Refactor/Reformat tls_pre_decrypt
PATCH 1/3 Refactor/Reformat tls_pre_decrypt
- Extract data packet handling to its own function
- Replace two instances of
if (x) { code } with
if (!x) return; code
- Remove extra curly braces that were used for pre C99 code style to be able to declare variables in the middle of a block
This patch is easier to review with "ignore white space" as the diff is then a lot smaller in that case and the changes more obvious.
--- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 791 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 410 insertions(+), 381 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/ssl.c +410 -381
@@ -3166,6 +3166,102 @@ nohard:* to implement a multiplexed TLS channel over the TCP/UDP port. */ +static inline void +handle_data_channel_paket (struct tls_multi *multi, +const struct link_socket_actual *from, +struct buffer *buf, +struct crypto_options **opt, +bool floated, +const uint8_t **ad_start) +{ +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); + +uint8_t c = *BPTR (buf); +int op = c >>P_OPCODE_SHIFT ; +int key_id = c &P_KEY_ID_MASK ; + +/* data channel packet */ +for (int i =0 ; i <KEY_SCAN_SIZE ; ++i) + { +struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; + +/* +* This is the basic test of TLS state compatibility between a local OpenVPN +* instance and its remote peer. +* +* If the test fails, it tells us that we are getting a packet from a source +* which claims reference to a prior negotiated TLS session, but the local +* OpenVPN instance has no memory of such a negotiation. +* +* It almost always occurs on UDP sessions when the passive side of the +* connection is restarted without the active side restarting as well (the +* passive side is the server which only listens for the connections, the +* active side is the client which initiates connections). +*/ +if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED (multi, ks) + && key_id == ks->key_id + && (ks->authenticated ==KS_AUTH_TRUE ) + && (floated ||link_socket_actual_match (from, &ks->remote_addr))) + { +if (!ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.initialized) + { +msg (D_MULTI_DROPPED , +"Key %s [%d] not initialized (yet), dropping packet." , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), key_id); + goto error_lite; + } + +/* return appropriate data channel decrypt key in opt */ + *opt = &ks->crypto_options; +if (op ==P_DATA_V2 ) + { + *ad_start =BPTR (buf); + } +ASSERT (buf_advance (buf,1 )); +if (op ==P_DATA_V1 ) + { + *ad_start =BPTR (buf); + } +else if (op ==P_DATA_V2 ) + { +if (buf->len <4 ) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Protocol error: received P_DATA_V2 from %s but length is < 4" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } +ASSERT (buf_advance (buf,3 )); + } + + ++ks->n_packets; + ks->n_bytes += buf->len; +dmsg (D_TLS_KEYSELECT , +"TLS: tls_pre_decrypt, key_id=%d, IP=%s" , + key_id,print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); +gc_free (&gc); +return ; + } + } + +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: local/remote TLS keys are out of sync: %s [%d]" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), key_id); + goto error_lite; + + +done: + buf->len =0 ; + *opt =NULL ; +gc_free (&gc); +return ; + +error: + ++multi->n_soft_errors; +error_lite: +tls_clear_error (); + goto done; +} +/* * * When we are in TLS mode, this is the first routine which sees
@@ -3199,440 +3295,374 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, bool floated, const uint8_t **ad_start) { + +if (buf->len <=0 ) + { + buf->len =0 ; + *opt =NULL ; +return false; + } +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new ();bool ret = false; -if (buf->len >0 ) +/* get opcode */ +uint8_t pkt_firstbyte = *BPTR (buf); +int op = pkt_firstbyte >>P_OPCODE_SHIFT ; + +if ((op ==P_DATA_V1 ) || (op ==P_DATA_V2 )) { -int i; -int op; -int key_id; +handle_data_channel_paket (multi, from, buf, opt, floated, ad_start); +return false; + } -/* get opcode and key ID */ +/* get key_id */ +int key_id = pkt_firstbyte &P_KEY_ID_MASK ; + +/* control channel packet */ +bool do_burst = false; +bool new_link = false; +struct session_id sid;/* remote session ID */ + +/* verify legal opcode */ +if (op <P_FIRST_OPCODE || op >P_LAST_OPCODE ) + { +if (op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 + || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 ) { -uint8_t c = *BPTR (buf); - op = c >>P_OPCODE_SHIFT ; - key_id = c &P_KEY_ID_MASK ; +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Peer tried unsupported key-method 1" ); } +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: unknown opcode received from %s op=%d" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), op); + goto error; + } -if ((op ==P_DATA_V1 ) || (op ==P_DATA_V2 )) +/* hard reset ? */ +if (is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) + { +/* verify client -> server or server -> client connection */ +if (((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 + || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 ) && !multi->opt.server) + || ((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ) && multi->opt.server)) { -/* data channel packet */ -for (i =0 ; i <KEY_SCAN_SIZE ; ++i) - { -struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; - -/* -* This is the basic test of TLS state compatibility between a local OpenVPN -* instance and its remote peer. -* -* If the test fails, it tells us that we are getting a packet from a source -* which claims reference to a prior negotiated TLS session, but the local -* OpenVPN instance has no memory of such a negotiation. -* -* It almost always occurs on UDP sessions when the passive side of the -* connection is restarted without the active side restarting as well (the -* passive side is the server which only listens for the connections, the -* active side is the client which initiates connections). -*/ -if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED (multi, ks) - && key_id == ks->key_id - && (ks->authenticated ==KS_AUTH_TRUE ) - && (floated ||link_socket_actual_match (from, &ks->remote_addr))) - { -if (!ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.initialized) - { -msg (D_MULTI_DROPPED , -"Key %s [%d] not initialized (yet), dropping packet." , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), key_id); - goto error_lite; - } - -/* return appropriate data channel decrypt key in opt */ - *opt = &ks->crypto_options; -if (op ==P_DATA_V2 ) - { - *ad_start =BPTR (buf); - } -ASSERT (buf_advance (buf,1 )); -if (op ==P_DATA_V1 ) - { - *ad_start =BPTR (buf); - } -else if (op ==P_DATA_V2 ) - { -if (buf->len <4 ) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Protocol error: received P_DATA_V2 from %s but length is < 4" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } -ASSERT (buf_advance (buf,3 )); - } +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: client->client or server->server connection attempted from %s" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } + } - ++ks->n_packets; - ks->n_bytes += buf->len; -dmsg (D_TLS_KEYSELECT , -"TLS: tls_pre_decrypt, key_id=%d, IP=%s" , - key_id,print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); -gc_free (&gc); -return ret; - } - } +/* +* Authenticate Packet +*/ +dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG ,"TLS: control channel, op=%s, IP=%s" , +packet_opcode_name (op),print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); +/* get remote session-id */ + { +struct buffer tmp = *buf; +buf_advance (&tmp,1 ); +if (!session_id_read (&sid, &tmp) || !session_id_defined (&sid)) + {msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: local/remote TLS keys are out of sync: %s [%d]" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), key_id); - goto error_lite; +"TLS Error: session-id not found in packet from %s" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; } -else /* control channel packet */ - { -bool do_burst = false; -bool new_link = false; -struct session_id sid;/* remote session ID */ + } + +int i; +/* use session ID to match up packet with appropriate tls_session object */ +for (i =0 ; i <TM_SIZE ; ++i) + { +struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; +struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; + +dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , +"TLS: initial packet test, i=%d state=%s, mysid=%s, rec-sid=%s, rec-ip=%s, stored-sid=%s, stored-ip=%s" , + i, +state_name (ks->state), +session_id_print (&session->session_id, &gc), +session_id_print (&sid, &gc), +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), +session_id_print (&ks->session_id_remote, &gc), +print_link_socket_actual (&ks->remote_addr, &gc)); -/* verify legal opcode */ -if (op <P_FIRST_OPCODE || op >P_LAST_OPCODE ) +if (session_id_equal (&ks->session_id_remote, &sid)) +/* found a match */ + { +if (i ==TM_LAME_DUCK ) { -if (op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 - || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 ) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Peer tried unsupported key-method 1" ); - }msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: unknown opcode received from %s op=%d" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), op); +"TLS ERROR: received control packet with stale session-id=%s" , +session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); goto error; } +dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , +"TLS: found match, session[%d], sid=%s" , + i,session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); +break ; + } + } -/* hard reset ? */ -if (is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) - { -/* verify client -> server or server -> client connection */ -if (((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 - || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 ) && !multi->opt.server) - || ((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ) && multi->opt.server)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: client->client or server->server connection attempted from %s" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } - } - -/* -* Authenticate Packet -*/ -dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG ,"TLS: control channel, op=%s, IP=%s" , -packet_opcode_name (op),print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); +/* +* Hard reset and session id does not match any session in +* multi->session: Possible initial packet +*/ +if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) + { +struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE ]; +struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; -/* get remote session-id */ +/* +* If we have no session currently in progress, the initial packet will +* open a new session in TM_ACTIVE rather than TM_UNTRUSTED. +*/ +if (!session_id_defined (&ks->session_id_remote)) + { +if (multi->opt.single_session && multi->n_sessions) { -struct buffer tmp = *buf; -buf_advance (&tmp,1 ); -if (!session_id_read (&sid, &tmp) || !session_id_defined (&sid)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: session-id not found in packet from %s" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [1]" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; } -/* use session ID to match up packet with appropriate tls_session object */ -for (i =0 ; i <TM_SIZE ; ++i) +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT +if (management) { -struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; -struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; - -dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , -"TLS: initial packet test, i=%d state=%s, mysid=%s, rec-sid=%s, rec-ip=%s, stored-sid=%s, stored-ip=%s" , - i, -state_name (ks->state), -session_id_print (&session->session_id, &gc), -session_id_print (&sid, &gc), -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), -session_id_print (&ks->session_id_remote, &gc), -print_link_socket_actual (&ks->remote_addr, &gc)); - -if (session_id_equal (&ks->session_id_remote, &sid)) -/* found a match */ - { -if (i ==TM_LAME_DUCK ) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS ERROR: received control packet with stale session-id=%s" , -session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); - goto error; - } -dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , -"TLS: found match, session[%d], sid=%s" , - i,session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); -break ; - } +management_set_state (management, +OPENVPN_STATE_AUTH , +NULL , +NULL , +NULL , +NULL , +NULL ); } +#endif -/* -* Hard reset and session id does not match any session in -* multi->session: Possible initial packet -*/ -if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) - { -struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE ]; -struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; - -/* -* If we have no session currently in progress, the initial packet will -* open a new session in TM_ACTIVE rather than TM_UNTRUSTED. -*/ -if (!session_id_defined (&ks->session_id_remote)) - { -if (multi->opt.single_session && multi->n_sessions) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [1]" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } +msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW , +"TLS: Initial packet from %s, sid=%s" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), +session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); -#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT -if (management) - { -management_set_state (management, -OPENVPN_STATE_AUTH , -NULL , -NULL , -NULL , -NULL , -NULL ); - } -#endif + do_burst = true; + new_link = true; + i =TM_ACTIVE ; + session->untrusted_addr = *from; + } + } -msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW , -"TLS: Initial packet from %s, sid=%s" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), -session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); +/* +* If we detected new session in the last if block, i has +* changed to TM_ACTIVE, so check the condition again. +*/ +if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) + { +/* +* No match with existing sessions, +* probably a new session. +*/ +struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED ]; - do_burst = true; - new_link = true; - i =TM_ACTIVE ; - session->untrusted_addr = *from; - } - } +/* +* If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request +* unless it the the first packet of the session. +*/ +if (multi->opt.single_session) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [2]" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } -/* -* If we detected new session in the last if block, i has -* changed to TM_ACTIVE, so check the condition again. -*/ -if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) - { -/* -* No match with existing sessions, -* probably a new session. -*/ -struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED ]; - -/* -* If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request -* unless it the the first packet of the session. -*/ -if (multi->opt.single_session) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [2]" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } +if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, + session->opt)) + { + goto error; + } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) - { - goto error; - } +/* +* New session-initiating control packet is authenticated at this point, +* assuming that the --tls-auth command line option was used. +* +* Without --tls-auth, we leave authentication entirely up to TLS. +*/ +msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW , +"TLS: new session incoming connection from %s" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); -/* -* New session-initiating control packet is authenticated at this point, -* assuming that the --tls-auth command line option was used. -* -* Without --tls-auth, we leave authentication entirely up to TLS. -*/ -msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW , -"TLS: new session incoming connection from %s" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + new_link = true; + i =TM_UNTRUSTED ; + session->untrusted_addr = *from; + } +else + { +struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; +struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; - new_link = true; - i =TM_UNTRUSTED ; - session->untrusted_addr = *from; - } -else +/* +* Packet must belong to an existing session. +*/ +if (i !=TM_ACTIVE && i !