5.6.16-rc1 review
Subsystems (4)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 148/177 xfrm: call xfrm_output_gso when inner_protocol is set in xfrm_output
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Xin Long <[email protected]>
commit a204aef9fd77dce1efd9066ca4e44eede99cd858 upstream.
An use-after-free crash can be triggered when sending big packets over vxlan over esp with esp offload enabled:
[] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ipv6_gso_pull_exthdrs.part.8+0x32c/0x4e0 [] Call Trace:
[] dump_stack+0x75/0xa0 [] kasan_report+0x37/0x50 [] ipv6_gso_pull_exthdrs.part.8+0x32c/0x4e0 [] ipv6_gso_segment+0x2c8/0x13c0 [] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x1cb/0x420 [] skb_udp_tunnel_segment+0x6b5/0x1c90 [] inet_gso_segment+0x440/0x1380 [] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x1cb/0x420 [] esp4_gso_segment+0xae8/0x1709 [esp4_offload] [] inet_gso_segment+0x440/0x1380 [] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x1cb/0x420 [] __skb_gso_segment+0x2d7/0x5f0 [] validate_xmit_skb+0x527/0xb10 [] __dev_queue_xmit+0x10f8/0x2320 <--- [] ip_finish_output2+0xa2e/0x1b50 [] ip_output+0x1a8/0x2f0 [] xfrm_output_resume+0x110e/0x15f0 [] __xfrm4_output+0xe1/0x1b0 [] xfrm4_output+0xa0/0x200 [] iptunnel_xmit+0x5a7/0x920 [] vxlan_xmit_one+0x1658/0x37a0 [vxlan] [] vxlan_xmit+0x5e4/0x3ec8 [vxlan] [] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x125/0x540 [] __dev_queue_xmit+0x17bd/0x2320 <--- [] ip6_finish_output2+0xb20/0x1b80 [] ip6_output+0x1b3/0x390 [] ip6_xmit+0xb82/0x17e0 [] inet6_csk_xmit+0x225/0x3d0 [] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1763/0x3520 [] tcp_write_xmit+0xd64/0x5fe0 [] __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x8c/0x320 [] tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2245/0x3500 [] tcp_sendmsg+0x27/0x40
As on the tx path of vxlan over esp, skb->inner_network_header would be set on vxlan_xmit() and xfrm4_tunnel_encap_add(), and the later one can overwrite the former one. It causes skb_udp_tunnel_segment() to use a wrong skb->inner_network_header, then the issue occurs.
This patch is to fix it by calling xfrm_output_gso() instead when the inner_protocol is set, in which gso_segment of inner_protocol will be done first.
While at it, also improve some code around.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c +7 -5
@@ -583,18 +583,20 @@ int xfrm_output(struct sock *sk, structxfrm_state_hold (x);if (skb_is_gso (skb)) { -skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_type |=SKB_GSO_ESP ; +if (skb->inner_protocol) +return xfrm_output_gso (net, sk, skb); -return xfrm_output2 (net, sk, skb); +skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_type |=SKB_GSO_ESP ; + goto out; }if (x->xso.dev && x->xso.dev->features &NETIF_F_HW_ESP_TX_CSUM ) goto out; + }else { +if (skb_is_gso (skb)) +return xfrm_output_gso (net, sk, skb); } -if (skb_is_gso (skb)) -return xfrm_output_gso (net, sk, skb); -if (skb->ip_summed ==CHECKSUM_PARTIAL ) { err =skb_checksum_help (skb);if (err) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 149/177 xfrm interface: fix oops when deleting a x-netns interface
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
commit c95c5f58b35ef995f66cb55547eee6093ab5fcb8 upstream.
Here is the steps to reproduce the problem:
ip netns add foo
ip netns add bar
ip -n foo link add xfrmi0 type xfrm dev lo if_id 42 ip -n foo link set xfrmi0 netns bar
ip netns del foo
ip netns del bar
Which results to:
[ 186.686395] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6bd3: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 186.687665] CPU: 7 PID: 232 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Not tainted 5.6.0+ #1 [ 186.688430] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 186.689420] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net [ 186.689903] RIP: 0010:xfrmi_dev_uninit+0x1b/0x4b [xfrm_interface] [ 186.690657] Code: 44 f6 ff ff 31 c0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3 48 8d 8f c0 08 00 00 8b 05 ce 14 00 00 48 8b 97 d0 08 00 00 48 8b 92 c0 0e 00 00 <48> 8b 14 c2 48 8b 02 48 85 c0 74 19 48 39 c1 75 0c 48 8b 87 c0 08 [ 186.692838] RSP: 0018:ffffc900003b7d68 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 186.693435] RAX: 000000000000000d RBX: ffff8881b0f31000 RCX: ffff8881b0f318c0 [ 186.694334] RDX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff8881b0f31000 [ 186.695190] RBP: ffffc900003b7df0 R08: ffff888236c07740 R09: 0000000000000040 [ 186.696024] R10: ffffffff81fce1b8 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffffc900003b7d80 [ 186.696859] R13: ffff8881edcc6a40 R14: ffff8881a1b6e780 R15: ffffffff81ed47c8 [ 186.697738] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888237dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 186.698705] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 186.699408] CR2: 00007f2129e93148 CR3: 0000000001e0a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 186.700221] Call Trace: [ 186.700508] rollback_registered_many+0x32b/0x3fd [ 186.701058] ? __rtnl_unlock+0x20/0x3d [ 186.701494] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x11/0x17 [ 186.702012] unregister_netdevice_many+0x12/0x55 [ 186.702594] default_device_exit_batch+0x12b/0x150 [ 186.703160] ? prepare_to_wait_exclusive+0x60/0x60 [ 186.703719] cleanup_net+0x17d/0x234 [ 186.704138] process_one_work+0x196/0x2e8 [ 186.704652] worker_thread+0x1a4/0x249 [ 186.705087] ? cancel_delayed_work+0x92/0x92 [ 186.705620] kthread+0x105/0x10f [ 186.706000] ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x57/0x57 [ 186.706501] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [ 186.706978] Modules linked in: xfrm_interface nfsv3 nfs_acl auth_rpcgss nfsv4 nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc button parport_pc parport serio_raw evdev pcspkr loop ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 crc32c_generic 8139too ide_cd_mod cdrom ide_gd_mod ata_generic ata_piix libata scsi_mod piix psmouse i2c_piix4 ide_core 8139cp i2c_core mii floppy [ 186.710423] ---[ end trace 463bba18105537e5 ]---
The problem is that x-netns xfrm interface are not removed when the link netns is removed. This causes later this oops when thoses interfaces are removed.
Let's add a handler to remove all interfaces related to a netns when this netns is removed.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_interface.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_interface.c +21 -0
@@ -750,7 +750,28 @@ static struct rtnl_link_ops xfrmi_link_o .get_link_net = xfrmi_get_link_net, }; +static void __net_exit xfrmi_exit_batch_net(struct list_head *net_exit_list) +{ +struct net *net; +LIST_HEAD (list); + +rtnl_lock (); +list_for_each_entry (net, net_exit_list, exit_list) { +struct xfrmi_net *xfrmn =net_generic (net, xfrmi_net_id); +struct xfrm_if __rcu **xip; +struct xfrm_if *xi; + +for (xip = &xfrmn->xfrmi[0 ]; + (xi =rtnl_dereference (*xip)) !=NULL ; + xip = &xi->next) +unregister_netdevice_queue (xi->dev, &list); + } +unregister_netdevice_many (&list); +rtnl_unlock (); +} +static struct pernet_operations xfrmi_net_ops = { + .exit_batch = xfrmi_exit_batch_net, .id = &xfrmi_net_id, .size =sizeof (struct xfrmi_net ), };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 150/177 xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Xin Long <[email protected]>
commit ed17b8d377eaf6b4a01d46942b4c647378a79bdd upstream.
