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add support for direct I/O with fscrypt using blk-crypto

PATCH Superseded Satya Tangirala 3 participants 14 messages Jul 24, 2020 – Jul 27, 2020

Subsystems (6)

v6 of 9 Superseded Latest is v9 →

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#0 lore raw

v6 cover add support for direct I/O with fscrypt using blk-crypto

This patch series adds support for direct I/O with fscrypt using blk-crypto. It has been rebased on fscrypt/master (i.e. the "master" branch of the fscrypt tree at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt.git)

Patch 1 adds two functions to fscrypt that need to be called to determine if direct I/O is supported for a request.

Patches 2 and 3 modify direct-io and iomap respectively to set bio crypt contexts on bios when appropriate by calling into fscrypt.

Patches 4 and 5 allow ext4 and f2fs direct I/O to support fscrypt without falling back to buffered I/O.

Patches 6 and 7 update the fscrypt documentation for inline encryption support and direct I/O. The documentation now notes the required conditions for inline encryption and direct I/O on encrypted files.

This patch series was tested by running xfstests with test_dummy_encryption with and without the 'inlinecrypt' mount option, and there were no meaningful regressions. One regression was for generic/587 on ext4, but that test isn't compatible with test_dummy_encryption in the first place, and the test "incorrectly" passes without the 'inlinecrypt' mount option - a patch will be sent out to exclude that test when test_dummy_encryption is turned on with ext4 (like the other quota related tests that use user visible quota files). The other regression was for generic/252 on ext4, which does direct I/O with a buffer aligned to the block device's blocksize, but not necessarily aligned to the filesystem's block size, which direct I/O with fscrypt requires.

Changes v5 => v6:
- fix bug with fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() and make it ready for 64 bit block numbers.
- remove Reviewed-by for Patch 1 due to significant changes from when the Reviewed-by was given.

Changes v4 => v5:
- replace fscrypt_limit_io_pages() with fscrypt_limit_io_block(), which is now called by individual filesystems (currently only ext4) instead of the iomap code. This new function serves the same end purpose as the one it replaces (ensuring that DUNs within a bio are contiguous) but operates purely with blocks instead of with pages.
- make iomap_dio_zero() set bio_crypt_ctx's again, instead of just a WARN_ON() since some folks prefer that instead.
- add Reviewed-by's

Changes v3 => v4:
- Fix bug in iomap_dio_bio_actor() where fscrypt_limit_io_pages() was being called too early (thanks Eric!)
- Improve comments and fix formatting in documentation
- iomap_dio_zero() is only called to zero out partial blocks, but direct I/O is only supported on encrypted files when I/O is blocksize aligned, so it doesn't need to set encryption contexts on bios. Replace setting the encryption context with a WARN_ON(). (Eric)

Changes v2 => v3:
- add changelog to coverletter

Changes v1 => v2:
- Fix bug in f2fs caused by replacing f2fs_post_read_required() with !fscrypt_dio_supported() since the latter doesn't check for compressed inodes unlike the former.
- Add patches 6 and 7 for fscrypt documentation
- cleanups and comments

Eric Biggers (5):
fscrypt: Add functions for direct I/O support
direct-io: add support for fscrypt using blk-crypto
iomap: support direct I/O with fscrypt using blk-crypto
ext4: support direct I/O with fscrypt using blk-crypto
f2fs: support direct I/O with fscrypt using blk-crypto

Satya Tangirala (2):
fscrypt: document inline encryption support
fscrypt: update documentation for direct I/O support

 Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 36 +++++++++++--
 fs/crypto/crypto.c                    |  8 +++
 fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c              | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/direct-io.c                        | 15 +++++-
 fs/ext4/file.c                        | 10 ++--
 fs/ext4/inode.c                       |  7 +++
 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h                        |  6 ++-
 fs/iomap/direct-io.c                  |  6 +++
 include/linux/fscrypt.h               | 18 +++++++
 9 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog
#1 lore raw

PATCH v6 1/7 fscrypt: Add functions for direct I/O support

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Introduce fscrypt_dio_supported() to check whether a direct I/O request is unsupported due to encryption constraints.

Also introduce fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() to limit how many blocks can be added to a bio being prepared for direct I/O. This is needed for filesystems that use the iomap direct I/O implementation to avoid DUN wraparound in the middle of a bio (which is possible with the IV_INO_LBLK_32 IV generation method). Elsewhere fscrypt_mergeable_bio() is used for this, but iomap operates on logical ranges directly, so filesystems using iomap won't have a chance to call fscrypt_mergeable_bio() on every block added to a bio. So we need this function which limits a logical range in one go.

