ima: make appraisal state runtime dependent on secure boot
Subsystems (7)
v3 cover ima: make appraisal state runtime dependent on secure boot
To switch APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM and ARCH_POLICY dependency from compile time to run time the secure boot checking code (specific to each arch) had to be slightly modified to include, in the PowerPC arch, the Trusted Boot state, which is also relevant to the arch policy choice and also required the ima_appraise to be enforced.
With that I changed the checking order: instead of first check the arch_policy and then the secure/trusted boot state, now we first check the boot state, set ima_appraise to be enforced and then the existence of arch policy. In other words, whenever secure/trusted boot is enabled, (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) == true.
I've tested these patches in a x86_64 platform with and without secure boot enabled and in a PowerPC without secure boot enabled:
1) with secure boot enabled (x86_64) and ima_policy=appraise_tcb, the ima_appraise= options were completly ignored and the boot always failed with "missing-hash" for /sbin/init, which is the expected result;
2) with secure boot enabled (x86_64), but no ima_policy:
[ 1.396111] ima: Allocated hash algorithm: sha256 [ 1.424025] ima: setting IMA appraisal to enforced [ 1.424039] audit: type=1807 audit(1592927955.557:2): action=measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK res=1 [ 1.424040] audit: type=1807 audit(1592927955.557:3): action=measure func=MODULE_CHECK res=1
3) with secure boot disabled (PowerPC and x86_64) and "ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix", audit messages were triggered with "op=appraisal_data cause=missing-hash" but the system worked fine due to "fix".
Bruno Meneguele (2):
arch/ima: extend secure boot check to include trusted boot
ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 5 +++-- arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 7 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v3 1/2 arch/ima: extend secure boot check to include trusted boot
ima_get_secureboot() has been used for checking platform's secure boot state for enabling different arch specific IMA policies where available. However, for powerpc there also is the concept of Trusted Boot, which is also relevant to the check code.
This patch extend the code or'ing the Trusted Boot state in PowerPC arch while leaving the other arches (x86 and s390) unchanged. The only changes performed in the other arches is related to the function name change.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 5 +++-- arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c | 5 +++-- include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c +3 -2
@@ -7,9 +7,10 @@#include <linux/ima.h> #include <asm/secure_boot.h> -bool arch_ima_get_secureboot (void ) +bool arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot (void ) { -return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled (); +return (is_ppc_secureboot_enabled () || +is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled ()); }/*
arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c +1 -1
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@#include <linux/ima.h> #include <asm/boot_data.h> -bool arch_ima_get_secureboot (void ) +bool arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot (void ) {return ipl_secure_flag; }
arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c +3 -2
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled; } -bool arch_ima_get_secureboot (void ) +bool arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot (void ) {static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode;static bool initialized;
@@ -85,7 +85,8 @@ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy (void ) { -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) && +arch_ima_secure_or_tusted_boot ()) {if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG ))set_module_sig_enforced ();return sb_arch_rules;
include/linux/ima.h +2 -2
@@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);#endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT -extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot (void ); +extern bool arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot (void );extern const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy (void );#else -static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot (void ) +static inline bool arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot (void ) {return false; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1 -1
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)switch (id) {case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE :if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG ) - &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) { + &&arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot ()) {pr_err ("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n" );return -EACCES ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 1/2] arch/ima: extend secure boot check to include trusted boot
On Tue, 2020-06-23 at 17:26 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
<snip>
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) · line 700
Quoted 13 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-1@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)switch (id) {case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE :if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG ) - &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) { + &&arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot ()) {pr_err ("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n" );return -EACCES ; }
Only IMA-appraisal enforces file integrity based on policy.
Mimi
Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] arch/ima: extend secure boot check to include trusted boot
Quoted 19 lines · Mimi Zohar
On Tue, 2020-06-23 at 17:26 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
<snip>security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) · line 700
Quoted 13 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-1@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)switch (id) {case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE :if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG ) - &&arch_ima_get_secureboot ()) { + &&arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot ()) {pr_err ("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n" );return -EACCES ; }Only IMA-appraisal enforces file integrity based on policy.
