arm64: add Armv8.6 pointer authentication
v2 cover arm64: add Armv8.6 pointer authentication
Hi all,
These patch series adds support for Armv8.6 pointer authentication enhanced mandatory features. These features are,
* Enhanced PAC generation algorithm.
* Generate fault when authenticate instruction fails.
For the first feature no code change is done and for the second feature a ptrauth fault handler is added.
More details can be found here [1].
Changes since v1:
* Patch 1 is newly added and fixes a meta cpucapability check.
* Patch 3 is forked out from earlier patch 1 ("arm64: ptrauth: add pointer authentication Armv8.6 enhanced feature"). This was suggested by Will [2].
This series is based on kernel version v5.7-rc1.
Note: patch 4 may need some changes with Mark Brown's work on whitelisting of hint instructions [3].
Regards,
Amit
[1]: https://community.arm.com/developer/ip-products/processors/b/processors-ip-blog/posts/arm-architecture-developments-armv8-6-a
[2]: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2020-March/715443.html
[3]: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2020-March/720280.html
Amit Daniel Kachhap (4):
arm64: cpufeature: Extract meta-capability scope from list
arm64: ptrauth: add pointer authentication Armv8.6 enhanced feature
arm64: cpufeature: Modify address authentication cpufeature to exact
arm64: kprobe: disable probe of fault prone ptrauth instruction
arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h | 4 +++- arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h | 13 +++++++------ arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++-------- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
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2.17.1 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v2 1/4 arm64: cpufeature: Extract meta-capability scope from list
This fixes the earlier commit 3ff047f6971d3c ("arm64: cpufeature: Fix meta-capability cpufeature check"). This patch was added to fix the dependency of individual meta-cpucaps checks on the array entry order. This dependency was specifically added for cpufeature of system scope.
However this dependency can occur for cpufeature of boot scope such as ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH so this patch renames the helper function __system_matches_cap to __cpufeature_matches_cap and invokes the match handler with the scope fetched from the cpufeatures array list.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +9 -9
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ cpufeature_pan_not_uao(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int __unused)static void cpu_enable_cnp (struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap); -static bool __system_matches_cap (unsigned int n); +static bool __cpufeature_matches_cap (unsigned int n);/* * NOTE: Any changes to the visibility of features should be kept in
@@ -1373,15 +1373,15 @@ static void cpu_clear_disr(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)static bool has_address_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,int __unused) { -return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || -__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +return __cpufeature_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || +__cpufeature_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); }static bool has_generic_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,int __unused) { -return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || -__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +return __cpufeature_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || +__cpufeature_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); }#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
@@ -2251,16 +2251,16 @@ bool this_cpu_has_cap(unsigned int n)/* * This helper function is used in a narrow window when, * - The system wide safe registers are set with all the SMP CPUs and, -* - The SYSTEM_FEATURE cpu_hwcaps may not have been set. +* - The cpu_hwcaps may not have been set. * In all other cases cpus_have_{const_}cap() should be used. */ -static bool __system_matches_cap (unsigned int n) +static bool __cpufeature_matches_cap (unsigned int n) {if (n <ARM64_NCAPS ) {const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap = cpu_hwcaps_ptrs[n];if (cap) -return cap->matches (cap,SCOPE_SYSTEM ); +return cap->matches (cap,cpucap_default_scope (cap)); }return false; }
@@ -2337,7 +2337,7 @@ void __init setup_cpu_features(void)static bool __maybe_unused cpufeature_pan_not_uao (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,int __unused) { -return (__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_PAN ) && !__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_UAO )); +return (__cpufeature_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_PAN ) && !__cpufeature_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_UAO )); }static void __maybe_unused cpu_enable_cnp (struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap)
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2.17.1 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 1/4] arm64: cpufeature: Extract meta-capability scope from list
Quoted 5 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This fixes the earlier commit
3ff047f6971d3c("arm64: cpufeature: Fix meta-capability cpufeature check"). This patch was added to fix the dependency of individual meta-cpucaps checks on the array entry order. This dependency was specifically added for cpufeature of system scope.
Quoted 7 lines
However this dependency can occur for cpufeature of boot scope such as
ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTHso this patch renames the helper function__system_matches_capto__cpufeature_matches_capand invokes the match handler with the scope fetched from the cpufeatures array list.Fixes 3ff047f6971d3c ("arm64: cpufeature: Fix meta-capability cpufeature check")Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>
Does this patch need to be merged in 5.7? The fixed commit went in 5.7-rc1 but it doesn't look to me like we'd have a problem without this fix. Basically we read the sanitised regs with SYSTEM_SCOPE rather than the current CPU regs. These are already populated correctly to the register values of the boot CPU.
Otherwise I'm fine with the patch, just disputing the Fixes tag.
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Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] arm64: cpufeature: Extract meta-capability scope from list
Quoted 11 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 10 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This fixes the earlier commit
3ff047f6971d3c("arm64: cpufeature: Fix meta-capability cpufeature check"). This patch was added to fix the dependency of individual meta-cpucaps checks on the array entry order. This dependency was specifically added for cpufeature of system scope.However this dependency can occur for cpufeature of boot scope such as
ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTHso this patch renames the helper function__system_matches_capto__cpufeature_matches_capand invokes the match handler with the scope fetched from the cpufeatures array list.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Fixes 3ff047f6971d3c ("arm64: cpufeature: Fix meta-capability cpufeature check")Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>Does this patch need to be merged in 5.7? The fixed commit went in 5.7-rc1 but it doesn't look to me like we'd have a problem without this fix. Basically we read the sanitised regs with
SYSTEM_SCOPErather than
Yes, this fixes an actual issue. The code is fine for BOOT cpu when we detect whether the system supports the capability. However, for verifying the secondary CPUs, this still succeeds as we only check the sanitised values and a defective CPU could escape from being parked.