=TM_UNTRUSTED ) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: Unroutable control packet received from %s (si=%d op=%s)" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), + i, +packet_opcode_name (op)); + goto error; + } + +/* +* Verify remote IP address +*/ +if (!new_link && !link_socket_actual_match (&ks->remote_addr, from)) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: Received control packet from unexpected IP addr: %s" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } + +/* +* Remote is requesting a key renegotiation +*/ +if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 + &&DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED (multi, ks)) + { +if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, + session->opt)) { -struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; -struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; + goto error; + } -/* -* Packet must belong to an existing session. -*/ -if (i !=TM_ACTIVE && i !=TM_UNTRUSTED ) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: Unroutable control packet received from %s (si=%d op=%s)" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), - i, -packet_opcode_name (op)); - goto error; - } +key_state_soft_reset (session); -/* -* Verify remote IP address -*/ -if (!new_link && !link_socket_actual_match (&ks->remote_addr, from)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: Received control packet from unexpected IP addr: %s" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } +dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , +"TLS: received P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 s=%d sid=%s" , + i,session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); + } +else + { +/* +* Remote responding to our key renegotiation request? +*/ +if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 ) + { + do_burst = true; + } -/* -* Remote is requesting a key renegotiation -*/ -if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 - &&DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED (multi, ks)) - { -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) - { - goto error; - } +if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, + session->opt)) + { + goto error; + } -key_state_soft_reset (session); +dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , +"TLS: received control channel packet s#=%d sid=%s" , + i,session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); + } + } -dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , -"TLS: received P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 s=%d sid=%s" , - i,session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); - } -else - { -/* -* Remote responding to our key renegotiation request? -*/ -if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 ) - { - do_burst = true; - } +/* +* We have an authenticated control channel packet (if --tls-auth was set). +* Now pass to our reliability layer which deals with +* packet acknowledgements, retransmits, sequencing, etc. +*/ +struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; +struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) - { - goto error; - } +/* Make sure we were initialized and that we're not in an error state */ +ASSERT (ks->state !=S_UNDEF ); +ASSERT (ks->state !=S_ERROR ); +ASSERT (session_id_defined (&session->session_id)); -dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , -"TLS: received control channel packet s#=%d sid=%s" , - i,session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); - } - } +/* Let our caller know we processed a control channel packet */ + ret = true; -/* -* We have an authenticated control channel packet (if --tls-auth was set). -* Now pass to our reliability layer which deals with -* packet acknowledgements, retransmits, sequencing, etc. -*/ - { -struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; -struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; +/* +* Set our remote address and remote session_id +*/ +if (new_link) + { + ks->session_id_remote = sid; + ks->remote_addr = *from; + ++multi->n_sessions; + } +else if (!link_socket_actual_match (&ks->remote_addr, from)) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: Existing session control channel packet from unknown IP address: %s" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } -/* Make sure we were initialized and that we're not in an error state */ -ASSERT (ks->state !=S_UNDEF ); -ASSERT (ks->state !=S_ERROR ); -ASSERT (session_id_defined (&session->session_id)); +/* +* Should we do a retransmit of all unacknowledged packets in +* the send buffer? This improves the start-up efficiency of the +* initial key negotiation after the 2nd peer comes online. +*/ +if (do_burst && !session->burst) + { +reliable_schedule_now (ks->send_reliable); + session->burst = true; + } -/* Let our caller know we processed a control channel packet */ - ret = true; +/* Check key_id */ +if (ks->key_id != key_id) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS ERROR: local/remote key IDs out of sync (%d/%d) ID: %s" , + ks->key_id, key_id,print_key_id (multi, &gc)); + goto error; + } -/* -* Set our remote address and remote session_id -*/ -if (new_link) - { - ks->session_id_remote = sid; - ks->remote_addr = *from; - ++multi->n_sessions; - } -else if (!link_socket_actual_match (&ks->remote_addr, from)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: Existing session control channel packet from unknown IP address: %s" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } +/* +* Process incoming ACKs for packets we can now +* delete from reliable send buffer +*/ + { +/* buffers all packet IDs to delete from send_reliable */ +struct reliable_ack send_ack; -/* -* Should we do a retransmit of all unacknowledged packets in -* the send buffer? This improves the start-up efficiency of the -* initial key negotiation after the 2nd peer comes online. -*/ -if (do_burst && !session->burst) - { -reliable_schedule_now (ks->send_reliable); - session->burst = true; - } + send_ack.len =0 ; +if (!reliable_ack_read (&send_ack, buf, &session->session_id)) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: reading acknowledgement record from packet" ); + goto error; + } +reliable_send_purge (ks->send_reliable, &send_ack); + } -/* Check key_id */ -if (ks->key_id != key_id) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS ERROR: local/remote key IDs out of sync (%d/%d) ID: %s" , - ks->key_id, key_id,print_key_id (multi, &gc)); - goto error; - } +if (op !=P_ACK_V1 &&reliable_can_get (ks->rec_reliable)) + { +packet_id_type id; -/* -* Process incoming ACKs for packets we can now -* delete from reliable send buffer -*/ +/* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ +if (reliable_ack_read_packet_id (buf, &id)) + { +/* Avoid deadlock by rejecting packet that would de-sequentialize receive buffer */ +if (reliable_wont_break_sequentiality (ks->rec_reliable, id)) + { +if (reliable_not_replay (ks->rec_reliable, id)) { -/* buffers all packet IDs to delete from send_reliable */ -struct reliable_ack send_ack; - - send_ack.len =0 ; -if (!reliable_ack_read (&send_ack, buf, &session->session_id)) +/* Save incoming ciphertext packet to reliable buffer */ +struct buffer *in =reliable_get_buf (ks->rec_reliable); +ASSERT (in); +if (!buf_copy (in, buf)) { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: reading acknowledgement record from packet" ); +msg (D_MULTI_DROPPED , +"Incoming control channel packet too big, dropping." ); goto error; } -reliable_send_purge (ks->send_reliable, &send_ack); +reliable_mark_active_incoming (ks->rec_reliable, in, id, op); } -if (op !=P_ACK_V1 &&reliable_can_get (ks->rec_reliable)) - { -packet_id_type id; - -/* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ -if (reliable_ack_read_packet_id (buf, &id)) - { -/* Avoid deadlock by rejecting packet that would de-sequentialize receive buffer */ -if (reliable_wont_break_sequentiality (ks->rec_reliable, id)) - { -if (reliable_not_replay (ks->rec_reliable, id)) - { -/* Save incoming ciphertext packet to reliable buffer */ -struct buffer *in =reliable_get_buf (ks->rec_reliable); -ASSERT (in); -if (!buf_copy (in, buf)) - { -msg (D_MULTI_DROPPED , -"Incoming control channel packet too big, dropping." ); - goto error; - } -reliable_mark_active_incoming (ks->rec_reliable, in, id, op); - } - -/* Process outgoing acknowledgment for packet just received, even if it's a replay */ -reliable_ack_acknowledge_packet_id (ks->rec_ack, id); - } - } - } +/* Process outgoing acknowledgment for packet just received, even if it's a replay */ +reliable_ack_acknowledge_packet_id (ks->rec_ack, id); } } }
@@ -3645,7 +3675,6 @@ done: error: ++multi->n_soft_errors; -error_lite:tls_clear_error (); goto done; }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH 2/3 Cleanup tls_pre_decrypt_lite and tls_pre_encrypt
Mostly C90 -> C99 cleanups and again immediately instead wrapping function body into if.
