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capable_bpf_net_admin()

PATCH Superseded Maciej Żenczykowski 4 participants 14 messages Jun 18, 2020 – Jul 6, 2020

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#0 lore raw

is
(SYS_ADMIN || BPF) && NET_ADMIN

should this not be
SYS_ADMIN || (BPF && NET_ADMIN)

?

Won't this cause a just SYS_ADMIN process to fail to load network bpf progs?

(I haven't debugged this at all, but John is reporting 5.8-rc1 fails to load bpf progs from Android's bpfloader with EPERM error)

Or are we okay with this user space visible behavioural change?

#1 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Maciej Żenczykowski

is
(SYS_ADMIN || BPF) && NET_ADMIN

should this not be
SYS_ADMIN || (BPF && NET_ADMIN)

?

capable_bpf_net_admin doesn't exist.

Quoted 1 line

Won't this cause a just SYS_ADMIN process to fail to load network bpf progs?

if the process has cap_sys_admin it has all privs.

Quoted 4 lines

(I haven't debugged this at all, but John is reporting 5.8-rc1 fails to load bpf progs from Android's bpfloader with EPERM error)

Or are we okay with this user space visible behavioural change?

What kind of change? Could you please be more specific?

#2 lore raw

John has all the details. I'm just guessing.

But having actually looked at the code, commit 2c78ee898d8f1 ie.

kernel/bpf/syscall.c: bpf_prog_load()
+ if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;

looks fishy, since our bpfloader only has CHOWN SYS_ADMIN, and the maps/programs it creates/loads are used by netd which only has NET_ADMIN (but not SYS_ADMIN). Furthermore I don't really want to grant it NET_ADMIN.

I think this should again be either NET_ADMIN or SYS_ADMIN.

Quoted 24 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 8 lines · Maciej Żenczykowski

is
(SYS_ADMIN || BPF) && NET_ADMIN

should this not be
SYS_ADMIN || (BPF && NET_ADMIN)

?

capable_bpf_net_admin doesn't exist.

Quoted 1 line

Won't this cause a just SYS_ADMIN process to fail to load network bpf progs?

if the process has cap_sys_admin it has all privs.

Quoted 4 lines

(I haven't debugged this at all, but John is reporting 5.8-rc1 fails to load bpf progs from Android's bpfloader with EPERM error)

Or are we okay with this user space visible behavioural change?

What kind of change? Could you please be more specific?

#3 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Maciej Żenczykowski

John has all the details. I'm just guessing.

But having actually looked at the code, commit 2c78ee898d8f1 ie.

kernel/bpf/syscall.c: bpf_prog_load()

(quoted diff) +2 -0
+       if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+               return -EPERM;
Quoted 6 lines

looks fishy, since our bpfloader only has CHOWN SYS_ADMIN, and the maps/programs it creates/loads are used by netd which only has NET_ADMIN (but not SYS_ADMIN). Furthermore I don't really want to grant it NET_ADMIN.

I think this should again be either NET_ADMIN or SYS_ADMIN.

Just to confirm, reverting 2c78ee898d8f1 (which doesn't revert perfectly cleanly) seems to avoid the failure I was seeing.

And specifically in the chunk Maciej pointed out above, if we just switch the check to CAP_SYS_ADMIN it also avoids the problem.

Let me know if there is anything folks would like me to test!

thanks
-john

#4 lore raw

Ok so I think

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2 -0
+       if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+               return -EPERM;

should be

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2 -0
+       if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+               return -EPERM;

and presumably similar change just below that for perfmon.

#5 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 restore behaviour of CAP_SYS_ADMIN allowing the loading of net bpf program

From: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]>

This is a 5.8-rc1 regression.

Cc Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Cc Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Fixes 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF")
---
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +1 -1
index 8da159936bab..7d946435587d 100644
@@ -2121,7 +2121,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
 	    !bpf_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (is_perfmon_prog_type(type) && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0.290.gba653c62da-goog
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] restore behaviour of CAP_SYS_ADMIN allowing the loading of net bpf program

Quoted 4 lines · Maciej Żenczykowski

From: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]>

This is a 5.8-rc1 regression.

Please add full explanation here.

Also use [PATCH bpf] in the subject for future submission.

Quoted 3 lines
Cc Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Cc Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Fixes 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF")

Reported-by: John
is missing?

Quoted 21 lines
---
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +1 -2
index 8da159936bab..7d946435587d 100644
@@ -2121,7 +2121,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
            !bpf_capable())
                return -EPERM;
 
-       if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+       if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                return -EPERM;
        if (is_perfmon_prog_type(type) && !perfmon_capable())
                return -EPERM;
--

2.27.0.290.gba653c62da-goog

#7 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 restore behaviour of CAP_SYS_ADMIN allowing the loading of networking bpf programs

From: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]>

This is a fix for a regression introduced in 5.8-rc1 by:
commit 2c78ee898d8f10ae6fb2fa23a3fbaec96b1b7366 'bpf: Implement CAP_BPF'

Before the above commit it was possible to load network bpf programs with just the CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.

The Android bpfloader happens to run in such a configuration (it has SYS_ADMIN but not NET_ADMIN) and creates maps and loads bpf programs for later use by Android's netd (which has NET_ADMIN but not SYS_ADMIN).