I think something like the following is a better idea, to make sure we do the appropriate checks.
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +13 -5
@@ -1373,15 +1373,23 @@ static void cpu_clear_disr(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)static bool has_address_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,int __unused) { -return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || -__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +if (scope ==SCOPE_SYSTEM ) +return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || +__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +else +return this_cpu_has_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || +this_cpu_has_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); }static bool has_generic_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, -int __unused) +int scope) { -return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || -__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +if (scope ==SCOPE_SYSTEM ) +return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || +__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +else +return this_cpu_has_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || +this_cpu_has_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); }#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
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Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] arm64: cpufeature: Extract meta-capability scope from list
Hi,
Quoted 19 lines · Suzuki K Poulose
Quoted 11 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 10 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This fixes the earlier commit
3ff047f6971d3c("arm64: cpufeature: Fix meta-capability cpufeature check"). This patch was added to fix the dependency of individual meta-cpucaps checks on the array entry order. This dependency was specifically added for cpufeature of system scope.However this dependency can occur for cpufeature of boot scope such as
ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTHso this patch renames the helper function__system_matches_capto__cpufeature_matches_capand invokes the match handler with the scope fetched from the cpufeatures array list.Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Fixes 3ff047f6971d3c ("arm64: cpufeature: Fix meta-capability cpufeature check")Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>Does this patch need to be merged in 5.7? The fixed commit went in 5.7-rc1 but it doesn't look to me like we'd have a problem without this fix. Basically we read the sanitised regs with
SYSTEM_SCOPErather than
Quoted 7 lines
Yes, this fixes an actual issue. The code is fine for BOOT cpu when we detect whether the system supports the capability. However, for verifying the secondary CPUs, this still succeeds as we only check the sanitised values and a defective CPU could escape from being parked.
I think something like the following is a better idea, to make sure we do the appropriate checks.
This approach looks better. I will use it in the next iteration.
Cheers,
Amit
Quoted 36 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +13
-5@@ -1373,15 +1373,23 @@ static void cpu_clear_disr(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)static bool has_address_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,int __unused) { -return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || -__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +if (scope ==SCOPE_SYSTEM ) +return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || +__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +else +return this_cpu_has_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH ) || +this_cpu_has_cap (ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); }static bool has_generic_auth (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, -int __unused) +int scope) { -return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || -__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +if (scope ==SCOPE_SYSTEM ) +return __system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || +__system_matches_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); +else +return this_cpu_has_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_ARCH ) || +this_cpu_has_cap (ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF ); }#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
Quoted 5 lines
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PATCH v2 2/4 arm64: ptrauth: add pointer authentication Armv8.6 enhanced feature
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis patch add changes for Pointer Authentication enhanced features mandatory for Armv8.6. These features are,
* Uses an enhanced PAC generation logic which hardens finding the correct PAC value of the authenticated pointer. However, no code change done for this.
* Fault(FPAC) is generated now when the ptrauth authentication instruction fails in authenticating the PAC present in the address. This is different from earlier case when such failures just adds an error code in the top byte and waits for subsequent load/store to abort. The ptrauth instructions which may cause this fault are autiasp, retaa etc.
The above features are now represented by additional configurations for the Address Authentication cpufeature.
The fault received in the kernel due to FPAC is treated as Illegal instruction and hence signal SIGILL is injected with ILL_ILLOPN as the signal code. Note that this is different from earlier ARMv8.3 ptrauth where signal SIGSEGV is issued due to Pointer authentication failures.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h | 4 +++- arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++-------- arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h +3 -1
@@ -35,7 +35,9 @@#define ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64 (0x18)#define ESR_ELx_EC_SVE (0x19)#define ESR_ELx_EC_ERET (0x1a)/* EL2 only */ -/* Unallocated EC: 0x1b - 0x1E */ +/* Unallocated EC: 0x1B */ +#define ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC (0x1C)/* EL1 and above */ +/* Unallocated EC: 0x1D - 0x1E */ #define ESR_ELx_EC_IMP_DEF (0x1f)/* EL3 only */ #define ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW (0x20)#define ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_CUR (0x21)
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +1 -0
@@ -46,4 +46,5 @@ void bad_el0_sync(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);void do_cp15instr (unsigned int esr,struct pt_regs *regs);void do_el0_svc (struct pt_regs *regs);void do_el0_svc_compat (struct pt_regs *regs); +void do_ptrauth_fault (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long esr);#endif /* __ASM_EXCEPTION_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +16 -8
