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Intel SGX foundations

PATCH Superseded Jarkko Sakkinen 10 participants 93 messages Jun 17, 2020 – Oct 27, 2020

Subsystems (11)

v33 of 40 Superseded Latest is v40 →

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v33 cover Intel SGX foundations

Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the enclave is disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave by the CPU access control.

There is a new hardware unit in the processor called Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) starting from the Skylake microacrhitecture. BIOS can define one or many MEE regions that can hold enclave data by configuring them with PRMRR registers.

The MEE automatically encrypts the data leaving the processor package to the MEE regions. The data is encrypted using a random key whose life-time is exactly one power cycle.

The current implementation requires that the firmware sets IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH* MSRs as writable so that ultimately the kernel can decide what enclaves it wants run. The implementation does not create any bottlenecks to support read-only MSRs later on.

You can tell if your CPU supports SGX by looking into /proc/cpuinfo:

cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep sgx

v33:
* Rebased to v5.8-rc1. Given the core changes (mmap_lock and #DB handling), it made sense to update the series.
* Refined documentation about how remote attestation is done in SGX.

v32:
* v31 contained not fully cleaned up main.c after merger of main.c and reclaim.c. Fixed in this version.
* Rebased to v5.7. Forgot to do this for v31.

v31:
* Unset SGX_ENCL_IOCTL in the error path of checking encl->flags in order to prevent leaving it set and thus block any further ioctl calls.
* Added missing cleanup_srcu_struct() call to sgx_encl_release().
* Take encl->lock in sgx_encl_add_page() in order to prevent races with the page reclaimer.
* Fix a use-after-free bug from the page reclaimer. Call kref_put() for encl->refcount only after putting enclave page back to the active page list because it could be the last ref to the enclave.
* Filter any CPU disallowed values from sigstruct->vendor SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT.
* Use bits 0-7 of page descriptor for the EPC section index. This should be enough for long term needs.
* Refined naming for functions that allocate and free EPC pages to be more sound and consistent.
* Merge main.c and reclaim.c into one.

v30:
Bunch of tags added. No actual code changes.

v29:
* The selftest has been moved to selftests/sgx. Because SGX is an execution environment of its own, it really isn't a great fit with more "standard" x86 tests.

The RSA key is now generated on fly and the whole signing process has been made as part of the enclave loader instead of signing the enclave during the compilation time.

Finally, the enclave loader loads now the test enclave directly from its ELF file, which means that ELF file does not need to be coverted as raw binary during the build process.
* Version the mm_list instead of using on synchronize_mm() when adding new entries. We hold the write lock for the mm_struct, and dup_mm() can thus deadlock with the page reclaimer, which could hold the lock for the old mm_struct.
* Disallow mmap(PROT_NONE) from /dev/sgx. Any mapping (e.g. anonymous) can be used to reserve the address range. Now /dev/sgx supports only opaque mappings to the (initialized) enclave data.
* Make the vDSO callable directly from C by preserving RBX and taking leaf from RCX.

v28:
* Documented to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst how the kernel manages the enclave ownership.
* Removed non-LC flow from sgx_einit().
* Removed struct sgx_einittoken since only the size of the corresponding microarchitectural structure is used in the series ATM.

v27:
* Disallow RIE processes to use enclaves as there could a permission conflict between VMA and enclave permissions.
* In the documentation, replace "grep /proc/cpuinfo" with "grep sgx /proc/cpuinfo".

v26:
* Fixed the commit author in "x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver", which was changed in v25 by mistake.
* Addressed a bunch of grammar mistakes in sgx.rst (thanks Randy once again for such a detailed feedback).
* Added back the MAINTAINERS update commit, which was mistakenly removed in v25.
* EREMOVE's for SECS cannot be done while sanitizing an EPC section. The CPU does not allow to remove a SECS page before all of its children have been removed, and a child page can be in some other section than the one currently being processed. Thus, removed special SECS processing from sgx_sanitize_page() and instead put sections through it twice. In the 2nd round the lists should only contain SECS pages.

v25:
* Fix a double-free issue when SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
fails on executing ENCLS[EADD]. The rollback path executed radix_tree_delete() on the same address twice when this happened.
* Return -EINTR instead of -ERESTARTSYS in SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES when a signal is pending.
* As requested by Borislav, move the CPUID 0x12 features to their own word in cpufeatures.
* Sean fixed a bug from sgx_reclaimer_write() where sgx_encl_put_backing() was called with an uninitialized pointer when sgx_encl_get_backing() fails.
* Migrated /dev/sgx/* to misc. This is future-proof as struct miscdevice has 'groups' for setting up sysfs attributes for the device.
* Use device_initcall instead of subsys_initcall so that misc_class is initialized before SGX is initialized.
* Return -EACCES in SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT when caller tries to select enclave attributes that we the kernel does not allow it to set instead of -EINVAL.
* Unless SGX public key MSRs are writable always deny the feature from Linux. Previously this was only denied from driver. How VMs should be supported is not really part of initial patch set, which makes this an obvious choice.
* Cleaned up and refined documentation to be more approachable.

v24:
* Reclaim unmeasured and TCS pages (regression in v23).
* Replace usages of GFP_HIGHUSER with GFP_KERNEL.
* Return -EIO on when EADD or EEXTEND fails in %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES and use the same rollback (destroy enclave). This can happen when host suspends itself unknowingly to a VM running enclaves. From -EIO the user space can deduce what happened.
* Have a separate @count in struct sgx_enclave_add_pages to output number of bytes processed instead of overwriting the input parameters for clarity and more importantly that the API provides means for partial processing (@count could be less than @length in success case).

v23:
* Replace SGX_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE with SGX_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES. Replace @mrmask with %SGX_PAGE_MEASURE flag.
* Return -EIO instead of -ECANCELED when ptrace() fails to read a TCS page.
* In the reclaimer, pin page before ENCLS[EBLOCK] because pinning can fail (because of OOM) even in legit behaviour and after EBLOCK the reclaiming flow can be only reverted by killing the whole enclave.
* Fixed SGX_ATTR_RESERVED_MASK. Bit 7 was marked as reserved while in fact it should have been bit 6 (Table 37-3 in the SDM).
* Return -EPERM from SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT when ENCLS[EINIT] returns an SGX error code.

v22:
* Refined bunch commit messages and added associated SDM references as many of them were too exhausting and some outdated.
* Alignment checks have been removed from mmap() because it does not define the ELRANGE. VMAs only act as windows to the enclave. The semantics compare somewhat how mmap() works with regular files.
* We now require user space addresses given to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE to be page aligned so that we can pass the page directly to EADD and do not have to do an extra copy. This was made effectively possible by removing the worker thread for adding pages.
* The selftest build files have been refined throughout of various glitches and work properly in a cross compilation environment such as BuildRoot. In addition, libcalls fail the build with an assertion in the linker script, if they end up to the enclave binary.
* CONFIG_INTEL_SGX_DRIVER has been removed because you cannot use SGX core for anything without having the driver. This could change when KVM support is added.
* We require zero permissions in SECINFO for TCS pages because the CPU overwrites SECINFO flags with zero permissions and measures the page only after that. Allowing to pass TCS with non-zero permissions would cause mismatching measurement between the one provided in SIGSTRUCT and the one computed by the CPU.
* Obviously lots of small fixes and clean ups (does make sense to document them all).

v21:
* Check on mmap() that the VMA does cover an area that does not have enclave pages. Only mapping with PROT_NONE can do that to reserve initial address space for an enclave.
* Check om mmap() and mprotect() that the VMA permissions do not surpass the enclave permissions.
* Remove two refcounts from vma_close(): mm_list and encl->refcount. Enclave refcount is only need for swapper/enclave sync and we can remove mm_list refcount by destroying mm_struct when the process is closed. By not having vm_close() the Linux MM can merge VMAs.
* Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address.
* Numerous small fixes and clean ups.
* Use SRCU for synchronizing the list of mm_struct's.
* Move to stack based call convention in the vDSO.

v20:
* Fine-tune Kconfig messages and spacing and remove MMU_NOTIFIER dependency as MMU notifiers are no longer used in the driver.
* Use mm_users instead of mm_count as refcount for mm_struct as mm_count only protects from deleting mm_struct, not removing its contents.
* Sanitize EPC when the reclaimer thread starts by doing EREMOVE for all of them. They could be in initialized state when the kernel starts because it might be spawned by kexec().
* Documentation overhaul.
* Use a device /dev/sgx/provision for delivering the provision token instead of securityfs.
* Create a reference to the enclave when already when opening /dev/sgx/enclave. The file is then associated with this enclave only. mmap() can be done at free at any point and always get a reference to the enclave. To summarize the file now represents the enclave.

v19:
* Took 3-4 months but in some sense this was more like a rewrite of most of the corners of the source code. If I've forgotten to deal with some feedback, please don't shout me. Make a remark and I will fix it for the next version. Hopefully there won't be this big turnovers anymore.
* Validate SECS attributes properly against CPUID given attributes and against allowed attributes. SECS attributes are the ones that are enforced whereas SIGSTRUCT attributes tell what is required to run the enclave.
* Add KSS (Key Sharing Support) to the enclave attributes.
* Deny MAP_PRIVATE as an enclave is always a shared memory entity.
* Revert back to shmem backing storage so that it can be easily shared by multiple processes.
* Split the recognization of an ENCLS leaf failure by using three functions to detect it: encsl_faulted(), encls_returned_code() and sgx_failed(). encls_failed() is only caused by a spurious expections that should never happen. Thus, it is not defined as an inline function in order to easily insert a kprobe to it.
* Move low-level enclave management routines, page fault handler and page reclaiming routines from driver to the core. These cannot be separated from each other as they are heavily interdependent. The rationale is that the core does not call any code from the driver.
* Allow the driver to be compiled as a module now that it no code is using its routines and it only uses exported symbols. Now the driver is essentially just a thin ioctl layer.
* Reworked the driver to maintain a list of mm_struct's. The VMA callbacks add new entries to this list as the process is forked. Each entry has its own refcount because they have a different life-cycle as the enclave does. In effect @tgid and @mm have been removed from struct sgx_encl and we allow forking by removing VM_DONTCOPY from vm flags.
* Generate a cpu mask in the reclaimer from the cpu mask's of all mm_struct's. This will kick out the hardware threads out of the enclave from multiple processes. It is not a local variable because it would eat too much of the stack space but instead a field in struct sgx_encl.
* Allow forking i.e. remove VM_DONTCOPY. I did not change the API because the old API scaled to the workload that Andy described. The codebase is now mostly API independent i.e. changing the API is a small task. For me the proper trigger to chanage it is a as concrete as possible workload that cannot be fulfilled. I hope you understand my thinking here. I don't want to change anything w/o proper basis but I'm ready to change anything if there is a proper basis. I do not have any kind of attachment to any particular type of API.
* Add Sean's vDSO ENCLS(EENTER) patches and update selftest to use the new vDSO.

v18:
* Update the ioctl-number.txt.
* Move the driver under arch/x86.
* Add SGX features (SGX, SGX1, SGX2) to the disabled-features.h.
* Rename the selftest as test_sgx (previously sgx-selftest).
* In order to enable process accounting, swap EPC pages and PCMD's to a VMA instead of shmem.
* Allow only to initialize and run enclaves with a subset of {DEBUG, MODE64BIT} set.
* Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE to allow an enclave to have privileged attributes e.g. PROVISIONKEY.

v17:
* Add a simple selftest.
* Fix a null pointer dereference to section->pages when its allocation fails.
* Add Sean's description of the exception handling to the documentation.

v16:
* Fixed SOB's in the commits that were a bit corrupted in v15.
* Implemented exceptio handling properly to detect_sgx().
* Use GENMASK() to define SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_TYPE_MASK.
* Updated the documentation to use rst definition lists.
* Added the missing Documentation/x86/index.rst, which has a link to intel_sgx.rst. Now the SGX and uapi documentation is properly generated with 'make htmldocs'.
* While enumerating EPC sections, if an undefined section is found, fail the driver initialization instead of continuing the initialization.
* Issue a warning if there are more than %SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS.
* Remove copyright notice from arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h.
* Migrated from ioremap_cache() to memremap().

v15:
* Split into more digestable size patches.
* Lots of small fixes and clean ups.
* Signal a "plain" SIGSEGV on an EPCM violation.

v14:
* Change the comment about X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC from “SGX launch configuration” to “SGX launch control”.
* Move the SGX-related CPU feature flags as part of the Linux defined virtual leaf 8.
* Add SGX_ prefix to the constants defining the ENCLS leaf functions.
* Use GENMASK*() and BIT*() in sgx_arch.h instead of raw hex numbers.
* Refine the long description for CONFIG_INTEL_SGX_CORE.
* Do not use pr_*_ratelimited() in the driver. The use of the rate limited versions is legacy cruft from the prototyping phase.
* Detect sleep with SGX_INVALID_EINIT_TOKEN instead of counting power cycles.
* Manually prefix with “sgx:” in the core SGX code instead of redefining pr_fmt.
* Report if IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHx MSRs are not writable in the driver instead of core because it is a driver requirement.
* Change prompt to bool in the entry for CONFIG_INTEL_SGX_CORE because the default is ‘n’.
* Rename struct sgx_epc_bank as struct sgx_epc_section in order to match the SDM.
* Allocate struct sgx_epc_page instances one at a time.
* Use “__iomem void *” pointers for the mapped EPC memory consistently.
* Retry once on SGX_INVALID_TOKEN in sgx_einit() instead of counting power cycles.
* Call enclave swapping operations directly from the driver instead of calling them .indirectly through struct sgx_epc_page_ops because indirect calls are not required yet as the patch set does not contain the KVM support.
* Added special signal SEGV_SGXERR to notify about SGX EPCM violation errors.

v13:
* Always use SGX_CPUID constant instead of a hardcoded value.
* Simplified and documented the macros and functions for ENCLS leaves.
* Enable sgx_free_page() to free active enclave pages on demand in order to allow sgx_invalidate() to delete enclave pages. It no longer performs EREMOVE if a page is in the process of being reclaimed.
* Use PM notifier per enclave so that we don't have to traverse the global list of active EPC pages to find enclaves.
* Removed unused SGX_LE_ROLLBACK constant from uapi/asm/sgx.h
* Always use ioremap() to map EPC banks as we only support 64-bit kernel.
* Invalidate IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH cache used by sgx_einit() when going to sleep.

v12:
* Split to more narrow scoped commits in order to ease the review process and use co-developed-by tag for co-authors of commits instead of listing them in the source files.
* Removed cruft EXPORT_SYMBOL() declarations and converted to static variables.
* Removed in-kernel LE i.e. this version of the SGX software stack only supports unlocked IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHx MSRs.
* Refined documentation on launching enclaves, swapping and enclave construction.
* Refined sgx_arch.h to include alignment information for every struct that requires it and removed structs that are not needed without an LE.
* Got rid of SGX_CPUID.
* SGX detection now prints log messages about firmware configuration issues.

v11:
* Polished ENCLS wrappers with refined exception handling.
* ksgxswapd was not stopped (regression in v5) in sgx_page_cache_teardown(), which causes a leaked kthread after driver deinitialization.
* Shutdown sgx_le_proxy when going to suspend because its EPC pages will be invalidated when resuming, which will cause it not function properly anymore.
* Set EINITTOKEN.VALID to zero for a token that is passed when SGXLEPUBKEYHASH matches MRSIGNER as alloc_page() does not give a zero page.
* Fixed the check in sgx_edbgrd() for a TCS page. Allowed to read offsets around the flags field, which causes a #GP. Only flags read is readable.
* On read access memcpy() call inside sgx_vma_access() had src and dest parameters in wrong order.
* The build issue with CONFIG_KASAN is now fixed. Added undefined symbols to LE even if “KASAN_SANITIZE := false” was set in the makefile.
* Fixed a regression in the #PF handler. If a page has SGX_ENCL_PAGE_RESERVED flag the #PF handler should unconditionally fail. It did not, which caused weird races when trying to change other parts of swapping code.
* EPC management has been refactored to a flat LRU cache and moved to arch/x86. The swapper thread reads a cluster of EPC pages and swaps all of them. It can now swap from multiple enclaves in the same round.
* For the sake of consistency with SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE, return -EINVAL when an enclave is already initialized or dead instead of zero.

v10:
* Cleaned up anon inode based IPC between the ring-0 and ring-3 parts of the driver.
* Unset the reserved flag from an enclave page if EDBGRD/WR fails (regression in v6).
* Close the anon inode when LE is stopped (regression in v9).
* Update the documentation with a more detailed description of SGX.

v9:
* Replaced kernel-LE IPC based on pipes with an anonymous inode. The driver does not require anymore new exports.

v8:
* Check that public key MSRs match the LE public key hash in the driver initialization when the MSRs are read-only.
* Fix the race in VA slot allocation by checking the fullness immediately after succeesful allocation.
* Fix the race in hash mrsigner calculation between the launch enclave and user enclaves by having a separate lock for hash calculation.

v7:
* Fixed offset calculation in sgx_edbgr/wr(). Address was masked with PAGE_MASK when it should have been masked with ~PAGE_MASK.
* Fixed a memory leak in sgx_ioc_enclave_create().
* Simplified swapping code by using a pointer array for a cluster instead of a linked list.
* Squeezed struct sgx_encl_page to 32 bytes.
* Fixed deferencing of an RSA key on OpenSSL 1.1.0.
* Modified TC's CMAC to use kernel AES-NI. Restructured the code
a bit in order to better align with kernel conventions.

v6:
* Fixed semaphore underrun when accessing /dev/sgx from the launch enclave.
* In sgx_encl_create() s/IS_ERR(secs)/IS_ERR(encl)/.
* Removed virtualization chapter from the documentation.
* Changed the default filename for the signing key as signing_key.pem.
* Reworked EPC management in a way that instead of a linked list of struct sgx_epc_page instances there is an array of integers that encodes address and bank of an EPC page (the same data as 'pa' field earlier). The locking has been moved to the EPC bank level instead of a global lock.
* Relaxed locking requirements for EPC management. EPC pages can be released back to the EPC bank concurrently.
* Cleaned up ptrace() code.
* Refined commit messages for new architectural constants.
* Sorted includes in every source file.
* Sorted local variable declarations according to the line length in every function.
* Style fixes based on Darren's comments to sgx_le.c.

v5:
* Described IPC between the Launch Enclave and kernel in the commit messages.
* Fixed all relevant checkpatch.pl issues that I have forgot fix in earlier versions except those that exist in the imported TinyCrypt code.
* Fixed spelling mistakes in the documentation.
* Forgot to check the return value of sgx_drv_subsys_init().
* Encapsulated properly page cache init and teardown.
* Collect epc pages to a temp list in sgx_add_epc_bank
* Removed SGX_ENCLAVE_INIT_ARCH constant.

v4:
* Tied life-cycle of the sgx_le_proxy process to /dev/sgx.
* Removed __exit annotation from sgx_drv_subsys_exit().
* Fixed a leak of a backing page in sgx_process_add_page_req() in the case when vm_insert_pfn() fails.
* Removed unused symbol exports for sgx_page_cache.c.
* Updated sgx_alloc_page() to require encl parameter and documented the behavior (Sean Christopherson).
* Refactored a more lean API for sgx_encl_find() and documented the behavior.
* Moved #PF handler to sgx_fault.c.
* Replaced subsys_system_register() with plain bus_register().
* Retry EINIT 2nd time only if MSRs are not locked.

v3:
* Check that FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED and FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_ENABLE are set.
* Return -ERESTARTSYS in __sgx_encl_add_page() when sgx_alloc_page() fails.
* Use unused bits in epc_page->pa to store the bank number.
* Removed #ifdef for WQ_NONREENTRANT.
* If mmu_notifier_register() fails with -EINTR, return -ERESTARTSYS.
* Added --remove-section=.got.plt to objcopy flags in order to prevent a dummy .got.plt, which will cause an inconsistent size for the LE.
* Documented sgx_encl_* functions.
* Added remark about AES implementation used inside the LE.
* Removed redundant sgx_sys_exit() from le/main.c.
* Fixed struct sgx_secinfo alignment from 128 to 64 bytes.
* Validate miscselect in sgx_encl_create().
* Fixed SSA frame size calculation to take the misc region into account.
* Implemented consistent exception handling to __encls() and __encls_ret().
* Implemented a proper device model in order to allow sysfs attributes and in-kernel API.
* Cleaned up various "find enclave" implementations to the unified sgx_encl_find().
* Validate that vm_pgoff is zero.
* Discard backing pages with shmem_truncate_range() after EADD.
* Added missing EEXTEND operations to LE signing and launch.
* Fixed SSA size for GPRS region from 168 to 184 bytes.
* Fixed the checks for TCS flags. Now DBGOPTIN is allowed.
* Check that TCS addresses are in ELRANGE and not just page aligned.
* Require kernel to be compiled with X64_64 and CPU_SUP_INTEL.
* Fixed an incorrect value for SGX_ATTR_DEBUG from 0x01 to 0x02.

v2:
* get_rand_uint32() changed the value of the pointer instead of value where it is pointing at.
* Launch enclave incorrectly used sigstruct attributes-field instead of enclave attributes-field.
* Removed unused struct sgx_add_page_req from sgx_ioctl.c
* Removed unused sgx_has_sgx2.
* Updated arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h so that it provides stub implementations when sgx in not enabled.
* Removed cruft rdmsr-calls from sgx_set_pubkeyhash_msrs().
* return -ENOMEM in sgx_alloc_page() when VA pages consume too much space
* removed unused global sgx_nr_pids
* moved sgx_encl_release to sgx_encl.c
* return -ERESTARTSYS instead of -EINTR in sgx_encl_init() Jarkko Sakkinen (11):
x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter
x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page() x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer
x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver
selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX
docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS

Sean Christopherson (10):
x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support
x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections
mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call

 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |   2 +
 .../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst      |   1 +
 Documentation/x86/index.rst                   |   1 +
 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst                     | 197 +++++
 MAINTAINERS                                   |  11 +
 arch/x86/Kconfig                              |  17 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile                  |   8 +-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c                 |  46 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h                 |  29 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S         |   9 +-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S                |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h                  |  50 +-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S      | 131 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h             |   5 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |   8 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h      |  18 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h                  |   8 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h              |   8 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h      |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h                  |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h                   |   5 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h               | 175 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile                  |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c                |  41 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile              |   5 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h                | 343 ++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c              | 209 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h              |  32 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c                | 758 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h                | 128 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h               | 238 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c               | 819 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c                | 753 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h                 |  65 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c                       |  19 +-
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                           |  45 +-
 include/linux/mm.h                            |   2 +
 mm/mprotect.c                                 |  14 +-
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h      |   7 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/Makefile              |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore        |   2 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile          |  53 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S            |  54 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h         |  21 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c            | 282 ++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c            | 199 +++++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h            |  38 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c       | 395 +++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c       |  20 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds     |  40 +
 .../selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S       |  89 ++
 52 files changed, 5383 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v33 1/21 x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add X86_FEATURE_SGX from CPUID.(EAX=7, ECX=1), which informs whether the CPU has SGX.

Add X86_FEATURE_SGX1 and X86_FEATURE_SGX2 from CPUID.(EAX=12H, ECX=0), which describe the level of SGX support available [1].

Add IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_ENABLE. BIOS can use this bit to opt-in SGX before locking the feature control MSR [2].