This waring can be triggered simply by:
# ip xfrm policy update src 192.168.1.1/24 dst 192.168.1.2/24 dir in \
priority 1 mark 0 mask 0x10 #[1]
# ip xfrm policy update src 192.168.1.1/24 dst 192.168.1.2/24 dir in \
priority 2 mark 0 mask 0x1 #[2]
# ip xfrm policy update src 192.168.1.1/24 dst 192.168.1.2/24 dir in \
priority 2 mark 0 mask 0x10 #[3]Then dmesg shows:
[ ] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7265 at net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1548 [ ] RIP: 0010:xfrm_policy_insert_list+0x2f2/0x1030 [ ] Call Trace:
[ ] xfrm_policy_inexact_insert+0x85/0xe50 [ ] xfrm_policy_insert+0x4ba/0x680 [ ] xfrm_add_policy+0x246/0x4d0 [ ] xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x331/0x5c0 [ ] netlink_rcv_skb+0x121/0x350 [ ] xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x66/0x80 [ ] netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630 [ ] netlink_sendmsg+0x714/0xbf0 [ ] sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
The issue was introduced by Commit 7cb8a93968e3 ("xfrm: Allow inserting policies with matching mark and different priorities"). After that, the policies [1] and [2] would be able to be added with different priorities.
However, policy [3] will actually match both [1] and [2]. Policy [1] was matched due to the 1st 'return true' in xfrm_policy_mark_match(), and policy [2] was matched due to the 2nd 'return true' in there. It caused WARN_ON() in xfrm_policy_insert_list().
This patch is to fix it by only (the same value and priority) as the same policy in xfrm_policy_mark_match().
Thanks to Yuehaibing, we could make this fix better.
v1->v2:
- check policy->mark.v == pol->mark.v only without mask.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 7 +------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +1 -6
@@ -1436,12 +1436,7 @@ static void xfrm_policy_requeue(struct xstatic bool xfrm_policy_mark_match (struct xfrm_policy *policy,struct xfrm_policy *pol) { -u32 mark = policy->mark.v & policy->mark.m; - -if (policy->mark.v == pol->mark.v && policy->mark.m == pol->mark.m) -return true; - -if ((mark & pol->mark.m) == pol->mark.v && +if (policy->mark.v == pol->mark.v && policy->priority == pol->priority)return true;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 151/177 xfrm: fix a NULL-ptr deref in xfrm_local_error
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Xin Long <[email protected]>
commit f6a23d85d078c2ffde79c66ca81d0a1dde451649 upstream.
This patch is to fix a crash:
[ ] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access [ ] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ ] RIP: 0010:ipv6_local_error+0xac/0x7a0
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] xfrm6_local_error+0x1eb/0x300 [ ] xfrm_local_error+0x95/0x130 [ ] __xfrm6_output+0x65f/0xb50 [ ] xfrm6_output+0x106/0x46f [ ] udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb+0x618/0xbf0 [ip6_udp_tunnel] [ ] vxlan_xmit_one+0xbc6/0x2c60 [vxlan] [ ] vxlan_xmit+0x6a0/0x4276 [vxlan] [ ] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x165/0x820 [ ] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1ff0/0x2b90 [ ] ip_finish_output2+0xd3e/0x1480 [ ] ip_do_fragment+0x182d/0x2210 [ ] ip_output+0x1d0/0x510 [ ] ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0 [ ] raw_sendmsg+0x1b4c/0x2b80 [ ] sock_sendmsg+0xc0/0x110
This occurred when sending a v4 skb over vxlan6 over ipsec, in which case skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) while skb->sk->sk_family == AF_INET in xfrm_local_error(). Then it will go to xfrm6_local_error() where it tries to get ipv6 info from a ipv4 sk.
This issue was actually fixed by Commit 628e341f319f ("xfrm: make local error reporting more robust"), but brought back by Commit 844d48746e4b ("xfrm: choose protocol family by skb protocol").
So to fix it, we should call xfrm6_local_error() only when skb->protocol is htons(ETH_P_IPV6) and skb->sk->sk_family is AF_INET6.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c +2 -1
@@ -642,7 +642,8 @@ void xfrm_local_error(struct sk_buff *skif (skb->protocol ==htons (ETH_P_IP )) proto =AF_INET ; -else if (skb->protocol ==htons (ETH_P_IPV6 )) +else if (skb->protocol ==htons (ETH_P_IPV6 ) && + skb->sk->sk_family ==AF_INET6 ) proto =AF_INET6 ;else return ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 152/177 xfrm: fix error in comment
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Antony Antony <[email protected]>
commit 29e4276667e24ee6b91d9f91064d8fda9a210ea1 upstream.
s/xfrm_state_offload/xfrm_user_offload/
--- include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h +1 -1
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ enum xfrm_attr_type_t {XFRMA_PROTO ,/* __u8 */ XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER ,/* struct xfrm_address_filter */ XFRMA_PAD , -XFRMA_OFFLOAD_DEV ,/* struct xfrm_state_offload */ +XFRMA_OFFLOAD_DEV ,/* struct xfrm_user_offload */ XFRMA_SET_MARK ,/* __u32 */ XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK ,/* __u32 */ XFRMA_IF_ID, /* __u32 */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 153/177 ip_vti: receive ipip packet by calling ip_tunnel_rcv
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Xin Long <[email protected]>
commit 976eba8ab596bab94b9714cd46d38d5c6a2c660d upstream.
In Commit dd9ee3444014 ("vti4: Fix a ipip packet processing bug in 'IPCOMP' virtual tunnel"), it tries to receive IPIP packets in vti by calling xfrm_input(). This case happens when a small packet or frag sent by peer is too small to get compressed.
However, xfrm_input() will still get to the IPCOMP path where skb sec_path is set, but never dropped while it should have been done in vti_ipcomp4_protocol.cb_handler(vti_rcv_cb), as it's not an ipcomp4 packet. This will cause that the packet can never pass xfrm4_policy_check() in the upper protocol rcv functions.
So this patch is to call ip_tunnel_rcv() to process IPIP packets instead.
--- net/ipv4/ip_vti.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/ip_vti.c +22 -1
@@ -93,7 +93,28 @@ static int vti_rcv_proto(struct sk_buffstatic int vti_rcv_tunnel (struct sk_buff *skb) { -return vti_rcv (skb,ip_hdr (skb)->saddr, true); +struct ip_tunnel_net *itn =net_generic (dev_net (skb->dev), vti_net_id); +const struct iphdr *iph =ip_hdr (skb); +struct ip_tunnel *tunnel; + + tunnel =ip_tunnel_lookup (itn, skb->dev->ifindex,TUNNEL_NO_KEY , + iph->saddr, iph->daddr,0 ); +if (tunnel) { +struct tnl_ptk_info tpi = { + .proto =htons (ETH_P_IP ), + }; + +if (!xfrm4_policy_check (NULL ,XFRM_POLICY_IN , skb)) + goto drop; +if (iptunnel_pull_header (skb,0 , tpi.proto, false)) + goto drop; +return ip_tunnel_rcv (tunnel, skb, &tpi,NULL , false); + } + +return -EINVAL ; +drop: +kfree_skb (skb); +return 0 ; }static int vti_rcv_cb (struct sk_buff *skb,int err)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 154/177 netfilter: nft_reject_bridge: enable reject with bridge vlan
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Michael Braun <[email protected]>
commit e9c284ec4b41c827f4369973d2792992849e4fa5 upstream.
Currently, using the bridge reject target with tagged packets results in untagged packets being sent back.
Fix this by mirroring the vlan id as well.