@@ -621,14 +621,22 @@#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT 4#define ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT 0 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_NI 0x0 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCHITECTED 0x1 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_NI 0x0 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF 0x1 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_NI 0x0 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_ARCHITECTED 0x1 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_NI 0x0 -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF 0x1 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_NI 0x0 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCHITECTED 0x1 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCH_EPAC 0x2 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCH_EPAC2 0x3 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCH_EPAC2_FPAC 0x4 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCH_EPAC2_FPAC_CMB 0x5 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_NI 0x0 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF 0x1 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF_EPAC 0x2 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF_EPAC2 0x3 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF_EPAC2_FPAC 0x4 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF_EPAC2_FPAC_CMB 0x5 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_NI 0x0 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_ARCHITECTED 0x1 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_NI 0x0 +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF 0x1/* id_aa64pfr0 */ #define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT 60
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +25 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include <asm/exception.h> #include <asm/kprobes.h> #include <asm/mmu.h> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h> #include <asm/sysreg.h> static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
@@ -66,6 +67,13 @@ static void notrace el1_dbg(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr) }NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (el1_dbg); +static void notrace el1_fpac(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr) +{ +local_daif_inherit (regs); +do_ptrauth_fault (regs, esr); +} +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (el1_fpac); + asmlinkage void notrace el1_sync_handler(struct pt_regs *regs) {unsigned long esr =read_sysreg (esr_el1);
@@ -92,6 +100,9 @@ asmlinkage void notrace el1_sync_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)case ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64:el1_dbg (regs, esr);break ; +case ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC: +el1_fpac (regs, esr); +break ;default :el1_inv (regs, esr); };
@@ -219,6 +230,14 @@ static void notrace el0_svc(struct pt_regs *regs) }NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (el0_svc); +static void notrace el0_fpac(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr) +{ +user_exit_irqoff (); +local_daif_restore (DAIF_PROCCTX ); +do_ptrauth_fault (regs, esr); +} +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (el0_fpac); + asmlinkage void notrace el0_sync_handler(struct pt_regs *regs) {unsigned long esr =read_sysreg (esr_el1);
@@ -261,6 +280,9 @@ asmlinkage void notrace el0_sync_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)case ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64:el0_dbg (regs, esr);break ; +case ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC: +el0_fpac (regs, esr); +break ;default :el0_inv (regs, esr); }
@@ -324,6 +346,9 @@ asmlinkage void notrace el0_sync_compat_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)case ESR_ELx_EC_BKPT32:el0_dbg (regs, esr);break ; +case ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC: +el0_fpac (regs, esr); +break ;default :el0_inv (regs, esr); }
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +18 -0
@@ -411,6 +411,23 @@ void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs) }NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (do_undefinstr); +void do_ptrauth_fault (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long esr) +{ +const char *desc; + +BUG_ON (!user_mode (regs)); + +/* Even if we chose not to use PTRAUTH, the hardware might still trap */ +if (unlikely (!(system_supports_address_auth ()))) { +force_signal_inject (SIGILL ,ILL_ILLOPC , regs->pc); +return ; + } + + desc ="pointer authentication fault" ; +arm64_notify_die (desc, regs,SIGILL ,ILL_ILLOPN , (void __user *)regs->pc, esr); +} +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (do_ptrauth_fault); +#define __user_cache_maint (insn, address, res) \ if (address >= user_addr_max()) { \ res = -EFAULT; \
@@ -763,6 +780,7 @@ static const char *esr_class_str[] = { [ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64] = "MSR/MRS (AArch64)", [ESR_ELx_EC_SVE] = "SVE", [ESR_ELx_EC_ERET] = "ERET/ERETAA/ERETAB", + [ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC] = "FPAC", [ESR_ELx_EC_IMP_DEF] = "EL3 IMP DEF", [ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW] = "IABT (lower EL)", [ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_CUR] = "IABT (current EL)",
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2.17.1 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 2/4] arm64: ptrauth: add pointer authentication Armv8.6 enhanced feature
Quoted 13 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch add changes for Pointer Authentication enhanced features mandatory for Armv8.6. These features are,
* Uses an enhanced PAC generation logic which hardens finding the correct PAC value of the authenticated pointer. However, no code change done for this.
* Fault(FPAC) is generated now when the ptrauth authentication instruction fails in authenticating the PAC present in the address. This is different from earlier case when such failures just adds an error code in the top byte and waits for subsequent load/store to abort. The ptrauth instructions which may cause this fault are autiasp, retaa etc.
Quoted 7 lines
The above features are now represented by additional configurations for the Address Authentication cpufeature.
The fault received in the kernel due to FPAC is treated as Illegal instruction and hence signal SIGILL is injected with
ILL_ILLOPNas the signal code. Note that this is different from earlier ARMv8.3 ptrauth where signal SIGSEGV is issued due to Pointer authentication failures.
Sorry if it was discussed before. Was there any reasoning behind choosing ILL_ILLOPN vs something else like ILL_ILLADR?
Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +0
-0@@ -411,6 +411,23 @@ void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs) }
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs) · line 421
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +8
-0NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (do_undefinstr); +void do_ptrauth_fault (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long esr) +{ +const char *desc; + +BUG_ON (!user_mode (regs)); + +/* Even if we chose not to use PTRAUTH, the hardware might still trap */ +if (unlikely (!(system_supports_address_auth ()))) {
Nitpick: no need for braces around system_supports_address_auth().
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs) · line 424
Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +3
-0+force_signal_inject (SIGILL ,ILL_ILLOPC , regs->pc); +return ; + }
So when do we execute this path? Is it on a big.LITTLE system where some CPUs don't have the 8.6 behaviour? It's the same AUT instruction that triggered it, so I don't think we should report a different ILL code.
It's a bit unfortunate that this new ptrauth feature doesn't have an opt-in, so user-space would have to cope with both behaviours. In this case I don't see why we need to differentiate on system_supports_address_auth().
