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evmctl option improvements

PATCH In review Mimi Zohar 2 participants 7 messages Jul 31, 2020 – Aug 1, 2020 Keys-trusted

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Mimi Zohar

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover evmctl option improvements

Support for the original IMA LTP "--verify" and "--validate" options was just added in version 1.3.0.

- Verifying the template data digest against the value stored in the IMA measurement list should not be optional. Drop "--verify".
- Walking the IMA measurement list to validate the PCRs should not by default "fix" the file integrity violations. Rename the "--validate" option to "--ignore-violations", clafifying its purpose.

Mimi Zohar (3):
Drop the ima_measurement "--verify" option
Rename "--validate" to "--ignore-violations"
Update the ima_boot_aggregate apsects of the "README" and "help" files

 README       |  6 +++---
 src/evmctl.c | 36 +++++++++++++++---------------------
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.18.4
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 Drop the ima_measurement "--verify" option

While walking the IMA measurement list re-calculating the PCRS, ima_measurement should always re-calculate the template data digest and verify it against the measurement list value.

This patch removes the "--verify" option.

On success, return 0.

---
 README       |  3 +--
 src/evmctl.c | 23 ++++++++---------------
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
README +1 -2
index 73b38a1f35ba..d8b8f404534b 100644
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ COMMANDS
  ima_sign [--sigfile] [--key key] [--pass password] file
  ima_verify file
  ima_hash file
- ima_measurement [--validate] [--verify] [--verify-sig [--key "key1, key2, ..."]]  [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file
+ ima_measurement [--validate] [--verify-sig [--key "key1, key2, ..."]]  [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file
  ima_fix [-t fdsxm] path
  sign_hash [--key key] [--pass password]
  hmac [--imahash | --imasig ] file
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ OPTIONS
       --engine e     preload OpenSSL engine e (such as: gost)
       --pcrs         file containing TPM pcrs, one per hash-algorithm/bank
       --validate     ignore ToMToU measurement violations
-      --verify       verify the template data digest
       --verify-sig   verify the file signature based on the file hash, both
                      stored in the template data.
   -v                 increase verbosity level
src/evmctl.c +8 -15
index 448e4a9c8d78..b4d2333fb880 100644
@@ -1393,7 +1393,6 @@ struct template_entry {
 static uint8_t zero[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 
 static int validate = 0;
-static int verify = 0;
 
 static int ima_verify_template_hash(struct template_entry *entry)
 {
@@ -1945,7 +1944,7 @@ static int ima_measurement(const char *file)
 
 	struct template_entry entry = { .template = 0 };
 	FILE *fp;
-	int verified_template_digest = 0;
+	int invalid_template_digest = 0;
 	int err_padded = -1;
 	int err = -1;
 
@@ -2075,11 +2074,9 @@ static int ima_measurement(const char *file)
 				 pseudo_padded_banks);
 
 		/* Recalculate and verify template data digest */
-		if (verify) {
-			err = ima_verify_template_hash(&entry);
-			if (err)
-				verified_template_digest = 1;
-		}
+		err = ima_verify_template_hash(&entry);
+		if (err)
+			invalid_template_digest = 1;
 
 		if (is_ima_template)
 			ima_show(&entry);
@@ -2116,7 +2113,7 @@ static int ima_measurement(const char *file)
 			log_info("Failed to match per TPM bank or SHA1 padded TPM digest(s).\n");
 	}
 
-	if (verified_template_digest) {
+	if (invalid_template_digest) {
 		log_info("Failed to verify template data digest.\n");
 		err = 1;
 	}
@@ -2486,7 +2483,7 @@ struct command cmds[] = {
 	{"ima_verify", cmd_verify_ima, 0, "file", "Verify IMA signature (for debugging).\n"},
 	{"ima_setxattr", cmd_setxattr_ima, 0, "[--sigfile file]", "Set IMA signature from sigfile\n"},
 	{"ima_hash", cmd_hash_ima, 0, "file", "Make file content hash.\n"},
-	{"ima_measurement", cmd_ima_measurement, 0, "[--validate] [--verify] [--verify-sig [--key key1, key2, ...]] [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file", "Verify measurement list (experimental).\n"},
+	{"ima_measurement", cmd_ima_measurement, 0, "[--validate] [--verify-sig [--key key1, key2, ...]] [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file", "Verify measurement list (experimental).\n"},
 	{"ima_boot_aggregate", cmd_ima_bootaggr, 0, "[file]", "Calculate per TPM bank boot_aggregate digests\n"},
 	{"ima_fix", cmd_ima_fix, 0, "[-t fdsxm] path", "Recursively fix IMA/EVM xattrs in fix mode.\n"},
 	{"ima_clear", cmd_ima_clear, 0, "[-t fdsxm] path", "Recursively remove IMA/EVM xattrs.\n"},
@@ -2526,8 +2523,7 @@ static struct option opts[] = {
 	{"engine", 1, 0, 139},
 	{"xattr-user", 0, 0, 140},
 	{"validate", 0, 0, 141},
-	{"verify", 0, 0, 142},
-	{"pcrs", 1, 0, 143},
+	{"pcrs", 1, 0, 142},
 	{}
 
 };
@@ -2709,10 +2705,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		case 141: /* --validate */
 			validate = 1;
 			break;
-		case 142: /* --verify */
-			verify = 1;
-			break;
-		case 143:
+		case 142:
 			if (npcrfile >= MAX_PCRFILE) {
 				log_err("too many --pcrfile options\n");
 				exit(1);
Signature · 1 line
2.18.4
Reviewed-by on v1 1/3
#2 lore raw

Re: [ima-evm-utils: PATCH 1/3] Drop the ima_measurement "--verify" option

Quoted 6 lines · Mimi Zohar

While walking the IMA measurement list re-calculating the PCRS, ima_measurement should always re-calculate the template data digest and verify it against the measurement list value.

This patch removes the "--verify" option.

Quoted 9 lines

On success, return 0.

---
  README       |  3 +--
  src/evmctl.c | 23 ++++++++---------------
  2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
Quoted 98 lines
README +1 -2
index 73b38a1f35ba..d8b8f404534b 100644
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ COMMANDS
   ima_sign [--sigfile] [--key key] [--pass password] file
   ima_verify file
   ima_hash file
- ima_measurement [--validate] [--verify] [--verify-sig [--key "key1, key2, ..."]]  [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file
+ ima_measurement [--validate] [--verify-sig [--key "key1, key2, ..."]]  [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file
   ima_fix [-t fdsxm] path
   sign_hash [--key key] [--pass password]
   hmac [--imahash | --imasig ] file
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ OPTIONS
        --engine e     preload OpenSSL engine e (such as: gost)
        --pcrs         file containing TPM pcrs, one per hash-algorithm/bank
        --validate     ignore ToMToU measurement violations
-      --verify       verify the template data digest
        --verify-sig   verify the file signature based on the file hash, both
                       stored in the template data.
    -v                 increase verbosity level
src/evmctl.c +8 -15
index 448e4a9c8d78..b4d2333fb880 100644
@@ -1393,7 +1393,6 @@ struct template_entry {
  static uint8_t zero[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 
  static int validate = 0;
-static int verify = 0;
 
  static int ima_verify_template_hash(struct template_entry *entry)
  {
@@ -1945,7 +1944,7 @@ static int ima_measurement(const char *file)
 
  	struct template_entry entry = { .template = 0 };
  	FILE *fp;
-	int verified_template_digest = 0;
+	int invalid_template_digest = 0;
  	int err_padded = -1;
  	int err = -1;
 
@@ -2075,11 +2074,9 @@ static int ima_measurement(const char *file)
  				 pseudo_padded_banks);
 
  		/* Recalculate and verify template data digest */
-		if (verify) {
-			err = ima_verify_template_hash(&entry);
-			if (err)
-				verified_template_digest = 1;
-		}
+		err = ima_verify_template_hash(&entry);
+		if (err)
+			invalid_template_digest = 1;
 
  		if (is_ima_template)
  			ima_show(&entry);
@@ -2116,7 +2113,7 @@ static int ima_measurement(const char *file)
  			log_info("Failed to match per TPM bank or SHA1 padded TPM digest(s).\n");
  	}
 
-	if (verified_template_digest) {
+	if (invalid_template_digest) {
  		log_info("Failed to verify template data digest.\n");
  		err = 1;
  	}
@@ -2486,7 +2483,7 @@ struct command cmds[] = {
  	{"ima_verify", cmd_verify_ima, 0, "file", "Verify IMA signature (for debugging).\n"},
  	{"ima_setxattr", cmd_setxattr_ima, 0, "[--sigfile file]", "Set IMA signature from sigfile\n"},
  	{"ima_hash", cmd_hash_ima, 0, "file", "Make file content hash.\n"},
-	{"ima_measurement", cmd_ima_measurement, 0, "[--validate] [--verify] [--verify-sig [--key key1, key2, ...]] [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file", "Verify measurement list (experimental).\n"},
+	{"ima_measurement", cmd_ima_measurement, 0, "[--validate] [--verify-sig [--key key1, key2, ...]] [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file", "Verify measurement list (experimental).\n"},
  	{"ima_boot_aggregate", cmd_ima_bootaggr, 0, "[file]", "Calculate per TPM bank boot_aggregate digests\n"},
  	{"ima_fix", cmd_ima_fix, 0, "[-t fdsxm] path", "Recursively fix IMA/EVM xattrs in fix mode.\n"},
  	{"ima_clear", cmd_ima_clear, 0, "[-t fdsxm] path", "Recursively remove IMA/EVM xattrs.\n"},
@@ -2526,8 +2523,7 @@ static struct option opts[] = {
  	{"engine", 1, 0, 139},
  	{"xattr-user", 0, 0, 140},
  	{"validate", 0, 0, 141},
-	{"verify", 0, 0, 142},
-	{"pcrs", 1, 0, 143},
+	{"pcrs", 1, 0, 142},
  	{}
 
  };
@@ -2709,10 +2705,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  		case 141: /* --validate */
  			validate = 1;
  			break;
-		case 142: /* --verify */
-			verify = 1;
-			break;
-		case 143:
+		case 142:
  			if (npcrfile >= MAX_PCRFILE) {
  				log_err("too many --pcrfile options\n");
  				exit(1);
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 Rename "--validate" to "--ignore-violations"

In reply to Mimi Zohar

IMA records file "Time of Measure, Time of Use (ToMToU)" and "open writers" integrity violations by adding a record to the measurement list containing one value (0x00's), but extending the TPM with a different value (0xFF's).

To avoid known file integrity violations, the builtin "tcb" measurement policy should be replaced with a custom policy as early as possible. This patch renames the existing "--validate" option to "--ignore-violations".

---
 README       |  4 ++--
 src/evmctl.c | 13 +++++++------
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
README +2 -2
index d8b8f404534b..b37325f31802 100644
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ COMMANDS
  ima_sign [--sigfile] [--key key] [--pass password] file
  ima_verify file
  ima_hash file
- ima_measurement [--validate] [--verify-sig [--key "key1, key2, ..."]]  [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file
+ ima_measurement [--ignore-violations] [--verify-sig [--key "key1, key2, ..."]]  [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file
  ima_fix [-t fdsxm] path
  sign_hash [--key key] [--pass password]
  hmac [--imahash | --imasig ] file
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ OPTIONS
       --m64          force EVM hmac/signature for 64 bit target system
       --engine e     preload OpenSSL engine e (such as: gost)
       --pcrs         file containing TPM pcrs, one per hash-algorithm/bank
-      --validate     ignore ToMToU measurement violations
+      --ignore-violations ignore ToMToU measurement violations
       --verify-sig   verify the file signature based on the file hash, both
                      stored in the template data.
   -v                 increase verbosity level
src/evmctl.c +7 -6
index b4d2333fb880..7ad11507487f 100644
@@ -1392,7 +1392,7 @@ struct template_entry {
 
 static uint8_t zero[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 
-static int validate = 0;
+static int ignore_violations = 0;
 
 static int ima_verify_template_hash(struct template_entry *entry)
 {
@@ -1739,7 +1739,7 @@ static void extend_tpm_banks(struct template_entry *entry, int num_banks,
 		 * size.
 		 */
 		if (memcmp(entry->header.digest, zero, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0) {
-			if (!validate) {
+			if (!ignore_violations) {
 				memset(bank[i].digest, 0x00, bank[i].digest_size);
 				memset(padded_bank[i].digest, 0x00, padded_bank[i].digest_size);
 			} else {
@@ -2467,6 +2467,7 @@ static void usage(void)
 		"      --caps         use custom Capabilities for EVM(unspecified: from FS, empty: do not use)\n"
 		"      --verify-sig   verify measurement list signatures\n"
 		"      --engine e     preload OpenSSL engine e (such as: gost)\n"
+		"      --ignore-violations ignore ToMToU measurement violations"
 		"  -v                 increase verbosity level\n"
 		"  -h, --help         display this help and exit\n"
 		"\n");
@@ -2483,7 +2484,7 @@ struct command cmds[] = {
 	{"ima_verify", cmd_verify_ima, 0, "file", "Verify IMA signature (for debugging).\n"},
 	{"ima_setxattr", cmd_setxattr_ima, 0, "[--sigfile file]", "Set IMA signature from sigfile\n"},
 	{"ima_hash", cmd_hash_ima, 0, "file", "Make file content hash.\n"},
-	{"ima_measurement", cmd_ima_measurement, 0, "[--validate] [--verify-sig [--key key1, key2, ...]] [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file", "Verify measurement list (experimental).\n"},
+	{"ima_measurement", cmd_ima_measurement, 0, "[--ignore-violations] [--verify-sig [--key key1, key2, ...]] [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file", "Verify measurement list (experimental).\n"},
 	{"ima_boot_aggregate", cmd_ima_bootaggr, 0, "[file]", "Calculate per TPM bank boot_aggregate digests\n"},
 	{"ima_fix", cmd_ima_fix, 0, "[-t fdsxm] path", "Recursively fix IMA/EVM xattrs in fix mode.\n"},
 	{"ima_clear", cmd_ima_clear, 0, "[-t fdsxm] path", "Recursively remove IMA/EVM xattrs.\n"},
@@ -2522,7 +2523,7 @@ static struct option opts[] = {
 	{"verify-sig", 0, 0, 138},
 	{"engine", 1, 0, 139},
 	{"xattr-user", 0, 0, 140},
-	{"validate", 0, 0, 141},
+	{"ignore-violations", 0, 0, 141},
 	{"pcrs", 1, 0, 142},
 	{}
 
@@ -2702,8 +2703,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 			xattr_ima = "user.ima";
 			xattr_evm = "user.evm";
 			break;
-		case 141: /* --validate */
-			validate = 1;
+		case 141: /* --ignore-violations */
+			ignore_violations = 1;
 			break;
 		case 142:
 			if (npcrfile >= MAX_PCRFILE) {
Signature · 1 line
2.18.4
Reviewed-by on v1 2/3
#4 lore raw

Re: [ima-evm-utils: PATCH 2/3] Rename "--validate" to "--ignore-violations"

Quoted 10 lines · Mimi Zohar

IMA records file "Time of Measure, Time of Use (ToMToU)" and "open writers" integrity violations by adding a record to the measurement list containing one value (0x00's), but extending the TPM with a different value (0xFF's).

To avoid known file integrity violations, the builtin "tcb" measurement policy should be replaced with a custom policy as early as possible. This patch renames the existing "--validate" option to "--ignore-violations".

Quoted 6 lines
---
  README       |  4 ++--
  src/evmctl.c | 13 +++++++------
  2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Quoted 83 lines
README +2 -2
index d8b8f404534b..b37325f31802 100644
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ COMMANDS
   ima_sign [--sigfile] [--key key] [--pass password] file
   ima_verify file
   ima_hash file
- ima_measurement [--validate] [--verify-sig [--key "key1, key2, ..."]]  [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file
+ ima_measurement [--ignore-violations] [--verify-sig [--key "key1, key2, ..."]]  [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file
   ima_fix [-t fdsxm] path
   sign_hash [--key key] [--pass password]
   hmac [--imahash | --imasig ] file
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ OPTIONS
        --m64          force EVM hmac/signature for 64 bit target system
        --engine e     preload OpenSSL engine e (such as: gost)
        --pcrs         file containing TPM pcrs, one per hash-algorithm/bank
-      --validate     ignore ToMToU measurement violations
+      --ignore-violations ignore ToMToU measurement violations
        --verify-sig   verify the file signature based on the file hash, both
                       stored in the template data.
    -v                 increase verbosity level
src/evmctl.c +7 -6
index b4d2333fb880..7ad11507487f 100644
@@ -1392,7 +1392,7 @@ struct template_entry {
 
  static uint8_t zero[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 
-static int validate = 0;
+static int ignore_violations = 0;
 
  static int ima_verify_template_hash(struct template_entry *entry)
  {
@@ -1739,7 +1739,7 @@ static void extend_tpm_banks(struct template_entry *entry, int num_banks,
  		 * size.
  		 */
  		if (memcmp(entry->header.digest, zero, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0) {
-			if (!validate) {
+			if (!ignore_violations) {
  				memset(bank[i].digest, 0x00, bank[i].digest_size);
  				memset(padded_bank[i].digest, 0x00, padded_bank[i].digest_size);
  			} else {
@@ -2467,6 +2467,7 @@ static void usage(void)
  		"      --caps         use custom Capabilities for EVM(unspecified: from FS, empty: do not use)\n"
  		"      --verify-sig   verify measurement list signatures\n"
  		"      --engine e     preload OpenSSL engine e (such as: gost)\n"
+		"      --ignore-violations ignore ToMToU measurement violations"
  		"  -v                 increase verbosity level\n"
  		"  -h, --help         display this help and exit\n"
  		"\n");
@@ -2483,7 +2484,7 @@ struct command cmds[] = {
  	{"ima_verify", cmd_verify_ima, 0, "file", "Verify IMA signature (for debugging).\n"},
  	{"ima_setxattr", cmd_setxattr_ima, 0, "[--sigfile file]", "Set IMA signature from sigfile\n"},
  	{"ima_hash", cmd_hash_ima, 0, "file", "Make file content hash.\n"},
-	{"ima_measurement", cmd_ima_measurement, 0, "[--validate] [--verify-sig [--key key1, key2, ...]] [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file", "Verify measurement list (experimental).\n"},
+	{"ima_measurement", cmd_ima_measurement, 0, "[--ignore-violations] [--verify-sig [--key key1, key2, ...]] [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file", "Verify measurement list (experimental).\n"},
  	{"ima_boot_aggregate", cmd_ima_bootaggr, 0, "[file]", "Calculate per TPM bank boot_aggregate digests\n"},
  	{"ima_fix", cmd_ima_fix, 0, "[-t fdsxm] path", "Recursively fix IMA/EVM xattrs in fix mode.\n"},
  	{"ima_clear", cmd_ima_clear, 0, "[-t fdsxm] path", "Recursively remove IMA/EVM xattrs.\n"},
@@ -2522,7 +2523,7 @@ static struct option opts[] = {
  	{"verify-sig", 0, 0, 138},
  	{"engine", 1, 0, 139},
  	{"xattr-user", 0, 0, 140},
-	{"validate", 0, 0, 141},
+	{"ignore-violations", 0, 0, 141},
  	{"pcrs", 1, 0, 142},
  	{}
 
@@ -2702,8 +2703,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  			xattr_ima = "user.ima";
  			xattr_evm = "user.evm";
  			break;
-		case 141: /* --validate */
-			validate = 1;
+		case 141: /* --ignore-violations */
+			ignore_violations = 1;
  			break;
  		case 142:
  			if (npcrfile >= MAX_PCRFILE) {
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 Update the ima_boot_aggregate apsects of the "README" and "help" files

In reply to Mimi Zohar

Add the missing "evmctl ima_boot_aggregate" info to the README. Update the "help" to include the new "--pcrs" option. In addition, replace the "file" option with "TPM 1.2 BIOS event log". The new format is:

ima_boot_aggregate [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] [TPM 1.2 BIOS event log]

Reminder: calculating the TPM PCRs based on the BIOS event log and comparing them with the TPM PCRs should be done prior to calculating the possible boot_aggregate value(s).

For TPM 1.2, the TPM 1.2 BIOS event log may be provided as an option when calculating the ima_boot_aggregate. For TPM 2.0, "tsseventextend -sim -if <binary_bios_measurements> -ns -v", may be used to validate the TPM 2.0 event log.

(Note: some TPM 2.0's export the BIOS event log in the TPM 1.2 format.)

---
 README       | 1 +
 src/evmctl.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
README +1 -0
index b37325f31802..321045d9d52b 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ COMMANDS
  import [--rsa] pubkey keyring
  sign [-r] [--imahash | --imasig ] [--portable] [--key key] [--pass password] file
  verify file
+ ima_boot_aggregate [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] [TPM 1.2 BIOS event log]
  ima_sign [--sigfile] [--key key] [--pass password] file
  ima_verify file
  ima_hash file
src/evmctl.c +1 -1
index 7ad11507487f..de7299d41b2c 100644
@@ -2485,7 +2485,7 @@ struct command cmds[] = {
 	{"ima_setxattr", cmd_setxattr_ima, 0, "[--sigfile file]", "Set IMA signature from sigfile\n"},
 	{"ima_hash", cmd_hash_ima, 0, "file", "Make file content hash.\n"},
 	{"ima_measurement", cmd_ima_measurement, 0, "[--ignore-violations] [--verify-sig [--key key1, key2, ...]] [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file", "Verify measurement list (experimental).\n"},
-	{"ima_boot_aggregate", cmd_ima_bootaggr, 0, "[file]", "Calculate per TPM bank boot_aggregate digests\n"},
+	{"ima_boot_aggregate", cmd_ima_bootaggr, 0, "[--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] [TPM 1.2 BIOS event log]", "Calculate per TPM bank boot_aggregate digests\n"},
 	{"ima_fix", cmd_ima_fix, 0, "[-t fdsxm] path", "Recursively fix IMA/EVM xattrs in fix mode.\n"},
 	{"ima_clear", cmd_ima_clear, 0, "[-t fdsxm] path", "Recursively remove IMA/EVM xattrs.\n"},
 	{"sign_hash", cmd_sign_hash, 0, "[--key key] [--pass [password]", "Sign hashes from shaXsum output.\n"},
Signature · 1 line
2.18.4
Reviewed-by on v1 3/3
#6 lore raw

Re: [ima-evm-utils: PATCH 3/3] Update the ima_boot_aggregate apsects of the "README" and "help" files

Quoted 15 lines · Mimi Zohar

Add the missing "evmctl ima_boot_aggregate" info to the README. Update the "help" to include the new "--pcrs" option. In addition, replace the "file" option with "TPM 1.2 BIOS event log". The new format is:

ima_boot_aggregate [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] [TPM 1.2 BIOS event log]

Reminder: calculating the TPM PCRs based on the BIOS event log and comparing them with the TPM PCRs should be done prior to calculating the possible boot_aggregate value(s).

For TPM 1.2, the TPM 1.2 BIOS event log may be provided as an option when calculating the ima_boot_aggregate. For TPM 2.0, "tsseventextend -sim -if <binary_bios_measurements> -ns -v", may be used to validate the TPM 2.0 event log.

Quoted 8 lines

(Note: some TPM 2.0's export the BIOS event log in the TPM 1.2 format.)

---
  README       | 1 +
  src/evmctl.c | 2 +-
  2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 26 lines
README +1 -0
index b37325f31802..321045d9d52b 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ COMMANDS
   import [--rsa] pubkey keyring
   sign [-r] [--imahash | --imasig ] [--portable] [--key key] [--pass password] file
   verify file
+ ima_boot_aggregate [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] [TPM 1.2 BIOS event log]
   ima_sign [--sigfile] [--key key] [--pass password] file
   ima_verify file
   ima_hash file
src/evmctl.c +1 -1
index 7ad11507487f..de7299d41b2c 100644
@@ -2485,7 +2485,7 @@ struct command cmds[] = {
  	{"ima_setxattr", cmd_setxattr_ima, 0, "[--sigfile file]", "Set IMA signature from sigfile\n"},
  	{"ima_hash", cmd_hash_ima, 0, "file", "Make file content hash.\n"},
  	{"ima_measurement", cmd_ima_measurement, 0, "[--ignore-violations] [--verify-sig [--key key1, key2, ...]] [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file", "Verify measurement list (experimental).\n"},
-	{"ima_boot_aggregate", cmd_ima_bootaggr, 0, "[file]", "Calculate per TPM bank boot_aggregate digests\n"},
+	{"ima_boot_aggregate", cmd_ima_bootaggr, 0, "[--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] [TPM 1.2 BIOS event log]", "Calculate per TPM bank boot_aggregate digests\n"},
  	{"ima_fix", cmd_ima_fix, 0, "[-t fdsxm] path", "Recursively fix IMA/EVM xattrs in fix mode.\n"},
  	{"ima_clear", cmd_ima_clear, 0, "[-t fdsxm] path", "Recursively remove IMA/EVM xattrs.\n"},
  	{"sign_hash", cmd_sign_hash, 0, "[--key key] [--pass [password]", "Sign hashes from shaXsum output.\n"},