--- net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c +6 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ static void nft_reject_br_push_etherhdr(ether_addr_copy (eth->h_dest,eth_hdr (oldskb)->h_source); eth->h_proto =eth_hdr (oldskb)->h_proto;skb_pull (nskb,ETH_HLEN ); + +if (skb_vlan_tag_present (oldskb)) { +u16 vid =skb_vlan_tag_get (oldskb); + +__vlan_hwaccel_put_tag (nskb, oldskb->vlan_proto, vid); + } }static int nft_bridge_iphdr_validate (struct sk_buff *skb)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 155/177 netfilter: ipset: Fix subcounter update skip
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Phil Sutter <[email protected]>
commit a164b95ad6055c50612795882f35e0efda1f1390 upstream.
If IPSET_FLAG_SKIP_SUBCOUNTER_UPDATE is set, user requested to not update counters in sub sets. Therefore IPSET_FLAG_SKIP_COUNTER_UPDATE must be set, not unset.
--- net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c +1 -1
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ list_set_ktest(struct ip_set *set, const/* Don't lookup sub-counters at all */ opt->cmdflags &= ~IPSET_FLAG_MATCH_COUNTERS ;if (opt->cmdflags &IPSET_FLAG_SKIP_SUBCOUNTER_UPDATE ) - opt->cmdflags &= ~IPSET_FLAG_SKIP_COUNTER_UPDATE ; + opt->cmdflags |=IPSET_FLAG_SKIP_COUNTER_UPDATE ;list_for_each_entry_rcu (e, &map->members, list) { ret =ip_set_test (e->id, skb, par, opt);if (ret <=0 )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 156/177 netfilter: conntrack: make conntrack userspace helpers work again
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
commit ee04805ff54a63ffd90bc6749ebfe73473734ddb upstream.
Florian Westphal says:
"Problem is that after the helper hook was merged back into the confirm one, the queueing itself occurs from the confirm hook, i.e. we queue from the last netfilter callback in the hook-list.
Therefore, on return, the packet bypasses the confirm action and the connection is never committed to the main conntrack table.
To fix this there are several ways:
1. revert the 'Fixes' commit and have a extra helper hook again. Works, but has the drawback of adding another indirect call for everyone.
2. Special case this: split the hooks only when userspace helper gets added, so queueing occurs at a lower priority again, and normal enqueue reinject would eventually call the last hook.
3. Extend the existing nf_queue ct update hook to allow a forced confirmation (plus run the seqadj code).
This goes for 3)."
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 72 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +72 -6
@@ -2014,22 +2014,18 @@ static void nf_conntrack_attach(struct snf_conntrack_get (skb_nfct (nskb)); } -static int nf_conntrack_update (struct net *net,struct sk_buff *skb) +static int __nf_conntrack_update (struct net *net,struct sk_buff *skb, +struct nf_conn *ct) {struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h;struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;struct nf_nat_hook *nat_hook;unsigned int status; -struct nf_conn *ct;int dataoff;u16 l3num;u8 l4num; - ct =nf_ct_get (skb, &ctinfo); -if (!ct ||nf_ct_is_confirmed (ct)) -return 0 ; - l3num =nf_ct_l3num (ct); dataoff =get_l4proto (skb,skb_network_offset (skb), l3num, &l4num);
@@ -2086,6 +2082,76 @@ static int nf_conntrack_update(struct nereturn 0 ; } +/* This packet is coming from userspace via nf_queue, complete the packet +* processing after the helper invocation in nf_confirm(). +*/ +static int nf_confirm_cthelper (struct sk_buff *skb,struct nf_conn *ct, +enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo) +{ +const struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper; +const struct nf_conn_help *help; +unsigned int protoff; + + help =nfct_help (ct); +if (!help) +return 0 ; + + helper =rcu_dereference (help->helper); +if (!(helper->flags &NF_CT_HELPER_F_USERSPACE )) +return 0 ; + +switch (nf_ct_l3num (ct)) { +case NFPROTO_IPV4 : + protoff =skb_network_offset (skb) +ip_hdrlen (skb); +break ; +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 ) +case NFPROTO_IPV6 : { +__be16 frag_off; +u8 pnum; + + pnum =ipv6_hdr (skb)->nexthdr; + protoff =ipv6_skip_exthdr (skb,sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ), &pnum, + &frag_off); +if (protoff <0 || (frag_off &htons (~0x7 )) !=0 ) +return 0 ; +break ; + } +#endif +default : +return 0 ; + } + +if (test_bit (IPS_SEQ_ADJUST_BIT , &ct->status) && + !nf_is_loopback_packet (skb)) { +if (!nf_ct_seq_adjust (skb, ct, ctinfo, protoff)) { +NF_CT_STAT_INC_ATOMIC (nf_ct_net (ct), drop); +return -1 ; + } + } + +/* We've seen it coming out the other side: confirm it */ +return nf_conntrack_confirm (skb) ==NF_DROP ? -1 :0 ; +} + +static int nf_conntrack_update (struct net *net,struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; +struct nf_conn *ct; +int err; + + ct =nf_ct_get (skb, &ctinfo); +if (!ct) +return 0 ; + +if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed (ct)) { + err =__nf_conntrack_update (net, skb, ct); +if (err <0 ) +return err; + } + +return nf_confirm_cthelper (skb, ct, ctinfo); +} +static bool nf_conntrack_get_tuple_skb (struct nf_conntrack_tuple *dst_tuple,const struct sk_buff *skb) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 157/177 netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: unbreak userspace helper support
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
commit 703acd70f2496537457186211c2f03e792409e68 upstream.
Restore helper data size initialization and fix memcopy of the helper data size.
--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c +2 -1
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ nfnl_cthelper_from_nlattr(struct nlattrif (help->helper->data_len ==0 )return -EINVAL ; -nla_memcpy (help->data,nla_data (attr),sizeof (help->data)); +nla_memcpy (help->data, attr,sizeof (help->data));return 0 ; }
@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ nfnl_cthelper_create(const struct nlattr ret = -ENOMEM ; goto err2; } + helper->data_len = size; helper->flags |=NF_CT_HELPER_F_USERSPACE ;memcpy (&helper->tuple, tuple,sizeof (struct nf_conntrack_tuple ));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 158/177 netfilter: nf_conntrack_pptp: prevent buffer overflows in debug code
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
commit 4c559f15efcc43b996f4da528cd7f9483aaca36d upstream.
Dan Carpenter says: "Smatch complains that the value for "cmd" comes from the network and can't be trusted."
Add pptp_msg_name() helper function that checks for the array boundary.
--- include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_pptp.h | 2 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_pptp.c | 7 --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_pptp.c | 62 +++++++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_pptp.h +1 -1
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h> #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tuple_common.h> -extern const char *const pptp_msg_name[]; +extern const char *const pptp_msg_name (u_int16_t msg);/* state of the control session */ enum pptp_ctrlsess_state {
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_pptp.c +2 -5
@@ -166,8 +166,7 @@ pptp_outbound_pkt(struct sk_buff *skb,break ;default :pr_debug ("unknown outbound packet 0x%04x:%s\n" , msg, - msg <=PPTP_MSG_MAX ? pptp_msg_name[msg] : - pptp_msg_name[0 ]); +pptp_msg_name (msg));/* fall through */ case PPTP_SET_LINK_INFO :/* only need to NAT in case PAC is behind NAT box */
@@ -268,9 +267,7 @@ pptp_inbound_pkt(struct sk_buff *skb, pcid_off = offsetof(union pptp_ctrl_union, setlink.peersCallID);break ;default : -pr_debug ("unknown inbound packet %s\n" , - msg <=PPTP_MSG_MAX ? pptp_msg_name[msg] : - pptp_msg_name[0 ]); +pr_debug ("unknown inbound packet %s\n" ,pptp_msg_name (msg));/* fall through */ case PPTP_START_SESSION_REQUEST :case PPTP_START_SESSION_REPLY :
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_pptp.c +35 -27
129 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 159/177 esp6: get the right proto for transport mode in esp6_gso_encap
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Xin Long <[email protected]>
commit 3c96ec56828922e3fe5477f75eb3fc02f98f98b5 upstream.
