scsi: megaraid_sas: Use array_size() helper
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 scsi: megaraid_sas: Use array_size() helper
The get_order() function has no 2-factor argument form, so multiplication factors need to be wrapped in array_size().
This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle and, audited and fixed manually.
Addresses-KSPP-ID: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/83
--- drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c +4 -4
@@ -5180,8 +5180,8 @@ megasas_alloc_fusion_context(struct megasas_instance *instance) fusion = instance->ctrl_context; - fusion->log_to_span_pages =get_order (MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT * -sizeof (LD_SPAN_INFO )); + fusion->log_to_span_pages =get_order (array_size (MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT , +sizeof (LD_SPAN_INFO ))); fusion->log_to_span = (PLD_SPAN_INFO )__get_free_pages (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, fusion->log_to_span_pages);
@@ -5196,8 +5196,8 @@ megasas_alloc_fusion_context(struct megasas_instance *instance) } } - fusion->load_balance_info_pages =get_order (MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT * -sizeof (struct LD_LOAD_BALANCE_INFO )); + fusion->load_balance_info_pages =get_order (array_size (MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT , +sizeof (struct LD_LOAD_BALANCE_INFO ))); fusion->load_balance_info = (struct LD_LOAD_BALANCE_INFO *)__get_free_pages (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, fusion->load_balance_info_pages);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Quoted 30 lines · Gustavo A. R. Silva
The
get_order()function has no 2-factor argument form, so multiplication
factors need to be wrapped inarray_size().This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle and, audited and fixed
manually.Addresses-KSPP-ID: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/83
Signed-off-by Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>--- drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c +2
-2@@ -5180,8 +5180,8 @@ megasas_alloc_fusion_context(struct megasas_instance *instance) fusion = instance->ctrl_context; - fusion->log_to_span_pages =get_order (MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT * -sizeof (LD_SPAN_INFO )); + fusion->log_to_span_pages =get_order (array_size (MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT , +sizeof (LD_SPAN_INFO )))
Quoted 1 line
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What's the point of this? You're replacing a constant multiplication the compiler can compute with one it can't on the theory there might be an overflow, which is pretty far fetched given MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT is 256 and sizeof(LD_SPAN_INFO) is around 82.
I thought the whole point of overflow detection was to use it for instances where we could be tricked into triggering one by userspace which may result in a buffer under or overflow ... this is two constants, how could this ever be a source of an exploit?
James