Cc Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Cc Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Fixes 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF")
---
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +1 -1
index 8da159936bab..7d946435587d 100644
@@ -2121,7 +2121,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
 	    !bpf_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (is_perfmon_prog_type(type) && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0.111.gc72c7da667-goog
Tested-by on v2 1/1
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf v2] restore behaviour of CAP_SYS_ADMIN allowing the loading of networking bpf programs

Quoted 14 lines · Maciej Żenczykowski

From: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]>

This is a fix for a regression introduced in 5.8-rc1 by:
commit 2c78ee898d8f10ae6fb2fa23a3fbaec96b1b7366 'bpf: Implement CAP_BPF'

Before the above commit it was possible to load network bpf programs with just the CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.

The Android bpfloader happens to run in such a configuration (it has SYS_ADMIN but not NET_ADMIN) and creates maps and loads bpf programs for later use by Android's netd (which has NET_ADMIN but not SYS_ADMIN).

Quoted 5 lines
Cc Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Cc Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Fixes 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF")

Thanks so much for helping narrow this regression down and submitting this fix! It's much appreciated!

thanks
-john

#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf v2] restore behaviour of CAP_SYS_ADMIN allowing the loading of networking bpf programs

Quoted 23 lines · John Stultz
Quoted 14 lines · Maciej Żenczykowski

From: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]>

This is a fix for a regression introduced in 5.8-rc1 by:
commit 2c78ee898d8f10ae6fb2fa23a3fbaec96b1b7366 'bpf: Implement CAP_BPF'

Before the above commit it was possible to load network bpf programs with just the CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.

The Android bpfloader happens to run in such a configuration (it has SYS_ADMIN but not NET_ADMIN) and creates maps and loads bpf programs for later use by Android's netd (which has NET_ADMIN but not SYS_ADMIN).

Quoted 5 lines
Cc Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Cc Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Fixes 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF")
Quoted 4 lines

Thanks so much for helping narrow this regression down and submitting this fix! It's much appreciated!

Applied to bpf tree. Thanks

#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf v2] restore behaviour of CAP_SYS_ADMIN allowing the loading of networking bpf programs

Quoted 22 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 21 lines · John Stultz
Quoted 18 lines · Maciej Żenczykowski

From: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]>

This is a fix for a regression introduced in 5.8-rc1 by:
commit 2c78ee898d8f10ae6fb2fa23a3fbaec96b1b7366 'bpf: Implement CAP_BPF'

Before the above commit it was possible to load network bpf programs with just the CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.

The Android bpfloader happens to run in such a configuration (it has SYS_ADMIN but not NET_ADMIN) and creates maps and loads bpf programs for later use by Android's netd (which has NET_ADMIN but not SYS_ADMIN).

Cc Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Cc Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Fixes 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF")
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Thanks so much for helping narrow this regression down and submitting this fix! It's much appreciated!

Applied to bpf tree. Thanks

Hey all,
Just wanted to follow up on this as I've not seen the regression fix
land in 5.8-rc4 yet? Is it still pending, or did it fall through a gap?

thanks
-john

maintainer
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf v2] restore behaviour of CAP_SYS_ADMIN allowing the loading of networking bpf programs

Quoted 27 lines · John Stultz
Quoted 25 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 24 lines · John Stultz
Quoted 13 lines · Maciej Żenczykowski

From: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]>

This is a fix for a regression introduced in 5.8-rc1 by:
commit 2c78ee898d8f10ae6fb2fa23a3fbaec96b1b7366 'bpf: Implement CAP_BPF'

Before the above commit it was possible to load network bpf programs with just the CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.

The Android bpfloader happens to run in such a configuration (it has SYS_ADMIN but not NET_ADMIN) and creates maps and loads bpf programs for later use by Android's netd (which has NET_ADMIN but not SYS_ADMIN).

Quoted 5 lines
Cc Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Cc Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Fixes 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF")

Thanks so much for helping narrow this regression down and submitting this fix! It's much appreciated!

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

Applied to bpf tree. Thanks

Hey all,
Just wanted to follow up on this as I've not seen the regression fix
land in 5.8-rc4 yet? Is it still pending, or did it fall through a gap?

No, it's in DaveM's -net tree currently, will go to Linus' tree on his next pull req:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net.git/commit/?id=b338cb921e6739ff59ce32f43342779fe5ffa732

#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf v2] restore behaviour of CAP_SYS_ADMIN allowing the loading of networking bpf programs

Quoted 8 lines · Daniel Borkmann
Quoted 3 lines · John Stultz

Just wanted to follow up on this as I've not seen the regression fix
land in 5.8-rc4 yet? Is it still pending, or did it fall through a gap?

No, it's in DaveM's -net tree currently, will go to Linus' tree on his next pull req:

   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net.git/commit/?id=b338cb921e6739ff59ce32f43342779fe5ffa732

Great! Much appreciated! Sorry to nag!
-john

#13 lore raw
In reply to Maciej Żenczykowski
Quoted 6 lines · Maciej Żenczykowski

Ok so I think

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2 -0
+       if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+               return -EPERM;
Quoted 6 lines

should be

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2 -0
+       if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+               return -EPERM;

and presumably similar change just below that for perfmon.

Looks ok to me. Do you want to send out such a patch? If not I'll do so on Monday.

thanks
-john