capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
Subsystems (8)
v5 cover capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
This is v5 of the 'Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE' patchset. The changes to v4 are:
* split into more patches to have the introduction of CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE and the actual usage in different patches
* reduce the /proc/self/exe patch to only be about CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
Adrian Reber (5):
capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
pid: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for set_tid
pid_namespace: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for ns_last_pid
proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
selftests: add clone3() CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE test
Nicolas Viennot (1):
prctl: Allow checkpoint/restore capable processes to change exe link
fs/proc/base.c | 8 +- include/linux/capability.h | 6 + include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 9 +- kernel/pid.c | 2 +- kernel/pid_namespace.c | 2 +- kernel/sys.c | 12 +- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 5 +- tools/testing/selftests/clone3/Makefile | 4 +- .../clone3/clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore.c | 203 ++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 236 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/clone3/clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore.c
base-commit: d31958b30ea3b7b6e522d6bf449427748ad45822
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v5 1/6 capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
This patch introduces CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, a new capability facilitating checkpoint/restore for non-root users.
Over the last years, The CRIU (Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace) team has been asked numerous times if it is possible to checkpoint/restore a process as non-root. The answer usually was: 'almost'.
The main blocker to restore a process as non-root was to control the PID of the restored process. This feature available via the clone3 system call, or via /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid is unfortunately guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
In the past two years, requests for non-root checkpoint/restore have increased due to the following use cases:
* Checkpoint/Restore in an HPC environment in combination with a resource manager distributing jobs where users are always running as non-root. There is a desire to provide a way to checkpoint and restore long running jobs.
* Container migration as non-root
* We have been in contact with JVM developers who are integrating CRIU into a Java VM to decrease the startup time. These checkpoint/restore applications are not meant to be running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
We have seen the following workarounds:
* Use a setuid wrapper around CRIU:
See https://github.com/FredHutch/slurm-examples/blob/master/checkpointer/lib/checkpointer/checkpointer-suid.c
* Use a setuid helper that writes to ns_last_pid.
Unfortunately, this helper delegation technique is impossible to use with
clone3, and is thus prone to races.
See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
* Cycle through PIDs with fork() until the desired PID is reached:
This has been demonstrated to work with cycling rates of 100,000 PIDs/s
See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
* Patch out the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check from the kernel
* Run the desired application in a new user and PID namespace to provide
a local CAP_SYS_ADMIN for controlling PIDs. This technique has limited use in
typical container environments (e.g., Kubernetes) as /proc is
typically protected with read-only layers (e.g., /proc/sys) for hardening
purposes. Read-only layers prevent additional /proc mounts (due to proc's SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE property), making the use of new PID namespaces limited as
certain applications need access to /proc matching their PID namespace.
The introduced capability allows to:
* Control PIDs when the current user is CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable for the corresponding PID namespace via ns_last_pid/clone3.
* Open files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace, useful for recovering files that are unreachable via the file system such as deleted files, or memfd files.
See corresponding selftest for an example with clone3().
--- include/linux/capability.h | 6 ++++++ include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 9 ++++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +6 -0
@@ -261,6 +261,12 @@ static inline bool bpf_capable(void)return capable (CAP_BPF ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); } +static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns) +{ +return ns_capable (ns,CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE ) || +ns_capable (ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +} +/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk (const struct dentry *dentry,struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
include/uapi/linux/capability.h +8 -1
@@ -408,7 +408,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {*/ #define CAP_BPF 39 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BPF + +/* Allow checkpoint/restore related operations */ +/* Allow PID selection during clone3() */ +/* Allow writing to ns_last_pid */ + +#define CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE 40 + +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE#define cap_valid (x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +3 -2
@@ -27,9 +27,10 @@ "audit_control", "setfcap"#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon", "bpf" + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon", "bpf", \ + "checkpoint_restore" -#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_BPF +#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Quoted 49 lines · Adrian Reber
This patch introduces
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, a new capability facilitating checkpoint/restore for non-root users.Over the last years, The CRIU (Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace) team has been asked numerous times if it is possible to checkpoint/restore a process as non-root. The answer usually was: 'almost'.
