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ath9x: Fix stack-out-of-bounds Write in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb

PATCH In review Sasha Levin 5 participants 76 messages Jun 8, 2020 – Jun 9, 2020

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Sasha Levin

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/72 ath9x: Fix stack-out-of-bounds Write in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb

From: Qiujun Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 19d6c375d671ce9949a864fb9a03e19f5487b4d3 ]

Add barrier to accessing the stack array skb_pool.

The case reported by syzbot:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:626 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb+0xdf6/0xf70
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:666
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881db309a28 by task swapper/1/0

Call Trace:
ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:626
[inline]
ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb+0xdf6/0xf70
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:666
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x1f2/0x470 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1648
usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x368/0x420 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1713
dummy_timer+0x1258/0x32ae drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1966
call_timer_fn+0x195/0x6f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1404
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1449 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1773 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1740 [inline]
run_timer_softirq+0x5f9/0x1500 kernel/time/timer.c:1786
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c +5 -0
index 6f669166c263..4399e1ebac15 100644
@@ -610,6 +610,11 @@ static void ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev,
 			hif_dev->remain_skb = nskb;
 			spin_unlock(&hif_dev->rx_lock);
 		} else {
+			if (pool_index == MAX_PKT_NUM_IN_TRANSFER) {
+				dev_err(&hif_dev->udev->dev,
+					"ath9k_htc: over RX MAX_PKT_NUM\n");
+				goto err;
+			}
 			nskb = __dev_alloc_skb(pkt_len + 32, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			if (!nskb) {
 				dev_err(&hif_dev->udev->dev,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/72 ath9k: Fix use-after-free Write in ath9k_htc_rx_msg

From: Qiujun Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e4ff08a4d727146bb6717a39a8d399d834654345 ]

Write out of slab bounds. We should check epid.

The case reported by syzbot:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in htc_process_conn_rsp
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c:131 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ath9k_htc_rx_msg+0xa25/0xaf0
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c:443
Write of size 2 at addr ffff8881cea291f0 by task swapper/1/0

Call Trace:
 htc_process_conn_rsp drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c:131

[inline]
ath9k_htc_rx_msg+0xa25/0xaf0
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c:443
ath9k_hif_usb_reg_in_cb+0x1ba/0x630
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:718

__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x29a/0x550 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1650
usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x368/0x420 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1716
dummy_timer+0x1258/0x32ae drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1966
call_timer_fn+0x195/0x6f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1404
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1449 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1773 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1740 [inline]
run_timer_softirq+0x5f9/0x1500 kernel/time/timer.c:1786
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c +3 -0
index 1bf63a4efb4c..d2e062eaf561 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ static void htc_process_conn_rsp(struct htc_target *target,
 
 	if (svc_rspmsg->status == HTC_SERVICE_SUCCESS) {
 		epid = svc_rspmsg->endpoint_id;
+		if (epid < 0 || epid >= ENDPOINT_MAX)
+			return;
+
 		service_id = be16_to_cpu(svc_rspmsg->service_id);
 		max_msglen = be16_to_cpu(svc_rspmsg->max_msg_len);
 		endpoint = &target->endpoint[epid];
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/72 drm: bridge: adv7511: Extend list of audio sample rates

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bogdan Togorean <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b97b6a1f6e14a25d1e1ca2a46c5fa3e2ca374e22 ]

ADV7511 support sample rates up to 192kHz. CTS and N parameters should be computed accordingly so this commit extend the list up to maximum supported sample rate.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/adv7511/adv7511_audio.c | 12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/adv7511/adv7511_audio.c +7 -5
index 67469c26bae8..45a027d7a1e4 100644
@@ -20,13 +20,15 @@ static void adv7511_calc_cts_n(unsigned int f_tmds, unsigned int fs,
 {
 	switch (fs) {
 	case 32000:
-		*n = 4096;
+	case 48000:
+	case 96000:
+	case 192000:
+		*n = fs * 128 / 1000;
 		break;
 	case 44100:
-		*n = 6272;
-		break;
-	case 48000:
-		*n = 6144;
+	case 88200:
+	case 176400:
+		*n = fs * 128 / 900;
 		break;
 	}
 
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1

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[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/72 crypto: ccp -- don't "select" CONFIG_DMADEVICES

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eebac678556d6927f09a992872f4464cf3aecc76 ]

DMADEVICES is the top-level option for the slave DMA subsystem, and should not be selected by device drivers, as this can cause circular dependencies such as:

drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/Kconfig:6:error: recursive dependency detected!
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/Kconfig:6: symbol NET_VENDOR_FREESCALE depends on PPC_BESTCOMM
drivers/dma/bestcomm/Kconfig:6: symbol PPC_BESTCOMM depends on DMADEVICES
drivers/dma/Kconfig:6: symbol DMADEVICES is selected by CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP
drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig:10: symbol CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP depends on CRYPTO
crypto/Kconfig:16: symbol CRYPTO is selected by LIBCRC32C
lib/Kconfig:222: symbol LIBCRC32C is selected by LIQUIDIO
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/Kconfig:65: symbol LIQUIDIO depends on PTP_1588_CLOCK
drivers/ptp/Kconfig:8: symbol PTP_1588_CLOCK is implied by FEC
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/Kconfig:23: symbol FEC depends on NET_VENDOR_FREESCALE

The LIQUIDIO driver causing this problem is addressed in a separate patch, but this change is needed to prevent it from happening again.

Using "depends on DMADEVICES" is what we do for all other implementations of slave DMA controllers as well.

Fixes b3c2fee5d66b ("crypto: ccp - Ensure all dependencies are specified")
---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig +1 -2
index 6d626606b9c5..898dcf3200c3 100644
@@ -8,10 +8,9 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD
 config CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP
 	bool "Cryptographic Coprocessor device"
 	default y
-	depends on CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD
+	depends on CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD && DMADEVICES
 	select HW_RANDOM
 	select DMA_ENGINE
-	select DMADEVICES
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	select CRYPTO_SHA256
 	help
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/72 media: si2157: Better check for running tuner in init

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Brad Love <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e955f959ac52e145f27ff2be9078b646d0352af0 ]

Getting the Xtal trim property to check if running is less error prone. Reset if_frequency if state is unknown.

Replaces the previous "garbage check".

---
 drivers/media/tuners/si2157.c | 15 +++++++--------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/media/tuners/si2157.c +7 -8
index e35b1faf0ddc..c826997f5433 100644
@@ -84,24 +84,23 @@ static int si2157_init(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
 	struct si2157_cmd cmd;
 	const struct firmware *fw;
 	const char *fw_name;
-	unsigned int uitmp, chip_id;
+	unsigned int chip_id, xtal_trim;
 
 	dev_dbg(&client->dev, "\n");
 
-	/* Returned IF frequency is garbage when firmware is not running */
-	memcpy(cmd.args, "\x15\x00\x06\x07", 4);
+	/* Try to get Xtal trim property, to verify tuner still running */
+	memcpy(cmd.args, "\x15\x00\x04\x02", 4);
 	cmd.wlen = 4;
 	cmd.rlen = 4;
 	ret = si2157_cmd_execute(client, &cmd);
-	if (ret)
-		goto err;
 
-	uitmp = cmd.args[2] << 0 | cmd.args[3] << 8;
-	dev_dbg(&client->dev, "if_frequency kHz=%u\n", uitmp);
+	xtal_trim = cmd.args[2] | (cmd.args[3] << 8);
 
-	if (uitmp == dev->if_frequency / 1000)
+	if (ret == 0 && xtal_trim < 16)
 		goto warm;
 
+	dev->if_frequency = 0; /* we no longer know current tuner state */
+
 	/* power up */
 	if (dev->chiptype == SI2157_CHIPTYPE_SI2146) {
 		memcpy(cmd.args, "\xc0\x05\x01\x00\x00\x0b\x00\x00\x01", 9);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/72 objtool: Ignore empty alternatives

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Julien Thierry <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7170cf47d16f1ba29eca07fd818870b7af0a93a5 ]

The .alternatives section can contain entries with no original instructions. Objtool will currently crash when handling such an entry.

Just skip that entry, but still give a warning to discourage useless entries.

---
 tools/objtool/check.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
tools/objtool/check.c +6 -0
index 5685fe2c7a7d..247fbb5f6a38 100644
@@ -778,6 +778,12 @@ static int add_special_section_alts(struct objtool_file *file)
 		}
 
 		if (special_alt->group) {
+			if (!special_alt->orig_len) {
+				WARN_FUNC("empty alternative entry",
+					  orig_insn->sec, orig_insn->offset);
+				continue;
+			}
+
 			ret = handle_group_alt(file, special_alt, orig_insn,
 					       &new_insn);
 			if (ret)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/72 spi: pxa2xx: Apply CS clk quirk to BXT

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Evan Green <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6eefaee4f2d366a389da0eb95e524ba82bf358c4 ]

With a couple allies at Intel, and much badgering, I got confirmation from Intel that at least BXT suffers from the same SPI chip-select issue as Cannonlake (and beyond). The issue being that after going through runtime suspend/resume, toggling the chip-select line without also sending data does nothing.

Add the quirk to BXT to briefly toggle dynamic clock gating off and on, forcing the fabric to wake up enough to notice the CS register change.

---
 drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.c +1 -0
index 5160e16d3a98..45a211c7dd22 100644
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ static const struct lpss_config lpss_platforms[] = {
 		.tx_threshold_hi = 48,
 		.cs_sel_shift = 8,
 		.cs_sel_mask = 3 << 8,
+		.cs_clk_stays_gated = true,
 	},
 	{	/* LPSS_CNL_SSP */
 		.offset = 0x200,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 8/72 net: ena: fix error returning in ena_com_get_hash_function()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Arthur Kiyanovski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e9a1de378dd46375f9abfd8de1e6f59ee114a793 ]

In case the "func" parameter is NULL we now return "-EINVAL". This shouldn't happen in general, but when it does happen, this is the proper way to handle it.

We also check func for NULL in the beginning of the function, as there is no reason to do all the work and realize in the end of the function it was useless.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_com.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_com.c +4 -2
index dc9149a32f41..bb1710ff910a 100644
@@ -2131,6 +2131,9 @@ int ena_com_get_hash_function(struct ena_com_dev *ena_dev,
 		rss->hash_key;
 	int rc;
 
+	if (unlikely(!func))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	rc = ena_com_get_feature_ex(ena_dev, &get_resp,
 				    ENA_ADMIN_RSS_HASH_FUNCTION,
 				    rss->hash_key_dma_addr,
@@ -2143,8 +2146,7 @@ int ena_com_get_hash_function(struct ena_com_dev *ena_dev,
 	if (rss->hash_func)
 		rss->hash_func--;
 
-	if (func)
-		*func = rss->hash_func;
+	*func = rss->hash_func;
 
 	if (key)
 		memcpy(key, hash_key->key, (size_t)(hash_key->keys_num) << 2);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 9/72 spi: dw: Zero DMA Tx and Rx configurations on stack

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3cb97e223d277f84171cc4ccecab31e08b2ee7b5 ]

Some DMA controller drivers do not tolerate non-zero values in the DMA configuration structures. Zero them to avoid issues with such DMA controller drivers. Even despite above this is a good practice per se.

---
 drivers/spi/spi-dw-mid.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/spi/spi-dw-mid.c +2 -0
index 837cb8d0bac6..4f41d44e8b4c 100644
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ static struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *dw_spi_dma_prepare_tx(struct dw_spi *dws,
 	if (!xfer->tx_buf)
 		return NULL;
 
+	memset(&txconf, 0, sizeof(txconf));
 	txconf.direction = DMA_MEM_TO_DEV;
 	txconf.dst_addr = dws->dma_addr;
 	txconf.dst_maxburst = 16;
@@ -201,6 +202,7 @@ static struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *dw_spi_dma_prepare_rx(struct dw_spi *dws,
 	if (!xfer->rx_buf)
 		return NULL;
 
+	memset(&rxconf, 0, sizeof(rxconf));
 	rxconf.direction = DMA_DEV_TO_MEM;
 	rxconf.src_addr = dws->dma_addr;
 	rxconf.src_maxburst = 16;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 10/72 ixgbe: Fix XDP redirect on archs with PAGE_SIZE above 4K

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 88eb0ee17b2ece64fcf6689a4557a5c2e7a89c4b ]

The ixgbe driver have another memory model when compiled on archs with PAGE_SIZE above 4096 bytes. In this mode it doesn't split the page in two halves, but instead increment rx_buffer->page_offset by truesize of packet (which include headroom and tailroom for skb_shared_info).

This is done correctly in ixgbe_build_skb(), but in ixgbe_rx_buffer_flip which is currently only called on XDP_TX and XDP_REDIRECT, it forgets to add the tailroom for skb_shared_info. This breaks XDP_REDIRECT, for veth and cpumap. Fix by adding size of skb_shared_info tailroom.

Maintainers notice: This fix have been queued to Jeff.

Fixes 6453073987ba ("ixgbe: add initial support for xdp redirect")
Cc Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c +2 -1
index ba184287e11f..64ee45b6680a 100644
@@ -2274,7 +2274,8 @@ static void ixgbe_rx_buffer_flip(struct ixgbe_ring *rx_ring,
 	rx_buffer->page_offset ^= truesize;
 #else
 	unsigned int truesize = ring_uses_build_skb(rx_ring) ?
-				SKB_DATA_ALIGN(IXGBE_SKB_PAD + size) :
+				SKB_DATA_ALIGN(IXGBE_SKB_PAD + size) +
+				SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info)) :
 				SKB_DATA_ALIGN(size);
 
 	rx_buffer->page_offset += truesize;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 11/72 MIPS: Loongson: Build ATI Radeon GPU driver as module

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a44de7497f91834df0b8b6d459e259788ba66794 ]

When ATI Radeon GPU driver has been compiled directly into the kernel instead of as a module, we should make sure the firmware for the model (check available ones in /lib/firmware/radeon) is built-in to the kernel as well, otherwise there exists the following fatal error during GPU init, change CONFIG_DRM_RADEON=y to CONFIG_DRM_RADEON=m to fix it.

[    1.900997] [drm] Loading RS780 Microcode
[    1.905077] radeon 0000:01:05.0: Direct firmware load for radeon/RS780_pfp.bin failed with error -2
[    1.914140] r600_cp: Failed to load firmware "radeon/RS780_pfp.bin"
[    1.920405] [drm:r600_init] *ERROR* Failed to load firmware!
[    1.926069] radeon 0000:01:05.0: Fatal error during GPU init
[    1.931729] [drm] radeon: finishing device.
Fixes 024e6a8b5bb1 ("MIPS: Loongson: Add a Loongson-3 default config file")
---
 arch/mips/configs/loongson3_defconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/mips/configs/loongson3_defconfig +1 -1
index 324dfee23dfb..c871e40b8878 100644
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ CONFIG_MEDIA_CAMERA_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_MEDIA_USB_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_USB_VIDEO_CLASS=m
 CONFIG_DRM=y
-CONFIG_DRM_RADEON=y
+CONFIG_DRM_RADEON=m
 CONFIG_FB_RADEON=y
 CONFIG_LCD_CLASS_DEVICE=y
 CONFIG_LCD_PLATFORM=m
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 12/72 Bluetooth: Add SCO fallback for invalid LMP parameters error

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Hsin-Yu Chao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 56b5453a86203a44726f523b4133c1feca49ce7c ]

Bluetooth PTS test case HFP/AG/ACC/BI-12-I accepts SCO connection with invalid parameter at the first SCO request expecting AG to attempt another SCO request with the use of "safe settings" for given codec, base on section 5.7.1.2 of HFP 1.7 specification.

This patch addresses it by adding "Invalid LMP Parameters" (0x1e) to the SCO fallback case. Verified with below log:

< HCI Command: Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) plen 17
Handle: 256
Transmit bandwidth: 8000
Receive bandwidth: 8000
Max latency: 13
Setting: 0x0003
Input Coding: Linear
Input Data Format: 1's complement
Input Sample Size: 8-bit
# of bits padding at MSB: 0
Air Coding Format: Transparent Data
Retransmission effort: Optimize for link quality (0x02) Packet type: 0x0380
3-EV3 may not be used
2-EV5 may not be used
3-EV5 may not be used

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4

      Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5

Num handles: 1
Handle: 256
Count: 1

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3

Handle: 256
Max slots: 1

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Synchronous Connect Complete (0x2c) plen 17

        Status: Invalid LMP Parameters / Invalid LL Parameters (0x1e)
        Handle: 0
        Address: 00:1B:DC:F2:21:59 (OUI 00-1B-DC)
        Link type: eSCO (0x02)
        Transmission interval: 0x00
        Retransmission window: 0x02
        RX packet length: 0
        TX packet length: 0
        Air mode: Transparent (0x03)

< HCI Command: Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) plen 17
Handle: 256
Transmit bandwidth: 8000
Receive bandwidth: 8000
Max latency: 8
Setting: 0x0003
Input Coding: Linear
Input Data Format: 1's complement
Input Sample Size: 8-bit
# of bits padding at MSB: 0
Air Coding Format: Transparent Data
Retransmission effort: Optimize for link quality (0x02) Packet type: 0x03c8
EV3 may be used
2-EV3 may not be used
3-EV3 may not be used
2-EV5 may not be used
3-EV5 may not be used

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4

      Setup Synchronous Connection (0x01|0x0028) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3

Handle: 256
Max slots: 5

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Max Slots Change (0x1b) plen 3

Handle: 256
Max slots: 1

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Synchronous Connect Complete (0x2c) plen 17

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 257
        Address: 00:1B:DC:F2:21:59 (OUI 00-1B-DC)
        Link type: eSCO (0x02)
        Transmission interval: 0x06
        Retransmission window: 0x04
        RX packet length: 30
        TX packet length: 30
        Air mode: Transparent (0x03)
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +1 -0
index 363dc85bbc5c..56e4ae7d7f63 100644
@@ -3775,6 +3775,7 @@ static void hci_sync_conn_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
 	case 0x11:	/* Unsupported Feature or Parameter Value */
 	case 0x1c:	/* SCO interval rejected */
 	case 0x1a:	/* Unsupported Remote Feature */
+	case 0x1e:	/* Invalid LMP Parameters */
 	case 0x1f:	/* Unspecified error */
 	case 0x20:	/* Unsupported LMP Parameter value */
 		if (conn->out) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 13/72 kgdb: Prevent infinite recursive entries to the debugger

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3ca676e4ca60d1834bb77535dafe24169cadacef ]

If we detect that we recursively entered the debugger we should hack our I/O ops to NULL so that the panic() in the next line won't actually cause another recursion into the debugger. The first line of kgdb_panic() will check this and return.

---
 kernel/debug/debug_core.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
kernel/debug/debug_core.c +1 -0
index 94aa9ae0007a..159a53ff2716 100644
@@ -444,6 +444,7 @@ static int kgdb_reenter_check(struct kgdb_state *ks)
 
 	if (exception_level > 1) {
 		dump_stack();
+		kgdb_io_module_registered = false;
 		panic("Recursive entry to debugger");
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 14/72 spi: dw: Enable interrupts in accordance with DMA xfer mode

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Serge Semin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 43dba9f3f98c2b184a19f856f06fe22817bfd9e0 ]

It's pointless to track the Tx overrun interrupts if Rx-only SPI transfer is issued. Similarly there is no need in handling the Rx overrun/underrun interrupts if Tx-only SPI transfer is executed. So lets unmask the interrupts only if corresponding SPI transactions are implied.

---
 drivers/spi/spi-dw-mid.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/spi/spi-dw-mid.c +8 -4
index 4f41d44e8b4c..c4244d2f1ee3 100644
@@ -228,19 +228,23 @@ static struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *dw_spi_dma_prepare_rx(struct dw_spi *dws,
 
 static int mid_spi_dma_setup(struct dw_spi *dws, struct spi_transfer *xfer)
 {
-	u16 dma_ctrl = 0;
+	u16 imr = 0, dma_ctrl = 0;
 
 	dw_writel(dws, DW_SPI_DMARDLR, 0xf);
 	dw_writel(dws, DW_SPI_DMATDLR, 0x10);
 
-	if (xfer->tx_buf)
+	if (xfer->tx_buf) {
 		dma_ctrl |= SPI_DMA_TDMAE;
-	if (xfer->rx_buf)
+		imr |= SPI_INT_TXOI;
+	}
+	if (xfer->rx_buf) {
 		dma_ctrl |= SPI_DMA_RDMAE;
+		imr |= SPI_INT_RXUI | SPI_INT_RXOI;
+	}
 	dw_writel(dws, DW_SPI_DMACR, dma_ctrl);
 
 	/* Set the interrupt mask */
-	spi_umask_intr(dws, SPI_INT_TXOI | SPI_INT_RXUI | SPI_INT_RXOI);
+	spi_umask_intr(dws, imr);
 
 	dws->transfer_handler = dma_transfer;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 15/72 clocksource: dw_apb_timer: Make CPU-affiliation being optional

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Serge Semin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cee43dbf2ee3f430434e2b66994eff8a1aeda889 ]

Currently the DW APB Timer driver binds each clockevent timers to a particular CPU. This isn't good for multiple reasons. First of all seeing the device is placed on APB bus (which makes it accessible from any CPU core), accessible over MMIO and having the DYNIRQ flag set we can be sure that manually binding the timer to any CPU just isn't correct. By doing so we just set an extra limitation on device usage. This also doesn't reflect the device actual capability, since by setting the IRQ affinity we can make it virtually local to any CPU. Secondly imagine if you had a real CPU-local timer with the same rating and the same CPU-affinity. In this case if DW APB timer was registered first, then due to the clockevent framework tick-timer selection procedure we'll end up with the real CPU-local timer being left unselected for clock-events tracking. But on most of the platforms (MIPS/ARM/etc) such timers are normally embedded into the CPU core and are accessible with much better performance then devices placed on APB. For instance in MIPS architectures there is r4k-timer, which is CPU-local, assigned with the same rating, and normally its clockevent device is registered after the platform-specific one.

So in order to fix all of these issues let's make the DW APB Timer CPU affinity being optional and deactivated by passing a negative CPU id, which will effectively set the DW APB clockevent timer cpumask to 'cpu_possible_mask'.