Right, but I didn't get the relation to the code above: I basically renamed the function:
"arch_ima_get_secureboot" -> "arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot".
Which doesn't change the ima_load_data logic.
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PATCH v3 2/2 ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
In reply to Bruno MenegueleIMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM has been marked as dependent on !IMA_ARCH_POLICY in compile time, enforcing the appraisal whenever the kernel had the arch policy option enabled.
However it breaks systems where the option is actually set but the system wasn't booted in a "secure boot" platform. In this scenario, anytime an appraisal policy (i.e. ima_policy=appraisal_tcb) is used it will be forced, giving no chance to the user set the 'fix' state (ima_appraise=fix) to actually measure system's files.
This patch remove this compile time dependency and move it to a runtime
decision: all architecture that supports it so far (powerpc, x86 and s390) only enable such specific policies if the secure/trusted boot is actually enabled in the platform, thus the IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE flag is set whenever the secure/trusted boot state is met, otherwise the kernel paramenter value passed is used.
--- arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c | 3 +-- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c +1 -2
@@ -85,8 +85,7 @@ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy (void ) { -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY ) && -arch_ima_secure_or_tusted_boot ()) { +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY )) {if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG ))set_module_sig_enforced ();return sb_arch_rules;
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM bool "ima_appraise boot parameter" - depends on IMA_APPRAISE && !IMA_ARCH_POLICY + depends on IMA_APPRAISE default y help This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +14 -6
@@ -732,12 +732,20 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)* and custom policies, prior to other appraise rules. * (Highest priority) */ - arch_entries =ima_init_arch_policy (); -if (!arch_entries) -pr_info ("No architecture policies found\n" ); -else -add_rules (arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, -IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY |IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY ); +if (arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot ()) { +/* In secure and/or trusted boot the appraisal must be +* enforced, regardless kernel parameters, preventing +* runtime changes */ +pr_info ("setting IMA appraisal to enforced\n" ); + ima_appraise |=IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE ; + + arch_entries =ima_init_arch_policy (); +if (!arch_entries) +pr_info ("No architecture policies found\n" ); +else +add_rules (arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, +IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY |IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY ); + }/* * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
On Tue, 2020-06-23 at 17:26 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
<snip>
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS · line 235
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +1
-1@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM bool "ima_appraise boot parameter" - depends on IMA_APPRAISE && !IMA_ARCH_POLICY + depends on IMA_APPRAISE
Ok
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +0
-0default y help This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modessecurity/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0
-0
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c void __init ima_init_policy(void) · line 735
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1
-6@@ -732,12 +732,20 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)* and custom policies, prior to other appraise rules. * (Highest priority) */ - arch_entries =ima_init_arch_policy (); -if (!arch_entries) -pr_info ("No architecture policies found\n" ); -else -add_rules (arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, -IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY |IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY ); +if (arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot ()) {
Today only "measure" and "appraise" rules are included in the arch specific policy, but someone might decide they want to include "audit" rules as well.
I'm not if the "secure_boot" flag is available prior to calling default_appraise_setup(), but if it is, you could modify the test there to also check if the system is booted in secure boot mode (eg. IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM) && !arch_ima_get_secureboot())
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c void __init ima_init_policy(void) · line 738
Quoted 3 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +3
-0+/* In secure and/or trusted boot the appraisal must be +* enforced, regardless kernel parameters, preventing +* runtime changes */
Only "appraise" rules are enforced.