While the new behaviour is a lot more useful in practice, I wonder whether we could still emulate the old one by setting regs->pc to a faulting address and returning to user.
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs) · line 427
Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +3
-0+ + desc ="pointer authentication fault" ; +arm64_notify_die (desc, regs,SIGILL ,ILL_ILLOPN , (void __user *)regs->pc, esr);
Nitpick: you could pass the string directly, no need for an additional variable.
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Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] arm64: ptrauth: add pointer authentication Armv8.6 enhanced feature
Hi,
Quoted 17 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 16 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch add changes for Pointer Authentication enhanced features mandatory for Armv8.6. These features are,
* Uses an enhanced PAC generation logic which hardens finding the correct PAC value of the authenticated pointer. However, no code change done for this.
* Fault(FPAC) is generated now when the ptrauth authentication instruction fails in authenticating the PAC present in the address. This is different from earlier case when such failures just adds an error code in the top byte and waits for subsequent load/store to abort. The ptrauth instructions which may cause this fault are autiasp, retaa etc.
The above features are now represented by additional configurations for the Address Authentication cpufeature.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
The fault received in the kernel due to FPAC is treated as Illegal instruction and hence signal SIGILL is injected with
ILL_ILLOPNas the signal code. Note that this is different from earlier ARMv8.3 ptrauth where signal SIGSEGV is issued due to Pointer authentication failures.Sorry if it was discussed before. Was there any reasoning behind choosing
ILL_ILLOPNvs something else likeILL_ILLADR?
No it was not discussed earlier. I used it as I thought that autiasp failed here due to incorrect operands provided (sp, key, lr). Although sp and lr are addresses.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +0
-0@@ -411,6 +411,23 @@ void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs) }NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (do_undefinstr);
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs) · line 421
Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +8
-0+void do_ptrauth_fault (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long esr) +{ +const char *desc; + +BUG_ON (!user_mode (regs)); + +/* Even if we chose not to use PTRAUTH, the hardware might still trap */ +if (unlikely (!(system_supports_address_auth ()))) {Nitpick: no need for braces around
system_supports_address_auth().
ok
Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs) · line 424
Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +3
-0+force_signal_inject (SIGILL ,ILL_ILLOPC , regs->pc); +return ; + }So when do we execute this path? Is it on a big.LITTLE system where some CPUs don't have the 8.6 behaviour? It's the same AUT instruction that triggered it, so I don't think we should report a different ILL code.
Quoted 4 lines
It's a bit unfortunate that this new ptrauth feature doesn't have an opt-in, so user-space would have to cope with both behaviours. In this case I don't see why we need to differentiate on
system_supports_address_auth().
I was referring to some similar checks present in do_sve_acc in
file arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c to gaurd some unknown situations. Anyway I should probably drop this as EC value is already matched.
Quoted 4 lines
While the new behaviour is a lot more useful in practice, I wonder whether we could still emulate the old one by setting
regs->pcto a faulting address and returning to user.
However even if we set regs->pc to the faulting lr address but this lr
may not be same as earlier one as theoretically there can be two autia
instructions so I am not sure if complete emulation is possible. Also other work will be change ESR value, set error pattern in the faulting address etc when the error pattern is itself not defined.
Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs) · line 427
Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +3
-0+ + desc ="pointer authentication fault" ; +arm64_notify_die (desc, regs,SIGILL ,ILL_ILLOPN , (void __user *)regs->pc, esr);Nitpick: you could pass the string directly, no need for an additional variable.
ok
Amit
Quoted 1 line
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Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 2/4] arm64: ptrauth: add pointer authentication Armv8.6 enhanced feature
Quoted 22 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 21 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 20 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch add changes for Pointer Authentication enhanced features mandatory for Armv8.6. These features are,
* Uses an enhanced PAC generation logic which hardens finding the correct PAC value of the authenticated pointer. However, no code change done for this.
* Fault(FPAC) is generated now when the ptrauth authentication instruction fails in authenticating the PAC present in the address. This is different from earlier case when such failures just adds an error code in the top byte and waits for subsequent load/store to abort. The ptrauth instructions which may cause this fault are autiasp, retaa etc.
The above features are now represented by additional configurations for the Address Authentication cpufeature.
The fault received in the kernel due to FPAC is treated as Illegal instruction and hence signal SIGILL is injected with
ILL_ILLOPNas the signal code. Note that this is different from earlier ARMv8.3 ptrauth where signal SIGSEGV is issued due to Pointer authentication failures.
[...]
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
While the new behaviour is a lot more useful in practice, I wonder whether we could still emulate the old one by setting
regs->pcto a faulting address and returning to user.However even if we set
regs->pcto the faulting lr address but this lr may not be same as earlier one as theoretically there can be two autia instructions so I am not sure if complete emulation is possible. Also other work will be change ESR value, set error pattern in the faulting address etc when the error pattern is itself not defined.
You are right, we can't fully emulate this. I was thinking of getting a fake faulting PC and returning to it so that we trigger a SIGSEGV. Anyway, I don't think it buys us anything and I really doubt we have user space relying on the 8.3 behaviour.
Signature · 6 lines
Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
PATCH v2 3/4 arm64: cpufeature: Modify address authentication cpufeature to exact
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis patch modifies the address authentication cpufeature type to EXACT from earlier LOWER_SAFE as the different configurations added for Armv8.6 enhanced PAC have different behaviour and there is no tunable to enable the lower safe versions. The safe value is set as 0.