[1] Intel SDM: 36.7.2 Intel® SGX Resource Enumeration Leaves
[2] Intel SDM: 36.7.1 Intel® SGX Opt-In Configuration

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h        |  5 +++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h       |  7 ++++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h         |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c             |  4 ++++
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  7 ++++++-
 7 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +3 -2
index 59bf91c57aa8..efbdba5170a3 100644
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafs
 	CPUID_7_ECX,
 	CPUID_8000_0007_EBX,
 	CPUID_7_EDX,
+	CPUID_12_EAX,
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK					  ||	\
-	   BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19))
+	   BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))
 
 #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit)				\
 	 ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK,  0, feature_bit) ||	\
@@ -112,7 +113,7 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) ||	\
 	   DISABLED_MASK_CHECK					  ||	\
-	   BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19))
+	   BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))
 
 #define cpu_has(c, bit)							\
 	(__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 :	\
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +6 -1
index 02dabc9e77b0..545ac3e0e269 100644
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 /*
  * Defines x86 CPU feature bits
  */
-#define NCAPINTS			19	   /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
+#define NCAPINTS			20	   /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
 #define NBUGINTS			1	   /* N 32-bit bug flags */
 
 /*
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE		( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST		( 9*32+ 1) /* TSC adjustment MSR 0x3B */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX			( 9*32+ 2) /* Software Guard Extensions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_BMI1		( 9*32+ 3) /* 1st group bit manipulation extensions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_HLE			( 9*32+ 4) /* Hardware Lock Elision */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX2		( 9*32+ 5) /* AVX2 instructions */
@@ -373,6 +374,10 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+30) /* "" IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES MSR */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD	(18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
+/* Intel-defined SGX features, CPUID level 0x00000012:0 (EAX), word 19 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX1		(19*32+ 0) /* SGX1 leaf functions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX2		(19*32+ 1) /* SGX2 leaf functions */
+
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
  */
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +15 -3
index 4ea8584682f9..dbe534d5153f 100644
@@ -28,13 +28,18 @@
 # define DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR	(1<<(X86_FEATURE_CYRIX_ARR & 31))
 # define DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR	(1<<(X86_FEATURE_CENTAUR_MCR & 31))
 # define DISABLE_PCID		0
+# define DISABLE_SGX1		0
+# define DISABLE_SGX2		0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_VME		0
 # define DISABLE_K6_MTRR	0
 # define DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR	0
 # define DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR	0
 # define DISABLE_PCID		(1<<(X86_FEATURE_PCID & 31))
-#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+# define DISABLE_SGX1		(1<<(X86_FEATURE_SGX1 & 31))
+# define DISABLE_SGX2		(1<<(X86_FEATURE_SGX2 & 31))
+ #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
 # define DISABLE_PKU		0
@@ -56,6 +61,12 @@
 # define DISABLE_PTI		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX
+# define DISABLE_SGX	0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_SGX	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_SGX & 31))
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
  */
@@ -68,7 +79,7 @@
 #define DISABLED_MASK6	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK7	(DISABLE_PTI)
 #define DISABLED_MASK8	0
-#define DISABLED_MASK9	(DISABLE_SMAP)
+#define DISABLED_MASK9	(DISABLE_SMAP|DISABLE_SGX)
 #define DISABLED_MASK10	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK11	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK12	0
@@ -78,6 +89,7 @@
 #define DISABLED_MASK16	(DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)
 #define DISABLED_MASK17	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK18	0
-#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
+#define DISABLED_MASK19	(DISABLE_SGX1|DISABLE_SGX2)
+#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +1 -0
index e8370e64a155..18e08da19f16 100644
@@ -582,6 +582,7 @@
 #define FEAT_CTL_LOCKED				BIT(0)
 #define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX		BIT(1)
 #define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX	BIT(2)
+#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED			BIT(18)
 #define FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED			BIT(20)
 
 #define MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST             0x0000003b
arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +1 -1
index 6847d85400a8..039e58be2fe6 100644
@@ -101,6 +101,6 @@
 #define REQUIRED_MASK16	0
 #define REQUIRED_MASK17	0
 #define REQUIRED_MASK18	0
-#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
+#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +4 -0
index 043d93cdcaad..93105b14effd 100644
@@ -914,6 +914,10 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		c->x86_capability[CPUID_D_1_EAX] = eax;
 	}
 
+	/* Additional Intel-defined SGX flags: level 0x00000012 */
+	if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000012)
+		c->x86_capability[CPUID_12_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x00000012);
+
 	/* AMD-defined flags: level 0x80000001 */
 	eax = cpuid_eax(0x80000000);
 	c->extended_cpuid_level = eax;
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +6 -1
index db189945e9b0..fc4422f747d5 100644
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 /*
  * Defines x86 CPU feature bits
  */
-#define NCAPINTS			19	   /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
+#define NCAPINTS			20	   /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
 #define NBUGINTS			1	   /* N 32-bit bug flags */
 
 /*
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE		( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST		( 9*32+ 1) /* TSC adjustment MSR 0x3B */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX			( 9*32+ 2) /* Software Guard Extensions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_BMI1		( 9*32+ 3) /* 1st group bit manipulation extensions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_HLE			( 9*32+ 4) /* Hardware Lock Elision */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX2		( 9*32+ 5) /* AVX2 instructions */
@@ -372,6 +373,10 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+30) /* "" IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES MSR */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD	(18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
+/* Intel-defined SGX features, CPUID level 0x00000012:0 (EAX), word 19 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX1		(19*32+ 0) /* SGX1 leaf functions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX2		(19*32+ 1) /* SGX2 leaf functions */
+
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
  */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer Reviewed-by on v33 1/21
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 01/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits

Quoted 9 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add X86_FEATURE_SGX from CPUID.(EAX=7, ECX=1), which informs whether the CPU has SGX.

Add X86_FEATURE_SGX1 and X86_FEATURE_SGX2 from CPUID.(EAX=12H, ECX=0), which describe the level of SGX support available [1].

Add IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_ENABLE. BIOS can use this bit to opt-in SGX

I'm guessing that wants to be

IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL.SGX_ENABLE

judging by the diff and the SDM chapter.

Quoted 10 lines

before locking the feature control MSR [2].

[1] Intel SDM: 36.7.2 Intel® SGX Resource Enumeration Leaves
[2] Intel SDM: 36.7.1 Intel® SGX Opt-In Configuration

Quoted 8 lines
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h        |  5 +++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h       |  7 ++++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h         |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c             |  4 ++++
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  7 ++++++-

Also, please drop this change to tools/, see

https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

from today.

With those addressed:

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 01/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits

Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 8 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add X86_FEATURE_SGX from CPUID.(EAX=7, ECX=1), which informs whether the CPU has SGX.

Add X86_FEATURE_SGX1 and X86_FEATURE_SGX2 from CPUID.(EAX=12H, ECX=0), which describe the level of SGX support available [1].

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Add IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_ENABLE. BIOS can use this bit to opt-in SGX

I'm guessing that wants to be

IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL.SGX_ENABLE

judging by the diff and the SDM chapter.

Underscore must be just a typo.

Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 11 lines

before locking the feature control MSR [2].

[1] Intel SDM: 36.7.2 Intel® SGX Resource Enumeration Leaves
[2] Intel SDM: 36.7.1 Intel® SGX Opt-In Configuration

Quoted 8 lines
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h        |  5 +++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h       |  7 ++++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h         |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c             |  4 ++++
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  7 ++++++-
Quoted 5 lines

Also, please drop this change to tools/, see

https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

from today.

OK I reverted it [*].

Quoted 3 lines

With those addressed:

Thank you, I'll update this to the commit.

Quoted 8 lines

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

[*] By "git diff -R HEAD~1 -- tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | patch -p1".

/Jarkko

#4 lore raw

PATCH v33 2/21 x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, which informs whether or not the CPU supports SGX Launch Control.

Add MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}, which when combined contain a SHA256 hash of a 3072-bit RSA public key. SGX backed software packages, so called enclaves, are always signed. All enclaves signed with the public key are unconditionally allowed to initialize. [1]

Add FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_LE_WR bit of the feature control MSR, which informs whether the aformentioned MSRs are writable or not. If the bit is off, the public key MSRs are read-only for the OS.

If the MSRs are read-only, the platform must provide a launch enclave (LE). LE can create cryptographic tokens for other enclaves that they can pass together with their signature to the ENCLS(EINIT) opcode, which is used to initialize enclaves.

Linux is unlikely to support the locked configuration because it takes away the control of the launch decisions from the kernel.

[1] Intel SDM: 38.1.4 Intel SGX Launch Control Configuration

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   | 7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
index 545ac3e0e269..0a4541e4f076 100644
@@ -352,6 +352,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLDEMOTE		(16*32+25) /* CLDEMOTE instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIRI		(16*32+27) /* MOVDIRI instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B		(16*32+28) /* MOVDIR64B instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC		(16*32+30) /* Software Guard Extensions Launch Control */
 
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000007 (EBX), word 17 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_OVERFLOW_RECOV	(17*32+ 0) /* MCA overflow recovery support */
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +7 -0
index 18e08da19f16..3d7c89a8533f 100644
@@ -582,6 +582,7 @@
 #define FEAT_CTL_LOCKED				BIT(0)
 #define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX		BIT(1)
 #define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX	BIT(2)
+#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED			BIT(17)
 #define FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED			BIT(18)
 #define FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED			BIT(20)
 
@@ -602,6 +603,12 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE		0x00000079
 #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV		0x0000008b
 
+/* Intel SGX Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs */
+#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0	0x0000008C
+#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH1	0x0000008D
+#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH2	0x0000008E
+#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3	0x0000008F
+
 #define MSR_IA32_SMM_MONITOR_CTL	0x0000009b
 #define MSR_IA32_SMBASE			0x0000009e
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer Reviewed-by on v33 2/21
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits

Quoted 11 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, which informs whether or not the CPU supports SGX Launch Control.

Add MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}, which when combined contain a SHA256 hash of a 3072-bit RSA public key. SGX backed software packages, so called enclaves, are always signed. All enclaves signed with the public key are unconditionally allowed to initialize. [1]

Add FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_LE_WR bit of the feature control MSR, which informs

LE_WR or LC_ENABLED?

With that addressed:

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits

Quoted 6 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 5 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, which informs whether or not the CPU supports SGX Launch Control.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Add MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}, which when combined contain a SHA256 hash of a 3072-bit RSA public key. SGX backed software packages, so called enclaves, are always signed. All enclaves signed with the public key are unconditionally allowed to initialize. [1]

Add FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_LE_WR bit of the feature control MSR, which informs

LE_WR or LC_ENABLED?

It should be FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED, i.e. the actual code is correct. We updated the #define to use the SDM name to be consistent with the other bits and neglected to update the changelog.

Thanks!

Quoted 9 lines

With that addressed:

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits

Quoted 14 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 13 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 11 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, which informs whether or not the CPU supports SGX Launch Control.

Add MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}, which when combined contain a SHA256 hash of a 3072-bit RSA public key. SGX backed software packages, so called enclaves, are always signed. All enclaves signed with the public key are unconditionally allowed to initialize. [1]

Add FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_LE_WR bit of the feature control MSR, which informs

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 1 line

LE_WR or LC_ENABLED?

It should be FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED, i.e. the actual code is correct. We updated the #define to use the SDM name to be consistent with the other bits and neglected to update the changelog.

Thanks!

Quoted 3 lines

With that addressed:

I'll update the commit according to this information.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Signature · 5 lines
-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

Thank you.

/Jarkko

#8 lore raw

PATCH v33 3/21 x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Include SGX bit to the PF error codes and throw SIGSEGV with PF_SGX when a #PF with SGX set happens.

CPU throws a #PF with the SGX bit in the event of Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) conflict. The EPCM is a CPU-internal table, which describes the properties for a enclave page. Enclaves are measured and signed software entities, which SGX hosts. [1]

Although the primary purpose of the EPCM conflict checks is to prevent malicious accesses to an enclave, an illegit access can happen also for legit reasons.

All SGX reserved memory, including EPCM is encrypted with a transient key that does not survive from the power transition. Throwing a SIGSEGV allows user space software react when this happens (e.g. rec-create the enclave, which was invalidated).

[1] Intel SDM: 36.5.1 Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c          | 13 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +1 -0
index 714b1a30e7b0..ee3617b67bf4 100644
@@ -58,5 +58,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {
 	X86_PF_RSVD	=		1 << 3,
 	X86_PF_INSTR	=		1 << 4,
 	X86_PF_PK	=		1 << 5,
+	X86_PF_SGX	=		1 << 15,
 };
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +13 -0
index 66be9bd60307..25d48aae36c1 100644
@@ -1055,6 +1055,19 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	if (error_code & X86_PF_PK)
 		return 1;
 
+	/*
+	 * Access is blocked by the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), i.e. the
+	 * access is allowed by the PTE but not the EPCM. This usually happens
+	 * when the EPCM is yanked out from under us, e.g. by hardware after a
+	 * suspend/resume cycle. In any case, software, i.e. the kernel, can't
+	 * fix the source of the fault as the EPCM can't be directly modified by
+	 * software. Handle the fault as an access error in order to signal
+	 * userspace so that userspace can rebuild their enclave(s), even though
+	 * userspace may not have actually violated access permissions.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(error_code & X86_PF_SGX))
+		return 1;
+
 	/*
 	 * Make sure to check the VMA so that we do not perform
 	 * faults just to hit a X86_PF_PK as soon as we fill in a
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX

Quoted 6 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Include SGX bit to the PF error codes and throw SIGSEGV with PF_SGX when a #PF with SGX set happens.

CPU throws a #PF with the SGX bit in the event of Enclave Page Cache Map

				   ^
				   set
Quoted 11 lines

(EPCM) conflict. The EPCM is a CPU-internal table, which describes the properties for a enclave page. Enclaves are measured and signed software entities, which SGX hosts. [1]

Although the primary purpose of the EPCM conflict checks is to prevent malicious accesses to an enclave, an illegit access can happen also for legit reasons.

All SGX reserved memory, including EPCM is encrypted with a transient key that does not survive from the power transition. Throwing a SIGSEGV allows user space software react when this happens (e.g. rec-create the

			    ^
			    to				   recreate
Quoted 17 lines

enclave, which was invalidated).

[1] Intel SDM: 36.5.1 Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c          | 13 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +0 -0
index 714b1a30e7b0..ee3617b67bf4 100644

arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h enum x86_pf_error_code { · line 61

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +1 -0
@@ -58,5 +58,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {
 	X86_PF_RSVD	=		1 << 3,
 	X86_PF_INSTR	=		1 << 4,
 	X86_PF_PK	=		1 << 5,
+	X86_PF_SGX	=		1 << 15,

Needs to be added to the doc above it.

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +0 -0
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +0 -0
index 66be9bd60307..25d48aae36c1 100644
@@ -1055,6 +1055,19 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	if (error_code & X86_PF_PK)
 		return 1;
 

arch/x86/mm/fault.c access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) · line 1067

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +10 -0
+	/*
+	 * Access is blocked by the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), i.e. the
+	 * access is allowed by the PTE but not the EPCM. This usually happens
+	 * when the EPCM is yanked out from under us, e.g. by hardware after a
+	 * suspend/resume cycle. In any case, software, i.e. the kernel, can't
+	 * fix the source of the fault as the EPCM can't be directly modified by
+	 * software. Handle the fault as an access error in order to signal
+	 * userspace so that userspace can rebuild their enclave(s), even though
+	 * userspace may not have actually violated access permissions.
+	 */

Lemme check whether I understand this correctly: userspace must check whether the SIGSEGV is generated on an access to an enclave page?

Also, do I see it correctly that when this happens, dmesg will have

printk("%s%s[%d]: segfault at %lx ip %px sp %px error %lx",

due to:

       if (likely(show_unhandled_signals))
               show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk);

which does:

if (!unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV))
return;

or is the task expected to register a SIGSEGV handler so that the segfault doesn't land in dmesg?

If so, are we documenting this?

If not, then we should not issue any "segfault" messages to dmesg because that would be wrong.

Or maybe I'm not seeing it right but I don't have the hardware to test this out...

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX

Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 8 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +0 -0
index 66be9bd60307..25d48aae36c1 100644
@@ -1055,6 +1055,19 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	if (error_code & X86_PF_PK)
 		return 1;
 
Quoted 13 lines

arch/x86/mm/fault.c access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) · line 1067

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +10 -0
+	/*
+	 * Access is blocked by the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), i.e. the
+	 * access is allowed by the PTE but not the EPCM. This usually happens
+	 * when the EPCM is yanked out from under us, e.g. by hardware after a
+	 * suspend/resume cycle. In any case, software, i.e. the kernel, can't
+	 * fix the source of the fault as the EPCM can't be directly modified by
+	 * software. Handle the fault as an access error in order to signal
+	 * userspace so that userspace can rebuild their enclave(s), even though
+	 * userspace may not have actually violated access permissions.
+	 */

Lemme check whether I understand this correctly: userspace must check whether the SIGSEGV is generated on an access to an enclave page?

Sort of. Technically it's that's an accurate statement, but practically speaking userspace can only access enclave pages when it is executing in the enclave, and exceptions in enclaves have unique behavior. Exceptions in enclaves essentially bounce through a userspace-software-defined location prior to being delivered to the kernel. The trampoline is done by the CPU so that the CPU can scrub the GPRs, XSAVE state, etc... and hide the true RIP of the exception. The pre-exception enclave state is saved into protected memory and restored when userspace resumes the enclave.

Enterring or resuming an enclave can only be done through dedicted ENCLU instructions, so really it ends up being that the SIGSEGV handler needs to check the IP that "caused" the fault, which is actually the IP of the trampoline.

But, that's only the first half of the story...

Quoted 9 lines

Also, do I see it correctly that when this happens, dmesg will have

printk("%s%s[%d]: segfault at %lx ip %px sp %px error %lx",

due to:

       if (likely(show_unhandled_signals))
               show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk);
Quoted 7 lines

which does:

if (!unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV))
return;

or is the task expected to register a SIGSEGV handler so that the segfault doesn't land in dmesg?

Yes, without extra help, any task running an enclave is expected to register a SIGSEGV handler so that the task can restart the enclave if the EPC is "lost".

However, building and running enclaves is complex, and the vast majority of SGX enabled applications are expected to leverage a library of one kind or another to hand the bulk of the gory details. But, signal handling in libraries is a mess, e.g. requires filtering/forwarding, resignaling, etc...

To that end, in v14 of this patch[1], Andy Lutomirski came up with the idea of adding a vDSO function to provide the low level enclave EENTER/ERESUME and trampoline, and then teaching the kernel to do exception fixup on the relevant instructions in the vDSO. The vDSO's exception fixup then returns to normal userspace, with a (technically optional) struct holding the details of the exception. That allows for synchronous delivery of exceptions in enclaves, obviates the need for userspace to regsiter a SIGSEGV handler, and also means the SIGSEGV will never show up in dmesg so long as userspace is using the vDSO. The kernel still supports direct EENTER/ERESUME, but AFAIK everyone is moving (or has moved) to the vDSO interface.

The vDSO stuff is in patches 15-18 of this series.

There's a gigantic thread on all the alternatives that were considered[2].

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrXByb2UVuZ6AXUeOd8y90NAikbZuvdN3wf_TjHZ+CxNhA@mail.gmail.com
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrWdpoDkbZjkucKL91GWpDPG9p=VqYrULade2pFDR7S=GQ@mail.gmail.com

Quoted 16 lines

If so, are we documenting this?

If not, then we should not issue any "segfault" messages to dmesg because that would be wrong.

Or maybe I'm not seeing it right but I don't have the hardware to test this out...

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
maintainer
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX

Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson

However, building and running enclaves is complex, and the vast majority of SGX enabled applications are expected to leverage a library of one kind or another to hand the bulk of the gory details.

I gotta say this rings a bell: dhansen alluded on IRC to the jumping through hoops one needs to do in order to run SGX enclaves.

...

Quoted 6 lines

The vDSO stuff is in patches 15-18 of this series.

There's a gigantic thread on all the alternatives that were considered[2].

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrXByb2UVuZ6AXUeOd8y90NAikbZuvdN3wf_TjHZ+CxNhA@mail.gmail.com
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrWdpoDkbZjkucKL91GWpDPG9p=VqYrULade2pFDR7S=GQ@mail.gmail.com

Yeah, that makes it very clear. Thanks a lot for taking the time and writing it down. I've snipped it for brevity but it is very useful!

Thx!

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX

In reply to Borislav Petkov
Quoted 36 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 6 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Include SGX bit to the PF error codes and throw SIGSEGV with PF_SGX when a #PF with SGX set happens.

CPU throws a #PF with the SGX bit in the event of Enclave Page Cache Map

				   ^
				   set
Quoted 11 lines

(EPCM) conflict. The EPCM is a CPU-internal table, which describes the properties for a enclave page. Enclaves are measured and signed software entities, which SGX hosts. [1]

Although the primary purpose of the EPCM conflict checks is to prevent malicious accesses to an enclave, an illegit access can happen also for legit reasons.

All SGX reserved memory, including EPCM is encrypted with a transient key that does not survive from the power transition. Throwing a SIGSEGV allows user space software react when this happens (e.g. rec-create the

			    ^
			    to				   recreate
Quoted 12 lines

enclave, which was invalidated).

[1] Intel SDM: 36.5.1 Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c          | 13 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
Quoted 11 lines

arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h enum x86_pf_error_code { · line 61

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +1 -0
index 714b1a30e7b0..ee3617b67bf4 100644
@@ -58,5 +58,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {
 	X86_PF_RSVD	=		1 << 3,
 	X86_PF_INSTR	=		1 << 4,
 	X86_PF_PK	=		1 << 5,
+	X86_PF_SGX	=		1 << 15,

Needs to be added to the doc above it.

I ended up with:

* bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access
* bit 6 == 1: inside SGX enclave
*/

/Jarkko

maintainer
#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX

Quoted 4 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

I ended up with:

* bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access
* bit 6 == 1: inside SGX enclave

You mean bit 15.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 03/21] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX

Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 4 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

I ended up with:

* bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access
* bit 6 == 1: inside SGX enclave

You mean bit 15.

Duh, did this last thing before falling into sleep last night :-/

Yes, it should be 15.

I'll also rephrase the text to "inside an SGX enclave".

/Jarkko

#15 lore raw

PATCH v33 4/21 x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Define the SGX microarchitectural data structures used by various SGX opcodes. This is not an exhaustive representation of all SGX data structures but only those needed by the kernel.