---
 drivers/clocksource/dw_apb_timer.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/clocksource/dw_apb_timer.c +3 -2
index 1f5f734e4919..a018199575e3 100644
@@ -225,7 +225,8 @@ static int apbt_next_event(unsigned long delta,
 /**
  * dw_apb_clockevent_init() - use an APB timer as a clock_event_device
  *
- * @cpu:	The CPU the events will be targeted at.
+ * @cpu:	The CPU the events will be targeted at or -1 if CPU affiliation
+ *		isn't required.
  * @name:	The name used for the timer and the IRQ for it.
  * @rating:	The rating to give the timer.
  * @base:	I/O base for the timer registers.
@@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ dw_apb_clockevent_init(int cpu, const char *name, unsigned rating,
 	dw_ced->ced.max_delta_ticks = 0x7fffffff;
 	dw_ced->ced.min_delta_ns = clockevent_delta2ns(5000, &dw_ced->ced);
 	dw_ced->ced.min_delta_ticks = 5000;
-	dw_ced->ced.cpumask = cpumask_of(cpu);
+	dw_ced->ced.cpumask = cpu < 0 ? cpu_possible_mask : cpumask_of(cpu);
 	dw_ced->ced.features = CLOCK_EVT_FEAT_PERIODIC |
 				CLOCK_EVT_FEAT_ONESHOT | CLOCK_EVT_FEAT_DYNIRQ;
 	dw_ced->ced.set_state_shutdown = apbt_shutdown;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 16/72 clocksource: dw_apb_timer_of: Fix missing clockevent timers

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Serge Semin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6d2e16a3181bafb77b535095c39ad1c8b9558c8c ]

Commit 100214889973 ("clocksource: dw_apb_timer_of: use clocksource_of_init") replaced a publicly available driver initialization method with one called by the timer_probe() method available after CLKSRC_OF. In current implementation it traverses all the timers available in the system and calls their initialization methods if corresponding devices were either in dtb or in acpi. But if before the commit any number of available timers would be installed as clockevent and clocksource devices, after that there would be at most two. The rest are just ignored since default case branch doesn't do anything. I don't see a reason of such behaviour, neither the commit message explains it. Moreover this might be wrong if on some platforms these timers might be used for different purpose, as virtually CPU-local clockevent timers and as an independent broadcast timer. So in order to keep the compatibility with the platforms where the order of the timers detection has some meaning, lets add the secondly discovered timer to be of clocksource/sched_clock type, while the very first and the others would provide the clockevents service.

Fixes 100214889973 ("clocksource: dw_apb_timer_of: use clocksource_of_init")
Cc Alexey Malahov <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Burton <[email protected]>
Cc Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc Alessandro Zummo <[email protected]>
Cc Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Rob Herring <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/clocksource/dw_apb_timer_of.c | 6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/clocksource/dw_apb_timer_of.c +2 -4
index 69866cd8f4bb..3e4d0e5733d3 100644
@@ -146,10 +146,6 @@ static int num_called;
 static int __init dw_apb_timer_init(struct device_node *timer)
 {
 	switch (num_called) {
-	case 0:
-		pr_debug("%s: found clockevent timer\n", __func__);
-		add_clockevent(timer);
-		break;
 	case 1:
 		pr_debug("%s: found clocksource timer\n", __func__);
 		add_clocksource(timer);
@@ -160,6 +156,8 @@ static int __init dw_apb_timer_init(struct device_node *timer)
 #endif
 		break;
 	default:
+		pr_debug("%s: found clockevent timer\n", __func__);
+		add_clockevent(timer);
 		break;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 17/72 btrfs: do not ignore error from btrfs_next_leaf() when inserting checksums

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7e4a3f7ed5d54926ec671bbb13e171cfe179cc50 ]

We are currently treating any non-zero return value from btrfs_next_leaf() the same way, by going to the code that inserts a new checksum item in the tree. However if btrfs_next_leaf() returns an error (a value < 0), we should just stop and return the error, and not behave as if nothing has happened, since in that case we do not have a way to know if there is a next leaf or we are currently at the last leaf already.

So fix that by returning the error from btrfs_next_leaf().

---
 fs/btrfs/file-item.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/file-item.c +4 -2
index 717d82d51bb1..edd5f152e448 100644
@@ -795,10 +795,12 @@ int btrfs_csum_file_blocks(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 		nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(path->nodes[0]);
 		if (!nritems || (path->slots[0] >= nritems - 1)) {
 			ret = btrfs_next_leaf(root, path);
-			if (ret == 1)
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				goto out;
+			} else if (ret > 0) {
 				found_next = 1;
-			if (ret != 0)
 				goto insert;
+			}
 			slot = path->slots[0];
 		}
 		btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(path->nodes[0], &found_key, slot);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 18/72 ARM: 8978/1: mm: make act_mm() respect THREAD_SIZE

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e1de94380af588bdf6ad6f0cc1f75004c35bc096 ]

Recent work with KASan exposed the folling hard-coded bitmask in arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S:

bic rd, sp, #8128
bic rd, rd, #63

This forms the bitmask 0x1FFF that is coinciding with (PAGE_SIZE << THREAD_SIZE_ORDER) - 1, this code was assuming that THREAD_SIZE is always 8K (8192).

As KASan was increasing THREAD_SIZE_ORDER to 2, I ran into this bug.

Fix it by this little oneline suggested by Ard:

bic rd, sp, #(THREAD_SIZE - 1) & ~63

Where THREAD_SIZE is defined using THREAD_SIZE_ORDER.

We have to also include <linux/const.h> since the THREAD_SIZE expands to use the _AC() macro.

---
 arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S +2 -1
index 5461d589a1e2..60ac7c5999a9 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
  *  VMA_VM_FLAGS
  *  VM_EXEC
  */
+#include <linux/const.h>
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/thread_info.h>
 
@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@
  * act_mm - get current->active_mm
  */
 	.macro	act_mm, rd
-	bic	\rd, sp, #8128
+	bic	\rd, sp, #(THREAD_SIZE - 1) & ~63
 	bic	\rd, \rd, #63
 	ldr	\rd, [\rd, #TI_TASK]
 	.if (TSK_ACTIVE_MM > IMM12_MASK)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 19/72 spi: dw: Fix Rx-only DMA transfers

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Serge Semin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 46164fde6b7890e7a3982d54549947c8394c0192 ]

Tx-only DMA transfers are working perfectly fine since in this case the code just ignores the Rx FIFO overflow interrupts. But it turns out the SPI Rx-only transfers are broken since nothing pushing any data to the shift registers, so the Rx FIFO is left empty and the SPI core subsystems just returns a timeout error. Since DW DMAC driver doesn't support something like cyclic write operations of a single byte to a device register, the only way to support the Rx-only SPI transfers is to fake it by using a dummy Tx-buffer. This is what we intend to fix in this commit by setting the SPI_CONTROLLER_MUST_TX flag for DMA-capable platform.

---
 drivers/spi/spi-dw.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/spi/spi-dw.c +1 -0
index b461200871f8..26ed3b4233a2 100644
@@ -526,6 +526,7 @@ int dw_spi_add_host(struct device *dev, struct dw_spi *dws)
 			dws->dma_inited = 0;
 		} else {
 			master->can_dma = dws->dma_ops->can_dma;
+			master->flags |= SPI_CONTROLLER_MUST_TX;
 		}
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 20/72 x86/kvm/hyper-v: Explicitly align hcall param for kvm_hyperv_exit

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jon Doron <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f7d31e65368aeef973fab788aa22c4f1d5a6af66 ]

The problem the patch is trying to address is the fact that 'struct kvm_hyperv_exit' has different layout on when compiling in 32 and 64 bit modes.

In 64-bit mode the default alignment boundary is 64 bits thus forcing extra gaps after 'type' and 'msr' but in 32-bit mode the boundary is at 32 bits thus no extra gaps.

This is an issue as even when the kernel is 64 bit, the userspace using the interface can be both 32 and 64 bit but the same 32 bit userspace has to work with 32 bit kernel.

The issue is fixed by forcing the 64 bit layout, this leads to ABI change for 32 bit builds and while we are obviously breaking '32 bit userspace with 32 bit kernel' case, we're fixing the '32 bit userspace with 64 bit kernel' one.

As the interface has no (known) users and 32 bit KVM is rather baroque nowadays, this seems like a reasonable decision.

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt | 2 ++
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h          | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt +2 -0
index f67ed33d1054..81a8802cea88 100644
@@ -3737,9 +3737,11 @@ EOI was received.
 #define KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_SYNIC          1
 #define KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_HCALL          2
 			__u32 type;
+			__u32 pad1;
 			union {
 				struct {
 					__u32 msr;
+					__u32 pad2;
 					__u64 control;
 					__u64 evt_page;
 					__u64 msg_page;
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +2 -0
index 27c62abb6c9e..efe8873943f6 100644
@@ -189,9 +189,11 @@ struct kvm_hyperv_exit {
 #define KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_SYNIC          1
 #define KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_HCALL          2
 	__u32 type;
+	__u32 pad1;
 	union {
 		struct {
 			__u32 msr;
+			__u32 pad2;
 			__u64 control;
 			__u64 evt_page;
 			__u64 msg_page;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH 21/72 net: vmxnet3: fix possible buffer overflow caused by bad DMA value in vmxnet3_get_rss()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3e1c6846b9e108740ef8a37be80314053f5dd52a ]

The value adapter->rss_conf is stored in DMA memory, and it is assigned to rssConf, so rssConf->indTableSize can be modified at anytime by malicious hardware. Because rssConf->indTableSize is assigned to n, buffer overflow may occur when the code "rssConf->indTable[n]" is executed.

To fix this possible bug, n is checked after being used.

---
 drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_ethtool.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_ethtool.c +2 -0
index 2ff27314e047..66c6c07c7a16 100644
@@ -692,6 +692,8 @@ vmxnet3_get_rss(struct net_device *netdev, u32 *p, u8 *key, u8 *hfunc)
 		*hfunc = ETH_RSS_HASH_TOP;
 	if (!p)
 		return 0;
+	if (n > UPT1_RSS_MAX_IND_TABLE_SIZE)
+		return 0;
 	while (n--)
 		p[n] = rssConf->indTable[n];
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#21 lore raw

PATCH 22/72 staging: android: ion: use vmap instead of vm_map_ram

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5bf9917452112694b2c774465ee4dbe441c84b77 ]

vm_map_ram can keep mappings around after the vm_unmap_ram. Using that with non-PAGE_KERNEL mappings can lead to all kinds of aliasing issues.

Cc Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Cc Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Cc Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Cc David Airlie <[email protected]>
Cc Gao Xiang <[email protected]>
Cc Haiyang Zhang <[email protected]>
Cc Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc "K. Y. Srinivasan" <[email protected]>
Cc Laura Abbott <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Kelley <[email protected]>
Cc Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc Nitin Gupta <[email protected]>
Cc Robin Murphy <[email protected]>
Cc Sakari Ailus <[email protected]>
Cc Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Cc Sumit Semwal <[email protected]>
Cc Wei Liu <[email protected]>
Cc Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_heap.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_heap.c +2 -2
index babbd94c32d9..33a9777e7a99 100644
@@ -105,12 +105,12 @@ int ion_heap_map_user(struct ion_heap *heap, struct ion_buffer *buffer,
 
 static int ion_heap_clear_pages(struct page **pages, int num, pgprot_t pgprot)
 {
-	void *addr = vm_map_ram(pages, num, -1, pgprot);
+	void *addr = vmap(pages, num, VM_MAP, pgprot);
 
 	if (!addr)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	memset(addr, 0, PAGE_SIZE * num);
-	vm_unmap_ram(addr, num);
+	vunmap(addr);
 
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#22 lore raw

PATCH 23/72 ath9k: Fix use-after-free Read in ath9k_wmi_ctrl_rx

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qiujun Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit abeaa85054ff8cfe8b99aafc5c70ea067e5d0908 ]

Free wmi later after cmd urb has been killed, as urb cb will access wmi.

the case reported by syzbot:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ath9k_wmi_ctrl_rx+0x416/0x500
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c:215
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881cef1417c by task swapper/1/0

Call Trace:
<IRQ>
ath9k_wmi_ctrl_rx+0x416/0x500 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c:215
ath9k_htc_rx_msg+0x2da/0xaf0
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c:459
ath9k_hif_usb_reg_in_cb+0x1ba/0x630
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:718
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x29a/0x550 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1650
usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x368/0x420 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1716
dummy_timer+0x1258/0x32ae drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1966
call_timer_fn+0x195/0x6f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1404
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1449 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1773 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1740 [inline]
run_timer_softirq+0x5f9/0x1500 kernel/time/timer.c:1786
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c      |  5 +++--
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.h      |  1 +
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_init.c | 10 +++++++---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c          |  5 ++++-
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.h          |  3 ++-
 5 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c +3 -2
index 4399e1ebac15..805d88ecc7ac 100644
@@ -976,7 +976,7 @@ static int ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 	return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
-static void ath9k_hif_usb_dealloc_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
+void ath9k_hif_usb_dealloc_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 {
 	usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&hif_dev->regout_submitted);
 	ath9k_hif_usb_dealloc_reg_in_urbs(hif_dev);
@@ -1344,8 +1344,9 @@ static void ath9k_hif_usb_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface)
 
 	if (hif_dev->flags & HIF_USB_READY) {
 		ath9k_htc_hw_deinit(hif_dev->htc_handle, unplugged);
-		ath9k_htc_hw_free(hif_dev->htc_handle);
 		ath9k_hif_usb_dev_deinit(hif_dev);
+		ath9k_destoy_wmi(hif_dev->htc_handle->drv_priv);
+		ath9k_htc_hw_free(hif_dev->htc_handle);
 	}
 
 	usb_set_intfdata(interface, NULL);
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.h +1 -0
index 7846916aa01d..a94e7e1c86e9 100644
@@ -133,5 +133,6 @@ struct hif_device_usb {
 
 int ath9k_hif_usb_init(void);
 void ath9k_hif_usb_exit(void);
+void ath9k_hif_usb_dealloc_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev);
 
 #endif /* HTC_USB_H */
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_init.c +7 -3
index da2164b0cccc..66ef5cf16450 100644
@@ -933,8 +933,9 @@ static int ath9k_init_device(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv,
 int ath9k_htc_probe_device(struct htc_target *htc_handle, struct device *dev,
 			   u16 devid, char *product, u32 drv_info)
 {
-	struct ieee80211_hw *hw;
+	struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev;
 	struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv;
+	struct ieee80211_hw *hw;
 	int ret;
 
 	hw = ieee80211_alloc_hw(sizeof(struct ath9k_htc_priv), &ath9k_htc_ops);
@@ -969,7 +970,10 @@ int ath9k_htc_probe_device(struct htc_target *htc_handle, struct device *dev,
 	return 0;
 
 err_init:
-	ath9k_deinit_wmi(priv);
+	ath9k_stop_wmi(priv);
+	hif_dev = (struct hif_device_usb *)htc_handle->hif_dev;
+	ath9k_hif_usb_dealloc_urbs(hif_dev);
+	ath9k_destoy_wmi(priv);
 err_free:
 	ieee80211_free_hw(hw);
 	return ret;
@@ -984,7 +988,7 @@ void ath9k_htc_disconnect_device(struct htc_target *htc_handle, bool hotunplug)
 			htc_handle->drv_priv->ah->ah_flags |= AH_UNPLUGGED;
 
 		ath9k_deinit_device(htc_handle->drv_priv);
-		ath9k_deinit_wmi(htc_handle->drv_priv);
+		ath9k_stop_wmi(htc_handle->drv_priv);
 		ieee80211_free_hw(htc_handle->drv_priv->hw);
 	}
 }
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c +4 -1
index 64a354fa78ab..f57f48e4d7a0 100644
@@ -112,14 +112,17 @@ struct wmi *ath9k_init_wmi(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv)
 	return wmi;
 }
 
-void ath9k_deinit_wmi(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv)
+void ath9k_stop_wmi(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv)
 {
 	struct wmi *wmi = priv->wmi;
 
 	mutex_lock(&wmi->op_mutex);
 	wmi->stopped = true;
 	mutex_unlock(&wmi->op_mutex);
+}
 
+void ath9k_destoy_wmi(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv)
+{
 	kfree(priv->wmi);
 }
 
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.h +2 -1
index 380175d5ecd7..d8b912206232 100644
@@ -179,7 +179,6 @@ struct wmi {
 };
 
 struct wmi *ath9k_init_wmi(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv);
-void ath9k_deinit_wmi(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv);
 int ath9k_wmi_connect(struct htc_target *htc, struct wmi *wmi,
 		      enum htc_endpoint_id *wmi_ctrl_epid);
 int ath9k_wmi_cmd(struct wmi *wmi, enum wmi_cmd_id cmd_id,
@@ -189,6 +188,8 @@ int ath9k_wmi_cmd(struct wmi *wmi, enum wmi_cmd_id cmd_id,
 void ath9k_wmi_event_tasklet(unsigned long data);
 void ath9k_fatal_work(struct work_struct *work);
 void ath9k_wmi_event_drain(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv);
+void ath9k_stop_wmi(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv);
+void ath9k_destoy_wmi(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv);
 
 #define WMI_CMD(_wmi_cmd)						\
 	do {								\
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#23 lore raw

PATCH 24/72 ath9k: Fix general protection fault in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qiujun Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2bbcaaee1fcbd83272e29f31e2bb7e70d8c49e05 ]

In ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb interface number is assumed to be 0. usb_ifnum_to_if(urb->dev, 0)
But it isn't always true.

The case reported by syzbot:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]
usb 2-1: new high-speed USB device number 2 using dummy_hcd usb 2-1: config 1 has an invalid interface number: 2 but max is 0 usb 2-1: config 1 has no interface number 0
usb 2-1: New USB device found, idVendor=0cf3, idProduct=9271, bcdDevice= 1.08
usb 2-1: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000015: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000a8-0x00000000000000af]
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc5-syzkaller #0

Call Trace

__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x29a/0x550 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1650
usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x368/0x420 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1716
dummy_timer+0x1258/0x32ae drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1966
call_timer_fn+0x195/0x6f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1404
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1449 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1773 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1740 [inline]
run_timer_softirq+0x5f9/0x1500 kernel/time/timer.c:1786
__do_softirq+0x21e/0x950 kernel/softirq.c:292
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline]
irq_exit+0x178/0x1a0 kernel/softirq.c:413
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:546 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x141/0x540 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1146
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:829
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++------
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.h |  5 +++
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c +37 -11
index 805d88ecc7ac..4e769cf07f59 100644
@@ -641,9 +641,9 @@ static void ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev,
 
 static void ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb(struct urb *urb)
 {
-	struct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *) urb->context;
-	struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev =
-		usb_get_intfdata(usb_ifnum_to_if(urb->dev, 0));
+	struct rx_buf *rx_buf = (struct rx_buf *)urb->context;
+	struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev = rx_buf->hif_dev;
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx_buf->skb;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!skb)
@@ -683,14 +683,15 @@ static void ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb(struct urb *urb)
 	return;
 free:
 	kfree_skb(skb);
+	kfree(rx_buf);
 }
 
 static void ath9k_hif_usb_reg_in_cb(struct urb *urb)
 {
-	struct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *) urb->context;
+	struct rx_buf *rx_buf = (struct rx_buf *)urb->context;
+	struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev = rx_buf->hif_dev;
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx_buf->skb;
 	struct sk_buff *nskb;
-	struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev =
-		usb_get_intfdata(usb_ifnum_to_if(urb->dev, 0));
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!skb)
@@ -748,6 +749,7 @@ static void ath9k_hif_usb_reg_in_cb(struct urb *urb)
 	return;
 free:
 	kfree_skb(skb);
+	kfree(rx_buf);
 	urb->context = NULL;
 }
 
@@ -793,7 +795,7 @@ static int ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_tx_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 	init_usb_anchor(&hif_dev->mgmt_submitted);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_TX_URB_NUM; i++) {
-		tx_buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tx_buf), GFP_KERNEL);
+		tx_buf = kzalloc(sizeof(*tx_buf), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!tx_buf)
 			goto err;
 
@@ -830,8 +832,9 @@ static void ath9k_hif_usb_dealloc_rx_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 
 static int ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_rx_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 {
-	struct urb *urb = NULL;
+	struct rx_buf *rx_buf = NULL;
 	struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
+	struct urb *urb = NULL;
 	int i, ret;
 
 	init_usb_anchor(&hif_dev->rx_submitted);
@@ -839,6 +842,12 @@ static int ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_rx_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URB_NUM; i++) {
 
+		rx_buf = kzalloc(sizeof(*rx_buf), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!rx_buf) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err_rxb;
+		}
+
 		/* Allocate URB */
 		urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (urb == NULL) {
@@ -853,11 +862,14 @@ static int ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_rx_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 			goto err_skb;
 		}
 
+		rx_buf->hif_dev = hif_dev;
+		rx_buf->skb = skb;
+
 		usb_fill_bulk_urb(urb, hif_dev->udev,
 				  usb_rcvbulkpipe(hif_dev->udev,
 						  USB_WLAN_RX_PIPE),
 				  skb->data, MAX_RX_BUF_SIZE,
-				  ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb, skb);
+				  ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb, rx_buf);
 
 		/* Anchor URB */
 		usb_anchor_urb(urb, &hif_dev->rx_submitted);
@@ -883,6 +895,8 @@ static int ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_rx_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 err_skb:
 	usb_free_urb(urb);
 err_urb:
+	kfree(rx_buf);
+err_rxb:
 	ath9k_hif_usb_dealloc_rx_urbs(hif_dev);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -894,14 +908,21 @@ static void ath9k_hif_usb_dealloc_reg_in_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 
 static int ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_reg_in_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 {
-	struct urb *urb = NULL;
+	struct rx_buf *rx_buf = NULL;
 	struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
+	struct urb *urb = NULL;
 	int i, ret;
 
 	init_usb_anchor(&hif_dev->reg_in_submitted);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_REG_IN_URB_NUM; i++) {
 
+		rx_buf = kzalloc(sizeof(*rx_buf), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!rx_buf) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err_rxb;
+		}
+
 		/* Allocate URB */
 		urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (urb == NULL) {
@@ -916,11 +937,14 @@ static int ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_reg_in_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 			goto err_skb;
 		}
 
+		rx_buf->hif_dev = hif_dev;
+		rx_buf->skb = skb;
+
 		usb_fill_int_urb(urb, hif_dev->udev,
 				  usb_rcvintpipe(hif_dev->udev,
 						  USB_REG_IN_PIPE),
 				  skb->data, MAX_REG_IN_BUF_SIZE,
-				  ath9k_hif_usb_reg_in_cb, skb, 1);
+				  ath9k_hif_usb_reg_in_cb, rx_buf, 1);
 
 		/* Anchor URB */
 		usb_anchor_urb(urb, &hif_dev->reg_in_submitted);
@@ -946,6 +970,8 @@ static int ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_reg_in_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 err_skb:
 	usb_free_urb(urb);
 err_urb:
+	kfree(rx_buf);
+err_rxb:
 	ath9k_hif_usb_dealloc_reg_in_urbs(hif_dev);
 	return ret;
 }
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.h +5 -0
index a94e7e1c86e9..5985aa15ca93 100644
@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ struct tx_buf {
 	struct list_head list;
 };
 
+struct rx_buf {
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev;
+};
+
 #define HIF_USB_TX_STOP  BIT(0)
 #define HIF_USB_TX_FLUSH BIT(1)
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#24 lore raw

PATCH 25/72 brcmfmac: fix wrong location to get firmware feature

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jaehoon Chung <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c57673852062428cdeabdd6501ac8b8e4c302067 ]

sup_wpa feature is getting after setting feature_disable flag. If firmware is supported sup_wpa feature, it's always enabled regardless of feature_disable flag.