After this change, if there is any variation in configurations in secondary cpus from boot cpu then those cpus are marked tainted. The KVM guests may completely disable address authentication if there is any such variations detected.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +2 -2
@@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = {ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE ,FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE ,FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ), -FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), +FTR_STRICT ,FTR_EXACT ,ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ), -FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), +FTR_STRICT ,FTR_EXACT ,ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE ,FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), ARM64_FTR_END, };
Signature · 7 lines
2.17.1 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 3/4] arm64: cpufeature: Modify address authentication cpufeature to exact
Quoted 20 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch modifies the address authentication cpufeature type to EXACT from earlier
LOWER_SAFEas the different configurations added for Armv8.6 enhanced PAC have different behaviour and there is no tunable to enable the lower safe versions. The safe value is set as 0.After this change, if there is any variation in configurations in secondary cpus from boot cpu then those cpus are marked tainted. The KVM guests may completely disable address authentication if there is any such variations detected.
Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +0
-0
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = { · line 161
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +2
-2@@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = {ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE ,FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE ,FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ), -FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), +FTR_STRICT ,FTR_EXACT ,ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ), -FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), +FTR_STRICT ,FTR_EXACT ,ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE ,FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), ARM64_FTR_END,
Is this sufficient? If we have the boot CPU already enabling the ptrauth and we get a secondary CPU with a different ISAR1 field that matches the address auth in cpufeature.c, we still allow it to boot. We no longer report the feature to the user system_supports_address_auth() is true while system_supports_generic_auth() would be false as it checks the sanitised feature registers.
Signature · 6 lines
Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] arm64: cpufeature: Modify address authentication cpufeature to exact
Quoted 30 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 29 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch modifies the address authentication cpufeature type to EXACT from earlier
LOWER_SAFEas the different configurations added for Armv8.6 enhanced PAC have different behaviour and there is no tunable to enable the lower safe versions. The safe value is set as 0.After this change, if there is any variation in configurations in secondary cpus from boot cpu then those cpus are marked tainted. The KVM guests may completely disable address authentication if there is any such variations detected.
Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +2
-2@@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = {ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE ,FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE ,FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ), -FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), +FTR_STRICT ,FTR_EXACT ,ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ), -FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), +FTR_STRICT ,FTR_EXACT ,ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT, 4, 0),
Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = { · line 161
Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +0
-0ARM64_FTR_END,Is this sufficient? If we have the boot CPU already enabling the ptrauth and we get a secondary CPU with a different ISAR1 field that matches the address auth in
cpufeature.c, we still allow it to boot. We no longer report the feature to the usersystem_supports_address_auth()is true whilesystem_supports_generic_auth()would be false as it checks the sanitised feature registers.
Yes agreed. Generic authentication also needs EXACT cpufeature type.
Quoted 1 line
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Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 3/4] arm64: cpufeature: Modify address authentication cpufeature to exact
Quoted 40 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 30 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 29 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch modifies the address authentication cpufeature type to EXACT from earlier
LOWER_SAFEas the different configurations added for Armv8.6 enhanced PAC have different behaviour and there is no tunable to enable the lower safe versions. The safe value is set as 0.After this change, if there is any variation in configurations in secondary cpus from boot cpu then those cpus are marked tainted. The KVM guests may completely disable address authentication if there is any such variations detected.
Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +2
-2@@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = {ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE ,FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE ,FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ), -FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), +FTR_STRICT ,FTR_EXACT ,ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ), -FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), +FTR_STRICT ,FTR_EXACT ,ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT, 4, 0),Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = { · line 161
Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +0
-0ARM64_FTR_END,Is this sufficient? If we have the boot CPU already enabling the ptrauth and we get a secondary CPU with a different ISAR1 field that matches the address auth in
cpufeature.c, we still allow it to boot. We no longer report the feature to the usersystem_supports_address_auth()is true whilesystem_supports_generic_auth()would be false as it checks the sanitised feature registers.
Quoted 1 line
Yes agreed. Generic authentication also needs EXACT cpufeature type.
I'm still not sure that's sufficient. If we boot the primary CPU with ptrauth as detected in proc.S, we consider this a boot feature so all secondary CPUs must have it. Subsequent CPUs are currently checked via the arm64_features[] definitions and we allow them to boot if the ID is at least that of the boot CPU. How does this interact with the above FTR_EXACT changes?
My concern is that we boot with PAC enabled on all CPUs but because of the FTR_EXACT, the sanitised ID registers no longer report the feature.
Signature · 6 lines
Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] arm64: cpufeature: Modify address authentication cpufeature to exact
Quoted 41 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 40 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 38 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 20 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch modifies the address authentication cpufeature type to EXACT from earlier
LOWER_SAFEas the different configurations added for Armv8.6 enhanced PAC have different behaviour and there is no tunable to enable the lower safe versions. The safe value is set as 0.After this change, if there is any variation in configurations in secondary cpus from boot cpu then those cpus are marked tainted. The KVM guests may completely disable address authentication if there is any such variations detected.
Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +0
-0arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = { · line 161
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +2
-2@@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = {ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE ,FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE ,FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ), -FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), +FTR_STRICT ,FTR_EXACT ,ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ), -FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), +FTR_STRICT ,FTR_EXACT ,ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE ,FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), ARM64_FTR_END,Is this sufficient? If we have the boot CPU already enabling the ptrauth and we get a secondary CPU with a different ISAR1 field that matches the address auth in
cpufeature.c, we still allow it to boot. We no longer report the feature to the usersystem_supports_address_auth()is true whilesystem_supports_generic_auth()would be false as it checks the sanitised feature registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Yes agreed. Generic authentication also needs EXACT cpufeature type.