Mimi
Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
Quoted 30 lines · Mimi Zohar
On Tue, 2020-06-23 at 17:26 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
<snip>security/integrity/ima/Kconfig config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS · line 235
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +1
-1@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM bool "ima_appraise boot parameter" - depends on IMA_APPRAISE && !IMA_ARCH_POLICY + depends on IMA_APPRAISEOk
Quoted 14 lines
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +0
-0default y help This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modessecurity/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0
-3@@ -732,12 +732,20 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)* and custom policies, prior to other appraise rules. * (Highest priority) */ - arch_entries =ima_init_arch_policy (); -if (!arch_entries) -pr_info ("No architecture policies found\n" );
Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c void __init ima_init_policy(void) · line 735
Quoted 4 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1
-3-else -add_rules (arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, -IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY |IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY ); +if (arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot ()) {Today only "measure" and "appraise" rules are included in the arch specific policy, but someone might decide they want to include "audit" rules as well.
Right, but both arches (powerpc and x86) using specific arch policies only add it in case secure and/or trusted boot are enabled. That's why I considered enclosing the whole arch_policy loading in the secure/trusted boot checking there. I would say that a fine-grained check for which action the rules have can be added later, in a separate patchset.
Quoted 6 lines
I'm not if the "
secure_boot" flag is available prior to callingdefault_appraise_setup(), but if it is, you could modify the test there to also check if the system is booted in secure boot mode (eg.IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM)&& !arch_ima_get_secureboot())
Well pointed. I built a custom x86 kernel with some workaround to get this flag status within default_appraise_setup() and as a result the flag is was correctly available.
Considering the nature of this flag (platform's firmware (in all arches?)) can we trust that every arch supporting secure/trusted boot will have it available in the __setup() call time?
Quoted 6 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c void __init ima_init_policy(void) · line 738
Quoted 3 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +3
-0+/* In secure and/or trusted boot the appraisal must be +* enforced, regardless kernel parameters, preventing +* runtime changes */ Only "appraise" rules are enforced.
Hmm.. do you mean the comment wording is wrong/"could be better", pointing the "appraise" action explicitly?
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Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
Quoted 8 lines · Bruno Meneguele
Quoted 7 lines
I'm not if the "
secure_boot" flag is available prior to callingdefault_appraise_setup(), but if it is, you could modify the test there to also check if the system is booted in secure boot mode (eg.IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM)&& !arch_ima_get_secureboot())
Quoted 7 lines
Well pointed. I built a custom x86 kernel with some workaround to get this flag status within
default_appraise_setup()and as a result the flag is was correctly available.Considering the nature of this flag (platform's firmware (in all arches?)) can we trust that every arch supporting secure/trusted boot will have it available in the
__setup()call time?
Calling default_appraise_setup() could be deferred.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c void __init ima_init_policy(void) · line 738
Quoted 4 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +3
-0+/* In secure and/or trusted boot the appraisal must be +* enforced, regardless kernel parameters, preventing +* runtime changes */ Only "appraise" rules are enforced.
Hmm.. do you mean the comment wording is wrong/"could be better", pointing the "appraise" action explicitly?
No, it's more than just the comment. Like "trusted boot", IMA- measurement only measures files, never enforces integrity. "ima_appraise" mode is only applicable to IMA-appraisal.
Mimi
Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
Quoted 14 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 12 lines · Bruno Meneguele
Quoted 7 lines
I'm not if the "
secure_boot" flag is available prior to callingdefault_appraise_setup(), but if it is, you could modify the test there to also check if the system is booted in secure boot mode (eg.IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM)&& !arch_ima_get_secureboot())Well pointed. I built a custom x86 kernel with some workaround to get this flag status within
default_appraise_setup()and as a result the flag is was correctly available.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Considering the nature of this flag (platform's firmware (in all arches?)) can we trust that every arch supporting secure/trusted boot will have it available in the
__setup()call time?Calling default_appraise_setup() could be deferred.
Hmmm.. ok, I'm going to investigate it further.
Didn't really know that.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c void __init ima_init_policy(void) · line 738
Quoted 4 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +3
-0+/* In secure and/or trusted boot the appraisal must be +* enforced, regardless kernel parameters, preventing +* runtime changes */ Only "appraise" rules are enforced.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Hmm.. do you mean the comment wording is wrong/"could be better", pointing the "appraise" action explicitly?