Fixes b8a64f0e96c2 ("brcmfmac: support 4-way handshake offloading for WPA/WPA2-PSK")
---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/feature.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/feature.c +2 -1
index 53ae30259989..473b2b3cb6f5 100644
@@ -192,13 +192,14 @@ void brcmf_feat_attach(struct brcmf_pub *drvr)
 	if (!err)
 		ifp->drvr->feat_flags |= BIT(BRCMF_FEAT_SCAN_RANDOM_MAC);
 
+	brcmf_feat_iovar_int_get(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_FWSUP, "sup_wpa");
+
 	if (drvr->settings->feature_disable) {
 		brcmf_dbg(INFO, "Features: 0x%02x, disable: 0x%02x\n",
 			  ifp->drvr->feat_flags,
 			  drvr->settings->feature_disable);
 		ifp->drvr->feat_flags &= ~drvr->settings->feature_disable;
 	}
-	brcmf_feat_iovar_int_get(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_FWSUP, "sup_wpa");
 
 	/* set chip related quirks */
 	switch (drvr->bus_if->chip) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#25 lore raw

PATCH 26/72 tools api fs: Make xxx__mountpoint() more scalable

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c6fddb28bad26e5472cb7acf7b04cd5126f1a4ab ]

The xxx_mountpoint() interface provided by fs.c finds mount points for common pseudo filesystems. The first time xxx_mountpoint() is invoked, it scans the mount table (/proc/mounts) looking for a match. If found, it is cached. The price to scan /proc/mounts is paid once if the mount is found.

When the mount point is not found, subsequent calls to xxx_mountpoint() scan /proc/mounts over and over again. There is no caching.

This causes a scaling issue in perf record with hugeltbfs__mountpoint(). The function is called for each process found in synthesize__mmap_events(). If the machine has thousands of processes and if the /proc/mounts has many entries this could cause major overhead in perf record. We have observed multi-second slowdowns on some configurations.

As an example on a laptop:

Before:

  $ sudo umount /dev/hugepages
  $ strace -e trace=openat -o /tmp/tt perf record -a ls
  $ fgrep mounts /tmp/tt
  285

After:

  $ sudo umount /dev/hugepages
  $ strace -e trace=openat -o /tmp/tt perf record -a ls
  $ fgrep mounts /tmp/tt
  1

One could argue that the non-caching in case the moint point is not found is intentional. That way subsequent calls may discover a moint point if the sysadmin mounts the filesystem. But the same argument could be made against caching the mount point. It could be unmounted causing errors. It all depends on the intent of the interface. This patch assumes it is expected to scan /proc/mounts once. The patch documents the caching behavior in the fs.h header file.

An alternative would be to just fix perf record. But it would solve the problem with hugetlbs__mountpoint() but there could be similar issues (possibly down the line) with other xxx_mountpoint() calls in perf or other tools.

---
 tools/lib/api/fs/fs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 tools/lib/api/fs/fs.h | 12 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
tools/lib/api/fs/fs.c +17 -0
index 45b50b89009a..c61841051a90 100644
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ struct fs {
 	const char * const	*mounts;
 	char			 path[PATH_MAX];
 	bool			 found;
+	bool			 checked;
 	long			 magic;
 };
 
@@ -111,31 +112,37 @@ static struct fs fs__entries[] = {
 		.name	= "sysfs",
 		.mounts	= sysfs__fs_known_mountpoints,
 		.magic	= SYSFS_MAGIC,
+		.checked = false,
 	},
 	[FS__PROCFS] = {
 		.name	= "proc",
 		.mounts	= procfs__known_mountpoints,
 		.magic	= PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,
+		.checked = false,
 	},
 	[FS__DEBUGFS] = {
 		.name	= "debugfs",
 		.mounts	= debugfs__known_mountpoints,
 		.magic	= DEBUGFS_MAGIC,
+		.checked = false,
 	},
 	[FS__TRACEFS] = {
 		.name	= "tracefs",
 		.mounts	= tracefs__known_mountpoints,
 		.magic	= TRACEFS_MAGIC,
+		.checked = false,
 	},
 	[FS__HUGETLBFS] = {
 		.name	= "hugetlbfs",
 		.mounts = hugetlbfs__known_mountpoints,
 		.magic	= HUGETLBFS_MAGIC,
+		.checked = false,
 	},
 	[FS__BPF_FS] = {
 		.name	= "bpf",
 		.mounts = bpf_fs__known_mountpoints,
 		.magic	= BPF_FS_MAGIC,
+		.checked = false,
 	},
 };
 
@@ -158,6 +165,7 @@ static bool fs__read_mounts(struct fs *fs)
 	}
 
 	fclose(fp);
+	fs->checked = true;
 	return fs->found = found;
 }
 
@@ -220,6 +228,7 @@ static bool fs__env_override(struct fs *fs)
 		return false;
 
 	fs->found = true;
+	fs->checked = true;
 	strncpy(fs->path, override_path, sizeof(fs->path) - 1);
 	fs->path[sizeof(fs->path) - 1] = '\0';
 	return true;
@@ -246,6 +255,14 @@ static const char *fs__mountpoint(int idx)
 	if (fs->found)
 		return (const char *)fs->path;
 
+	/* the mount point was already checked for the mount point
+	 * but and did not exist, so return NULL to avoid scanning again.
+	 * This makes the found and not found paths cost equivalent
+	 * in case of multiple calls.
+	 */
+	if (fs->checked)
+		return NULL;
+
 	return fs__get_mountpoint(fs);
 }
 
tools/lib/api/fs/fs.h +12 -0
index dda49deefb52..57a3dc160b08 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,18 @@
 	const char *name##__mount(void);	\
 	bool name##__configured(void);		\
 
+/*
+ * The xxxx__mountpoint() entry points find the first match mount point for each
+ * filesystems listed below, where xxxx is the filesystem type.
+ *
+ * The interface is as follows:
+ *
+ * - If a mount point is found on first call, it is cached and used for all
+ *   subsequent calls.
+ *
+ * - If a mount point is not found, NULL is returned on first call and all
+ *   subsequent calls.
+ */
 FS(sysfs)
 FS(procfs)
 FS(debugfs)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#26 lore raw

PATCH 27/72 e1000: Distribute switch variables for initialization

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a34c7f5156654ebaf7eaace102938be7ff7036cb ]

Variables declared in a switch statement before any case statements cannot be automatically initialized with compiler instrumentation (as they are not part of any execution flow). With GCC's proposed automatic stack variable initialization feature, this triggers a warning (and they don't get initialized). Clang's automatic stack variable initialization (via CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL=y) doesn't throw a warning, but it also doesn't initialize such variables[1]. Note that these warnings (or silent skipping) happen before the dead-store elimination optimization phase, so even when the automatic initializations are later elided in favor of direct initializations, the warnings remain.

To avoid these problems, move such variables into the "case" where they're used or lift them up into the main function body.

drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c: In function ?e1000_xmit_frame?:
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3143:18: warning: statement will never be executed [-Wswitch-unreachable]

 3143 |     unsigned int pull_size;
      |                  ^~~~~~~~~

[1] https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=44916

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c +3 -1
index 3dd4aeb2706d..175681aa5260 100644
@@ -3169,8 +3169,9 @@ static netdev_tx_t e1000_xmit_frame(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		hdr_len = skb_transport_offset(skb) + tcp_hdrlen(skb);
 		if (skb->data_len && hdr_len == len) {
 			switch (hw->mac_type) {
+			case e1000_82544: {
 				unsigned int pull_size;
-			case e1000_82544:
+
 				/* Make sure we have room to chop off 4 bytes,
 				 * and that the end alignment will work out to
 				 * this hardware's requirements
@@ -3191,6 +3192,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t e1000_xmit_frame(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				}
 				len = skb_headlen(skb);
 				break;
+			}
 			default:
 				/* do nothing */
 				break;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#27 lore raw

PATCH 28/72 dt-bindings: display: mediatek: control dpi pins mode to avoid leakage

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jitao Shi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b0ff9b590733079f7f9453e5976a9dd2630949e3 ]

Add property "pinctrl-names" to swap pin mode between gpio and dpi mode. Set the dpi pins to gpio mode and output-low to avoid leakage current when dpi disabled.

---
 .../devicetree/bindings/display/mediatek/mediatek,dpi.txt   | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/mediatek/mediatek,dpi.txt +6 -0
index b6a7e7397b8b..b944fe067188 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ Required properties:
   Documentation/devicetree/bindings/graph.txt. This port should be connected
   to the input port of an attached HDMI or LVDS encoder chip.
 
+Optional properties:
+- pinctrl-names: Contain "default" and "sleep".
+
 Example:
 
 dpi0: dpi@1401d000 {
@@ -26,6 +29,9 @@ dpi0: dpi@1401d000 {
 		 <&mmsys CLK_MM_DPI_ENGINE>,
 		 <&apmixedsys CLK_APMIXED_TVDPLL>;
 	clock-names = "pixel", "engine", "pll";
+	pinctrl-names = "default", "sleep";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&dpi_pin_func>;
+	pinctrl-1 = <&dpi_pin_idle>;
 
 	port {
 		dpi0_out: endpoint {
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#28 lore raw

PATCH 29/72 audit: fix a net reference leak in audit_send_reply()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a48b284b403a4a073d8beb72d2bb33e54df67fb6 ]

If audit_send_reply() fails when trying to create a new thread to send the reply it also fails to cleanup properly, leaking a reference to a net structure. This patch fixes the error path and makes a handful of other cleanups that came up while fixing the code.

---
 kernel/audit.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
kernel/audit.c +29 -21
index aa6d5e39526b..53224f399038 100644
@@ -897,19 +897,30 @@ struct sk_buff *audit_make_reply(int seq, int type, int done,
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+static void audit_free_reply(struct audit_reply *reply)
+{
+	if (!reply)
+		return;
+
+	if (reply->skb)
+		kfree_skb(reply->skb);
+	if (reply->net)
+		put_net(reply->net);
+	kfree(reply);
+}
+
 static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg)
 {
 	struct audit_reply *reply = (struct audit_reply *)arg;
-	struct sock *sk = audit_get_sk(reply->net);
 
 	mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
 	mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
 
 	/* Ignore failure. It'll only happen if the sender goes away,
 	   because our timeout is set to infinite. */
-	netlink_unicast(sk, reply->skb, reply->portid, 0);
-	put_net(reply->net);
-	kfree(reply);
+	netlink_unicast(audit_get_sk(reply->net), reply->skb, reply->portid, 0);
+	reply->skb = NULL;
+	audit_free_reply(reply);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -923,35 +934,32 @@ static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg)
  * @payload: payload data
  * @size: payload size
  *
- * Allocates an skb, builds the netlink message, and sends it to the port id.
- * No failure notifications.
+ * Allocates a skb, builds the netlink message, and sends it to the port id.
  */
 static void audit_send_reply(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq, int type, int done,
 			     int multi, const void *payload, int size)
 {
-	struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk);
-	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
-	struct audit_reply *reply = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_reply),
-					    GFP_KERNEL);
+	struct audit_reply *reply;
 
+	reply = kzalloc(sizeof(*reply), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!reply)
 		return;
 
-	skb = audit_make_reply(seq, type, done, multi, payload, size);
-	if (!skb)
-		goto out;
-
-	reply->net = get_net(net);
+	reply->skb = audit_make_reply(seq, type, done, multi, payload, size);
+	if (!reply->skb)
+		goto err;
+	reply->net = get_net(sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk));
 	reply->portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid;
-	reply->skb = skb;
 
 	tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_reply_thread, reply, "audit_send_reply");
-	if (!IS_ERR(tsk))
-		return;
-	kfree_skb(skb);
-out:
-	kfree(reply);
+	if (IS_ERR(tsk))
+		goto err;
+
+	return;
+
+err:
+	audit_free_reply(reply);
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#29 lore raw

PATCH 30/72 media: dvb: return -EREMOTEIO on i2c transfer failure.

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 96f3a9392799dd0f6472648a7366622ffd0989f3 ]

Currently when i2c transfers fail the error return -EREMOTEIO is assigned to err but then later overwritten when the tuner attach call is made. Fix this by returning early with the error return code -EREMOTEIO on i2c transfer failure errors.

If the transfer fails, an uninitialized value will be read from b2.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")

Fixes fbfee8684ff2 ("V4L/DVB (5651): Dibusb-mb: convert pll handling to properly use dvb-pll")
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dibusb-mb.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dibusb-mb.c +1 -1
index a0057641cc86..c55180912c3a 100644
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static int dibusb_tuner_probe_and_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)
 
 	if (i2c_transfer(&adap->dev->i2c_adap, msg, 2) != 2) {
 		err("tuner i2c write failed.");
-		ret = -EREMOTEIO;
+		return -EREMOTEIO;
 	}
 
 	if (adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.i2c_gate_ctrl)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#30 lore raw

PATCH 31/72 media: platform: fcp: Set appropriate DMA parameters

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Kieran Bingham <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dd844fb8e50b12e65bbdc5746c9876c6735500df ]

Enabling CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG=y and CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG_SG=y will enable extra validation on DMA operations ensuring that the size restraints are met.

When using the FCP in conjunction with the VSP1/DU, and display frames, the size of the DMA operations is larger than the default maximum segment size reported by the DMA core (64K). With the DMA debug enabled, this produces a warning such as the following:

"DMA-API: rcar-fcp fea27000.fcp: mapping sg segment longer than device claims to support [len=3145728] [max=65536]"

We have no specific limitation on the segment size which isn't already handled by the VSP1/DU which actually handles the DMA allcoations and buffer management, so define a maximum segment size of up to 4GB (a 32 bit mask).

---
 drivers/media/platform/rcar-fcp.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/media/platform/rcar-fcp.c +5 -0
index 2988031d285d..0047d144c932 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@
 struct rcar_fcp_device {
 	struct list_head list;
 	struct device *dev;
+	struct device_dma_parameters dma_parms;
 };
 
 static LIST_HEAD(fcp_devices);
@@ -139,6 +141,9 @@ static int rcar_fcp_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	fcp->dev = &pdev->dev;
 
+	fcp->dev->dma_parms = &fcp->dma_parms;
+	dma_set_max_seg_size(fcp->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32));
+
 	pm_runtime_enable(&pdev->dev);
 
 	mutex_lock(&fcp_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#31 lore raw

PATCH 32/72 MIPS: Make sparse_init() using top-down allocation

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 269b3a9ac538c4ae87f84be640b9fa89914a2489 ]

In the current code, if CONFIG_SWIOTLB is set, when failed to get IO TLB memory from the low pages by plat_swiotlb_setup(), it may lead to the boot process failed with kernel panic.

(1) On the Loongson and SiByte platform
arch/mips/loongson64/dma.c
arch/mips/sibyte/common/dma.c
void __init plat_swiotlb_setup(void)

{
	swiotlb_init(1);
}

kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
void __init
swiotlb_init(int verbose)
{
...

	vstart = memblock_alloc_low(PAGE_ALIGN(bytes), PAGE_SIZE);
	if (vstart && !swiotlb_init_with_tbl(vstart, io_tlb_nslabs, verbose))
		return;
...
	pr_warn("Cannot allocate buffer");
	no_iotlb_memory = true;
}

phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single()
{
...

	if (no_iotlb_memory)
		panic("Can not allocate SWIOTLB buffer earlier ...");

...
}

(2) On the Cavium OCTEON platform
arch/mips/cavium-octeon/dma-octeon.c
void __init plat_swiotlb_setup(void)
{
...

	octeon_swiotlb = memblock_alloc_low(swiotlbsize, PAGE_SIZE);
	if (!octeon_swiotlb)
		panic("%s: Failed to allocate %zu bytes align=%lx\n",
		      __func__, swiotlbsize, PAGE_SIZE);

...
}

Because IO_TLB_DEFAULT_SIZE is 64M, if the rest size of low memory is less than 64M when call plat_swiotlb_setup(), we can easily reproduce the panic case.

In order to reduce the possibility of kernel panic when failed to get IO TLB memory under CONFIG_SWIOTLB, it is better to allocate low memory as small as possible before plat_swiotlb_setup(), so make sparse_init() using top-down allocation.

---
 arch/mips/kernel/setup.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
arch/mips/kernel/setup.c +10 -0
index 05ed4ed411c7..abd7ee9e90ab 100644
@@ -911,7 +911,17 @@ static void __init arch_mem_init(char **cmdline_p)
 				BOOTMEM_DEFAULT);
 #endif
 	device_tree_init();
+
+	/*
+	 * In order to reduce the possibility of kernel panic when failed to
+	 * get IO TLB memory under CONFIG_SWIOTLB, it is better to allocate
+	 * low memory as small as possible before plat_swiotlb_setup(), so
+	 * make sparse_init() using top-down allocation.
+	 */
+	memblock_set_bottom_up(false);
 	sparse_init();
+	memblock_set_bottom_up(true);
+
 	plat_swiotlb_setup();
 
 	dma_contiguous_reserve(PFN_PHYS(max_low_pfn));
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#32 lore raw

PATCH 33/72 audit: fix a net reference leak in audit_list_rules_send()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3054d06719079388a543de6adb812638675ad8f5 ]

If audit_list_rules_send() fails when trying to create a new thread to send the rules it also fails to cleanup properly, leaking a reference to a net structure. This patch fixes the error patch and renames audit_send_list() to audit_send_list_thread() to better match its cousin, audit_send_reply_thread().

---
 kernel/audit.c       |  2 +-
 kernel/audit.h       |  2 +-
 kernel/auditfilter.c | 16 +++++++---------
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
kernel/audit.c +1 -1
index 53224f399038..6faaa908544a 100644
@@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int audit_send_list(void *_dest)
+int audit_send_list_thread(void *_dest)
 {
 	struct audit_netlink_list *dest = _dest;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
kernel/audit.h +1 -1
index 9b110ae17ee3..1007773b0b81 100644
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ struct audit_netlink_list {
 	struct sk_buff_head q;
 };
 
-int audit_send_list(void *_dest);
+int audit_send_list_thread(void *_dest);
 
 extern int selinux_audit_rule_update(void);
 
kernel/auditfilter.c +7 -9
index 16cf396ea738..f26f4cb5d08d 100644
@@ -1137,11 +1137,8 @@ int audit_rule_change(int type, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz)
  */
 int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq)
 {
-	u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid;
-	struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk);
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	struct audit_netlink_list *dest;
-	int err = 0;
 
 	/* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
 	 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
@@ -1149,25 +1146,26 @@ int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq)
 	 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
 	 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
 
-	dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+	dest = kmalloc(sizeof(*dest), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!dest)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	dest->net = get_net(net);
-	dest->portid = portid;
+	dest->net = get_net(sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk));
+	dest->portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid;
 	skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q);
 
 	mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
 	audit_list_rules(seq, &dest->q);
 	mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
 
-	tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list, dest, "audit_send_list");
+	tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list_thread, dest, "audit_send_list");
 	if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
 		skb_queue_purge(&dest->q);
+		put_net(dest->net);
 		kfree(dest);
-		err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
+		return PTR_ERR(tsk);
 	}
 
-	return err;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#33 lore raw

PATCH 34/72 netfilter: nft_nat: return EOPNOTSUPP if type or flags are not supported

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0d7c83463fdf7841350f37960a7abadd3e650b41 ]

Instead of EINVAL which should be used for malformed netlink messages.

Fixes eb31628e37a0 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Add support for IPv6 NAT")
---
 net/netfilter/nft_nat.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nft_nat.c +2 -2
index ed548d06b6dd..a18cceecef88 100644
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static int nft_nat_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr,
 		priv->type = NF_NAT_MANIP_DST;
 		break;
 	default:
-		return -EINVAL;
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
 
 	if (tb[NFTA_NAT_FAMILY] == NULL)
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static int nft_nat_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr,
 	if (tb[NFTA_NAT_FLAGS]) {
 		priv->flags = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_NAT_FLAGS]));
 		if (priv->flags & ~NF_NAT_RANGE_MASK)
-			return -EINVAL;
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
 
 	return nf_ct_netns_get(ctx->net, family);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#34 lore raw

PATCH 35/72 net: bcmgenet: set Rx mode before starting netif

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Doug Berger <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 72f96347628e73dbb61b307f18dd19293cc6792a ]

This commit explicitly calls the bcmgenet_set_rx_mode() function when the network interface is started. This function is normally called by ndo_set_rx_mode when the flags are changed, but apparently not when the driver is suspended and resumed.

This change ensures that address filtering or promiscuous mode are properly restored by the driver after the MAC may have been reset.

Fixes b6e978e50444 ("net: bcmgenet: add suspend/resume callbacks")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c +4 -0
index 38391230ca86..7d3cbbd88a00 100644
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
 #define GENET_RDMA_REG_OFF	(priv->hw_params->rdma_offset + \
 				TOTAL_DESC * DMA_DESC_SIZE)
 
+/* Forward declarations */
+static void bcmgenet_set_rx_mode(struct net_device *dev);
+
 static inline void bcmgenet_writel(u32 value, void __iomem *offset)
 {
 	/* MIPS chips strapped for BE will automagically configure the
@@ -2858,6 +2861,7 @@ static void bcmgenet_netif_start(struct net_device *dev)
 	struct bcmgenet_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
 
 	/* Start the network engine */
+	bcmgenet_set_rx_mode(dev);
 	bcmgenet_enable_rx_napi(priv);
 	bcmgenet_enable_tx_napi(priv);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#35 lore raw

PATCH 36/72 lib/mpi: Fix 64-bit MIPS build with Clang

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 18f1ca46858eac22437819937ae44aa9a8f9f2fa ]

When building 64r6_defconfig with CONFIG_MIPS32_O32 disabled and CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA enabled:

lib/mpi/generic_mpih-mul1.c:37:24: error: invalid use of a cast in a inline asm context requiring an l-value: remove the cast or build with -fheinous-gnu-extensions

                umul_ppmm(prod_high, prod_low, s1_ptr[j], s2_limb);
                ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
lib/mpi/longlong.h:664:22: note: expanded from macro 'umul_ppmm'
                 : "=d" ((UDItype)(w0))
                         ~~~~~~~~~~^~~
lib/mpi/generic_mpih-mul1.c:37:13: error: invalid use of a cast in a
inline asm context requiring an l-value: remove the cast
or build with -fheinous-gnu-extensions
                umul_ppmm(prod_high, prod_low, s1_ptr[j], s2_limb);
                ~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
lib/mpi/longlong.h:668:22: note: expanded from macro 'umul_ppmm'
                 : "=d" ((UDItype)(w1))
                         ~~~~~~~~~~^~~

2 errors generated.