For transport mode, when ipv6 nexthdr is set, the packet format might be like:
----------------------------------------------------
| | dest | | | | ESP | ESP |
| IP6 hdr| opts.| ESP | TCP | Data | Trailer | ICV |
----------------------------------------------------
What it wants to get for x-proto in esp6_gso_encap() is the proto that will be set in ESP nexthdr. So it should skip all ipv6 nexthdrs and get the real transport protocol. Othersize, the wrong proto number will be set into ESP nexthdr.
This patch is to skip all ipv6 nexthdrs by calling ipv6_skip_exthdr() in esp6_gso_encap().
--- net/ipv6/esp6_offload.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/esp6_offload.c +8 -1
@@ -121,9 +121,16 @@ static void esp6_gso_encap(struct xfrm_sstruct ip_esp_hdr *esph;struct ipv6hdr *iph =ipv6_hdr (skb);struct xfrm_offload *xo =xfrm_offload (skb); -int proto = iph->nexthdr; +u8 proto = iph->nexthdr;skb_push (skb, -skb_network_offset (skb)); + +if (x->outer_mode.encap ==XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT ) { +__be16 frag; + +ipv6_skip_exthdr (skb,sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ), &proto, &frag); + } + esph =ip_esp_hdr (skb); *skb_mac_header (skb) =IPPROTO_ESP ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 160/177 bnxt_en: Fix accumulation of bp->net_stats_prev.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Michael Chan <[email protected]>
commit b8056e8434b037fdab08158fea99ed7bc8ef3a74 upstream.
We have logic to maintain network counters across resets by storing the counters in bp->net_stats_prev before reset. But not all resets will clear the counters. Certain resets that don't need to change the number of rings do not clear the counters. The current logic accumulates the counters before all resets, causing big jumps in the counters after some resets, such as ethtool -G.
Fix it by only accumulating the counters during reset if the irq_re_init parameter is set. The parameter signifies that all rings and interrupts will be reset and that means that the counters will also be reset.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +1 -1
@@ -9324,7 +9324,7 @@ static void __bnxt_close_nic(struct bnxtbnxt_free_skbs (bp);/* Save ring stats before shutdown */ -if (bp->bnapi) +if (bp->bnapi && irq_re_init)bnxt_get_ring_stats (bp, &bp->net_stats_prev);if (irq_re_init) {bnxt_free_irq (bp);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 161/177 bnxt_en: fix firmware message length endianness
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Edwin Peer <[email protected]>
commit 2a5a8800fa915bd9bc272c91ca64728e6aa84c0a upstream.
The explicit mask and shift is not the appropriate way to parse fields out of a little endian struct. The length field is internally __le16 and the strategy employed only happens to work on little endian machines because the offset used is actually incorrect (length is at offset 6).
Also remove the related and no longer used definitions from bnxt.h.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 14 ++++---------- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h | 5 ----- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +4 -10
@@ -4184,14 +4184,12 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_do_send_msg(structint i, intr_process, rc, tmo_count;struct input *req = msg;u32 *data = msg; -__le32 *resp_len;u8 *valid;u16 cp_ring_id, len =0 ;struct hwrm_err_output *resp = bp->hwrm_cmd_resp_addr;u16 max_req_len =BNXT_HWRM_MAX_REQ_LEN ;struct hwrm_short_input short_input = {0 };u32 doorbell_offset =BNXT_GRCPF_REG_CHIMP_COMM_TRIGGER ; -u8 *resp_addr = (u8 *)bp->hwrm_cmd_resp_addr;u32 bar_offset =BNXT_GRCPF_REG_CHIMP_COMM ;u16 dst =BNXT_HWRM_CHNL_CHIMP ;
@@ -4209,7 +4207,6 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_do_send_msg(struct bar_offset =BNXT_GRCPF_REG_KONG_COMM ; doorbell_offset =BNXT_GRCPF_REG_KONG_COMM_TRIGGER ; resp = bp->hwrm_cmd_kong_resp_addr; - resp_addr = (u8 *)bp->hwrm_cmd_kong_resp_addr; }memset (resp,0 ,PAGE_SIZE );
@@ -4278,7 +4275,6 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_do_send_msg(struct tmo_count =HWRM_SHORT_TIMEOUT_COUNTER ; timeout = timeout -HWRM_SHORT_MIN_TIMEOUT *HWRM_SHORT_TIMEOUT_COUNTER ; tmo_count +=DIV_ROUND_UP (timeout,HWRM_MIN_TIMEOUT ); - resp_len = (__le32 *)(resp_addr +HWRM_RESP_LEN_OFFSET );if (intr_process) {u16 seq_id = bp->hwrm_intr_seq_id;
@@ -4306,9 +4302,8 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_do_send_msg(struct le16_to_cpu(req->req_type));return -EBUSY ; } - len = (le32_to_cpu (*resp_len) &HWRM_RESP_LEN_MASK ) >> -HWRM_RESP_LEN_SFT ; - valid = resp_addr + len -1 ; + len =le16_to_cpu (resp->resp_len); + valid = ((u8 *)resp) + len -1 ; }else {int j;
@@ -4319,8 +4314,7 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_do_send_msg(struct*/ if (test_bit (BNXT_STATE_FW_FATAL_COND , &bp->state))return -EBUSY ; - len = (le32_to_cpu (*resp_len) &HWRM_RESP_LEN_MASK ) >> -HWRM_RESP_LEN_SFT ; + len =le16_to_cpu (resp->resp_len);if (len)break ;/* on first few passes, just barely sleep */
@@ -4342,7 +4336,7 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_do_send_msg(struct }/* Last byte of resp contains valid bit */ - valid = resp_addr + len -1 ; + valid = ((u8 *)resp) + len -1 ;for (j =0 ; j <HWRM_VALID_BIT_DELAY_USEC ; j++) {/* make sure we read from updated DMA memory */ dma_rmb ();
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h +0 -5
@@ -654,11 +654,6 @@ struct nqe_cn {#define HWRM_CMD_TIMEOUT (bp->hwrm_cmd_timeout)#define HWRM_RESET_TIMEOUT ((HWRM_CMD_TIMEOUT) * 4)#define HWRM_COREDUMP_TIMEOUT ((HWRM_CMD_TIMEOUT) * 12) -#define HWRM_RESP_ERR_CODE_MASK 0xffff -#define HWRM_RESP_LEN_OFFSET 4 -#define HWRM_RESP_LEN_MASK 0xffff0000 -#define HWRM_RESP_LEN_SFT 16 -#define HWRM_RESP_VALID_MASK 0xff000000#define BNXT_HWRM_REQ_MAX_SIZE 128#define BNXT_HWRM_REQS_PER_PAGE (BNXT_PAGE_SIZE / \ BNXT_HWRM_REQ_MAX_SIZE)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 162/177 ieee80211: Fix incorrect mask for default PE duration
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Pradeep Kumar Chitrapu <[email protected]>
commit d031781bdabe1027858a3220f868866586bf6e7c upstream.
Fixes bitmask for HE opration's default PE duration.
--- include/linux/ieee80211.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/ieee80211.h +1 -1
@@ -2047,7 +2047,7 @@ ieee80211_he_ppe_size(u8 ppe_thres_hdr, }/* HE Operation defines */ -#define IEEE80211_HE_OPERATION_DFLT_PE_DURATION_MASK 0x00000003 +#define IEEE80211_HE_OPERATION_DFLT_PE_DURATION_MASK 0x00000007#define IEEE80211_HE_OPERATION_TWT_REQUIRED 0x00000008#define IEEE80211_HE_OPERATION_RTS_THRESHOLD_MASK 0x00003ff0#define IEEE80211_HE_OPERATION_RTS_THRESHOLD_OFFSET 4
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 163/177 x86/ioperm: Prevent a memory leak when fork fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jay Lang <[email protected]>
commit 4bfe6cce133cad82cea04490c308795275857782 upstream.