---
 fs/crypto/crypto.c       |  8 +++++
 fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/fscrypt.h  | 18 ++++++++++
 3 files changed, 100 insertions(+)
fs/crypto/crypto.c +8 -0
index 9212325763b0..f72f22a718b2 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ void fscrypt_free_bounce_page(struct page *bounce_page)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_free_bounce_page);
 
+/*
+ * Generate the IV for the given logical block number within the given file.
+ * For filenames encryption, lblk_num == 0.
+ *
+ * Keep this in sync with fscrypt_limit_io_blocks().  fscrypt_limit_io_blocks()
+ * needs to know about any IV generation methods where the low bits of IV don't
+ * simply contain the lblk_num (e.g., IV_INO_LBLK_32).
+ */
 void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
 			 const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
 {
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +74 -0

83 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/fscrypt.h +18 -0
index bb257411365f..5de122ec0464 100644
@@ -559,6 +559,10 @@ bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio(struct bio *bio, const struct inode *inode,
 bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio_bh(struct bio *bio,
 			      const struct buffer_head *next_bh);
 
+bool fscrypt_dio_supported(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter);
+
+u64 fscrypt_limit_io_blocks(const struct inode *inode, u64 lblk, u64 nr_blocks);
+
 #else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT */
 
 static inline bool __fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(const struct inode *inode)
@@ -587,6 +591,20 @@ static inline bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio_bh(struct bio *bio,
 {
 	return true;
 }
+
+static inline bool fscrypt_dio_supported(struct kiocb *iocb,
+					 struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+	const struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
+
+	return !fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(inode);
+}
+
+static inline u64 fscrypt_limit_io_blocks(const struct inode *inode, u64 lblk,
+					  u64 nr_blocks)
+{
+	return nr_blocks;
+}
 #endif /* !CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT */
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6 1/7] fscrypt: Add functions for direct I/O support

Quoted 77 lines · Satya Tangirala

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Introduce fscrypt_dio_supported() to check whether a direct I/O request is unsupported due to encryption constraints.

Also introduce fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() to limit how many blocks can be added to a bio being prepared for direct I/O. This is needed for filesystems that use the iomap direct I/O implementation to avoid DUN wraparound in the middle of a bio (which is possible with the IV_INO_LBLK_32 IV generation method). Elsewhere fscrypt_mergeable_bio() is used for this, but iomap operates on logical ranges directly, so filesystems using iomap won't have a chance to call fscrypt_mergeable_bio() on every block added to a bio. So we need this function which limits a logical range in one go.

---
 fs/crypto/crypto.c       |  8 +++++
 fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/fscrypt.h  | 18 ++++++++++
 3 files changed, 100 insertions(+)
fs/crypto/crypto.c +8 -0
index 9212325763b0..f72f22a718b2 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ void fscrypt_free_bounce_page(struct page *bounce_page)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_free_bounce_page);
 
+/*
+ * Generate the IV for the given logical block number within the given file.
+ * For filenames encryption, lblk_num == 0.
+ *
+ * Keep this in sync with fscrypt_limit_io_blocks().  fscrypt_limit_io_blocks()
+ * needs to know about any IV generation methods where the low bits of IV don't
+ * simply contain the lblk_num (e.g., IV_INO_LBLK_32).
+ */
 void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
 			 const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
 {
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +19 -0
index d7aecadf33c1..4cdf807b89b9 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/blkdev.h>
 #include <linux/buffer_head.h>
 #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
 
 #include "fscrypt_private.h"
 
@@ -362,3 +363,76 @@ bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio_bh(struct bio *bio,
 	return fscrypt_mergeable_bio(bio, inode, next_lblk);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_mergeable_bio_bh);
+
+/**
+ * fscrypt_dio_supported() - check whether a direct I/O request is unsupported
+ *			     due to encryption constraints
+ * @iocb: the file and position the I/O is targeting
+ * @iter: the I/O data segment(s)
+ *
+ * Return: true if direct I/O is supported
+ */
+bool fscrypt_dio_supported(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+	const struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
+	const unsigned int blocksize = i_blocksize(inode);
+
+	/* If the file is unencrypted, no veto from us. */
+	if (!fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(inode))
+		return true;
+

fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio_bh(struct bio *bio, · line 393

Quoted 10 lines
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +10 -0
+	/* We only support direct I/O with inline crypto, not fs-layer crypto */
+	if (!fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since the granularity of encryption is filesystem blocks, the I/O
+	 * must be block aligned -- not just disk sector aligned.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(iocb->ki_pos | iov_iter_alignment(iter), blocksize))
+		return false;

Doesn't this force user buffers to be filesystem block size aligned, instead of 512 byte aligned as is typical for direct IO?

That's going to cause applications that work fine on normal filesystems becaues the memalign() buffers to 512 bytes or logical block device sector sizes (as per the open(2) man page) to fail on encrypted volumes, and it's not going to be obvious to users as to why this happens.

