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pull request (net): ipsec 2020-07-31

PATCH New Steffen Klassert 2 participants 12 messages Jul 31, 2020 – Aug 1, 2020

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Steffen Klassert

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

1) Fix policy matching with mark and mask on userspace interfaces. From Xin Long.

2) Several fixes for the new ESP in TCP encapsulation. From Sabrina Dubroca.

3) Fix crash when the hold queue is used. The assumption that xdst->path and dst->child are not a NULL pointer only if dst->xfrm is not a NULL pointer is true with the exception of using the hold queue. Fix this by checking for hold queue usage before dereferencing xdst->path or dst->child.

4) Validate pfkey_dump parameter before sending them. From Mark Salyzyn.

5) Fix the location of the transport header with ESP in UDPv6 encapsulation. From Sabrina Dubroca.

Please pull or let me know if there are problems.

Thanks!

The following changes since commit 0275875530f692c725c6f993aced2eca2d6ac50c:

Merge branch 'Two-phylink-pause-fixes' (2020-06-23 20:53:28 -0700)

are available in the Git repository at:

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec.git master

for you to fetch changes up to 71b59bf482b2dd662774f34108c5b904efa9e02b:

espintcp: count packets dropped in espintcp_rcv (2020-07-30 06:51:36 +0200)

----------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Salyzyn (1):
af_key: pfkey_dump needs parameter validation

Sabrina Dubroca (7):
xfrm: esp6: fix encapsulation header offset computation
espintcp: support non-blocking sends
espintcp: recv() should return 0 when the peer socket is closed
xfrm: policy: fix IPv6-only espintcp compilation
xfrm: esp6: fix the location of the transport header with encapsulation
espintcp: handle short messages instead of breaking the encap socket
espintcp: count packets dropped in espintcp_rcv

Steffen Klassert (2):
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/testing'
xfrm: Fix crash when the hold queue is used.

Xin Long (1):
xfrm: policy: match with both mark and mask on user interfaces

 include/net/xfrm.h     | 15 +++++++-----
 net/ipv6/esp6.c        | 13 ++++++++---
 net/key/af_key.c       | 11 +++++++--
 net/xfrm/espintcp.c    | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 43 +++++++++++++++-------------------
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c   | 18 +++++++++------
 6 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/10 xfrm: policy: match with both mark and mask on user interfaces

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

In commit ed17b8d377ea ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list"), it would take 'priority' to make a policy unique, and allow duplicated policies with different 'priority' to be added, which is not expected by userland, as Tobias reported in strongswan.

To fix this duplicated policies issue, and also fix the issue in commit ed17b8d377ea ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list"), when doing add/del/get/update on user interfaces, this patch is to change to look up a policy with both mark and mask by doing:

  mark.v == pol->mark.v && mark.m == pol->mark.m

and leave the check:

(mark & pol->mark.m) == pol->mark.v

for tx/rx path only.

As the userland expects an exact mark and mask match to manage policies.

v1->v2:
- make xfrm_policy_mark_match inline and fix the changelog as Tobias suggested.

Fixes 295fae568885 ("xfrm: Allow user space manipulation of SPD mark")
Fixes ed17b8d377ea ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list")
---
 include/net/xfrm.h     | 11 +++++++----
 net/key/af_key.c       |  4 ++--
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c   | 18 +++++++++++-------
 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
include/net/xfrm.h +7 -4
index c7d213c9f9d8..5c20953c8deb 100644
@@ -1630,13 +1630,16 @@ int xfrm_policy_walk(struct net *net, struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk,
 		     void *);
 void xfrm_policy_walk_done(struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk, struct net *net);
 int xfrm_policy_insert(int dir, struct xfrm_policy *policy, int excl);
-struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 if_id,
-					  u8 type, int dir,
+struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct net *net,
+					  const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
+					  u32 if_id, u8 type, int dir,
 					  struct xfrm_selector *sel,
 					  struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, int delete,
 					  int *err);
-struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_byid(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 if_id, u8,
-				     int dir, u32 id, int delete, int *err);
+struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_byid(struct net *net,
+				     const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u32 if_id,
+				     u8 type, int dir, u32 id, int delete,
+				     int *err);
 int xfrm_policy_flush(struct net *net, u8 type, bool task_valid);
 void xfrm_policy_hash_rebuild(struct net *net);
 u32 xfrm_get_acqseq(void);
net/key/af_key.c +2 -2
index b67ed3a8486c..979c579afc63 100644
@@ -2400,7 +2400,7 @@ static int pfkey_spddelete(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sa
 			return err;
 	}
 
