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syscalls: clock_settime: Add test around y2038 vulnerability

PATCH Superseded Viresh Kumar 2 participants 4 messages Aug 4, 2020 – Aug 6, 2020

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v8 1/1 syscalls: clock_settime: Add test around y2038 vulnerability

This adds a test around the y2038 vulnerability, it sets the system time to just before y2038 time (i.e. max value that can be stored in s32), and adds a timer to expire just after crossing it.

---
V8:
- Check compatibility issues for TST_KERN_OLD_TIMESPEC and not the new timespec.
- s/TFAIL/TCONF/ in setup()
- Use kernel_timer_t
- rearrange code and don't expect timer to fire before.

 runtest/syscalls                                   |   1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/.gitignore |   1 +
 .../syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c       | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 125 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c
runtest/syscalls +1 -0
index 3c6e78a4c6d0..3c2f5f6c0b37 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ leapsec01 leapsec01
 
 clock_settime01 clock_settime01
 clock_settime02 clock_settime02
+clock_settime03 clock_settime03
 
 clone01 clone01
 clone02 clone02
testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/.gitignore +1 -0
index 28121755006b..b66169b3eb7b 100644
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 clock_settime01
 clock_settime02
+clock_settime03
testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c new file +123 -0

123 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.14.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v8 1/1 syscalls: clock_settime: Add test around y2038 vulnerability

Hi!

Quoted 82 lines

This adds a test around the y2038 vulnerability, it sets the system time to just before y2038 time (i.e. max value that can be stored in s32), and adds a timer to expire just after crossing it.

---
V8:
- Check compatibility issues for TST_KERN_OLD_TIMESPEC and not the new timespec.
- s/TFAIL/TCONF/ in setup()
- Use kernel_timer_t
- rearrange code and don't expect timer to fire before.

 runtest/syscalls                                   |   1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/.gitignore |   1 +
 .../syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c       | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 125 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c
runtest/syscalls +1 -0
index 3c6e78a4c6d0..3c2f5f6c0b37 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ leapsec01 leapsec01
 
 clock_settime01 clock_settime01
 clock_settime02 clock_settime02
+clock_settime03 clock_settime03
 
 clone01 clone01
 clone02 clone02
testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/.gitignore +1 -0
index 28121755006b..b66169b3eb7b 100644
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 clock_settime01
 clock_settime02
+clock_settime03
testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c new file +37 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..da062a8d0333
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Linaro Limited. All rights reserved.
+ * Author: Viresh Kumar<[email protected]>
+ *
+ * Check Year 2038 related vulnerabilities.
+ */
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include "config.h"
+#include "tst_timer.h"
+#include "tst_safe_clocks.h"
+
+#define TIMER_DELTA	3
+#define ALLOWED_DELTA	(50 * 1000) /* 50 ms */
+
+static struct tst_ts start, end;
+static struct tst_its its;
+
+static struct test_variants {
+	int (*clock_gettime)(clockid_t clk_id, void *ts);
+	int (*clock_settime)(clockid_t clk_id, void *ts);
+	int (*timer_settime)(kernel_timer_t timerid, int flags, void *its,
+			     void *old_its);
+	enum tst_ts_type type;
+	char *desc;
+} variants[] = {
+#if (__NR_clock_settime != __LTP__NR_INVALID_SYSCALL)
+	{ .clock_gettime = sys_clock_gettime, .clock_settime = sys_clock_settime, .timer_settime = sys_timer_settime, .type = TST_KERN_OLD_TIMESPEC, .desc = "syscall with old kernel spec"},
+#endif
+
+#if (__NR_clock_settime64 != __LTP__NR_INVALID_SYSCALL)
+	{ .clock_gettime = sys_clock_gettime64, .clock_settime = sys_clock_settime64, .timer_settime = sys_timer_settime64, .type = TST_KERN_TIMESPEC, .desc = "syscall time64 with kernel spec"},
+#endif
+};
+
+static void setup(void)

testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c line 47

Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c new file +10 -0
+{
+	struct test_variants *tv = &variants[tst_variant];
+
+	tst_res(TINFO, "Testing variant: %s", tv->desc);
+	start.type = end.type = its.type = tv->type;
+
+	/* Check if the kernel is y2038 safe */
+	if (tv->type == TST_KERN_OLD_TIMESPEC &&
+	    sizeof(start.ts.kern_old_ts) == 8)
+		tst_brk(TCONF, "Not Y2038 safe to run test");

Thinking of this again, it may be safer to assert the size of the kernel_old_ts.tv_sec, since the compiler is technically allowed to padd the structure. So what about sizeof(start.ts.kernel_old_ts.tv_sec) == 4?

Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c new file +10 -0
+}
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+	struct test_variants *tv = &variants[tst_variant];
+	unsigned long long time = 0x7FFFFFFE; /* Time just before y2038 */
+	struct sigevent ev = {
+		.sigev_notify = SIGEV_SIGNAL,
+		.sigev_signo = SIGABRT,
+	};

testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c line 67

Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c new file +10 -0
+	long long diff;
+	kernel_timer_t timer;
+	sigset_t set;
+	int sig, ret;
+
+	if (sigemptyset(&set) == -1)
+		tst_brk(TBROK, "sigemptyset() failed");
+
+	if (sigaddset(&set, SIGABRT) == -1)
+		tst_brk(TBROK, "sigaddset() failed");

We do have a safe macros for these two now.

