ima: Rename internal audit rule functions
Subsystems (4)
PATCH v2 1/1 ima: Rename internal audit rule functions
Rename IMA's internal audit rule functions from security_filter_rule_*() to ima_filter_rule_*(). This avoids polluting the security_* namespace, which is typically reserved for general security subsystem infrastructure.
---
* v2
- Rebased onto v3 of prereq series
- Renamed the functions to ima_filter_rule_*(), instead of ima_audit_rule_*(), at Mimi's request
- Didn't pick up Casey's Reviewed-by on v1 since nearly every line of the patch changed. Although, I suspect he'll be equally as happy with the new names in v2.
Developed on top of next-integrity-testing, commit cd1d8603df60 ("IMA:
Add audit log for failure conditions"), plus this patch series:
[PATCH v3 00/12] ima: Fix rule parsing bugs and extend KEXEC_CMDLINE rule support
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]/T/#t
This patch has dependencies on the above patch series.
Tested with and without CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES enabled by attempting to load IMA policy with rules containing the subj_role=foo conditional. Build logs are clean in both configurations. The IMA policy was first loaded without and then with a valid AppArmor profile named "foo". The behavior is the same before and after this patch is applied:
| CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES=n | CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES=y
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Without Profile | IMA policy load fails | IMA policy load fails With Profile | IMA policy load fails | IMA policy load succeeds
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 16 +++++++-------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 30 +++++++++++++---------------- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +8 -8
@@ -413,24 +413,24 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)/* LSM based policy rules require audit */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES -#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init -#define security_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free -#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match +#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init +#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free +#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match#else -static inline int security_filter_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr, -void **lsmrule) +static inline int ima_filter_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr, +void **lsmrule) {return -EINVAL ; } -static inline void security_filter_rule_free (void *lsmrule) +static inline void ima_filter_rule_free (void *lsmrule) { } -static inline int security_filter_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op, -void *lsmrule) +static inline int ima_filter_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op, +void *lsmrule) {return -EINVAL ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +13 -17
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)int i;for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) { -security_filter_rule_free (entry->lsm[i].rule); +ima_filter_rule_free (entry->lsm[i].rule);kfree (entry->lsm[i].args_p); } }
@@ -308,10 +308,9 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)*/ entry->lsm[i].args_p =NULL ; -security_filter_rule_init (nentry->lsm[i].type, - Audit_equal, - nentry->lsm[i].args_p, - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); +ima_filter_rule_init (nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, + nentry->lsm[i].args_p, + &nentry->lsm[i].rule);if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)pr_warn ("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n" , entry->lsm[i].args_p);
@@ -495,18 +494,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_OBJ_ROLE :case LSM_OBJ_TYPE :security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); - rc =security_filter_rule_match (osid, - rule->lsm[i].type, - Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + rc =ima_filter_rule_match (osid, rule->lsm[i].type, + Audit_equal, + rule->lsm[i].rule);break ;case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE : - rc =security_filter_rule_match (secid, - rule->lsm[i].type, - Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + rc =ima_filter_rule_match (secid, rule->lsm[i].type, + Audit_equal, + rule->lsm[i].rule);default :break ; }
@@ -901,10 +898,9 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,return -ENOMEM ; entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; - result =security_filter_rule_init (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, - Audit_equal, - entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + result =ima_filter_rule_init (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, + entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {pr_warn ("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n" , entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1