XFS has XFS_IOC_DIOINFO to expose exactly this information to userspace on a per-file basis. Other filesystem and VFS developers have said for the past 15 years "we don't need no stinking DIOINFO". The same people shot down adding optional IO alignment constraint fields to statx() a few years ago, too.

Yet here were are again, with alignment of DIO buffers being an issue that userspace needs to know about....

Cheers,

Dave.

Signature · 2 lines
Dave Chinner
[email protected]
maintainer
#3 lore raw

Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v6 1/7] fscrypt: Add functions for direct I/O support

Quoted 23 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 9 lines
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +9 -0
+bool fscrypt_dio_supported(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+	const struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
+	const unsigned int blocksize = i_blocksize(inode);
+
+	/* If the file is unencrypted, no veto from us. */
+	if (!fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(inode))
+		return true;
+

fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio_bh(struct bio *bio, · line 393

Quoted 10 lines
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +10 -0
+	/* We only support direct I/O with inline crypto, not fs-layer crypto */
+	if (!fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since the granularity of encryption is filesystem blocks, the I/O
+	 * must be block aligned -- not just disk sector aligned.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(iocb->ki_pos | iov_iter_alignment(iter), blocksize))
+		return false;

Doesn't this force user buffers to be filesystem block size aligned, instead of 512 byte aligned as is typical for direct IO?

Quoted 5 lines

That's going to cause applications that work fine on normal filesystems becaues the memalign() buffers to 512 bytes or logical block device sector sizes (as per the open(2) man page) to fail on encrypted volumes, and it's not going to be obvious to users as to why this happens.

The status quo is that direct I/O on encrypted files falls back to buffered I/O.

So this patch is strictly an improvement; it's making direct I/O work in a case where previously it didn't work.

Quoted 10 lines

XFS has XFS_IOC_DIOINFO to expose exactly this information to userspace on a per-file basis. Other filesystem and VFS developers have said for the past 15 years "we don't need no stinking DIOINFO". The same people shot down adding optional IO alignment constraint fields to statx() a few years ago, too.

Yet here were are again, with alignment of DIO buffers being an issue that userspace needs to know about....

A DIOINFO ioctl sounds like a good idea to me, although I'm not familiar with previous discussions about it.

Note that there are lots of other cases where ext4 and f2fs fall back to buffered I/O; see ext4_dio_supported() and f2fs_force_buffered_io(). So this isn't a new problem.

- Eric

_______________________________________________
Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel

#4 lore raw

Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v6 1/7] fscrypt: Add functions for direct I/O support

Quoted 24 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 23 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 9 lines
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +9 -0
+bool fscrypt_dio_supported(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+	const struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
+	const unsigned int blocksize = i_blocksize(inode);
+
+	/* If the file is unencrypted, no veto from us. */
+	if (!fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(inode))
+		return true;
+

fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio_bh(struct bio *bio, · line 393

Quoted 10 lines
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +10 -0
+	/* We only support direct I/O with inline crypto, not fs-layer crypto */
+	if (!fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since the granularity of encryption is filesystem blocks, the I/O
+	 * must be block aligned -- not just disk sector aligned.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(iocb->ki_pos | iov_iter_alignment(iter), blocksize))
+		return false;

Doesn't this force user buffers to be filesystem block size aligned, instead of 512 byte aligned as is typical for direct IO?

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

That's going to cause applications that work fine on normal filesystems becaues the memalign() buffers to 512 bytes or logical block device sector sizes (as per the open(2) man page) to fail on encrypted volumes, and it's not going to be obvious to users as to why this happens.

The status quo is that direct I/O on encrypted files falls back to buffered I/O.

Largely irrelevant.

You claimed in another thread that performance is a key feature that inline encryption + DIO provides. Now you're implying that failing to provide that performance doesn't really matter at all.

Quoted 2 lines

So this patch is strictly an improvement; it's making direct I/O work in a case where previously it didn't work.

Improvements still need to follow longstanding conventions. And, IMO, it's not an improvement if the feature results in unpredictable performance for userspace applications.

i.e. there is no point in enabling direct IO if it is unpredictably going to fall back to the buffered IO path when applications are coded to the guidelines the man page said they should use. Such problems are an utter PITA to diagnose in the field, and on those grounds alone the current implementation gets a NACK.

Quoted 3 lines

Note that there are lots of other cases where ext4 and f2fs fall back to buffered I/O; see ext4_dio_supported() and f2fs_force_buffered_io(). So this isn't a new problem.

No shit, sherlock. But that's also irrelevant to the discussion at hand - claiming "we can fall back to buffered IO" doesn't address the problem I've raised. It's just an excuse for not fixing it.