I'm still not sure that's sufficient. If we boot the primary CPU with ptrauth as detected in
proc.S, we consider this a boot feature so all secondary CPUs must have it. Subsequent CPUs are currently checked via the arm64_features[] definitions and we allow them to boot if the ID is at least that of the boot CPU. How does this interact with the aboveFTR_EXACTchanges?
Unfortunately FTR_EXACT does not effect the bootflow directly but marks the cpu TAINTED and goes ahead.
Quoted 4 lines
My concern is that we boot with PAC enabled on all CPUs but because of the
FTR_EXACT, the sanitised ID registers no longer report the feature.
You are right that PAC is enabled in hardware but un-reported to user in this case.
The issue here is in feature_matches() which only validates with the entry->min_field_value. If we can modify this value to boot cpu value for FTR_EXACT type then this cpu will fail to online.
May be we can introduce a new structure or make arm64_feature[] writable for this.
Something like below code.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +2 -0
@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ DECLARE_BITMAP(boot_capabilities, ARM64_NPATCHABLE);bool arm64_use_ng_mappings = false;EXPORT_SYMBOL (arm64_use_ng_mappings); +u8 min_cap_value[ARM64_NCAPS ]; +/* * Flag to indicate if we have computed the system wide * capabilities based on the boot time active CPUs. This
@@ -616,6 +618,17 @@ static void __init sort_ftr_regs(void) BUG_ON(arm64_ftr_regs[i].sys_id < arm64_ftr_regs[i -
1].sys_id);
}
+static void __init update_cpu_capability_min(u32 sys_reg, s64 new) +{
+ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps = arm64_features;
+ for (; caps->matches; caps++) {
+ if (caps->sys_reg == sys_reg) {
+ if (caps->min_field_value)
+ min_cap_value[caps->capability] = new;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Initialise the CPU feature register from Boot CPU values.
* Also initiliases the strict_mask for the register.
@@ -649,6 +662,8 @@ static void __init init_cpu_ftr_reg(u32 sys_reg, u64 new)
reg->user_val = arm64_ftr_set_value(ftrp,
reg->user_val,ftrp->safe_val);
+ if (ftrp->type == FTR_EXACT)
+ update_cpu_capability_min(sys_reg, ftr_new);
}
val &= valid_mask;
@@ -1021,8 +1036,10 @@ static bool
feature_matches(u64 reg, const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
{
int val = cpuid_feature_extract_field(reg, entry->field_pos, entry->sign);
-
- return val >= entry->min_field_value;
+ if (min_cap_value[entry->capability])
+ return val >= min_cap_value[entry->capability];
+ else
+ return val >= entry->min_field_value;
}
static bool
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] arm64: cpufeature: Modify address authentication cpufeature to exact
Quoted 66 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 46 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 45 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 43 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 31 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch modifies the address authentication cpufeature type to EXACT from earlier
LOWER_SAFEas the different configurations added for Armv8.6 enhanced PAC have different behaviour and there is no tunable to enable the lower safe versions. The safe value is set as 0.After this change, if there is any variation in configurations in secondary cpus from boot cpu then those cpus are marked tainted. The KVM guests may completely disable address authentication if there is any such variations detected.
Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c| 4 ++--1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +1
-2@@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = { ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT, 4, 0),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ), - FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT,4 ,0 ), + FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH), - FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT,Quoted 4 lines
4, 0),
+FTR_STRICT,FTR_EXACT,ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, 4, 0),ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT, 4, 0),ARM64_FTR_END,Is this sufficient? If we have the boot CPU already enabling the ptrauth and we get a secondary CPU with a different ISAR1 field that matches the address auth in
cpufeature.c, we still allow it to boot. We no longer report the feature to the usersystem_supports_address_auth()is true whilesystem_supports_generic_auth()would be false as it checks the sanitised feature registers.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Yes agreed. Generic authentication also needs EXACT cpufeature type.
I'm still not sure that's sufficient. If we boot the primary CPU with ptrauth as detected in
proc.S, we consider this a boot feature so all secondary CPUs must have it. Subsequent CPUs are currently checked via the arm64_features[] definitions and we allow them to boot if the ID is at least that of the boot CPU. How does this interact with the aboveFTR_EXACTchanges?Unfortunately
FTR_EXACTdoes not effect the bootflow directly but marks the cpu TAINTED and goes ahead.Quoted 4 lines
My concern is that we boot with PAC enabled on all CPUs but because of the
FTR_EXACT, the sanitised ID registers no longer report the feature.
Quoted 8 lines
You are right that PAC is enabled in hardware but un-reported to user in this case.
The issue here is in
feature_matches()which only validates with theentry->min_field_value. If we can modify this value to boot cpu value forFTR_EXACTtype then this cpu will fail to online.
May be we can introduce a new structure or make arm64_feature[] writable for this.Something like below code.