The main blocker to restore a process as non-root was to control the PID of the restored process. This feature available via the clone3 system call, or via
/proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pidis unfortunately guarded byCAP_SYS_ADMIN.In the past two years, requests for non-root checkpoint/restore have increased due to the following use cases:
* Checkpoint/Restore in an HPC environment in combination with a resource manager distributing jobs where users are always running as non-root. There is a desire to provide a way to checkpoint and restore long running jobs.
* Container migration as non-root
* We have been in contact with JVM developers who are integrating CRIU into a Java VM to decrease the startup time. These checkpoint/restore applications are not meant to be running withCAP_SYS_ADMIN.We have seen the following workarounds:
* Use a setuid wrapper around CRIU:
See https://github.com/FredHutch/slurm-examples/blob/master/checkpointer/lib/checkpointer/checkpointer-suid.c
* Use a setuid helper that writes tons_last_pid.
Unfortunately, this helper delegation technique is impossible to use with
clone3, and is thus prone to races.
See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
* Cycle through PIDs withfork()until the desired PID is reached:
This has been demonstrated to work with cycling rates of 100,000 PIDs/s
See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
* Patch out theCAP_SYS_ADMINcheck from the kernel
* Run the desired application in a new user and PID namespace to provide
a localCAP_SYS_ADMINfor controlling PIDs. This technique has limited use in
typical container environments (e.g., Kubernetes) as /proc is
typically protected with read-only layers (e.g.,/proc/sys) for hardening
purposes. Read-only layers prevent additional /proc mounts (due to proc'sSB_I_USERNS_VISIBLEproperty), making the use of new PID namespaces limited as
certain applications need access to /proc matching their PID namespace.The introduced capability allows to:
* Control PIDs when the current user isCAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREcapable for the corresponding PID namespace via ns_last_pid/clone3.
* Open files in/proc/pid/map_fileswhen the current user isCAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREcapable in the root namespace, useful for recovering files that are unreachable via the file system such as deleted files, or memfd files.
Quoted 5 lines
See corresponding selftest for an example with
clone3().Signed-off-by Adrian Reber <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Nicolas Viennot <[email protected]>---
Thanks!
This looks good now.
Quoted 62 lines
include/linux/capability.h | 6 ++++++ include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 9 ++++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)include/linux/capability.h +6
-0@@ -261,6 +261,12 @@ static inline bool bpf_capable(void)return capable (CAP_BPF ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); } +static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns) +{ +return ns_capable (ns,CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE ) || +ns_capable (ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +} +/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk (const struct dentry *dentry,struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);include/uapi/linux/capability.h +8
-1@@ -408,7 +408,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {*/ #define CAP_BPF 39 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BPF + +/* Allow checkpoint/restore related operations */ +/* Allow PID selection during clone3() */ +/* Allow writing to ns_last_pid */ + +#define CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE 40 + +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE#define cap_valid (x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)security/selinux/include/classmap.h +3
-2@@ -27,9 +27,10 @@ "audit_control", "setfcap"#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon", "bpf" + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon", "bpf", \ + "checkpoint_restore" -#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_BPF +#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.#endif Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v5 2/6 pid: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for set_tid
In reply to Adrian ReberUse the newly introduced capability CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to allow using clone3() with set_tid set.
--- kernel/pid.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/pid.c +1 -1
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ struct pid *alloc_pid(struct pid_namespace *ns, pid_t *set_tid,if (tid !=1 && !tmp->child_reaper) goto out_free; retval = -EPERM ; -if (!ns_capable (tmp->user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable (tmp->user_ns)) goto out_free; set_tid_size--; }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] pid: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for set_tid
Quoted 6 lines · Adrian Reber
Use the newly introduced capability
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREto allow usingclone3()withset_tidset.Signed-off-by Adrian Reber <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Nicolas Viennot <[email protected]>---
Looks good!
Quoted 19 lines
kernel/pid.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)kernel/pid.c +1
-1@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ struct pid *alloc_pid(struct pid_namespace *ns, pid_t *set_tid,if (tid !=1 && !tmp->child_reaper) goto out_free; retval = -EPERM ; -if (!ns_capable (tmp->user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable (tmp->user_ns)) goto out_free; set_tid_size--; }Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v5 3/6 pid_namespace: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for ns_last_pid
In reply to Adrian ReberUse the newly introduced capability CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to allow writing to ns_last_pid.