This special case for umul_ppmm for MIPS64r6 was added in commit bbc25bee37d2b ("lib/mpi: Fix umul_ppmm() for MIPS64r6"), due to GCC being inefficient and emitting a __multi3 intrinsic.

There is no such issue with clang; with this patch applied, I can build this configuration without any problems and there are no link errors like mentioned in the commit above (which I can still reproduce with GCC 9.3.0 when that commit is reverted). Only use this definition when GCC is being used.

This really should have been caught by commit b0c091ae04f67 ("lib/mpi:
Eliminate unused umul_ppmm definitions for MIPS") when I was messing around in this area but I was not testing 64-bit MIPS at the time.

---
 lib/mpi/longlong.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/mpi/longlong.h +1 -1
index e01b705556aa..6c5229f98c9e 100644
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ do {						\
 	**************  MIPS/64  **************
 	***************************************/
 #if (defined(__mips) && __mips >= 3) && W_TYPE_SIZE == 64
-#if defined(__mips_isa_rev) && __mips_isa_rev >= 6
+#if defined(__mips_isa_rev) && __mips_isa_rev >= 6 && defined(CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC)
 /*
  * GCC ends up emitting a __multi3 intrinsic call for MIPS64r6 with the plain C
  * code below, so we special case MIPS64r6 until the compiler can do better.
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#36 lore raw

PATCH 37/72 perf: Add cond_resched() to task_function_call()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Barret Rhoden <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2ed6edd33a214bca02bd2b45e3fc3038a059436b ]

Under rare circumstances, task_function_call() can repeatedly fail and cause a soft lockup.

There is a slight race where the process is no longer running on the cpu we targeted by the time remote_function() runs. The code will simply try again. If we are very unlucky, this will continue to fail, until a watchdog fires. This can happen in a heavily loaded, multi-core virtual machine.

---
 kernel/events/core.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +14 -9
index 5636c9c48545..e50b140053f9 100644
@@ -94,11 +94,11 @@ static void remote_function(void *data)
  * @info:	the function call argument
  *
  * Calls the function @func when the task is currently running. This might
- * be on the current CPU, which just calls the function directly
+ * be on the current CPU, which just calls the function directly.  This will
+ * retry due to any failures in smp_call_function_single(), such as if the
+ * task_cpu() goes offline concurrently.
  *
- * returns: @func return value, or
- *	    -ESRCH  - when the process isn't running
- *	    -EAGAIN - when the process moved away
+ * returns @func return value or -ESRCH when the process isn't running
  */
 static int
 task_function_call(struct task_struct *p, remote_function_f func, void *info)
@@ -111,11 +111,16 @@ task_function_call(struct task_struct *p, remote_function_f func, void *info)
 	};
 	int ret;
 
-	do {
-		ret = smp_call_function_single(task_cpu(p), remote_function, &data, 1);
-		if (!ret)
-			ret = data.ret;
-	} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
+	for (;;) {
+		ret = smp_call_function_single(task_cpu(p), remote_function,
+					       &data, 1);
+		ret = !ret ? data.ret : -EAGAIN;
+
+		if (ret != -EAGAIN)
+			break;
+
+		cond_resched();
+	}
 
 	return ret;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#37 lore raw

PATCH 38/72 exit: Move preemption fixup up, move blocking operations down

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 586b58cac8b4683eb58a1446fbc399de18974e40 ]

With CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y and CONFIG_CGROUPS=y, kernel oopses in non-preemptible context look untidy; after the main oops, the kernel prints a "sleeping function called from invalid context" report because exit_signals() -> cgroup_threadgroup_change_begin() -> percpu_down_read() can sleep, and that happens before the preempt_count_set(PREEMPT_ENABLED) fixup.

It looks like the same thing applies to profile_task_exit() and kcov_task_exit().

Fix it by moving the preemption fixup up and the calls to profile_task_exit() and kcov_task_exit() down.

Fixes 1dc0fffc48af ("sched/core: Robustify preemption leak checks")
---
 kernel/exit.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
kernel/exit.c +16 -9
index d1baf9c96c3e..8458a81a09e3 100644
@@ -770,8 +770,12 @@ void __noreturn do_exit(long code)
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 	int group_dead;
 
-	profile_task_exit(tsk);
-	kcov_task_exit(tsk);
+	/*
+	 * We can get here from a kernel oops, sometimes with preemption off.
+	 * Start by checking for critical errors.
+	 * Then fix up important state like USER_DS and preemption.
+	 * Then do everything else.
+	 */
 
 	WARN_ON(blk_needs_flush_plug(tsk));
 
@@ -789,6 +793,16 @@ void __noreturn do_exit(long code)
 	 */
 	set_fs(USER_DS);
 
+	if (unlikely(in_atomic())) {
+		pr_info("note: %s[%d] exited with preempt_count %d\n",
+			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
+			preempt_count());
+		preempt_count_set(PREEMPT_ENABLED);
+	}
+
+	profile_task_exit(tsk);
+	kcov_task_exit(tsk);
+
 	ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT, code);
 
 	validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
@@ -806,13 +820,6 @@ void __noreturn do_exit(long code)
 
 	exit_signals(tsk);  /* sets PF_EXITING */
 
-	if (unlikely(in_atomic())) {
-		pr_info("note: %s[%d] exited with preempt_count %d\n",
-			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
-			preempt_count());
-		preempt_count_set(PREEMPT_ENABLED);
-	}
-
 	/* sync mm's RSS info before statistics gathering */
 	if (tsk->mm)
 		sync_mm_rss(tsk->mm);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#38 lore raw

PATCH 39/72 net: lpc-enet: fix error return code in lpc_mii_init()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Wei Yongjun <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 88ec7cb22ddde725ed4ce15991f0bd9dd817fd85 ]

Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.

Fixes b7370112f519 ("lpc32xx: Added ethernet driver")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/nxp/lpc_eth.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/nxp/lpc_eth.c +2 -1
index 41d30f55c946..6bd6c261f2ba 100644
@@ -845,7 +845,8 @@ static int lpc_mii_init(struct netdata_local *pldat)
 	if (mdiobus_register(pldat->mii_bus))
 		goto err_out_unregister_bus;
 
-	if (lpc_mii_probe(pldat->ndev) != 0)
+	err = lpc_mii_probe(pldat->ndev);
+	if (err)
 		goto err_out_unregister_bus;
 
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#39 lore raw

PATCH 40/72 media: cec: silence shift wrapping warning in __cec_s_log_addrs()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3b5af3171e2d5a73ae6f04965ed653d039904eb6 ]

The log_addrs->log_addr_type[i] value is a u8 which is controlled by the user and comes from the ioctl. If it's over 31 then that results in undefined behavior (shift wrapping) and that leads to a Smatch static checker warning. We already cap the value later so we can silence the warning just by re-ordering the existing checks.

I think the UBSan checker will also catch this bug at runtime and generate a warning. But otherwise the bug is harmless.

Fixes 9881fe0ca187 ("[media] cec: add HDMI CEC framework (adapter)")
---
 drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c +4 -4
index 0d7d687aeea0..061b7824f698 100644
@@ -1624,6 +1624,10 @@ int __cec_s_log_addrs(struct cec_adapter *adap,
 		unsigned j;
 
 		log_addrs->log_addr[i] = CEC_LOG_ADDR_INVALID;
+		if (log_addrs->log_addr_type[i] > CEC_LOG_ADDR_TYPE_UNREGISTERED) {
+			dprintk(1, "unknown logical address type\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 		if (type_mask & (1 << log_addrs->log_addr_type[i])) {
 			dprintk(1, "duplicate logical address type\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -1644,10 +1648,6 @@ int __cec_s_log_addrs(struct cec_adapter *adap,
 			dprintk(1, "invalid primary device type\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-		if (log_addrs->log_addr_type[i] > CEC_LOG_ADDR_TYPE_UNREGISTERED) {
-			dprintk(1, "unknown logical address type\n");
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
 		for (j = 0; j < feature_sz; j++) {
 			if ((features[j] & 0x80) == 0) {
 				if (op_is_dev_features)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#40 lore raw

PATCH 41/72 net: allwinner: Fix use correct return type for ndo_start_xmit()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Yunjian Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 09f6c44aaae0f1bdb8b983d7762676d5018c53bc ]

The method ndo_start_xmit() returns a value of type netdev_tx_t. Fix the ndo function to use the correct type. And emac_start_xmit() can leak one skb if 'channel' == 3.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/allwinner/sun4i-emac.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/allwinner/sun4i-emac.c +2 -2
index 3143de45baaa..c458b81ba63a 100644
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ static void emac_timeout(struct net_device *dev)
 /* Hardware start transmission.
  * Send a packet to media from the upper layer.
  */
-static int emac_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t emac_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct emac_board_info *db = netdev_priv(dev);
 	unsigned long channel;
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ static int emac_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 
 	channel = db->tx_fifo_stat & 3;
 	if (channel == 3)
-		return 1;
+		return NETDEV_TX_BUSY;
 
 	channel = (channel == 1 ? 1 : 0);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#41 lore raw

PATCH 42/72 powerpc/spufs: fix copy_to_user while atomic

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jeremy Kerr <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 88413a6bfbbe2f648df399b62f85c934460b7a4d ]

Currently, we may perform a copy_to_user (through simple_read_from_buffer()) while holding a context's register_lock, while accessing the context save area.

This change uses a temporary buffer for the context save area data, which we then pass to simple_read_from_buffer.

Includes changes from Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>.

Fixes bf1ab978be23 ("[POWERPC] coredump: Add SPU elf notes to coredump.")
[hch: renamed to function to avoid ___-prefixes]
---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c | 113 +++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c +75 -38
index 5ffcdeb1eb17..9d9fffaedeef 100644
@@ -1988,8 +1988,9 @@ static ssize_t __spufs_mbox_info_read(struct spu_context *ctx,
 static ssize_t spufs_mbox_info_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				   size_t len, loff_t *pos)
 {
-	int ret;
 	struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
+	u32 stat, data;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, len))
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -1998,11 +1999,16 @@ static ssize_t spufs_mbox_info_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	spin_lock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
-	ret = __spufs_mbox_info_read(ctx, buf, len, pos);
+	stat = ctx->csa.prob.mb_stat_R;
+	data = ctx->csa.prob.pu_mb_R;
 	spin_unlock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
 	spu_release_saved(ctx);
 
-	return ret;
+	/* EOF if there's no entry in the mbox */
+	if (!(stat & 0x0000ff))
+		return 0;
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, pos, &data, sizeof(data));
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations spufs_mbox_info_fops = {
@@ -2029,6 +2035,7 @@ static ssize_t spufs_ibox_info_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				   size_t len, loff_t *pos)
 {
 	struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
+	u32 stat, data;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, len))
@@ -2038,11 +2045,16 @@ static ssize_t spufs_ibox_info_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	spin_lock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
-	ret = __spufs_ibox_info_read(ctx, buf, len, pos);
+	stat = ctx->csa.prob.mb_stat_R;
+	data = ctx->csa.priv2.puint_mb_R;
 	spin_unlock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
 	spu_release_saved(ctx);
 
-	return ret;
+	/* EOF if there's no entry in the ibox */
+	if (!(stat & 0xff0000))
+		return 0;
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, pos, &data, sizeof(data));
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations spufs_ibox_info_fops = {
@@ -2051,6 +2063,11 @@ static const struct file_operations spufs_ibox_info_fops = {
 	.llseek  = generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
+static size_t spufs_wbox_info_cnt(struct spu_context *ctx)
+{
+	return (4 - ((ctx->csa.prob.mb_stat_R & 0x00ff00) >> 8)) * sizeof(u32);
+}
+
 static ssize_t __spufs_wbox_info_read(struct spu_context *ctx,
 			char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *pos)
 {
@@ -2059,7 +2076,7 @@ static ssize_t __spufs_wbox_info_read(struct spu_context *ctx,
 	u32 wbox_stat;
 
 	wbox_stat = ctx->csa.prob.mb_stat_R;
-	cnt = 4 - ((wbox_stat & 0x00ff00) >> 8);
+	cnt = spufs_wbox_info_cnt(ctx);
 	for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
 		data[i] = ctx->csa.spu_mailbox_data[i];
 	}
@@ -2072,7 +2089,8 @@ static ssize_t spufs_wbox_info_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				   size_t len, loff_t *pos)
 {
 	struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
-	int ret;
+	u32 data[ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->csa.spu_mailbox_data)];
+	int ret, count;
 
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, len))
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -2081,11 +2099,13 @@ static ssize_t spufs_wbox_info_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	spin_lock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
-	ret = __spufs_wbox_info_read(ctx, buf, len, pos);
+	count = spufs_wbox_info_cnt(ctx);
+	memcpy(&data, &ctx->csa.spu_mailbox_data, sizeof(data));
 	spin_unlock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
 	spu_release_saved(ctx);
 
-	return ret;
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, pos, &data,
+				count * sizeof(u32));
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations spufs_wbox_info_fops = {
@@ -2094,27 +2114,33 @@ static const struct file_operations spufs_wbox_info_fops = {
 	.llseek  = generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
-static ssize_t __spufs_dma_info_read(struct spu_context *ctx,
-			char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *pos)
+static void spufs_get_dma_info(struct spu_context *ctx,
+		struct spu_dma_info *info)
 {
-	struct spu_dma_info info;
-	struct mfc_cq_sr *qp, *spuqp;
 	int i;
 
-	info.dma_info_type = ctx->csa.priv2.spu_tag_status_query_RW;
-	info.dma_info_mask = ctx->csa.lscsa->tag_mask.slot[0];
-	info.dma_info_status = ctx->csa.spu_chnldata_RW[24];
-	info.dma_info_stall_and_notify = ctx->csa.spu_chnldata_RW[25];
-	info.dma_info_atomic_command_status = ctx->csa.spu_chnldata_RW[27];
+	info->dma_info_type = ctx->csa.priv2.spu_tag_status_query_RW;
+	info->dma_info_mask = ctx->csa.lscsa->tag_mask.slot[0];
+	info->dma_info_status = ctx->csa.spu_chnldata_RW[24];
+	info->dma_info_stall_and_notify = ctx->csa.spu_chnldata_RW[25];
+	info->dma_info_atomic_command_status = ctx->csa.spu_chnldata_RW[27];
 	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
-		qp = &info.dma_info_command_data[i];
-		spuqp = &ctx->csa.priv2.spuq[i];
+		struct mfc_cq_sr *qp = &info->dma_info_command_data[i];
+		struct mfc_cq_sr *spuqp = &ctx->csa.priv2.spuq[i];
 
 		qp->mfc_cq_data0_RW = spuqp->mfc_cq_data0_RW;
 		qp->mfc_cq_data1_RW = spuqp->mfc_cq_data1_RW;
 		qp->mfc_cq_data2_RW = spuqp->mfc_cq_data2_RW;
 		qp->mfc_cq_data3_RW = spuqp->mfc_cq_data3_RW;
 	}
+}
+
+static ssize_t __spufs_dma_info_read(struct spu_context *ctx,
+			char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct spu_dma_info info;
+
+	spufs_get_dma_info(ctx, &info);
 
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, pos, &info,
 				sizeof info);
@@ -2124,6 +2150,7 @@ static ssize_t spufs_dma_info_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 			      size_t len, loff_t *pos)
 {
 	struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
+	struct spu_dma_info info;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, len))
@@ -2133,11 +2160,12 @@ static ssize_t spufs_dma_info_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	spin_lock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
-	ret = __spufs_dma_info_read(ctx, buf, len, pos);
+	spufs_get_dma_info(ctx, &info);
 	spin_unlock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
 	spu_release_saved(ctx);
 
-	return ret;
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, pos, &info,
+				sizeof(info));
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations spufs_dma_info_fops = {
@@ -2146,13 +2174,31 @@ static const struct file_operations spufs_dma_info_fops = {
 	.llseek = no_llseek,
 };
 
+static void spufs_get_proxydma_info(struct spu_context *ctx,
+		struct spu_proxydma_info *info)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	info->proxydma_info_type = ctx->csa.prob.dma_querytype_RW;
+	info->proxydma_info_mask = ctx->csa.prob.dma_querymask_RW;
+	info->proxydma_info_status = ctx->csa.prob.dma_tagstatus_R;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+		struct mfc_cq_sr *qp = &info->proxydma_info_command_data[i];
+		struct mfc_cq_sr *puqp = &ctx->csa.priv2.puq[i];
+
+		qp->mfc_cq_data0_RW = puqp->mfc_cq_data0_RW;
+		qp->mfc_cq_data1_RW = puqp->mfc_cq_data1_RW;
+		qp->mfc_cq_data2_RW = puqp->mfc_cq_data2_RW;
+		qp->mfc_cq_data3_RW = puqp->mfc_cq_data3_RW;
+	}
+}
+
 static ssize_t __spufs_proxydma_info_read(struct spu_context *ctx,
 			char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *pos)
 {
 	struct spu_proxydma_info info;
-	struct mfc_cq_sr *qp, *puqp;
 	int ret = sizeof info;
-	int i;
 
 	if (len < ret)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -2160,18 +2206,7 @@ static ssize_t __spufs_proxydma_info_read(struct spu_context *ctx,
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, len))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	info.proxydma_info_type = ctx->csa.prob.dma_querytype_RW;
-	info.proxydma_info_mask = ctx->csa.prob.dma_querymask_RW;
-	info.proxydma_info_status = ctx->csa.prob.dma_tagstatus_R;
-	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
-		qp = &info.proxydma_info_command_data[i];
-		puqp = &ctx->csa.priv2.puq[i];
-
-		qp->mfc_cq_data0_RW = puqp->mfc_cq_data0_RW;
-		qp->mfc_cq_data1_RW = puqp->mfc_cq_data1_RW;
-		qp->mfc_cq_data2_RW = puqp->mfc_cq_data2_RW;
-		qp->mfc_cq_data3_RW = puqp->mfc_cq_data3_RW;
-	}
+	spufs_get_proxydma_info(ctx, &info);
 
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, pos, &info,
 				sizeof info);
@@ -2181,17 +2216,19 @@ static ssize_t spufs_proxydma_info_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				   size_t len, loff_t *pos)
 {
 	struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
+	struct spu_proxydma_info info;
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	spin_lock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
-	ret = __spufs_proxydma_info_read(ctx, buf, len, pos);
+	spufs_get_proxydma_info(ctx, &info);
 	spin_unlock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
 	spu_release_saved(ctx);
 
-	return ret;
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, pos, &info,
+				sizeof(info));
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations spufs_proxydma_info_fops = {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#42 lore raw

PATCH 43/72 ath9k_htc: Silence undersized packet warnings

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Masashi Honma <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 450edd2805982d14ed79733a82927d2857b27cac ]

Some devices like TP-Link TL-WN722N produces this kind of messages frequently.

kernel: ath: phy0: Short RX data len, dropping (dlen: 4)

This warning is useful for developers to recognize that the device (Wi-Fi dongle or USB hub etc) is noisy but not for general users. So this patch make this warning to debug message.

Ref: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207539

Fixes cd486e627e67 ("ath9k_htc: Discard undersized packets")
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c +3 -3
index 4748f557c753..11d06021b5e4 100644
@@ -999,9 +999,9 @@ static bool ath9k_rx_prepare(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv,
 	 * which are not PHY_ERROR (short radar pulses have a length of 3)
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(!rs_datalen || (rs_datalen < 10 && !is_phyerr))) {
-		ath_warn(common,
-			 "Short RX data len, dropping (dlen: %d)\n",
-			 rs_datalen);
+		ath_dbg(common, ANY,
+			"Short RX data len, dropping (dlen: %d)\n",
+			rs_datalen);
 		goto rx_next;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#43 lore raw

PATCH 44/72 Crypto/chcr: fix for ccm(aes) failed test

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Devulapally Shiva Krishna <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 10b0c75d7bc19606fa9a62c8ab9180e95c0e0385 ]

The ccm(aes) test fails when req->assoclen > ~240bytes.

The problem is the value assigned to auth_offset is wrong. As auth_offset is unsigned char, it can take max value as 255. So fix it by making it unsigned int.

---
 drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c +1 -1
index 8d39f3a07bf8..99c3827855c7 100644
@@ -2201,7 +2201,7 @@ static void fill_sec_cpl_for_aead(struct cpl_tx_sec_pdu *sec_cpl,
 	unsigned int mac_mode = CHCR_SCMD_AUTH_MODE_CBCMAC;
 	unsigned int c_id = chcrctx->dev->rx_channel_id;
 	unsigned int ccm_xtra;
-	unsigned char tag_offset = 0, auth_offset = 0;
+	unsigned int tag_offset = 0, auth_offset = 0;
 	unsigned int assoclen;
 
 	if (get_aead_subtype(tfm) == CRYPTO_ALG_SUB_TYPE_AEAD_RFC4309)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#44 lore raw

PATCH 45/72 MIPS: Truncate link address into 32bit for 32bit kernel

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jiaxun Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ff487d41036035376e47972c7c522490b839ab37 ]

LLD failed to link vmlinux with 64bit load address for 32bit ELF while bfd will strip 64bit address into 32bit silently.
To fix LLD build, we should truncate load address provided by platform into 32bit for 32bit kernel.