The has_cpuid_feature() is for features with "FTR_LOWER_SAFE". Hacking it to support EXACT doesn't look ideal. You may simply add your own "matches()" for ptr-auth.
something like :
static boolhas_addr_auth(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
{
static int boot_cpu_auth;
int local_cpu_auth;
u64 isar1;
/* We don't expect to be called with SCOPE_SYSTEM */
WARN_ON(scope == SCOPE_SYSTEM);
isar1 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1);
local_cpu_auth = cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(isar1, entry->shift);
/*
* The ptr-auth feature levels are not intercompatible with
* lower levels. Hence we must match all the CPUs with that
* of the boot CPU. So cache the level of boot CPU and compare
* it against the secondary CPUs.
*/
if (scope & SCOPE_BOOT_CPU) {
boot_cpu_auth = local_cpu_auth;
return boot_cpu_auth > 0;
} else if (scope & SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) {
return local_cpu_auth == boot_cpu_auth;
}
}Suzuki
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Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] arm64: cpufeature: Modify address authentication cpufeature to exact
Hi Suzuki,
Quoted 72 lines · Suzuki K Poulose
Quoted 71 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 44 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 43 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 41 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 31 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch modifies the address authentication cpufeature type to EXACT from earlier
LOWER_SAFEas the different configurations added for Armv8.6 enhanced PAC have different behaviour and there is no tunable to enable the lower safe versions. The safe value is set as 0.After this change, if there is any variation in configurations in secondary cpus from boot cpu then those cpus are marked tainted. The KVM guests may completely disable address authentication if there is any such variations detected.
Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c| 4 ++--1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +2
-2@@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = { ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH), - FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, 4, 0), + FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH), - FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, 4, 0), + FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, 4, 0),Quoted 2 lines
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT, 4, 0),ARM64_FTR_END,Is this sufficient? If we have the boot CPU already enabling the ptrauth and we get a secondary CPU with a different ISAR1 field that matches the address auth in
cpufeature.c, we still allow it to boot. We no longer report the feature to the usersystem_supports_address_auth()is true whilesystem_supports_generic_auth()would be false as it checks the sanitised feature registers.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Yes agreed. Generic authentication also needs EXACT cpufeature type.
I'm still not sure that's sufficient. If we boot the primary CPU with ptrauth as detected in
proc.S, we consider this a boot feature so all secondary CPUs must have it. Subsequent CPUs are currently checked via the arm64_features[] definitions and we allow them to boot if the ID is at least that of the boot CPU. How does this interact with the aboveFTR_EXACTchanges?Unfortunately
FTR_EXACTdoes not effect the bootflow directly but marks the cpu TAINTED and goes ahead.Quoted 4 lines
My concern is that we boot with PAC enabled on all CPUs but because of the
FTR_EXACT, the sanitised ID registers no longer report the feature.You are right that PAC is enabled in hardware but un-reported to user in this case.
The issue here is in
feature_matches()which only validates with theentry->min_field_value. If we can modify this value to boot cpu value forFTR_EXACTtype then this cpu will fail to online.
May be we can introduce a new structure or make arm64_feature[] writable for this.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Something like below code.
The
has_cpuid_feature()is for features with "FTR_LOWER_SAFE". Hacking it to support EXACT doesn't look ideal. You may simply add your own "matches()" for ptr-auth.
Yes it is reasonable to have separate match() function. I was thinking of adding some generic match function for FTR_EXACT to be used by other similar cpufeatures.
Quoted 7 lines
something like :
static bool
has_addr_auth(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope){
static intboot_cpu_auth;
I suppose that is this new match() has to be used for both AUTH_ARCH and AUTH_IMP_DEF then we may need 2 such static variables.
Quoted 9 lines
int
local_cpu_auth;
u64 isar1;/* We don't expect to be called with
SCOPE_SYSTEM*/WARN_ON(scope == SCOPE_SYSTEM);
isar1 =read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1);local_cpu_auth= cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(isar1,entry->shift);
Quoted 9 lines
/*
* The ptr-auth feature levels are not intercompatible with
* lower levels. Hence we must match all the CPUs with that
* of the boot CPU. So cache the level of boot CPU and compare
* it against the secondary CPUs.
*/
if (scope &SCOPE_BOOT_CPU) {
boot_cpu_auth=local_cpu_auth;
returnboot_cpu_auth> 0;
May be,
return boot_cpu_auth >= entry->min_field_value
Quoted 6 lines
} else if (scope &
SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) {
returnlocal_cpu_auth==boot_cpu_auth;
}
}Suzuki
Thanks,
Amit Daniel
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Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] arm64: cpufeature: Modify address authentication cpufeature to exact
Quoted 79 lines · Amit Kachhap
Hi Suzuki,
Quoted 76 lines · Suzuki K Poulose
Quoted 74 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 46 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 45 lines · Amit Kachhap
Quoted 43 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 30 lines · Amit Daniel Kachhap
This patch modifies the address authentication cpufeature type to EXACT from earlier
LOWER_SAFEas the different configurations added for Armv8.6 enhanced PAC have different behaviour and there is no tunable to enable the lower safe versions. The safe value is set as 0.After this change, if there is any variation in configurations in secondary cpus from boot cpu then those cpus are marked tainted. The KVM guests may completely disable address authentication if there is any such variations detected.
