sockptr_t fixes v2
Subsystems (10)
cover sockptr_t fixes v2
Hi Dave,
a bunch of fixes for the sockptr_t conversion
Changes since v1:
- fix a user pointer dereference braino in bpfilter
PATCH 1/4 netfilter: arp_tables: restore a SPDX identifier
This was accidentally removed in an unrelated commit.
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +1 -1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ - +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * Packet matching code for ARP packets. *
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH 2/4 net: make sockptr_is_null strict aliasing safe
In reply to Christoph HellwigWhile the kernel in general is not strict aliasing safe we can trivially do that in sockptr_is_null without affecting code generation, so always check the actually assigned union member.
--- include/linux/sockptr.h | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/sockptr.h +3 -1
@@ -64,7 +64,9 @@ static inline int __must_check init_user_sockptr(sockptr_t *sp, void __user *p)static inline bool sockptr_is_null (sockptr_t sockptr) { -return !sockptr.user && !sockptr.kernel; +if (sockptr_is_kernel (sockptr)) +return !sockptr.kernel; +return !sockptr.user; }static inline int copy_from_sockptr (void *dst,sockptr_t src,size_t size)
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
RE: [PATCH 2/4] net: make sockptr_is_null strict aliasing safe
From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Quoted 5 lines
Sent: 28 July 2020 17:39
While the kernel in general is not strict aliasing safe we can trivially do that in
sockptr_is_nullwithout affecting code generation, so always check the actually assigned union member.
Even with 'strict aliasing' gcc (at least) guarantees that the members of a union alias each other.
It is about the only way so safely interpret a float as an int.
So when sockptr_t is a union testing either member is enough.
When it is a structure the changed form almost certainly adds code.
David
-
Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)
RE: [PATCH 2/4] net: make sockptr_is_null strict aliasing safe
Quoted 10 lines · David Laight
From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Quoted 5 lines
Sent: 28 July 2020 17:39
While the kernel in general is not strict aliasing safe we can trivially do that in
sockptr_is_nullwithout affecting code generation, so always check the actually assigned union member.Even with 'strict aliasing' gcc (at least) guarantees that the members of a union alias each other.
It is about the only way so safely interpret a float as an int.
The only?
float given; int i; memcpy(&i, &given, sizeof(i)); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(i) > sizeof(given));
PATCH 3/4 net: remove sockptr_advance
In reply to Christoph Hellwigsockptr_advance never properly worked. Replace it with _offset variants of copy_from_sockptr and copy_to_sockptr.
--- drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_main.c | 12 +++++----- include/linux/sockptr.h | 27 +++++++++++------------ net/dccp/proto.c | 5 ++--- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 8 +++---- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 8 +++---- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 5 +++-- net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c | 11 ++++----- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 8 +++---- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 7 +++--- net/tls/tls_main.c | 6 ++--- 10 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_main.c +6 -6
@@ -525,9 +525,9 @@ static int do_chtls_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname,/* Obtain version and type from previous copy */ crypto_info[0 ] = tmp_crypto_info;/* Now copy the following data */ -sockptr_advance (optval,sizeof (*crypto_info)); - rc =copy_from_sockptr ((char *)crypto_info +sizeof (*crypto_info), - optval, + rc =copy_from_sockptr_offset ((char *)crypto_info + +sizeof (*crypto_info), + optval,sizeof (*crypto_info),sizeof (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 ) -sizeof (*crypto_info));