---
 arch/mips/Makefile                 | 13 ++++++++++++-
 arch/mips/boot/compressed/Makefile |  2 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S     |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/mips/Makefile +12 -1
index 5977884b008e..a4a06d173858 100644
@@ -279,12 +279,23 @@ ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
   endif
 endif
 
+# When linking a 32-bit executable the LLVM linker cannot cope with a
+# 32-bit load address that has been sign-extended to 64 bits.  Simply
+# remove the upper 32 bits then, as it is safe to do so with other
+# linkers.
+ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+	load-ld			= $(load-y)
+else
+	load-ld			= $(subst 0xffffffff,0x,$(load-y))
+endif
+
 KBUILD_AFLAGS	+= $(cflags-y)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(cflags-y)
-KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -DVMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS=$(load-y)
+KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -DVMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS=$(load-y) -DLINKER_LOAD_ADDRESS=$(load-ld)
 KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -DDATAOFFSET=$(if $(dataoffset-y),$(dataoffset-y),0)
 
 bootvars-y	= VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS=$(load-y) \
+		  LINKER_LOAD_ADDRESS=$(load-ld) \
 		  VMLINUX_ENTRY_ADDRESS=$(entry-y) \
 		  PLATFORM="$(platform-y)" \
 		  ITS_INPUTS="$(its-y)"
arch/mips/boot/compressed/Makefile +1 -1
index baa34e4deb78..516e593a8ee9 100644
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ ifneq ($(zload-y),)
 VMLINUZ_LOAD_ADDRESS := $(zload-y)
 else
 VMLINUZ_LOAD_ADDRESS = $(shell $(obj)/calc_vmlinuz_load_addr \
-		$(obj)/vmlinux.bin $(VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS))
+		$(obj)/vmlinux.bin $(LINKER_LOAD_ADDRESS))
 endif
 UIMAGE_LOADADDR = $(VMLINUZ_LOAD_ADDRESS)
 
arch/mips/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +1 -1
index 36f2e860ba3e..be63fff95b2a 100644
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ SECTIONS
 	/* . = 0xa800000000300000; */
 	. = 0xffffffff80300000;
 #endif
-	. = VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS;
+	. = LINKER_LOAD_ADDRESS;
 	/* read-only */
 	_text = .;	/* Text and read-only data */
 	.text : {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#45 lore raw

PATCH 46/72 mips: cm: Fix an invalid error code of INTVN_*_ERR

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Serge Semin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8a0efb8b101665a843205eab3d67ab09cb2d9a8d ]

Commit 3885c2b463f6 ("MIPS: CM: Add support for reporting CM cache errors") adds cm2_causes[] array with map of error type ID and pointers to the short description string. There is a mistake in the table, since according to MIPS32 manual CM2_ERROR_TYPE = {17,18} correspond to INTVN_WR_ERR and INTVN_RD_ERR, while the table claims they have {0x17,0x18} codes. This is obviously hex-dec copy-paste bug. Moreover codes {0x18 - 0x1a} indicate L2 ECC errors.

Fixes 3885c2b463f6 ("MIPS: CM: Add support for reporting CM cache errors")
Cc Alexey Malahov <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Burton <[email protected]>
Cc Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Rob Herring <[email protected]>
---
 arch/mips/kernel/mips-cm.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/mips/kernel/mips-cm.c +3 -3
index 7f3f136572de..50d3d74001cb 100644
@@ -123,9 +123,9 @@ static char *cm2_causes[32] = {
 	"COH_RD_ERR", "MMIO_WR_ERR", "MMIO_RD_ERR", "0x07",
 	"0x08", "0x09", "0x0a", "0x0b",
 	"0x0c", "0x0d", "0x0e", "0x0f",
-	"0x10", "0x11", "0x12", "0x13",
-	"0x14", "0x15", "0x16", "INTVN_WR_ERR",
-	"INTVN_RD_ERR", "0x19", "0x1a", "0x1b",
+	"0x10", "INTVN_WR_ERR", "INTVN_RD_ERR", "0x13",
+	"0x14", "0x15", "0x16", "0x17",
+	"0x18", "0x19", "0x1a", "0x1b",
 	"0x1c", "0x1d", "0x1e", "0x1f"
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#46 lore raw

PATCH 47/72 kgdb: Fix spurious true from in_dbg_master()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3fec4aecb311995189217e64d725cfe84a568de3 ]

Currently there is a small window where a badly timed migration could cause in_dbg_master() to spuriously return true. Specifically if we migrate to a new core after reading the processor id and the previous core takes a breakpoint then we will evaluate true if we read kgdb_active before we get the IPI to bring us to halt.

Fix this by checking irqs_disabled() first. Interrupts are always disabled when we are executing the kgdb trap so this is an acceptable prerequisite. This also allows us to replace raw_smp_processor_id() with smp_processor_id() since the short circuit logic will prevent warnings from PREEMPT_DEBUG.

---
 include/linux/kgdb.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/kgdb.h +1 -1
index e465bb15912d..6be5545d3584 100644
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ extern void gdbstub_exit(int status);
 extern int			kgdb_single_step;
 extern atomic_t			kgdb_active;
 #define in_dbg_master() \
-	(raw_smp_processor_id() == atomic_read(&kgdb_active))
+	(irqs_disabled() && (smp_processor_id() == atomic_read(&kgdb_active)))
 extern bool dbg_is_early;
 extern void __init dbg_late_init(void);
 #else /* ! CONFIG_KGDB */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#47 lore raw

PATCH 48/72 nvme: refine the Qemu Identify CNS quirk

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b9a5c3d4c34d8bd9fd75f7f28d18a57cb68da237 ]

Add a helper to check if we can use Identify CNS values > 1, and refine the Qemu quirk to not apply to reported versions larger than 1.1, as the Qemu implementation had been fixed by then.

---
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/host/core.c +14 -2
index a760c449f4a9..2d95755092e3 100644
@@ -758,6 +758,19 @@ void nvme_stop_keep_alive(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_stop_keep_alive);
 
+/*
+ * In NVMe 1.0 the CNS field was just a binary controller or namespace
+ * flag, thus sending any new CNS opcodes has a big chance of not working.
+ * Qemu unfortunately had that bug after reporting a 1.1 version compliance
+ * (but not for any later version).
+ */
+static bool nvme_ctrl_limited_cns(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
+{
+	if (ctrl->quirks & NVME_QUIRK_IDENTIFY_CNS)
+		return ctrl->vs < NVME_VS(1, 2, 0);
+	return ctrl->vs < NVME_VS(1, 1, 0);
+}
+
 static int nvme_identify_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *dev, struct nvme_id_ctrl **id)
 {
 	struct nvme_command c = { };
@@ -2538,8 +2551,7 @@ static void nvme_scan_work(struct work_struct *work)
 		return;
 
 	nn = le32_to_cpu(id->nn);
-	if (ctrl->vs >= NVME_VS(1, 1, 0) &&
-	    !(ctrl->quirks & NVME_QUIRK_IDENTIFY_CNS)) {
+	if (!nvme_ctrl_limited_cns(ctrl)) {
 		if (!nvme_scan_ns_list(ctrl, nn))
 			goto done;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#48 lore raw

PATCH 49/72 wcn36xx: Fix error handling path in 'wcn36xx_probe()'

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a86308fc534edeceaf64670c691e17485436a4f4 ]

In case of error, 'qcom_wcnss_open_channel()' must be undone by a call to 'rpmsg_destroy_ept()', as already done in the remove function.

Fixes 5052de8deff5 ("soc: qcom: smd: Transition client drivers from smd to rpmsg")
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/wcn36xx/main.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/wcn36xx/main.c +4 -2
index af37c19dbfd7..688152bcfc15 100644
@@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@ static int wcn36xx_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (addr && ret != ETH_ALEN) {
 		wcn36xx_err("invalid local-mac-address\n");
 		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto out_wq;
+		goto out_destroy_ept;
 	} else if (addr) {
 		wcn36xx_info("mac address: %pM\n", addr);
 		SET_IEEE80211_PERM_ADDR(wcn->hw, addr);
@@ -1288,7 +1288,7 @@ static int wcn36xx_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	ret = wcn36xx_platform_get_resources(wcn, pdev);
 	if (ret)
-		goto out_wq;
+		goto out_destroy_ept;
 
 	wcn36xx_init_ieee80211(wcn);
 	ret = ieee80211_register_hw(wcn->hw);
@@ -1300,6 +1300,8 @@ static int wcn36xx_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 out_unmap:
 	iounmap(wcn->ccu_base);
 	iounmap(wcn->dxe_base);
+out_destroy_ept:
+	rpmsg_destroy_ept(wcn->smd_channel);
 out_wq:
 	ieee80211_free_hw(hw);
 out_err:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#49 lore raw

PATCH 50/72 net: qed*: Reduce RX and TX default ring count when running inside kdump kernel

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bhupesh Sharma <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 73e030977f7884dbe1be0018bab517e8d02760f8 ]

Normally kdump kernel(s) run under severe memory constraint with the basic idea being to save the crashdump vmcore reliably when the primary kernel panics/hangs.

Currently the qed* ethernet driver ends up consuming a lot of memory in the kdump kernel, leading to kdump kernel panic when one tries to save the vmcore via ssh/nfs (thus utilizing the services of the underlying qed* network interfaces).

An example OOM message log seen in the kdump kernel can be seen here [1], with crashkernel size reservation of 512M.

Using tools like memstrack (see [2]), we can track the modules taking up the bulk of memory in the kdump kernel and organize the memory usage output as per 'highest allocator first'. An example log for the OOM case indicates that the qed* modules end up allocating approximately 216M memory, which is a large part of the total crashkernel size:

dracut-pre-pivot[676]: ======== Report format module_summary: ======== dracut-pre-pivot[676]: Module qed using 149.6MB (2394 pages), peak allocation 149.6MB (2394 pages) dracut-pre-pivot[676]: Module qede using 65.3MB (1045 pages), peak allocation 65.3MB (1045 pages)

This patch reduces the default RX and TX ring count from 1024 to 64 when running inside kdump kernel, which leads to a significant memory saving.

An example log with the patch applied shows the reduced memory
allocation in the kdump kernel:
dracut-pre-pivot[674]: ======== Report format module_summary: ======== dracut-pre-pivot[674]: Module qed using 141.8MB (2268 pages), peak allocation 141.8MB (2268 pages) <..snip..>
[dracut-pre-pivot[674]: Module qede using 4.8MB (76 pages), peak allocation 4.9MB (78 pages)

Tested crashdump vmcore save via ssh/nfs protocol using underlying qed* network interface after applying this patch.

[1] OOM log:
------------

kworker/0:6: page allocation failure: order:6, mode:0x60c0c0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO), nodemask=(null) kworker/0:6 cpuset=/ mems_allowed=0

 CPU: 0 PID: 145 Comm: kworker/0:6 Not tainted 4.18.0-109.el8.aarch64 #1
 Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. Saber/Saber, BIOS 0ACKL025
 01/18/2019
 Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
 Call trace:
  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x188
  show_stack+0x24/0x30
  dump_stack+0x90/0xb4
  warn_alloc+0xf4/0x178
  __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xcac/0xd58
  alloc_pages_current+0x8c/0xf8
  kmalloc_order_trace+0x38/0x108
  qed_iov_alloc+0x40/0x248 [qed]
  qed_resc_alloc+0x224/0x518 [qed]
  qed_slowpath_start+0x254/0x928 [qed]
   __qede_probe+0xf8/0x5e0 [qede]
  qede_probe+0x68/0xd8 [qede]
  local_pci_probe+0x44/0xa8
  work_for_cpu_fn+0x20/0x30
  process_one_work+0x1ac/0x3e8
  worker_thread+0x44/0x448
  kthread+0x130/0x138
  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
  Cannot start slowpath
  qede: probe of 0000:05:00.1 failed with error -12

[2]. Memstrack tool: https://github.com/ryncsn/memstrack

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qede/qede.h      |  2 ++
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qede/qede_main.c | 11 +++++++++--
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qede/qede.h +2 -0
index a80531b5aecc..c132b08cefde 100644
@@ -528,12 +528,14 @@ void qede_update_rx_prod(struct qede_dev *edev, struct qede_rx_queue *rxq);
 #define RX_RING_SIZE		((u16)BIT(RX_RING_SIZE_POW))
 #define NUM_RX_BDS_MAX		(RX_RING_SIZE - 1)
 #define NUM_RX_BDS_MIN		128
+#define NUM_RX_BDS_KDUMP_MIN	63
 #define NUM_RX_BDS_DEF		((u16)BIT(10) - 1)
 
 #define TX_RING_SIZE_POW	13
 #define TX_RING_SIZE		((u16)BIT(TX_RING_SIZE_POW))
 #define NUM_TX_BDS_MAX		(TX_RING_SIZE - 1)
 #define NUM_TX_BDS_MIN		128
+#define NUM_TX_BDS_KDUMP_MIN	63
 #define NUM_TX_BDS_DEF		NUM_TX_BDS_MAX
 
 #define QEDE_MIN_PKT_LEN		64
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qede/qede_main.c +9 -2
index dab202f343c6..8bb734486bf3 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
  * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
  * SOFTWARE.
  */
+#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/pci.h>
 #include <linux/version.h>
@@ -624,8 +625,14 @@ static struct qede_dev *qede_alloc_etherdev(struct qed_dev *cdev,
 	edev->dp_module = dp_module;
 	edev->dp_level = dp_level;
 	edev->ops = qed_ops;
-	edev->q_num_rx_buffers = NUM_RX_BDS_DEF;
-	edev->q_num_tx_buffers = NUM_TX_BDS_DEF;
+
+	if (is_kdump_kernel()) {
+		edev->q_num_rx_buffers = NUM_RX_BDS_KDUMP_MIN;
+		edev->q_num_tx_buffers = NUM_TX_BDS_KDUMP_MIN;
+	} else {
+		edev->q_num_rx_buffers = NUM_RX_BDS_DEF;
+		edev->q_num_tx_buffers = NUM_TX_BDS_DEF;
+	}
 
 	DP_INFO(edev, "Allocated netdev with %d tx queues and %d rx queues\n",
 		info->num_queues, info->num_queues);
Signature · 7 lines
2.25.1


_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
author maintainer
#50 lore raw

PATCH 51/72 md: don't flush workqueue unconditionally in md_open

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Guoqing Jiang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f6766ff6afff70e2aaf39e1511e16d471de7c3ae ]

We need to check mddev->del_work before flush workqueu since the purpose of flush is to ensure the previous md is disappeared. Otherwise the similar deadlock appeared if LOCKDEP is enabled, it is due to md_open holds the bdev->bd_mutex before flush workqueue.

kernel: [ 154.522645] ======================================================
kernel: [ 154.522647] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
kernel: [ 154.522650] 5.6.0-rc7-lp151.27-default #25 Tainted: G O
kernel: [ 154.522651] ------------------------------------------------------
kernel: [ 154.522653] mdadm/2482 is trying to acquire lock:
kernel: [ 154.522655] ffff888078529128 ((wq_completion)md_misc){+.+.}, at: flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0
kernel: [ 154.522673]
kernel: [ 154.522673] but task is already holding lock:
kernel: [ 154.522675] ffff88804efa9338 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}, at: __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590
kernel: [ 154.522691]
kernel: [ 154.522691] which lock already depends on the new lock.
kernel: [ 154.522691]
kernel: [ 154.522694]
kernel: [ 154.522694] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
kernel: [ 154.522696]
kernel: [ 154.522696] -> #4 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}:
kernel: [ 154.522704] __mutex_lock+0x87/0x950
kernel: [ 154.522706] __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590
kernel: [ 154.522708] blkdev_get+0x65/0x140
kernel: [ 154.522709] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x2f/0x40
kernel: [ 154.522716] lock_rdev+0x3d/0x90 [md_mod]
kernel: [ 154.522719] md_import_device+0xd6/0x1b0 [md_mod]
kernel: [ 154.522723] new_dev_store+0x15e/0x210 [md_mod]
kernel: [ 154.522728] md_attr_store+0x7a/0xc0 [md_mod]
kernel: [ 154.522732] kernfs_fop_write+0x117/0x1b0
kernel: [ 154.522735] vfs_write+0xad/0x1a0
kernel: [ 154.522737] ksys_write+0xa4/0xe0
kernel: [ 154.522745] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0
kernel: [ 154.522748] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
kernel: [ 154.522749]
kernel: [ 154.522749] -> #3 (&mddev->reconfig_mutex){+.+.}:
kernel: [ 154.522752] __mutex_lock+0x87/0x950
kernel: [ 154.522756] new_dev_store+0xc9/0x210 [md_mod]
kernel: [ 154.522759] md_attr_store+0x7a/0xc0 [md_mod]
kernel: [ 154.522761] kernfs_fop_write+0x117/0x1b0
kernel: [ 154.522763] vfs_write+0xad/0x1a0
kernel: [ 154.522765] ksys_write+0xa4/0xe0
kernel: [ 154.522767] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0
kernel: [ 154.522769] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
kernel: [ 154.522770]
kernel: [ 154.522770] -> #2 (kn->count#253){++++}:
kernel: [ 154.522775] __kernfs_remove+0x253/0x2c0
kernel: [ 154.522778] kernfs_remove+0x1f/0x30
kernel: [ 154.522780] kobject_del+0x28/0x60
kernel: [ 154.522783] mddev_delayed_delete+0x24/0x30 [md_mod]
kernel: [ 154.522786] process_one_work+0x2a7/0x5f0
kernel: [ 154.522788] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0
kernel: [ 154.522793] kthread+0x117/0x130
kernel: [ 154.522795] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
kernel: [ 154.522796]
kernel: [ 154.522796] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&mddev->del_work)){+.+.}:
kernel: [ 154.522800] process_one_work+0x27e/0x5f0
kernel: [ 154.522802] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0
kernel: [ 154.522804] kthread+0x117/0x130
kernel: [ 154.522806] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
kernel: [ 154.522807]
kernel: [ 154.522807] -> #0 ((wq_completion)md_misc){+.+.}:
kernel: [ 154.522813] __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690
kernel: [ 154.522816] lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1a0
kernel: [ 154.522818] flush_workqueue+0xab/0x4b0
kernel: [ 154.522821] md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod]
kernel: [ 154.522823] __blkdev_get+0xea/0x590
kernel: [ 154.522825] blkdev_get+0x65/0x140
kernel: [ 154.522828] do_dentry_open+0x1d1/0x380
kernel: [ 154.522831] path_openat+0x567/0xcc0
kernel: [ 154.522834] do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
kernel: [ 154.522836] do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0
kernel: [ 154.522838] do_sys_open+0x57/0x80
kernel: [ 154.522840] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0
kernel: [ 154.522842] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
kernel: [ 154.522844]
kernel: [ 154.522844] other info that might help us debug this:
kernel: [ 154.522844]
kernel: [ 154.522846] Chain exists of:
kernel: [ 154.522846] (wq_completion)md_misc --> &mddev->reconfig_mutex --> &bdev->bd_mutex
kernel: [ 154.522846]
kernel: [ 154.522850] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
kernel: [ 154.522850]
kernel: [ 154.522852] CPU0 CPU1
kernel: [ 154.522853] ---- ----
kernel: [ 154.522854] lock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
kernel: [ 154.522856] lock(&mddev->reconfig_mutex);
kernel: [ 154.522858] lock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
kernel: [ 154.522860] lock((wq_completion)md_misc);
kernel: [ 154.522861]
kernel: [ 154.522861] *** DEADLOCK ***
kernel: [ 154.522861]
kernel: [ 154.522864] 1 lock held by mdadm/2482:
kernel: [ 154.522865] #0: ffff88804efa9338 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}, at: __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590
kernel: [ 154.522868]
kernel: [ 154.522868] stack backtrace:
kernel: [ 154.522873] CPU: 1 PID: 2482 Comm: mdadm Tainted: G O 5.6.0-rc7-lp151.27-default #25
kernel: [ 154.522875] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
kernel: [ 154.522878] Call Trace:
kernel: [ 154.522881] dump_stack+0x8f/0xcb
kernel: [ 154.522884] check_noncircular+0x194/0x1b0
kernel: [ 154.522888] ? __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690
kernel: [ 154.522890] __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690
kernel: [ 154.522893] lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1a0
kernel: [ 154.522895] ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0
kernel: [ 154.522898] flush_workqueue+0xab/0x4b0
kernel: [ 154.522900] ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0
kernel: [ 154.522905] ? md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod]
kernel: [ 154.522908] md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod]
kernel: [ 154.522910] __blkdev_get+0xea/0x590
kernel: [ 154.522912] ? bd_acquire+0xc0/0xc0
kernel: [ 154.522914] blkdev_get+0x65/0x140
kernel: [ 154.522916] ? bd_acquire+0xc0/0xc0
kernel: [ 154.522918] do_dentry_open+0x1d1/0x380
kernel: [ 154.522921] path_openat+0x567/0xcc0
kernel: [ 154.522923] ? __lock_acquire+0x380/0x1690
kernel: [ 154.522926] do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
kernel: [ 154.522929] ? __alloc_fd+0xe5/0x1f0
kernel: [ 154.522935] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x28c/0x630
kernel: [ 154.522939] ? do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0
kernel: [ 154.522941] do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0
kernel: [ 154.522944] do_sys_open+0x57/0x80
kernel: [ 154.522946] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0
kernel: [ 154.522948] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
kernel: [ 154.522951] RIP: 0033:0x7f98d279d9ae

And md_alloc also flushed the same workqueue, but the thing is different here. Because all the paths call md_alloc don't hold bdev->bd_mutex, and the flush is necessary to avoid race condition, so leave it as it is.

---
 drivers/md/md.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/md.c +2 -1
index b942c74f1ce8..948344531baf 100644
@@ -7411,7 +7411,8 @@ static int md_open(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode)
 		 */
 		mddev_put(mddev);
 		/* Wait until bdev->bd_disk is definitely gone */
-		flush_workqueue(md_misc_wq);
+		if (work_pending(&mddev->del_work))
+			flush_workqueue(md_misc_wq);
 		/* Then retry the open from the top */
 		return -ERESTARTSYS;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#51 lore raw

PATCH 52/72 rtlwifi: Fix a double free in _rtl_usb_tx_urb_setup()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit beb12813bc75d4a23de43b85ad1c7cb28d27631e ]

Seven years ago we tried to fix a leak but actually introduced a double free instead. It was an understandable mistake because the code was a bit confusing and the free was done in the wrong place. The "skb" pointer is freed in both _rtl_usb_tx_urb_setup() and _rtl_usb_transmit(). The free belongs _rtl_usb_transmit() instead of _rtl_usb_tx_urb_setup() and I've cleaned the code up a bit to hopefully make it more clear.