In the copy_process() routine called by _do_fork(), failure to allocate a PID (or further along in the function) will trigger an invocation to exit_thread(). This is done to clean up from an earlier call to copy_thread_tls(). Naturally, the child task is passed into exit_thread(), however during the process, io_bitmap_exit() nullifies the parent's io_bitmap rather than the child's.
As copy_thread_tls() has been called ahead of the failure, the reference count on the calling thread's io_bitmap is incremented as we would expect. However, io_bitmap_exit() doesn't accept any arguments, and thus assumes it should trash the current thread's io_bitmap reference rather than the child's. This is pretty sneaky in practice, because in all instances but this one, exit_thread() is called with respect to the current task and everything works out.
A determined attacker can issue an appropriate ioctl (i.e. KDENABIO) to get a bitmap allocated, and force a clone3() syscall to fail by passing in a zeroed clone_args structure. The kernel handles the erroneous struct and the buggy code path is followed, and even though the parent's reference to the io_bitmap is trashed, the child still holds a reference and thus the structure will never be freed.
Fix this by tweaking io_bitmap_exit() and its subroutines to accept a task_struct argument which to operate on.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/io_bitmap.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/io_bitmap.h +2 -2
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct task_struct;#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM void io_bitmap_share (struct task_struct *tsk); -void io_bitmap_exit (void ); +void io_bitmap_exit (struct task_struct *tsk);void native_tss_update_io_bitmap (void );
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ void native_tss_update_io_bitmap(void);#else static inline void io_bitmap_share (struct task_struct *tsk) { } -static inline void io_bitmap_exit (void ) { } +static inline void io_bitmap_exit (struct task_struct *tsk) { }static inline void tss_update_io_bitmap (void ) { }#endif
arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c +11 -11
@@ -32,15 +32,15 @@ void io_bitmap_share(struct task_structset_tsk_thread_flag (tsk,TIF_IO_BITMAP ); } -static void task_update_io_bitmap (void ) +static void task_update_io_bitmap (struct task_struct *tsk) { -struct thread_struct *t = ¤t->thread; +struct thread_struct *t = &tsk->thread;if (t->iopl_emul ==3 || t->io_bitmap) {/* TSS update is handled on exit to user space */ -set_thread_flag (TIF_IO_BITMAP ); +set_tsk_thread_flag (tsk,TIF_IO_BITMAP ); }else { -clear_thread_flag (TIF_IO_BITMAP ); +clear_tsk_thread_flag (tsk,TIF_IO_BITMAP );/* Invalidate TSS */ preempt_disable ();tss_update_io_bitmap ();
@@ -48,12 +48,12 @@ static void task_update_io_bitmap(void) } } -void io_bitmap_exit (void ) +void io_bitmap_exit (struct task_struct *tsk) { -struct io_bitmap *iobm = current->thread.io_bitmap; +struct io_bitmap *iobm = tsk->thread.io_bitmap; - current->thread.io_bitmap =NULL ; -task_update_io_bitmap (); + tsk->thread.io_bitmap =NULL ; +task_update_io_bitmap (tsk);if (iobm &&refcount_dec_and_test (&iobm->refcnt))kfree (iobm); }
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ long ksys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsif (!iobm)return -ENOMEM ;refcount_set (&iobm->refcnt,1 ); -io_bitmap_exit (); +io_bitmap_exit (current); }/*
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ long ksys_ioperm(unsigned long from, uns }/* All permissions dropped? */ if (max_long ==UINT_MAX ) { -io_bitmap_exit (); +io_bitmap_exit (current);return 0 ; }
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, leve } t->iopl_emul = level; -task_update_io_bitmap (); +task_update_io_bitmap (current);return 0 ; }
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +2 -2
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_str }/* -* Free current thread data structures etc.. +* Free thread data structures etc.. */ void exit_thread (struct task_struct *tsk) {
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tskstruct fpu *fpu = &t->fpu;if (test_thread_flag (TIF_IO_BITMAP )) -io_bitmap_exit (); +io_bitmap_exit (tsk);free_vm86 (t);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 164/177 xsk: Add overflow check for u64 division, stored into u32
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Björn Töpel <[email protected]>
commit b16a87d0aef7a6be766f6618976dc5ff2c689291 upstream.
The npgs member of struct xdp_umem is an u32 entity, and stores the number of pages the UMEM consumes. The calculation of npgs
npgs = size / PAGE_SIZE
can overflow.
To avoid overflow scenarios, the division is now first stored in a u64, and the result is verified to fit into 32b.
An alternative would be storing the npgs as a u64, however, this wastes memory and is an unrealisticly large packet area.
--- net/xdp/xdp_umem.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/xdp/xdp_umem.c +6 -2
@@ -341,8 +341,8 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem {bool unaligned_chunks = mr->flags &XDP_UMEM_UNALIGNED_CHUNK_FLAG ;u32 chunk_size = mr->chunk_size, headroom = mr->headroom; +u64 npgs, addr = mr->addr, size = mr->len;unsigned int chunks, chunks_per_page; -u64 addr = mr->addr, size = mr->len;int err;if (chunk_size <XDP_UMEM_MIN_CHUNK_SIZE || chunk_size >PAGE_SIZE ) {
@@ -372,6 +372,10 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umemif ((addr + size) < addr)return -EINVAL ; + npgs =div_u64 (size,PAGE_SIZE ); +if (npgs >U32_MAX ) +return -EINVAL ; + chunks = (unsigned int )div_u64 (size, chunk_size);if (chunks ==0 )return -EINVAL ;
@@ -391,7 +395,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem umem->size = size; umem->headroom = headroom; umem->chunk_size_nohr = chunk_size - headroom; - umem->npgs = size /PAGE_SIZE ; + umem->npgs = (u32 )npgs; umem->pgs =NULL ; umem->user =NULL ; umem->flags = mr->flags;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 165/177 qlcnic: fix missing release in qlcnic_83xx_interrupt_test.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Qiushi Wu <[email protected]>
commit 15c973858903009e995b2037683de29dfe968621 upstream.
In function qlcnic_83xx_interrupt_test(), function qlcnic_83xx_diag_alloc_res() is not handled by function qlcnic_83xx_diag_free_res() after a call of the function qlcnic_alloc_mbx_args() failed. Fix this issue by adding a jump target "fail_mbx_args", and jump to this new target when qlcnic_alloc_mbx_args() failed.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c +3 -1
@@ -3651,7 +3651,7 @@ int qlcnic_83xx_interrupt_test(struct ne ahw->diag_cnt =0 ; ret =qlcnic_alloc_mbx_args (&cmd, adapter,QLCNIC_CMD_INTRPT_TEST );if (ret) - goto fail_diag_irq; + goto fail_mbx_args;if (adapter->flags &QLCNIC_MSIX_ENABLED ) intrpt_id = ahw->intr_tbl[0 ].id;
@@ -3681,6 +3681,8 @@ int qlcnic_83xx_interrupt_test(struct ne done:qlcnic_free_mbx_args (&cmd); + +fail_mbx_args:qlcnic_83xx_diag_free_res (netdev, drv_sds_rings); fail_diag_irq:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 166/177 crypto: chelsio/chtls: properly set tp->lsndtime
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit a4976a3ef844c510ae9120290b23e9f3f47d6bce upstream.
TCP tp->lsndtime unit/base is tcp_jiffies32, not tcp_time_stamp()
--- drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_io.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_io.c +1 -1
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ int chtls_push_frames(struct chtls_sockmake_tx_data_wr (sk, skb, immdlen, len, credits_needed, completion); tp->snd_nxt += len; - tp->lsndtime =tcp_time_stamp (tp); + tp->lsndtime = tcp_jiffies32;if (completion)ULP_SKB_CB (skb)->flags &= ~ULPCB_FLAG_NEED_HDR ; }else {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 167/177 nexthops: Move code from remove_nexthop_from_groups to remove_nh_grp_entry
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: David Ahern <[email protected]>
commit ac21753a5c2c9a6a2019997481a2ac12bbde48c8 upstream.