Signed-off-by Amit Daniel Kachhap <[email protected]>---
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c| 4 ++--1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +1
-2@@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = { ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT, 4, 0),ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH ), - FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE,ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ), + FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH), - FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE,Quoted 5 lines
ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+FTR_STRICT,FTR_EXACT,ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, 4,
0),
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT, 4, 0),ARM64_FTR_END,Is this sufficient? If we have the boot CPU already enabling the ptrauth and we get a secondary CPU with a different ISAR1 field that matches the address auth in
cpufeature.c, we still allow it to boot. We no longer report the feature to the usersystem_supports_address_auth()is true whilesystem_supports_generic_auth()would be false as it checks the sanitised feature registers.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Yes agreed. Generic authentication also needs EXACT cpufeature type.
I'm still not sure that's sufficient. If we boot the primary CPU with ptrauth as detected in
proc.S, we consider this a boot feature so all secondary CPUs must have it. Subsequent CPUs are currently checked via the arm64_features[] definitions and we allow them to boot if the ID is at least that of the boot CPU. How does this interact with the aboveFTR_EXACTchanges?Unfortunately
FTR_EXACTdoes not effect the bootflow directly but marks the cpu TAINTED and goes ahead.Quoted 4 lines
My concern is that we boot with PAC enabled on all CPUs but because of the
FTR_EXACT, the sanitised ID registers no longer report the feature.You are right that PAC is enabled in hardware but un-reported to user in this case.
The issue here is in
feature_matches()which only validates with theentry->min_field_value. If we can modify this value to boot cpu value forFTR_EXACTtype then this cpu will fail to online.
May be we can introduce a new structure or make arm64_feature[] writable for this.Something like below code.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
The
has_cpuid_feature()is for features with "FTR_LOWER_SAFE". Hacking it to support EXACT doesn't look ideal. You may simply add your own "matches()" for ptr-auth.Yes it is reasonable to have separate
match()function. I was thinking of adding some generic match function forFTR_EXACTto be used by other similar cpufeatures.
Ideally, if we enable CPU feature sanity check infrastructure to do this for us (i.e park a CPU which conflicts), we don't have to duplicate it here in the capabilities. For now, yes, let us use something specific to
ptr-auth, which may not cater for generic EXACT features. Generalizing
it for different "scope"s are going to be tricky.
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 8 lines
something like :
static bool
has_addr_auth(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope){
static intboot_cpu_auth;I suppose that is this new
match()has to be used for bothAUTH_ARCHandAUTH_IMP_DEFthen we may need 2 such static variables.Quoted 8 lines
int
local_cpu_auth;
u64 isar1;/* We don't expect to be called with
SCOPE_SYSTEM*/WARN_ON(scope == SCOPE_SYSTEM);
isar1 =read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1);
local_cpu_auth =cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(isar1, entry->shift);Quoted 9 lines
/*
* The ptr-auth feature levels are not intercompatible with
* lower levels. Hence we must match all the CPUs with that
* of the boot CPU. So cache the level of boot CPU and compare
* it against the secondary CPUs.
*/
if (scope &SCOPE_BOOT_CPU) {
boot_cpu_auth=local_cpu_auth;
returnboot_cpu_auth> 0;
Quoted 2 lines
May be,
returnboot_cpu_auth>=entry->min_field_value
Yes, thats fine.
Cheers
Suzuki
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PATCH v2 4/4 arm64: kprobe: disable probe of fault prone ptrauth instruction
In reply to Amit Daniel KachhapThis patch disables the probing of authenticate ptrauth instruction (AUTIASP) which falls under the hint instructions region. This is done to disallow probe of authenticate instruction in the kernel which may lead to ptrauth faults with the addition of Armv8.6 enhanced ptrauth features.
The corresponding append pac ptrauth instruction (PACIASP) is not disabled and they can still be probed.
---
This patch may need some changes with Mark Brown's work on whitelisting of hint instructions [1].
[1]: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2020-March/720280.html
arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h | 13 +++++++------ arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h +7 -6
@@ -40,12 +40,13 @@ enum aarch64_insn_encoding_class { };enum aarch64_insn_hint_op { -AARCH64_INSN_HINT_NOP =0x0 <<5 , -AARCH64_INSN_HINT_YIELD =0x1 <<5 , -AARCH64_INSN_HINT_WFE =0x2 <<5 , -AARCH64_INSN_HINT_WFI =0x3 <<5 , -AARCH64_INSN_HINT_SEV =0x4 <<5 , -AARCH64_INSN_HINT_SEVL =0x5 <<5 , +AARCH64_INSN_HINT_NOP =0x0 <<5 , +AARCH64_INSN_HINT_YIELD =0x1 <<5 , +AARCH64_INSN_HINT_WFE =0x2 <<5 , +AARCH64_INSN_HINT_WFI =0x3 <<5 , +AARCH64_INSN_HINT_SEV =0x4 <<5 , +AARCH64_INSN_HINT_SEVL =0x5 <<5 , +AARCH64_INSN_HINT_AUTIASP = (0x3 <<8 ) | (0x5 <<5 ), };enum aarch64_insn_imm_type {
arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c +1 -0
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ bool __kprobes aarch64_insn_is_nop(u32 insn)case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_WFI :case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_SEV :case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_SEVL : +case AARCH64_INSN_HINT_AUTIASP :return false;default :return true;
arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c +1 -1
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static bool __kprobes aarch64_insn_is_steppable(u32 insn) != AARCH64_INSN_SPCLREG_DAIF;/* -* The HINT instruction is is problematic when single-stepping, +* The HINT instruction is problematic when single-stepping, * except for the NOP case. */ if (aarch64_insn_is_hint (insn))
Signature · 7 lines
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