Fixes 36ef0b473fbf ("rtlwifi: usb: add missing freeing of skbuff")
---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/usb.c | 8 ++------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/usb.c +2 -6
index 93eda23f0123..7a050a75bdcb 100644
@@ -910,10 +910,8 @@ static struct urb *_rtl_usb_tx_urb_setup(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
 
 	WARN_ON(NULL == skb);
 	_urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!_urb) {
-		kfree_skb(skb);
+	if (!_urb)
 		return NULL;
-	}
 	_rtl_install_trx_info(rtlusb, skb, ep_num);
 	usb_fill_bulk_urb(_urb, rtlusb->udev, usb_sndbulkpipe(rtlusb->udev,
 			  ep_num), skb->data, skb->len, _rtl_tx_complete, skb);
@@ -927,7 +925,6 @@ static void _rtl_usb_transmit(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct rtl_usb *rtlusb = rtl_usbdev(rtl_usbpriv(hw));
 	u32 ep_num;
 	struct urb *_urb = NULL;
-	struct sk_buff *_skb = NULL;
 
 	WARN_ON(NULL == rtlusb->usb_tx_aggregate_hdl);
 	if (unlikely(IS_USB_STOP(rtlusb))) {
@@ -936,8 +933,7 @@ static void _rtl_usb_transmit(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return;
 	}
 	ep_num = rtlusb->ep_map.ep_mapping[qnum];
-	_skb = skb;
-	_urb = _rtl_usb_tx_urb_setup(hw, _skb, ep_num);
+	_urb = _rtl_usb_tx_urb_setup(hw, skb, ep_num);
 	if (unlikely(!_urb)) {
 		pr_err("Can't allocate urb. Drop skb!\n");
 		kfree_skb(skb);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#52 lore raw

PATCH 53/72 mwifiex: Fix memory corruption in dump_station

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Pali Rohár <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3aa42bae9c4d1641aeb36f1a8585cd1d506cf471 ]

The mwifiex_cfg80211_dump_station() uses static variable for iterating over a linked list of all associated stations (when the driver is in UAP role). This has a race condition if .dump_station is called in parallel for multiple interfaces. This corruption can be triggered by registering multiple SSIDs and calling, in parallel for multiple interfaces
iw dev <iface> station dump

[16750.719775] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dead000000000110
...
[16750.899173] Call trace:
[16750.901696]  mwifiex_cfg80211_dump_station+0x94/0x100 [mwifiex]
[16750.907824]  nl80211_dump_station+0xbc/0x278 [cfg80211]
[16750.913160]  netlink_dump+0xe8/0x320
[16750.916827]  netlink_recvmsg+0x1b4/0x338
[16750.920861]  ____sys_recvmsg+0x7c/0x2b0
[16750.924801]  ___sys_recvmsg+0x70/0x98
[16750.928564]  __sys_recvmsg+0x58/0xa0
[16750.932238]  __arm64_sys_recvmsg+0x28/0x30
[16750.936453]  el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0x90/0x158
[16750.941378]  do_el0_svc+0x74/0x90
[16750.944784]  el0_sync_handler+0x12c/0x1a8
[16750.948903]  el0_sync+0x114/0x140
[16750.952312] Code: f9400003 f907f423 eb02007f 54fffd60 (b9401060)
[16750.958583] ---[ end trace c8ad181c2f4b8576 ]---

This patch drops the use of the static iterator, and instead every time the function is called iterates to the idx-th position of the linked-list.

It would be better to convert the code not to use linked list for associated stations storage (since the chip has a limited number of associated stations anyway - it could just be an array). Such a change may be proposed in the future. In the meantime this patch can backported into stable kernels in this simple form.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/cfg80211.c | 14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/cfg80211.c +6 -8
index 5e8e34a08b2d..79c50aebffc4 100644
@@ -1451,7 +1451,8 @@ mwifiex_cfg80211_dump_station(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev,
 			      int idx, u8 *mac, struct station_info *sinfo)
 {
 	struct mwifiex_private *priv = mwifiex_netdev_get_priv(dev);
-	static struct mwifiex_sta_node *node;
+	struct mwifiex_sta_node *node;
+	int i;
 
 	if ((GET_BSS_ROLE(priv) == MWIFIEX_BSS_ROLE_STA) &&
 	    priv->media_connected && idx == 0) {
@@ -1461,13 +1462,10 @@ mwifiex_cfg80211_dump_station(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev,
 		mwifiex_send_cmd(priv, HOST_CMD_APCMD_STA_LIST,
 				 HostCmd_ACT_GEN_GET, 0, NULL, true);
 
-		if (node && (&node->list == &priv->sta_list)) {
-			node = NULL;
-			return -ENOENT;
-		}
-
-		node = list_prepare_entry(node, &priv->sta_list, list);
-		list_for_each_entry_continue(node, &priv->sta_list, list) {
+		i = 0;
+		list_for_each_entry(node, &priv->sta_list, list) {
+			if (i++ != idx)
+				continue;
 			ether_addr_copy(mac, node->mac_addr);
 			return mwifiex_dump_station_info(priv, node, sinfo);
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#53 lore raw

PATCH 54/72 x86/boot: Correct relocation destination on old linkers

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Arvind Sankar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5214028dd89e49ba27007c3ee475279e584261f0 ]

For the 32-bit kernel, as described in

6d92bc9d483a ("x86/build: Build compressed x86 kernels as PIE"),

pre-2.26 binutils generates R_386_32 relocations in PIE mode. Since the startup code does not perform relocation, any reloc entry with R_386_32 will remain as 0 in the executing code.

Commit

974f221c84b0 ("x86/boot: Move compressed kernel to the end of the
decompression buffer")

added a new symbol _end but did not mark it hidden, which doesn't give the correct offset on older linkers. This causes the compressed kernel to be copied beyond the end of the decompression buffer, rather than flush against it. This region of memory may be reserved or already allocated for other purposes by the bootloader.

Mark _end as hidden to fix. This changes the relocation from R_386_32 to R_386_RELATIVE even on the pre-2.26 binutils.

For 64-bit, this is not strictly necessary, as the 64-bit kernel is only built as PIE if the linker supports -z noreloc-overflow, which implies binutils-2.27+, but for consistency, mark _end as hidden here too.

The below illustrates the before/after impact of the patch using binutils-2.25 and gcc-4.6.4 (locally compiled from source) and QEMU.

Disassembly before patch:

    48:   8b 86 60 02 00 00       mov    0x260(%esi),%eax
    4e:   2d 00 00 00 00          sub    $0x0,%eax
                          4f: R_386_32    _end
  Disassembly after patch:
    48:   8b 86 60 02 00 00       mov    0x260(%esi),%eax
    4e:   2d 00 f0 76 00          sub    $0x76f000,%eax
                          4f: R_386_RELATIVE      *ABS*

Dump from extract_kernel before patch:

	early console in extract_kernel
	input_data: 0x0207c098 <--- this is at output + init_size
	input_len: 0x0074fef1
	output: 0x01000000
	output_len: 0x00fa63d0
	kernel_total_size: 0x0107c000
	needed_size: 0x0107c000

Dump from extract_kernel after patch:

	early console in extract_kernel
	input_data: 0x0190d098 <--- this is at output + init_size - _end
	input_len: 0x0074fef1
	output: 0x01000000
	output_len: 0x00fa63d0
	kernel_total_size: 0x0107c000
	needed_size: 0x0107c000
Fixes 974f221c84b0 ("x86/boot: Move compressed kernel to the end of the decompression buffer")
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 5 +++--
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 1 +
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S +3 -2
index 01d628ea3402..c6c4b877f3d2 100644
@@ -49,16 +49,17 @@
  * Position Independent Executable (PIE) so that linker won't optimize
  * R_386_GOT32X relocation to its fixed symbol address.  Older
  * linkers generate R_386_32 relocations against locally defined symbols,
- * _bss, _ebss, _got and _egot, in PIE.  It isn't wrong, just less
+ * _bss, _ebss, _got, _egot and _end, in PIE.  It isn't wrong, just less
  * optimal than R_386_RELATIVE.  But the x86 kernel fails to properly handle
  * R_386_32 relocations when relocating the kernel.  To generate
- * R_386_RELATIVE relocations, we mark _bss, _ebss, _got and _egot as
+ * R_386_RELATIVE relocations, we mark _bss, _ebss, _got, _egot and _end as
  * hidden:
  */
 	.hidden _bss
 	.hidden _ebss
 	.hidden _got
 	.hidden _egot
+	.hidden _end
 
 	__HEAD
 ENTRY(startup_32)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S +1 -0
index a25127916e67..7ab1c6bcc66a 100644
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
 	.hidden _ebss
 	.hidden _got
 	.hidden _egot
+	.hidden _end
 
 	__HEAD
 	.code32
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#54 lore raw

PATCH 55/72 mips: MAAR: Use more precise address mask

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Serge Semin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bbb5946eb545fab8ad8f46bce8a803e1c0c39d47 ]

Indeed according to the MIPS32 Privileged Resource Architecgture the MAAR pair register address field either takes [12:31] bits for non-XPA systems and [12:55] otherwise. In any case the current address mask is just wrong for 64-bit and 32-bits XPA chips. So lets extend it to 59-bits of physical address value. This shall cover the 64-bits architecture and systems with XPA enabled, and won't cause any problem for non-XPA 32-bit systems, since address values exceeding the architecture specific MAAR mask will be just truncated with setting zeros in the unsupported upper bits.

---
 arch/mips/include/asm/mipsregs.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/mips/include/asm/mipsregs.h +1 -1
index a6810923b3f0..a7f9acb42034 100644
@@ -737,7 +737,7 @@
 
 /* MAAR bit definitions */
 #define MIPS_MAAR_VH		(_U64CAST_(1) << 63)
-#define MIPS_MAAR_ADDR		((BIT_ULL(BITS_PER_LONG - 12) - 1) << 12)
+#define MIPS_MAAR_ADDR		GENMASK_ULL(55, 12)
 #define MIPS_MAAR_ADDR_SHIFT	12
 #define MIPS_MAAR_S		(_ULCAST_(1) << 1)
 #define MIPS_MAAR_VL		(_ULCAST_(1) << 0)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#55 lore raw

PATCH 56/72 mips: Add udelay lpj numbers adjustment

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Serge Semin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ed26aacfb5f71eecb20a51c4467da440cb719d66 ]

Loops-per-jiffies is a special number which represents a number of noop-loop cycles per CPU-scheduler quantum - jiffies. As you understand aside from CPU-specific implementation it depends on the CPU frequency. So when a platform has the CPU frequency fixed, we have no problem and the current udelay interface will work just fine. But as soon as CPU-freq driver is enabled and the cores frequency changes, we'll end up with distorted udelay's. In order to fix this we have to accordinly adjust the per-CPU udelay_val (the same as the global loops_per_jiffy) number. This can be done in the CPU-freq transition event handler. We subscribe to that event in the MIPS arch time-inititalization method.

---
 arch/mips/kernel/time.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+)
arch/mips/kernel/time.c +70 -0
index a6ebc8135112..df18f386d457 100644
@@ -22,12 +22,82 @@
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/cpufreq.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpu-features.h>
 #include <asm/cpu-type.h>
 #include <asm/div64.h>
 #include <asm/time.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_FREQ
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, pcp_lpj_ref);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, pcp_lpj_ref_freq);
+static unsigned long glb_lpj_ref;
+static unsigned long glb_lpj_ref_freq;
+
+static int cpufreq_callback(struct notifier_block *nb,
+			    unsigned long val, void *data)
+{
+	struct cpufreq_freqs *freq = data;
+	struct cpumask *cpus = freq->policy->cpus;
+	unsigned long lpj;
+	int cpu;
+
+	/*
+	 * Skip lpj numbers adjustment if the CPU-freq transition is safe for
+	 * the loops delay. (Is this possible?)
+	 */
+	if (freq->flags & CPUFREQ_CONST_LOOPS)
+		return NOTIFY_OK;
+
+	/* Save the initial values of the lpjes for future scaling. */
+	if (!glb_lpj_ref) {
+		glb_lpj_ref = boot_cpu_data.udelay_val;
+		glb_lpj_ref_freq = freq->old;
+
+		for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+			per_cpu(pcp_lpj_ref, cpu) =
+				cpu_data[cpu].udelay_val;
+			per_cpu(pcp_lpj_ref_freq, cpu) = freq->old;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Adjust global lpj variable and per-CPU udelay_val number in
+	 * accordance with the new CPU frequency.
+	 */
+	if ((val == CPUFREQ_PRECHANGE  && freq->old < freq->new) ||
+	    (val == CPUFREQ_POSTCHANGE && freq->old > freq->new)) {
+		loops_per_jiffy = cpufreq_scale(glb_lpj_ref,
+						glb_lpj_ref_freq,
+						freq->new);
+
+		for_each_cpu(cpu, cpus) {
+			lpj = cpufreq_scale(per_cpu(pcp_lpj_ref, cpu),
+					    per_cpu(pcp_lpj_ref_freq, cpu),
+					    freq->new);
+			cpu_data[cpu].udelay_val = (unsigned int)lpj;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return NOTIFY_OK;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block cpufreq_notifier = {
+	.notifier_call  = cpufreq_callback,
+};
+
+static int __init register_cpufreq_notifier(void)
+{
+	return cpufreq_register_notifier(&cpufreq_notifier,
+					 CPUFREQ_TRANSITION_NOTIFIER);
+}
+core_initcall(register_cpufreq_notifier);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_FREQ */
+
 /*
  * forward reference
  */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#56 lore raw

PATCH 57/72 x86/mm: Stop printing BRK addresses

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Arvind Sankar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 67d631b7c05eff955ccff4139327f0f92a5117e5 ]

This currently leaks kernel physical addresses into userspace.

---
 arch/x86/mm/init.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/init.c +0 -2
index 32bb38f6fc18..8039a951db8f 100644
@@ -112,8 +112,6 @@ __ref void *alloc_low_pages(unsigned int num)
 	} else {
 		pfn = pgt_buf_end;
 		pgt_buf_end += num;
-		printk(KERN_DEBUG "BRK [%#010lx, %#010lx] PGTABLE\n",
-			pfn << PAGE_SHIFT, (pgt_buf_end << PAGE_SHIFT) - 1);
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#57 lore raw

PATCH 58/72 m68k: mac: Don't call via_flush_cache() on Mac IIfx

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Finn Thain <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bcc44f6b74106b31f0b0408b70305a40360d63b7 ]

There is no VIA2 chip on the Mac IIfx, so don't call via_flush_cache(). This avoids a boot crash which appeared in v5.4.

printk: console [ttyS0] enabled
printk: bootconsole [debug0] disabled
printk: bootconsole [debug0] disabled
Calibrating delay loop... 9.61 BogoMIPS (lpj=48064)
pid_max: default: 32768 minimum: 301
Mount-cache hash table entries: 1024 (order: 0, 4096 bytes, linear) Mountpoint-cache hash table entries: 1024 (order: 0, 4096 bytes, linear)
devtmpfs: initialized
random: get_random_u32 called from bucket_table_alloc.isra.27+0x68/0x194 with crng_init=0
clocksource: jiffies: mask: 0xffffffff max_cycles: 0xffffffff, max_idle_ns: 19112604462750000 ns futex hash table entries: 256 (order: -1, 3072 bytes, linear)
NET: Registered protocol family 16
Data read fault at 0x00000000 in Super Data (pc=0x8a6a)
BAD KERNEL BUSERR

Oops: 00000000
Modules linked in:
PC: [<00008a6a>] via_flush_cache+0x12/0x2c
SR: 2700  SP: 01c1fe3c  a2: 01c24000
d0: 00001119    d1: 0000000c    d2: 00012000    d3: 0000000f
d4: 01c06840    d5: 00033b92    a0: 00000000    a1: 00000000

Process swapper (pid: 1, task=01c24000)
Frame format=B ssw=0755 isc=0200 isb=fff7 daddr=00000000 dobuf=01c1fed0 baddr=00008a6e dibuf=0000004e ver=f
Stack from 01c1fec4:

        01c1fed0 00007d7e 00010080 01c1fedc 0000792e 00000001 01c1fef4 00006b40
        01c80000 00040000 00000006 00000003 01c1ff1c 004a545e 004ff200 00040000
        00000000 00000003 01c06840 00033b92 004a5410 004b6c88 01c1ff84 000021e2
        00000073 00000003 01c06840 00033b92 0038507a 004bb094 004b6ca8 004b6c88
        004b6ca4 004b6c88 000021ae 00020002 00000000 01c0685d 00000000 01c1ffb4
        0049f938 00409c85 01c06840 0045bd40 00000073 00000002 00000002 00000000
Call Trace: [<00007d7e>] mac_cache_card_flush+0x12/0x1c
 [<00010080>] fix_dnrm+0x2/0x18
 [<0000792e>] cache_push+0x46/0x5a
 [<00006b40>] arch_dma_prep_coherent+0x60/0x6e
 [<00040000>] switched_to_dl+0x76/0xd0
 [<004a545e>] dma_atomic_pool_init+0x4e/0x188
 [<00040000>] switched_to_dl+0x76/0xd0
 [<00033b92>] parse_args+0x0/0x370
 [<004a5410>] dma_atomic_pool_init+0x0/0x188
 [<000021e2>] do_one_initcall+0x34/0x1be
 [<00033b92>] parse_args+0x0/0x370
 [<0038507a>] strcpy+0x0/0x1e
 [<000021ae>] do_one_initcall+0x0/0x1be
 [<00020002>] do_proc_dointvec_conv+0x54/0x74
 [<0049f938>] kernel_init_freeable+0x126/0x190
 [<0049f94c>] kernel_init_freeable+0x13a/0x190
 [<004a5410>] dma_atomic_pool_init+0x0/0x188
 [<00041798>] complete+0x0/0x3c
 [<000b9b0c>] kfree+0x0/0x20a
 [<0038df98>] schedule+0x0/0xd0
 [<0038d604>] kernel_init+0x0/0xda
 [<0038d610>] kernel_init+0xc/0xda
 [<0038d604>] kernel_init+0x0/0xda
 [<00002d38>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0xc/0x14
Code: 0000 2079 0048 10da 2279 0048 10c8 d3c8 <1011> 0200 fff7 1280 d1f9 0048 10c8 1010 0000 0008 1080 4e5e 4e75 4e56 0000 2039
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b

Thanks to Stan Johnson for capturing the console log and running git bisect.

Git bisect said commit 8e3a68fb55e0 ("dma-mapping: make dma_atomic_pool_init self-contained") is the first "bad" commit. I don't know why. Perhaps mach_l2_flush first became reachable with that commit.

---
 arch/m68k/include/asm/mac_via.h |  1 +
 arch/m68k/mac/config.c          | 21 ++-------------------
 arch/m68k/mac/via.c             |  6 +++++-
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
arch/m68k/include/asm/mac_via.h +1 -0
index de1470c4d829..1149251ea58d 100644
@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ extern int rbv_present,via_alt_mapping;
 
 struct irq_desc;
 
+extern void via_l2_flush(int writeback);
 extern void via_register_interrupts(void);
 extern void via_irq_enable(int);
 extern void via_irq_disable(int);
arch/m68k/mac/config.c +2 -19
index 2004b3f72d80..3ea7450c51f2 100644
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ extern void iop_preinit(void);
 extern void iop_init(void);
 extern void via_init(void);
 extern void via_init_clock(irq_handler_t func);
-extern void via_flush_cache(void);
 extern void oss_init(void);
 extern void psc_init(void);
 extern void baboon_init(void);
@@ -132,21 +131,6 @@ int __init mac_parse_bootinfo(const struct bi_record *record)
 	return unknown;
 }
 
-/*
- * Flip into 24bit mode for an instant - flushes the L2 cache card. We
- * have to disable interrupts for this. Our IRQ handlers will crap
- * themselves if they take an IRQ in 24bit mode!
- */
-
-static void mac_cache_card_flush(int writeback)
-{
-	unsigned long flags;
-
-	local_irq_save(flags);
-	via_flush_cache();
-	local_irq_restore(flags);
-}
-
 void __init config_mac(void)
 {
 	if (!MACH_IS_MAC)
@@ -179,9 +163,8 @@ void __init config_mac(void)
 	 * not.
 	 */
 
-	if (macintosh_config->ident == MAC_MODEL_IICI
-	    || macintosh_config->ident == MAC_MODEL_IIFX)
-		mach_l2_flush = mac_cache_card_flush;
+	if (macintosh_config->ident == MAC_MODEL_IICI)
+		mach_l2_flush = via_l2_flush;
 }
 
 
arch/m68k/mac/via.c +5 -1
index 863806e6775a..6ab6a1d54b37 100644
@@ -300,10 +300,14 @@ void via_debug_dump(void)
  * the system into 24-bit mode for an instant.
  */
 
-void via_flush_cache(void)
+void via_l2_flush(int writeback)
 {
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	local_irq_save(flags);
 	via2[gBufB] &= ~VIA2B_vMode32;
 	via2[gBufB] |= VIA2B_vMode32;
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#58 lore raw

PATCH 59/72 macvlan: Skip loopback packets in RX handler

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 81f3dc9349ce0bf7b8447f147f45e70f0a5b36a6 ]

Ignore loopback-originatig packets soon enough and don't try to process L2 header where it doesn't exist. The very similar br_handle_frame() in bridge code performs exactly the same check.

This is an example of such ICMPv6 packet:

skb len=96 headroom=40 headlen=96 tailroom=56 mac=(40,0) net=(40,40) trans=80
shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=0 gso(size=0 type=0 segs=0)) csum(0xae2e9a2f ip_summed=1 complete_sw=0 valid=0 level=0) hash(0xc97ebd88 sw=1 l4=1) proto=0x86dd pkttype=5 iif=24 dev name=etha01.212 feat=0x0x0000000040005000

skb headroom: 00000000: 00 7c 86 52 84 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00
skb headroom: 00000010: 45 00 00 9e 5d 5c 40 00 40 11 33 33 00 00 00 01
skb headroom: 00000020: 02 40 43 80 00 00 86 dd
skb linear:   00000000: 60 09 88 bd 00 38 3a ff fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00
skb linear:   00000010: 00 40 43 ff fe 80 00 00 ff 02 00 00 00 00 00 00
skb linear:   00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 86 00 61 00 40 00 00 2d
skb linear:   00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 04 40 e0 00 00 01 2c
skb linear:   00000040: 00 00 00 78 00 00 00 00 fd 5f 42 68 23 87 a8 81
skb linear:   00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 01 02 40 43 80 00 00
skb tailroom: 00000000: ...
skb tailroom: 00000010: ...
skb tailroom: 00000020: ...
skb tailroom: 00000030: ...