Move nh_grp dereference and check for removing nexthop group due to all members gone into remove_nh_grp_entry.
--- net/ipv4/nexthop.c | 27 +++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/nexthop.c +13 -14
@@ -694,17 +694,21 @@ static void nh_group_rebalance(struct nh } } -static void remove_nh_grp_entry (struct nh_grp_entry *nhge, -struct nh_group *nhg, +static void remove_nh_grp_entry (struct net *net,struct nh_grp_entry *nhge,struct nl_info *nlinfo) { +struct nexthop *nhp = nhge->nh_parent;struct nexthop *nh = nhge->nh;struct nh_grp_entry *nhges; +struct nh_group *nhg;bool found = false;int i;WARN_ON (!nh); +list_del (&nhge->nh_list); + + nhg =rtnl_dereference (nhp->nh_grp); nhges = nhg->nh_entries;for (i =0 ; i < nhg->num_nh; ++i) {if (found) {
@@ -728,7 +732,11 @@ static void remove_nh_grp_entry(struct nnexthop_put (nh);if (nlinfo) -nexthop_notify (RTM_NEWNEXTHOP , nhge->nh_parent, nlinfo); +nexthop_notify (RTM_NEWNEXTHOP , nhp, nlinfo); + +/* if this group has no more entries then remove it */ +if (!nhg->num_nh) +remove_nexthop (net, nhp, nlinfo); } static void remove_nexthop_from_groups(struct net *net, struct nexthop *nh,
@@ -736,17 +744,8 @@ static void remove_nexthop_from_groups(s {struct nh_grp_entry *nhge, *tmp; -list_for_each_entry_safe (nhge, tmp, &nh->grp_list, nh_list) { -struct nh_group *nhg; - -list_del (&nhge->nh_list); - nhg =rtnl_dereference (nhge->nh_parent->nh_grp); -remove_nh_grp_entry (nhge, nhg, nlinfo); - -/* if this group has no more entries then remove it */ -if (!nhg->num_nh) -remove_nexthop (net, nhge->nh_parent, nlinfo); - } +list_for_each_entry_safe (nhge, tmp, &nh->grp_list, nh_list) +remove_nh_grp_entry (net, nhge, nlinfo); }static void remove_nexthop_group (struct nexthop *nh,struct nl_info *nlinfo)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 168/177 nexthops: dont modify published nexthop groups
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
commit 90f33bffa382598a32cc82abfeb20adc92d041b6 upstream.
We must avoid modifying published nexthop groups while they might be in use, otherwise we might see NULL ptr dereferences. In order to do that we allocate 2 nexthoup group structures upon nexthop creation and swap between them when we have to delete an entry. The reason is that we can't fail nexthop group removal, so we can't handle allocation failure thus we move the extra allocation on creation where we can safely fail and return ENOMEM.
--- include/net/nexthop.h | 1 net/ipv4/nexthop.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
include/net/nexthop.h +1 -0
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ struct nh_grp_entry { };struct nh_group { +struct nh_group *spare;/* spare group for removals */ u16 num_nh;bool mpath;bool has_v4;
net/ipv4/nexthop.c +58 -33
153 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 169/177 nexthop: Expand nexthop_is_multipath in a few places
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: David Ahern <[email protected]>
commit 0b5e2e39739e861fa5fc84ab27a35dbe62a15330 upstream.
I got too fancy consolidating checks on multipath type. The result is that path lookups can access 2 different nh_grp structs as exposed by Nik's torture tests. Expand nexthop_is_multipath within nexthop.h to avoid multiple, nh_grp dereferences and make decisions based on the consistent struct.
Only 2 places left using nexthop_is_multipath are within IPv6, both only check that the nexthop is a multipath for a branching decision which are acceptable.
--- include/net/nexthop.h | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
include/net/nexthop.h +25 -16
@@ -137,21 +137,20 @@ static inline unsigned int nexthop_num_p {unsigned int rc =1 ; -if (nexthop_is_multipath (nh)) { +if (nh->is_group) {struct nh_group *nh_grp; nh_grp =rcu_dereference_rtnl (nh->nh_grp); - rc = nh_grp->num_nh; +if (nh_grp->mpath) + rc = nh_grp->num_nh; }return rc; }static inline -struct nexthop *nexthop_mpath_select (const struct nexthop *nh,int nhsel) +struct nexthop *nexthop_mpath_select (const struct nh_group *nhg,int nhsel) { -const struct nh_group *nhg =rcu_dereference_rtnl (nh->nh_grp); -/* for_nexthops macros in fib_semantics.c grabs a pointer to * the nexthop before checking nhsel */
@@ -186,12 +185,14 @@ static inline bool nexthop_is_blackhole( {const struct nh_info *nhi; -if (nexthop_is_multipath (nh)) { -if (nexthop_num_path (nh) >1 ) -return false; - nh =nexthop_mpath_select (nh,0 ); -if (!nh) +if (nh->is_group) { +struct nh_group *nh_grp; + + nh_grp =rcu_dereference_rtnl (nh->nh_grp); +if (nh_grp->num_nh >1 )return false; + + nh = nh_grp->nh_entries[0 ].nh; } nhi =rcu_dereference_rtnl (nh->nh_info);
@@ -217,10 +218,15 @@ struct fib_nh_common *nexthop_fib_nhc(stBUILD_BUG_ON (offsetof(struct fib_nh , nh_common) !=0 );BUILD_BUG_ON (offsetof(struct fib6_nh , nh_common) !=0 ); -if (nexthop_is_multipath (nh)) { - nh =nexthop_mpath_select (nh, nhsel); -if (!nh) -return NULL ; +if (nh->is_group) { +struct nh_group *nh_grp; + + nh_grp =rcu_dereference_rtnl (nh->nh_grp); +if (nh_grp->mpath) { + nh =nexthop_mpath_select (nh_grp, nhsel); +if (!nh) +return NULL ; + } } nhi =rcu_dereference_rtnl (nh->nh_info);
@@ -264,8 +270,11 @@ static inline struct fib6_nh *nexthop_fi {struct nh_info *nhi; -if (nexthop_is_multipath (nh)) { - nh =nexthop_mpath_select (nh,0 ); +if (nh->is_group) { +struct nh_group *nh_grp; + + nh_grp =rcu_dereference_rtnl (nh->nh_grp); + nh =nexthop_mpath_select (nh_grp,0 );if (!nh)return NULL ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 170/177 ipv4: nexthop version of fib_info_nh_uses_dev
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: David Ahern <[email protected]>
commit 1fd1c768f3624a5e66766e7b4ddb9b607cd834a5 upstream.
Similar to the last path, need to fix fib_info_nh_uses_dev for external nexthops to avoid referencing multiple nh_grp structs. Move the device check in fib_info_nh_uses_dev to a helper and create a nexthop version that is called if the fib_info uses an external nexthop.
