fix would be to add a check in ovl_fid_to_fh().
if (buflen < sizeof(*fh)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
But that feels like papering over the bug.
regards,
dan carpenter
Amir Goldstein
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · Dan Carpenter
Hello Amir Goldstein,
Hi Dan,
Quoted 10 lines
The patch
cbe7fba8edfc: "ovl: make sure that real fid is 32bit aligned in memory" from Nov 15, 2019, leads to the following static checker warning:
fs/overlayfs/export.c:791ovl_fid_to_fh()
warn: check that subtract can't underflow
fs/overlayfs/export.c
775 static structovl_fh*ovl_fid_to_fh(struct fid *fid, int buflen, intfh_type)
Quoted 11 lines
776 {
777 struct ovl_fh *fh;
778
779 /* If on-wire inner fid is aligned - nothing to do */
780 if (fh_type == OVL_FILEID_V1)
781 return (struct ovl_fh *)fid;
782
783 if (fh_type != OVL_FILEID_V0)
784 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
785
786 fh = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);Doesn't Smatch warn on possible kmalloc(0)?
That can't be good. Right?
Quoted 15 lines
787 if (!fh) 788 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 789 790 /* Copy unaligned inner fh into aligned buffer */ 791 memcpy(&fh->fb, fid, buflen - OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET); ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^792 return fh; 793 }Samtch thinks buflen can be "0,4-128".
OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSETis 3. The problem is that 0 - 3 is a negative and thememcpy()will crash.In
do_handle_to_path()we do:
Quoted 8 lines
handle_dwords = handle->handle_bytes >> 2;Handle ->handle_bytes is non-zero but when it's >> 2 then it can become zero. It's a round down. In
ovl_fh_to_dentry()we do:int len = fh_len << 2;If we rounded down to zero then "len" is still zero.
I agree with your analysis.
The reproducer should be trivial because there are no sanotify checks prior to buggy code except for fh_type != OVL_FILEID_V0.
Quoted 5 lines
Obviously one fix
would be to add a check inovl_fid_to_fh().if (buflen <
sizeof(*fh))
returnERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
Correct fix IMO in the context of ovl_fid_to_fh() should be:
if (buflen <= OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
Just to avoid the crash.
Quoted 3 lines
But that feels like papering over the bug.
It won't be papering over, because of the check:
err = ovl_check_fh_len(fh, len);
This was the check before the offending commit that was responsible for sanity checking the value of len, but the commit slipped in this code before the sanity check.
I assume you will be sending the patch.
I will put writing a test on my TODO.
Thanks,
Amir.
PATCH 1/1 ovl: potential crash in ovl_fid_to_fh()
The "buflen" value comes from the user and there is a potential that it could be zero. In do_handle_to_path() we know that "handle->handle_bytes" is non-zero and we do:
handle_dwords = handle->handle_bytes >> 2;
So values 1-3 become zero. Then in ovl_fh_to_dentry() we do:
int len = fh_len << 2;
So now len is in the "0,4-128" range and a multiple of 4. But if "buflen" is zero it will try to copy negative bytes when we do the memcpy in ovl_fid_to_fh().
memcpy(&fh->fb, fid, buflen - OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET);
And that will lead to a crash. Thanks to Amir Goldstein for his help with this patch.
--- fs/overlayfs/export.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/overlayfs/export.c +3 -0
@@ -776,6 +776,9 @@ static struct ovl_fh *ovl_fid_to_fh(struct fid *fid, int buflen, int fh_type) {struct ovl_fh *fh; +if (buflen <=OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET ) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +/* If on-wire inner fid is aligned - nothing to do */ if (fh_type =OVL_FILEID_V1 )return (struct ovl_fh *)fid;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH] ovl: potential crash in ovl_fid_to_fh()
Quoted 31 lines · Dan Carpenter
The "buflen" value comes from the user and there is a potential that it could be zero. In
do_handle_to_path()we know that "handle->handle_bytes" is non-zero and we do:handle_dwords = handle->handle_bytes >> 2;So values 1-3 become zero. Then in
ovl_fh_to_dentry()we do:int len = fh_len << 2;So now len is in the "0,4-128" range and a multiple of 4. But if "buflen" is zero it will try to copy negative bytes when we do the memcpy in
ovl_fid_to_fh().memcpy(&fh->fb, fid, buflen - OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET);And that will lead to a crash. Thanks to Amir Goldstein for his help with this patch.
Fixes cbe7fba8edfc: ("ovl: make sure that real fid is 32bit aligned in memory")Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>--- fs/overlayfs/export.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)fs/overlayfs/export.c +0
-0
fs/overlayfs/export.c static struct ovl_fh *ovl_fid_to_fh(struct fid *fid, int buflen, int fh_type) · line 781
Quoted 6 lines
fs/overlayfs/export.c +3
-0@@ -776,6 +776,9 @@ static struct ovl_fh *ovl_fid_to_fh(struct fid *fid, int buflen, int fh_type) {struct ovl_fh *fh; +if (buflen <=OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET ) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +
Sorry, I should have been more specific.
This check belongs after fh_type != OVL_FILEID_V0 because it is only relevant for OVL_FILEID_V0.
For OVL_FILEID_V1 len properly checked by ovl_check_fh_len().
Otherwise feel free to add:
Thanks,
Amir.
PATCH v2 1/1 ovl: potential crash in ovl_fid_to_fh()
The "buflen" value comes from the user and there is a potential that it could be zero. In do_handle_to_path() we know that "handle->handle_bytes" is non-zero and we do:
handle_dwords = handle->handle_bytes >> 2;
So values 1-3 become zero. Then in ovl_fh_to_dentry() we do:
int len = fh_len << 2;
So now len is in the "0,4-128" range and a multiple of 4. But if "buflen" is zero it will try to copy negative bytes when we do the memcpy in ovl_fid_to_fh().
memcpy(&fh->fb, fid, buflen - OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET);
And that will lead to a crash. Thanks to Amir Goldstein for his help with this patch.
---
v2: Move the check after the other checks
fs/overlayfs/export.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/overlayfs/export.c +3 -0
@@ -783,6 +783,9 @@ static struct ovl_fh *ovl_fid_to_fh(struct fid *fid, int buflen, int fh_type)if (fh_type !=OVL_FILEID_V0 )return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +if (buflen <=OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET ) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + fh =kzalloc (buflen,GFP_KERNEL );if (!fh)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM );
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Quoted 21 lines · Amir Goldstein
Quoted 9 lines
The patch
cbe7fba8edfc: "ovl: make sure that real fid is 32bit aligned in memory" from Nov 15, 2019, leads to the following static checker warning:
fs/overlayfs/export.c:791ovl_fid_to_fh()
warn: check that subtract can't underflow
fs/overlayfs/export.c
775 static structovl_fh*ovl_fid_to_fh(struct fid *fid, int buflen, intfh_type)Quoted 11 lines
776 { 777 struct ovl_fh *fh; 778 779 /* If on-wire inner fid is aligned - nothing to do */ 780 if (fh_type == OVL_FILEID_V1) 781 return (struct ovl_fh *)fid; 782 783 if (fh_type != OVL_FILEID_V0) 784 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 785 786 fh = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
Quoted 2 lines
Doesn't Smatch warn on possible kmalloc(0)?
That can't be good. Right?
No, no. Allocating zero bytes is a useful feature.
size = 0; buf = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) buf[i] = 42; memcpy(dest, buf, size); copy_to_user(p, dest, size);
That all works. Neat, huh?
regards,
dan carpenter