-	xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, DUMMY_MARK, 0, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN,
+	xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, &dummy_mark, 0, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN,
 				   pol->sadb_x_policy_dir - 1, &sel, pol_ctx,
 				   1, &err);
 	security_xfrm_policy_free(pol_ctx);
@@ -2651,7 +2651,7 @@ static int pfkey_spdget(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	delete = (hdr->sadb_msg_type == SADB_X_SPDDELETE2);
-	xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, DUMMY_MARK, 0, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN,
+	xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, &dummy_mark, 0, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN,
 			      dir, pol->sadb_x_policy_id, delete, &err);
 	if (xp == NULL)
 		return -ENOENT;
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +16 -23
index 564aa6492e7c..6847b3579f54 100644
@@ -1433,14 +1433,10 @@ static void xfrm_policy_requeue(struct xfrm_policy *old,
 	spin_unlock_bh(&pq->hold_queue.lock);
 }
 
-static bool xfrm_policy_mark_match(struct xfrm_policy *policy,
-				   struct xfrm_policy *pol)
+static inline bool xfrm_policy_mark_match(const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
+					  struct xfrm_policy *pol)
 {
-	if (policy->mark.v == pol->mark.v &&
-	    policy->priority == pol->priority)
-		return true;
-
-	return false;
+	return mark->v == pol->mark.v && mark->m == pol->mark.m;
 }
 
 static u32 xfrm_pol_bin_key(const void *data, u32 len, u32 seed)
@@ -1503,7 +1499,7 @@ static void xfrm_policy_insert_inexact_list(struct hlist_head *chain,
 		if (pol->type == policy->type &&
 		    pol->if_id == policy->if_id &&
 		    !selector_cmp(&pol->selector, &policy->selector) &&
-		    xfrm_policy_mark_match(policy, pol) &&
+		    xfrm_policy_mark_match(&policy->mark, pol) &&
 		    xfrm_sec_ctx_match(pol->security, policy->security) &&
 		    !WARN_ON(delpol)) {
 			delpol = pol;
@@ -1538,7 +1534,7 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_insert_list(struct hlist_head *chain,
 		if (pol->type == policy->type &&
 		    pol->if_id == policy->if_id &&
 		    !selector_cmp(&pol->selector, &policy->selector) &&
-		    xfrm_policy_mark_match(policy, pol) &&
+		    xfrm_policy_mark_match(&policy->mark, pol) &&
 		    xfrm_sec_ctx_match(pol->security, policy->security) &&
 		    !WARN_ON(delpol)) {
 			if (excl)
@@ -1610,9 +1606,8 @@ int xfrm_policy_insert(int dir, struct xfrm_policy *policy, int excl)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_insert);
 
 static struct xfrm_policy *
-__xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct hlist_head *chain, u32 mark, u32 if_id,
-			u8 type, int dir,
-			struct xfrm_selector *sel,
+__xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct hlist_head *chain, const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
+			u32 if_id, u8 type, int dir, struct xfrm_selector *sel,
 			struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	struct xfrm_policy *pol;
@@ -1623,7 +1618,7 @@ __xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct hlist_head *chain, u32 mark, u32 if_id,
 	hlist_for_each_entry(pol, chain, bydst) {
 		if (pol->type == type &&
 		    pol->if_id == if_id &&
-		    (mark & pol->mark.m) == pol->mark.v &&
+		    xfrm_policy_mark_match(mark, pol) &&
 		    !selector_cmp(sel, &pol->selector) &&
 		    xfrm_sec_ctx_match(ctx, pol->security))
 			return pol;
@@ -1632,11 +1627,10 @@ __xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct hlist_head *chain, u32 mark, u32 if_id,
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 if_id,
-					  u8 type, int dir,
-					  struct xfrm_selector *sel,
-					  struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, int delete,
-					  int *err)
+struct xfrm_policy *
+xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u32 if_id,
+		      u8 type, int dir, struct xfrm_selector *sel,
+		      struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, int delete, int *err)
 {
 	struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *bin = NULL;
 	struct xfrm_policy *pol, *ret = NULL;
@@ -1703,9 +1697,9 @@ struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 if_id,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx);
 
-struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_byid(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 if_id,
-				     u8 type, int dir, u32 id, int delete,
-				     int *err)
+struct xfrm_policy *
+xfrm_policy_byid(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u32 if_id,
+		 u8 type, int dir, u32 id, int delete, int *err)
 {
 	struct xfrm_policy *pol, *ret;
 	struct hlist_head *chain;
@@ -1720,8 +1714,7 @@ struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_byid(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 if_id,
 	ret = NULL;
 	hlist_for_each_entry(pol, chain, byidx) {
 		if (pol->type == type && pol->index == id &&
-		    pol->if_id == if_id &&
-		    (mark & pol->mark.m) == pol->mark.v) {
+		    pol->if_id == if_id && xfrm_policy_mark_match(mark, pol)) {
 			xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
 			if (delete) {
 				*err = security_xfrm_policy_delete(
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +11 -7
index e6cfaa680ef3..fbb7d9d06478 100644
@@ -1863,7 +1863,6 @@ static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 	struct km_event c;
 	int delete;
 	struct xfrm_mark m;
-	u32 mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
 	u32 if_id = 0;
 
 	p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
@@ -1880,8 +1879,11 @@ static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 	if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID])
 		if_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]);
 
+	xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
+
 	if (p->index)
-		xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, mark, if_id, type, p->dir, p->index, delete, &err);
+		xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, &m, if_id, type, p->dir,
+				      p->index, delete, &err);
 	else {
 		struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX];
 		struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
@@ -1898,8 +1900,8 @@ static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 			if (err)
 				return err;
 		}
-		xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, mark, if_id, type, p->dir, &p->sel,
-					   ctx, delete, &err);
+		xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, &m, if_id, type, p->dir,
+					   &p->sel, ctx, delete, &err);
 		security_xfrm_policy_free(ctx);
 	}
 	if (xp == NULL)
@@ -2166,7 +2168,6 @@ static int xfrm_add_pol_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 	u8 type = XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN;
 	int err = -ENOENT;
 	struct xfrm_mark m;
-	u32 mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
 	u32 if_id = 0;
 
 	err = copy_from_user_policy_type(&type, attrs);
@@ -2180,8 +2181,11 @@ static int xfrm_add_pol_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 	if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID])
 		if_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]);
 
+	xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
+
 	if (p->index)
-		xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, mark, if_id, type, p->dir, p->index, 0, &err);
+		xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, &m, if_id, type, p->dir, p->index,
+				      0, &err);
 	else {
 		struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX];
 		struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
@@ -2198,7 +2202,7 @@ static int xfrm_add_pol_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 			if (err)
 				return err;
 		}
-		xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, mark, if_id, type, p->dir,
+		xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, &m, if_id, type, p->dir,
 					   &p->sel, ctx, 0, &err);
 		security_xfrm_policy_free(ctx);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/10 xfrm: esp6: fix encapsulation header offset computation

In reply to Steffen Klassert

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>

In commit 0146dca70b87, I incorrectly adapted the code that computes the location of the UDP or TCP encapsulation header from IPv4 to IPv6. In esp6_input_done2, skb->transport_header points to the ESP header, so by adding skb_network_header_len, uh and th will point to the ESP header, not the encapsulation header that's in front of it.

Since the TCP header's size can change with options, we have to start from the IPv6 header and walk past possible extensions.

Fixes 0146dca70b87 ("xfrm: add support for UDPv6 encapsulation of ESP")
Fixes 26333c37fc28 ("xfrm: add IPv6 support for espintcp")
---
 net/ipv6/esp6.c | 12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/esp6.c +9 -3
index c43592771126..55ae70be91b3 100644
@@ -805,10 +805,16 @@ int esp6_input_done2(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
 
 	if (x->encap) {
 		const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+		int offset = skb_network_offset(skb) + sizeof(*ip6h);
 		struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
-		struct udphdr *uh = (void *)(skb_network_header(skb) + hdr_len);
-		struct tcphdr *th = (void *)(skb_network_header(skb) + hdr_len);
-		__be16 source;
+		u8 nexthdr = ip6h->nexthdr;
+		__be16 frag_off, source;
+		struct udphdr *uh;
+		struct tcphdr *th;
+
+		offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
+		uh = (void *)(skb->data + offset);
+		th = (void *)(skb->data + offset);
 
 		switch (x->encap->encap_type) {
 		case TCP_ENCAP_ESPINTCP:
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/10 espintcp: support non-blocking sends

In reply to Steffen Klassert

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>

Currently, non-blocking sends from userspace result in EOPNOTSUPP.