Indeed, the problem is easy to fix - fscrypt only cares that the user IO offset and length is DUN aligned. fscrypt does not care that the user memory buffer is filesystem block aligned - user memory buffer alignment is an underlying hardware DMA constraint - and so fscrypt_dio_supported() needs to relax or remove the user memroy buffer alignment constraint so that it follows existing conventions....

Cheers,

Dave.

Signature · 2 lines
Dave Chinner
[email protected]
maintainer
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6 1/7] fscrypt: Add functions for direct I/O support

Quoted 52 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 24 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 23 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 9 lines
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +9 -0
+bool fscrypt_dio_supported(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+	const struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
+	const unsigned int blocksize = i_blocksize(inode);
+
+	/* If the file is unencrypted, no veto from us. */
+	if (!fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(inode))
+		return true;
+

fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio_bh(struct bio *bio, · line 393

Quoted 10 lines
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +10 -0
+	/* We only support direct I/O with inline crypto, not fs-layer crypto */
+	if (!fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since the granularity of encryption is filesystem blocks, the I/O
+	 * must be block aligned -- not just disk sector aligned.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(iocb->ki_pos | iov_iter_alignment(iter), blocksize))
+		return false;

Doesn't this force user buffers to be filesystem block size aligned, instead of 512 byte aligned as is typical for direct IO?

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

That's going to cause applications that work fine on normal filesystems becaues the memalign() buffers to 512 bytes or logical block device sector sizes (as per the open(2) man page) to fail on encrypted volumes, and it's not going to be obvious to users as to why this happens.

The status quo is that direct I/O on encrypted files falls back to buffered I/O.

Largely irrelevant.

You claimed in another thread that performance is a key feature that inline encryption + DIO provides. Now you're implying that failing to provide that performance doesn't really matter at all.

Quoted 2 lines

So this patch is strictly an improvement; it's making direct I/O work in a case where previously it didn't work.

Improvements still need to follow longstanding conventions. And, IMO, it's not an improvement if the feature results in unpredictable performance for userspace applications.

i.e. there is no point in enabling direct IO if it is unpredictably going to fall back to the buffered IO path when applications are coded to the guidelines the man page said they should use. Such problems are an utter PITA to diagnose in the field, and on those grounds alone the current implementation gets a NACK.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Note that there are lots of other cases where ext4 and f2fs fall back to buffered I/O; see ext4_dio_supported() and f2fs_force_buffered_io(). So this isn't a new problem.

No shit, sherlock. But that's also irrelevant to the discussion at hand - claiming "we can fall back to buffered IO" doesn't address the problem I've raised. It's just an excuse for not fixing it.

Actually we never specifically discussed the motivation for DIO on encrypted files, but yes there are some specific applications that need it for performance reasons (e.g., zram writeback to a loop device backed by an encrypted file), as well as benchmarking applications. These applications aren't expected to have much trouble (if any) dealing with a fs blocksize alignment requirement.

We always try to make encrypted files behave just like unencrypted files, but sometimes it's just not possible to do so. We document the exceptions in Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst, which this patchset updates to document the conditions for direct I/O working. Note that these conditions include more than just the alignment requirement.

The open() man page does mention that O_DIRECT I/O typically needs to be aligned to logical_block_size; however it also says "In Linux alignment restrictions vary by filesystem and kernel version and might be absent entirely."

The other examples of falling back to buffered I/O are relevant, since they show that similar issues are already being dealt with in the (rare) use cases of O_DIRECT. So I don't think the convention is as strong as you think it is...

Quoted 7 lines

Indeed, the problem is easy to fix - fscrypt only cares that the user IO offset and length is DUN aligned. fscrypt does not care that the user memory buffer is filesystem block aligned - user memory buffer alignment is an underlying hardware DMA constraint - and so fscrypt_dio_supported() needs to relax or remove the user memroy buffer alignment constraint so that it follows existing conventions....

Relaxing the user buffer alignment requirement would mean that a single encryption data unit could be discontiguous in memory. I'm not sure that's allowed -- it *might* be, but we'd have to verify it on every vendor's inline encryption hardware, as well as handle this case in block/blk-crypto-fallback.c. It's much easier to just require proper alignment.

Also, would relaxing the user buffer alignment really address your concern, given that the file offset and length would still have to be fs-block aligned? Applications might also align the offset and length to logical_block_size only.

So I don't see how this is "easy to fix" at all, other than by limiting direct I/O support to data_unit_size == logical_block_size (which we could do for now if it gets you to stop nacking the DIO patches, though I'm pretty sure that restriction won't work for some people so would need to be re-visited later...).