Other than that these the code looks good. I can fix these two before applying if you agree.

Signature · 2 lines
Cyril Hrubis
[email protected]
#2 lore raw

PATCH v8 1/1 syscalls: clock_settime: Add test around y2038 vulnerability

Quoted 122 lines · Cyril Hrubis

Hi!

Quoted 82 lines

This adds a test around the y2038 vulnerability, it sets the system time to just before y2038 time (i.e. max value that can be stored in s32), and adds a timer to expire just after crossing it.

---
V8:
- Check compatibility issues for TST_KERN_OLD_TIMESPEC and not the new timespec.
- s/TFAIL/TCONF/ in setup()
- Use kernel_timer_t
- rearrange code and don't expect timer to fire before.

 runtest/syscalls                                   |   1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/.gitignore |   1 +
 .../syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c       | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 125 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c
runtest/syscalls +1 -0
index 3c6e78a4c6d0..3c2f5f6c0b37 100644
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ leapsec01 leapsec01
 
 clock_settime01 clock_settime01
 clock_settime02 clock_settime02
+clock_settime03 clock_settime03
 
 clone01 clone01
 clone02 clone02
testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/.gitignore +1 -0
index 28121755006b..b66169b3eb7b 100644
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 clock_settime01
 clock_settime02
+clock_settime03
testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c new file +37 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..da062a8d0333
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Linaro Limited. All rights reserved.
+ * Author: Viresh Kumar<[email protected]>
+ *
+ * Check Year 2038 related vulnerabilities.
+ */
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include "config.h"
+#include "tst_timer.h"
+#include "tst_safe_clocks.h"
+
+#define TIMER_DELTA	3
+#define ALLOWED_DELTA	(50 * 1000) /* 50 ms */
+
+static struct tst_ts start, end;
+static struct tst_its its;
+
+static struct test_variants {
+	int (*clock_gettime)(clockid_t clk_id, void *ts);
+	int (*clock_settime)(clockid_t clk_id, void *ts);
+	int (*timer_settime)(kernel_timer_t timerid, int flags, void *its,
+			     void *old_its);
+	enum tst_ts_type type;
+	char *desc;
+} variants[] = {
+#if (__NR_clock_settime != __LTP__NR_INVALID_SYSCALL)
+	{ .clock_gettime = sys_clock_gettime, .clock_settime = sys_clock_settime, .timer_settime = sys_timer_settime, .type = TST_KERN_OLD_TIMESPEC, .desc = "syscall with old kernel spec"},
+#endif
+
+#if (__NR_clock_settime64 != __LTP__NR_INVALID_SYSCALL)
+	{ .clock_gettime = sys_clock_gettime64, .clock_settime = sys_clock_settime64, .timer_settime = sys_timer_settime64, .type = TST_KERN_TIMESPEC, .desc = "syscall time64 with kernel spec"},
+#endif
+};
+
+static void setup(void)

testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c line 47

Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c new file +10 -0
+{
+	struct test_variants *tv = &variants[tst_variant];
+
+	tst_res(TINFO, "Testing variant: %s", tv->desc);
+	start.type = end.type = its.type = tv->type;
+
+	/* Check if the kernel is y2038 safe */
+	if (tv->type == TST_KERN_OLD_TIMESPEC &&
+	    sizeof(start.ts.kern_old_ts) == 8)
+		tst_brk(TCONF, "Not Y2038 safe to run test");

Thinking of this again, it may be safer to assert the size of the kernel_old_ts.tv_sec, since the compiler is technically allowed to padd the structure. So what about sizeof(start.ts.kernel_old_ts.tv_sec) == 4?

Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c new file +10 -0
+}
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+	struct test_variants *tv = &variants[tst_variant];
+	unsigned long long time = 0x7FFFFFFE; /* Time just before y2038 */
+	struct sigevent ev = {
+		.sigev_notify = SIGEV_SIGNAL,
+		.sigev_signo = SIGABRT,
+	};

testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c line 67

Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/clock_settime/clock_settime03.c new file +10 -0
+	long long diff;
+	kernel_timer_t timer;
+	sigset_t set;
+	int sig, ret;
+
+	if (sigemptyset(&set) == -1)
+		tst_brk(TBROK, "sigemptyset() failed");
+
+	if (sigaddset(&set, SIGABRT) == -1)
+		tst_brk(TBROK, "sigaddset() failed");

We do have a safe macros for these two now.

Quoted 2 lines

Other than that these the code looks good. I can fix these two before applying if you agree.

Sure. Thanks.

Signature · 1 line
viresh
#3 lore raw

PATCH v8 1/1 syscalls: clock_settime: Add test around y2038 vulnerability

Hi!

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Other than that these the code looks good. I can fix these two before applying if you agree.

Sure. Thanks.

In the end I've also added safe macros for sigprocmask() and sigwait() mainly because sigwait() is one of these funcitons that return error instead of setting errno. Now the error handling that nobody gets right is handled in the library...

Signature · 2 lines
Cyril Hrubis
[email protected]