To support this, we need to tell espintcp_sendskb_locked() and espintcp_sendskmsg_locked() that non-blocking operation was requested from espintcp_sendmsg().

Fixes e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
---
 net/xfrm/espintcp.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/espintcp.c +13 -13
index 100e29682b48..5d3d2b98c62d 100644
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static int espintcp_sendskmsg_locked(struct sock *sk,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int espintcp_push_msgs(struct sock *sk)
+static int espintcp_push_msgs(struct sock *sk, int flags)
 {
 	struct espintcp_ctx *ctx = espintcp_getctx(sk);
 	struct espintcp_msg *emsg = &ctx->partial;
@@ -227,12 +227,12 @@ static int espintcp_push_msgs(struct sock *sk)
 	ctx->tx_running = 1;
 
 	if (emsg->skb)
-		err = espintcp_sendskb_locked(sk, emsg, 0);
+		err = espintcp_sendskb_locked(sk, emsg, flags);
 	else
-		err = espintcp_sendskmsg_locked(sk, emsg, 0);
+		err = espintcp_sendskmsg_locked(sk, emsg, flags);
 	if (err == -EAGAIN) {
 		ctx->tx_running = 0;
-		return 0;
+		return flags & MSG_DONTWAIT ? -EAGAIN : 0;
 	}
 	if (!err)
 		memset(emsg, 0, sizeof(*emsg));
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ int espintcp_push_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	offset = skb_transport_offset(skb);
 	len = skb->len - offset;
 
-	espintcp_push_msgs(sk);
+	espintcp_push_msgs(sk, 0);
 
 	if (emsg->len) {
 		kfree_skb(skb);
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ int espintcp_push_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	emsg->len = len;
 	emsg->skb = skb;
 
-	espintcp_push_msgs(sk);
+	espintcp_push_msgs(sk, 0);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int espintcp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
 	char buf[2] = {0};
 	int err, end;
 
-	if (msg->msg_flags)
+	if (msg->msg_flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	if (size > MAX_ESPINTCP_MSG)
@@ -298,9 +298,10 @@ static int espintcp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
 
-	err = espintcp_push_msgs(sk);
+	err = espintcp_push_msgs(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
 	if (err < 0) {
-		err = -ENOBUFS;
+		if (err != -EAGAIN || !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT))
+			err = -ENOBUFS;
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
@@ -337,10 +338,9 @@ static int espintcp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
 
 	tcp_rate_check_app_limited(sk);
 
-	err = espintcp_push_msgs(sk);
+	err = espintcp_push_msgs(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
 	/* this message could be partially sent, keep it */
-	if (err < 0)
-		goto unlock;
+
 	release_sock(sk);
 
 	return size;
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ static void espintcp_tx_work(struct work_struct *work)
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
 	if (!ctx->tx_running)
-		espintcp_push_msgs(sk);
+		espintcp_push_msgs(sk, 0);
 	release_sock(sk);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/10 espintcp: recv() should return 0 when the peer socket is closed

In reply to Steffen Klassert

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>

man 2 recv says:

RETURN VALUE

When a stream socket peer has performed an orderly shutdown, the return value will be 0 (the traditional "end-of-file" return).

Currently, this works for blocking reads, but non-blocking reads will return -EAGAIN. This patch overwrites that return value when the peer won't send us any more data.

Fixes e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
---
 net/xfrm/espintcp.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/xfrm/espintcp.c +4 -1
index 5d3d2b98c62d..cb83e3664680 100644
@@ -109,8 +109,11 @@ static int espintcp_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
 	flags |= nonblock ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0;
 
 	skb = __skb_recv_datagram(sk, &ctx->ike_queue, flags, &off, &err);
-	if (!skb)
+	if (!skb) {
+		if (err == -EAGAIN && sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
+			return 0;
 		return err;
+	}
 
 	copied = len;
 	if (copied > skb->len)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/10 xfrm: policy: fix IPv6-only espintcp compilation

In reply to Steffen Klassert

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>

In case we're compiling espintcp support only for IPv6, we should still initialize the common code.

Fixes 26333c37fc28 ("xfrm: add IPv6 support for espintcp")
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +2 -2
index 6847b3579f54..19c5e0fa3f44 100644
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_STATISTICS
 #include <net/snmp.h>
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_INET_ESPINTCP
+#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_ESPINTCP
 #include <net/espintcp.h>
 #endif
 
@@ -4149,7 +4149,7 @@ void __init xfrm_init(void)
 	seqcount_init(&xfrm_policy_hash_generation);
 	xfrm_input_init();
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_INET_ESPINTCP
+#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_ESPINTCP
 	espintcp_init();
 #endif
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/10 xfrm: Fix crash when the hold queue is used.