@@ -542,9 +542,9 @@ static int do_chtls_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, }case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256 : { crypto_info[0 ] = tmp_crypto_info; -sockptr_advance (optval,sizeof (*crypto_info)); - rc =copy_from_sockptr ((char *)crypto_info +sizeof (*crypto_info), - optval, + rc =copy_from_sockptr_offset ((char *)crypto_info + +sizeof (*crypto_info), + optval,sizeof (*crypto_info),sizeof (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 ) -sizeof (*crypto_info));
include/linux/sockptr.h +13 -14
@@ -69,19 +69,26 @@ static inline bool sockptr_is_null(sockptr_t sockptr)return !sockptr.user; } -static inline int copy_from_sockptr (void *dst,sockptr_t src,size_t size) +static inline int copy_from_sockptr_offset (void *dst,sockptr_t src, +size_t offset,size_t size) {if (!sockptr_is_kernel (src)) -return copy_from_user (dst, src.user, size); -memcpy (dst, src.kernel, size); +return copy_from_user (dst, src.user + offset, size); +memcpy (dst, src.kernel + offset, size);return 0 ; } -static inline int copy_to_sockptr (sockptr_t dst,const void *src,size_t size) +static inline int copy_from_sockptr (void *dst,sockptr_t src,size_t size) +{ +return copy_from_sockptr_offset (dst, src,0 , size); +} + +static inline int copy_to_sockptr_offset (sockptr_t dst,size_t offset, +const void *src,size_t size) {if (!sockptr_is_kernel (dst)) -return copy_to_user (dst.user, src, size); -memcpy (dst.kernel, src, size); +return copy_to_user (dst.user + offset, src, size); +memcpy (dst.kernel + offset, src, size);return 0 ; }
@@ -112,14 +119,6 @@ static inline void *memdup_sockptr_nul(sockptr_t src, size_t len)return p; } -static inline void sockptr_advance (sockptr_t sockptr,size_t len) -{ -if (sockptr_is_kernel (sockptr)) - sockptr.kernel += len; -else - sockptr.user += len; -} -static inline long strncpy_from_sockptr (char *dst,sockptr_t src,size_t count) {if (sockptr_is_kernel (src)) {
net/dccp/proto.c +2 -3
@@ -426,9 +426,8 @@ static int dccp_setsockopt_service(struct sock *sk, const __be32 service,return -ENOMEM ; sl->dccpsl_nr = optlen /sizeof (u32) -1 ; -sockptr_advance (optval,sizeof (service)); -if (copy_from_sockptr (sl->dccpsl_list, optval, - optlen -sizeof (service)) || +if (copy_from_sockptr_offset (sl->dccpsl_list, optval, +sizeof (service), optlen -sizeof (service)) ||dccp_list_has_service (sl,DCCP_SERVICE_INVALID_VALUE )) {kfree (sl);return -EFAULT ;
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +4 -4
@@ -971,8 +971,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)return -ENOMEM ; loc_cpu_entry = newinfo->entries; -sockptr_advance (arg,sizeof (tmp)); -if (copy_from_sockptr (loc_cpu_entry, arg, tmp.size) !=0 ) { +if (copy_from_sockptr_offset (loc_cpu_entry, arg,sizeof (tmp), + tmp.size) !=0 ) { ret = -EFAULT ; goto free_newinfo; }
@@ -1267,8 +1267,8 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)return -ENOMEM ; loc_cpu_entry = newinfo->entries; -sockptr_advance (arg,sizeof (tmp)); -if (copy_from_sockptr (loc_cpu_entry, arg, tmp.size) !=0 ) { +if (copy_from_sockptr_offset (loc_cpu_entry, arg,sizeof (tmp), + tmp.size) !=0 ) { ret = -EFAULT ; goto free_newinfo; }
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +4 -4
@@ -1126,8 +1126,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)return -ENOMEM ; loc_cpu_entry = newinfo->entries; -sockptr_advance (arg,sizeof (tmp)); -if (copy_from_sockptr (loc_cpu_entry, arg, tmp.size) !=0 ) { +if (copy_from_sockptr_offset (loc_cpu_entry, arg,sizeof (tmp), + tmp.size) !=0 ) { ret = -EFAULT ; goto free_newinfo; }
@@ -1508,8 +1508,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)return -ENOMEM ; loc_cpu_entry = newinfo->entries; -sockptr_advance (arg,sizeof (tmp)); -if (copy_from_sockptr (loc_cpu_entry, arg, tmp.size) !=0 ) { +if (copy_from_sockptr_offset (loc_cpu_entry, arg,sizeof (tmp), + tmp.size) !=0 ) { ret = -EFAULT ; goto free_newinfo; }
net/ipv4/tcp.c +3 -2