- Eric

#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6 1/7] fscrypt: Add functions for direct I/O support

Quoted 46 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 45 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 24 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 23 lines · Dave Chinner
Quoted 9 lines
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +9 -0
+bool fscrypt_dio_supported(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+	const struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
+	const unsigned int blocksize = i_blocksize(inode);
+
+	/* If the file is unencrypted, no veto from us. */
+	if (!fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(inode))
+		return true;
+

fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio_bh(struct bio *bio, · line 393

Quoted 10 lines
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +10 -0
+	/* We only support direct I/O with inline crypto, not fs-layer crypto */
+	if (!fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since the granularity of encryption is filesystem blocks, the I/O
+	 * must be block aligned -- not just disk sector aligned.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(iocb->ki_pos | iov_iter_alignment(iter), blocksize))
+		return false;

Doesn't this force user buffers to be filesystem block size aligned, instead of 512 byte aligned as is typical for direct IO?

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

That's going to cause applications that work fine on normal filesystems becaues the memalign() buffers to 512 bytes or logical block device sector sizes (as per the open(2) man page) to fail on encrypted volumes, and it's not going to be obvious to users as to why this happens.

The status quo is that direct I/O on encrypted files falls back to buffered I/O.

Largely irrelevant.

You claimed in another thread that performance is a key feature that inline encryption + DIO provides. Now you're implying that failing to provide that performance doesn't really matter at all.

Quoted 2 lines

So this patch is strictly an improvement; it's making direct I/O work in a case where previously it didn't work.

Improvements still need to follow longstanding conventions. And, IMO, it's not an improvement if the feature results in unpredictable performance for userspace applications.

.....

Quoted 3 lines

The open() man page does mention that O_DIRECT I/O typically needs to be aligned to logical_block_size; however it also says "In Linux alignment restrictions vary by filesystem and kernel version and might be absent entirely."

Now you are just language-laywering. I'll quote from the next paragraph in the man page:

"Since Linux 2.6.0, alignment to the logical block size of the underlying storage (typically 512 bytes) suffices. The logi cal block size can be determined using the ioctl(2) BLKSSZGET operation [...]"

There's the longstanding convention I've been talking about, clearly splet out. Applications that follow this convention (and there are lots) should just work. Having code that works correctly on one file but not on another -on the same filesystem- despite doing all the right things is not at all user friendly.

What I really care about is that new functionality works without requiring applications to be rewritten to cater specifically for some whacky foilble in a new feature.

fscrypt is generic functionality and hardware acceleration of crypt functions are only going to get more common in future. Hence the combination of the two needs to *play nicely* with the vast library of existing userspace software that is already out there.

We need to get this stuff correct right from the start, otherwise we're just leaving a huge mountain of technical debt for our future selfs to have to clean up.

Quoted 3 lines

The other examples of falling back to buffered I/O are relevant, since they show that similar issues are already being dealt with in the (rare) use cases of O_DIRECT. So I don't think the convention is as strong as you think it is...

The convention is there so that applications that *expect* to be using direct IO can do so -reliably-. Breaking conventions that people have become accustomed to just because it is convenient for you is pretty damn selfish act.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Indeed, the problem is easy to fix - fscrypt only cares that the user IO offset and length is DUN aligned. fscrypt does not care that the user memory buffer is filesystem block aligned - user memory buffer alignment is an underlying hardware DMA constraint - and so fscrypt_dio_supported() needs to relax or remove the user memroy buffer alignment constraint so that it follows existing conventions....

Quoted 5 lines

Relaxing the user buffer alignment requirement would mean that a single encryption data unit could be discontiguous in memory. I'm not sure that's allowed -- it *might* be, but we'd have to verify it on every vendor's inline encryption hardware, as well as handle this case in block/blk-crypto-fallback.c. It's much easier to just require proper alignment.

If the hardware can't handle logical block size aligned DMA addresses for any operation they might be are asked to perform, then the hardware has not specified it's blk_queue_logical_block_size() correctly. This is not something the fscrypt layer should be trying to enforce - that's a massive layering violation.

Seriously, if the hardware can't support discontiguous memory addresses for critical operations, then it needs to tell the rest of the IO stack about these limitations that so that the higher layers will either align things correctly or bounce buffer IOs that aren't memory aligned properly.

Quoted 2 lines

Also, would relaxing the user buffer alignment really address your concern, given that the file offset and length would still have to be fs-block aligned?

Isn't that exactly what I just suggested you do?

Quoted 1 line

Applications might also align the offset and length to logical_block_size only.

And so fscrypt_dio_supported() rejects them if they they don't align to the DUN requirements of fscrypt. That's the only -fscrypt specific restriction- on direct IO.

Quoted 3 lines

So I don't see how this is "easy to fix" at all, other than by limiting direct I/O support to data_unit_size == logical_block_size (which we could do for now if it gets you to stop nacking the DIO patches,

I'm saying now because I think these things need to be fixed before the code gets merged, not because I think they are easy to fix.