The data structures are described in:

Intel SDM: 37.6 INTEL® SGX DATA STRUCTURES OVERVIEW

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h | 343 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 343 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h new file +343 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ddae55e9d4d8
@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */
+/**
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Contains data structures defined by the SGX architecture.  Data structures
+ * defined by the Linux software stack should not be placed here.
+ */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H
+#define _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H
+
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define SGX_CPUID				0x12
+#define SGX_CPUID_FIRST_VARIABLE_SUB_LEAF	2
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_return_code - The return code type for ENCLS, ENCLU and ENCLV
+ * %SGX_NOT_TRACKED:		Previous ETRACK's shootdown sequence has not
+ *				been completed yet.
+ * %SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN:	EINITTOKEN is invalid and enclave signer's
+ *				public key does not match IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH.
+ * %SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT:		An unmasked event, e.g. INTR, was received
+ */
+enum sgx_return_code {
+	SGX_NOT_TRACKED			= 11,
+	SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN		= 16,
+	SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT		= 128,
+};
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_sub_leaf_types - SGX CPUID variable sub-leaf types
+ * %SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_INVALID:		Indicates this sub-leaf is invalid.
+ * %SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_EPC_SECTION:	Sub-leaf enumerates an EPC section.
+ */
+enum sgx_sub_leaf_types {
+	SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_INVALID	= 0x0,
+	SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_EPC_SECTION	= 0x1,
+};
+
+#define SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_TYPE_MASK	GENMASK(3, 0)
+
+#define SGX_MODULUS_SIZE 384
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_miscselect - additional information to an SSA frame
+ * %SGX_MISC_EXINFO:	Report #PF or #GP to the SSA frame.
+ *
+ * Save State Area (SSA) is a stack inside the enclave used to store processor
+ * state when an exception or interrupt occurs. This enum defines additional
+ * information stored to an SSA frame.
+ */
+enum sgx_miscselect {
+	SGX_MISC_EXINFO		= BIT(0),
+};
+
+#define SGX_MISC_RESERVED_MASK	GENMASK_ULL(63, 1)
+
+#define SGX_SSA_GPRS_SIZE		184
+#define SGX_SSA_MISC_EXINFO_SIZE	16
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_attributes - the attributes field in &struct sgx_secs
+ * %SGX_ATTR_INIT:		Enclave can be entered (is initialized).
+ * %SGX_ATTR_DEBUG:		Allow ENCLS(EDBGRD) and ENCLS(EDBGWR).
+ * %SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT:		Tell that this a 64-bit enclave.
+ * %SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY:      Allow to use provisioning keys for remote
+ *				attestation.
+ * %SGX_ATTR_KSS:		Allow to use key separation and sharing (KSS).
+ * %SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY:	Allow to use token signing key that is used to
+ *				sign cryptographic tokens that can be passed to
+ *				EINIT as an authorization to run an enclave.
+ */
+enum sgx_attribute {
+	SGX_ATTR_INIT		= BIT(0),
+	SGX_ATTR_DEBUG		= BIT(1),
+	SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT	= BIT(2),
+	SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY	= BIT(4),
+	SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY	= BIT(5),
+	SGX_ATTR_KSS		= BIT(7),
+};
+
+#define SGX_ATTR_RESERVED_MASK	(BIT_ULL(3) | BIT_ULL(6) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 8))
+#define SGX_ATTR_ALLOWED_MASK	(SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT | \
+				 SGX_ATTR_KSS)
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_secs - SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS)
+ * @size:		size of the address space
+ * @base:		base address of the  address space
+ * @ssa_frame_size:	size of an SSA frame
+ * @miscselect:		additional information stored to an SSA frame
+ * @attributes:		attributes for enclave
+ * @xfrm:		XSave-Feature Request Mask (subset of XCR0)
+ * @mrenclave:		SHA256-hash of the enclave contents
+ * @mrsigner:		SHA256-hash of the public key used to sign the SIGSTRUCT
+ * @config_id:		a user-defined value that is used in key derivation
+ * @isv_prod_id:	a user-defined value that is used in key derivation
+ * @isv_svn:		a user-defined value that is used in key derivation
+ * @config_svn:		a user-defined value that is used in key derivation
+ *
+ * SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) is a special enclave page that is not
+ * visible in the address space. In fact, this structure defines the address
+ * range and other global attributes for the enclave and it is the first EPC
+ * page created for any enclave. It is moved from a temporary buffer to an EPC
+ * by the means of ENCLS(ECREATE) leaf.
+ */
+struct sgx_secs {
+	u64 size;
+	u64 base;
+	u32 ssa_frame_size;
+	u32 miscselect;
+	u8  reserved1[24];
+	u64 attributes;
+	u64 xfrm;
+	u32 mrenclave[8];
+	u8  reserved2[32];
+	u32 mrsigner[8];
+	u8  reserved3[32];
+	u32 config_id[16];
+	u16 isv_prod_id;
+	u16 isv_svn;
+	u16 config_svn;
+	u8  reserved4[3834];
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_tcs_flags - execution flags for TCS
+ * %SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN:	If enabled allows single-stepping and breakpoints
+ *			inside an enclave. It is cleared by EADD but can
+ *			be set later with EDBGWR.
+ */
+enum sgx_tcs_flags {
+	SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN	= 0x01,
+};
+
+#define SGX_TCS_RESERVED_MASK	GENMASK_ULL(63, 1)
+#define SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE	4024
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_tcs - Thread Control Structure (TCS)
+ * @state:		used to mark an entered TCS
+ * @flags:		execution flags (cleared by EADD)
+ * @ssa_offset:		SSA stack offset relative to the enclave base
+ * @ssa_index:		the current SSA frame index (cleard by EADD)
+ * @nr_ssa_frames:	the number of frame in the SSA stack
+ * @entry_offset:	entry point offset relative to the enclave base
+ * @exit_addr:		address outside the enclave to exit on an exception or
+ *			interrupt
+ * @fs_offset:		offset relative to the enclave base to become FS
+ *			segment inside the enclave
+ * @gs_offset:		offset relative to the enclave base to become GS
+ *			segment inside the enclave
+ * @fs_limit:		size to become a new FS-limit (only 32-bit enclaves)
+ * @gs_limit:		size to become a new GS-limit (only 32-bit enclaves)
+ *
+ * Thread Control Structure (TCS) is an enclave page visible in its address
+ * space that defines an entry point inside the enclave. A thread enters inside
+ * an enclave by supplying address of TCS to ENCLU(EENTER). A TCS can be entered
+ * by only one thread at a time.
+ */
+struct sgx_tcs {
+	u64 state;
+	u64 flags;
+	u64 ssa_offset;
+	u32 ssa_index;
+	u32 nr_ssa_frames;
+	u64 entry_offset;
+	u64 exit_addr;
+	u64 fs_offset;
+	u64 gs_offset;
+	u32 fs_limit;
+	u32 gs_limit;
+	u8  reserved[SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE];
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_pageinfo - an enclave page descriptor
+ * @addr:	address of the enclave page
+ * @contents:	pointer to the page contents
+ * @metadata:	pointer either to a SECINFO or PCMD instance
+ * @secs:	address of the SECS page
+ */
+struct sgx_pageinfo {
+	u64 addr;
+	u64 contents;
+	u64 metadata;
+	u64 secs;
+} __packed __aligned(32);
+
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_page_type - bits in the SECINFO flags defining the page type
+ * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS:	a SECS page
+ * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS:	a TCS page
+ * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG:	a regular page
+ * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA:	a VA page
+ * %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM:	a page in trimmed state
+ */
+enum sgx_page_type {
+	SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS,
+	SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS,
+	SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG,
+	SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA,
+	SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM,
+};
+
+#define SGX_NR_PAGE_TYPES	5
+#define SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK	GENMASK(7, 0)
+
+/**
+ * enum sgx_secinfo_flags - the flags field in &struct sgx_secinfo
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_R:	allow read
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_W:	allow write
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_X:	allow execution
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_SECS:	a SECS page
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_TCS:	a TCS page
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_REG:	a regular page
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_VA:	a VA page
+ * %SGX_SECINFO_TRIM:	a page in trimmed state
+ */
+enum sgx_secinfo_flags {
+	SGX_SECINFO_R			= BIT(0),
+	SGX_SECINFO_W			= BIT(1),
+	SGX_SECINFO_X			= BIT(2),
+	SGX_SECINFO_SECS		= (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS << 8),
+	SGX_SECINFO_TCS			= (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS << 8),
+	SGX_SECINFO_REG			= (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG << 8),
+	SGX_SECINFO_VA			= (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA << 8),
+	SGX_SECINFO_TRIM		= (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM << 8),
+};
+
+#define SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK	GENMASK_ULL(2, 0)
+#define SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK	(SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK << 8)
+#define SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK	~(SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK | \
+					  SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK)
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_secinfo - describes attributes of an EPC page
+ * @flags:	permissions and type
+ *
+ * Used together with ENCLS leaves that add or modify an EPC page to an
+ * enclave to define page permissions and type.
+ */
+struct sgx_secinfo {
+	u64 flags;
+	u8  reserved[56];
+} __packed __aligned(64);
+
+#define SGX_PCMD_RESERVED_SIZE 40
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_pcmd - Paging Crypto Metadata (PCMD)
+ * @enclave_id:	enclave identifier
+ * @mac:	MAC over PCMD, page contents and isvsvn
+ *
+ * PCMD is stored for every swapped page to the regular memory. When ELDU loads
+ * the page back it recalculates the MAC by using a isvsvn number stored in a
+ * VA page. Together these two structures bring integrity and rollback
+ * protection.
+ */
+struct sgx_pcmd {
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	u64 enclave_id;
+	u8  reserved[SGX_PCMD_RESERVED_SIZE];
+	u8  mac[16];
+} __packed __aligned(128);
+
+#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED1_SIZE 84
+#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED2_SIZE 20
+#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED3_SIZE 32
+#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED4_SIZE 12
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_sigstruct_header -  defines author of the enclave
+ * @header1:		constant byte string
+ * @vendor:		must be either 0x0000 or 0x8086
+ * @date:		YYYYMMDD in BCD
+ * @header2:		costant byte string
+ * @swdefined:		software defined value
+ */
+struct sgx_sigstruct_header {
+	u64 header1[2];
+	u32 vendor;
+	u32 date;
+	u64 header2[2];
+	u32 swdefined;
+	u8  reserved1[84];
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_sigstruct_body - defines contents of the enclave
+ * @miscselect:		additional information stored to an SSA frame
+ * @misc_mask:		required miscselect in SECS
+ * @attributes:		attributes for enclave
+ * @xfrm:		XSave-Feature Request Mask (subset of XCR0)
+ * @attributes_mask:	required attributes in SECS
+ * @xfrm_mask:		required XFRM in SECS
+ * @mrenclave:		SHA256-hash of the enclave contents
+ * @isvprodid:		a user-defined value that is used in key derivation
+ * @isvsvn:		a user-defined value that is used in key derivation
+ */
+struct sgx_sigstruct_body {
+	u32 miscselect;
+	u32 misc_mask;
+	u8  reserved2[20];
+	u64 attributes;
+	u64 xfrm;
+	u64 attributes_mask;
+	u64 xfrm_mask;
+	u8  mrenclave[32];
+	u8  reserved3[32];
+	u16 isvprodid;
+	u16 isvsvn;
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sgx_sigstruct - an enclave signature
+ * @header:		defines author of the enclave
+ * @modulus:		the modulus of the public key
+ * @exponent:		the exponent of the public key
+ * @signature:		the signature calculated over the fields except modulus,
+ * @body:		defines contents of the enclave
+ * @q1:			a value used in RSA signature verification
+ * @q2:			a value used in RSA signature verification
+ *
+ * Header and body are the parts that are actual signed. The remaining fields
+ * define the signature of the enclave.
+ */
+struct sgx_sigstruct {
+	struct sgx_sigstruct_header header;
+	u8  modulus[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE];
+	u32 exponent;
+	u8  signature[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE];
+	struct sgx_sigstruct_body body;
+	u8  reserved4[12];
+	u8  q1[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE];
+	u8  q2[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE];
+} __packed;
+
+#define SGX_LAUNCH_TOKEN_SIZE 304
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#16 lore raw

PATCH v33 5/21 x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

ENCLS is a ring 0 instruction, which contains a set of leaf functions for managing an enclave. Enclaves are measured and signed software entities, which are protected by asserting the outside memory accesses and memory encryption.

Add a two-layer macro system along with an encoding scheme to allow wrappers to return trap numbers along ENCLS-specific error codes. The bottom layer of the macro system splits between the leafs that return an error code and those that do not. The second layer generates the correct input/output annotations based on the number of operands for each leaf function.

ENCLS leaf functions are documented in

Intel SDM: 36.6 ENCLAVE INSTRUCTIONS AND INTEL®

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 238 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 238 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h new file +238 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f716b4328614
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */
+#ifndef _X86_ENCLS_H
+#define _X86_ENCLS_H
+
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+enum sgx_encls_leaf {
+	ECREATE	= 0x00,
+	EADD	= 0x01,
+	EINIT	= 0x02,
+	EREMOVE	= 0x03,
+	EDGBRD	= 0x04,
+	EDGBWR	= 0x05,
+	EEXTEND	= 0x06,
+	ELDU	= 0x08,
+	EBLOCK	= 0x09,
+	EPA	= 0x0A,
+	EWB	= 0x0B,
+	ETRACK	= 0x0C,
+};
+
+/**
+ * ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG - flag signifying an ENCLS return code is a trapnr
+ *
+ * ENCLS has its own (positive value) error codes and also generates
+ * ENCLS specific #GP and #PF faults.  And the ENCLS values get munged
+ * with system error codes as everything percolates back up the stack.
+ * Unfortunately (for us), we need to precisely identify each unique
+ * error code, e.g. the action taken if EWB fails varies based on the
+ * type of fault and on the exact SGX error code, i.e. we can't simply
+ * convert all faults to -EFAULT.
+ *
+ * To make all three error types coexist, we set bit 30 to identify an
+ * ENCLS fault.  Bit 31 (technically bits N:31) is used to differentiate
+ * between positive (faults and SGX error codes) and negative (system
+ * error codes) values.
+ */
+#define ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG 0x40000000
+
+/* Retrieve the encoded trapnr from the specified return code. */
+#define ENCLS_TRAPNR(r) ((r) & ~ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)
+
+/* Issue a WARN() about an ENCLS leaf. */
+#define ENCLS_WARN(r, name) {						  \
+	do {								  \
+		int _r = (r);						  \
+		WARN_ONCE(_r, "%s returned %d (0x%x)\n", (name), _r, _r); \
+	} while (0);							  \
+}
+
+/**
+ * encls_failed() - Check if an ENCLS leaf function failed
+ * @ret:	the return value of an ENCLS leaf function call
+ *
+ * Check if an ENCLS leaf function failed. This happens when the leaf function
+ * causes a fault that is not caused by an EPCM conflict or when the leaf
+ * function returns a non-zero value.
+ */
+static inline bool encls_failed(int ret)
+{
+	int epcm_trapnr;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX2))
+		epcm_trapnr = X86_TRAP_PF;
+	else
+		epcm_trapnr = X86_TRAP_GP;
+
+	if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)
+		return ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret) != epcm_trapnr;
+
+	return !!ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __encls_ret_N - encode an ENCLS leaf that returns an error code in EAX
+ * @rax:	leaf number
+ * @inputs:	asm inputs for the leaf
+ *
+ * Emit assembly for an ENCLS leaf that returns an error code, e.g. EREMOVE.
+ * And because SGX isn't complex enough as it is, leafs that return an error
+ * code also modify flags.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *	0 on success,
+ *	SGX error code on failure
+ */
+#define __encls_ret_N(rax, inputs...)				\
+	({							\
+	int ret;						\
+	asm volatile(						\
+	"1: .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xcf;\n\t"			\
+	"2:\n"							\
+	".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"				\
+	"3: orl $"__stringify(ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)",%%eax\n"	\
+	"   jmp 2b\n"						\
+	".previous\n"						\
+	_ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(1b, 3b)				\
+	: "=a"(ret)						\
+	: "a"(rax), inputs					\
+	: "memory", "cc");					\
+	ret;							\
+	})
+
+#define __encls_ret_1(rax, rcx)		\
+	({				\
+	__encls_ret_N(rax, "c"(rcx));	\
+	})
+
+#define __encls_ret_2(rax, rbx, rcx)		\
+	({					\
+	__encls_ret_N(rax, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx));	\
+	})
+
+#define __encls_ret_3(rax, rbx, rcx, rdx)			\
+	({							\
+	__encls_ret_N(rax, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx), "d"(rdx));	\
+	})
+
+/**
+ * __encls_N - encode an ENCLS leaf that doesn't return an error code
+ * @rax:	leaf number
+ * @rbx_out:	optional output variable
+ * @inputs:	asm inputs for the leaf
+ *
+ * Emit assembly for an ENCLS leaf that does not return an error code,
+ * e.g. ECREATE.  Leaves without error codes either succeed or fault.
+ * @rbx_out is an optional parameter for use by EDGBRD, which returns
+ * the the requested value in RBX.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   0 on success,
+ *   trapnr with ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG set on fault
+ */
+#define __encls_N(rax, rbx_out, inputs...)			\
+	({							\
+	int ret;						\
+	asm volatile(						\
+	"1: .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xcf;\n\t"			\
+	"   xor %%eax,%%eax;\n"					\
+	"2:\n"							\
+	".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"				\
+	"3: orl $"__stringify(ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)",%%eax\n"	\
+	"   jmp 2b\n"						\
+	".previous\n"						\
+	_ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(1b, 3b)				\
+	: "=a"(ret), "=b"(rbx_out)				\
+	: "a"(rax), inputs					\
+	: "memory");						\
+	ret;							\
+	})
+
+#define __encls_2(rax, rbx, rcx)				\
+	({							\
+	unsigned long ign_rbx_out;				\
+	__encls_N(rax, ign_rbx_out, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx));	\
+	})
+
+#define __encls_1_1(rax, data, rcx)			\
+	({						\
+	unsigned long rbx_out;				\
+	int ret = __encls_N(rax, rbx_out, "c"(rcx));	\
+	if (!ret)					\
+		data = rbx_out;				\
+	ret;						\
+	})
+
+static inline int __ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *secs)
+{
+	return __encls_2(ECREATE, pginfo, secs);
+}
+
+static inline int __eextend(void *secs, void *addr)
+{
+	return __encls_2(EEXTEND, secs, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __eadd(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr)
+{
+	return __encls_2(EADD, pginfo, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __einit(void *sigstruct, void *token, void *secs)
+{
+	return __encls_ret_3(EINIT, sigstruct, secs, token);
+}
+
+static inline int __eremove(void *addr)
+{
+	return __encls_ret_1(EREMOVE, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __edbgwr(void *addr, unsigned long *data)
+{
+	return __encls_2(EDGBWR, *data, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __edbgrd(void *addr, unsigned long *data)
+{
+	return __encls_1_1(EDGBRD, *data, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __etrack(void *addr)
+{
+	return __encls_ret_1(ETRACK, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __eldu(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr,
+			 void *va)
+{
+	return __encls_ret_3(ELDU, pginfo, addr, va);
+}
+
+static inline int __eblock(void *addr)
+{
+	return __encls_ret_1(EBLOCK, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __epa(void *addr)
+{
+	unsigned long rbx = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA;
+
+	return __encls_2(EPA, rbx, addr);
+}
+
+static inline int __ewb(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr,
+			void *va)
+{
+	return __encls_ret_3(EWB, pginfo, addr, va);
+}
+
+#endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#17 lore raw

PATCH v33 6/21 x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Configure SGX as part of feature control MSR initialization and update the associated X86_FEATURE flags accordingly. Because the kernel will require the LE hash MSRs to be writable when running native enclaves, disable X86_FEATURE_SGX (and all derivatives) if SGX Launch Control is not (or cannot) be fully enabled via feature control MSR.

The check is done for every CPU, not just BSP, in order to verify that MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL is correctly configured on all CPUs. The other parts of the kernel, like the enclave driver, expect the same configuration from all CPUs.

Note, unlike VMX, clear the X86_FEATURE_SGX* flags for all CPUs if any CPU lacks SGX support as the kernel expects SGX to be available on all CPUs. X86_FEATURE_VMX is intentionally cleared only for the current CPU so that KVM can provide additional information if KVM fails to load, e.g. print which CPU doesn't support VMX. KVM/VMX requires additional per-CPU enabling, e.g. to set CR4.VMXE and do VMXON, and so already has the necessary infrastructure to do per-CPU checks. SGX on the other hand doesn't require additional enabling, so clearing the feature flags on all CPUs means the SGX subsystem doesn't need to manually do support checks on a per-CPU basis.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +31 -1
index 29a3bedabd06..c3afcd2e4342 100644
@@ -93,16 +93,35 @@ static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES */
 
+static void clear_sgx_caps(void)
+{
+	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX);
+	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
+	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX1);
+	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX2);
+}
+
 void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	bool tboot = tboot_enabled();
+	bool enable_sgx;
 	u64 msr;
 
 	if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr)) {
 		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
+		clear_sgx_caps();
 		return;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Enable SGX if and only if the kernel supports SGX and Launch Control
+	 * is supported, i.e. disable SGX if the LE hash MSRs can't be written.
+	 */
+	enable_sgx = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX) &&
+		     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX1) &&
+		     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) &&
+		     IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_SGX);
+
 	if (msr & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED)
 		goto update_caps;
 
@@ -124,13 +143,16 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 			msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
 	}
 
+	if (enable_sgx)
+		msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED | FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+
 	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, msr);
 
 update_caps:
 	set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL);
 
 	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
-		return;
+		goto update_sgx;
 
 	if ( (tboot && !(msr & FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX)) ||
 	    (!tboot && !(msr & FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX))) {
@@ -143,4 +165,12 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		init_vmx_capabilities(c);
 #endif
 	}
+
+update_sgx:
+	if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED) ||
+	    !(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) || !enable_sgx) {
+		if (enable_sgx)
+			pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS\n");
+		clear_sgx_caps();
+	}
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#18 lore raw

PATCH v33 7/21 x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Add kernel parameter to disable Intel SGX kernel support.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c                  | 9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +2 -0
index fb95fad81c79..e747bd9ca911 100644
@@ -3314,6 +3314,8 @@
 
 	nosep		[BUGS=X86-32] Disables x86 SYSENTER/SYSEXIT support.
 
+	nosgx		[X86-64,SGX] Disables Intel SGX kernel support.
+
 	nosmp		[SMP] Tells an SMP kernel to act as a UP kernel,
 			and disable the IO APIC.  legacy for "maxcpus=0".
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +9 -0
index c3afcd2e4342..1837df39527f 100644
@@ -101,6 +101,15 @@ static void clear_sgx_caps(void)
 	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX2);
 }
 
+static int __init nosgx(char *str)
+{
+	clear_sgx_caps();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+early_param("nosgx", nosgx);
+
 void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	bool tboot = tboot_enabled();
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#19 lore raw

PATCH v33 8/21 x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Enumerate Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections via CPUID and add the data structures necessary to track EPC pages so that they can be easily borrowed for different uses.

Embed section index to the first eight bits of the EPC page descriptor. Existing client hardware supports only a single section, while upcoming server hardware will support at most eight sections. Thus, eight bits should be enough for long term needs.

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                 |  17 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile     |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c   | 216 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h    |  53 ++++++++
 5 files changed, 289 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
arch/x86/Kconfig +17 -0
index 6a0cc524882d..e9a9c530c087 100644
@@ -1926,6 +1926,23 @@ config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO
 	  side channel attacks- equals the tsx=auto command line parameter.
 endchoice
 
+config INTEL_SGX
+	bool "Intel SGX"
+	depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	depends on CRYPTO=y
+	depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y
+	select SRCU
+	select MMU_NOTIFIER
+	help
+	  Intel(R) Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions
+	  that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code
+	  and data, referred to as enclaves. An enclave's private memory can
+	  only be accessed by code running within the enclave. Accesses from
+	  outside the enclave, including other enclaves, are disallowed by
+	  hardware.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile +1 -0
index dba6a83bc349..b00f801601f3 100644
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MCE)			+= mce/
 obj-$(CONFIG_MTRR)			+= mtrr/
 obj-$(CONFIG_MICROCODE)			+= microcode/
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL)		+= resctrl/
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_SGX)			+= sgx/
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC)		+= perfctr-watchdog.o
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile new file +2 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..79510ce01b3b
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+obj-y += \
+	main.o
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c new file +216 -0

216 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h new file +53 -0

53 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer
#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 08/21] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h line 41

Quoted 2 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h new file +2 -0
+static inline struct sgx_epc_section *sgx_get_epc_section(
+		struct sgx_epc_page *page)

Just let it stick out - breaking lines on arg opening brace are the ugliest. Also:

bdc48fa11e46 ("checkpatch/coding-style: deprecate 80-column warning")

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#21 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 08/21] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections

Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h line 41

Quoted 2 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h new file +2 -0
+static inline struct sgx_epc_section *sgx_get_epc_section(
+		struct sgx_epc_page *page)

Just let it stick out - breaking lines on arg opening brace are the ugliest. Also:

Quoted 9 lines

bdc48fa11e46 ("checkpatch/coding-style: deprecate 80-column warning")

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

OK, I put everything into one line.

/Jarkko

#22 lore raw

PATCH v33 9/21 x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page()

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page(), which iterates through EPC sections and borrows a page structure that is not used by anyone else. When a page is no longer needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page(). This function implicitly calls ENCLS[EREMOVE], which will return the page to the uninitialized state (i.e. not required from caller part).

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h  |  3 ++
 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +61 -0
index c5831e3db14a..b776d249289f 100644
@@ -83,6 +83,67 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
+static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section)
+{
+	struct sgx_epc_page *page;
+
+	if (list_empty(&section->page_list))
+		return NULL;
+
+	page = list_first_entry(&section->page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list);
+	list_del_init(&page->list);
+	return page;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __sgx_alloc_epc_page() - Allocate an EPC page
+ *
+ * Iterate through EPC sections and borrow a free EPC page to the caller. When a
+ * page is no longer needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page().
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *   an EPC page,
+ *   -errno on error
+ */
+struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void)
+{
+	struct sgx_epc_section *section;
+	struct sgx_epc_page *page;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) {
+		section = &sgx_epc_sections[i];
+		spin_lock(&section->lock);
+		page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section(section);
+		spin_unlock(&section->lock);
+
+		if (page)
+			return page;
+	}
+
+	return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_free_epc_page() - Free an EPC page
+ * @page:	an EPC page
+ *
+ * Call EREMOVE for an EPC page and insert it back to the list of free pages.
+ */
+void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
+{
+	struct sgx_epc_section *section = sgx_get_epc_section(page);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_addr(page));
+	if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret))
+		return;
+
+	spin_lock(&section->lock);
+	list_add_tail(&page->list, &section->page_list);
+	spin_unlock(&section->lock);
+}
+
 static void __init sgx_free_epc_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section)
 {
 	struct sgx_epc_page *page;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +3 -0
index 6508bfefd6d9..aae6bfb3bc8a 100644
@@ -50,4 +50,7 @@ static inline void *sgx_get_epc_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
 	return section->va + (page->desc & PAGE_MASK) - section->pa;
 }
 
+struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void);
+void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
+
 #endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer
#23 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 09/21] x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page()

Quoted 22 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page(), which iterates through EPC sections and borrows a page structure that is not used by anyone else. When a page is no longer needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page(). This function implicitly calls ENCLS[EREMOVE], which will return the page to the uninitialized state (i.e. not required from caller part).

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h  |  3 ++
 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +0 -0
index c5831e3db14a..b776d249289f 100644
@@ -83,6 +83,67 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void)
 	return true;
 }

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void) · line 94

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +9 -0
 
+static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section)
+{
+	struct sgx_epc_page *page;
+
+	if (list_empty(&section->page_list))
+		return NULL;
+
+	page = list_first_entry(&section->page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list);
+	list_del_init(&page->list);

<---- newline here.

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void) · line 96

Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +2 -0
+	return page;
+}

Otherwise looks good; nice comments.