Call Trace, how it happens exactly:
...

 macvlan_handle_frame+0x321/0x425 [macvlan]
 ? macvlan_forward_source+0x110/0x110 [macvlan]
 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x545/0xda0
 ? enqueue_task_fair+0xe5/0x8e0
 ? __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x36/0x70
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x36/0x70
 process_backlog+0x97/0x140
 net_rx_action+0x1eb/0x350
 ? __hrtimer_run_queues+0x136/0x2e0
 __do_softirq+0xe3/0x383
 do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40
 </IRQ>
 do_softirq.part.4+0x4e/0x50
 netif_rx_ni+0x60/0xd0
 dev_loopback_xmit+0x83/0xf0
 ip6_finish_output2+0x575/0x590 [ipv6]
 ? ip6_cork_release.isra.1+0x64/0x90 [ipv6]
 ? __ip6_make_skb+0x38d/0x680 [ipv6]
 ? ip6_output+0x6c/0x140 [ipv6]
 ip6_output+0x6c/0x140 [ipv6]
 ip6_send_skb+0x1e/0x60 [ipv6]
 rawv6_sendmsg+0xc4b/0xe10 [ipv6]
 ? proc_put_long+0xd0/0xd0
 ? rw_copy_check_uvector+0x4e/0x110
 ? sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40
 sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x2b6/0x2d0
 ? proc_dointvec+0x23/0x30
 ? addrconf_sysctl_forward+0x8d/0x250 [ipv6]
 ? dev_forward_change+0x130/0x130 [ipv6]
 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x12/0x30
 ? proc_sys_call_handler.isra.14+0x9f/0x110
 ? __call_rcu+0x213/0x510
 ? get_max_files+0x10/0x10
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2c/0xe0
 ? __sys_sendmsg+0x63/0xa0
 __sys_sendmsg+0x63/0xa0
 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x1e0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
---
 drivers/net/macvlan.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/net/macvlan.c +4 -0
index 3072fc902eca..b7f41c52766f 100644
@@ -449,6 +449,10 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macvlan_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb)
 	int ret;
 	rx_handler_result_t handle_res;
 
+	/* Packets from dev_loopback_xmit() do not have L2 header, bail out */
+	if (unlikely(skb->pkt_type == PACKET_LOOPBACK))
+		return RX_HANDLER_PASS;
+
 	port = macvlan_port_get_rcu(skb->dev);
 	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(eth->h_dest)) {
 		unsigned int hash;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#59 lore raw

PATCH 60/72 PCI: Don't disable decoding when mmio_always_on is set

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jiaxun Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b6caa1d8c80cb71b6162cb1f1ec13aa655026c9f ]

Don't disable MEM/IO decoding when a device have both non_compliant_bars and mmio_always_on.

That would allow us quirk devices with junk in BARs but can't disable their decoding.

---
 drivers/pci/probe.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pci/probe.c +1 -1
index e23bfd9845b1..92c3abe0b2b9 100644
@@ -1446,7 +1446,7 @@ int pci_setup_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
 	/* device class may be changed after fixup */
 	class = dev->class >> 8;
 
-	if (dev->non_compliant_bars) {
+	if (dev->non_compliant_bars && !dev->mmio_always_on) {
 		pci_read_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, &cmd);
 		if (cmd & (PCI_COMMAND_IO | PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY)) {
 			dev_info(&dev->dev, "device has non-compliant BARs; disabling IO/MEM decoding\n");
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#60 lore raw

PATCH 61/72 MIPS: Fix IRQ tracing when call handle_fpe() and handle_msa_fpe()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: YuanJunQing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 31e1b3efa802f97a17628dde280006c4cee4ce5e ]

Register "a1" is unsaved in this function,
when CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS is enabled,
the TRACE_IRQS_OFF macro will call trace_hardirqs_off(), and this may change register "a1".
The changed register "a1" as argument will be send to do_fpe() and do_msa_fpe().

---
 arch/mips/kernel/genex.S | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/mips/kernel/genex.S +3 -3
index 37b9383eacd3..cf74a963839f 100644
@@ -431,20 +431,20 @@ NESTED(nmi_handler, PT_SIZE, sp)
 	.endm
 
 	.macro	__build_clear_fpe
+	CLI
+	TRACE_IRQS_OFF
 	.set	push
 	/* gas fails to assemble cfc1 for some archs (octeon).*/ \
 	.set	mips1
 	SET_HARDFLOAT
 	cfc1	a1, fcr31
 	.set	pop
-	CLI
-	TRACE_IRQS_OFF
 	.endm
 
 	.macro	__build_clear_msa_fpe
-	_cfcmsa	a1, MSA_CSR
 	CLI
 	TRACE_IRQS_OFF
+	_cfcmsa	a1, MSA_CSR
 	.endm
 
 	.macro	__build_clear_ade
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#61 lore raw

PATCH 62/72 xfs: gut error handling in xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dc3ffbb14060c943469d5e12900db3a60bc3fa64 ]

xfs: gut error handling in xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb()

From: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>

The error handling in xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb() is largely incorrect - rolling back the changes in the transaction if only one counter underruns makes all the other counters incorrect. We still allow the change to proceed and committing the transaction, except now we have multiple incorrect counters instead of a single underflow.

Further, we don't actually report the error to the caller, so this is completely silent except on debug kernels that will assert on failure before we even get to the rollback code. Hence this error handling is broken, untested, and largely unnecessary complexity.

Just remove it.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c | 163 ++++++---------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 143 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c +20 -143
index a87f657f59c9..cad4b04e31a7 100644
@@ -493,57 +493,9 @@ xfs_trans_apply_sb_deltas(
 				  sizeof(sbp->sb_frextents) - 1);
 }
 
-STATIC int
-xfs_sb_mod8(
-	uint8_t			*field,
-	int8_t			delta)
-{
-	int8_t			counter = *field;
-
-	counter += delta;
-	if (counter < 0) {
-		ASSERT(0);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	*field = counter;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-STATIC int
-xfs_sb_mod32(
-	uint32_t		*field,
-	int32_t			delta)
-{
-	int32_t			counter = *field;
-
-	counter += delta;
-	if (counter < 0) {
-		ASSERT(0);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	*field = counter;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-STATIC int
-xfs_sb_mod64(
-	uint64_t		*field,
-	int64_t			delta)
-{
-	int64_t			counter = *field;
-
-	counter += delta;
-	if (counter < 0) {
-		ASSERT(0);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	*field = counter;
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /*
- * xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb() is called to release unused reservations
- * and apply superblock counter changes to the in-core superblock.  The
+ * xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb() is called to release unused reservations and
+ * apply superblock counter changes to the in-core superblock.  The
  * t_res_fdblocks_delta and t_res_frextents_delta fields are explicitly NOT
  * applied to the in-core superblock.  The idea is that that has already been
  * done.
@@ -588,20 +540,17 @@ xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb(
 	/* apply the per-cpu counters */
 	if (blkdelta) {
 		error = xfs_mod_fdblocks(mp, blkdelta, rsvd);
-		if (error)
-			goto out;
+		ASSERT(!error);
 	}
 
 	if (idelta) {
 		error = xfs_mod_icount(mp, idelta);
-		if (error)
-			goto out_undo_fdblocks;
+		ASSERT(!error);
 	}
 
 	if (ifreedelta) {
 		error = xfs_mod_ifree(mp, ifreedelta);
-		if (error)
-			goto out_undo_icount;
+		ASSERT(!error);
 	}
 
 	if (rtxdelta == 0 && !(tp->t_flags & XFS_TRANS_SB_DIRTY))
@@ -609,95 +558,23 @@ xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb(
 
 	/* apply remaining deltas */
 	spin_lock(&mp->m_sb_lock);
-	if (rtxdelta) {
-		error = xfs_sb_mod64(&mp->m_sb.sb_frextents, rtxdelta);
-		if (error)
-			goto out_undo_ifree;
-	}
-
-	if (tp->t_dblocks_delta != 0) {
-		error = xfs_sb_mod64(&mp->m_sb.sb_dblocks, tp->t_dblocks_delta);
-		if (error)
-			goto out_undo_frextents;
-	}
-	if (tp->t_agcount_delta != 0) {
-		error = xfs_sb_mod32(&mp->m_sb.sb_agcount, tp->t_agcount_delta);
-		if (error)
-			goto out_undo_dblocks;
-	}
-	if (tp->t_imaxpct_delta != 0) {
-		error = xfs_sb_mod8(&mp->m_sb.sb_imax_pct, tp->t_imaxpct_delta);
-		if (error)
-			goto out_undo_agcount;
-	}
-	if (tp->t_rextsize_delta != 0) {
-		error = xfs_sb_mod32(&mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize,
-				     tp->t_rextsize_delta);
-		if (error)
-			goto out_undo_imaxpct;
-	}
-	if (tp->t_rbmblocks_delta != 0) {
-		error = xfs_sb_mod32(&mp->m_sb.sb_rbmblocks,
-				     tp->t_rbmblocks_delta);
-		if (error)
-			goto out_undo_rextsize;
-	}
-	if (tp->t_rblocks_delta != 0) {
-		error = xfs_sb_mod64(&mp->m_sb.sb_rblocks, tp->t_rblocks_delta);
-		if (error)
-			goto out_undo_rbmblocks;
-	}
-	if (tp->t_rextents_delta != 0) {
-		error = xfs_sb_mod64(&mp->m_sb.sb_rextents,
-				     tp->t_rextents_delta);
-		if (error)
-			goto out_undo_rblocks;
-	}
-	if (tp->t_rextslog_delta != 0) {
-		error = xfs_sb_mod8(&mp->m_sb.sb_rextslog,
-				     tp->t_rextslog_delta);
-		if (error)
-			goto out_undo_rextents;
-	}
+	mp->m_sb.sb_frextents += rtxdelta;
+	mp->m_sb.sb_dblocks += tp->t_dblocks_delta;
+	mp->m_sb.sb_agcount += tp->t_agcount_delta;
+	mp->m_sb.sb_imax_pct += tp->t_imaxpct_delta;
+	mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize += tp->t_rextsize_delta;
+	mp->m_sb.sb_rbmblocks += tp->t_rbmblocks_delta;
+	mp->m_sb.sb_rblocks += tp->t_rblocks_delta;
+	mp->m_sb.sb_rextents += tp->t_rextents_delta;
+	mp->m_sb.sb_rextslog += tp->t_rextslog_delta;
 	spin_unlock(&mp->m_sb_lock);
-	return;
 
-out_undo_rextents:
-	if (tp->t_rextents_delta)
-		xfs_sb_mod64(&mp->m_sb.sb_rextents, -tp->t_rextents_delta);
-out_undo_rblocks:
-	if (tp->t_rblocks_delta)
-		xfs_sb_mod64(&mp->m_sb.sb_rblocks, -tp->t_rblocks_delta);
-out_undo_rbmblocks:
-	if (tp->t_rbmblocks_delta)
-		xfs_sb_mod32(&mp->m_sb.sb_rbmblocks, -tp->t_rbmblocks_delta);
-out_undo_rextsize:
-	if (tp->t_rextsize_delta)
-		xfs_sb_mod32(&mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize, -tp->t_rextsize_delta);
-out_undo_imaxpct:
-	if (tp->t_rextsize_delta)
-		xfs_sb_mod8(&mp->m_sb.sb_imax_pct, -tp->t_imaxpct_delta);
-out_undo_agcount:
-	if (tp->t_agcount_delta)
-		xfs_sb_mod32(&mp->m_sb.sb_agcount, -tp->t_agcount_delta);
-out_undo_dblocks:
-	if (tp->t_dblocks_delta)
-		xfs_sb_mod64(&mp->m_sb.sb_dblocks, -tp->t_dblocks_delta);
-out_undo_frextents:
-	if (rtxdelta)
-		xfs_sb_mod64(&mp->m_sb.sb_frextents, -rtxdelta);
-out_undo_ifree:
-	spin_unlock(&mp->m_sb_lock);
-	if (ifreedelta)
-		xfs_mod_ifree(mp, -ifreedelta);
-out_undo_icount:
-	if (idelta)
-		xfs_mod_icount(mp, -idelta);
-out_undo_fdblocks:
-	if (blkdelta)
-		xfs_mod_fdblocks(mp, -blkdelta, rsvd);
-out:
-	ASSERT(error == 0);
+	/*
+	 * Debug checks outside of the spinlock so they don't lock up the
+	 * machine if they fail.
+	 */
+	ASSERT(mp->m_sb.sb_imax_pct >= 0);
+	ASSERT(mp->m_sb.sb_rextslog >= 0);
 	return;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#62 lore raw

PATCH 63/72 mmc: sdhci-msm: Set SDHCI_QUIRK_MULTIBLOCK_READ_ACMD12 quirk

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Veerabhadrarao Badiganti <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d863cb03fb2aac07f017b2a1d923cdbc35021280 ]

sdhci-msm can support auto cmd12.
So enable SDHCI_QUIRK_MULTIBLOCK_READ_ACMD12 quirk.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-msm.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-msm.c +3 -1
index 192844b50c69..661052f450fb 100644
@@ -1162,7 +1162,9 @@ static const struct sdhci_pltfm_data sdhci_msm_pdata = {
 	.quirks = SDHCI_QUIRK_BROKEN_CARD_DETECTION |
 		  SDHCI_QUIRK_NO_CARD_NO_RESET |
 		  SDHCI_QUIRK_SINGLE_POWER_WRITE |
-		  SDHCI_QUIRK_CAP_CLOCK_BASE_BROKEN,
+		  SDHCI_QUIRK_CAP_CLOCK_BASE_BROKEN |
+		  SDHCI_QUIRK_MULTIBLOCK_READ_ACMD12,
+
 	.quirks2 = SDHCI_QUIRK2_PRESET_VALUE_BROKEN,
 	.ops = &sdhci_msm_ops,
 };
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#63 lore raw

PATCH 64/72 staging: greybus: sdio: Respect the cmd->busy_timeout from the mmc core

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a389087ee9f195fcf2f31cd771e9ec5f02c16650 ]

Using a fixed 1s timeout for all commands is a bit problematic.

For some commands it means waiting longer than needed for the timeout to expire, which may not a big issue, but still. For other commands, like for an erase (CMD38) that uses a R1B response, may require longer timeouts than 1s. In these cases, we may end up treating the command as it failed, while it just needed some more time to complete successfully.

Fix the problem by respecting the cmd->busy_timeout, which is provided by the mmc core.

---
 drivers/staging/greybus/sdio.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/greybus/sdio.c +7 -3
index 101ca5097fc9..93e2c091c565 100644
@@ -412,6 +412,7 @@ static int gb_sdio_command(struct gb_sdio_host *host, struct mmc_command *cmd)
 	struct gb_sdio_command_request request = {0};
 	struct gb_sdio_command_response response;
 	struct mmc_data *data = host->mrq->data;
+	unsigned int timeout_ms;
 	u8 cmd_flags;
 	u8 cmd_type;
 	int i;
@@ -470,9 +471,12 @@ static int gb_sdio_command(struct gb_sdio_host *host, struct mmc_command *cmd)
 		request.data_blksz = cpu_to_le16(data->blksz);
 	}
 
-	ret = gb_operation_sync(host->connection, GB_SDIO_TYPE_COMMAND,
-				&request, sizeof(request), &response,
-				sizeof(response));
+	timeout_ms = cmd->busy_timeout ? cmd->busy_timeout :
+		GB_OPERATION_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
+
+	ret = gb_operation_sync_timeout(host->connection, GB_SDIO_TYPE_COMMAND,
+					&request, sizeof(request), &response,
+					sizeof(response), timeout_ms);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#64 lore raw

PATCH 65/72 mmc: via-sdmmc: Respect the cmd->busy_timeout from the mmc core

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 966244ccd2919e28f25555a77f204cd1c109cad8 ]

Using a fixed 1s timeout for all commands (and data transfers) is a bit problematic.

For some commands it means waiting longer than needed for the timer to expire, which may not a big issue, but still. For other commands, like for an erase (CMD38) that uses a R1B response, may require longer timeouts than 1s. In these cases, we may end up treating the command as it failed, while it just needed some more time to complete successfully.

Fix the problem by respecting the cmd->busy_timeout, which is provided by the mmc core.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/via-sdmmc.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/host/via-sdmmc.c +6 -1
index a838bf5480d8..a863a345fc59 100644
@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ struct via_crdr_mmc_host {
 /* some devices need a very long delay for power to stabilize */
 #define VIA_CRDR_QUIRK_300MS_PWRDELAY	0x0001
 
+#define VIA_CMD_TIMEOUT_MS		1000
+
 static const struct pci_device_id via_ids[] = {
 	{PCI_VENDOR_ID_VIA, PCI_DEVICE_ID_VIA_9530,
 	  PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0,},
@@ -555,14 +557,17 @@ static void via_sdc_send_command(struct via_crdr_mmc_host *host,
 {
 	void __iomem *addrbase;
 	struct mmc_data *data;
+	unsigned int timeout_ms;
 	u32 cmdctrl = 0;
 
 	WARN_ON(host->cmd);
 
 	data = cmd->data;
-	mod_timer(&host->timer, jiffies + HZ);
 	host->cmd = cmd;
 
+	timeout_ms = cmd->busy_timeout ? cmd->busy_timeout : VIA_CMD_TIMEOUT_MS;
+	mod_timer(&host->timer, jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(timeout_ms));
+
 	/*Command index*/
 	cmdctrl = cmd->opcode << 8;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#65 lore raw

PATCH 66/72 ixgbe: fix signed-integer-overflow warning

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3b70683fc4d68f5d915d9dc7e5ba72c732c7315c ]

ubsan report this warning, fix it by adding a unsigned suffix.

UBSAN: signed-integer-overflow in
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_common.c:2246:26
65535 * 65537 cannot be represented in type 'int'
CPU: 21 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u256:0 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc3-debug+ #39
Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDC, BIOS 2280-V2 03/27/2020
Workqueue: ixgbe ixgbe_service_task [ixgbe]
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3f0
 show_stack+0x28/0x38
 dump_stack+0x154/0x1e4
 ubsan_epilogue+0x18/0x60
 handle_overflow+0xf8/0x148
 __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow+0x34/0x48
 ixgbe_fc_enable_generic+0x4d0/0x590 [ixgbe]
 ixgbe_service_task+0xc20/0x1f78 [ixgbe]
 process_one_work+0x8f0/0xf18
 worker_thread+0x430/0x6d0
 kthread+0x218/0x238
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_common.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_common.c +1 -1
index 815284fe9324..6b5662674c75 100644
@@ -2267,7 +2267,7 @@ s32 ixgbe_fc_enable_generic(struct ixgbe_hw *hw)
 	}
 
 	/* Configure pause time (2 TCs per register) */
-	reg = hw->fc.pause_time * 0x00010001;
+	reg = hw->fc.pause_time * 0x00010001U;
 	for (i = 0; i < (MAX_TRAFFIC_CLASS / 2); i++)
 		IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_FCTTV(i), reg);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#66 lore raw

PATCH 67/72 mmc: sdhci-esdhc-imx: fix the mask for tuning start point

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Haibo Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1194be8c949b8190b2882ad8335a5d98aa50c735 ]

According the RM, the bit[6~0] of register ESDHC_TUNING_CTRL is TUNING_START_TAP, bit[7] of this register is to disable the command CRC check for standard tuning. So fix it here.

Fixes d87fc9663688 ("mmc: sdhci-esdhc-imx: support setting tuning start point")
---
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-esdhc-imx.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-esdhc-imx.c +1 -1
index 8c0b80a54e4d..6d1ac9443eb2 100644
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
 #define ESDHC_STD_TUNING_EN		(1 << 24)
 /* NOTE: the minimum valid tuning start tap for mx6sl is 1 */
 #define ESDHC_TUNING_START_TAP_DEFAULT	0x1
-#define ESDHC_TUNING_START_TAP_MASK	0xff
+#define ESDHC_TUNING_START_TAP_MASK	0x7f
 #define ESDHC_TUNING_STEP_MASK		0x00070000
 #define ESDHC_TUNING_STEP_SHIFT		16
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#67 lore raw

PATCH 68/72 spi: dw: Return any value retrieved from the dma_transfer callback

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Serge Semin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f0410bbf7d0fb80149e3b17d11d31f5b5197873e ]

DW APB SSI DMA-part of the driver may need to perform the requested SPI-transfer synchronously. In that case the dma_transfer() callback will return 0 as a marker of the SPI transfer being finished so the SPI core doesn't need to wait and may proceed with the SPI message trasnfers pumping procedure. This will be needed to fix the problem when DMA transactions are finished, but there is still data left in the SPI Tx/Rx FIFOs being sent/received. But for now make dma_transfer to return 1 as the normal dw_spi_transfer_one() method.

---
 drivers/spi/spi-dw-mid.c | 2 +-
 drivers/spi/spi-dw.c     | 7 ++-----
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/spi/spi-dw-mid.c +1 -1
index c4244d2f1ee3..cb268cc4ba2b 100644
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static int mid_spi_dma_transfer(struct dw_spi *dws, struct spi_transfer *xfer)
 		dma_async_issue_pending(dws->txchan);
 	}
 
-	return 0;
+	return 1;
 }
 
 static void mid_spi_dma_stop(struct dw_spi *dws)
drivers/spi/spi-dw.c +2 -5
index 26ed3b4233a2..9d0f655a65c6 100644
@@ -381,11 +381,8 @@ static int dw_spi_transfer_one(struct spi_master *master,
 
 	spi_enable_chip(dws, 1);
 
-	if (dws->dma_mapped) {
-		ret = dws->dma_ops->dma_transfer(dws, transfer);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return ret;
-	}
+	if (dws->dma_mapped)
+		return dws->dma_ops->dma_transfer(dws, transfer);
 
 	if (chip->poll_mode)
 		return poll_transfer(dws);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#68 lore raw

PATCH 69/72 cpuidle: Fix three reference count leaks

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qiushi Wu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c343bf1ba5efcbf2266a1fe3baefec9cc82f867f ]

kobject_init_and_add() takes reference even when it fails. If this function returns an error, kobject_put() must be called to properly clean up the memory associated with the object.

Previous commit "b8eb718348b8" fixed a similar problem.