I'm just asking you layer your checks the way the rest of the storage stack does them (i.e. user data IO constraints applied at the fscrypt level, DMA address requirements propagate up from the hardware) so that they behave as existing applications expect them to.

i.e. if crypted data requires contiguous memory for the DMA, then usrespace needs to be told that via BLKSSZGET. Filesystem mkfs apps need to be told this so they can set up their internal block sizes and alignments correctly. Everything that issues IO to the storage needs to know this.

Quoted 2 lines

though I'm pretty sure that
restriction won't work for some people so would need to be re-visited later...).

That's entirely my point. You need to fix the architectural flaws right now so we don't have to deal with trying to fix them in future when we are limited by constraints such as "thou shalt not break userspace"....

Cheers,

Dave.

Signature · 2 lines
Dave Chinner
[email protected]
#7 lore raw

PATCH v6 2/7 direct-io: add support for fscrypt using blk-crypto

In reply to Satya Tangirala

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Set bio crypt contexts on bios by calling into fscrypt when required, and explicitly check for DUN continuity when adding pages to the bio. (While DUN continuity is usually implied by logical block contiguity, this is not the case when using certain fscrypt IV generation methods like IV_INO_LBLK_32).

---
 fs/direct-io.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/direct-io.c +14 -1
index 6d5370eac2a8..f27f7e3780ee 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fscrypt.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
@@ -411,6 +412,7 @@ dio_bio_alloc(struct dio *dio, struct dio_submit *sdio,
 	      sector_t first_sector, int nr_vecs)
 {
 	struct bio *bio;
+	struct inode *inode = dio->inode;
 
 	/*
 	 * bio_alloc() is guaranteed to return a bio when allowed to sleep and
@@ -418,6 +420,9 @@ dio_bio_alloc(struct dio *dio, struct dio_submit *sdio,
 	 */
 	bio = bio_alloc(GFP_KERNEL, nr_vecs);
 
+	fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx(bio, inode,
+				  sdio->cur_page_fs_offset >> inode->i_blkbits,
+				  GFP_KERNEL);
 	bio_set_dev(bio, bdev);
 	bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = first_sector;
 	bio_set_op_attrs(bio, dio->op, dio->op_flags);
@@ -782,9 +787,17 @@ static inline int dio_send_cur_page(struct dio *dio, struct dio_submit *sdio,
 		 * current logical offset in the file does not equal what would
 		 * be the next logical offset in the bio, submit the bio we
 		 * have.
+		 *
+		 * When fscrypt inline encryption is used, data unit number
+		 * (DUN) contiguity is also required.  Normally that's implied
+		 * by logical contiguity.  However, certain IV generation
+		 * methods (e.g. IV_INO_LBLK_32) don't guarantee it.  So, we
+		 * must explicitly check fscrypt_mergeable_bio() too.
 		 */
 		if (sdio->final_block_in_bio != sdio->cur_page_block ||
-		    cur_offset != bio_next_offset)
+		    cur_offset != bio_next_offset ||
+		    !fscrypt_mergeable_bio(sdio->bio, dio->inode,
+					   cur_offset >> dio->inode->i_blkbits))
 			dio_bio_submit(dio, sdio);
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog
#8 lore raw

PATCH v6 3/7 iomap: support direct I/O with fscrypt using blk-crypto

In reply to Satya Tangirala

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Set bio crypt contexts on bios by calling into fscrypt when required. No DUN contiguity checks are done - callers are expected to set up the iomap correctly to ensure that each bio submitted by iomap will not have blocks with incontiguous DUNs by calling fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() appropriately.

---
 fs/iomap/direct-io.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/iomap/direct-io.c +6 -0
index ec7b78e6feca..a8785bffdc7c 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fscrypt.h>
 #include <linux/iomap.h>
 #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
 #include <linux/uio.h>
@@ -183,11 +184,14 @@ static void
 iomap_dio_zero(struct iomap_dio *dio, struct iomap *iomap, loff_t pos,
 		unsigned len)
 {
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(dio->iocb->ki_filp);
 	struct page *page = ZERO_PAGE(0);
 	int flags = REQ_SYNC | REQ_IDLE;
 	struct bio *bio;
 
 	bio = bio_alloc(GFP_KERNEL, 1);
+	fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx(bio, inode, pos >> inode->i_blkbits,
+				  GFP_KERNEL);
 	bio_set_dev(bio, iomap->bdev);
 	bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = iomap_sector(iomap, pos);
 	bio->bi_private = dio;
@@ -270,6 +274,8 @@ iomap_dio_bio_actor(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length,
 		}
 
 		bio = bio_alloc(GFP_KERNEL, nr_pages);
+		fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx(bio, inode, pos >> inode->i_blkbits,
+					  GFP_KERNEL);
 		bio_set_dev(bio, iomap->bdev);
 		bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = iomap_sector(iomap, pos);
 		bio->bi_write_hint = dio->iocb->ki_hint;
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog
#9 lore raw