--- include/net/ip_fib.h | 10 ++++++++++ include/net/nexthop.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/net/ip_fib.h +10 -0
@@ -447,6 +447,16 @@ static inline int fib_num_tclassid_users#endif int fib_unmerge (struct net *net); +static inline bool nhc_l3mdev_matches_dev (const struct fib_nh_common *nhc, +const struct net_device *dev) +{ +if (nhc->nhc_dev == dev || +l3mdev_master_ifindex_rcu (nhc->nhc_dev) == dev->ifindex) +return true; + +return false; +} +/* Exported by fib_semantics.c */ int ip_fib_check_default (__be32 gw,struct net_device *dev);int fib_sync_down_dev (struct net_device *dev,unsigned long event,bool force);
include/net/nexthop.h +25 -0
@@ -233,6 +233,31 @@ struct fib_nh_common *nexthop_fib_nhc(streturn &nhi->fib_nhc; } +static inline bool nexthop_uses_dev (const struct nexthop *nh, +const struct net_device *dev) +{ +struct nh_info *nhi; + +if (nh->is_group) { +struct nh_group *nhg =rcu_dereference (nh->nh_grp); +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i < nhg->num_nh; i++) { +struct nexthop *nhe = nhg->nh_entries[i].nh; + + nhi =rcu_dereference (nhe->nh_info); +if (nhc_l3mdev_matches_dev (&nhi->fib_nhc, dev)) +return true; + } + }else { + nhi =rcu_dereference (nh->nh_info); +if (nhc_l3mdev_matches_dev (&nhi->fib_nhc, dev)) +return true; + } + +return false; +} +static inline unsigned int fib_info_num_path (const struct fib_info *fi) {if (unlikely (fi->nh))
net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c +10 -9
@@ -309,17 +309,18 @@ bool fib_info_nh_uses_dev(struct fib_inf {bool dev_match = false;#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH -int ret; +if (unlikely (fi->nh)) { + dev_match =nexthop_uses_dev (fi->nh, dev); + }else { +int ret; -for (ret =0 ; ret <fib_info_num_path (fi); ret++) { -const struct fib_nh_common *nhc =fib_info_nhc (fi, ret); +for (ret =0 ; ret <fib_info_num_path (fi); ret++) { +const struct fib_nh_common *nhc =fib_info_nhc (fi, ret); -if (nhc->nhc_dev == dev) { - dev_match = true; -break ; - }else if (l3mdev_master_ifindex_rcu (nhc->nhc_dev) == dev->ifindex) { - dev_match = true; -break ; +if (nhc_l3mdev_matches_dev (nhc, dev)) { + dev_match = true; +break ; + } } }#else
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 171/177 net: dsa: declare lockless TX feature for slave ports
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]>
commit 2b86cb8299765688c5119fd18d5f436716c81010 upstream.
Be there a platform with the following layout:
Regular NIC
|
+----> DSA master for switch port
|
+----> DSA master for another switch portAfter changing DSA back to static lockdep class keys in commit 1a33e10e4a95 ("net: partially revert dynamic lockdep key changes"), this kernel splat can be seen:
[ 13.361198] ============================================
[ 13.366524] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 13.371851] 5.7.0-rc4-02121-gc32a05ecd7af-dirty #988 Not tainted
[ 13.377874] --------------------------------------------
[ 13.383201] swapper/0/0 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 13.388004] ffff0000668ff298 (&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x84c/0xbe0
[ 13.397879]
[ 13.397879] but task is already holding lock:
[ 13.403727] ffff0000661a1698 (&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x84c/0xbe0
[ 13.413593]
[ 13.413593] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 13.420140] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 13.420140]
[ 13.426075] CPU0
[ 13.428523] ----
[ 13.430969] lock(&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key);
[ 13.435946] lock(&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key);
[ 13.440924]
[ 13.440924] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 13.440924]
[ 13.446860] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 13.446860]
[ 13.453668] 6 locks held by swapper/0/0:
[ 13.457598] #0: ffff800010003de0 ((&idev->mc_ifc_timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0x0/0x400
[ 13.466593] #1: ffffd4d3fb478700 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: mld_sendpack+0x0/0x560
[ 13.474803] #2: ffffd4d3fb478728 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip6_finish_output2+0x64/0xb10
[ 13.483886] #3: ffffd4d3fb478728 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x6c/0xbe0
[ 13.492793] #4: ffff0000661a1698 (&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x84c/0xbe0
[ 13.503094] #5: ffffd4d3fb478728 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x6c/0xbe0
[ 13.512000]
[ 13.512000] stack backtrace:
[ 13.516369] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4-02121-gc32a05ecd7af-dirty #988
[ 13.530421] Call trace:
[ 13.532871] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1d8
[ 13.536539] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 13.539862] dump_stack+0xe8/0x150
[ 13.543271] __lock_acquire+0x1030/0x1678
[ 13.547290] lock_acquire+0xf8/0x458
[ 13.550873] _raw_spin_lock+0x44/0x58
[ 13.554543] __dev_queue_xmit+0x84c/0xbe0
[ 13.558562] dev_queue_xmit+0x24/0x30
[ 13.562232] dsa_slave_xmit+0xe0/0x128
[ 13.565988] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xf4/0x448
[ 13.570182] __dev_queue_xmit+0x808/0xbe0
[ 13.574200] dev_queue_xmit+0x24/0x30
[ 13.577869] neigh_resolve_output+0x15c/0x220
[ 13.582237] ip6_finish_output2+0x244/0xb10
[ 13.586430] __ip6_finish_output+0x1dc/0x298
[ 13.590709] ip6_output+0x84/0x358
[ 13.594116] mld_sendpack+0x2bc/0x560
[ 13.597786] mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x210/0x390
[ 13.602153] call_timer_fn+0xcc/0x400
[ 13.605822] run_timer_softirq+0x588/0x6e0
[ 13.609927] __do_softirq+0x118/0x590
[ 13.613597] irq_exit+0x13c/0x148
[ 13.616918] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 13.621023] gic_handle_irq+0x6c/0x160
[ 13.624779] el1_irq+0xbc/0x180
[ 13.627927] cpuidle_enter_state+0xb4/0x4d0
[ 13.632120] cpuidle_enter+0x3c/0x50
[ 13.635703] call_cpuidle+0x44/0x78
[ 13.639199] do_idle+0x228/0x2c8
[ 13.642433] cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x48
[ 13.646363] rest_init+0x1ac/0x280
[ 13.649773] arch_call_rest_init+0x14/0x1c
[ 13.653878] start_kernel+0x490/0x4bcLockdep keys themselves were added in commit ab92d68fc22f ("net: core:
add generic lockdep keys"), and it's very likely that this splat existed since then, but I have no real way to check, since this stacked platform wasn't supported by mainline back then.
Quoted 1 line
From Taehee's own words:
This patch was considered that all stackable devices have LLTX flag. But the dsa doesn't have LLTX, so this splat happened. After this patch, dsa shares the same lockdep class key. On the nested dsa interface architecture, which you illustrated, the same lockdep class key will be used in __dev_queue_xmit() because dsa doesn't have LLTX.
So that lockdep detects deadlock because the same lockdep class key is used recursively although actually the different locks are used. There are some ways to fix this problem.
1. using NETIF_F_LLTX flag.
If possible, using the LLTX flag is a very clear way for it. But I'm so sorry I don't know whether the dsa could have LLTX or not.
2. using dynamic lockdep again.
It means that each interface uses a separate lockdep class key. So, lockdep will not detect recursive locking.
But this way has a problem that it could consume lockdep class key too many.
Currently, lockdep can have 8192 lockdep class keys.
- you can see this number with the following command.
cat /proc/lockdep_stats
lock-classes: 1251 [max: 8192]
...
The [max: 8192] means that the maximum number of lockdep class keys.
If too many lockdep class keys are registered, lockdep stops to work. So, using a dynamic(separated) lockdep class key should be considered carefully.
In addition, updating lockdep class key routine might have to be existing. (lockdep_register_key(), lockdep_set_class(), lockdep_unregister_key())
3. Using lockdep subclass.
A lockdep class key could have 8 subclasses.
The different subclass is considered different locks by lockdep infrastructure.
But "lock-classes" is not counted by subclasses.
So, it could avoid stopping lockdep infrastructure by an overflow of lockdep class keys.
This approach should also have an updating lockdep class key routine. (lockdep_set_subclass())
4. Using nonvalidate lockdep class key.
The lockdep infrastructure supports nonvalidate lockdep class key type. It means this lockdep is not validated by lockdep infrastructure. So, the splat will not happen but lockdep couldn't detect real deadlock case because lockdep really doesn't validate it.