--- kernel/pid_namespace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/pid_namespace.c +1 -1
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static int pid_ns_ctl_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,struct ctl_table tmp = *table;int ret, next; -if (write && !ns_capable (pid_ns->user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (write && !checkpoint_restore_ns_capable (pid_ns->user_ns))return -EPERM ;/*
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] pid_namespace: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for ns_last_pid
Quoted 6 lines · Adrian Reber
Use the newly introduced capability
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREto allow writing tons_last_pid.Signed-off-by Adrian Reber <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Nicolas Viennot <[email protected]>---
PATCH v5 4/6 proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
In reply to Adrian ReberOpening files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace is useful for checkpointing and restoring to recover files that are unreachable via the file system such as deleted files, or memfd files.
--- fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/proc/base.c +4 -4
@@ -2194,16 +2194,16 @@ struct map_files_info { };/* -* Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the -* symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the -* path to the file in question. +* Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to follow the links, due +* to concerns about how the symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on +* ancestor directories in the path to the file in question. */ static const char *proc_map_files_get_link (struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,struct delayed_call *done) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) || !capable (CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE ))return ERR_PTR (-EPERM );return proc_pid_get_link (dentry, inode, done);
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v5 4/6] proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
Quoted 7 lines · Adrian Reber
Opening files in
/proc/pid/map_fileswhen the current user isCAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREcapable in the root namespace is useful for checkpointing and restoring to recover files that are unreachable via the file system such as deleted files, or memfd files.Signed-off-by Adrian Reber <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Nicolas Viennot <[email protected]>
I still have a plan to make this code been usable without capabilities requirements but due to lack of spare time for deep investigation this won't happen anytime soon. Thus the patch looks OK to me, fwiw
Re: [PATCH v5 4/6] proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
In reply to Adrian ReberQuoted 23 lines · Adrian Reber
Opening files in
/proc/pid/map_fileswhen the current user isCAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREcapable in the root namespace is useful for checkpointing and restoring to recover files that are unreachable via the file system such as deleted files, or memfd files.Signed-off-by Adrian Reber <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Nicolas Viennot <[email protected]>--- fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)fs/proc/base.c +1
-3@@ -2194,16 +2194,16 @@ struct map_files_info { };/* -* Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the -* symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the -* path to the file in question. +* Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to follow the links, due
fs/proc/base.c struct map_files_info { · line 2206
Quoted 10 lines
fs/proc/base.c +3
-1+* to concerns about how the symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on +* ancestor directories in the path to the file in question. */ static const char *proc_map_files_get_link (struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,struct delayed_call *done) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) || !capable (CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE ))
So right now, when I'd do
git grep checkpoint_restore_ns_capable
I'd not hit that codepath which isn't great. So I'd suggest to use:
if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(&init_user_ns))
at the end of the day, capable(<cap>) just callsns_capable(&init_user_ns, <cap>) anyway.
Thanks!
Christian
PATCH v5 5/6 prctl: Allow checkpoint/restore capable processes to change exe link
In reply to Adrian ReberFrom: Nicolas Viennot <[email protected]>
Allow CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable users to change /proc/self/exe.
This commit also changes the permission error code from -EINVAL to -EPERM for consistency with the rest of the prctl() syscall when checking capabilities.
--- kernel/sys.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
kernel/sys.c +7 -5
@@ -2007,12 +2007,14 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long dataif (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1 ) {/* -* Make sure the caller has the rights to -* change /proc/pid/exe link: only local sys admin should -* be allowed to. +* Check if the current user is checkpoint/restore capable. +* At the time of this writing, it checks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN +* or CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. +* Note that a user with access to ptrace can masquerade an +* arbitrary program as any executable, even setuid ones. */ -if (!ns_capable (current_user_ns (),CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EINVAL ; +if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable (current_user_ns ())) +return -EPERM ; error =prctl_set_mm_exe_file (mm, prctl_map.exe_fd);if (error)
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v5 5/6] prctl: Allow checkpoint/restore capable processes to change exe link
Quoted 7 lines · Adrian Reber
From: Nicolas Viennot <[email protected]>
Allow
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREcapable users to change/proc/self/exe.This commit also changes the permission error code from
-EINVALto-EPERMfor consistency with the rest of theprctl()syscall when checking capabilities.
I agree that EINVAL seems weird here but this is a potentially user visible change. Might be nice to have the EINVAL->EPERM change be an additional patch on top after this one so we can revert it in case it breaks someone (unlikely though). I can split this out myself though so no need to resend for that alone.
What I would also prefer is to have some history in the commit message tbh. The reason is that when we started discussing that specific change I had to hunt down the history of changing /proc/self/exe and had to dig up and read through ancient threads on lore to come up with the explanation why this is placed under a capability. The commit message should then also mention that there are other ways to change the /proc/self/exe link that don't require capabilities and that /proc/self/exe itself is not something userspace should rely on for security. Mainly so that in a few months/years we can read through that commit message and go "Weird, but ok.". :)
But maybe I can just rewrite this myself so you don't have to go through the trouble. This is really not pedantry it's just that it's a lot of work digging up the reasons for a piece of code existing when it's really not obvious. :)
Christian
Quoted 34 lines
Signed-off-by Nicolas Viennot <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Adrian Reber <[email protected]>--- kernel/sys.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)kernel/sys.c +7
-5@@ -2007,12 +2007,14 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long dataif (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1 ) {/* -* Make sure the caller has the rights to -* change /proc/pid/exe link: only local sys admin should -* be allowed to. +* Check if the current user is checkpoint/restore capable. +* At the time of this writing, it checks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN +* or CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. +* Note that a user with access to ptrace can masquerade an +* arbitrary program as any executable, even setuid ones. */ -if (!ns_capable (current_user_ns (),CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) -return -EINVAL ; +if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable (current_user_ns ())) +return -EPERM ; error =prctl_set_mm_exe_file (mm, prctl_map.exe_fd);if (error)Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
RE: [PATCH v5 5/6] prctl: Allow checkpoint/restore capable processes to change exe link
Quoted 11 lines · Adrian Reber
Quoted 7 lines
From: Nicolas Viennot <[email protected]>
Allow
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREcapable users to change/proc/self/exe.This commit also changes the permission error code from
-EINVALto-EPERMfor consistency with the rest of theprctl()syscall when checking capabilities.I agree that EINVAL seems weird here but this is a potentially user visible change. Might be nice to have the
EINVAL->EPERMchange be an additional patch on top after this one so we can revert it in case it breaks someone (unlikely though). I can split this out myself though so no need to resend for that alone.
What I would also prefer is to have some history in the commit message tbh. The reason is that when we started discussing that specific change I had to hunt down the history of changing/proc/self/exeand had to dig up and read through ancient threads on lore to come up with the explanation why this is placed under a capability. The commit message should then also mention that there are other ways to change the/proc/self/exelink that don't require capabilities and that/proc/self/exeitself is not something userspace should rely on for security. Mainly so that in a few months/years we can read through that commit message and go "Weird, but ok.". :) But maybe I can just rewrite this myself so you don't have to go through the trouble. This is really not pedantry it's just that it's a lot of work digging up the reasons for a piece of code existing when it's really not obvious. :)
Hello Christian,
I agree.
Thank you for suggesting doing the work, but you've done plenty already. So we'll come back to you with:
1) A separate commit for EINVAL->EPERM
2) A full history of discussions in the commit message related to /proc/self/exe capability check
Thanks,
Nico
PATCH v5 6/6 selftests: add clone3() CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE test
In reply to Adrian ReberThis adds a test that changes its UID, uses capabilities to get CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE and uses clone3() with set_tid to create a process with a given PID as non-root.
--- tools/testing/selftests/clone3/Makefile | 4 +- .../clone3/clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore.c | 203 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/clone3/clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore.c
tools/testing/selftests/clone3/Makefile +3 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 CFLAGS += -g -I../../../../usr/include/ +LDLIBS += -lcap -TEST_GEN_PROGS := clone3 clone3_clear_sighand clone3_set_tid +TEST_GEN_PROGS := clone3 clone3_clear_sighand clone3_set_tid \ + clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore include ../lib.mk
tools/testing/selftests/clone3/clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore.c new file +203 -0
203 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v5 6/6] selftests: add clone3() CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE test
Quoted 7 lines · Adrian Reber
This adds a test that changes its UID, uses capabilities to get
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREand usesclone3()withset_tidto create a process with a given PID as non-root.Signed-off-by Adrian Reber <[email protected]>Acked-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>---
You need to add the new clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore binary to .gitignore too. :)
And one more annoying request: can you port the selftests to use the kselftest_harness.h infrastructure, please? It is way nicer to use, has a more uniform feel, and generates better output. You can look at:
tools/testing/selftests/pidfd/pidfd_setns_test.ctools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
and others for examples on how to use it.
Thanks!
Christian
Quoted 231 lines
tools/testing/selftests/clone3/Makefile | 4 +- .../clone3/clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore.c | 203 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/clone3/clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore.ctools/testing/selftests/clone3/Makefile +3
-1@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 CFLAGS += -g -I../../../../usr/include/ +LDLIBS += -lcap -TEST_GEN_PROGS := clone3 clone3_clear_sighand clone3_set_tid +TEST_GEN_PROGS := clone3 clone3_clear_sighand clone3_set_tid \ + clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore include ../lib.mktools/testing/selftests/clone3/clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore.c new file +203
-0@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +/* +* Based on Christian Brauner's clone3() example. +* These tests are assuming to be running in the host's +* PID namespace. +*/ + +/* capabilities related code based on selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include <errno.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <sys/capability.h> +#include <sys/prctl.h> +#include <sys/syscall.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/un.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sched.h> + +#include "../kselftest.h" +#include "clone3_selftests.h" + +#ifndef MAX_PID_NS_LEVEL +#define MAX_PID_NS_LEVEL 32 +#endif + +static void child_exit (int ret) +{ +fflush (stdout); +fflush (stderr); +_exit (ret); +} + +static int call_clone3_set_tid (pid_t * set_tid,size_t set_tid_size) +{ +int status; +pid_t pid =-1 ; + +struct clone_args args = { + .exit_signal =SIGCHLD , + .set_tid =ptr_to_u64 (set_tid), + .set_tid_size = set_tid_size, + }; + + pid =sys_clone3 (&args,sizeof (struct clone_args )); +if (pid <0 ) { +ksft_print_msg ("%s - Failed to create new process\n" , +strerror (errno)); +return -errno; + } + +if (pid ==0 ) { +int ret; +char tmp =0 ; + +ksft_print_msg + ("I am the child, my PID is %d (expected %d)\n" , +getpid (), set_tid[0 ]); + +if (set_tid[0 ] !=getpid ()) +child_exit (EXIT_FAILURE ); +child_exit (EXIT_SUCCESS ); + } + +ksft_print_msg ("I am the parent (%d). My child's pid is %d\n" , +getpid (), pid); + +if (waitpid (pid, &status,0 ) <0 ) { +ksft_print_msg ("Child returned %s\n" ,strerror (errno)); +return -errno; + } + +if (!WIFEXITED (status)) +return -1 ; + +return WEXITSTATUS (status); +} + +static int test_clone3_set_tid (pid_t * set_tid, +size_t set_tid_size,int expected) +{ +int ret; + +ksft_print_msg ("[%d] Trying clone3() with CLONE_SET_TID to %d\n" , +getpid (), set_tid[0 ]); + ret =call_clone3_set_tid (set_tid, set_tid_size); + +ksft_print_msg + ("[%d] clone3() with CLONE_SET_TID %d says :%d - expected %d\n" , +getpid (), set_tid[0 ], ret, expected); +if (ret != expected) { +ksft_test_result_fail + ("[%d] Result (%d) is different than expected (%d)\n" , +getpid (), ret, expected); +return -1 ; + } +ksft_test_result_pass + ("[%d] Result (%d) matches expectation (%d)\n" ,getpid (), ret, + expected); + +return 0 ; +} + +struct libcap { +struct __user_cap_header_struct hdr; +struct __user_cap_data_struct data[2 ]; +}; + +static int set_capability () +{ +cap_value_t cap_values[] = {CAP_SETUID ,CAP_SETGID }; +struct libcap *cap; +int ret =-1 ; +cap_t caps; + + caps =cap_get_proc (); +if (!caps) { +perror ("cap_get_proc" ); +return -1 ; + } + +/* Drop all capabilities */ +if (cap_clear (caps)) { +perror ("cap_clear" ); + goto out; + } + +cap_set_flag (caps,CAP_EFFECTIVE ,2 , cap_values,CAP_SET ); +cap_set_flag (caps,CAP_PERMITTED ,2 , cap_values,CAP_SET ); + + cap = (struct libcap *) caps; + +/* 40 -> CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ + cap->data[1 ].effective |=1 << (40 -32 ); + cap->data[1 ].permitted |=1 << (40 -32 ); + +if (cap_set_proc (caps)) { +perror ("cap_set_proc" ); + goto out; + } + ret =0 ; +out: +if (cap_free (caps)) +perror ("cap_free" ); +return ret; +} + +int main (int argc,char *argv[]) +{ +pid_t pid; +int status; +int ret =0 ; +pid_t set_tid[1 ]; +uid_t uid =getuid (); + +ksft_print_header (); +test_clone3_supported (); +ksft_set_plan (2 ); + +if (uid !=0 ) { + ksft_cnt.ksft_xskip = ksft_plan; +ksft_print_msg ("Skipping all tests as non-root\n" ); +return ksft_exit_pass (); + } + +memset (&set_tid,0 ,sizeof (set_tid)); + +/* Find the current active PID */ + pid =fork (); +if (pid ==0 ) { +ksft_print_msg ("Child has PID %d\n" ,getpid ()); +child_exit (EXIT_SUCCESS ); + } +if (waitpid (pid, &status,0 ) <0 ) +ksft_exit_fail_msg ("Waiting for child %d failed" , pid); + +/* After the child has finished, its PID should be free. */ + set_tid[0 ] = pid; + +if (set_capability ()) +ksft_test_result_fail + ("Could not set CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE\n" ); +prctl (PR_SET_KEEPCAPS ,1 ,0 ,0 ,0 ); +/* This would fail without CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ +setgid (1000 ); +setuid (1000 ); + set_tid[0 ] = pid; + ret |=test_clone3_set_tid (set_tid,1 , -EPERM ); +if (set_capability ()) +ksft_test_result_fail + ("Could not set CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE\n" ); +/* This should work as we have CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE as non-root */ + ret |=test_clone3_set_tid (set_tid,1 ,0 ); + +return !ret ?ksft_exit_pass () :ksft_exit_fail (); +}Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Quoted 16 lines · Adrian Reber
This is v5 of the 'Introduce
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE' patchset. The changes to v4 are:* split into more patches to have the introduction of
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREand the actual usage in different patches
* reduce the/proc/self/exepatch to only be aboutCAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREAdrian Reber (5):
capabilities: IntroduceCAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
pid: usecheckpoint_restore_ns_capable()forset_tid
pid_namespace: usecheckpoint_restore_ns_capable()forns_last_pid
proc: allow access in init userns formap_fileswithCAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
selftests: addclone3()CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREtest
Quoted 2 lines
Nicolas Viennot (1):
prctl: Allow checkpoint/restore capable processes to change exe link
(This is probably bad form, but) All
Assuming you changes patches 4 and 6 per Christian's suggestions, I'd like to re-review those then.
Quoted 17 lines
fs/proc/base.c | 8 +- include/linux/capability.h | 6 + include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 9 +- kernel/pid.c | 2 +- kernel/pid_namespace.c | 2 +- kernel/sys.c | 12 +- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 5 +- tools/testing/selftests/clone3/Makefile | 4 +- .../clone3/clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore.c | 203 ++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 236 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/clone3/clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore.cbase-commit:
d31958b30ea3b7b6e522d6bf449427748ad45822Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Quoted 20 lines · Serge Hallyn
Quoted 16 lines · Adrian Reber
This is v5 of the 'Introduce
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE' patchset. The changes to v4 are:* split into more patches to have the introduction of
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREand the actual usage in different patches
* reduce the/proc/self/exepatch to only be aboutCAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREAdrian Reber (5):
capabilities: IntroduceCAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
pid: usecheckpoint_restore_ns_capable()forset_tid
pid_namespace: usecheckpoint_restore_ns_capable()forns_last_pid
proc: allow access in init userns formap_fileswithCAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
selftests: addclone3()CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTOREtestQuoted 2 lines
Nicolas Viennot (1):
prctl: Allow checkpoint/restore capable processes to change exe link
Quoted 6 lines
(This is probably bad form, but) All
Reviewed-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>Assuming you changes patches 4 and 6 per Christian's suggestions, I'd like to re-review those then.
Thanks, once Adrian has reposted the changes and you agree with them as well, I'll pick them up though I might end up pushing this into the next merge window...
Christian