arm64: continue loading even if kaslr-seed is not wiped to zero
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 arm64: continue loading even if kaslr-seed is not wiped to zero
The commit c3f043241a866a (arm64: Add support to supply 'kaslr-seed' to secondary kernel) add kaslr-seed support. And consider the primary kernel reads the 'kaslr-seed' and wipes it to 0. But in the situation, 'CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE' was not set to y in the primary kernel and ATF firmware has set the 'kaslr-seed' dtb property with non-zero, Thus will return error.
So in the above case, continue loading the segments with no kaslr supported situation.
--- kexec/arch/arm64/kexec-arm64.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kexec/arch/arm64/kexec-arm64.c +2 -2
@@ -506,8 +506,7 @@ static int setup_2nd_dtb(struct dtb *dtb, char *command_line, int on_crash)if (kaslr_seed !=0 ) {dbgprintf ("%s: kaslr-seed is not wiped to 0.\n" , __func__); - result = -EINVAL ; - goto on_error; + goto unable_kaslr; }/*
@@ -550,6 +549,7 @@ static int setup_2nd_dtb(struct dtb *dtb, char *command_line, int on_crash) } } +unable_kaslr:if (on_crash) {/* add linux,elfcorehdr */ nodeoffset =fdt_path_offset (new_buf,"/chosen" );
Signature · 7 lines
2.17.1 _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Hi Xunlin,
Quoted 38 lines · Xulin Sun
The commit
c3f043241a866a(arm64: Add support to supply 'kaslr-seed' to secondary kernel) add kaslr-seed support. And consider the primary kernel reads the 'kaslr-seed' and wipes it to 0. But in the situation, 'CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE' was not set to y in the primary kernel and ATF firmware has set the 'kaslr-seed' dtb property with non-zero, Thus will return error.So in the above case, continue loading the segments with no kaslr supported situation.
Signed-off-by Xulin Sun <[email protected]>--- kexec/arch/arm64/kexec-arm64.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)kexec/arch/arm64/kexec-arm64.c +2
-3@@ -506,8 +506,7 @@ static int setup_2nd_dtb(struct dtb *dtb, char *command_line, int on_crash)if (kaslr_seed !=0 ) {dbgprintf ("%s: kaslr-seed is not wiped to 0.\n" , __func__); - result = -EINVAL ; - goto on_error; + goto unable_kaslr; }/* @@ -550,6 +549,7 @@ static int setup_2nd_dtb(struct dtb *dtb, char *command_line, int on_crash) } } +unable_kaslr:if (on_crash) {/* add linux,elfcorehdr */ nodeoffset =fdt_path_offset (new_buf,"/chosen" ); --
Quoted 1 line
2.17.1
Sorry, but this seems like an ATF issue which you are trying to fix in kexec-tools.
See 'Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt' for the details of the 'kaslr-seed' property:
kaslr-seed
-----------
This property is used when booting with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE as the entropy used to randomize the kernel image base address location. Since it is used directly, this value is intended only for KASLR, and should not be used for other purposes (as it may leak information about KASLR offsets). It is parsed as a u64 value, e.g.
/ {
chosen {
kaslr-seed = <0xfeedbeef 0xc0def00d>;
};
};So, if CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE (or kaslr) is disabled, this value should not be available in the patched DTB read from the kernel, as otherwise we have a possible security vulnerability as we are leaking out the kernel text address which can be used by snooping applications to inject malicious code in the kernel.
For example on my qualcomm arm64 platform, if CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is set to n, user-space tools like 'dtc' are not able to find the 'kaslr-seed' property in the /chosen node (and same is the case with kexec-tools):
# dtc -I dtb -O dts /sys/firmware/fdt | grep -A 10 -i chosen
chosen {
... no 'kaslr-seed' node
}Also confirm that the kernel symbol base address is not randomized on successive reboots (in this case) via:
# cat /proc/kallsyms
Whereas, if I boot the kernel with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE (or kaslr) enabled, I can see that the 'kaslr-seed' property is wiped to '0' (as expected by the kernel') and can be seen in the output of:
# dtc -I dtb -O dts /sys/firmware/fdt | grep -A 10 -i chosen
chosen {
kaslr-seed = <0x0 0x0>
}Thanks,
Bhupesh
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Quoted 72 lines · Bhupesh Sharma
Hi Xunlin,
Quoted 37 lines · Xulin Sun
The commit
c3f043241a866a(arm64: Add support to supply 'kaslr-seed' to secondary kernel) add kaslr-seed support. And consider the primary kernel reads the 'kaslr-seed' and wipes it to 0. But in the situation, 'CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE' was not set to y in the primary kernel and ATF firmware has set the 'kaslr-seed' dtb property with non-zero, Thus will return error.So in the above case, continue loading the segments with no kaslr supported situation.
Signed-off-by Xulin Sun <[email protected]>--- kexec/arch/arm64/kexec-arm64.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)kexec/arch/arm64/kexec-arm64.c +2
-3@@ -506,8 +506,7 @@ static int setup_2nd_dtb(struct dtb *dtb, char *command_line, int on_crash)if (kaslr_seed !=0 ) {dbgprintf ("%s: kaslr-seed is not wiped to 0.\n" , __func__); - result = -EINVAL ; - goto on_error; + goto unable_kaslr; }/* @@ -550,6 +549,7 @@ static int setup_2nd_dtb(struct dtb *dtb, char *command_line, int on_crash) } } +unable_kaslr:if (on_crash) {/* add linux,elfcorehdr */ nodeoffset =fdt_path_offset (new_buf,"/chosen" ); --Quoted 1 line
2.17.1
Sorry, but this seems like an ATF issue which you are trying to fix in kexec-tools.
See 'Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt' for the details of the 'kaslr-seed' property:kaslr-seed
-----------This property is used when booting with
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASEas the entropy used to randomize the kernel image base address location. Since it is used directly, this value is intended only for KASLR, and should not be used for other purposes (as it may leak information about KASLR offsets). It is parsed as a u64 value, e.g./ { chosen { kaslr-seed = <0xfeedbeef 0xc0def00d>; }; };So, if
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE(or kaslr) is disabled, this value should not be available in the patched DTB read from the kernel, as otherwise we have a possible security vulnerability as we are leaking out the kernel text address which can be used by snooping applications to inject malicious code in the kernel.For example on my qualcomm arm64 platform, if
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASEis set to n, user-space tools like 'dtc' are not able to find the 'kaslr-seed' property in the /chosen node (and same is the case with kexec-tools):
Quoted 4 lines
# dtc -I dtb -O dts /sys/firmware/fdt | grep -A 10 -i chosen
chosen {
... no 'kaslr-seed' node
}On my NXP LS1043A RDB platform(arm64), the ATF related bootloader and firmware are default installed with NXP released latest version.
1. if CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is set to n on linux kernel.
#dtc -I dtb -O dts fdt | grep -A 10 -i chosen
chosen {
kaslr-seed = <0x48895203 0x935bea31>;
}
2. if CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is set to y on linux kernel
#dtc -I dtb -O dts fdt | grep -A 10 -i chosen
chosen {
kaslr-seed = <0x0 0x0>;
}
The u-boot code flow to set the "kaslr-seed" is: https://source.codeaurora.org/external/qoriq/qoriq-components/u-boot
ft_board_setup
ft_cpu_setup
fdt_fixup_kaslr
fdt_setprop(fdt, nodeoffset, "kaslr-seed", rand,
So I suspect that u-boot will set the "kaslr-seed" property and does not need to know if kernel has enabled the kernel config option "CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE" or not, and it has no way to get the value.
Do your qualcomm arm64 platform use the same u-boot code with "git.denx.de"?
Thanks
Xulin
Quoted 9 lines
Also confirm that the kernel symbol base address is not randomized on successive reboots (in this case) via:
# cat /proc/kallsymsWhereas, if I boot the kernel with
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE(or kaslr) enabled, I can see that the 'kaslr-seed' property is wiped to '0' (as expected by the kernel') and can be seen in the output of:
Quoted 8 lines
# dtc -I dtb -O dts /sys/firmware/fdt | grep -A 10 -i chosen chosen { kaslr-seed = <0x0 0x0> }Thanks,
Bhupesh
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