lockdown bypass on mainline kernel for loading unsigned modules
Subsystems (3)
Hi everyone,
Yesterday, I found a lockdown bypass in Ubuntu 18.04's kernel using ACPI table tricks via the efi ssdt variable [1]. Today I found another one that's a bit easier to exploit and appears to be unpatched on mainline, using acpi_configfs to inject an ACPI table. The tricks are basically the same as the first one, but this one appears to be unpatched, at least on my test machine. Explanation is in the header of the PoC:
https://git.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language/tree/american-unsigned-language-2.sh
I need to get some sleep, but if nobody posts a patch in the meanwhile, I'll try to post a fix tomorrow.
Jason
[1] https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/06/14/1
PATCH 1/1 acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down
Like other vectors already patched, this one here allows the root user to load ACPI tables, which enables arbitrary physical address writes, which in turn makes it possible to disable lockdown. This patch prevents this by checking the lockdown status before allowing a new ACPI table to be installed. The link in the trailer shows a PoC of how this might be used.
--- drivers/acpi/acpi_configfs.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/acpi/acpi_configfs.c +5 -1
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/configfs.h> #include <linux/acpi.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "acpica/accommon.h" #include "acpica/actables.h"
@@ -28,7 +29,10 @@ static ssize_t acpi_table_aml_write(struct config_item *cfg, {const struct acpi_table_header *header = data;struct acpi_table *table; -int ret; +int ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES ); + +if (ret) +return ret; table = container_of(cfg, struct acpi_table, cfg);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Re: [PATCH] acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down
Hi Rafael, Len,
Looks like I should have CC'd you on this patch. This is probably something we should get into 5.8-rc2, so that it can then get put into stable kernels, as some people think this is security sensitive. Bigger picture is this:
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2.gif
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2-fedora-5.8.png
Also, somebody mentioned to me that Microsoft's ACPI implementation disallows writes to system memory as a security mitigation. I haven't looked at what that actually entails, but I wonder if entirely disabling support for ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY would be sensible. I haven't looked at too many DSDTs. Would that break real hardware, or does nobody do that? Alternatively, the range of acceptable addresses for SystemMemory could exclude kernel memory. Would that break anything? Have you heard about Microsoft's mitigation to know more details on what they figured out they could safely restrict without breaking hardware? Either way, food for thought I suppose.
Jason
Re: [PATCH] acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down
Quoted 11 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Hi Rafael, Len,
Looks like I should have CC'd you on this patch. This is probably something we should get into 5.8-rc2, so that it can then get put into stable kernels, as some people think this is security sensitive. Bigger picture is this:
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2.gif
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2-fedora-5.8.png
Quoted 11 lines
Also, somebody mentioned to me that Microsoft's ACPI implementation disallows writes to system memory as a security mitigation. I haven't looked at what that actually entails, but I wonder if entirely disabling support for
ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORYwould be sensible. I haven't looked at too many DSDTs. Would that break real hardware, or does nobody do that? Alternatively, the range of acceptable addresses for SystemMemory could exclude kernel memory. Would that break anything? Have you heard about Microsoft's mitigation to know more details on what they figured out they could safely restrict without breaking hardware? Either way, food for thought I suppose.
ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY may be used for everything that is memory mapped, i.e., PCIe ECAM space, GPIO control registers etc.
I agree that using ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY for any memory that is under the kernel's control is a bad idea, and this should be easy to filter out: the SystemMemory address space handler needs the ACPI support routines to map the physical addresses used by AML into virtual kernel addresses, so all these accesses go through acpi_os_ioremap(). So as a first step, it should be reasonable to put a lockdown check there, and fail any access to OS owned memory if lockdown is enabled, and print a warning if it is not.
Re: [PATCH] acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down
Quoted 28 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 11 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Hi Rafael, Len,
Looks like I should have CC'd you on this patch. This is probably something we should get into 5.8-rc2, so that it can then get put into stable kernels, as some people think this is security sensitive. Bigger picture is this:
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2.gif
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2-fedora-5.8.pngQuoted 11 lines
Also, somebody mentioned to me that Microsoft's ACPI implementation disallows writes to system memory as a security mitigation. I haven't looked at what that actually entails, but I wonder if entirely disabling support for
ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORYwould be sensible. I haven't looked at too many DSDTs. Would that break real hardware, or does nobody do that? Alternatively, the range of acceptable addresses for SystemMemory could exclude kernel memory. Would that break anything? Have you heard about Microsoft's mitigation to know more details on what they figured out they could safely restrict without breaking hardware? Either way, food for thought I suppose.
ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORYmay be used for everything that is memory mapped, i.e., PCIe ECAM space, GPIO control registers etc.
Quoted 8 lines
I agree that using
ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORYfor any memory that is under the kernel's control is a bad idea, and this should be easy to filter out: the SystemMemory address space handler needs the ACPI support routines to map the physical addresses used by AML into virtual kernel addresses, so all these accesses go throughacpi_os_ioremap(). So as a first step, it should be reasonable to put a lockdown check there, and fail any access to OS owned memory if lockdown is enabled, and print a warning if it is not.
Makes sense. Though I was thinking of doing this unconditionally, not just for lockdown, as a "realer" security mitigation (hence CCing kernel-hardening), against bugs that manage to mess with acpi things. A second mitigation might be marking inmemory acpi bytecode pages as read only.
RE: [PATCH] acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelQuoted 14 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] <linux-acpi- [email protected]> On Behalf Of Ard Biesheuvel
Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2020 1:38 AM
To: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Cc: Len Brown <[email protected]>; Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>; LKML <[email protected]>; ACPI Devel Maling List <linux- [email protected]>; Kernel Hardening <kernel- [email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 11 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Hi Rafael, Len,
Looks like I should have CC'd you on this patch. This is probably something we should get into 5.8-rc2, so that it can then get put into stable kernels, as some people think this is security sensitive. Bigger picture is this:
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2.gif
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2-fedora-5.8.png
Hi,
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Also, somebody mentioned to me that Microsoft's ACPI implementation disallows writes to system memory as a security mitigation. I haven't looked at what that actually entails, but I wonder if entirely disabling support for
ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORYwould besensible.
No, Windows uses these as well. They might have some restriction on which areas are allowed though. With that said, there are plenty of use cases (SMI handlers, power management, etc) where this is needed. Disabling SystemMemory would definitely break existing systems.
Erik
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 7 lines
I haven't looked at too many DSDTs. Would that break real hardware, or does nobody do that? Alternatively, the range of acceptable addresses for SystemMemory could exclude kernel memory. Would that break anything? Have you heard about Microsoft's mitigation to know more details on what they figured out they could safely restrict without breaking hardware? Either way, food for thought I suppose.
ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORYmay be used for everything that is memory
mapped, i.e., PCIe ECAM space, GPIO control registers etc.I agree that using
ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORYfor any memory that is
under the kernel's control is a bad idea, and this should be easy to filter out: the SystemMemory address space handler needs the ACPI support routines to map the physical addresses used by AML into virtual kernel addresses, so all these accesses go throughacpi_os_ioremap(). So as a first step, it should be reasonable to put a lockdown check there, and fail any access to OS owned memory if lockdown is enabled, and print a warning if it is not.
Re: [PATCH] acpi: disallow loading configfs acpi tables when locked down
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldHi,
Quoted 10 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Hi Rafael, Len,
Looks like I should have CC'd you on this patch. This is probably something we should get into 5.8-rc2, so that it can then get put into stable kernels, as some people think this is security sensitive. Bigger picture is this:
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2.gif
https://data.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language-2-fedora-5.8.png
I was offline during the last week, sorry.
Applied as 5.8-rc material with some subject/changelog edits, thanks!
Hi Jason,
Quoted 12 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Hi everyone,
Yesterday, I found a lockdown bypass in Ubuntu 18.04's kernel using ACPI table tricks via the efi ssdt variable [1]. Today I found another one that's a bit easier to exploit and appears to be unpatched on mainline, using
acpi_configfsto inject an ACPI table. The tricks are basically the same as the first one, but this one appears to be unpatched, at least on my test machine. Explanation is in the header of the PoC:
Quoted 8 lines
https://git.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language/tree/american-unsigned-language-2.sh
I need to get some sleep, but if nobody posts a patch in the meanwhile, I'll try to post a fix tomorrow.
Jason
[1] https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/06/14/1
This looks CVE-worthy. Are you going to ask for a CVE for it?
jch
Quoted 14 lines · John Haxby
Quoted 14 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Yesterday, I found a lockdown bypass in Ubuntu 18.04's kernel using ACPI table tricks via the efi ssdt variable [1]. Today I found another one that's a bit easier to exploit and appears to be unpatched on mainline, using
acpi_configfsto inject an ACPI table. The tricks are basically the same as the first one, but this one appears to be unpatched, at least on my test machine. Explanation is in the header of the PoC:https://git.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language/tree/american-unsigned-language-2.sh
I need to get some sleep, but if nobody posts a patch in the meanwhile, I'll try to post a fix tomorrow.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Jason
[1] https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/06/14/1
This looks CVE-worthy. Are you going to ask for a CVE for it?
Does it really make sense to dole out CVEs for individual lockdown bypasses when various areas of the kernel (such as filesystems and BPF) don't see root->kernel privilege escalation issues as a problem? It's not like applying the fix for this one issue is going to make systems meaningfully safer.
Quoted 20 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 19 lines · John Haxby
Quoted 17 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Yesterday, I found a lockdown bypass in Ubuntu 18.04's kernel using ACPI table tricks via the efi ssdt variable [1]. Today I found another one that's a bit easier to exploit and appears to be unpatched on mainline, using
acpi_configfsto inject an ACPI table. The tricks are basically the same as the first one, but this one appears to be unpatched, at least on my test machine. Explanation is in the header of the PoC:https://git.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language/tree/american-unsigned-language-2.sh
I need to get some sleep, but if nobody posts a patch in the meanwhile, I'll try to post a fix tomorrow.
Jason
[1] https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/06/14/1
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
This looks CVE-worthy. Are you going to ask for a CVE for it?
Does it really make sense to dole out CVEs for individual lockdown bypasses when various areas of the kernel (such as filesystems and BPF) don't see
root->kernelprivilege escalation issues as a problem? It's not like applying the fix for this one issue is going to make systems meaningfully safer.
Indeed, I'm more or less of the same mind: lockdown is kind of a best-effort thing at the moment, and it'd be crazy to rely on it, considering various bypasses and differing attitudes on the security model from different subsystems. This acpi bypass is a bug, maybe, but it doesn't feel like a "real" security bug, because I'm not sure why this would be a feature somebody would want to lean on at this point in time. I wrote a PoC for this one rather than others because it seemed fun and technically interesting to poke around with acpi in this way, not because it's particularly rare or something.