(Review with ignore whitespace)
--- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 219 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 106 insertions(+), 113 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/ssl.c +106 -113
@@ -3696,100 +3696,91 @@ tls_pre_decrypt_lite(const struct tls_auth_standalone *tas, const struct buffer *buf) { -struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -bool ret = false; - -if (buf->len >0 ) +if (buf->len <=0 ) { -int op; -int key_id; +return false; + } +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -/* get opcode and key ID */ - { -uint8_t c = *BPTR (buf); - op = c >>P_OPCODE_SHIFT ; - key_id = c &P_KEY_ID_MASK ; - } +/* get opcode and key ID */ +uint8_t pkt_firstbyte = *BPTR (buf); +int op = pkt_firstbyte >>P_OPCODE_SHIFT ; +int key_id = pkt_firstbyte &P_KEY_ID_MASK ; -/* this packet is from an as-yet untrusted source, so -* scrutinize carefully */ +/* this packet is from an as-yet untrusted source, so +* scrutinize carefully */ -if (op !=P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 - && op !=P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 ) - { -/* -* This can occur due to bogus data or DoS packets. -*/ -dmsg (D_TLS_STATE_ERRORS , -"TLS State Error: No TLS state for client %s, opcode=%d" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), - op); - goto error; - } +if (op !=P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 + && op !=P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 ) + { +/* +* This can occur due to bogus data or DoS packets. +*/ +dmsg (D_TLS_STATE_ERRORS , +"TLS State Error: No TLS state for client %s, opcode=%d" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), + op); + goto error; + } -if (key_id !=0 ) - { -dmsg (D_TLS_STATE_ERRORS , -"TLS State Error: Unknown key ID (%d) received from %s -- 0 was expected" , - key_id, -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } +if (key_id !=0 ) + { +dmsg (D_TLS_STATE_ERRORS , +"TLS State Error: Unknown key ID (%d) received from %s -- 0 was expected" , + key_id, +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } -if (buf->len >EXPANDED_SIZE_DYNAMIC (&tas->frame)) - { -dmsg (D_TLS_STATE_ERRORS , -"TLS State Error: Large packet (size %d) received from %s -- a packet no larger than %d bytes was expected" , - buf->len, -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), -EXPANDED_SIZE_DYNAMIC (&tas->frame)); - goto error; - } +if (buf->len >EXPANDED_SIZE_DYNAMIC (&tas->frame)) + { +dmsg (D_TLS_STATE_ERRORS , +"TLS State Error: Large packet (size %d) received from %s -- a packet no larger than %d bytes was expected" , + buf->len, +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), +EXPANDED_SIZE_DYNAMIC (&tas->frame)); + goto error; + } - { -struct buffer newbuf =clone_buf (buf); -struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap_tmp = tas->tls_wrap; -bool status; - -/* HMAC test, if --tls-auth was specified */ - status =read_control_auth (&newbuf, &tls_wrap_tmp, from,NULL ); -free_buf (&newbuf); -free_buf (&tls_wrap_tmp.tls_crypt_v2_metadata); -if (tls_wrap_tmp.cleanup_key_ctx) - { -free_key_ctx_bi (&tls_wrap_tmp.opt.key_ctx_bi); - } -if (!status) - { - goto error; - } -/* -* At this point, if --tls-auth is being used, we know that -* the packet has passed the HMAC test, but we don't know if -* it is a replay yet. We will attempt to defeat replays -* by not advancing to the S_START state until we -* receive an ACK from our first reply to the client -* that includes an HMAC of our randomly generated 64 bit -* session ID. -* -* On the other hand if --tls-auth is not being used, we -* will proceed to begin the TLS authentication -* handshake with only cursory integrity checks having -* been performed, since we will be leaving the task -* of authentication solely up to TLS. -*/ +struct buffer newbuf =clone_buf (buf); +struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap_tmp = tas->tls_wrap; - ret = true; - } +/* HMAC test, if --tls-auth was specified */ +bool status =read_control_auth (&newbuf, &tls_wrap_tmp, from,NULL ); +free_buf (&newbuf); +free_buf (&tls_wrap_tmp.tls_crypt_v2_metadata); +if (tls_wrap_tmp.cleanup_key_ctx) + { +free_key_ctx_bi (&tls_wrap_tmp.opt.key_ctx_bi); + } +if (!status) + { + goto error; } + +/* +* At this point, if --tls-auth is being used, we know that +* the packet has passed the HMAC test, but we don't know if +* it is a replay yet. We will attempt to defeat replays +* by not advancing to the S_START state until we +* receive an ACK from our first reply to the client +* that includes an HMAC of our randomly generated 64 bit +* session ID. +* +* On the other hand if --tls-auth is not being used, we +* will proceed to begin the TLS authentication +* handshake with only cursory integrity checks having +* been performed, since we will be leaving the task +* of authentication solely up to TLS. +*/ gc_free (&gc); -return ret; +return true; error:tls_clear_error ();gc_free (&gc); -return ret; +return false; }/* Choose the key with which to encrypt a data packet */
@@ -3798,48 +3789,50 @@ tls_pre_encrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, struct buffer *buf, struct crypto_options **opt) { multi->save_ks = NULL; -if (buf->len >0 ) +if (buf->len <=0 ) { -int i; -struct key_state *ks_select =NULL ; -for (i =0 ; i <KEY_SCAN_SIZE ; ++i) + buf->len =0 ; + opt =NULL ; + } + +struct key_state *ks_select =NULL ; +for (int i =0 ; i <KEY_SCAN_SIZE ; ++i) + { +struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; +if (ks->state >=S_ACTIVE + && (ks->authenticated ==KS_AUTH_TRUE ) + && ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.initialized + ) { -struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; -if (ks->state >=S_ACTIVE - && (ks->authenticated ==KS_AUTH_TRUE ) - && ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.initialized - ) +if (!ks_select) { -if (!ks_select) - { - ks_select = ks; - } -if (now >= ks->auth_deferred_expire) - { - ks_select = ks; -break ; - } + ks_select = ks; + } +if (now >= ks->auth_deferred_expire) + { + ks_select = ks; +break ; } } + } -if (ks_select) - { - *opt = &ks_select->crypto_options; - multi->save_ks = ks_select; -dmsg (D_TLS_KEYSELECT ,"TLS: tls_pre_encrypt: key_id=%d" , ks_select->key_id); -return ; - } -else - { -struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -dmsg (D_TLS_KEYSELECT ,"TLS Warning: no data channel send key available: %s" , -print_key_id (multi, &gc)); -gc_free (&gc); - } +if (ks_select) + { + *opt = &ks_select->crypto_options; + multi->save_ks = ks_select; +dmsg (D_TLS_KEYSELECT ,"TLS: tls_pre_encrypt: key_id=%d" , ks_select->key_id); +return ; } +else + { +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); +dmsg (D_TLS_KEYSELECT ,"TLS Warning: no data channel send key available: %s" , +print_key_id (multi, &gc)); +gc_free (&gc); - buf->len =0 ; - *opt =NULL ; + *opt =NULL ; + buf->len =0 ; + } }void
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 2/3] Cleanup tls_pre_decrypt_lite and tls_pre_encrypt
Am 22.07.20 um 11:30 schrieb Arne Schwabe:
Quoted 4 lines
Mostly C90 -> C99 cleanups and again immediately instead wrapping function body into if.