@@ -2801,12 +2801,13 @@ static int tcp_repair_options_est(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optbuf, {struct tcp_sock *tp =tcp_sk (sk);struct tcp_repair_opt opt; +size_t offset =0 ;while (len >=sizeof (opt)) { -if (copy_from_sockptr (&opt, optbuf,sizeof (opt))) +if (copy_from_sockptr_offset (&opt, optbuf, offset,sizeof (opt)))return -EFAULT ; -sockptr_advance (optbuf,sizeof (opt)); + offset +=sizeof (opt); len -=sizeof (opt);switch (opt.opt_code) {
net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c +6 -5
@@ -401,8 +401,8 @@ fl_create(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct in6_flowlabel_req *freq,memset (fl->opt,0 ,sizeof (*fl->opt)); fl->opt->tot_len =sizeof (*fl->opt) + olen; err = -EFAULT ; -sockptr_advance (optval,CMSG_ALIGN (sizeof (*freq))); -if (copy_from_sockptr (fl->opt +1 , optval, olen)) +if (copy_from_sockptr_offset (fl->opt +1 , optval, +CMSG_ALIGN (sizeof (*freq)), olen)) goto done; msg.msg_controllen = olen;
@@ -703,9 +703,10 @@ static int ipv6_flowlabel_get(struct sock *sk, struct in6_flowlabel_req *freq, goto recheck;if (!freq->flr_label) { -sockptr_advance (optval, - offsetof(struct in6_flowlabel_req , flr_label)); -if (copy_to_sockptr (optval, &fl->label,sizeof (fl->label))) { +size_t offset = offsetof(struct in6_flowlabel_req , flr_label); + +if (copy_to_sockptr_offset (optval, offset, &fl->label, +sizeof (fl->label))) {/* Intentionally ignore fault. */ } }
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +4 -4
@@ -1143,8 +1143,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)return -ENOMEM ; loc_cpu_entry = newinfo->entries; -sockptr_advance (arg,sizeof (tmp)); -if (copy_from_sockptr (loc_cpu_entry, arg, tmp.size) !=0 ) { +if (copy_from_sockptr_offset (loc_cpu_entry, arg,sizeof (tmp), + tmp.size) !=0 ) { ret = -EFAULT ; goto free_newinfo; }
@@ -1517,8 +1517,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)return -ENOMEM ; loc_cpu_entry = newinfo->entries; -sockptr_advance (arg,sizeof (tmp)); -if (copy_from_sockptr (loc_cpu_entry, arg, tmp.size) !=0 ) { +if (copy_from_sockptr_offset (loc_cpu_entry, arg,sizeof (tmp), + tmp.size) !=0 ) { ret = -EFAULT ; goto free_newinfo; }
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +4 -3
@@ -1050,6 +1050,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_check_target);void *xt_copy_counters (sockptr_t arg,unsigned int len,struct xt_counters_info *info) { +size_t offset;void *mem;u64 size;
@@ -1067,7 +1068,7 @@ void *xt_copy_counters(sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len,memcpy (info->name, compat_tmp.name,sizeof (info->name) -1 ); info->num_counters = compat_tmp.num_counters; -sockptr_advance (arg,sizeof (compat_tmp)); + offset =sizeof (compat_tmp); } else#endif {
@@ -1078,7 +1079,7 @@ void *xt_copy_counters(sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len,if (copy_from_sockptr (info, arg,sizeof (*info)) !=0 )return ERR_PTR (-EFAULT ); -sockptr_advance (arg,sizeof (*info)); + offset =sizeof (*info); } info->name[sizeof (info->name) -1 ] ='\0' ;
@@ -1092,7 +1093,7 @@ void *xt_copy_counters(sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len,if (!mem)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); -if (copy_from_sockptr (mem, arg, len) ==0 ) +if (copy_from_sockptr_offset (mem, arg, offset, len) ==0 )return mem;vfree (mem);
net/tls/tls_main.c +3 -3
@@ -522,9 +522,9 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, goto err_crypto_info; } -sockptr_advance (optval,sizeof (*crypto_info)); - rc =copy_from_sockptr (crypto_info +1 , optval, - optlen -sizeof (*crypto_info)); + rc =copy_from_sockptr_offset (crypto_info +1 , optval, +sizeof (*crypto_info), + optlen -sizeof (*crypto_info));if (rc) { rc = -EFAULT ; goto err_crypto_info;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH 4/4 net: improve the user pointer check in init_user_sockptr
In reply to Christoph HellwigMake sure not just the pointer itself but the whole range lies in the user address space. For that pass the length and then use the access_ok helper to do the check.
--- include/linux/sockptr.h | 18 ++++++------------ net/ipv4/bpfilter/sockopt.c | 2 +- net/socket.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
include/linux/sockptr.h +6 -12
@@ -27,14 +27,6 @@ static inline sockptr_t KERNEL_SOCKPTR(void *p) { return (sockptr_t) { .kernel = p }; } - -static inline int __must_check init_user_sockptr(sockptr_t *sp, void __user *p) -{ - if ((unsigned long)p >= TASK_SIZE) - return -EFAULT; - sp->user = p; - return 0; -} #else /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE */ typedef struct { union {
@@ -53,14 +45,16 @@ static inline sockptr_t KERNEL_SOCKPTR(void *p) {return (sockptr_t ) { .kernel = p, .is_kernel = true }; } +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE */ -static inline int __must_check init_user_sockptr (sockptr_t *sp,void __user *p) +static inline int __must_check init_user_sockptr (sockptr_t *sp,void __user *p, +size_t size) { - sp->user = p; - sp->is_kernel = false; +if (!access_ok (p, size)) +return -EFAULT ; + *sp = (sockptr_t ) { .user = p };return 0 ; } -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE */ static inline bool sockptr_is_null (sockptr_t sockptr) {
net/ipv4/bpfilter/sockopt.c +1 -1
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ int bpfilter_ip_get_sockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname,if (get_user (len, optlen))return -EFAULT ; - err =init_user_sockptr (&optval, user_optval); + err =init_user_sockptr (&optval, user_optval, len);if (err)return err;return bpfilter_mbox_request (sk, optname, optval, len, false);
net/socket.c +1 -1
@@ -2105,7 +2105,7 @@ int __sys_setsockopt(int fd, int level, int optname, char __user *user_optval,if (optlen <0 )return -EINVAL ; - err =init_user_sockptr (&optval, user_optval); + err =init_user_sockptr (&optval, user_optval, optlen);if (err)return err;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
RE: [PATCH 4/4] net: improve the user pointer check in init_user_sockptr
From: Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 5 lines
Sent: 28 July 2020 17:39
Make sure not just the pointer itself but the whole range lies in the user address space. For that pass the length and then use the
access_okhelper to do the check.
Now that the address is never changed it is enough to check the base address (although this would be slightly safer if sockaddr_t were 'const').
This is especially true given some code paths ignore the length (so the length must be checked later - which it will be).
Isn't TASK_SIZE the wrong 'constant'.
Looks pretty 'heavy' on x86-64.
You just need something between valid user and valid kernel addresses. So (1ull << 63) is fine on x86-64 (and probably all 64bit with non-overlapping user/kernel addresses).
For i386 you need (3ul << 30) - probably also common.
David
Quoted 77 lines
Fixes 6d04fe15f78a ("net: optimize the sockptr_t for unified kernel/user address spaces")Reported-by David Laight <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>--- include/linux/sockptr.h | 18 ++++++------------ net/ipv4/bpfilter/sockopt.c | 2 +- net/socket.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)include/linux/sockptr.h +6
-12@@ -27,14 +27,6 @@ static inline sockptr_t KERNEL_SOCKPTR(void *p) { return (sockptr_t) { .kernel = p }; } - -static inline int __must_check init_user_sockptr(sockptr_t *sp, void __user *p) -{ - if ((unsigned long)p >= TASK_SIZE) - return -EFAULT; - sp->user = p; - return 0; -} #else /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE */ typedef struct { union {@@ -53,14 +45,16 @@ static inline sockptr_t KERNEL_SOCKPTR(void *p) {return (sockptr_t ) { .kernel = p, .is_kernel = true }; } +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE */ -static inline int __must_check init_user_sockptr (sockptr_t *sp,void __user *p) +static inline int __must_check init_user_sockptr (sockptr_t *sp,void __user *p, +size_t size) { - sp->user = p; - sp->is_kernel = false; +if (!access_ok (p, size)) +return -EFAULT ; + *sp = (sockptr_t ) { .user = p };return 0 ; } -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE */ static inline bool sockptr_is_null (sockptr_t sockptr) {net/ipv4/bpfilter/sockopt.c +1
-1@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ int bpfilter_ip_get_sockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname,if (get_user (len, optlen))return -EFAULT ; - err =init_user_sockptr (&optval, user_optval); + err =init_user_sockptr (&optval, user_optval, len);if (err)return err;return bpfilter_mbox_request (sk, optname, optval, len, false);net/socket.c +1
-2@@ -2105,7 +2105,7 @@ int __sys_setsockopt(int fd, int level, int optname, char __user *user_optval,if (optlen <0 )return -EINVAL ; - err =init_user_sockptr (&optval, user_optval); + err =init_user_sockptr (&optval, user_optval, optlen);if (err)return err; --
Quoted 1 line
2.27.0
-
Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)