I think this should be used for really special cases. (lockdep_set_novalidate_class())
Further discussion here:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/[email protected]/
There appears to be no negative side-effect to declaring lockless TX for the DSA virtual interfaces, which means they handle their own locking. So that's what we do to make the splat go away.
Patch tested in a wide variety of cases: unicast, multicast, PTP, etc.
--- net/dsa/slave.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/dsa/slave.c +1 -0
@@ -1393,6 +1393,7 @@ int dsa_slave_create(struct dsa_port *poif (ds->ops->port_vlan_add && ds->ops->port_vlan_del) slave_dev->features |=NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER ; slave_dev->hw_features |=NETIF_F_HW_TC ; + slave_dev->features |=NETIF_F_LLTX ; slave_dev->ethtool_ops = &dsa_slave_ethtool_ops;if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (port->mac))ether_addr_copy (slave_dev->dev_addr, port->mac);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 172/177 bonding: Fix reference count leak in bond_sysfs_slave_add.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Qiushi Wu <[email protected]>
commit a068aab42258e25094bc2c159948d263ed7d7a77 upstream.
kobject_init_and_add() takes reference even when it fails. If this function returns an error, kobject_put() must be called to properly clean up the memory associated with the object. Previous commit "b8eb718348b8" fixed a similar problem.
--- drivers/net/bonding/bond_sysfs_slave.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/bonding/bond_sysfs_slave.c +3 -1
@@ -149,8 +149,10 @@ int bond_sysfs_slave_add(struct slave *s err =kobject_init_and_add (&slave->kobj, &slave_ktype, &(slave->dev->dev.kobj),"bonding_slave" ); -if (err) +if (err) { +kobject_put (&slave->kobj);return err; + }for (a = slave_attrs; *a; ++a) { err =sysfs_create_file (&slave->kobj, &((*a)->attr));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 173/177 powerpc/bpf: Enable bpf_probe_read{, str}() on powerpc again
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
commit d195b1d1d1196681ac4775e0361e9cca70f740c2 upstream.
The commit 0ebeea8ca8a4d1d453a ("bpf: Restrict bpf_probe_read{, str}() only to archs where they work") caused that bpf_probe_read{, str}() functions were not longer available on architectures where the same logical address might have different content in kernel and user memory mapping. These architectures should use probe_read_{user,kernel}_str helpers.
For backward compatibility, the problematic functions are still available on architectures where the user and kernel address spaces are not overlapping. This is defined CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE.
At the moment, these backward compatible functions are enabled only on x86_64, arm, and arm64. Let's do it also on powerpc that has the non overlapping address space as well.
--- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ config PPC select ARCH_HAS_MMIOWB if PPC64 select ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API + select ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE select ARCH_HAS_PTE_DEVMAP if PPC_BOOK3S_64 select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_CALLBACKS
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 174/177 Revert "Input: i8042 - add ThinkPad S230u to i8042 nomux list"
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
commit f4dec2d6160976b14e54be9c3950ce0f52385741 upstream.
This reverts commit 18931506465a762ffd3f4803d36a18d336a67da9. From Kevin Locke:
"... nomux only appeared to fix the issue because the controller continued working after warm reboots. After more thorough testing from both warm and cold start, I now believe the entry should be added to i8042_dmi_reset_table rather than i8042_dmi_nomux_table as i8042.reset=1 alone is sufficient to avoid the issue from both states while i8042.nomux is not."
--- drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h | 7 ------- 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h +0 -7
@@ -541,13 +541,6 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id __init DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Aspire 5738"), }, }, - { - /* Lenovo ThinkPad Twist S230u */ - .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"), - DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "33474HU"), - }, - }, { } };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 175/177 netfilter: conntrack: comparison of unsigned in cthelper confirmation
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
commit 94945ad2b330207cded0fd8d4abebde43a776dfb upstream.
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: In function nf_confirm_cthelper:net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2117:15: warning: comparison of unsigned expression in < 0 is always false [-Wtype-limits]
2117 | if (protoff < 0 || (frag_off & htons(~0x7)) != 0)
| ^
ipv6_skip_exthdr() returns a signed integer.
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +1 -1
@@ -2090,7 +2090,7 @@ static int nf_confirm_cthelper(struct sk {const struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper;const struct nf_conn_help *help; -unsigned int protoff; +int protoff; help =nfct_help (ct);if (!help)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 176/177 netfilter: conntrack: Pass value of ctinfo to __nf_conntrack_update
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
commit 46c1e0621a72e0469ec4edfdb6ed4d387ec34f8a upstream.
Clang warns:
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2068:21: warning: variable 'ctinfo' is uninitialized when used here [-Wuninitialized]
nf_ct_set(skb, ct, ctinfo);
^~~~~~
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2024:2: note: variable 'ctinfo' is
declared here
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
^1 warning generated.
nf_conntrack_update was split up into nf_conntrack_update and __nf_conntrack_update, where the assignment of ctinfo is in nf_conntrack_update but it is used in __nf_conntrack_update.
Pass the value of ctinfo from nf_conntrack_update to __nf_conntrack_update so that uninitialized memory is not used and everything works properly.
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +3 -3
@@ -2015,11 +2015,11 @@ static void nf_conntrack_attach(struct s }static int __nf_conntrack_update (struct net *net,struct sk_buff *skb, -struct nf_conn *ct) +struct nf_conn *ct, +enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo) {struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h;struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple; -enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;struct nf_nat_hook *nat_hook;unsigned int status;int dataoff;
@@ -2144,7 +2144,7 @@ static int nf_conntrack_update(struct nereturn 0 ;if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed (ct)) { - err =__nf_conntrack_update (net, skb, ct); + err =__nf_conntrack_update (net, skb, ct, ctinfo);if (err <0 )return err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 177/177 netfilter: nf_conntrack_pptp: fix compilation warning with W=1 build
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
commit 4946ea5c1237036155c3b3a24f049fd5f849f8f6 upstream.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_pptp.h:13:20: warning: 'const' type qualifier on return type has no effect [-Wignored-qualifiers]
extern const char *const pptp_msg_name(u_int16_t msg); ^~~~~~
--- include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_pptp.h | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_pptp.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_pptp.h +1 -1
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h> #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tuple_common.h> -extern const char *const pptp_msg_name (u_int16_t msg); +const char *pptp_msg_name (u_int16_t msg);/* state of the control session */ enum pptp_ctrlsess_state {
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_pptp.c +1 -1
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static const char *const pptp_msg_name_a [PPTP_SET_LINK_INFO] = "SET_LINK_INFO" }; -const char *const pptp_msg_name (u_int16_t msg) +const char *pptp_msg_name (u_int16_t msg) {if (msg >PPTP_MSG_MAX )return pptp_msg_name_array[0 ];
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.6.16 release. There are 177 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Jun 2020 17:38:19 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.6.16-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.6.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 5.6.16-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-5.6.y
git commit: c72fcbc7d224903b8241afc1202a414575c1e557
git describe: v5.6.15-178-gc72fcbc7d224
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-5.6-oe/build/v5.6.15-178-gc72fcbc7d224
No regressions (compared to build v5.6.15)
No fixes (compared to build v5.6.15)
Ran 31253 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c
- hi6220-hikey
- i386
- juno-r2
- juno-r2-compat
- juno-r2-kasan
- nxp-ls2088
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15
- x86
- x86-kasan
Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* install-android-platform-tools-r2800
* kselftest
* kselftest/drivers
* kselftest/filesystems
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* perf
* v4l2-compliance
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* kselftest/net
* kselftest/networking
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* network-basic-tests
* kvm-unit-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native/drivers
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native/filesystems
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native/net
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native/networking
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none/drivers
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none/filesystems
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none/net
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none/networking
Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT https://lkft.linaro.org