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lockdown bypass on mainline kernel for loading unsigned modules

PATCH Applied Jason A. Donenfeld 6 participants 10 messages Jun 15, 2020 – Jun 22, 2020

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#0 lore raw

Hi everyone,

Yesterday, I found a lockdown bypass in Ubuntu 18.04's kernel using ACPI table tricks via the efi ssdt variable [1]. Today I found another one that's a bit easier to exploit and appears to be unpatched on mainline, using acpi_configfs to inject an ACPI table. The tricks are basically the same as the first one, but this one appears to be unpatched, at least on my test machine. Explanation is in the header of the PoC:

https://git.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language/tree/american-unsigned-language-2.sh

I need to get some sleep, but if nobody posts a patch in the meanwhile, I'll try to post a fix tomorrow.

Jason

[1] https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/06/14/1

#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down

Like other vectors already patched, this one here allows the root user to load ACPI tables, which enables arbitrary physical address writes, which in turn makes it possible to disable lockdown. This patch prevents this by checking the lockdown status before allowing a new ACPI table to be installed. The link in the trailer shows a PoC of how this might be used.

---
 drivers/acpi/acpi_configfs.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/acpi/acpi_configfs.c +5 -1
index ece8c1a921cc..88c8af455ea3 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/configfs.h>
 #include <linux/acpi.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include "acpica/accommon.h"
 #include "acpica/actables.h"
@@ -28,7 +29,10 @@ static ssize_t acpi_table_aml_write(struct config_item *cfg,
 {
 	const struct acpi_table_header *header = data;
 	struct acpi_table *table;
-	int ret;
+	int ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES);
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	table = container_of(cfg, struct acpi_table, cfg);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down

Hi Rafael, Len,

Looks like I should have CC'd you on this patch. This is probably something we should get into 5.8-rc2, so that it can then get put into stable kernels, as some people think this is security sensitive. Bigger picture is this:

https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2.gif
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2-fedora-5.8.png

Also, somebody mentioned to me that Microsoft's ACPI implementation disallows writes to system memory as a security mitigation. I haven't looked at what that actually entails, but I wonder if entirely disabling support for ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY would be sensible. I haven't looked at too many DSDTs. Would that break real hardware, or does nobody do that? Alternatively, the range of acceptable addresses for SystemMemory could exclude kernel memory. Would that break anything? Have you heard about Microsoft's mitigation to know more details on what they figured out they could safely restrict without breaking hardware? Either way, food for thought I suppose.

Jason

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down

Quoted 11 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld

Hi Rafael, Len,

Looks like I should have CC'd you on this patch. This is probably something we should get into 5.8-rc2, so that it can then get put into stable kernels, as some people think this is security sensitive. Bigger picture is this:

https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2.gif
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2-fedora-5.8.png

Quoted 11 lines

Also, somebody mentioned to me that Microsoft's ACPI implementation disallows writes to system memory as a security mitigation. I haven't looked at what that actually entails, but I wonder if entirely disabling support for ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY would be sensible. I haven't looked at too many DSDTs. Would that break real hardware, or does nobody do that? Alternatively, the range of acceptable addresses for SystemMemory could exclude kernel memory. Would that break anything? Have you heard about Microsoft's mitigation to know more details on what they figured out they could safely restrict without breaking hardware? Either way, food for thought I suppose.

ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY may be used for everything that is memory mapped, i.e., PCIe ECAM space, GPIO control registers etc.

I agree that using ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY for any memory that is under the kernel's control is a bad idea, and this should be easy to filter out: the SystemMemory address space handler needs the ACPI support routines to map the physical addresses used by AML into virtual kernel addresses, so all these accesses go through acpi_os_ioremap(). So as a first step, it should be reasonable to put a lockdown check there, and fail any access to OS owned memory if lockdown is enabled, and print a warning if it is not.

#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down

Quoted 28 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 11 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld

Hi Rafael, Len,

Looks like I should have CC'd you on this patch. This is probably something we should get into 5.8-rc2, so that it can then get put into stable kernels, as some people think this is security sensitive. Bigger picture is this:

https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2.gif
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2-fedora-5.8.png

Quoted 11 lines

Also, somebody mentioned to me that Microsoft's ACPI implementation disallows writes to system memory as a security mitigation. I haven't looked at what that actually entails, but I wonder if entirely disabling support for ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY would be sensible. I haven't looked at too many DSDTs. Would that break real hardware, or does nobody do that? Alternatively, the range of acceptable addresses for SystemMemory could exclude kernel memory. Would that break anything? Have you heard about Microsoft's mitigation to know more details on what they figured out they could safely restrict without breaking hardware? Either way, food for thought I suppose.

ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY may be used for everything that is memory mapped, i.e., PCIe ECAM space, GPIO control registers etc.

Quoted 8 lines

I agree that using ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY for any memory that is under the kernel's control is a bad idea, and this should be easy to filter out: the SystemMemory address space handler needs the ACPI support routines to map the physical addresses used by AML into virtual kernel addresses, so all these accesses go through acpi_os_ioremap(). So as a first step, it should be reasonable to put a lockdown check there, and fail any access to OS owned memory if lockdown is enabled, and print a warning if it is not.

Makes sense. Though I was thinking of doing this unconditionally, not just for lockdown, as a "realer" security mitigation (hence CCing kernel-hardening), against bugs that manage to mess with acpi things. A second mitigation might be marking inmemory acpi bytecode pages as read only.

#5 lore raw

RE: [PATCH] acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down

In reply to Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 14 lines

-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] <linux-acpi- [email protected]> On Behalf Of Ard Biesheuvel
Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2020 1:38 AM
To: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Cc: Len Brown <[email protected]>; Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>; LKML <[email protected]>; ACPI Devel Maling List <linux- [email protected]>; Kernel Hardening <kernel- [email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down

Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 11 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld

Hi Rafael, Len,

Looks like I should have CC'd you on this patch. This is probably something we should get into 5.8-rc2, so that it can then get put into stable kernels, as some people think this is security sensitive. Bigger picture is this:

https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2.gif
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2-fedora-5.8.png

Hi,

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Also, somebody mentioned to me that Microsoft's ACPI implementation disallows writes to system memory as a security mitigation. I haven't looked at what that actually entails, but I wonder if entirely disabling support for ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY would be

sensible.

No, Windows uses these as well. They might have some restriction on which areas are allowed though. With that said, there are plenty of use cases (SMI handlers, power management, etc) where this is needed. Disabling SystemMemory would definitely break existing systems.

Erik

Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 7 lines

I haven't looked at too many DSDTs. Would that break real hardware, or does nobody do that? Alternatively, the range of acceptable addresses for SystemMemory could exclude kernel memory. Would that break anything? Have you heard about Microsoft's mitigation to know more details on what they figured out they could safely restrict without breaking hardware? Either way, food for thought I suppose.

ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY may be used for everything that is memory
mapped, i.e., PCIe ECAM space, GPIO control registers etc.

I agree that using ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY for any memory that is
under the kernel's control is a bad idea, and this should be easy to filter out: the SystemMemory address space handler needs the ACPI support routines to map the physical addresses used by AML into virtual kernel addresses, so all these accesses go through acpi_os_ioremap(). So as a first step, it should be reasonable to put a lockdown check there, and fail any access to OS owned memory if lockdown is enabled, and print a warning if it is not.

maintainer Applied
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down

In reply to Jason A. Donenfeld

Hi,

Quoted 10 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld

Hi Rafael, Len,

Looks like I should have CC'd you on this patch. This is probably something we should get into 5.8-rc2, so that it can then get put into stable kernels, as some people think this is security sensitive. Bigger picture is this:

https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2.gif
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2-fedora-5.8.png

I was offline during the last week, sorry.

Applied as 5.8-rc material with some subject/changelog edits, thanks!

#7 lore raw
In reply to Jason A. Donenfeld

Hi Jason,

Quoted 12 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld

Hi everyone,

Yesterday, I found a lockdown bypass in Ubuntu 18.04's kernel using ACPI table tricks via the efi ssdt variable [1]. Today I found another one that's a bit easier to exploit and appears to be unpatched on mainline, using acpi_configfs to inject an ACPI table. The tricks are basically the same as the first one, but this one appears to be unpatched, at least on my test machine. Explanation is in the header of the PoC:

Quoted 8 lines

https://git.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language/tree/american-unsigned-language-2.sh

I need to get some sleep, but if nobody posts a patch in the meanwhile, I'll try to post a fix tomorrow.

Jason

[1] https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/06/14/1

This looks CVE-worthy. Are you going to ask for a CVE for it?

jch

#8 lore raw
Quoted 14 lines · John Haxby
Quoted 14 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld

Yesterday, I found a lockdown bypass in Ubuntu 18.04's kernel using ACPI table tricks via the efi ssdt variable [1]. Today I found another one that's a bit easier to exploit and appears to be unpatched on mainline, using acpi_configfs to inject an ACPI table. The tricks are basically the same as the first one, but this one appears to be unpatched, at least on my test machine. Explanation is in the header of the PoC:

https://git.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language/tree/american-unsigned-language-2.sh

I need to get some sleep, but if nobody posts a patch in the meanwhile, I'll try to post a fix tomorrow.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Jason

[1] https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/06/14/1

This looks CVE-worthy. Are you going to ask for a CVE for it?

Does it really make sense to dole out CVEs for individual lockdown bypasses when various areas of the kernel (such as filesystems and BPF) don't see root->kernel privilege escalation issues as a problem? It's not like applying the fix for this one issue is going to make systems meaningfully safer.

#9 lore raw
Quoted 20 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 19 lines · John Haxby
Quoted 17 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld

Yesterday, I found a lockdown bypass in Ubuntu 18.04's kernel using ACPI table tricks via the efi ssdt variable [1]. Today I found another one that's a bit easier to exploit and appears to be unpatched on mainline, using acpi_configfs to inject an ACPI table. The tricks are basically the same as the first one, but this one appears to be unpatched, at least on my test machine. Explanation is in the header of the PoC:

https://git.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language/tree/american-unsigned-language-2.sh

I need to get some sleep, but if nobody posts a patch in the meanwhile, I'll try to post a fix tomorrow.

Jason

[1] https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/06/14/1

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

This looks CVE-worthy. Are you going to ask for a CVE for it?

Does it really make sense to dole out CVEs for individual lockdown bypasses when various areas of the kernel (such as filesystems and BPF) don't see root->kernel privilege escalation issues as a problem? It's not like applying the fix for this one issue is going to make systems meaningfully safer.

Indeed, I'm more or less of the same mind: lockdown is kind of a best-effort thing at the moment, and it'd be crazy to rely on it, considering various bypasses and differing attitudes on the security model from different subsystems. This acpi bypass is a bug, maybe, but it doesn't feel like a "real" security bug, because I'm not sure why this would be a feature somebody would want to lean on at this point in time. I wrote a PoC for this one rather than others because it seemed fun and technically interesting to poke around with acpi in this way, not because it's particularly rare or something.