PATCH v6 4/7 ext4: support direct I/O with fscrypt using blk-crypto

In reply to Satya Tangirala

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Wire up ext4 with fscrypt direct I/O support. Direct I/O with fscrypt is only supported through blk-crypto (i.e. CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION must have been enabled, the 'inlinecrypt' mount option must have been specified, and either hardware inline encryption support must be present or CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCYRPTION_FALLBACK must have been enabled). Further, direct I/O on encrypted files is only supported when I/O is aligned to the filesystem block size (which is *not* necessarily the same as the block device's block size).

fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() is called before setting up the iomap to ensure that the blocks of each bio that iomap will submit will have contiguous DUNs. Note that fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() is normally a no-op, as normally the DUNs simply increment along with the logical blocks. But it's needed to handle an edge case in one of the fscrypt IV generation methods.

---
 fs/ext4/file.c  | 10 ++++++----
 fs/ext4/inode.c |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/file.c +6 -4
index 2a01e31a032c..d534f72675d9 100644
@@ -36,9 +36,11 @@
 #include "acl.h"
 #include "truncate.h"
 
-static bool ext4_dio_supported(struct inode *inode)
+static bool ext4_dio_supported(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
 {
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) && IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
+
+	if (!fscrypt_dio_supported(iocb, iter))
 		return false;
 	if (fsverity_active(inode))
 		return false;
@@ -61,7 +63,7 @@ static ssize_t ext4_dio_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to)
 		inode_lock_shared(inode);
 	}
 
-	if (!ext4_dio_supported(inode)) {
+	if (!ext4_dio_supported(iocb, to)) {
 		inode_unlock_shared(inode);
 		/*
 		 * Fallback to buffered I/O if the operation being performed on
@@ -490,7 +492,7 @@ static ssize_t ext4_dio_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
 	}
 
 	/* Fallback to buffered I/O if the inode does not support direct I/O. */
-	if (!ext4_dio_supported(inode)) {
+	if (!ext4_dio_supported(iocb, from)) {
 		if (ilock_shared)
 			inode_unlock_shared(inode);
 		else
fs/ext4/inode.c +7 -0
index 44bad4bb8831..6725116ea348 100644
@@ -3445,6 +3445,13 @@ static int ext4_iomap_begin(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t length,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
+	/*
+	 * When inline encryption is enabled, sometimes I/O to an encrypted file
+	 * has to be broken up to guarantee DUN contiguity. Handle this by
+	 * limiting the length of the mapping returned.
+	 */
+	map.m_len = fscrypt_limit_io_blocks(inode, map.m_lblk, map.m_len);
+
 	ext4_set_iomap(inode, iomap, &map, offset, length);
 
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog
#10 lore raw

PATCH v6 5/7 f2fs: support direct I/O with fscrypt using blk-crypto

In reply to Satya Tangirala

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Wire up f2fs with fscrypt direct I/O support. direct I/O with fscrypt is only supported through blk-crypto (i.e. CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION must have been enabled, the 'inlinecrypt' mount option must have been specified, and either hardware inline encryption support must be present or CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCYRPTION_FALLBACK must have been enabled). Further, direct I/O on encrypted files is only supported when I/O is aligned to the filesystem block size (which is *not* necessarily the same as the block device's block size).

---
 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +5 -1
index b35a50f4953c..978130b5a195 100644
@@ -4082,7 +4082,11 @@ static inline bool f2fs_force_buffered_io(struct inode *inode,
 	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
 	int rw = iov_iter_rw(iter);
 
-	if (f2fs_post_read_required(inode))
+	if (!fscrypt_dio_supported(iocb, iter))
+		return true;
+	if (fsverity_active(inode))
+		return true;
+	if (f2fs_compressed_file(inode))
 		return true;
 	if (f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi))
 		return true;
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog
#11 lore raw

PATCH v6 6/7 fscrypt: document inline encryption support

In reply to Satya Tangirala

Update the fscrypt documentation file for inline encryption support.

---
 Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst +15 -1
index 1a6ad6f736b5..423c5a0daf45 100644
@@ -1204,6 +1204,18 @@ buffer.  Some filesystems, such as UBIFS, already use temporary
 buffers regardless of encryption.  Other filesystems, such as ext4 and
 F2FS, have to allocate bounce pages specially for encryption.
 