(Review with ignore whitespace)
I made a mistake in this. Ignore it and wait for V2
PATCH 3/3 Clean up a number of leftover C89 initialisations in ssl.c
In reply to Arne Schwabe--- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++------------------------------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/ssl.c +20 -36
@@ -831,10 +831,9 @@ session_index_name(int index)static const char *print_key_id (struct tls_multi *multi,struct gc_arena *gc) { -int i;struct buffer out =alloc_buf_gc (256 , gc); -for (i =0 ; i <KEY_SCAN_SIZE ; ++i) +for (int i =0 ; i <KEY_SCAN_SIZE ; ++i) {struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; buf_printf(&out, " [key#%d state=%s id=%d sid=%s]", i,
@@ -1315,8 +1314,6 @@ tls_multi_init_set_options(struct tls_multi *multi,void tls_multi_free (struct tls_multi *multi,bool clear) { -int i; -ASSERT (multi);auth_set_client_reason (multi,NULL );
@@ -1339,7 +1336,7 @@ tls_multi_free(struct tls_multi *multi, bool clear)free (multi->remote_ciphername); -for (i =0 ; i <TM_SIZE ; ++i) +for (int i =0 ; i <TM_SIZE ; ++i) {tls_session_free (&multi->session[i], false); }
@@ -1367,11 +1364,10 @@ tls_multi_free(struct tls_multi *multi, bool clear)static bool swap_hmac (struct buffer *buf,const struct crypto_options *co,bool incoming) { -const struct key_ctx *ctx; -ASSERT (co); - ctx = (incoming ? &co->key_ctx_bi.decrypt : &co->key_ctx_bi.encrypt); +const struct key_ctx *ctx = (incoming ? &co->key_ctx_bi.decrypt : + &co->key_ctx_bi.encrypt);ASSERT (ctx->hmac); {
@@ -1623,25 +1619,21 @@ tls1_P_hash(const md_kt_t *md_kt, int olen) {struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -int chunk; -hmac_ctx_t *ctx; -hmac_ctx_t *ctx_tmp;uint8_t A1 [MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH ]; -unsigned int A1_len;#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG const int olen_orig = olen;const uint8_t *out_orig = out;#endif - ctx =hmac_ctx_new (); - ctx_tmp =hmac_ctx_new (); +hmac_ctx_t *ctx =hmac_ctx_new (); +hmac_ctx_t *ctx_tmp =hmac_ctx_new ();dmsg (D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE ,"tls1_P_hash sec: %s" ,format_hex (sec, sec_len,0 , &gc));dmsg (D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE ,"tls1_P_hash seed: %s" ,format_hex (seed, seed_len,0 , &gc)); - chunk =md_kt_size (md_kt); - A1_len =md_kt_size (md_kt); +int chunk =md_kt_size (md_kt); +unsigned int A1_len =md_kt_size (md_kt);hmac_ctx_init (ctx, sec, sec_len, md_kt);hmac_ctx_init (ctx_tmp, sec, sec_len, md_kt);
@@ -1711,21 +1703,18 @@ tls1_PRF(const uint8_t *label,struct gc_arena gc =gc_new ();const md_kt_t *md5 =md_kt_get ("MD5" );const md_kt_t *sha1 =md_kt_get ("SHA1" ); -int len,i; -const uint8_t *S1 ,*S2 ; -uint8_t *out2; - out2 = (uint8_t *)gc_malloc (olen, false, &gc); +uint8_t *out2 = (uint8_t *)gc_malloc (olen, false, &gc); - len = slen/2 ; -S1 = sec; -S2 = &(sec[len]); +int len = slen/2 ; +const uint8_t *S1 = sec; +const uint8_t *S2 = &(sec[len]); len += (slen&1 );/* add for odd, make longer */ tls1_P_hash (md5,S1 ,len,label,label_len,out1,olen);tls1_P_hash (sha1,S2 ,len,label,label_len,out2,olen); -for (i =0 ; i<olen; i++) +for (int i =0 ; i<olen; i++) { out1[i] ^= out2[i]; }
@@ -2198,7 +2187,6 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)if (session->opt->push_peer_info_detail >0 ) {struct env_set *es = session->opt->es; -struct env_item *e;struct buffer out =alloc_buf_gc (512 *3 , &gc);/* push version */
@@ -2271,7 +2259,7 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session) }/* push env vars that begin with UV_, IV_PLAT_VER and IV_GUI_VER */ -for (e = es->list; e !=NULL ; e = e->next) +for (struct env_item *e = es->list; e !=NULL ; e = e->next) {if (e->string) {
@@ -3004,10 +2992,8 @@ tls_multi_process(struct tls_multi *multi, interval_t *wakeup) {struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -int i;int active =TLSMP_INACTIVE ;bool error = false; -int tas;perf_push (PERF_TLS_MULTI_PROCESS );
@@ -3018,7 +3004,7 @@ tls_multi_process(struct tls_multi *multi,* and which has a defined remote IP addr. */ -for (i =0 ; i <TM_SIZE ; ++i) +for (int i =0 ; i <TM_SIZE ; ++i) {struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i];struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ];
@@ -3093,7 +3079,7 @@ tls_multi_process(struct tls_multi *multi,update_time (); - tas =tls_authentication_status (multi,TLS_MULTI_AUTH_STATUS_INTERVAL ); +int tas =tls_authentication_status (multi,TLS_MULTI_AUTH_STATUS_INTERVAL );/* * If lame duck session expires, kill it.
@@ -3126,7 +3112,7 @@ tls_multi_process(struct tls_multi *multi,*/ if (error) { -for (i =0 ; i < (int )SIZE (multi->key_scan); ++i) +for (int i =0 ; i < (int )SIZE (multi->key_scan); ++i) {if (multi->key_scan[i]->state >=S_ACTIVE ) {
@@ -3143,7 +3129,7 @@ nohard:const int throw_level =GREMLIN_CONNECTION_FLOOD_LEVEL (multi->opt.gremlin);if (throw_level) { -for (i =0 ; i < (int )SIZE (multi->key_scan); ++i) +for (int i =0 ; i < (int )SIZE (multi->key_scan); ++i) {if (multi->key_scan[i]->state >= throw_level) {
@@ -3956,13 +3942,11 @@ void tls_update_remote_addr(struct tls_multi *multi, const struct link_socket_actual *addr) { struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); -int i, j; - -for (i =0 ; i <TM_SIZE ; ++i) +for (int i =0 ; i <TM_SIZE ; ++i) {struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; -for (j =0 ; j <KS_SIZE ; ++j) +for (int j =0 ; j <KS_SIZE ; ++j) {struct key_state *ks = &session->key[j];
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
3x minor typos
Quoted 464 lines · Arne Schwabe
- Extract data packet handling to its own function
- Replace two instances ofif (x) { code }with
if (!x) return; code- Remove extra curly braces that were used for pre C99 code style to be able to declare variables in the middle of a block
This patch is easier to review with "ignore white space" as the diff is then a lot smaller in that case and the changes more obvious.
Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>--- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 791 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 410 insertions(+), 381 deletions(-)src/openvpn/ssl.c +224
-181@@ -3166,6 +3166,102 @@ nohard:* to implement a multiplexed TLS channel over the TCP/UDP port. */ +static inline void +handle_data_channel_paket (struct tls_multi *multi, +const struct link_socket_actual *from, +struct buffer *buf, +struct crypto_options **opt, +bool floated, +const uint8_t **ad_start) +{ +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); + +uint8_t c = *BPTR (buf); +int op = c >>P_OPCODE_SHIFT ; +int key_id = c &P_KEY_ID_MASK ; + +/* data channel packet */ +for (int i =0 ; i <KEY_SCAN_SIZE ; ++i) + { +struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; + +/* +* This is the basic test of TLS state compatibility between a local OpenVPN +* instance and its remote peer. +* +* If the test fails, it tells us that we are getting a packet from a source +* which claims reference to a prior negotiated TLS session, but the local +* OpenVPN instance has no memory of such a negotiation. +* +* It almost always occurs on UDP sessions when the passive side of the +* connection is restarted without the active side restarting as well (the +* passive side is the server which only listens for the connections, the +* active side is the client which initiates connections). +*/ +if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED (multi, ks) + && key_id == ks->key_id + && (ks->authenticated ==KS_AUTH_TRUE ) + && (floated ||link_socket_actual_match (from, &ks->remote_addr))) + { +if (!ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.initialized) + { +msg (D_MULTI_DROPPED , +"Key %s [%d] not initialized (yet), dropping packet." , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), key_id); + goto error_lite; + } + +/* return appropriate data channel decrypt key in opt */ + *opt = &ks->crypto_options; +if (op ==P_DATA_V2 ) + { + *ad_start =BPTR (buf); + } +ASSERT (buf_advance (buf,1 )); +if (op ==P_DATA_V1 ) + { + *ad_start =BPTR (buf); + } +else if (op ==P_DATA_V2 ) + { +if (buf->len <4 ) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Protocol error: received P_DATA_V2 from %s but length is < 4" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } +ASSERT (buf_advance (buf,3 )); + } + + ++ks->n_packets; + ks->n_bytes += buf->len; +dmsg (D_TLS_KEYSELECT , +"TLS: tls_pre_decrypt, key_id=%d, IP=%s" , + key_id,print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); +gc_free (&gc); +return ; + } + } + +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: local/remote TLS keys are out of sync: %s [%d]" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), key_id); + goto error_lite; + + +done: + buf->len =0 ; + *opt =NULL ; +gc_free (&gc); +return ; + +error: + ++multi->n_soft_errors; +error_lite: +tls_clear_error (); + goto done; +} +/* * * When we are in TLS mode, this is the first routine which sees @@ -3199,440 +3295,374 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, bool floated, const uint8_t **ad_start) { + +if (buf->len <=0 ) + { + buf->len =0 ; + *opt =NULL ; +return false; + } +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new ();bool ret = false; -if (buf->len >0 ) +/* get opcode */ +uint8_t pkt_firstbyte = *BPTR (buf); +int op = pkt_firstbyte >>P_OPCODE_SHIFT ; + +if ((op ==P_DATA_V1 ) || (op ==P_DATA_V2 )) { -int i; -int op; -int key_id; +handle_data_channel_paket (multi, from, buf, opt, floated, ad_start); +return false; + } -/* get opcode and key ID */ +/* get key_id */ +int key_id = pkt_firstbyte &P_KEY_ID_MASK ; + +/* control channel packet */ +bool do_burst = false; +bool new_link = false; +struct session_id sid;/* remote session ID */ + +/* verify legal opcode */ +if (op <P_FIRST_OPCODE || op >P_LAST_OPCODE ) + { +if (op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 + || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 ) { -uint8_t c = *BPTR (buf); - op = c >>P_OPCODE_SHIFT ; - key_id = c &P_KEY_ID_MASK ; +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Peer tried unsupported key-method 1" ); } +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: unknown opcode received from %s op=%d" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), op); + goto error; + } -if ((op ==P_DATA_V1 ) || (op ==P_DATA_V2 )) +/* hard reset ? */ +if (is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) + { +/* verify client -> server or server -> client connection */ +if (((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 + || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 ) && !multi->opt.server) + || ((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ) && multi->opt.server)) { -/* data channel packet */ -for (i =0 ; i <KEY_SCAN_SIZE ; ++i) - { -struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; - -/* -* This is the basic test of TLS state compatibility between a local OpenVPN -* instance and its remote peer. -* -* If the test fails, it tells us that we are getting a packet from a source -* which claims reference to a prior negotiated TLS session, but the local -* OpenVPN instance has no memory of such a negotiation. -* -* It almost always occurs on UDP sessions when the passive side of the -* connection is restarted without the active side restarting as well (the -* passive side is the server which only listens for the connections, the -* active side is the client which initiates connections). -*/ -if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED (multi, ks) - && key_id == ks->key_id - && (ks->authenticated ==KS_AUTH_TRUE ) - && (floated ||link_socket_actual_match (from, &ks->remote_addr))) - { -if (!ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.initialized) - { -msg (D_MULTI_DROPPED , -"Key %s [%d] not initialized (yet), dropping packet." , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), key_id); - goto error_lite; - } - -/* return appropriate data channel decrypt key in opt */ - *opt = &ks->crypto_options; -if (op ==P_DATA_V2 ) - { - *ad_start =BPTR (buf); - } -ASSERT (buf_advance (buf,1 )); -if (op ==P_DATA_V1 ) - { - *ad_start =BPTR (buf); - } -else if (op ==P_DATA_V2 ) - { -if (buf->len <4 ) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Protocol error: received P_DATA_V2 from %s but length is < 4" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } -ASSERT (buf_advance (buf,3 )); - } +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: client->client or server->server connection attempted from %s" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } + } - ++ks->n_packets; - ks->n_bytes += buf->len; -dmsg (D_TLS_KEYSELECT , -"TLS: tls_pre_decrypt, key_id=%d, IP=%s" , - key_id,print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); -gc_free (&gc); -return ret; - } - } +/* +* Authenticate Packet +*/ +dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG ,"TLS: control channel, op=%s, IP=%s" , +packet_opcode_name (op),print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); +/* get remote session-id */ + { +struct buffer tmp = *buf; +buf_advance (&tmp,1 ); +if (!session_id_read (&sid, &tmp) || !session_id_defined (&sid)) + {msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: local/remote TLS keys are out of sync: %s [%d]" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), key_id); - goto error_lite; +"TLS Error: session-id not found in packet from %s" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; } -else /* control channel packet */ - { -bool do_burst = false; -bool new_link = false; -struct session_id sid;/* remote session ID */ + } + +int i; +/* use session ID to match up packet with appropriate tls_session object */ +for (i =0 ; i <TM_SIZE ; ++i) + { +struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; +struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; + +dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , +"TLS: initial packet test, i=%d state=%s, mysid=%s, rec-sid=%s, rec-ip=%s, stored-sid=%s, stored-ip=%s" , + i, +state_name (ks->state), +session_id_print (&session->session_id, &gc), +session_id_print (&sid, &gc), +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), +session_id_print (&ks->session_id_remote, &gc), +print_link_socket_actual (&ks->remote_addr, &gc)); -/* verify legal opcode */ -if (op <P_FIRST_OPCODE || op >P_LAST_OPCODE ) +if (session_id_equal (&ks->session_id_remote, &sid)) +/* found a match */ + { +if (i ==TM_LAME_DUCK ) { -if (op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 - || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 ) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"Peer tried unsupported key-method 1" ); - }msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: unknown opcode received from %s op=%d" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), op); +"TLS ERROR: received control packet with stale session-id=%s" , +session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); goto error; } +dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , +"TLS: found match, session[%d], sid=%s" , + i,session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); +break ; + } + } -/* hard reset ? */ -if (is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) - { -/* verify client -> server or server -> client connection */ -if (((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 - || op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 ) && !multi->opt.server) - || ((op ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ) && multi->opt.server)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: client->client or server->server connection attempted from %s" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } - } - -/* -* Authenticate Packet -*/ -dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG ,"TLS: control channel, op=%s, IP=%s" , -packet_opcode_name (op),print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); +/* +* Hard reset and session id does not match any session in +* multi->session: Possible initial packet +*/ +if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) + { +struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE ]; +struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; -/* get remote session-id */ +/* +* If we have no session currently in progress, the initial packet will +* open a new session in TM_ACTIVE rather than TM_UNTRUSTED. +*/ +if (!session_id_defined (&ks->session_id_remote)) + { +if (multi->opt.single_session && multi->n_sessions) { -struct buffer tmp = *buf; -buf_advance (&tmp,1 ); -if (!session_id_read (&sid, &tmp) || !session_id_defined (&sid)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: session-id not found in packet from %s" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [1]" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; } -/* use session ID to match up packet with appropriate tls_session object */ -for (i =0 ; i <TM_SIZE ; ++i) +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT +if (management) { -struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; -struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; - -dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , -"TLS: initial packet test, i=%d state=%s, mysid=%s, rec-sid=%s, rec-ip=%s, stored-sid=%s, stored-ip=%s" , - i, -state_name (ks->state), -session_id_print (&session->session_id, &gc), -session_id_print (&sid, &gc), -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), -session_id_print (&ks->session_id_remote, &gc), -print_link_socket_actual (&ks->remote_addr, &gc)); - -if (session_id_equal (&ks->session_id_remote, &sid)) -/* found a match */ - { -if (i ==TM_LAME_DUCK ) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS ERROR: received control packet with stale session-id=%s" , -session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); - goto error; - } -dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , -"TLS: found match, session[%d], sid=%s" , - i,session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); -break ; - } +management_set_state (management, +OPENVPN_STATE_AUTH , +NULL , +NULL , +NULL , +NULL , +NULL ); } +#endif -/* -* Hard reset and session id does not match any session in -* multi->session: Possible initial packet -*/ -if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) - { -struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE ]; -struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; - -/* -* If we have no session currently in progress, the initial packet will -* open a new session in TM_ACTIVE rather than TM_UNTRUSTED. -*/ -if (!session_id_defined (&ks->session_id_remote)) - { -if (multi->opt.single_session && multi->n_sessions) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [1]" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } +msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW , +"TLS: Initial packet from %s, sid=%s" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), +session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); -#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT -if (management) - { -management_set_state (management, -OPENVPN_STATE_AUTH , -NULL , -NULL , -NULL , -NULL , -NULL ); - } -#endif + do_burst = true; + new_link = true; + i =TM_ACTIVE ;
src/openvpn/ssl.c tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, · line 3458
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +5
-4+ session->untrusted_addr = *from; + } + } -msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW , -"TLS: Initial packet from %s, sid=%s" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), -session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); +/* +* If we detected new session in the last if block, i has
the last if block, i has -> the last if block, it has
Quoted 9 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +9
-0+* changed to TM_ACTIVE, so check the condition again. +*/ +if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) + { +/* +* No match with existing sessions, +* probably a new session. +*/ +struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED ];
src/openvpn/ssl.c tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, · line 3471
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +3
-6- do_burst = true; - new_link = true; - i =TM_ACTIVE ; - session->untrusted_addr = *from; - } - } +/* +* If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request +* unless it the the first packet of the session.
unless it the the first -> unless it is the first
Quoted 85 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +39
-42+*/ +if (multi->opt.single_session) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [2]" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } -/* -* If we detected new session in the last if block, i has -* changed to TM_ACTIVE, so check the condition again. -*/ -if (i ==TM_SIZE &&is_hard_reset_method2 (op)) - { -/* -* No match with existing sessions, -* probably a new session. -*/ -struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED ]; - -/* -* If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request -* unless it the the first packet of the session. -*/ -if (multi->opt.single_session) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [2]" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } +if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, + session->opt)) + { + goto error; + } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) - { - goto error; - } +/* +* New session-initiating control packet is authenticated at this point, +* assuming that the --tls-auth command line option was used. +* +* Without --tls-auth, we leave authentication entirely up to TLS. +*/ +msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW , +"TLS: new session incoming connection from %s" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); -/* -* New session-initiating control packet is authenticated at this point, -* assuming that the --tls-auth command line option was used. -* -* Without --tls-auth, we leave authentication entirely up to TLS. -*/ -msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW , -"TLS: new session incoming connection from %s" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + new_link = true; + i =TM_UNTRUSTED ; + session->untrusted_addr = *from; + } +else + { +struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; +struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; - new_link = true; - i =TM_UNTRUSTED ; - session->untrusted_addr = *from; - } -else +/* +* Packet must belong to an existing session. +*/ +if (i !=TM_ACTIVE && i !=TM_UNTRUSTED ) + { + msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: Unroutable control packet received from %s (si=%d op=%s)", + print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc), + i,
src/openvpn/ssl.c tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, · line 3524
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +10
-0+ packet_opcode_name(op)); + goto error; + } + +/* +* Verify remote IP address +*/ +if (!new_link && !link_socket_actual_match (&ks->remote_addr, from)) + { + msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Received control packet from unexpected IP addr: %s",