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#24 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 09/21] x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page()

Quoted 36 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 22 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page(), which iterates through EPC sections and borrows a page structure that is not used by anyone else. When a page is no longer needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page(). This function implicitly calls ENCLS[EREMOVE], which will return the page to the uninitialized state (i.e. not required from caller part).

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h  |  3 ++
 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +0 -0
index c5831e3db14a..b776d249289f 100644
@@ -83,6 +83,67 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void)
 	return true;
 }

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void) · line 94

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +9 -0
 
+static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section(struct sgx_epc_section *section)
+{
+	struct sgx_epc_page *page;
+
+	if (list_empty(&section->page_list))
+		return NULL;
+
+	page = list_first_entry(&section->page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list);
+	list_del_init(&page->list);

<---- newline here.

Quoted 4 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void) · line 96

Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +2 -0
+	return page;
+}

Otherwise looks good; nice comments.

Thanks!

Quoted 8 lines

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

/Jarko

#25 lore raw

PATCH v33 10/21 mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add vm_ops()->may_mprotect() to check additional constraints.

SGX uses this callback to add two constraints:

1. Verify that the address range does not have holes: for each page address, there is an actual enclave page created.
2. Mapped permissions do not surpass the lowest enclave page permissions in the address range.

[email protected]
Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

---
 include/linux/mm.h |  2 ++
 mm/mprotect.c      | 14 +++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/mm.h +2 -0
index dc7b87310c10..be40b9c29327 100644
@@ -542,6 +542,8 @@ struct vm_operations_struct {
 	void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
 	int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr);
 	int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
+	int (*may_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
+			    unsigned long end, unsigned long prot);
 	vm_fault_t (*fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf);
 	vm_fault_t (*huge_fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf,
 			enum page_entry_size pe_size);
mm/mprotect.c +11 -3
index ce8b8a5eacbb..f7731dc13ff0 100644
@@ -603,13 +603,21 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
+		tmp = vma->vm_end;
+		if (tmp > end)
+			tmp = end;
+
+		if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect) {
+			error = vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect(vma, nstart, tmp,
+							  prot);
+			if (error)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
 		error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
 		if (error)
 			goto out;
 
-		tmp = vma->vm_end;
-		if (tmp > end)
-			tmp = end;
 		error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
 		if (error)
 			goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer
#26 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 10/21] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()

Quoted 6 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add vm_ops()->may_mprotect() to check additional constraints.

SGX uses this callback to add two constraints:

Quoted 7 lines

1. Verify that the address range does not have holes: for each page address, there is an actual enclave page created.
2. Mapped permissions do not surpass the lowest enclave page permissions in the address range.

[email protected]
Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

Something ate the Cc:s. Lemme add the mm list, akpm is already on Cc.

Leaving in the rest for mm folks.

Quoted 53 lines
---
 include/linux/mm.h |  2 ++
 mm/mprotect.c      | 14 +++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/mm.h +2 -0
index dc7b87310c10..be40b9c29327 100644
@@ -542,6 +542,8 @@ struct vm_operations_struct {
 	void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
 	int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr);
 	int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
+	int (*may_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
+			    unsigned long end, unsigned long prot);
 	vm_fault_t (*fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf);
 	vm_fault_t (*huge_fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf,
 			enum page_entry_size pe_size);
mm/mprotect.c +11 -3
index ce8b8a5eacbb..f7731dc13ff0 100644
@@ -603,13 +603,21 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
+		tmp = vma->vm_end;
+		if (tmp > end)
+			tmp = end;
+
+		if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect) {
+			error = vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect(vma, nstart, tmp,
+							  prot);
+			if (error)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
 		error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
 		if (error)
 			goto out;
 
-		tmp = vma->vm_end;
-		if (tmp > end)
-			tmp = end;
 		error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
 		if (error)
 			goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#27 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 10/21] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()

Quoted 6 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Something ate the Cc:s. Lemme add the mm list, akpm is already on Cc.

Leaving in the rest for mm folks.

Thanks!

Quoted 10 lines

include/linux/mm.h struct vm_operations_struct { · line 546

Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/mm.h +2 -0
index dc7b87310c10..be40b9c29327 100644
@@ -542,6 +542,8 @@ struct vm_operations_struct {
 	void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
 	int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr);
 	int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
+	int (*may_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
+			    unsigned long end, unsigned long prot);

This is unlike any other vm operation. Every other one is a verb.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
mm/mprotect.c +0 -0
index ce8b8a5eacbb..f7731dc13ff0 100644
@@ -603,13 +603,21 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 5 lines
mm/mprotect.c +5 -0
+		tmp = vma->vm_end;
+		if (tmp > end)
+			tmp = end;
+
+		if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect) {

mm/mprotect.c static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len, · line 620

Quoted 10 lines
mm/mprotect.c +6 -0
+			error = vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect(vma, nstart, tmp,
+							  prot);
+			if (error)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
 		error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
 		if (error)
 			goto out;
 

I think the right way to do this is:

                error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
                if (error)
                        goto out;

                tmp = vma->vm_end;
                if (tmp > end)
                        tmp = end;

+ if (vma->vm_ops->mprotect)
+ error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp,
+ newflags);
+ else
+ error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp,
+ newflags);

-               error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
                if (error)
                        goto out;

and then the vma owner can do whatever it needs to before calling mprotect_fixup(), which is already not static.

(how did we get to v33 with this kind of problem still in the patch set?)

#28 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 10/21] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()

Quoted 45 lines · Matthew Wilcox
Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 8 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
mm/mprotect.c +0 -0
index ce8b8a5eacbb..f7731dc13ff0 100644
@@ -603,13 +603,21 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 5 lines
mm/mprotect.c +5 -0
+		tmp = vma->vm_end;
+		if (tmp > end)
+			tmp = end;
+
+		if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect) {

mm/mprotect.c static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len, · line 620

Quoted 10 lines
mm/mprotect.c +6 -0
+			error = vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect(vma, nstart, tmp,
+							  prot);
+			if (error)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
 		error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
 		if (error)
 			goto out;
 

I think the right way to do this is:

                error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
                if (error)
                        goto out;

                tmp = vma->vm_end;
                if (tmp > end)
                        tmp = end;
(quoted diff) +6 -1
+		if (vma->vm_ops->mprotect)
+			error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp,
+					newflags);
+		else
+			error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp,
+					newflags);
-               error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
                if (error)
                        goto out;
Quoted 2 lines

and then the vma owner can do whatever it needs to before calling mprotect_fixup(), which is already not static.

I'm certainly not opposed to a straight ->mprotect() hook. ->may_protect() came about because I/we thought it would be less objectionable to allow the vma owner to apply additional restrictions as opposed to a wholesale replacement.

Quoted 1 line

(how did we get to v33 with this kind of problem still in the patch set?)

Because no one from the mm world has looked at it. Which is completely understandable because it's a giant patch set and the first 25 or so versions were spent sorting out fundamental architectural/design issue (there have been a _lot_ of speed bumps), e.g. the need for hooking mprotect() didn't even come about until v21.

#29 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 10/21] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()

Quoted 46 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 45 lines · Matthew Wilcox
Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 8 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
mm/mprotect.c +0 -0
index ce8b8a5eacbb..f7731dc13ff0 100644
@@ -603,13 +603,21 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 5 lines
mm/mprotect.c +5 -0
+		tmp = vma->vm_end;
+		if (tmp > end)
+			tmp = end;
+
+		if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect) {

mm/mprotect.c static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len, · line 620

Quoted 10 lines
mm/mprotect.c +6 -0
+			error = vma->vm_ops->may_mprotect(vma, nstart, tmp,
+							  prot);
+			if (error)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
 		error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
 		if (error)
 			goto out;
 

I think the right way to do this is:

                error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
                if (error)
                        goto out;

                tmp = vma->vm_end;
                if (tmp > end)
                        tmp = end;
(quoted diff) +6 -1
+		if (vma->vm_ops->mprotect)
+			error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp,
+					newflags);
+		else
+			error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp,
+					newflags);
-               error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
                if (error)
                        goto out;
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

and then the vma owner can do whatever it needs to before calling mprotect_fixup(), which is already not static.

I'm certainly not opposed to a straight ->mprotect() hook. ->may_protect() came about because I/we thought it would be less objectionable to allow the vma owner to apply additional restrictions as opposed to a wholesale replacement.

Can you send fixes to associated patches to linux-sgx (i.e. this and driver)?

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

(how did we get to v33 with this kind of problem still in the patch set?)

Because no one from the mm world has looked at it. Which is completely understandable because it's a giant patch set and the first 25 or so versions were spent sorting out fundamental architectural/design issue (there have been a _lot_ of speed bumps), e.g. the need for hooking mprotect() didn't even come about until v21.

Actually also because we did not have an explicit linux-mm CC.

/Jarkko

#30 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 10/21] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()

In reply to Borislav Petkov
Quoted 12 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 11 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add vm_ops()->may_mprotect() to check additional constraints.

SGX uses this callback to add two constraints:

1. Verify that the address range does not have holes: for each page address, there is an actual enclave page created.
2. Mapped permissions do not surpass the lowest enclave page permissions in the address range.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

[email protected]
Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

Something ate the Cc:s. Lemme add the mm list, akpm is already on Cc.

Leaving in the rest for mm folks.

Thank you. So it seems. I've fixed them now.

/Jarkko

#31 lore raw

PATCH v33 11/21 x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the SGX hosted software entity is disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave enforced by the CPU. We call these entities as enclaves.

This commit implements a driver that provides an ioctl API to construct and run enclaves. Enclaves are constructed from pages residing in reserved physical memory areas. The contents of these pages can only be accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware thread running inside the enclave.

The starting state of an enclave consists of a fixed measured set of pages that are copied to the EPC during the construction process by using ENCLS leaf functions and Software Enclave Control Structure (SECS) that defines the enclave properties.

Enclave are constructed by using ENCLS leaf functions ECREATE, EADD and EINIT. ECREATE initializes SECS, EADD copies pages from system memory to the EPC and EINIT check a given signed measurement and moves the enclave into a state ready for execution.

An initialized enclave can only be accessed through special Thread Control Structure (TCS) pages by using ENCLU (ring-3 only) leaf EENTER. This leaf function converts a thread into enclave mode and continues the execution in the offset defined by the TCS provided to EENTER. An enclave is exited through syscall, exception, interrupts or by explicitly calling another ENCLU leaf EEXIT.

The permissions, which enclave page is added will set the limit for maximum permissions that can be set for mmap() and mprotect(). This will effectively allow to build different security schemes between producers and consumers of enclaves. Later on we can increase granularity with LSM hooks for page addition (i.e. for producers) and mapping of the enclave (i.e. for consumers)

---
 .../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst      |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h               |  66 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile              |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c              | 194 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h              |  30 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c                | 335 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h                |  87 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c               | 706 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c                |  11 +
 9 files changed, 1433 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +1 -0
index 59472cd6a11d..35f713e3a267 100644
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Code  Seq#    Include File                                           Comments
                                                                      <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xA3  90-9F  linux/dtlk.h
 0xA4  00-1F  uapi/linux/tee.h                                        Generic TEE subsystem
+0xA4  00-1F  uapi/asm/sgx.h                                          Intel SGX subsystem (a legit conflict as TEE and SGX do not co-exist)
 0xAA  00-3F  linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
 0xAB  00-1F  linux/nbd.h
 0xAC  00-1F  linux/raw.h
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h new file +66 -0

66 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile +3 -0
index 79510ce01b3b..91d3dc784a29 100644
@@ -1,2 +1,5 @@
 obj-y += \
+	driver.o \
+	encl.o \
+	ioctl.o \
 	main.o
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c new file +194 -0

194 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h new file +30 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e4063923115b
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */
+#ifndef __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__
+#define __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
+#include <linux/radix-tree.h>
+#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <uapi/asm/sgx.h>
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+#define SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT	20
+#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT	50
+#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME	20
+
+extern u64 sgx_encl_size_max_32;
+extern u64 sgx_encl_size_max_64;
+extern u32 sgx_misc_reserved_mask;
+extern u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask;
+extern u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask;
+extern u32 sgx_xsave_size_tbl[64];
+
+long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
+
+int sgx_drv_init(void);
+
+#endif /* __ARCH_X86_SGX_DRIVER_H__ */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c new file +335 -0

335 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h new file +87 -0

87 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +706 -0

706 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +11 -0
index b776d249289f..506cb0756147 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
 #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "driver.h"
+#include "encl.h"
 #include "encls.h"
 
 struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS];
@@ -259,6 +261,8 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void)
 
 static void __init sgx_init(void)
 {
+	int ret;
+
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX))
 		return;
 
@@ -268,8 +272,15 @@ static void __init sgx_init(void)
 	if (!sgx_page_reclaimer_init())
 		goto err_page_cache;
 
+	ret = sgx_drv_init();
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_kthread;
+
 	return;
 
+err_kthread:
+	kthread_stop(ksgxswapd_tsk);
+
 err_page_cache:
 	sgx_page_cache_teardown();
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer
#32 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 85 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the SGX hosted software entity is disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave enforced by the CPU. We call these entities as enclaves.

This commit implements a driver that provides an ioctl API to construct and run enclaves. Enclaves are constructed from pages residing in reserved physical memory areas. The contents of these pages can only be accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware thread running inside the enclave.

The starting state of an enclave consists of a fixed measured set of pages that are copied to the EPC during the construction process by using ENCLS leaf functions and Software Enclave Control Structure (SECS) that defines the enclave properties.

Enclave are constructed by using ENCLS leaf functions ECREATE, EADD and EINIT. ECREATE initializes SECS, EADD copies pages from system memory to the EPC and EINIT check a given signed measurement and moves the enclave into a state ready for execution.

An initialized enclave can only be accessed through special Thread Control Structure (TCS) pages by using ENCLU (ring-3 only) leaf EENTER. This leaf function converts a thread into enclave mode and continues the execution in the offset defined by the TCS provided to EENTER. An enclave is exited through syscall, exception, interrupts or by explicitly calling another ENCLU leaf EEXIT.

The permissions, which enclave page is added will set the limit for maximum permissions that can be set for mmap() and mprotect(). This will effectively allow to build different security schemes between producers and consumers of enclaves. Later on we can increase granularity with LSM hooks for page addition (i.e. for producers) and mapping of the enclave (i.e. for consumers)

---
 .../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst      |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h               |  66 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile              |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c              | 194 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h              |  30 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c                | 335 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h                |  87 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c               | 706 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c                |  11 +
 9 files changed, 1433 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +1 -0
index 59472cd6a11d..35f713e3a267 100644
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Code  Seq#    Include File                                           Comments
                                                                      <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xA3  90-9F  linux/dtlk.h
 0xA4  00-1F  uapi/linux/tee.h                                        Generic TEE subsystem
+0xA4  00-1F  uapi/asm/sgx.h                                          Intel SGX subsystem (a legit conflict as TEE and SGX do not co-exist)
 0xAA  00-3F  linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
 0xAB  00-1F  linux/nbd.h
 0xAC  00-1F  linux/raw.h
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5edb08ab8fd0

arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h line 1

Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h new file +1 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) WITH Linux-syscall-note */

Checkpatch complains here:

WARNING: 'SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) WITH Linux-syscall-note */' is not supported in LICENSES/... #114: FILE: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h:1:
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) WITH Linux-syscall-note */

Also, you had all patches until now split nice and logically doing one thing only.

But this one is huge. Why?

Why can't you split out the facilities which the driver uses: encl.[ch] into a patch, then ioctl.c into a separate one and then the driver into a third one? Or do they all belong together inseparably?

I guess I'll find out eventually but it would've been nice if they were split out...

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#33 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 11 lines · Borislav Petkov

Also, you had all patches until now split nice and logically doing one thing only.

But this one is huge. Why?

Why can't you split out the facilities which the driver uses: encl.[ch] into a patch, then ioctl.c into a separate one and then the driver into a third one? Or do they all belong together inseparably?

I guess I'll find out eventually but it would've been nice if they were split out...

Hmm, I think the most reasonable way to break up this beast would be to incrementally introduce functionality. E.g. four or so patches, one for each ioctl() of ENCLAVE_CREATE, ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES, ENCLAVE_INIT and ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE, in that order.

Splitting up by file probably wouldn't work very well. The split is pretty arbitrary, e.g. encl.[ch] isn't simply a pure representation of an enclave, there is a lot of the driver details/dependencies in there, i.e. the functionality between encl/ioctl/driver is all pretty intertwined.

But I think serially introducing each ioctl() would be fairly clean, and would help readers/reviewers better understand SGX as the patches would naturally document the process of building an enclave, e.g. CREATE the enclave, then ADD_PAGES, then INIT the enclave. SET_ATTRIBUTE is a bit of an outlier in that it would be chronologically out of order with respect to building the enclave, but I think that's ok.

Jarkko, thoughts?

maintainer
#34 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 4 lines · Sean Christopherson

Hmm, I think the most reasonable way to break up this beast would be to incrementally introduce functionality. E.g. four or so patches, one for each ioctl() of ENCLAVE_CREATE, ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES, ENCLAVE_INIT and ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE, in that order.

Yeah, I guess I can try reviewing it this way too and address each ioctl separately. You can try splitting later so that we don't waste time now. It would be good to have it split eventually, though, so that it is more palatable for other rewiewers too...

Quoted 4 lines

Splitting up by file probably wouldn't work very well. The split is pretty arbitrary, e.g. encl.[ch] isn't simply a pure representation of an enclave, there is a lot of the driver details/dependencies in there, i.e. the functionality between encl/ioctl/driver is all pretty intertwined.

... provided the functionality is not too intertwined to make a split actually worse than a single big patch.

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#35 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 23 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 11 lines · Borislav Petkov

Also, you had all patches until now split nice and logically doing one thing only.

But this one is huge. Why?

Why can't you split out the facilities which the driver uses: encl.[ch] into a patch, then ioctl.c into a separate one and then the driver into a third one? Or do they all belong together inseparably?

I guess I'll find out eventually but it would've been nice if they were split out...

Hmm, I think the most reasonable way to break up this beast would be to incrementally introduce functionality. E.g. four or so patches, one for each ioctl() of ENCLAVE_CREATE, ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES, ENCLAVE_INIT and ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE, in that order.

Splitting up by file probably wouldn't work very well. The split is pretty arbitrary, e.g. encl.[ch] isn't simply a pure representation of an enclave, there is a lot of the driver details/dependencies in there, i.e. the functionality between encl/ioctl/driver is all pretty intertwined.

Quoted 8 lines

But I think serially introducing each ioctl() would be fairly clean, and would help readers/reviewers better understand SGX as the patches would naturally document the process of building an enclave, e.g. CREATE the enclave, then ADD_PAGES, then INIT the enclave. SET_ATTRIBUTE is a bit of an outlier in that it would be chronologically out of order with respect to building the enclave, but I think that's ok.

Jarkko, thoughts?

I proposed the same before I go this email so I guess we have a consensus here.

/Jarkko

#36 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

In reply to Borislav Petkov
Quoted 97 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 85 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the SGX hosted software entity is disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave enforced by the CPU. We call these entities as enclaves.

This commit implements a driver that provides an ioctl API to construct and run enclaves. Enclaves are constructed from pages residing in reserved physical memory areas. The contents of these pages can only be accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware thread running inside the enclave.

The starting state of an enclave consists of a fixed measured set of pages that are copied to the EPC during the construction process by using ENCLS leaf functions and Software Enclave Control Structure (SECS) that defines the enclave properties.

Enclave are constructed by using ENCLS leaf functions ECREATE, EADD and EINIT. ECREATE initializes SECS, EADD copies pages from system memory to the EPC and EINIT check a given signed measurement and moves the enclave into a state ready for execution.

An initialized enclave can only be accessed through special Thread Control Structure (TCS) pages by using ENCLU (ring-3 only) leaf EENTER. This leaf function converts a thread into enclave mode and continues the execution in the offset defined by the TCS provided to EENTER. An enclave is exited through syscall, exception, interrupts or by explicitly calling another ENCLU leaf EEXIT.

The permissions, which enclave page is added will set the limit for maximum permissions that can be set for mmap() and mprotect(). This will effectively allow to build different security schemes between producers and consumers of enclaves. Later on we can increase granularity with LSM hooks for page addition (i.e. for producers) and mapping of the enclave (i.e. for consumers)

---
 .../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst      |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h               |  66 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile              |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c              | 194 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h              |  30 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c                | 335 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h                |  87 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c               | 706 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c                |  11 +
 9 files changed, 1433 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +1 -0
index 59472cd6a11d..35f713e3a267 100644
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Code  Seq#    Include File                                           Comments
                                                                      <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xA3  90-9F  linux/dtlk.h
 0xA4  00-1F  uapi/linux/tee.h                                        Generic TEE subsystem
+0xA4  00-1F  uapi/asm/sgx.h                                          Intel SGX subsystem (a legit conflict as TEE and SGX do not co-exist)
 0xAA  00-3F  linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
 0xAB  00-1F  linux/nbd.h
 0xAC  00-1F  linux/raw.h
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5edb08ab8fd0

arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h line 1

Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h new file +1 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) WITH Linux-syscall-note */

Checkpatch complains here:

WARNING: 'SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) WITH Linux-syscall-note */' is not supported in LICENSES/... #114: FILE: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h:1:
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) WITH Linux-syscall-note */

Also, you had all patches until now split nice and logically doing one thing only.

Quoted 8 lines

But this one is huge. Why?

Why can't you split out the facilities which the driver uses: encl.[ch] into a patch, then ioctl.c into a separate one and then the driver into a third one? Or do they all belong together inseparably?

I guess I'll find out eventually but it would've been nice if they were split out...

It's still kind a strongly connected set of functionalities, but I get your point.

I'd consider splitting for a slighly different angle:

1. Commit for the base driver.
2. Commit for each ioctl, adding the necessary "framework" to get that piece of functionality completed. The order would be:
A. Create
B. Add
C. Initialize

Would be probably easier to review also this way because the commit kind of rationalizes why things exist.

What do you think?

/Jarkko

/Jarkko

/Jarkko

maintainer
#37 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 4 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

Would be probably easier to review also this way because the commit kind of rationalizes why things exist.

What do you think?

Sounds like a plan but you can do this for the next version - no need to do it now. I'll try to review this way, per ioctl as I said in my mail to Sean.

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#38 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 4 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

Would be probably easier to review also this way because the commit kind of rationalizes why things exist.

What do you think?

Sounds like a plan but you can do this for the next version - no need to do it now. I'll try to review this way, per ioctl as I said in my mail to Sean.

OK, sure I won't rush with a new version :-)

The code has been reworked so many times that it is somewhat easy to make such split and I think it is one measure that an implementation is somewhat sound when parts of functionality build up cleanly on top of each other.

/Jarkko

maintainer
#39 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 1 line · Jarkko Sakkinen

Subject: Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

					 ^
					 Add
Quoted 5 lines

Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the SGX hosted software entity is disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave enforced by the CPU. We call these entities as enclaves.

s/as //

Quoted 1 line

This commit implements a driver that provides an ioctl API to construct

s/This commit implements/Implement/

Quoted 11 lines

and run enclaves. Enclaves are constructed from pages residing in reserved physical memory areas. The contents of these pages can only be accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware thread running inside the enclave.

The starting state of an enclave consists of a fixed measured set of pages that are copied to the EPC during the construction process by using ENCLS leaf functions and Software Enclave Control Structure (SECS) that defines the enclave properties.

Enclave are constructed by using ENCLS leaf functions ECREATE, EADD and

Enclaves

Quoted 2 lines

EINIT. ECREATE initializes SECS, EADD copies pages from system memory to the EPC and EINIT check a given signed measurement and moves the enclave

checks

Quoted 11 lines

into a state ready for execution.

An initialized enclave can only be accessed through special Thread Control Structure (TCS) pages by using ENCLU (ring-3 only) leaf EENTER. This leaf function converts a thread into enclave mode and continues the execution in the offset defined by the TCS provided to EENTER. An enclave is exited through syscall, exception, interrupts or by explicitly calling another ENCLU leaf EEXIT.

The permissions, which enclave page is added will set the limit for maximum permissions that can be set for mmap() and mprotect().

I can't parse that sentence.

Quoted 5 lines

This will
effectively allow to build different security schemes between producers and consumers of enclaves. Later on we can increase granularity with LSM hooks for page addition (i.e. for producers) and mapping of the enclave (i.e. for consumers)

Other than that, nice explanation. I like that in a commit message.

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#40 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Jarkko Sakkinen

Subject: Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

					 ^
					 Add

I'll change it to "Add SGX enclave driver".

