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ati-vga: check mm_index before recursive call

PATCH Superseded P J P 4 participants 5 messages Jun 3, 2020 – Jun 4, 2020

v2 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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P J P

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 ati-vga: check mm_index before recursive call

From: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>

While accessing VGA registers via ati_mm_read/write routines, a guest may set 's->regs.mm_index' such that it leads to infinite recursion. Check mm_index value to avoid it.

---
 hw/display/ati.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Update v2: add check before recursive call
-> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2020-06/msg00781.html

hw/display/ati.c +2 -2
index 065f197678..bda4a2d816 100644
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static uint64_t ati_mm_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size)
             if (idx <= s->vga.vram_size - size) {
                 val = ldn_le_p(s->vga.vram_ptr + idx, size);
             }
-        } else {
+        } else if (s->regs.mm_index > MM_DATA + 3) {
             val = ati_mm_read(s, s->regs.mm_index + addr - MM_DATA, size);
         }
         break;
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ static void ati_mm_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
             if (idx <= s->vga.vram_size - size) {
                 stn_le_p(s->vga.vram_ptr + idx, size, data);
             }
-        } else {
+        } else if (s->regs.mm_index > MM_DATA + 3) {
             ati_mm_write(s, s->regs.mm_index + addr - MM_DATA, data, size);
         }
         break;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
#1 lore raw
Quoted 22 lines · P J P

From: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>

While accessing VGA registers via ati_mm_read/write routines, a guest may set 's->regs.mm_index' such that it leads to infinite recursion. Check mm_index value to avoid it.

---
 hw/display/ati.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Update v2: add check before recursive call
-> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2020-06/msg00781.html

hw/display/ati.c +0 -0
index 065f197678..bda4a2d816 100644

hw/display/ati.c static uint64_t ati_mm_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size) · line 289

Quoted 6 lines
hw/display/ati.c +1 -1
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static uint64_t ati_mm_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size)
             if (idx <= s->vga.vram_size - size) {
                 val = ldn_le_p(s->vga.vram_ptr + idx, size);
             }
-        } else {
+        } else if (s->regs.mm_index > MM_DATA + 3) {
             val = ati_mm_read(s, s->regs.mm_index + addr - MM_DATA, size);

We usually log unexpected guest accesses with:

           } else {
               qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, ...

hw/display/ati.c static void ati_mm_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, · line 524

Quoted 9 lines
hw/display/ati.c +1 -1
         }
         break;
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ static void ati_mm_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
             if (idx <= s->vga.vram_size - size) {
                 stn_le_p(s->vga.vram_ptr + idx, size, data);
             }
-        } else {
+        } else if (s->regs.mm_index > MM_DATA + 3) {
             ati_mm_write(s, s->regs.mm_index + addr - MM_DATA, data, size);

Ditto:

           } else {
               qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, ...
Quoted 3 lines
hw/display/ati.c +0 -0
         }
         break;
#2 lore raw
In reply to P J P
Quoted 9 lines · P J P

From: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>

While accessing VGA registers via ati_mm_read/write routines, a guest may set 's->regs.mm_index' such that it leads to infinite recursion. Check mm_index value to avoid it.

therefore I think this should work but someone else should give Reviewed-by to cross check this.

Regards,
BALATON Zoltan

Quoted 31 lines

---
hw/display/ati.c | 4 ++--

1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Update v2: add check before recursive call
-> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2020-06/msg00781.html

hw/display/ati.c +2 -2
index 065f197678..bda4a2d816 100644
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static uint64_t ati_mm_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size)
            if (idx <= s->vga.vram_size - size) {
                val = ldn_le_p(s->vga.vram_ptr + idx, size);
            }
-        } else {
+        } else if (s->regs.mm_index > MM_DATA + 3) {
            val = ati_mm_read(s, s->regs.mm_index + addr - MM_DATA, size);
        }
        break;
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ static void ati_mm_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
            if (idx <= s->vga.vram_size - size) {
                stn_le_p(s->vga.vram_ptr + idx, size, data);
            }
-        } else {
+        } else if (s->regs.mm_index > MM_DATA + 3) {
            ati_mm_write(s, s->regs.mm_index + addr - MM_DATA, data, size);
        }
        break;
#3 lore raw
In reply to P J P
Quoted 5 lines · P J P

From: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>

While accessing VGA registers via ati_mm_read/write routines, a guest may set 's->regs.mm_index' such that it leads to infinite recursion. Check mm_index value to avoid it.

So this is a denial of service security issue. Is there any CVE assigned for this ?

Quoted 37 lines
---
 hw/display/ati.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Update v2: add check before recursive call
-> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2020-06/msg00781.html

hw/display/ati.c +2 -2
index 065f197678..bda4a2d816 100644
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static uint64_t ati_mm_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size)
             if (idx <= s->vga.vram_size - size) {
                 val = ldn_le_p(s->vga.vram_ptr + idx, size);
             }
-        } else {
+        } else if (s->regs.mm_index > MM_DATA + 3) {
             val = ati_mm_read(s, s->regs.mm_index + addr - MM_DATA, size);
         }
         break;
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ static void ati_mm_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
             if (idx <= s->vga.vram_size - size) {
                 stn_le_p(s->vga.vram_ptr + idx, size, data);
             }
-        } else {
+        } else if (s->regs.mm_index > MM_DATA + 3) {
             ati_mm_write(s, s->regs.mm_index + addr - MM_DATA, data, size);
         }
         break;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2

Regards,
Daniel

Signature · 3 lines
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author
#4 lore raw
+-- On Wed, 3 Jun 2020, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote --+
| > -        } else {
| > +        } else if (s->regs.mm_index > MM_DATA + 3) {
| >              val = ati_mm_read(s, s->regs.mm_index + addr - MM_DATA, size);
| 
| We usually log unexpected guest accesses with:
| 
|            } else {
|                qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, ...
| 
| > -        } else {
| > +        } else if (s->regs.mm_index > MM_DATA + 3) {
| >              ati_mm_write(s, s->regs.mm_index + addr - MM_DATA, data, size);
| 
| Ditto:
| 
|            } else {
|                qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, ...
+-- On Thu, 4 Jun 2020, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote --+
| On Thu, Jun 04, 2020 at 12:25:22AM +0530, P J P wrote:
| > While accessing VGA registers via ati_mm_read/write routines,
| > a guest may set 's->regs.mm_index' such that it leads to infinite
| > recursion. Check mm_index value to avoid it.
| 
| So this is a denial of service security issue. Is there any CVE
| assigned for this ?

Yes, just sent a revised patch v3 with above changes and CVE-ID.

Thank you.
--
Prasad J Pandit / Red Hat Product Security Team
8685 545E B54C 486B C6EB 271E E285 8B5A F050 DE8D