In reply to Steffen Klassert

The commits "xfrm: Move dst->path into struct xfrm_dst" and "net: Create and use new helper xfrm_dst_child()." changed xfrm bundle handling under the assumption that xdst->path and dst->child are not a NULL pointer only if dst->xfrm is not a NULL pointer. That is true with one exception. If the xfrm hold queue is used to wait until a SA is installed by the key manager, we create a dummy bundle without a valid dst->xfrm pointer. The current xfrm bundle handling crashes in that case. Fix this by extending the NULL check of dst->xfrm with a test of the DST_XFRM_QUEUE flag.

Fixes 0f6c480f23f4 ("xfrm: Move dst->path into struct xfrm_dst")
Fixes b92cf4aab8e6 ("net: Create and use new helper xfrm_dst_child().")
---
 include/net/xfrm.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/net/xfrm.h +2 -2
index 5c20953c8deb..51f65d23ebaf 100644
@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ struct xfrm_dst {
 static inline struct dst_entry *xfrm_dst_path(const struct dst_entry *dst)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
-	if (dst->xfrm) {
+	if (dst->xfrm || (dst->flags & DST_XFRM_QUEUE)) {
 		const struct xfrm_dst *xdst = (const struct xfrm_dst *) dst;
 
 		return xdst->path;
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ static inline struct dst_entry *xfrm_dst_path(const struct dst_entry *dst)
 static inline struct dst_entry *xfrm_dst_child(const struct dst_entry *dst)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
-	if (dst->xfrm) {
+	if (dst->xfrm || (dst->flags & DST_XFRM_QUEUE)) {
 		struct xfrm_dst *xdst = (struct xfrm_dst *) dst;
 		return xdst->child;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/10 af_key: pfkey_dump needs parameter validation

In reply to Steffen Klassert

From: Mark Salyzyn <[email protected]>

In pfkey_dump() dplen and splen can both be specified to access the xfrm_address_t structure out of bounds in__xfrm_state_filter_match() when it calls addr_match() with the indexes. Return EINVAL if either are out of range.

Cc Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Cc Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
---
 net/key/af_key.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
net/key/af_key.c +7 -0
index 979c579afc63..a915bc86620a 100644
@@ -1849,6 +1849,13 @@ static int pfkey_dump(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_ms
 	if (ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_FILTER - 1]) {
 		struct sadb_x_filter *xfilter = ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_FILTER - 1];
 
+		if ((xfilter->sadb_x_filter_splen >=
+			(sizeof(xfrm_address_t) << 3)) ||
+		    (xfilter->sadb_x_filter_dplen >=
+			(sizeof(xfrm_address_t) << 3))) {
+			mutex_unlock(&pfk->dump_lock);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 		filter = kmalloc(sizeof(*filter), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (filter == NULL) {
 			mutex_unlock(&pfk->dump_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/10 xfrm: esp6: fix the location of the transport header with encapsulation

In reply to Steffen Klassert

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>

commit 17175d1a27c6 ("xfrm: esp6: fix encapsulation header offset computation") changed esp6_input_done2 to correctly find the size of the IPv6 header that precedes the TCP/UDP encapsulation header, but didn't adjust the final call to skb_set_transport_header, which I assumed was correct in using skb_network_header_len.

Xiumei Mu reported that when we create xfrm states that include port numbers in the selector, traffic from the user sockets is dropped. It turns out that we get a state mismatch in __xfrm_policy_check, because we end up trying to compare the encapsulation header's ports with the selector that's based on user traffic ports.

Fixes 0146dca70b87 ("xfrm: add support for UDPv6 encapsulation of ESP")
Fixes 26333c37fc28 ("xfrm: add IPv6 support for espintcp")
---
 net/ipv6/esp6.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/ipv6/esp6.c +1 -0
index 55ae70be91b3..52c2f063529f 100644
@@ -815,6 +815,7 @@ int esp6_input_done2(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
 		offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
 		uh = (void *)(skb->data + offset);
 		th = (void *)(skb->data + offset);
+		hdr_len += offset;
 
 		switch (x->encap->encap_type) {
 		case TCP_ENCAP_ESPINTCP:
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/10 espintcp: handle short messages instead of breaking the encap socket

In reply to Steffen Klassert

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>

Currently, short messages (less than 4 bytes after the length header) will break the stream of messages. This is unnecessary, since we can still parse messages even if they're too short to contain any usable data. This is also bogus, as keepalive messages (a single 0xff byte), though not needed with TCP encapsulation, should be allowed.