No, it's more than just the comment. Like "trusted boot", IMA- measurement only measures files, never enforces integrity. "
ima_appraise" mode is only applicable to IMA-appraisal.
ah! Ok, I see it now and in fact it shouldn't be part of the check alongside secureboot.
Well, I'm going to rethink the approach entirely then.
As you said, only deferring default_appraise_setup() may be probably enough.
Thanks Mimi.
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Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
Quoted 19 lines · Bruno Meneguele
Quoted 18 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 15 lines · Bruno Meneguele
Quoted 7 lines
I'm not if the "
secure_boot" flag is available prior to callingdefault_appraise_setup(), but if it is, you could modify the test there to also check if the system is booted in secure boot mode (eg.IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM)&& !arch_ima_get_secureboot())Well pointed. I built a custom x86 kernel with some workaround to get this flag status within
default_appraise_setup()and as a result the flag is was correctly available.Considering the nature of this flag (platform's firmware (in all arches?)) can we trust that every arch supporting secure/trusted boot will have it available in the
__setup()call time?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Calling default_appraise_setup() could be deferred.
Hmmm.. ok, I'm going to investigate it further.
Didn't really know that.
After some research on powerpc, x86 and s390 (the only users of arch policies) codes it's clear that, no matter what, the secure boot flag will be available even before the kernel cmdline is actually copied/saved in kernel's memory.
Both powerpc and x86 populate it through setup_arch() call in init/main.c:kernel_start(), where some early_params are handled, but nothing about normal (non-early) __setup() params. s390 is a bit deeper where it gets the flag, right down its boot code, even before start_kernel().
With that said, it's safe checking it directly from default_appraise_setup(). I'm going to prepare a v4, test it and post it tomorrow.
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Gentle ping for review.
I also forgot to add the changelog for the patch, please see below.
Quoted 26 lines · Bruno Meneguele
To switch
APPRAISE_BOOTPARAMandARCH_POLICYdependency from compile time to run time the secure boot checking code (specific to each arch) had to be slightly modified to include, in the PowerPC arch, the Trusted Boot state, which is also relevant to the arch policy choice and also required theima_appraiseto be enforced.With that I changed the checking order: instead of first check the
arch_policyand then the secure/trusted boot state, now we first check the boot state, setima_appraiseto be enforced and then the existence of arch policy. In other words, whenever secure/trusted boot is enabled, (ima_appraise&IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) == true.I've tested these patches in a
x86_64platform with and without secure boot enabled and in a PowerPC without secure boot enabled:1) with secure boot enabled (
x86_64) and ima_policy=appraise_tcb, the ima_appraise= options were completly ignored and the boot always failed with "missing-hash" for/sbin/init, which is the expected result;2) with secure boot enabled (
x86_64), but noima_policy:[ 1.396111] ima: Allocated hash algorithm: sha256 [ 1.424025] ima: setting IMA appraisal to enforced [ 1.424039] audit: type=1807 audit(1592927955.557:2): action=measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK res=1 [ 1.424040] audit: type=1807 audit(1592927955.557:3): action=measure func=MODULE_CHECK res=1
Quoted 4 lines
3) with secure boot disabled (PowerPC and
x86_64) and "ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix", audit messages were triggered with "op=appraisal_data cause=missing-hash" but the system worked fine due to "fix".
Changelog:
v2:
- pr_info() message prefix correction
v3:
- extend secure boot arch checker to also consider trusted boot
- enforce IMA appraisal when secure boot is effectively enabled (Nayna)
- fix ima_appraise flag assignment by or'ing it (Mimi)
Quoted 17 lines
Bruno Meneguele (2):
arch/ima: extend secure boot check to include trusted boot
ima: moveAPPRAISE_BOOTPARAMdependency onARCH_POLICYto runtimearch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 5 +++-- arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 7 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
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