Quoted 41 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the SGX hosted software entity is disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave enforced by the CPU. We call these entities as enclaves.

s/as //

Quoted 1 line

This commit implements a driver that provides an ioctl API to construct

s/This commit implements/Implement/

Quoted 11 lines

and run enclaves. Enclaves are constructed from pages residing in reserved physical memory areas. The contents of these pages can only be accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware thread running inside the enclave.

The starting state of an enclave consists of a fixed measured set of pages that are copied to the EPC during the construction process by using ENCLS leaf functions and Software Enclave Control Structure (SECS) that defines the enclave properties.

Enclave are constructed by using ENCLS leaf functions ECREATE, EADD and

Enclaves

Quoted 2 lines

EINIT. ECREATE initializes SECS, EADD copies pages from system memory to the EPC and EINIT check a given signed measurement and moves the enclave

checks

Quoted 9 lines

into a state ready for execution.

An initialized enclave can only be accessed through special Thread Control Structure (TCS) pages by using ENCLU (ring-3 only) leaf EENTER. This leaf function converts a thread into enclave mode and continues the execution in the offset defined by the TCS provided to EENTER. An enclave is exited through syscall, exception, interrupts or by explicitly calling another ENCLU leaf EEXIT.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

The permissions, which enclave page is added will set the limit for maximum permissions that can be set for mmap() and mprotect().

I can't parse that sentence.

Neither can I.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

This will
effectively allow to build different security schemes between producers and consumers of enclaves. Later on we can increase granularity with LSM hooks for page addition (i.e. for producers) and mapping of the enclave (i.e. for consumers)

I rephrased the whole paragraph:

"
The mmap() permissions are capped by the contained enclave page permissions. The mapped areas must also be opaque, i.e. each page address must contain a page. This logic is implemented in sgx_encl_may_map(). "

Quoted 3 lines

Other than that, nice explanation. I like that in a commit message.

Thx.

Thank you.

Quoted 6 lines
Signature · 5 lines
-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

/Jarkko

maintainer
#41 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst Code Seq# Include File Comments · line 326

Quoted 9 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +1 -0
index 59472cd6a11d..35f713e3a267 100644
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Code  Seq#    Include File                                           Comments
                                                                      <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xA3  90-9F  linux/dtlk.h
 0xA4  00-1F  uapi/linux/tee.h                                        Generic TEE subsystem
+0xA4  00-1F  uapi/asm/sgx.h                                          Intel SGX subsystem (a legit conflict as TEE and SGX do not co-exist)

Maybe add <mailto:[email protected]> ?

Quoted 3 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +0 -0
 0xAA  00-3F  linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
 0xAB  00-1F  linux/nbd.h
 0xAC  00-1F  linux/raw.h

...

Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst

Quoted 3 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +3 -0
+static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
+{
+	unsigned long encl_size = secs->size + PAGE_SIZE;

Wait, you just copied @secs from user memory in sgx_ioc_enclave_create() and now use ->size unverified? You're kidding, right?

Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst

Quoted 11 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +11 -0
+	struct sgx_epc_page *secs_epc;
+	unsigned long ssaframesize;
+	struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	struct file *backing;
+	long ret;
+
+	if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ssaframesize = sgx_calc_ssaframesize(secs->miscselect, secs->xfrm);

So this is using more un-validated user input to do further calculations. What can possibly go wrong?

I sure hope *I* am wrong and am missing something here.

If not, please, for the next version, audit all your user input and validate it before using it. Srsly.

Quoted 55 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +55 -0
+	if (sgx_validate_secs(secs, ssaframesize)) {
+		pr_debug("invalid SECS\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	backing = shmem_file_setup("SGX backing", encl_size + (encl_size >> 5),
+				   VM_NORESERVE);
+	if (IS_ERR(backing))
+		return PTR_ERR(backing);
+
+	encl->backing = backing;
+
+	secs_epc = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
+	if (IS_ERR(secs_epc)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(secs_epc);
+		goto err_out_backing;
+	}
+
+	encl->secs.epc_page = secs_epc;
+
+	pginfo.addr = 0;
+	pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)secs;
+	pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+	pginfo.secs = 0;
+	memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+
+	ret = __ecreate((void *)&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_addr(secs_epc));
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_debug("ECREATE returned %ld\n", ret);
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+
+	if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_DEBUG)
+		atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags);
+
+	encl->secs.encl = encl;
+	encl->secs_attributes = secs->attributes;
+	encl->allowed_attributes |= SGX_ATTR_ALLOWED_MASK;
+	encl->base = secs->base;
+	encl->size = secs->size;
+	encl->ssaframesize = secs->ssa_frame_size;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set SGX_ENCL_CREATED only after the enclave is fully prepped.  This
+	 * allows setting and checking enclave creation without having to take
+	 * encl->lock.
+	 */
+	atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags);
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_out:
+	sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
+	encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
+

Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst

Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +10 -0
+err_out_backing:
+	fput(encl->backing);
+	encl->backing = NULL;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_create - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE
+ * @filep:	open file to /dev/sgx

That's

@encl: enclave pointer

or so.

Quoted 8 lines

+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_create instance
+ *
+ * Allocate kernel data structures for a new enclave and execute ECREATE after
+ * verifying the correctness of the provided SECS.
+ *
+ * Note, enforcement of restricted and disallowed attributes is deferred until
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init(), only the architectural correctness of the SECS is
+ * checked by sgx_ioc_enclave_create().

Well, I don't see that checking. Where is it?

Quoted 32 lines

+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * -errno otherwise
+ */

Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +27 -0
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_create ecreate;
+	struct page *secs_page;
+	struct sgx_secs *secs;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&ecreate, arg, sizeof(ecreate)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	secs_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!secs_page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	secs = kmap(secs_page);
+	if (copy_from_user(secs, (void __user *)ecreate.src, sizeof(*secs))) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = sgx_encl_create(encl, secs);
+
+out:
+	kunmap(secs_page);
+	__free_page(secs_page);
+	return ret;
+}
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#42 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 115

Quoted 3 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +3 -0
+static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
+{
+	unsigned long encl_size = secs->size + PAGE_SIZE;

Wait, you just copied @secs from user memory in sgx_ioc_enclave_create() and now use ->size unverified? You're kidding, right?

The size of the enclave is checked in sgx_validate_secs() before it is used to configure the shmem backing.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +6 -0
+	struct sgx_epc_page *secs_epc;
+	unsigned long ssaframesize;
+	struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	struct file *backing;
+	long ret;
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 126

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +5 -0
+
+	if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ssaframesize = sgx_calc_ssaframesize(secs->miscselect, secs->xfrm);

So this is using more un-validated user input to do further calculations. What can possibly go wrong?

ssaframesize is also validated below, and the computations on miscselect and xfm in sgx_calc_ssaframesize() are bounded such that bad input won't send the kernel into the weeds.

That being said, I agree that it would be safer to move sgx_calc_ssaframesize() inside sgx_validate_secs() and only compute encl_size after the secs is validated.

Quoted 126 lines

I sure hope *I* am wrong and am missing something here.

If not, please, for the next version, audit all your user input and validate it before using it. Srsly.

Quoted 55 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +55 -0
+	if (sgx_validate_secs(secs, ssaframesize)) {
+		pr_debug("invalid SECS\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	backing = shmem_file_setup("SGX backing", encl_size + (encl_size >> 5),
+				   VM_NORESERVE);
+	if (IS_ERR(backing))
+		return PTR_ERR(backing);
+
+	encl->backing = backing;
+
+	secs_epc = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
+	if (IS_ERR(secs_epc)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(secs_epc);
+		goto err_out_backing;
+	}
+
+	encl->secs.epc_page = secs_epc;
+
+	pginfo.addr = 0;
+	pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)secs;
+	pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+	pginfo.secs = 0;
+	memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+
+	ret = __ecreate((void *)&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_addr(secs_epc));
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_debug("ECREATE returned %ld\n", ret);
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+
+	if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_DEBUG)
+		atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags);
+
+	encl->secs.encl = encl;
+	encl->secs_attributes = secs->attributes;
+	encl->allowed_attributes |= SGX_ATTR_ALLOWED_MASK;
+	encl->base = secs->base;
+	encl->size = secs->size;
+	encl->ssaframesize = secs->ssa_frame_size;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set SGX_ENCL_CREATED only after the enclave is fully prepped.  This
+	 * allows setting and checking enclave creation without having to take
+	 * encl->lock.
+	 */
+	atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags);
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_out:
+	sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
+	encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
+

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 191

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +10 -0
+err_out_backing:
+	fput(encl->backing);
+	encl->backing = NULL;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_create - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE
+ * @filep:	open file to /dev/sgx

That's

@encl: enclave pointer

or so.

Quoted 8 lines

+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_create instance
+ *
+ * Allocate kernel data structures for a new enclave and execute ECREATE after
+ * verifying the correctness of the provided SECS.
+ *
+ * Note, enforcement of restricted and disallowed attributes is deferred until
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init(), only the architectural correctness of the SECS is
+ * checked by sgx_ioc_enclave_create().

Well, I don't see that checking. Where is it?

Quoted 32 lines

+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * -errno otherwise
+ */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +27 -0
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_create ecreate;
+	struct page *secs_page;
+	struct sgx_secs *secs;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&ecreate, arg, sizeof(ecreate)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	secs_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!secs_page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	secs = kmap(secs_page);
+	if (copy_from_user(secs, (void __user *)ecreate.src, sizeof(*secs))) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = sgx_encl_create(encl, secs);
+
+out:
+	kunmap(secs_page);
+	__free_page(secs_page);
+	return ret;
+}
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
maintainer
#43 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson

That being said, I agree that it would be safer to move sgx_calc_ssaframesize() inside sgx_validate_secs() and only compute encl_size after the secs is validated.

Yap, that would be the right thing to do.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#44 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson

That being said, I agree that it would be safer to move sgx_calc_ssaframesize() inside sgx_validate_secs() and only compute encl_size after the secs is validated.

Changed as

if (!secs->ssa_frame_size)

	return -EINVAL;

if (sgx_calc_ssa_frame_size(secs->miscselect, secs->xfrm) >

    secs->ssa_frame_size)
	return -EINVAL;

/Jarkko

#45 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

In reply to Borislav Petkov
Quoted 17 lines · Borislav Petkov

Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst Code Seq# Include File Comments · line 326

Quoted 9 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +1 -0
index 59472cd6a11d..35f713e3a267 100644
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Code  Seq#    Include File                                           Comments
                                                                      <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xA3  90-9F  linux/dtlk.h
 0xA4  00-1F  uapi/linux/tee.h                                        Generic TEE subsystem
+0xA4  00-1F  uapi/asm/sgx.h                                          Intel SGX subsystem (a legit conflict as TEE and SGX do not co-exist)

Maybe add <mailto:[email protected]> ?

Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst Code Seq# Include File Comments · line 329

Quoted 3 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +0 -0
 0xAA  00-3F  linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
 0xAB  00-1F  linux/nbd.h
 0xAC  00-1F  linux/raw.h
Quoted 8 lines

...

Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst

Quoted 3 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +3 -0
+static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
+{
+	unsigned long encl_size = secs->size + PAGE_SIZE;

Wait, you just copied @secs from user memory in sgx_ioc_enclave_create() and now use ->size unverified? You're kidding, right?

The validation is done in sgx_validate_secs().

Quoted 16 lines

Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst

Quoted 12 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +11 -0
+	struct sgx_epc_page *secs_epc;
+	unsigned long ssaframesize;
+	struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	struct file *backing;
+	long ret;
+
+	if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ssaframesize = sgx_calc_ssaframesize(secs->miscselect, secs->xfrm);

So this is using more un-validated user input to do further calculations. What can possibly go wrong?

Quoted 4 lines

I sure hope *I* am wrong and am missing something here.

If not, please, for the next version, audit all your user input and validate it before using it. Srsly.

It works but is unclean. I'd guess reason for this is just that code has evolved into this state over time.

I'd just move the call to sgx_calc_ssaframesize() inside sgx_validate_secs().

/Jarkko

maintainer
#46 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:

...

This could use some commenting along the lines of:

"— If the enclave developer requires measurement of the page as a proof for the content, use EEXTEND to add a measurement for 256 bytes of the page. Repeat this operation until the entire page is measured."

At least this text from the SDM maps to the 256 bytes below. Otherwise it is magic.

Quoted 32 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +32 -0
+static int __sgx_encl_extend(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+			     struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+		ret = __eextend(sgx_get_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page),
+				sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page) + (i * 0x100));
+		if (ret) {
+			if (encls_failed(ret))
+				ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EEXTEND");
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
+			     unsigned long offset, unsigned long length,
+			     struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+	int ret;
+
+	encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, offset, secinfo->flags);
+	if (IS_ERR(encl_page))
+		return PTR_ERR(encl_page);
+
+	epc_page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 338

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +10 -0
+	if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
+		kfree(encl_page);
+		return PTR_ERR(epc_page);
+	}
+
+	if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) &
+	    (SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED | SGX_ENCL_DEAD)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto err_out_free;
+	}

You can do this first thing when you enter the function so that you don't have to allocate needlessly in the error case, when SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED | SGX_ENCL_DEAD is set.

Quoted 59 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +59 -0
+
+	mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Insert prior to EADD in case of OOM.  EADD modifies MRENCLAVE, i.e.
+	 * can't be gracefully unwound, while failure on EADD/EXTEND is limited
+	 * to userspace errors (or kernel/hardware bugs).
+	 */
+	ret = radix_tree_insert(&encl->page_tree, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc),
+				encl_page);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_out_unlock;
+
+	ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, secinfo,
+				  src);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_out;
+
+	/*
+	 * Complete the "add" before doing the "extend" so that the "add"
+	 * isn't in a half-baked state in the extremely unlikely scenario the
+	 * the enclave will be destroyed in response to EEXTEND failure.
+	 */
+	encl_page->encl = encl;
+	encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
+	encl->secs_child_cnt++;
+
+	if (flags & SGX_PAGE_MEASURE) {
+		ret = __sgx_encl_extend(encl, epc_page);
+		if (ret)
+			goto err_out;
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
+	return ret;
+
+err_out:
+	radix_tree_delete(&encl_page->encl->page_tree,
+			  PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc));
+
+err_out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
+
+err_out_free:
+	sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+	kfree(encl_page);
+
+	/*
+	 * Destroy enclave on ENCLS failure as this means that EPC has been
+	 * invalidated.
+	 */
+	if (ret == -EIO) {
+		mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+		sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	}

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 407

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +10 -0
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
+ * @encl:       pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer)
+ * @arg:	a user pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_add_pages instance
+ *
+ * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally extend the

"uninitialized"?

Where is the test for SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED and erroring out otherwise?

I.e., what happens if you add pages to an initialized enclave?

Quoted 2 lines

+ * measurement with the contents of the page. The address range of pages must
+ * be contiguous.

Must? Who is enforcing this? I'm trying to find where...

Quoted 38 lines

The SECINFO and measurement mask are applied to all pages.
+ *
+ * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because
+ * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in
+ * the measurement.
+ *
+ * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For each page
+ * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following
+ * heuristics:
+ *
+ * 1. A regular page: PROT_R, PROT_W and PROT_X match the SECINFO permissions.
+ * 2. A TCS page: PROT_R | PROT_W.
+ *
+ * mmap() is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum protection bits
+ * within the given address range.
+ *
+ * If ENCLS opcode fails, that effectively means that EPC has been invalidated.
+ * When this happens the enclave is destroyed and -EIO is returned to the
+ * caller.
+ *
+ * Return:

+ *   0 on success,
+ *   -EACCES if an executable source page is located in a noexec partition,
+ *   -EIO if either ENCLS[EADD] or ENCLS[EEXTEND] fails
+ *   -errno otherwise

+ */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +12 -0
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_add_pages addp;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	unsigned long c;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp)))
+		return -EFAULT;

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 456

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +10 -0
+
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
+	    !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;

How many pages are allowed? Unlimited? I'm hoping some limits are checked somewhere...

Quoted 34 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +34 -0
+
+	if (addp.offset + addp.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)addp.secinfo,
+			   sizeof(secinfo)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (c = 0 ; c < addp.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			ret = -EINTR;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (need_resched())
+			cond_resched();
+
+		ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp.src + c, addp.offset + c,
+					addp.length - c, &secinfo, addp.flags);
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	addp.count = c;
+
+	if (copy_to_user(arg, &addp, sizeof(addp)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#47 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 4 lines · Borislav Petkov

On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:

...

Quoted 8 lines

This could use some commenting along the lines of:

"— If the enclave developer requires measurement of the page as a proof for the content, use EEXTEND to add a measurement for 256 bytes of the page. Repeat this operation until the entire page is measured."

At least this text from the SDM maps to the 256 bytes below. Otherwise it is magic.

Copied with pride:

/*
* If the caller requires measurement of the page as a proof for the content,
* use EEXTEND to add a measurement for 256 bytes of the page. Repeat this
* operation until the entire page is measured."
*/

Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 19 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +19 -0
+static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
+			     unsigned long offset, unsigned long length,
+			     struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+	int ret;
+
+	encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, offset, secinfo->flags);
+	if (IS_ERR(encl_page))
+		return PTR_ERR(encl_page);
+
+	epc_page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
+	if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
+		kfree(encl_page);
+		return PTR_ERR(epc_page);
+	}
+
+	if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) &
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 338

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +4 -0
+	    (SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED | SGX_ENCL_DEAD)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto err_out_free;
+	}

You can do this first thing when you enter the function so that you don't have to allocate needlessly in the error case, when SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED | SGX_ENCL_DEAD is set.

Updated version:

static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
unsigned long offset, unsigned long length, struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long flags)

{
	struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
	struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
	struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
	int ret;

	if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED)
		return -EFAULT;

SGX_ENCL_DEAD check is unnecessary altogether as this flag cannot be possibly be unset inside ioctl. 'sgx_release()' will set it which is the release callback for the enclave file.

'sgx_ioctl()' also unnecessarily has this check I just noticed (and removed).

Quoted 5 lines

"uninitialized"?

Where is the test for SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED and erroring out otherwise?

I.e., what happens if you add pages to an initialized enclave?

Because of historical reasons it is in sgx_encl_add_page(). Then we allowed ioctl's operate on enclave concurrently. Today we enforce sequential operation on a single enclave with SGX_ENCL_IOCTL flag because that is the only sane way to use the construction operations.

Therefore the check can be moved to sgx_ioc_encl_add_pages() if you request so but first I have one remark to discuss.

I noticed that sometimes wrong state flags turn into -EINVAL and sometimes into -EFAULT (like in the previous case). I'd suggest that when the ioctl is blocked based encl->flags and only on that, the ioctl would return -ENOIOCTLCMD in both cases, i.e. this command is not available.

That would give much better aids for debugging user space code.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

+ * measurement with the contents of the page. The address range of pages must
+ * be contiguous.

Must? Who is enforcing this? I'm trying to find where...

Unfortunately I cannot recall what I meant when I wrote that. I removed that sentence. I'm not sure what I meant exactly when I used 'contiguous' here.

Quoted 43 lines
Quoted 43 lines

The SECINFO and measurement mask are applied to all pages.
+ *
+ * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because
+ * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in
+ * the measurement.
+ *
+ * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For each page
+ * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following
+ * heuristics:
+ *
+ * 1. A regular page: PROT_R, PROT_W and PROT_X match the SECINFO permissions.
+ * 2. A TCS page: PROT_R | PROT_W.
+ *
+ * mmap() is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum protection bits
+ * within the given address range.
+ *
+ * If ENCLS opcode fails, that effectively means that EPC has been invalidated.
+ * When this happens the enclave is destroyed and -EIO is returned to the
+ * caller.
+ *
+ * Return:

+ *   0 on success,
+ *   -EACCES if an executable source page is located in a noexec partition,
+ *   -EIO if either ENCLS[EADD] or ENCLS[EEXTEND] fails
+ *   -errno otherwise

+ */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +17 -0
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_add_pages addp;
+	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+	unsigned long c;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
+	    !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 456

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +5 -0
+	if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;

How many pages are allowed? Unlimited? I'm hoping some limits are checked somewhere...

SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE defines the address range, and thus sets the limit on how many pages in total can be added to the enclave.

sgx_encl_size_max_64 contains the maximum size for the address range and is initialized as follows:

cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); sgx_encl_size_max_64 = 1ULL << ((edx >> 8) & 0xFF);

[derived from sgx_drv_init()]

Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 19 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +19 -0
+
+	if (addp.offset + addp.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)addp.secinfo,
+			   sizeof(secinfo)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (c = 0 ; c < addp.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			ret = -EINTR;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (need_resched())
+			cond_resched();
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 483

Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +8 -0
+
+		ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp.src + c, addp.offset + c,
+					addp.length - c, &secinfo, addp.flags);
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	addp.count = c;

If you referred with your previous question, how to limit the number of pages that this ioctl can process in one run, it is already supported in the API with 'addp.count'.

It'd be possible to add this if required:

addp.length = min(addp.length, SGX_ENCLAVE_IOC_ADD_PAGES_MAX_LENGTH));

/Jarkko

#48 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

In reply to Borislav Petkov
Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +9 -0
+	if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
+	    !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 456

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +6 -0
+
+	if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;

How many pages are allowed? Unlimited? I'm hoping some limits are checked somewhere...

What were you concerned about here? Was it how long the syscall could take, or that one user could exhaust all the enclave memory in one call?

Some later versions of this patch have a 1MB limit per to reduce how long each SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES call spends in the kernel. But, I'm not _sure_ that's what you were intending.

#49 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 19 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +9 -0
+	if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
+	    !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 456

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +6 -0
+
+	if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;

How many pages are allowed? Unlimited? I'm hoping some limits are checked somewhere...

Quoted 6 lines

What were you concerned about here? Was it how long the syscall could take, or that one user could exhaust all the enclave memory in one call?

Some later versions of this patch have a 1MB limit per to reduce how long each SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES call spends in the kernel. But, I'm not _sure_ that's what you were intending.

The loop does check for pending signals, i.e. it is possible to interrupt it.

/Jarkko

maintainer
#50 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

In reply to Dave Hansen
Quoted 2 lines · Dave Hansen

What were you concerned about here? Was it how long the syscall could take, or that one user could exhaust all the enclave memory in one call?

More the latter. And generally, to have a sanity-check on all requests coming from luserspace.

Quoted 3 lines

Some later versions of this patch have a 1MB limit per to reduce how long each SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES call spends in the kernel. But, I'm not _sure_ that's what you were intending.

Yeah, that was not my main goal - rather to sanity-check user input and impose a sane limit.

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#51 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Dave Hansen

What were you concerned about here? Was it how long the syscall could take, or that one user could exhaust all the enclave memory in one call?

More the latter. And generally, to have a sanity-check on all requests coming from luserspace.

I can't think of a *lot* of spots where we have sanity checks like this for memory. We have cgroups and the overcommit limits. But, in general, folks can allocate as much memory as they want until allocations start to fail.

Should SGX be any different?

If we had a sanity check that said, "you can only allocate 1/2 of enclave memory", wouldn't that just make somebody mad because they want one big enclave?

Or, do you just want a sanity check to see if, up front, the user is asking for more enclave memory than there is on the *whole* system? That's also sane, but it doesn't take overcommit into account. That's why, for instance, we have vm.overcommit_ratio for normal memory.

BTW, I think we all agree that a cgroup controller for enclave memory is going to be needed eventually.

maintainer
#52 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 7 lines · Dave Hansen

I can't think of a *lot* of spots where we have sanity checks like this for memory. We have cgroups and the overcommit limits. But, in general, folks can allocate as much memory as they want until allocations start to fail.

Should SGX be any different?

Quoted 8 lines

If we had a sanity check that said, "you can only allocate 1/2 of enclave memory", wouldn't that just make somebody mad because they want one big enclave?

Or, do you just want a sanity check to see if, up front, the user is asking for more enclave memory than there is on the *whole* system? That's also sane, but it doesn't take overcommit into account. That's why, for instance, we have vm.overcommit_ratio for normal memory.

Yeah, you're making sense and there's really no need for SGX to be any different. Especially since users are already familiar the "policy" of failing allocations when too much memory requested. :-)

Quoted 2 lines

BTW, I think we all agree that a cgroup controller for enclave memory is going to be needed eventually.

Right.

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
maintainer
#53 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 12 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +12 -0
+static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
+			 void *token)
+{
+	u64 mrsigner[4];
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+	int j;
+
+	/* Check that the required attributes have been authorized. */
+	if (encl->secs_attributes & ~encl->allowed_attributes)
+		return -EACCES;
+

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 567

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +10 -0
+	ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+	if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto err_out;
+	}

That test should be the first thing this function or its caller does.

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 570

Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +2 -0
+	for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) {
+		for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) {

Ew, what's that double-loop for?

It tries to init an enclave a bunch of times. Why does it need to init more than once?

Quoted 31 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +31 -0
+			ret = sgx_einit(sigstruct, token, encl->secs.epc_page,
+					mrsigner);
+			if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+				continue;
+			else
+				break;
+		}
+
+		if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+			break;
+
+		msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME);
+
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+			goto err_out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) {
+		if (encls_failed(ret))
+			ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT");
+
+		sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+	} else if (ret) {
+		pr_debug("EINIT returned %d\n", ret);
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	} else {
+		atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags);
+	}

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 611

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +10 -0
+
+err_out:
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
+ *
+ * @filep:	open file to /dev/sgx

@encl: pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer)

Quoted 11 lines

+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_init instance
+ *
+ * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The
+ * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match
+ * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct.
+ *
+ * Return:

+ *   0 on success,
+ *   SGX error code on EINIT failure,
+ *   -errno otherwise

+ */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 631

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +9 -0
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+	struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct;
+	struct sgx_enclave_init einit;
+	struct page *initp_page;
+	void *token;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))

Might just as well check the other flags: doing EINIT on an already initialized enclave - SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED - is perhaps a nono or similarly on a SGX_ENCL_DEAD enclave.

And you could do similar sanity checks in the other ioctl functions.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#54 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 17 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 16 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +16 -0
+static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
+			 void *token)
+{
+	u64 mrsigner[4];
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+	int j;
+
+	/* Check that the required attributes have been authorized. */
+	if (encl->secs_attributes & ~encl->allowed_attributes)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 567

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +6 -0
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+	if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto err_out;
+	}

That test should be the first thing this function or its caller does.

Hmm, I was going to say that SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can't be checked until encl->lock is held, but that's not true for this path as mutual exclusion is provided by the SGX_ENCL_IOCTL flag. So yeah, this can be checked at the same time as SGX_ENCL_CREATED in sgx_ioc_enclave_init().

Quoted 7 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 570

Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +2 -0
+	for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) {
+		for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) {

Ew, what's that double-loop for?

It tries to init an enclave a bunch of times. Why does it need to init more than once?

ENCLS[EINIT] is interruptible because it has such a high latency, e.g. 50k+ cycles on success. If an IRQ/NMI/SMI becomes pending, EINIT may fail with SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT so that the event can be serviced.

The idea behind the double loop is to try EINIT in a tight loop, then back off and sleep for a while before retrying that tight inner loop.

Quoted 69 lines
Quoted 31 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +31 -0
+			ret = sgx_einit(sigstruct, token, encl->secs.epc_page,
+					mrsigner);
+			if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+				continue;
+			else
+				break;
+		}
+
+		if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+			break;
+
+		msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME);
+
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+			goto err_out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) {
+		if (encls_failed(ret))
+			ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT");
+
+		sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+	} else if (ret) {
+		pr_debug("EINIT returned %d\n", ret);
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	} else {
+		atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags);
+	}

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 611

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +10 -0
+
+err_out:
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
+ *
+ * @filep:	open file to /dev/sgx

@encl: pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer)

Quoted 11 lines

+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_init instance
+ *
+ * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The
+ * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match
+ * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct.
+ *
+ * Return:

+ *   0 on success,
+ *   SGX error code on EINIT failure,
+ *   -errno otherwise

+ */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 631

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +9 -0
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+	struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct;
+	struct sgx_enclave_init einit;
+	struct page *initp_page;
+	void *token;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))

Might just as well check the other flags: doing EINIT on an already initialized enclave - SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED - is perhaps a nono or similarly on a SGX_ENCL_DEAD enclave.

Quoted 1 line

And you could do similar sanity checks in the other ioctl functions.

Ya, as above, SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can be checked here.

SGX_ENCL_DEAD is actually already checked in in the top level sgx_ioctl(), i.e. the check in sgx_encl_add_page() can technically be flat out dropped.

I say "technically" because I'm a bit torn over SGX_ENCL_DEAD; encl->lock must be held to SGX_ENCL_DEAD (the page fault and reclaim flows rely on this), but as it stands today only ioctl() paths (guarded by SGX_ENCL_IOCTL) and sgx_release() (makes the ioctls() unreachable) set SGX_ENCL_DEAD.

So it's safe to check SGX_ENCL_DEAD from ioctl() context without holding encl->lock, at least in the current code base, but it feels weird/sketchy.

In the end I don't think I have a strong opinion. Removing the technically unnecessary DEAD check in sgx_encl_add_page() is the simplest change, so it may make sense to do that and nothing more for initial upstreaming. Long term, I fully expect we'll add paths that set SGX_ENCL_DEAD outside of ioctl() context, e.g. to handle EPC OOM, but it wouldn't be a bad thing to have a standalone commit in a future series to add DEAD checks (under encl->lock) in the ADD and INIT flows.

maintainer
#55 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 4 lines · Sean Christopherson

Hmm, I was going to say that SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can't be checked until encl->lock is held, but that's not true for this path as mutual exclusion is provided by the SGX_ENCL_IOCTL flag. So yeah, this can be checked at the same time as SGX_ENCL_CREATED in sgx_ioc_enclave_init().

Right, so my point is to have state checks for flags which make sense in all ioctl entry points, in order to catch a misuse early. But we're on the same page.

Quoted 6 lines

ENCLS[EINIT] is interruptible because it has such a high latency, e.g. 50k+ cycles on success. If an IRQ/NMI/SMI becomes pending, EINIT may fail with SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT so that the event can be serviced.

The idea behind the double loop is to try EINIT in a tight loop, then back off and sleep for a while before retrying that tight inner loop.

That gist of that kinda wants to be in a comment over that double-loop for future on-lookers.

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#56 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 131 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 17 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 16 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +16 -0
+static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
+			 void *token)
+{
+	u64 mrsigner[4];
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+	int j;
+
+	/* Check that the required attributes have been authorized. */
+	if (encl->secs_attributes & ~encl->allowed_attributes)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 567

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +6 -0
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+	if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto err_out;
+	}

That test should be the first thing this function or its caller does.

Hmm, I was going to say that SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can't be checked until encl->lock is held, but that's not true for this path as mutual exclusion is provided by the SGX_ENCL_IOCTL flag. So yeah, this can be checked at the same time as SGX_ENCL_CREATED in sgx_ioc_enclave_init().

Quoted 7 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 570

Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +2 -0
+	for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) {
+		for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) {

Ew, what's that double-loop for?

It tries to init an enclave a bunch of times. Why does it need to init more than once?

ENCLS[EINIT] is interruptible because it has such a high latency, e.g. 50k+ cycles on success. If an IRQ/NMI/SMI becomes pending, EINIT may fail with SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT so that the event can be serviced.

The idea behind the double loop is to try EINIT in a tight loop, then back off and sleep for a while before retrying that tight inner loop.

Quoted 69 lines
Quoted 31 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +31 -0
+			ret = sgx_einit(sigstruct, token, encl->secs.epc_page,
+					mrsigner);
+			if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+				continue;
+			else
+				break;
+		}
+
+		if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+			break;
+
+		msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME);
+
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+			goto err_out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) {
+		if (encls_failed(ret))
+			ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT");
+
+		sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+	} else if (ret) {
+		pr_debug("EINIT returned %d\n", ret);
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	} else {
+		atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags);
+	}

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 611

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +10 -0
+
+err_out:
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
+ *
+ * @filep:	open file to /dev/sgx

@encl: pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer)

Quoted 11 lines

+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_init instance
+ *
+ * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The
+ * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match
+ * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct.
+ *
+ * Return:

+ *   0 on success,
+ *   SGX error code on EINIT failure,
+ *   -errno otherwise

+ */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 631

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +9 -0
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+	struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct;
+	struct sgx_enclave_init einit;
+	struct page *initp_page;
+	void *token;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))

Might just as well check the other flags: doing EINIT on an already initialized enclave - SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED - is perhaps a nono or similarly on a SGX_ENCL_DEAD enclave.

Quoted 1 line

And you could do similar sanity checks in the other ioctl functions.

Ya, as above, SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can be checked here.

SGX_ENCL_DEAD is actually already checked in in the top level sgx_ioctl(), i.e. the check in sgx_encl_add_page() can technically be flat out dropped.

I say "technically" because I'm a bit torn over SGX_ENCL_DEAD; encl->lock must be held to SGX_ENCL_DEAD (the page fault and reclaim flows rely on this), but as it stands today only ioctl() paths (guarded by SGX_ENCL_IOCTL) and sgx_release() (makes the ioctls() unreachable) set SGX_ENCL_DEAD.

So it's safe to check SGX_ENCL_DEAD from ioctl() context without holding encl->lock, at least in the current code base, but it feels weird/sketchy.

Quoted 7 lines

In the end I don't think I have a strong opinion. Removing the technically unnecessary DEAD check in sgx_encl_add_page() is the simplest change, so it may make sense to do that and nothing more for initial upstreaming. Long term, I fully expect we'll add paths that set SGX_ENCL_DEAD outside of ioctl() context, e.g. to handle EPC OOM, but it wouldn't be a bad thing to have a standalone commit in a future series to add DEAD checks (under encl->lock) in the ADD and INIT flows.

AFAIK nonne of th ioctl's should not need SGX_ENCL_DEAD check.

/Jarkko

#57 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 25 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 16 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line · Borislav Petkov

And you could do similar sanity checks in the other ioctl functions.

Ya, as above, SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can be checked here.

SGX_ENCL_DEAD is actually already checked in in the top level sgx_ioctl(), i.e. the check in sgx_encl_add_page() can technically be flat out dropped.

I say "technically" because I'm a bit torn over SGX_ENCL_DEAD; encl->lock must be held to SGX_ENCL_DEAD (the page fault and reclaim flows rely on this), but as it stands today only ioctl() paths (guarded by SGX_ENCL_IOCTL) and sgx_release() (makes the ioctls() unreachable) set SGX_ENCL_DEAD.

So it's safe to check SGX_ENCL_DEAD from ioctl() context without holding encl->lock, at least in the current code base, but it feels weird/sketchy.

Quoted 7 lines

In the end I don't think I have a strong opinion. Removing the technically unnecessary DEAD check in sgx_encl_add_page() is the simplest change, so it may make sense to do that and nothing more for initial upstreaming. Long term, I fully expect we'll add paths that set SGX_ENCL_DEAD outside of ioctl() context, e.g. to handle EPC OOM, but it wouldn't be a bad thing to have a standalone commit in a future series to add DEAD checks (under encl->lock) in the ADD and INIT flows.

Quoted 1 line

AFAIK nonne of th ioctl's should not need SGX_ENCL_DEAD check.

I can't tell if the double negative was intended, but I took a peek at your current master and see that you removed the SGX_ENCL_DEAD check in sgx_ioctl(). That check needs to stay, e.g. if EEXTEND fails we absolutely need to prevent any further operations on the enclave.

The above was calling out that additional checks on SGX_ENCL_DEAD after acquiring encl->lock are not necessary because SGX_ENCL_DEAD can only be set when the ioctls() are no longer reachable or from within an ioctl(), which provides exclusivity via SGX_ENCL_IOCTL.

#58 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 33 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 25 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 16 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line · Borislav Petkov

And you could do similar sanity checks in the other ioctl functions.

Ya, as above, SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can be checked here.

SGX_ENCL_DEAD is actually already checked in in the top level sgx_ioctl(), i.e. the check in sgx_encl_add_page() can technically be flat out dropped.

I say "technically" because I'm a bit torn over SGX_ENCL_DEAD; encl->lock must be held to SGX_ENCL_DEAD (the page fault and reclaim flows rely on this), but as it stands today only ioctl() paths (guarded by SGX_ENCL_IOCTL) and sgx_release() (makes the ioctls() unreachable) set SGX_ENCL_DEAD.

So it's safe to check SGX_ENCL_DEAD from ioctl() context without holding encl->lock, at least in the current code base, but it feels weird/sketchy.

Quoted 7 lines

In the end I don't think I have a strong opinion. Removing the technically unnecessary DEAD check in sgx_encl_add_page() is the simplest change, so it may make sense to do that and nothing more for initial upstreaming. Long term, I fully expect we'll add paths that set SGX_ENCL_DEAD outside of ioctl() context, e.g. to handle EPC OOM, but it wouldn't be a bad thing to have a standalone commit in a future series to add DEAD checks (under encl->lock) in the ADD and INIT flows.

Quoted 1 line

AFAIK nonne of th ioctl's should not need SGX_ENCL_DEAD check.

I can't tell if the double negative was intended, but I took a peek at your current master and see that you removed the SGX_ENCL_DEAD check in sgx_ioctl(). That check needs to stay, e.g. if EEXTEND fails we absolutely need to prevent any further operations on the enclave.

Quoted 4 lines

The above was calling out that additional checks on SGX_ENCL_DEAD after acquiring encl->lock are not necessary because SGX_ENCL_DEAD can only be set when the ioctls() are no longer reachable or from within an ioctl(), which provides exclusivity via SGX_ENCL_IOCTL.

Got it.

/Jarkko

#59 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

In reply to Borislav Petkov
Quoted 17 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 16 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +16 -0
+static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
+			 void *token)
+{
+	u64 mrsigner[4];
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+	int j;
+
+	/* Check that the required attributes have been authorized. */
+	if (encl->secs_attributes & ~encl->allowed_attributes)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 567

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +6 -0
+	mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+	if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto err_out;
+	}

That test should be the first thing this function or its caller does.

Fixed.

Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 570

Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +2 -0
+	for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) {
+		for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) {

Ew, what's that double-loop for?

It tries to init an enclave a bunch of times. Why does it need to init more than once?

From SDM:

"Periodically, EINIT polls for certain asynchronous events. If such an event is detected, it completes with failure code (ZF=1 and RAX = SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT), and RIP is incremented to point to the next instruction. These events includes external interrupts, non-maskable interrupts, system-management interrupts, machine checks, INIT signals, and the VMX-preemption timer. EINIT does not fail if the pending event is inhibited (e.g., external interrupts could be inhibited due to blocking by MOV SS blocking or by STI)."

Not exactly sure though why this must be polled inside the kernel though.

Quoted 70 lines
Quoted 32 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +31 -0
+			ret = sgx_einit(sigstruct, token, encl->secs.epc_page,
+					mrsigner);
+			if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+				continue;
+			else
+				break;
+		}
+
+		if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+			break;
+
+		msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME);
+
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+			goto err_out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) {
+		if (encls_failed(ret))
+			ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT");
+
+		sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+	} else if (ret) {
+		pr_debug("EINIT returned %d\n", ret);
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	} else {
+		atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags);
+	}

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 611

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +10 -0
+
+err_out:
+	mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
+ *
+ * @filep:	open file to /dev/sgx

@encl: pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer)

Quoted 11 lines

+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_init instance
+ *
+ * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The
+ * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match
+ * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct.
+ *
+ * Return:

+ *   0 on success,
+ *   SGX error code on EINIT failure,
+ *   -errno otherwise

+ */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 631

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +9 -0
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+	struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct;
+	struct sgx_enclave_init einit;
+	struct page *initp_page;
+	void *token;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))

Might just as well check the other flags: doing EINIT on an already initialized enclave - SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED - is perhaps a nono or similarly on a SGX_ENCL_DEAD enclave.

Quoted 1 line

And you could do similar sanity checks in the other ioctl functions.

Agreed (see my earlier response, let's continue this discussion there).

/Jarkko

#60 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 9 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +9 -0
+static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
+			     unsigned long ssaframesize)
+{
+	if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 61

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +10 -0
+	if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
+	    secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
+	    secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
+		if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
+		return -EINVAL;

These should be >=, not >, the SDM uses one of those fancy ≥ ligatures.

Internal versions use more obvious pseudocode, e.g.:

    if ((DS:TMP_SECS.ATTRIBUTES.MODE64BIT = 1) AND
        (DS:TMP_SECS.SIZE AND (~((1 << CPUID.18.0:EDX[15:8]) – 1)))
    {
        #GP(0);
    }
Quoted 18 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +18 -0
+
+	if (!(secs->xfrm & XFEATURE_MASK_FP) ||
+	    !(secs->xfrm & XFEATURE_MASK_SSE) ||
+	    (((secs->xfrm >> XFEATURE_BNDREGS) & 1) !=
+	     ((secs->xfrm >> XFEATURE_BNDCSR) & 1)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!secs->ssa_frame_size || ssaframesize > secs->ssa_frame_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (memchr_inv(secs->reserved1, 0, sizeof(secs->reserved1)) ||
+	    memchr_inv(secs->reserved2, 0, sizeof(secs->reserved2)) ||
+	    memchr_inv(secs->reserved3, 0, sizeof(secs->reserved3)) ||
+	    memchr_inv(secs->reserved4, 0, sizeof(secs->reserved4)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
#61 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 23 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +9 -0
+static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
+			     unsigned long ssaframesize)
+{
+	if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 61

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +10 -0
+	if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
+	    secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
+	    secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
+		if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
+		return -EINVAL;

These should be >=, not >, the SDM uses one of those fancy ≥ ligatures.

Quoted 6 lines

Internal versions use more obvious pseudocode, e.g.:

    if ((DS:TMP_SECS.ATTRIBUTES.MODE64BIT = 1) AND
        (DS:TMP_SECS.SIZE AND (~((1 << CPUID.18.0:EDX[15:8]) – 1)))
    {
        #GP(0);

Updated as:

static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs)

{
	u64 max_size = (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) ?
		       sgx_encl_size_max_64 : sgx_encl_size_max_32;

	if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
		return -EINVAL;

	if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
		return -EINVAL;

	if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
	    secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
	    secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (secs->size >= max_size)
		return -EINVAL;

/Jarkko

#62 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 44 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 23 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +9 -0
+static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
+			     unsigned long ssaframesize)
+{
+	if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 61

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +10 -0
+	if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
+	    secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
+	    secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
+		if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
+		return -EINVAL;

These should be >=, not >, the SDM uses one of those fancy ≥ ligatures.

Quoted 6 lines

Internal versions use more obvious pseudocode, e.g.:

    if ((DS:TMP_SECS.ATTRIBUTES.MODE64BIT = 1) AND
        (DS:TMP_SECS.SIZE AND (~((1 << CPUID.18.0:EDX[15:8]) – 1)))
    {
        #GP(0);

Updated as:

static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs)

{
	u64 max_size = (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) ?
		       sgx_encl_size_max_64 : sgx_encl_size_max_32;

	if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
		return -EINVAL;

	if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
		return -EINVAL;
Quoted 8 lines
	if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
	    secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
	    secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (secs->size >= max_size)
		return -EINVAL;

This should be > not >=. Issue raised and fixed by Fábio Silva for ported patches for OOT SGX support: https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives/pull/123

I tested and verified with Intel arch, the comparison indeed should be >.

Thanks
Haitao

#63 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 56 lines · Haitao Huang
Quoted 44 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 23 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +9 -0
+static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
+			     unsigned long ssaframesize)
+{
+	if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 61

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +10 -0
+	if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
+	    secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
+	    secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
+		if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
+		return -EINVAL;

These should be >=, not >, the SDM uses one of those fancy ≥ ligatures.

Quoted 6 lines

Internal versions use more obvious pseudocode, e.g.:

    if ((DS:TMP_SECS.ATTRIBUTES.MODE64BIT = 1) AND
        (DS:TMP_SECS.SIZE AND (~((1 << CPUID.18.0:EDX[15:8]) – 1)))
    {
        #GP(0);

Updated as:

static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs)

{
	u64 max_size = (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) ?
		       sgx_encl_size_max_64 : sgx_encl_size_max_32;

	if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
		return -EINVAL;

	if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
		return -EINVAL;
Quoted 8 lines
	if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
	    secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
	    secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (secs->size >= max_size)
		return -EINVAL;
Quoted 5 lines

This should be > not >=. Issue raised and fixed by Fábio Silva for ported patches for OOT SGX support:
https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives/pull/123

I tested and verified with Intel arch, the comparison indeed should be >.

And this is a confirmed SDM bug, correct?

#64 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

Quoted 58 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 57 lines · Haitao Huang
Quoted 15 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 14 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 13 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +13 -0
+static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
+			     unsigned long ssaframesize)
+{
+	if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
+	    secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
+	    secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
+		return -EINVAL;
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 61

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +6 -0
+
+	if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
+		if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
+		return -EINVAL;

These should be >=, not >, the SDM uses one of those fancy ≥

ligatures.

Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Internal versions use more obvious pseudocode, e.g.:

    if ((DS:TMP_SECS.ATTRIBUTES.MODE64BIT = 1) AND
        (DS:TMP_SECS.SIZE AND (~((1 << CPUID.18.0:EDX[15:8]) – 1)))
    {
        #GP(0);

Updated as:

static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs)

{
	u64 max_size = (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) ?
		       sgx_encl_size_max_64 : sgx_encl_size_max_32;

	if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
		return -EINVAL;

	if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
		return -EINVAL;

	if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
	    secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
	    secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (secs->size >= max_size)
		return -EINVAL;
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

This should be > not >=. Issue raised and fixed by Fábio Silva for ported patches for OOT SGX support:
https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives/pull/123

I tested and verified with Intel arch, the comparison indeed should be

Quoted 1 line

.

And this is a confirmed SDM bug, correct?

yes, the pseudo code for ECREATE is inaccurate and inconsistent with the CPUID spec. The latter is correct. Haitao

#65 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver

In reply to Haitao Huang
Quoted 56 lines · Haitao Huang
Quoted 44 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 23 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +9 -0
+static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs,
+			     unsigned long ssaframesize)
+{
+	if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c line 61

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +10 -0
+	if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
+	    secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
+	    secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) {
+		if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_64)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (secs->size > sgx_encl_size_max_32)
+		return -EINVAL;

These should be >=, not >, the SDM uses one of those fancy ≥ ligatures.

Quoted 6 lines

Internal versions use more obvious pseudocode, e.g.:

    if ((DS:TMP_SECS.ATTRIBUTES.MODE64BIT = 1) AND
        (DS:TMP_SECS.SIZE AND (~((1 << CPUID.18.0:EDX[15:8]) – 1)))
    {
        #GP(0);

Updated as:

static int sgx_validate_secs(const struct sgx_secs *secs)

{
	u64 max_size = (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) ?
		       sgx_encl_size_max_64 : sgx_encl_size_max_32;

	if (secs->size < (2 * PAGE_SIZE) || !is_power_of_2(secs->size))
		return -EINVAL;

	if (secs->base & (secs->size - 1))
		return -EINVAL;
Quoted 8 lines
	if (secs->miscselect & sgx_misc_reserved_mask ||
	    secs->attributes & sgx_attributes_reserved_mask ||
	    secs->xfrm & sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (secs->size >= max_size)
		return -EINVAL;
Quoted 8 lines

This should be > not >=. Issue raised and fixed by Fábio Silva for ported patches for OOT SGX support:
https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives/pull/123

I tested and verified with Intel arch, the comparison indeed should be >.

Thanks
Haitao

Thans a lot!

I added this changelog entry to the v37 log:

* Fixed off-by-one error in a size calculation:
https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives/commit/e44cc238becf584cc079aef40b557c6af9a03f38

Given the Boris' earlier feedback I xref every changelog entry in v37 changelog. Then it is also less time consuming to spot if something is missing.

/Jarkko

#66 lore raw

PATCH v33 12/21 x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key of a QE, e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel signed PCE is used.

To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be only allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted parties can certify QE's.

Obviously the attestation service should know the public key of the used PCE and that way detect illegit attestation, but whitelisting the legit users still adds an additional layer of defence.

Add new device file called /dev/sgx/provision. The sole purpose of this file is to provide file descriptors that act as privilege tokens to allow to build enclaves with ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY set. A new ioctl called SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE is used to assign this token to an enclave.

---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h  | 11 ++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 14 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c  | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 74 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +11 -0
index 5edb08ab8fd0..57d0d30c79b3 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
 	_IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages)
 #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT \
 	_IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x02, struct sgx_enclave_init)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE \
+	_IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x03, struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute)
 
 /**
  * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -63,4 +65,13 @@ struct sgx_enclave_init {
 	__u64 sigstruct;
 };
 
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute - parameter structure for the
+ *				      %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE ioctl
+ * @attribute_fd:	file handle of the attribute file in the securityfs
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_set_attribute {
+	__u64 attribute_fd;
+};
+
 #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +14 -0
index b4aa7b9f8376..d90114cec1c3 100644
@@ -150,6 +150,13 @@ static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = {
 	.fops = &sgx_encl_fops,
 };
 
+static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_provision = {
+	.minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+	.name = "provision",
+	.nodename = "sgx/provision",
+	.fops = &sgx_provision_fops,
+};
+
 int __init sgx_drv_init(void)
 {
 	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
@@ -190,5 +197,12 @@ int __init sgx_drv_init(void)
 		return ret;
 	}
 
+	ret = misc_register(&sgx_dev_provision);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("Creating /dev/sgx/provision failed with %d.\n", ret);
+		misc_deregister(&sgx_dev_enclave);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h +2 -0
index e4063923115b..72747d01c046 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ extern u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask;
 extern u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask;
 extern u32 sgx_xsave_size_tbl[64];
 
+extern const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops;
+
 long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
 
 int sgx_drv_init(void);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +47 -0

59 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer
#67 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation

Quoted 4 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key of a QE, e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel

What's a QE?