This patch changes the stream parser so that short messages are accepted and dropped in the kernel. Messages that contain a valid SPI or non-ESP header are processed as before.

Fixes e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
---
 net/xfrm/espintcp.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/xfrm/espintcp.c +24 -1
index cb83e3664680..0a91b07f2b43 100644
@@ -49,9 +49,32 @@ static void espintcp_rcv(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct espintcp_ctx *ctx = container_of(strp, struct espintcp_ctx,
 						strp);
 	struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
+	int len = rxm->full_len - 2;
 	u32 nonesp_marker;
 	int err;
 
+	/* keepalive packet? */
+	if (unlikely(len == 1)) {
+		u8 data;
+
+		err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + 2, &data, 1);
+		if (err < 0) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
+			return;
+		}
+
+		if (data == 0xff) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* drop other short messages */
+	if (unlikely(len <= sizeof(nonesp_marker))) {
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + 2, &nonesp_marker,
 			    sizeof(nonesp_marker));
 	if (err < 0) {
@@ -91,7 +114,7 @@ static int espintcp_parse(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return err;
 
 	len = be16_to_cpu(blen);
-	if (len < 6)
+	if (len < 2)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return len;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/10 espintcp: count packets dropped in espintcp_rcv

In reply to Steffen Klassert

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>

Currently, espintcp_rcv drops packets silently, which makes debugging issues difficult. Count packets as either XfrmInHdrError (when the packet was too short or contained invalid data) or XfrmInError (for other issues).

---
 net/xfrm/espintcp.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/espintcp.c +6 -0
index 0a91b07f2b43..827ccdf2db57 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ static void handle_nonesp(struct espintcp_ctx *ctx, struct sk_buff *skb,
 {
 	if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) >= sk->sk_rcvbuf ||
 	    !sk_rmem_schedule(sk, skb, skb->truesize)) {
+		XFRM_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_XFRMINERROR);
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 		return;
 	}
@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ static void espintcp_rcv(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 		err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + 2, &data, 1);
 		if (err < 0) {
+			XFRM_INC_STATS(sock_net(strp->sk), LINUX_MIB_XFRMINHDRERROR);
 			kfree_skb(skb);
 			return;
 		}
@@ -71,6 +73,7 @@ static void espintcp_rcv(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	/* drop other short messages */
 	if (unlikely(len <= sizeof(nonesp_marker))) {
+		XFRM_INC_STATS(sock_net(strp->sk), LINUX_MIB_XFRMINHDRERROR);
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 		return;
 	}
@@ -78,17 +81,20 @@ static void espintcp_rcv(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + 2, &nonesp_marker,
 			    sizeof(nonesp_marker));
 	if (err < 0) {
+		XFRM_INC_STATS(sock_net(strp->sk), LINUX_MIB_XFRMINHDRERROR);
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 		return;
 	}
 
 	/* remove header, leave non-ESP marker/SPI */
 	if (!__pskb_pull(skb, rxm->offset + 2)) {
+		XFRM_INC_STATS(sock_net(strp->sk), LINUX_MIB_XFRMINERROR);
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 		return;
 	}
 
 	if (pskb_trim(skb, rxm->full_len - 2) != 0) {
+		XFRM_INC_STATS(sock_net(strp->sk), LINUX_MIB_XFRMINERROR);
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 		return;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
maintainer
#11 lore raw
In reply to Steffen Klassert

From: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 09:17:54 +0200

Quoted 12 lines

1) Fix policy matching with mark and mask on userspace interfaces. From Xin Long.

2) Several fixes for the new ESP in TCP encapsulation. From Sabrina Dubroca.

3) Fix crash when the hold queue is used. The assumption that xdst->path and dst->child are not a NULL pointer only if dst->xfrm is not a NULL pointer is true with the exception of using the hold queue. Fix this by checking for hold queue usage before dereferencing xdst->path or dst->child.

Quoted 7 lines

4) Validate pfkey_dump parameter before sending them. From Mark Salyzyn.

5) Fix the location of the transport header with ESP in UDPv6 encapsulation. From Sabrina Dubroca.

Please pull or let me know if there are problems.

Pulled, thanks a lot Steffen.