packet from unexpected IP addr -> packet from unexpected IP address
Quoted 300 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +120
-148+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc)); + goto error; + } + +/* +* Remote is requesting a key renegotiation +*/ +if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 + &&DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED (multi, ks)) + { +if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, + session->opt)) { -struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; -struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; + goto error; + } -/* -* Packet must belong to an existing session. -*/ -if (i !=TM_ACTIVE && i !=TM_UNTRUSTED ) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: Unroutable control packet received from %s (si=%d op=%s)" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), - i, -packet_opcode_name (op)); - goto error; - } +key_state_soft_reset (session); -/* -* Verify remote IP address -*/ -if (!new_link && !link_socket_actual_match (&ks->remote_addr, from)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: Received control packet from unexpected IP addr: %s" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } +dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , +"TLS: received P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 s=%d sid=%s" , + i,session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); + } +else + { +/* +* Remote responding to our key renegotiation request? +*/ +if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 ) + { + do_burst = true; + } -/* -* Remote is requesting a key renegotiation -*/ -if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 - &&DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED (multi, ks)) - { -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) - { - goto error; - } +if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, + session->opt)) + { + goto error; + } -key_state_soft_reset (session); +dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , +"TLS: received control channel packet s#=%d sid=%s" , + i,session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); + } + } -dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , -"TLS: received P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 s=%d sid=%s" , - i,session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); - } -else - { -/* -* Remote responding to our key renegotiation request? -*/ -if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 ) - { - do_burst = true; - } +/* +* We have an authenticated control channel packet (if --tls-auth was set). +* Now pass to our reliability layer which deals with +* packet acknowledgements, retransmits, sequencing, etc. +*/ +struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; +struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) - { - goto error; - } +/* Make sure we were initialized and that we're not in an error state */ +ASSERT (ks->state !=S_UNDEF ); +ASSERT (ks->state !=S_ERROR ); +ASSERT (session_id_defined (&session->session_id)); -dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG , -"TLS: received control channel packet s#=%d sid=%s" , - i,session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); - } - } +/* Let our caller know we processed a control channel packet */ + ret = true; -/* -* We have an authenticated control channel packet (if --tls-auth was set). -* Now pass to our reliability layer which deals with -* packet acknowledgements, retransmits, sequencing, etc. -*/ - { -struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; -struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; +/* +* Set our remote address and remote session_id +*/ +if (new_link) + { + ks->session_id_remote = sid; + ks->remote_addr = *from; + ++multi->n_sessions; + } +else if (!link_socket_actual_match (&ks->remote_addr, from)) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: Existing session control channel packet from unknown IP address: %s" , +print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } -/* Make sure we were initialized and that we're not in an error state */ -ASSERT (ks->state !=S_UNDEF ); -ASSERT (ks->state !=S_ERROR ); -ASSERT (session_id_defined (&session->session_id)); +/* +* Should we do a retransmit of all unacknowledged packets in +* the send buffer? This improves the start-up efficiency of the +* initial key negotiation after the 2nd peer comes online. +*/ +if (do_burst && !session->burst) + { +reliable_schedule_now (ks->send_reliable); + session->burst = true; + } -/* Let our caller know we processed a control channel packet */ - ret = true; +/* Check key_id */ +if (ks->key_id != key_id) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS ERROR: local/remote key IDs out of sync (%d/%d) ID: %s" , + ks->key_id, key_id,print_key_id (multi, &gc)); + goto error; + } -/* -* Set our remote address and remote session_id -*/ -if (new_link) - { - ks->session_id_remote = sid; - ks->remote_addr = *from; - ++multi->n_sessions; - } -else if (!link_socket_actual_match (&ks->remote_addr, from)) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: Existing session control channel packet from unknown IP address: %s" , -print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); - goto error; - } +/* +* Process incoming ACKs for packets we can now +* delete from reliable send buffer +*/ + { +/* buffers all packet IDs to delete from send_reliable */ +struct reliable_ack send_ack; -/* -* Should we do a retransmit of all unacknowledged packets in -* the send buffer? This improves the start-up efficiency of the -* initial key negotiation after the 2nd peer comes online. -*/ -if (do_burst && !session->burst) - { -reliable_schedule_now (ks->send_reliable); - session->burst = true; - } + send_ack.len =0 ; +if (!reliable_ack_read (&send_ack, buf, &session->session_id)) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , +"TLS Error: reading acknowledgement record from packet" ); + goto error; + } +reliable_send_purge (ks->send_reliable, &send_ack); + } -/* Check key_id */ -if (ks->key_id != key_id) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS ERROR: local/remote key IDs out of sync (%d/%d) ID: %s" , - ks->key_id, key_id,print_key_id (multi, &gc)); - goto error; - } +if (op !=P_ACK_V1 &&reliable_can_get (ks->rec_reliable)) + { +packet_id_type id; -/* -* Process incoming ACKs for packets we can now -* delete from reliable send buffer -*/ +/* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ +if (reliable_ack_read_packet_id (buf, &id)) + { +/* Avoid deadlock by rejecting packet that would de-sequentialize receive buffer */ +if (reliable_wont_break_sequentiality (ks->rec_reliable, id)) + { +if (reliable_not_replay (ks->rec_reliable, id)) { -/* buffers all packet IDs to delete from send_reliable */ -struct reliable_ack send_ack; - - send_ack.len =0 ; -if (!reliable_ack_read (&send_ack, buf, &session->session_id)) +/* Save incoming ciphertext packet to reliable buffer */ +struct buffer *in =reliable_get_buf (ks->rec_reliable); +ASSERT (in); +if (!buf_copy (in, buf)) { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS , -"TLS Error: reading acknowledgement record from packet" ); +msg (D_MULTI_DROPPED , +"Incoming control channel packet too big, dropping." ); goto error; } -reliable_send_purge (ks->send_reliable, &send_ack); +reliable_mark_active_incoming (ks->rec_reliable, in, id, op); } -if (op !=P_ACK_V1 &&reliable_can_get (ks->rec_reliable)) - { -packet_id_type id; - -/* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ -if (reliable_ack_read_packet_id (buf, &id)) - { -/* Avoid deadlock by rejecting packet that would de-sequentialize receive buffer */ -if (reliable_wont_break_sequentiality (ks->rec_reliable, id)) - { -if (reliable_not_replay (ks->rec_reliable, id)) - { -/* Save incoming ciphertext packet to reliable buffer */ -struct buffer *in =reliable_get_buf (ks->rec_reliable); -ASSERT (in); -if (!buf_copy (in, buf)) - { -msg (D_MULTI_DROPPED , -"Incoming control channel packet too big, dropping." ); - goto error; - } -reliable_mark_active_incoming (ks->rec_reliable, in, id, op); - } - -/* Process outgoing acknowledgment for packet just received, even if it's a replay */ -reliable_ack_acknowledge_packet_id (ks->rec_ack, id); - } - } - } +/* Process outgoing acknowledgment for packet just received, even if it's a replay */ +reliable_ack_acknowledge_packet_id (ks->rec_ack, id); } } }@@ -3645,7 +3675,6 @@ done: error: ++multi->n_soft_errors; -error_lite:tls_clear_error (); goto done; }