I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.

Quoted 6 lines

signed PCE is used.

To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be only allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted parties can certify QE's.

Quoted 8 lines

Obviously the attestation service should know the public key of the used PCE and that way detect illegit attestation, but whitelisting the legit users still adds an additional layer of defence.

Add new device file called /dev/sgx/provision. The sole purpose of this file is to provide file descriptors that act as privilege tokens to allow to build enclaves with ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY set. A new ioctl called SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE is used to assign this token to an enclave.

So I'm sure I'm missing something here: what controls which enclave can open /dev/sgx/provision and thus pass the FD to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE?

And in general, how does that whole flow look like: what calls SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE when?

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#68 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation

Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 4 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key of a QE, e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel

What's a QE?

I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.

Quoting Enclave.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines

signed PCE is used.

To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be only allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted parties can certify QE's.

Obviously the attestation service should know the public key of the used PCE and that way detect illegit attestation, but whitelisting the legit users still adds an additional layer of defence.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Add new device file called /dev/sgx/provision. The sole purpose of this file is to provide file descriptors that act as privilege tokens to allow to build enclaves with ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY set. A new ioctl called SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE is used to assign this token to an enclave.

So I'm sure I'm missing something here: what controls which enclave can open /dev/sgx/provision and thus pass the FD to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE?

/dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is that the admin will configure the system to grant only specific enclaves access to the PROVISION_KEY.

Quoted 2 lines

And in general, how does that whole flow look like: what calls SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE when?

The basic gist is that the host process of an enclave that needs/wants access to the PROVISION_KEY will invoke SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE when building the enclave. Any enclave can request access to PROVISION_KEY, but practically speaking only the PCE and QE (or their non-Intel equivalents) actually need access to the key. KVM (future series) will also respect /dev/sgx/provision, i.e. require a similar ioctl() to expose the PROVISION_KEY to a guest.

E.g. for my own personal testing, I never do anything attestation related, so none of the enclaves I run request PROVISION_KEY, but I do expose it to VMs to test the KVM paths.

In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no additional kernel infrastructure to help userspace make per-enclave decisions. There have been more than a few proposals on how to extend the kernel to help provide better granularity, e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff to post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough down various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a corner.

If you want super gory details, Intel's whitepaper on attestation in cloud environments is a good starting point[*], but I don't recommended doing much more than skimming unless you really like attestation stuff or are masochistic, which IMO amount to the same thing :-)

[*] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/dcap-1.0/docs/SGX_ECDSA_QuoteGenReference_DCAP_API_Linux_1.0.pdf

maintainer
#69 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation

Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line

I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.

Quoting Enclave.

Yah, pls add it somewhere.

Quoted 3 lines

/dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is that the admin will configure the system to grant only specific enclaves access to the PROVISION_KEY.

Uuh, I don't like "the expectation is" - the reality happens to turn differently, more often than not.

Quoted 6 lines

In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no additional kernel infrastructure to help userspace make per-enclave decisions. There have been more than a few proposals on how to extend the kernel to help provide better granularity, e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff to post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough down various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a corner.

So this all sounds to me like we should not upstream /dev/sgx/provision now but delay it until the infrastructure for that has been made more concrete. We can always add it then. Changing it after the fact - if we have to and for whatever reason - would be a lot harder for a user-visible interface which someone has started using already.

So I'd leave that out from the initial patchset.

Quoted 4 lines

If you want super gory details, Intel's whitepaper on attestation in cloud environments is a good starting point[*], but I don't recommended doing much more than skimming unless you really like attestation stuff or are masochistic, which IMO amount to the same thing :-)

No thanks. :)

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#70 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation

Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson

/dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is that the admin will configure the system to grant only specific enclaves access to the PROVISION_KEY.

Uuh, I don't like "the expectation is" - the reality happens to turn differently, more often than not.

Would it help if I worded it as "only root should ever be able to run an enclave with access to PROVISION_KEY"? We obviously can't control what admins actually do, hence my wording of it as the expected behavior.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines

In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no additional kernel infrastructure to help userspace make per-enclave decisions. There have been more than a few proposals on how to extend the kernel to help provide better granularity, e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff to post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough down various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a corner.

Quoted 5 lines

So this all sounds to me like we should not upstream /dev/sgx/provision now but delay it until the infrastructure for that has been made more concrete. We can always add it then. Changing it after the fact - if we have to and for whatever reason - would be a lot harder for a user-visible interface which someone has started using already.

The userspace and attestation infrastructure is very concrete, i.e. the need for userspace to be able to access PROVISION_KEY is there, as is the desire to be able to restrict access to PROVISION_KEY, e.g. I believe Andy Lutomirski originally requested the ability to restrict access.

The additional infrastructure for per-enclave decisions is somewhat orthogonal to the PROVISION_KEY, e.g. they won't necessarily be employed by everyone running enclaves, and environments that do have per-enclave policies would still likely want the extra layer of restriction for PROVISION_KEY. I only brought the additional policy crud to call out that we've done enough path-finding on additional restrictions to have strong confidence that adding /dev/sgx/provision won't prevent us from adding more fine grained control in the future.

Quoted 1 line

So I'd leave that out from the initial patchset.

maintainer
#71 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation

Quoted 32 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson

/dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is that the admin will configure the system to grant only specific enclaves access to the PROVISION_KEY.

Uuh, I don't like "the expectation is" - the reality happens to turn differently, more often than not.

Would it help if I worded it as "only root should ever be able to run an enclave with access to PROVISION_KEY"? We obviously can't control what admins actually do, hence my wording of it as the expected behavior.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines

In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no additional kernel infrastructure to help userspace make per-enclave decisions. There have been more than a few proposals on how to extend the kernel to help provide better granularity, e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff to post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough down various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a corner.

Quoted 5 lines

So this all sounds to me like we should not upstream /dev/sgx/provision now but delay it until the infrastructure for that has been made more concrete. We can always add it then. Changing it after the fact - if we have to and for whatever reason - would be a lot harder for a user-visible interface which someone has started using already.

The userspace and attestation infrastructure is very concrete, i.e. the need for userspace to be able to access PROVISION_KEY is there, as is the desire to be able to restrict access to PROVISION_KEY, e.g. I believe Andy Lutomirski originally requested the ability to restrict access.

Quoted 8 lines

The additional infrastructure for per-enclave decisions is somewhat orthogonal to the PROVISION_KEY, e.g. they won't necessarily be employed by everyone running enclaves, and environments that do have per-enclave policies would still likely want the extra layer of restriction for PROVISION_KEY. I only brought the additional policy crud to call out that we've done enough path-finding on additional restrictions to have strong confidence that adding /dev/sgx/provision won't prevent us from adding more fine grained control in the future.

I agree.

I anticipate that most of the nasty fine-grained stuff will end up in userspace down the road. Systems can be configured such that provisioning is done as root, or systems can end up with fancy SELinux rules or daemons that pass around fds or whatever, but all of this can be done with the kernel code in this patchset.

#72 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation

In reply to Borislav Petkov

Good afternoon, I hope the week is progressing productively to an end for everyone.

I think it was almost two months ago now that Thomas Gleixner indicated that security and privacy issues that we were raising with respect to this driver, with what we believe is legitimate domain expertise, threatened the upstreaming of the driver. I think the case can be made that those claims were somewhat specious given a fast forward to today and the continued uncertainty regarding the architecture of this driver.

So I will take that risk once again in order to provide some context for this thread.

Quoted 6 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line

I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.

Quoting Enclave.

Yah, pls add it somewhere.

For the benefit of everyone not deeply involved with this and perhaps something that Jarkko can cut and paste if he desires.

The Quoting Enclave (QE) is the trusted endpoint that is responsible for signing the report of an enclave's initialized status on a platform.

In Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) based attestation, the QE is the custodian of one of the private EPID group keys that is provisioned to the platform by the Intel Attestation Service (IAS). The quoting enclave generates a signature over the attesting enclave's report structure using that key. The IAS uses its public copy of the group key to verify that the signature is from a trusted endpoint running on a member of the group.

The EPID provisioning process 'trusts' that the platform, to which the private group key is being delegated to, is a known Intel platform by virtue of the fact that the Platform Certification Enclave (PCE) is able to generate an identifier that could only be generated by having access to a specific symmetric encryption key. A key that is available only to enclaves that have been initialized with the PROVISION_KEY attribute bit.

The QE encrypts the private group key using a signer specific (MRSIGNER) symmetric encryption key that only the QE can generate while in a trusted initialization state. That provides a mechanisum for persisting this chain of trust outside the context of execution of the QE.

Things are slightly different from a mechanistic perspective when the Data Center Attestation Protocol (DCAP) is being used, but conceptually the same. In that attestation variant, the QE carries the PROVISION_KEY attribute so that it can certify that the report signature, generated with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) rather then EPID, is from a known platform.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

/dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is that the admin will configure the system to grant only specific enclaves access to the PROVISION_KEY.

Uuh, I don't like "the expectation is" - the reality happens to turn differently, more often than not.

Indeed, which is why we have consistently maintained that the platform owner should be allowed to use cryptographic access controls over which enclaves can possess the PROVISION_KEY attribute.

Given the security threat on a platform that is capable of supporting Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM), the ability to initialize an enclave is also a legitimate candidate for cryptographic access control.

We can bikeshed the significance of these issues all day, but for the record, access to the PROVISION_KEY allows platforms to be absolutely and precisely fingerprinted for their entire lifespan.

Initialized enclaves on an EDMM capable platform have the ability to execute arbitrary code, over which the kernel security infrastructure has no visibility into or control over.

There is little doubt that EDMM will be a mainstay of the Confidential Computing Initiative (CCI), which is the target of this driver. A review of the archives will indicate that RedHat/IBM has already confirmed that their candidate for this infrastructure (Enarx) requires EDMM.

To refresh everyone further, the last version of the SFLC patches that we proposed, allows a platform owner to run the driver in a default mode, which uses the proposed DAC controls over all of this or to opt for stronger cryptographic controls. The approach that we took has virtually no impact on the architecture and footprint of the driver.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines

In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no additional kernel infrastructure to help userspace make per-enclave decisions. There have been more than a few proposals on how to extend the kernel to help provide better granularity, e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff to post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough down various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a corner.

Quoted 8 lines

So this all sounds to me like we should not upstream /dev/sgx/provision now but delay it until the infrastructure for that has been made more concrete. We can always add it then. Changing it after the fact - if we have to and for whatever reason - would be a lot harder for a user-visible interface which someone has started using already.

So I'd leave that out from the initial patchset.

Without access to the PROVISION_KEY attribute, the two standard mechanisms for attestation will not function, the technology is arguably useless for its intended purposes without attestation.

Once again, I will leave it to community bike shedding as to whether or not Linux wants the ability to support unfettered deterministic platform fingerprinting that can be conducted for the physical lifespan of the platform.

Once again, for the record, our approach affords compatibility with the now 6+ year old out-of-tree user interface, without requiring its use. I would argue that the continually voiced concerns about 'painting ourselves into a corner', with respect to access authorization, is significantly less of a problem with our approach rather then without it.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

If you want super gory details, Intel's whitepaper on attestation in cloud environments is a good starting point[*], but I don't recommended doing much more than skimming unless you really like attestation stuff or are masochistic, which IMO amount to the same thing :-)

No thanks. :)

Interesting reflections and perhaps worthy of some introspection by the Linux development community.

I will concede that there are a lot of musty corners that need to be explored in order to understand how all of this works and the security/privacy issues involved. I certainly wouldn't wish exploration on those corners on anyone.

I think everyone will concede that my ideas and suggestions on these issues have been deemed to be unpopular, if not without merit. They do, however, come from the perspective of someone who directed a complete and independent implementation of all of this infrastructure.

A process which has left me with no uncertainty whatsoever with respect to the issues involved in all of this.

Quoted 2 lines

Regards/Gruss,
Boris.

Best wishes for a pleasant and productive weekend to everyone.

Dr. Greg

As always,
Dr. Greg Wettstein, Ph.D, Worker Autonomously self-defensive
Enjellic Systems Development, LLC IOT platforms and edge devices.
4206 N. 19th Ave.
Fargo, ND 58102
PH: 701-281-1686 EMAIL: [email protected]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"I suppose that could happen but he wouldn't know a Galois Field
if it kicked him in the nuts."
-- Anonymous mathematician
Resurrection.

#73 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation

In reply to Borislav Petkov
Quoted 21 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line

I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.

Quoting Enclave.

Yah, pls add it somewhere.

Quoted 3 lines

/dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is that the admin will configure the system to grant only specific enclaves access to the PROVISION_KEY.

Uuh, I don't like "the expectation is" - the reality happens to turn differently, more often than not.

Quoted 6 lines

In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no additional kernel infrastructure to help userspace make per-enclave decisions. There have been more than a few proposals on how to extend the kernel to help provide better granularity, e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff to post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough down various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a corner.

Quoted 7 lines

So this all sounds to me like we should not upstream /dev/sgx/provision now but delay it until the infrastructure for that has been made more concrete. We can always add it then. Changing it after the fact - if we have to and for whatever reason - would be a lot harder for a user-visible interface which someone has started using already.

So I'd leave that out from the initial patchset.

I'm trying to understand what is meant by "more concrete". Attestation is needed for most enclave applications.

If this patch is dropped, should we also allow PROVISION_KEY attribute to all enclaves? Dropping this patch and keeping that check in the driver patch is not very coherent behaviour.

/Jarkko

#74 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation

In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 57 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 4 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key of a QE, e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel

What's a QE?

I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.

Quoting Enclave.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines

signed PCE is used.

To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be only allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted parties can certify QE's.

Obviously the attestation service should know the public key of the used PCE and that way detect illegit attestation, but whitelisting the legit users still adds an additional layer of defence.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Add new device file called /dev/sgx/provision. The sole purpose of this file is to provide file descriptors that act as privilege tokens to allow to build enclaves with ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY set. A new ioctl called SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE is used to assign this token to an enclave.

So I'm sure I'm missing something here: what controls which enclave can open /dev/sgx/provision and thus pass the FD to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE?

/dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is that the admin will configure the system to grant only specific enclaves access to the PROVISION_KEY.

Quoted 2 lines

And in general, how does that whole flow look like: what calls SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE when?

The basic gist is that the host process of an enclave that needs/wants access to the PROVISION_KEY will invoke SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE when building the enclave. Any enclave can request access to PROVISION_KEY, but practically speaking only the PCE and QE (or their non-Intel equivalents) actually need access to the key. KVM (future series) will also respect /dev/sgx/provision, i.e. require a similar ioctl() to expose the PROVISION_KEY to a guest.

E.g. for my own personal testing, I never do anything attestation related, so none of the enclaves I run request PROVISION_KEY, but I do expose it to VMs to test the KVM paths.

In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no additional kernel infrastructure to help userspace make per-enclave decisions. There have been more than a few proposals on how to extend the kernel to help provide better granularity, e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff to post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough down various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a corner.

Quoted 6 lines

If you want super gory details, Intel's whitepaper on attestation in cloud environments is a good starting point[*], but I don't recommended doing much more than skimming unless you really like attestation stuff or are masochistic, which IMO amount to the same thing :-)

[*] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/dcap-1.0/docs/SGX_ECDSA_QuoteGenReference_DCAP_API_Linux_1.0.pdf

Section 3 in [*] is what describes the infrastructure. DCAP is only a component in the whole attestation infrastructure.

[*] https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/f1/b8/intel-sgx-support-for-third-party-attestation.pdf

/Jarkko

#75 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation

In reply to Borislav Petkov
Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 4 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key of a QE, e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel

What's a QE?

I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.

Quoting Enclave.

Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 7 lines

signed PCE is used.

To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be only allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted parties can certify QE's.

Quoted 8 lines

Obviously the attestation service should know the public key of the used PCE and that way detect illegit attestation, but whitelisting the legit users still adds an additional layer of defence.

Add new device file called /dev/sgx/provision. The sole purpose of this file is to provide file descriptors that act as privilege tokens to allow to build enclaves with ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY set. A new ioctl called SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE is used to assign this token to an enclave.

Quoted 6 lines

So I'm sure I'm missing something here: what controls which enclave can open /dev/sgx/provision and thus pass the FD to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE?

And in general, how does that whole flow look like: what calls SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE when?

I've documented it in the Remote Attestation section:

https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/linux-sgx/blob/master/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst

/Jarkko

#76 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation

Quoted 7 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 6 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 4 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key of a QE, e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

What's a QE?

I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset.

Quoting Enclave.

Thanks for spotting this. I updated my GIT-tree accordingly.

/Jarkko

#77 lore raw

PATCH v33 13/21 x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

There is a limited amount of EPC available. Therefore, some of it must be copied to the regular memory, and only subset kept in the SGX reserved memory. While kernel cannot directly access enclave memory, SGX provides a set of ENCLS leaf functions to perform reclaiming.

This commits implements a page reclaimer by using these leaf functions. It picks the victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. The thread ksgxswapd reclaims pages on the event when the number of free EPC pages goes below SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES up until it reaches SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES.

sgx_alloc_epc_page() can optionally directly reclaim pages with @reclaim set true. A caller must also supply owner for each page so that the reclaimer can access the associated enclaves. This is needed for locking, as most of the ENCLS leafs cannot be executed concurrently for an enclave. The owner is also needed for accessing SECS, which is required to be resident when its child pages are being reclaimed.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c   | 340 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h   |  41 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c  |  76 ++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c   | 465 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h    |   9 +
 6 files changed, 925 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +1 -0
index d90114cec1c3..997a7f4117c5 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static int sgx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 
 	atomic_set(&encl->flags, 0);
 	kref_init(&encl->refcount);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&encl->va_pages);
 	INIT_RADIX_TREE(&encl->page_tree, GFP_KERNEL);
 	mutex_init(&encl->lock);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&encl->mm_list);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +338 -2

390 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +41 -0

84 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +71 -5

143 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +465 -0

513 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +9 -0
index aae6bfb3bc8a..f2fb7e362226 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 
 struct sgx_epc_page {
 	unsigned long desc;
+	struct sgx_encl_page *owner;
 	struct list_head list;
 };
 
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ struct sgx_epc_page {
 struct sgx_epc_section {
 	unsigned long pa;
 	void *va;
+	unsigned long free_cnt;
 	struct list_head page_list;
 	struct list_head unsanitized_page_list;
 	spinlock_t lock;
@@ -34,6 +36,10 @@ struct sgx_epc_section {
 
 #define SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK		GENMASK(7, 0)
 #define SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS		(SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK + 1)
+#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMABLE	BIT(8)
+#define SGX_NR_TO_SCAN			16
+#define SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES		32
+#define SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES		64
 
 extern struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS];
 
@@ -50,7 +56,10 @@ static inline void *sgx_get_epc_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
 	return section->va + (page->desc & PAGE_MASK) - section->pa;
 }
 
+void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
+int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void);
+struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim);
 void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 
 #endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#78 lore raw

PATCH v33 14/21 x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Add VMA callbacks for ptrace() that can be used with debug enclaves. With debug enclaves data can be read and write the memory word at a time by using ENCLS(EDBGRD) and ENCLS(EDBGWR) leaf instructions.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +87 -0
index 525bed526041..d1edadfa3fc6 100644
@@ -334,10 +334,97 @@ static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
 				calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0));
 }
 
+static int sgx_edbgrd(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *page,
+		      unsigned long addr, void *data)
+{
+	unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+	int ret;
+
+
+	ret = __edbgrd(sgx_get_epc_addr(page->epc_page) + offset, data);
+	if (ret)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_edbgwr(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *page,
+		      unsigned long addr, void *data)
+{
+	unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = __edbgwr(sgx_get_epc_addr(page->epc_page) + offset, data);
+	if (ret)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
+			  void *buf, int len, int write)
+{
+	struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
+	struct sgx_encl_page *entry = NULL;
+	char data[sizeof(unsigned long)];
+	unsigned long align;
+	unsigned int flags;
+	int offset;
+	int cnt;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	/* If process was forked, VMA is still there but vm_private_data is set
+	 * to NULL.
+	 */
+	if (!encl)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	flags = atomic_read(&encl->flags);
+
+	if (!(flags & SGX_ENCL_DEBUG) || !(flags & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) ||
+	    (flags & SGX_ENCL_DEAD))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i += cnt) {
+		entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK);
+		if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(entry);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		align = ALIGN_DOWN(addr + i, sizeof(unsigned long));
+		offset = (addr + i) & (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1);
+		cnt = sizeof(unsigned long) - offset;
+		cnt = min(cnt, len - i);
+
+		ret = sgx_edbgrd(encl, entry, align, data);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (write) {
+			memcpy(data + offset, buf + i, cnt);
+			ret = sgx_edbgwr(encl, entry, align, data);
+			if (ret)
+				goto out;
+		} else
+			memcpy(buf + i, data + offset, cnt);
+
+out:
+		mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return ret < 0 ? ret : i;
+}
+
 const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = {
 	.open = sgx_vma_open,
 	.fault = sgx_vma_fault,
 	.may_mprotect = sgx_vma_mprotect,
+	.access = sgx_vma_access,
 };
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#79 lore raw

PATCH v33 15/21 x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

The basic concept and implementation is very similar to the kernel's exception fixup mechanism. The key differences are that the kernel handler is hardcoded and the fixup entry addresses are relative to the overall table as opposed to individual entries.

Hardcoding the kernel handler avoids the need to figure out how to get userspace code to point at a kernel function. Given that the expected usage is to propagate information to userspace, dumping all fault information into registers is likely the desired behavior for the vast majority of yet-to-be-created functions. Use registers DI, SI and DX to communicate fault information, which follows Linux's ABI for register consumption and hopefully avoids conflict with hardware features that might leverage the fixup capabilities, e.g. register usage for SGX instructions was at least partially designed with calling conventions in mind.

Making fixup addresses relative to the overall table allows the table to be stripped from the final vDSO image (it's a kernel construct) without complicating the offset logic, e.g. entry-relative addressing would also need to account for the table's location relative to the image.

Regarding stripping the table, modify vdso2c to extract the table from the raw, a.k.a. unstripped, data and dump it as a standalone byte array in the resulting .c file. The original base of the table, its length and a pointer to the byte array are captured in struct vdso_image. Alternatively, the table could be dumped directly into the struct, but because the number of entries can vary per image, that would require either hardcoding a max sized table into the struct definition or defining the table as a flexible length array. The flexible length array approach has zero benefits, e.g. the base/size are still needed, and prevents reusing the extraction code, while hardcoding the max size adds ongoing maintenance just to avoid exporting the explicit size.

The immediate use case is for Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX). SGX introduces a new CPL3-only "enclave" mode that runs as a sort of black box shared object that is hosted by an untrusted "normal" CPl3 process.

Entering an enclave can only be done through SGX-specific instructions, EENTER and ERESUME, and is a non-trivial process. Because of the complexity of transitioning to/from an enclave, the vast majority of enclaves are expected to utilize a library to handle the actual transitions. This is roughly analogous to how e.g. libc implementations are used by most applications.

Another crucial characteristic of SGX enclaves is that they can generate exceptions as part of their normal (at least as "normal" as SGX can be) operation that need to be handled *in* the enclave and/or are unique to SGX.

And because they are essentially fancy shared objects, a process can host any number of enclaves, each of which can execute multiple threads simultaneously.

Putting everything together, userspace enclaves will utilize a library that must be prepared to handle any and (almost) all exceptions any time at least one thread may be executing in an enclave. Leveraging signals to handle the enclave exceptions is unpleasant, to put it mildly, e.g. the SGX library must constantly (un)register its signal handler based on whether or not at least one thread is executing in an enclave, and filter and forward exceptions that aren't related to its enclaves. This becomes particularly nasty when using multiple levels of libraries that register signal handlers, e.g. running an enclave via cgo inside of the Go runtime.

Enabling exception fixup in vDSO allows the kernel to provide a vDSO function that wraps the low-level transitions to/from the enclave, i.e. the EENTER and ERESUME instructions. The vDSO function can intercept exceptions that would otherwise generate a signal and return the fault information directly to its caller, thus avoiding the need to juggle signal handlers.

Note that unlike the kernel's _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE implementation, the 'C' version of _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE doesn't use a pre-compiled assembly macro. Duplicating four lines of code is simpler than adding the necessary infrastructure to generate pre-compiled assembly and the intended benefit of massaging GCC's inlining algorithm is unlikely to realized in the vDSO any time soon, if ever.

---
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile          |  6 ++--
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c         | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h         | 29 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S |  9 ++++-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h          | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h           |  5 +++
 6 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +3 -3
index 04e65f0698f6..ebe82b7aecda 100644
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o
 vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o
 
 # files to link into kernel
-obj-y				+= vma.o
+obj-y				+= vma.o extable.o
 KASAN_SANITIZE_vma.o		:= y
 UBSAN_SANITIZE_vma.o		:= y
 KCSAN_SANITIZE_vma.o		:= y
@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ $(obj)/%-x32.o: $(obj)/%.o FORCE
 
 targets += vdsox32.lds $(vobjx32s-y)
 
-$(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S
-$(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg FORCE
+$(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S --remove-section __ex_table
+$(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg
 	$(call if_changed,objcopy)
 
 $(obj)/vdsox32.so.dbg: $(obj)/vdsox32.lds $(vobjx32s) FORCE
arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c new file +46 -0

46 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h new file +29 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..aafdac396948
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __VDSO_EXTABLE_H
+#define __VDSO_EXTABLE_H
+
+/*
+ * Inject exception fixup for vDSO code.  Unlike normal exception fixup,
+ * vDSO uses a dedicated handler the addresses are relative to the overall
+ * exception table, not each individual entry.
+ */
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to)	\
+	ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from to
+
+.macro ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from:req to:req
+	.pushsection __ex_table, "a"
+	.long (\from) - __ex_table
+	.long (\to) - __ex_table
+	.popsection
+.endm
+#else
+#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to)	\
+	".pushsection __ex_table, \"a\"\n"      \
+	".long (" #from ") - __ex_table\n"      \
+	".long (" #to ") - __ex_table\n"        \
+	".popsection\n"
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __VDSO_EXTABLE_H */
+
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S +8 -1
index 4d152933547d..dc8da7695859 100644
@@ -75,11 +75,18 @@ SECTIONS
 	 * stuff that isn't used at runtime in between.
 	 */
 
-	.text		: { *(.text*) }			:text	=0x90909090,
+	.text		: {
+		*(.text*)
+		*(.fixup)
+	}						:text	=0x90909090,
+
+
 
 	.altinstructions	: { *(.altinstructions) }	:text
 	.altinstr_replacement	: { *(.altinstr_replacement) }	:text
 
+	__ex_table		: { *(__ex_table) }		:text
+
 	/DISCARD/ : {
 		*(.discard)
 		*(.discard.*)
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h +49 -1

80 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h +5 -0
index bbcdc7b8f963..b5d23470f56b 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ struct vdso_image {
 	unsigned long size;   /* Always a multiple of PAGE_SIZE */
 
 	unsigned long alt, alt_len;
+	unsigned long extable_base, extable_len;
+	const void *extable;
 
 	long sym_vvar_start;  /* Negative offset to the vvar area */
 
@@ -45,6 +47,9 @@ extern void __init init_vdso_image(const struct vdso_image *image);
 
 extern int map_vdso_once(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr);
 
+extern bool fixup_vdso_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+				 unsigned long error_code,
+				 unsigned long fault_addr);
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_VDSO_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
maintainer
#80 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions

On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:37AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
...

Quoted 2 lines

intended benefit of massaging GCC's inlining algorithm is unlikely to realized in the vDSO any time soon, if ever.

That is a very good explanation and I would prefer if it would be in a sgx-specific README or so instead of it getting lost in git...

arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c line 24

Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c new file +13 -0
+bool fixup_vdso_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+			  unsigned long error_code, unsigned long fault_addr)
+{
+	const struct vdso_image *image = current->mm->context.vdso_image;
+	const struct vdso_exception_table_entry *extable;
+	unsigned int nr_entries, i;
+	unsigned long base;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not attempt to fixup #DB or #BP.  It's impossible to identify
+	 * whether or not a #DB/#BP originated from within an SGX enclave and
+	 * SGX enclaves are currently the only use case for vDSO fixup.
+	 */

So this is all fine and dandy but nowhere do I see the code doing:

	if (am_I_an_sgx_enclave(tsk))
		fixup_vdso_exception()

because that vDSO exception fixup, albeit it looking kinda generic, is SGX-only for now. So it should be designed to run only for SGX enclaves for now.

Also, is there any particular reason for fixup_vdso_exception() to be in arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c instead of in arch/x86/mm/extable.c?

I mean, it gets called by traps.c so it looks like normal kernel code to me or am I missing some vdso magic?

And built only when CONFIG_INTEL_SGX is enabled.

And so on...

...

Quoted 25 lines
arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h new file +19 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..aafdac396948
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __VDSO_EXTABLE_H
+#define __VDSO_EXTABLE_H
+
+/*
+ * Inject exception fixup for vDSO code.  Unlike normal exception fixup,
+ * vDSO uses a dedicated handler the addresses are relative to the overall
+ * exception table, not each individual entry.
+ */
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to)	\
+	ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from to
+
+.macro ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from:req to:req
+	.pushsection __ex_table, "a"
+	.long (\from) - __ex_table
+	.long (\to) - __ex_table
+	.popsection
+.endm

arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h line 29

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h new file +10 -0
+#else
+#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to)	\
+	".pushsection __ex_table, \"a\"\n"      \
+	".long (" #from ") - __ex_table\n"      \
+	".long (" #to ") - __ex_table\n"        \
+	".popsection\n"
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __VDSO_EXTABLE_H */
+

.git/rebase-apply/patch:122: new blank line at EOF. +

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#81 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions

Quoted 24 lines · Borislav Petkov

On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:37AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
...

Quoted 2 lines

intended benefit of massaging GCC's inlining algorithm is unlikely to realized in the vDSO any time soon, if ever.

That is a very good explanation and I would prefer if it would be in a sgx-specific README or so instead of it getting lost in git...

arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c line 24

Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c new file +13 -0
+bool fixup_vdso_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+			  unsigned long error_code, unsigned long fault_addr)
+{
+	const struct vdso_image *image = current->mm->context.vdso_image;
+	const struct vdso_exception_table_entry *extable;
+	unsigned int nr_entries, i;
+	unsigned long base;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not attempt to fixup #DB or #BP.  It's impossible to identify
+	 * whether or not a #DB/#BP originated from within an SGX enclave and
+	 * SGX enclaves are currently the only use case for vDSO fixup.
+	 */

So this is all fine and dandy but nowhere do I see the code doing:

Quoted 6 lines
	if (am_I_an_sgx_enclave(tsk))
		fixup_vdso_exception()

because that vDSO exception fixup, albeit it looking kinda generic, is SGX-only for now. So it should be designed to run only for SGX enclaves for now.

That's not really feasible as there is no readily available identifier for an SGX task. The only indication that a relevant task is an SGX task is if it has mmap()'d /dev/sgx/enclave, and hooking that would be heinous. And adding flag just to tag the task as SGX seems wasteful.

Even if we could easily condition the vDSO fixup on SGX tasks, I don't think that'd be a good ABI for the SGX vDSO code. The intended contract is that fixup will happen simply by virtue of the code at the related IP taking a fault (in userspace). E.g. the vDSO function should get the fixup even if userspace screws up mmap() and invokes __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() without being tagged an SGX task.

Quoted 5 lines

Also, is there any particular reason for fixup_vdso_exception() to be in arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c instead of in arch/x86/mm/extable.c?

I mean, it gets called by traps.c so it looks like normal kernel code to me or am I missing some vdso magic?

No hard dependency, it's normal kernel code. My reasoning for dropping it in .../vdso was largely to co-locate it with vdso/extable.h due to the dependency on the format of 'struct vdso_exception_table_entry'. And I put extable.h in .../vdso because it contains macros that are only for use in actual vDSO code.

Quoted 1 line

And built only when CONFIG_INTEL_SGX is enabled.

Ya, shouldn't be a problem to stub it out for SGX=n.

maintainer
#82 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions

Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson

E.g. the vDSO function should get the fixup even if userspace screws up mmap() and invokes __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() without being tagged an SGX task.

I sincerely hope you don't mean this seriously.

Please add a member to task_struct which denotes that a task is an sgx task, test that member where needed and forget real quickly about running *any* *fixup* for unrelated tasks.

Quoted 3 lines

No hard dependency, it's normal kernel code. My reasoning for dropping it in .../vdso was largely to co-locate it with vdso/extable.h due to the dependency on the format of 'struct vdso_exception_table_entry'.

A struct which you defined instead of simply using struct exception_table_entry even if it has a handler member which would remain unused?

Let's not put code in vdso/ if it doesn't really belong there pls.

Quoted 1 line

Ya, shouldn't be a problem to stub it out for SGX=n.

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#83 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions

Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson

E.g. the vDSO function should get the fixup even if userspace screws up mmap() and invokes __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() without being tagged an SGX task.

I sincerely hope you don't mean this seriously.

Please add a member to task_struct which denotes that a task is an sgx task, test that member where needed and forget real quickly about running *any* *fixup* for unrelated tasks.

But IMO they're not unrelated if they end up in __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave(). Getting to the point where __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() actually attempts ENCLU (the single fixup entry) requires a very deliberate attempt to run an enclave. Not to mention the fixup doesn't squash the fault, it simply morphs what would be a signal into a synchronous error.

And I don't see how to sanely track this in task_struct. As stated before, the only foolproof way to identify an SGX task is by tracking whether it has a VMA backed by /dev/sgx/enclave, i.e. the flag would probably need to reside in mm_struct. Keying off opening /dev/sgx/enclave isn't viable as enclaves can be handed off via SCM_RIGHTS or fork().

Putting a flag in mm_struct is doable, but it would need to be sticky to keep things sane, e.g. clearing the flag on unmapping the enclave would require refcounting VMAs and hooking vm_ops->close. The refcounting is painful (we had it for several years) and ->close prevents merging VMAs, which IMO is far worse than unconditionally morphing fault-based signals that originate in __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave(). And assuming we don't do the whole ->close thing, we'd end up with MADV_DONTFORK -> fork() having divergent behavior for mm_structs without /dev/sgx/enclave VMAs, i.e. the child of MADV_DONTFORK -> fork() case would not be tagged SGX (unless we intentionally do the "wrong" thing and propagate the flag), whereas the munmap() case would result in a SGX-tagged mm_struct with no /dev/sgx/enclave VMAs.

#84 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions

In reply to Borislav Petkov
Quoted 11 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson

E.g. the vDSO function should get the fixup even if userspace screws up mmap() and invokes __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() without being tagged an SGX task.

I sincerely hope you don't mean this seriously.

Please add a member to task_struct which denotes that a task is an sgx task, test that member where needed and forget real quickly about running *any* *fixup* for unrelated tasks.

I don't see the problem. If you call this magic vDSO function and get a fault, it gets handled. What's the failure mode?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

No hard dependency, it's normal kernel code. My reasoning for dropping it in .../vdso was largely to co-locate it with vdso/extable.h due to the dependency on the format of 'struct vdso_exception_table_entry'.

A struct which you defined instead of simply using struct exception_table_entry even if it has a handler member which would remain unused?

Don't forget the cross-arch issue. We need that structure to have constant layout so that the -m32 build from the vDSO has the same layout as in the kernel.

So my only actual objection to the patch is that there should probably be a comment above the structure reminding people that it needs to have the same layout on 32-bit, x32, and x86_64. So maybe the entries should be s32 instead of int, although this doesn't really matter.

#85 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions

Quoted 25 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 11 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson

E.g. the vDSO function should get the fixup even if userspace screws up mmap() and invokes __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() without being tagged an SGX task.

I sincerely hope you don't mean this seriously.

Please add a member to task_struct which denotes that a task is an sgx task, test that member where needed and forget real quickly about running *any* *fixup* for unrelated tasks.

I don't see the problem. If you call this magic vDSO function and get a fault, it gets handled. What's the failure mode?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

No hard dependency, it's normal kernel code. My reasoning for dropping it in .../vdso was largely to co-locate it with vdso/extable.h due to the dependency on the format of 'struct vdso_exception_table_entry'.

A struct which you defined instead of simply using struct exception_table_entry even if it has a handler member which would remain unused?

Quoted 8 lines

Don't forget the cross-arch issue. We need that structure to have constant layout so that the -m32 build from the vDSO has the same layout as in the kernel.

So my only actual objection to the patch is that there should probably be a comment above the structure reminding people that it needs to have the same layout on 32-bit, x32, and x86_64. So maybe the entries should be s32 instead of int, although this doesn't really matter.

I highly doubt my past self thought about the cross-arch issue. The main reason I created 'struct vdso_exception_table_entry' is that interpretation of the fields is different. For the kernel, the fields contain offsets that are relative to the address of the field itself, i.e. of the fixup itself. For vDSO, the offsets are relative to the base of the vDSO.

Reusing exception_table_entry felt like it would be all kinds of confusing.

#86 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v33 15/21] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions

In reply to Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 7 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 6 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson

E.g. the vDSO function should get the fixup even if userspace screws up mmap() and invokes __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() without being tagged an SGX task.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

I sincerely hope you don't mean this seriously.

Please add a member to task_struct which denotes that a task is an sgx task, test that member where needed and forget real quickly about running *any* *fixup* for unrelated tasks.

I don't see the problem. If you call this magic vDSO function and get a fault, it gets handled. What's the failure mode?

Handled by some definition of handled. If a random user space tasks ends up in that function then it will not die as it would otherwise, but I don't see a real issue with that either.

Thanks,

tglx

#87 lore raw

PATCH v33 16/21 x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add helper function to sanitize error code to prepare for vDSO exception fixup, which will expose the error code to userspace and runs before set_signal_archinfo(), i.e. suppresses the signal when fixup is successful.

---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +17 -7
index 25d48aae36c1..966af17523fb 100644
@@ -556,6 +556,18 @@ pgtable_bad(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 	oops_end(flags, regs, sig);
 }
 
+static void sanitize_error_code(unsigned long address,
+				unsigned long *error_code)
+{
+	/*
+	 * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page
+	 * table layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to
+	 * kernel addresses are always protection faults.
+	 */
+	if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
+		*error_code |= X86_PF_PROT;
+}
+
 static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address,
 				unsigned long error_code)
 {
@@ -612,6 +624,8 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 		 * faulting through the emulate_vsyscall() logic.
 		 */
 		if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) {
+			sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
+
 			set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
 
 			/* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */
@@ -760,13 +774,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 		if (is_errata100(regs, address))
 			return;
 
-		/*
-		 * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page table
-		 * layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to kernel addresses
-		 * are always protection faults.
-		 */
-		if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
-			error_code |= X86_PF_PROT;
+		sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
 
 		if (likely(show_unhandled_signals))
 			show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk);
@@ -885,6 +893,8 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
 	if (is_prefetch(regs, error_code, address))
 		return;
 
+	sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
+
 	set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#88 lore raw

PATCH v33 17/21 x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

vDSO functions can now leverage an exception fixup mechanism similar to kernel exception fixup. For vDSO exception fixup, the initial user is Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), which will wrap the low-level transitions to/from the enclave, i.e. EENTER and ERESUME instructions, in a vDSO function and leverage fixup to intercept exceptions that would otherwise generate a signal. This allows the vDSO wrapper to return the fault information directly to its caller, obviating the need for SGX applications and libraries to juggle signal handlers.

Attempt to fixup vDSO exceptions immediately prior to populating and sending signal information. Except for the delivery mechanism, an exception in a vDSO function should be treated like any other exception in userspace, e.g. any fault that is successfully handled by the kernel should not be directly visible to userspace.

Although it's debatable whether or not all exceptions are of interest to enclaves, defer to the vDSO fixup to decide whether to do fixup or generate a signal. Future users of vDSO fixup, if there ever are any, will undoubtedly have different requirements than SGX enclaves, e.g. the fixup vs. signal logic can be made function specific if/when necessary.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c     |  8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +16 -3
index af75109485c2..d283a216e503 100644
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
 #include <asm/umip.h>
 #include <asm/insn.h>
 #include <asm/insn-eval.h>
+#include <asm/vdso.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
@@ -118,6 +119,9 @@ do_trap_no_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, int trapnr, const char *str,
 		tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
 		tsk->thread.trap_nr = trapnr;
 		die(str, regs, error_code);
+	} else {
+		if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, trapnr, error_code, 0))
+			return 0;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -543,6 +547,9 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection)
 		tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
 		tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_GP;
 
+		if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_GP, error_code, 0))
+			return;
+
 		show_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV, "", desc, regs, error_code);
 		force_sig(SIGSEGV);
 		goto exit;
@@ -824,9 +831,12 @@ static void handle_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long dr6, bool user)
 #endif
 
 	if (notify_die(DIE_DEBUG, "debug", regs, (long)&dr6, 0,
-		       SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP) {
-		return;
-	}
+		       SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (user_mode(regs) &&
+	    fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_DB, 0, 0))
+		goto out;
 
 	/* It's safe to allow irq's after DR6 has been saved */
 	cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
@@ -968,6 +978,9 @@ static void math_error(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
 	if (!si_code)
 		goto exit;
 
+	if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, trapnr, 0, 0))
+		return;
+
 	force_sig_fault(SIGFPE, si_code,
 			(void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs));
 exit:
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +8 -0
index 966af17523fb..6e51ec08564f 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>		/* exception stack		*/
 #include <asm/pgtable_areas.h>		/* VMALLOC_START, ...		*/
 #include <asm/kvm_para.h>		/* kvm_handle_async_pf		*/
+#include <asm/vdso.h>			/* fixup_vdso_exception()	*/
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include <asm/trace/exceptions.h>
@@ -776,6 +777,10 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 
 		sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
 
+		if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF, error_code,
+		    address))
+			return;
+
 		if (likely(show_unhandled_signals))
 			show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk);
 
@@ -895,6 +900,9 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
 
 	sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
 
+	if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF, error_code, address))
+		return;
+
 	set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#89 lore raw

PATCH v33 18/21 x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

An SGX runtime must be aware of the exceptions, which happen inside an enclave. Introduce a vDSO call that wraps EENTER/ERESUME cycle and returns the CPU exception back to the caller exactly when it happens.

Kernel fixups the exception information to RDI, RSI and RDX. The SGX call vDSO handler fills this information to the user provided buffer or alternatively trigger user provided callback at the time of the exception.

The calling convention is custom and does not follow System V x86-64 ABI.

---
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile             |   2 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S           |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S | 131 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h             |   8 ++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h          |  98 +++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 240 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +2 -0
index ebe82b7aecda..f71ad5ebd0c4 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ VDSO32-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)	:= y
 vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o
 vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o
 vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o
+vobjs-$(VDSO64-y)		+= vsgx_enter_enclave.o
 
 # files to link into kernel
 obj-y				+= vma.o extable.o
@@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ $(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_vclock_gettime.o = -pg
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso32/vclock_gettime.o = -pg
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetcpu.o = -pg
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_vsgx_enter_enclave.o = -pg
 
 #
 # X32 processes use x32 vDSO to access 64bit kernel data.
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S +1 -0
index 36b644e16272..4bf48462fca7 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ VERSION {
 		__vdso_time;
 		clock_getres;
 		__vdso_clock_getres;
+		__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave;
 	local: *;
 	};
 }
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S new file +131 -0

131 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h new file +8 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..06157b3e9ede
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H
+#define _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H
+
+#define EENTER	0x02
+#define ERESUME	0x03
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H */
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +98 -0

102 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#90 lore raw

PATCH v33 19/21 selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Add a selftest for SGX. It is a trivial test where a simple enclave copies one 64-bit word of memory between two memory locations.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/Makefile              |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore        |   2 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile          |  53 +++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S            |  54 +++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h         |  21 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c            | 282 +++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c            | 199 +++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h            |  38 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c       | 395 ++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c       |  20 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds     |  40 ++
 .../selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S       |  89 ++++
 12 files changed, 1194 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile +1 -0
index 1195bd85af38..ec7be6d5a10d 100644
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ TARGETS += user
 TARGETS += vm
 TARGETS += x86
 TARGETS += zram
+TARGETS += sgx
 #Please keep the TARGETS list alphabetically sorted
 # Run "make quicktest=1 run_tests" or
 # "make quicktest=1 kselftest" from top level Makefile
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore new file +2 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fbaf0bda9a92
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+test_sgx
+test_encl.elf
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile new file +53 -0

53 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S new file +54 -0

54 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h new file +21 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..be8969922804
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef DEFINES_H
+#define DEFINES_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
+#define PAGE_MASK (~(PAGE_SIZE - 1))
+
+#define __aligned(x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x)))
+#define __packed __attribute__((packed))
+
+#include "../../../../arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h"
+#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h"
+#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h"
+
+#endif /* DEFINES_H */
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c new file +282 -0

282 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c new file +199 -0

199 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h new file +38 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..999422cc7343
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef MAIN_H
+#define MAIN_H
+
+struct encl_segment {
+	off_t offset;
+	size_t size;
+	unsigned int prot;
+	unsigned int flags;
+};
+
+struct encl {
+	int fd;
+	void *bin;
+	off_t bin_size;
+	void *src;
+	size_t src_size;
+	size_t encl_size;
+	off_t encl_base;
+	unsigned int nr_segments;
+	struct encl_segment *segment_tbl;
+	struct sgx_secs secs;
+	struct sgx_sigstruct sigstruct;
+};
+
+void encl_delete(struct encl *ctx);
+bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl);
+bool encl_measure(struct encl *encl);
+bool encl_build(struct encl *encl);
+
+int sgx_call_vdso(void *rdi, void *rsi, long rdx, u32 leaf, void *r8, void *r9,
+		  void *tcs, struct sgx_enclave_exception *ei, void *cb);
+
+#endif /* MAIN_H */
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c new file +395 -0

395 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c new file +20 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ede915399742
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
+// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation.
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+
+static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+		((char *)dest)[i] = ((char *)src)[i];
+
+	return dest;
+}
+
+void encl_body(void *rdi, void *rsi)
+{
+	memcpy(rsi, rdi, 8);
+}
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds new file +40 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0fbbda7e665e
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf64-x86-64)
+
+PHDRS
+{
+	tcs PT_LOAD;
+	text PT_LOAD;
+	data PT_LOAD;
+}
+
+SECTIONS
+{
+	. = 0;
+	.tcs : {
+		*(.tcs*)
+	} : tcs
+
+	. = ALIGN(4096);
+	.text : {
+		*(.text*)
+		*(.rodata*)
+	} : text
+
+	. = ALIGN(4096);
+	.data : {
+		*(.data*)
+	} : data
+
+	/DISCARD/ : {
+		*(.comment*)
+		*(.note*)
+		*(.debug*)
+		*(.eh_frame*)
+	}
+}
+
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.altinstructions), "ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves")
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.altinstr_replacement), "ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves")
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.discard.retpoline_safe), "RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves")
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.discard.nospec), "RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves")
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.got.plt), "Libcalls are not supported in enclaves")
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S new file +89 -0

89 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#91 lore raw

PATCH v33 20/21 docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Document the Intel SGX kernel architecture. The fine-grained micro architecture details can be looked up from Intel SDM Volume 3D.

---
 Documentation/x86/index.rst |   1 +
 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst   | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 198 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst
Documentation/x86/index.rst +1 -0
index 265d9e9a093b..807290bf357c 100644
@@ -30,3 +30,4 @@ x86-specific Documentation
    usb-legacy-support
    i386/index
    x86_64/index
+   sgx
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst new file +197 -0

197 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#92 lore raw

PATCH v33 21/21 x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS

In reply to Jarkko Sakkinen

Add the maintainer information for the SGX subsystem.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
---
 MAINTAINERS | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
MAINTAINERS +11 -0
index 301330e02bca..1cbdaba79797 100644
@@ -8968,6 +8968,17 @@ F:	Documentation/x86/intel_txt.rst
 F:	arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
 F:	include/linux/tboot.h
 
+INTEL SGX
+M:	Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
+M:	Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
+L:	[email protected]
+S:	Maintained
+Q:	https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/intel-sgx/list/
+T:	git https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/linux-sgx.git
+F:	arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
+F:	arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/*
+K:	\bSGX_
+
 INTERCONNECT API
 M:	Georgi Djakov <[email protected]>
 L:	[email protected]
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1