---
 drivers/cpuidle/sysfs.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/cpuidle/sysfs.c +3 -3
index ae948b1da93a..909bd2255978 100644
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static int cpuidle_add_state_sysfs(struct cpuidle_device *device)
 		ret = kobject_init_and_add(&kobj->kobj, &ktype_state_cpuidle,
 					   &kdev->kobj, "state%d", i);
 		if (ret) {
-			kfree(kobj);
+			kobject_put(&kobj->kobj);
 			goto error_state;
 		}
 		kobject_uevent(&kobj->kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ static int cpuidle_add_driver_sysfs(struct cpuidle_device *dev)
 	ret = kobject_init_and_add(&kdrv->kobj, &ktype_driver_cpuidle,
 				   &kdev->kobj, "driver");
 	if (ret) {
-		kfree(kdrv);
+		kobject_put(&kdrv->kobj);
 		return ret;
 	}
 
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ int cpuidle_add_sysfs(struct cpuidle_device *dev)
 	error = kobject_init_and_add(&kdev->kobj, &ktype_cpuidle, &cpu_dev->kobj,
 				   "cpuidle");
 	if (error) {
-		kfree(kdev);
+		kobject_put(&kdev->kobj);
 		return error;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#69 lore raw

PATCH 70/72 platform/x86: hp-wmi: Convert simple_strtoul() to kstrtou32()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5cdc45ed3948042f0d73c6fec5ee9b59e637d0d2 ]

First of all, unsigned long can overflow u32 value on 64-bit machine. Second, simple_strtoul() doesn't check for overflow in the input.

Convert simple_strtoul() to kstrtou32() to eliminate above issues.

---
 drivers/platform/x86/hp-wmi.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/platform/x86/hp-wmi.c +8 -2
index 06a3c1ef8eee..952544ca0d84 100644
@@ -474,8 +474,14 @@ static ssize_t postcode_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 static ssize_t als_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			 const char *buf, size_t count)
 {
-	u32 tmp = simple_strtoul(buf, NULL, 10);
-	int ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_ALS_QUERY, HPWMI_WRITE, &tmp,
+	u32 tmp;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = kstrtou32(buf, 10, &tmp);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = hp_wmi_perform_query(HPWMI_ALS_QUERY, HPWMI_WRITE, &tmp,
 				       sizeof(tmp), sizeof(tmp));
 	if (ret)
 		return ret < 0 ? ret : -EINVAL;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#70 lore raw

PATCH 71/72 vxlan: Avoid infinite loop when suppressing NS messages with invalid options

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8066e6b449e050675df48e7c4b16c29f00507ff0 ]

When proxy mode is enabled the vxlan device might reply to Neighbor Solicitation (NS) messages on behalf of remote hosts.

In case the NS message includes the "Source link-layer address" option [1], the vxlan device will use the specified address as the link-layer destination address in its reply.

To avoid an infinite loop, break out of the options parsing loop when encountering an option with length zero and disregard the NS message.

This is consistent with the IPv6 ndisc code and RFC 4886 which states that "Nodes MUST silently discard an ND packet that contains an option with length zero" [2].

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4861#section-4.3
[2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4861#section-4.6

Fixes 4b29dba9c085 ("vxlan: fix nonfunctional neigh_reduce()")
---
 drivers/net/vxlan.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/net/vxlan.c +4 -0
index 9bca97d5f063..afdc2c290fd0 100644
@@ -1610,6 +1610,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *vxlan_na_create(struct sk_buff *request,
 	ns_olen = request->len - skb_network_offset(request) -
 		sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) - sizeof(*ns);
 	for (i = 0; i < ns_olen-1; i += (ns->opt[i+1]<<3)) {
+		if (!ns->opt[i + 1]) {
+			kfree_skb(reply);
+			return NULL;
+		}
 		if (ns->opt[i] == ND_OPT_SOURCE_LL_ADDR) {
 			daddr = ns->opt + i + sizeof(struct nd_opt_hdr);
 			break;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#71 lore raw

PATCH 72/72 string.h: fix incompatibility between FORTIFY_SOURCE and KASAN

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 47227d27e2fcb01a9e8f5958d8997cf47a820afc ]

The memcmp KASAN self-test fails on a kernel with both KASAN and FORTIFY_SOURCE.

When FORTIFY_SOURCE is on, a number of functions are replaced with fortified versions, which attempt to check the sizes of the operands. However, these functions often directly invoke __builtin_foo() once they have performed the fortify check. Using __builtins may bypass KASAN checks if the compiler decides to inline it's own implementation as sequence of instructions, rather than emit a function call that goes out to a KASAN-instrumented implementation.

Why is only memcmp affected?
============================

Of the string and string-like functions that kasan_test tests, only memcmp is replaced by an inline sequence of instructions in my testing on x86 with gcc version 9.2.1 20191008 (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2).

I believe this is due to compiler heuristics. For example, if I annotate kmalloc calls with the alloc_size annotation (and disable some fortify compile-time checking!), the compiler will replace every memset except the one in kmalloc_uaf_memset with inline instructions. (I have some WIP patches to add this annotation.)

Does this affect other functions in string.h?
=============================================

Yes. Anything that uses __builtin_* rather than __real_* could be affected. This looks like:

- strncpy
- strcat
- strlen
- strlcpy maybe, under some circumstances?
- strncat under some circumstances
- memset
- memcpy
- memmove
- memcmp (as noted)
- memchr
- strcpy

Whether a function call is emitted always depends on the compiler. Most bugs should get caught by FORTIFY_SOURCE, but the missed memcmp test shows that this is not always the case.

Isn't FORTIFY_SOURCE disabled with KASAN?
========================================-

The string headers on all arches supporting KASAN disable fortify with kasan, but only when address sanitisation is _also_ disabled. For example from x86:

#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && !defined(__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__) /*
* For files that are not instrumented (e.g. mm/slub.c) we
* should use not instrumented version of mem* functions. */
#define memcpy(dst, src, len) __memcpy(dst, src, len) #define memmove(dst, src, len) __memmove(dst, src, len) #define memset(s, c, n) __memset(s, c, n)

#ifndef __NO_FORTIFY
#define __NO_FORTIFY /* FORTIFY_SOURCE uses __builtin_memcpy, etc. */ #endif

#endif

This comes from commit 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions"), and doesn't work when KASAN is enabled and the file is supposed to be sanitised - as with test_kasan.c

I'm pretty sure this is not wrong, but not as expansive it should be:

* we shouldn't use __builtin_memcpy etc in files where we don't have instrumentation - it could devolve into a function call to memcpy, which will be instrumented. Rather, we should use __memcpy which by convention is not instrumented.

* we also shouldn't be using __builtin_memcpy when we have a KASAN instrumented file, because it could be replaced with inline asm that will not be instrumented.

What is correct behaviour?
==========================

Firstly, there is some overlap between fortification and KASAN: both provide some level of _runtime_ checking. Only fortify provides compile-time checking.

KASAN and fortify can pick up different things at runtime:

- Some fortify functions, notably the string functions, could easily be modified to consider sub-object sizes (e.g. members within a struct), and I have some WIP patches to do this. KASAN cannot detect these because it cannot insert poision between members of a struct.

- KASAN can detect many over-reads/over-writes when the sizes of both operands are unknown, which fortify cannot.

So there are a couple of options:

1) Flip the test: disable fortify in santised files and enable it in unsanitised files. This at least stops us missing KASAN checking, but we lose the fortify checking.

2) Make the fortify code always call out to real versions. Do this only for KASAN, for fear of losing the inlining opportunities we get from __builtin_*.

(We can't use kasan_check_{read,write}: because the fortify functions are _extern inline_, you can't include _static_ inline functions without a compiler warning. kasan_check_{read,write} are static inline so we can't use them even when they would otherwise be suitable.)

Take approach 2 and call out to real versions when KASAN is enabled.

Use __underlying_foo to distinguish from __real_foo: __real_foo always refers to the kernel's implementation of foo, __underlying_foo could be either the kernel implementation or the __builtin_foo implementation.

This is sometimes enough to make the memcmp test succeed with FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled. It is at least enough to get the function call into the module. One more fix is needed to make it reliable: see the next patch.

Fixes 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions")
Cc Daniel Micay <[email protected]>
Cc Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>
Cc Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
---
 include/linux/string.h | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
include/linux/string.h +48 -12
index 3d43329c20be..315fef3aff4e 100644
@@ -238,6 +238,31 @@ void __read_overflow3(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of ob
 void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter");
 
 #if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+extern void *__underlying_memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memchr);
+extern int __underlying_memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcmp);
+extern void *__underlying_memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcpy);
+extern void *__underlying_memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memmove);
+extern void *__underlying_memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memset);
+extern char *__underlying_strcat(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcat);
+extern char *__underlying_strcpy(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcpy);
+extern __kernel_size_t __underlying_strlen(const char *p) __RENAME(strlen);
+extern char *__underlying_strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) __RENAME(strncat);
+extern char *__underlying_strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(strncpy);
+#else
+#define __underlying_memchr	__builtin_memchr
+#define __underlying_memcmp	__builtin_memcmp
+#define __underlying_memcpy	__builtin_memcpy
+#define __underlying_memmove	__builtin_memmove
+#define __underlying_memset	__builtin_memset
+#define __underlying_strcat	__builtin_strcat
+#define __underlying_strcpy	__builtin_strcpy
+#define __underlying_strlen	__builtin_strlen
+#define __underlying_strncat	__builtin_strncat
+#define __underlying_strncpy	__builtin_strncpy
+#endif
+
 __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 {
 	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
@@ -245,14 +270,14 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 		__write_overflow();
 	if (p_size < size)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
-	return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size);
+	return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size);
 }
 
 __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q)
 {
 	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
-		return __builtin_strcat(p, q);
+		return __underlying_strcat(p, q);
 	if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
 	return p;
@@ -266,7 +291,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
 	/* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */
 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 ||
 	    (__builtin_constant_p(p[p_size - 1]) && p[p_size - 1] == '\0'))
-		return __builtin_strlen(p);
+		return __underlying_strlen(p);
 	ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
 	if (p_size <= ret)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
@@ -299,7 +324,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size)
 			__write_overflow();
 		if (len >= p_size)
 			fortify_panic(__func__);
-		__builtin_memcpy(p, q, len);
+		__underlying_memcpy(p, q, len);
 		p[len] = '\0';
 	}
 	return ret;
@@ -312,12 +337,12 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count)
 	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
 	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
-		return __builtin_strncat(p, q, count);
+		return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count);
 	p_len = strlen(p);
 	copy_len = strnlen(q, count);
 	if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
-	__builtin_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
+	__underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
 	p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0';
 	return p;
 }
@@ -329,7 +354,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
 		__write_overflow();
 	if (p_size < size)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
-	return __builtin_memset(p, c, size);
+	return __underlying_memset(p, c, size);
 }
 
 __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
@@ -344,7 +369,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 	}
 	if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
-	return __builtin_memcpy(p, q, size);
+	return __underlying_memcpy(p, q, size);
 }
 
 __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
@@ -359,7 +384,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 	}
 	if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
-	return __builtin_memmove(p, q, size);
+	return __underlying_memmove(p, q, size);
 }
 
 extern void *__real_memscan(void *, int, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(memscan);
@@ -385,7 +410,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE int memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 	}
 	if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
-	return __builtin_memcmp(p, q, size);
+	return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size);
 }
 
 __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
@@ -395,7 +420,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
 		__read_overflow();
 	if (p_size < size)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
-	return __builtin_memchr(p, c, size);
+	return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size);
 }
 
 void *__real_memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n) __RENAME(memchr_inv);
@@ -426,11 +451,22 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q)
 	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
 	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
-		return __builtin_strcpy(p, q);
+		return __underlying_strcpy(p, q);
 	memcpy(p, q, strlen(q) + 1);
 	return p;
 }
 
+/* Don't use these outside the FORITFY_SOURCE implementation */
+#undef __underlying_memchr
+#undef __underlying_memcmp
+#undef __underlying_memcpy
+#undef __underlying_memmove
+#undef __underlying_memset
+#undef __underlying_strcat
+#undef __underlying_strcpy
+#undef __underlying_strlen
+#undef __underlying_strncat
+#undef __underlying_strncpy
 #endif
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#72 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 72/72] string.h: fix incompatibility between FORTIFY_SOURCE and KASAN

Hi Sasha,

There's nothing inherently wrong with these patches being backported, but they fix a bug that doesn't cause a crash and only affects debug kernels compiled with KASAN and FORTIFY_SOURCE. Personally I wouldn't change a core header file in a stable kernel for that. Perhaps I'm too risk-averse.

Regards,
Daniel

Quoted 302 lines

From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 47227d27e2fcb01a9e8f5958d8997cf47a820afc ]

The memcmp KASAN self-test fails on a kernel with both KASAN and FORTIFY_SOURCE.

When FORTIFY_SOURCE is on, a number of functions are replaced with fortified versions, which attempt to check the sizes of the operands. However, these functions often directly invoke __builtin_foo() once they have performed the fortify check. Using __builtins may bypass KASAN checks if the compiler decides to inline it's own implementation as sequence of instructions, rather than emit a function call that goes out to a KASAN-instrumented implementation.

Why is only memcmp affected?
============================

Of the string and string-like functions that kasan_test tests, only memcmp is replaced by an inline sequence of instructions in my testing on x86 with gcc version 9.2.1 20191008 (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2).

I believe this is due to compiler heuristics. For example, if I annotate kmalloc calls with the alloc_size annotation (and disable some fortify compile-time checking!), the compiler will replace every memset except the one in kmalloc_uaf_memset with inline instructions. (I have some WIP patches to add this annotation.)

Does this affect other functions in string.h?
=============================================

Yes. Anything that uses __builtin_* rather than __real_* could be affected. This looks like:

- strncpy
- strcat
- strlen
- strlcpy maybe, under some circumstances?
- strncat under some circumstances
- memset
- memcpy
- memmove
- memcmp (as noted)
- memchr
- strcpy

Whether a function call is emitted always depends on the compiler. Most bugs should get caught by FORTIFY_SOURCE, but the missed memcmp test shows that this is not always the case.

Isn't FORTIFY_SOURCE disabled with KASAN?
========================================-

The string headers on all arches supporting KASAN disable fortify with kasan, but only when address sanitisation is _also_ disabled. For example from x86:

#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && !defined(__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__) /*
* For files that are not instrumented (e.g. mm/slub.c) we
* should use not instrumented version of mem* functions. */
#define memcpy(dst, src, len) __memcpy(dst, src, len) #define memmove(dst, src, len) __memmove(dst, src, len) #define memset(s, c, n) __memset(s, c, n)

#ifndef __NO_FORTIFY
#define __NO_FORTIFY /* FORTIFY_SOURCE uses __builtin_memcpy, etc. */ #endif

#endif

This comes from commit 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions"), and doesn't work when KASAN is enabled and the file is supposed to be sanitised - as with test_kasan.c

I'm pretty sure this is not wrong, but not as expansive it should be:

* we shouldn't use __builtin_memcpy etc in files where we don't have instrumentation - it could devolve into a function call to memcpy, which will be instrumented. Rather, we should use __memcpy which by convention is not instrumented.

* we also shouldn't be using __builtin_memcpy when we have a KASAN instrumented file, because it could be replaced with inline asm that will not be instrumented.

What is correct behaviour?
==========================

Firstly, there is some overlap between fortification and KASAN: both provide some level of _runtime_ checking. Only fortify provides compile-time checking.

KASAN and fortify can pick up different things at runtime:

- Some fortify functions, notably the string functions, could easily be modified to consider sub-object sizes (e.g. members within a struct), and I have some WIP patches to do this. KASAN cannot detect these because it cannot insert poision between members of a struct.

- KASAN can detect many over-reads/over-writes when the sizes of both operands are unknown, which fortify cannot.

So there are a couple of options:

1) Flip the test: disable fortify in santised files and enable it in unsanitised files. This at least stops us missing KASAN checking, but we lose the fortify checking.

2) Make the fortify code always call out to real versions. Do this only for KASAN, for fear of losing the inlining opportunities we get from __builtin_*.

(We can't use kasan_check_{read,write}: because the fortify functions are _extern inline_, you can't include _static_ inline functions without a compiler warning. kasan_check_{read,write} are static inline so we can't use them even when they would otherwise be suitable.)

Take approach 2 and call out to real versions when KASAN is enabled.

Use __underlying_foo to distinguish from __real_foo: __real_foo always refers to the kernel's implementation of foo, __underlying_foo could be either the kernel implementation or the __builtin_foo implementation.

This is sometimes enough to make the memcmp test succeed with FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled. It is at least enough to get the function call into the module. One more fix is needed to make it reliable: see the next patch.

Fixes 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions")
Cc Daniel Micay <[email protected]>
Cc Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>
Cc Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
---
 include/linux/string.h | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
include/linux/string.h +48 -12
index 3d43329c20be..315fef3aff4e 100644
@@ -238,6 +238,31 @@ void __read_overflow3(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of ob
 void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter");
 
 #if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+extern void *__underlying_memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memchr);
+extern int __underlying_memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcmp);
+extern void *__underlying_memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcpy);
+extern void *__underlying_memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memmove);
+extern void *__underlying_memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memset);
+extern char *__underlying_strcat(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcat);
+extern char *__underlying_strcpy(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcpy);
+extern __kernel_size_t __underlying_strlen(const char *p) __RENAME(strlen);
+extern char *__underlying_strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) __RENAME(strncat);
+extern char *__underlying_strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(strncpy);
+#else
+#define __underlying_memchr	__builtin_memchr
+#define __underlying_memcmp	__builtin_memcmp
+#define __underlying_memcpy	__builtin_memcpy
+#define __underlying_memmove	__builtin_memmove
+#define __underlying_memset	__builtin_memset
+#define __underlying_strcat	__builtin_strcat
+#define __underlying_strcpy	__builtin_strcpy
+#define __underlying_strlen	__builtin_strlen
+#define __underlying_strncat	__builtin_strncat
+#define __underlying_strncpy	__builtin_strncpy
+#endif
+
 __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 {
 	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
@@ -245,14 +270,14 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 		__write_overflow();
 	if (p_size < size)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
-	return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size);
+	return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size);
 }
 
 __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q)
 {
 	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
-		return __builtin_strcat(p, q);
+		return __underlying_strcat(p, q);
 	if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
 	return p;
@@ -266,7 +291,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
 	/* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */
 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 ||
 	    (__builtin_constant_p(p[p_size - 1]) && p[p_size - 1] == '\0'))
-		return __builtin_strlen(p);
+		return __underlying_strlen(p);
 	ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
 	if (p_size <= ret)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
@@ -299,7 +324,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size)
 			__write_overflow();
 		if (len >= p_size)
 			fortify_panic(__func__);
-		__builtin_memcpy(p, q, len);
+		__underlying_memcpy(p, q, len);
 		p[len] = '\0';
 	}
 	return ret;
@@ -312,12 +337,12 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count)
 	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
 	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
-		return __builtin_strncat(p, q, count);
+		return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count);
 	p_len = strlen(p);
 	copy_len = strnlen(q, count);
 	if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
-	__builtin_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
+	__underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
 	p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0';
 	return p;
 }
@@ -329,7 +354,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
 		__write_overflow();
 	if (p_size < size)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
-	return __builtin_memset(p, c, size);
+	return __underlying_memset(p, c, size);
 }
 
 __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
@@ -344,7 +369,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 	}
 	if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
-	return __builtin_memcpy(p, q, size);
+	return __underlying_memcpy(p, q, size);
 }
 
 __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
@@ -359,7 +384,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 	}
 	if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
-	return __builtin_memmove(p, q, size);
+	return __underlying_memmove(p, q, size);
 }
 
 extern void *__real_memscan(void *, int, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(memscan);
@@ -385,7 +410,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE int memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
 	}
 	if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
-	return __builtin_memcmp(p, q, size);
+	return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size);
 }
 
 __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
@@ -395,7 +420,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
 		__read_overflow();
 	if (p_size < size)
 		fortify_panic(__func__);
-	return __builtin_memchr(p, c, size);
+	return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size);
 }
 
 void *__real_memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n) __RENAME(memchr_inv);
@@ -426,11 +451,22 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q)
 	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
 	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
 	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
-		return __builtin_strcpy(p, q);
+		return __underlying_strcpy(p, q);
 	memcpy(p, q, strlen(q) + 1);
 	return p;
 }
 
+/* Don't use these outside the FORITFY_SOURCE implementation */
+#undef __underlying_memchr
+#undef __underlying_memcmp
+#undef __underlying_memcpy
+#undef __underlying_memmove
+#undef __underlying_memset
+#undef __underlying_strcat
+#undef __underlying_strcpy
+#undef __underlying_strlen
+#undef __underlying_strncat
+#undef __underlying_strncpy
 #endif
 
 /**
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2.25.1
#73 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 72/72] string.h: fix incompatibility between FORTIFY_SOURCE and KASAN

Quoted 7 lines · Daniel Axtens

Hi Sasha,

There's nothing inherently wrong with these patches being backported, but they fix a bug that doesn't cause a crash and only affects debug kernels compiled with KASAN and FORTIFY_SOURCE. Personally I wouldn't change a core header file in a stable kernel for that. Perhaps I'm too risk-averse.

You are in agreement with existing documentation -- stable is only for serious bugs.

Pavel

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maintainer
#74 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 72/72] string.h: fix incompatibility between FORTIFY_SOURCE and KASAN

Quoted 11 lines · Pavel Machek
Quoted 7 lines · Daniel Axtens

Hi Sasha,

There's nothing inherently wrong with these patches being backported, but they fix a bug that doesn't cause a crash and only affects debug kernels compiled with KASAN and FORTIFY_SOURCE. Personally I wouldn't change a core header file in a stable kernel for that. Perhaps I'm too risk-averse.

You are in agreement with existing documentation -- stable is only for serious bugs.

No, lots of people run KASAN on those kernels when they are testing their devices, this patch is fine.

thanks,

greg k-h

#75 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 72/72] string.h: fix incompatibility between FORTIFY_SOURCE and KASAN

Quoted 10 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 9 lines · Pavel Machek
Quoted 7 lines · Daniel Axtens

Hi Sasha,

There's nothing inherently wrong with these patches being backported, but they fix a bug that doesn't cause a crash and only affects debug kernels compiled with KASAN and FORTIFY_SOURCE. Personally I wouldn't change a core header file in a stable kernel for that. Perhaps I'm too risk-averse.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

You are in agreement with existing documentation -- stable is only for serious bugs.

No, lots of people run KASAN on those kernels when they are testing their devices, this patch is fine.

Documentation currently says:

- It must fix a problem that causes a build error (but not for things marked CONFIG_BROKEN), an oops, a hang, data corruption, a real security issue, or some "oh, that's not good" issue. In short, something critical.

...but we also get various warning fixes (sometimes for external tools), changes to make printk()s less verbose, changes to make debugging easier, etc...

Could the documentation be updated to match current use?

Thanks,
Pavel

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