+Fscrypt is also able to use inline encryption hardware instead of the
+kernel crypto API for en/decryption of file contents.  When possible,
+and if directed to do so (by specifying the 'inlinecrypt' mount option
+for an ext4/F2FS filesystem), it adds encryption contexts to bios and
+uses blk-crypto to perform the en/decryption instead of making use of
+the above read/write path changes.  Of course, even if directed to
+make use of inline encryption, fscrypt will only be able to do so if
+either hardware inline encryption support is available for the
+selected encryption algorithm or CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK
+is selected.  If neither is the case, fscrypt will fall back to using
+the above mentioned read/write path changes for en/decryption.
+
 Filename hashing and encoding
 -----------------------------
 
@@ -1250,7 +1262,9 @@ Tests
 
 To test fscrypt, use xfstests, which is Linux's de facto standard
 filesystem test suite.  First, run all the tests in the "encrypt"
-group on the relevant filesystem(s).  For example, to test ext4 and
+group on the relevant filesystem(s).  One can also run the tests
+with the 'inlinecrypt' mount option to test the implementation for
+inline encryption support.  For example, to test ext4 and
 f2fs encryption using `kvm-xfstests
 <https://github.com/tytso/xfstests-bld/blob/master/Documentation/kvm-quickstart.md>`_::
 
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog
maintainer
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6 6/7] fscrypt: document inline encryption support

Quoted 33 lines · Satya Tangirala

Update the fscrypt documentation file for inline encryption support.

---
 Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst +12 -0
index 1a6ad6f736b5..423c5a0daf45 100644
@@ -1204,6 +1204,18 @@ buffer.  Some filesystems, such as UBIFS, already use temporary
 buffers regardless of encryption.  Other filesystems, such as ext4 and
 F2FS, have to allocate bounce pages specially for encryption.
 
+Fscrypt is also able to use inline encryption hardware instead of the
+kernel crypto API for en/decryption of file contents.  When possible,
+and if directed to do so (by specifying the 'inlinecrypt' mount option
+for an ext4/F2FS filesystem), it adds encryption contexts to bios and
+uses blk-crypto to perform the en/decryption instead of making use of
+the above read/write path changes.  Of course, even if directed to
+make use of inline encryption, fscrypt will only be able to do so if
+either hardware inline encryption support is available for the
+selected encryption algorithm or CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK
+is selected.  If neither is the case, fscrypt will fall back to using
+the above mentioned read/write path changes for en/decryption.
+
 Filename hashing and encoding
 -----------------------------
 

Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst Tests · line 1269

Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst +3 -1
@@ -1250,7 +1262,9 @@ Tests
 
 To test fscrypt, use xfstests, which is Linux's de facto standard
 filesystem test suite.  First, run all the tests in the "encrypt"
-group on the relevant filesystem(s).  For example, to test ext4 and
+group on the relevant filesystem(s).  One can also run the tests
+with the 'inlinecrypt' mount option to test the implementation for
+inline encryption support.  For example, to test ext4 and
 f2fs encryption using `kvm-xfstests
 <https://github.com/tytso/xfstests-bld/blob/master/Documentation/kvm-quickstart.md>`_::

Since this patch is separate from the direct I/O support, I've applied it to fscrypt.git#master for 5.9. I'm not applying the direct I/O patches yet.

- Eric

#13 lore raw

PATCH v6 7/7 fscrypt: update documentation for direct I/O support

In reply to Satya Tangirala

Update fscrypt documentation to reflect the addition of direct I/O support and document the necessary conditions for direct I/O on encrypted files.

---
 Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst +18 -2
index 423c5a0daf45..b9bbd6c612ff 100644
@@ -1049,8 +1049,10 @@ astute users may notice some differences in behavior:
   may be used to overwrite the source files but isn't guaranteed to be
   effective on all filesystems and storage devices.
 
-- Direct I/O is not supported on encrypted files.  Attempts to use
-  direct I/O on such files will fall back to buffered I/O.
+- Direct I/O is supported on encrypted files only under some
+  circumstances (see `Direct I/O support`_ for details). When these
+  circumstances are not met, attempts to use direct I/O on encrypted
+  files will fall back to buffered I/O.
 
 - The fallocate operations FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE and
   FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE are not supported on encrypted files and will
@@ -1123,6 +1125,20 @@ It is not currently possible to backup and restore encrypted files
 without the encryption key.  This would require special APIs which
 have not yet been implemented.
 
+Direct I/O support
+==================
+
+Direct I/O on encrypted files is supported through blk-crypto. In
+particular, this means the kernel must have CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION
+enabled, the filesystem must have had the 'inlinecrypt' mount option
+specified, and either hardware inline encryption must be present, or
+CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK must have been enabled. Further,
+any I/O must be aligned to the filesystem block size (*not* necessarily
+the same as the block device's block size) - in particular, any userspace
+buffer into which data is read/written from must also be aligned to the
+filesystem block size. If any of these conditions isn't met, attempts to do
+direct I/O on an encrypted file will fall back to buffered I/O.
+
 Encryption policy enforcement
 =============================
 
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog