bpf: verifier check for dead branch
Subsystems (5)
RFC 1/1 bpf: verifier check for dead branch
hi,
we have a customer facing some odd verifier fails on following sk_skb program:
0. r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + data_end)
1. r4 = *(u32 *)(r1 + data)
2. r3 = r4
3. r3 += 42
4. r1 = 0
5. if r3 > r2 goto 8
6. r4 += 14
7. r1 = r4
8. if r3 > r2 goto 10
9. r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 9)
10. r0 = 0
11. exit
The code checks if the skb data is big enough (5) and if it is, it prepares pointer in r1 (7), then there's again size check (8) and finally data load from r1 (9).
It's and odd code, but apparently this is something that can get produced by clang.
I made selftest out of it and it fails to load with:
# test_verifier -v 267 #267/p dead path check FAIL Failed to load prog 'Success'! 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 1: (61) r4 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 2: (bf) r3 = r4 3: (07) r3 += 42 4: (b7) r1 = 0 5: (2d) if r3 > r2 goto pc+2
from 5 to 8: R1_w=inv0 R2_w=pkt_end(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R3_w=pkt(id=0,off=42,r=0,imm=0) R4_w=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 8: (2d) if r3 > r2 goto pc+1
R1_w=inv0 R2_w=pkt_end(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R3_w=pkt(id=0,off=42,r=42,imm=0) R4_w=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=42,imm=0) R10=fp0
9: (69) r2 = *(u16 *)(r1 +9)
R1 invalid mem access 'inv'
processed 15 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 1 peak_states 1 mark_read 0
The verifier does not seem to take into account that code can't ever reach instruction 9 if the size check fails and r1 will be always valid when size check succeeds.
My guess is that verifier does not have such check, but I'm still scratching on the surface of it, so I could be totally wrong and missing something.. before I dive in I was wondering you guys could help me out with some insights or suggestions.
thanks,
jirka
--- .../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/ctx_skb.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/ctx_skb.c +21 -0
@@ -346,6 +346,27 @@ .result = ACCEPT, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB, }, +{ + "dead path check", + .insns = { +BPF_LDX_MEM (BPF_W ,BPF_REG_2 ,BPF_REG_1 ,// 0. r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + data_end) + offsetof(struct __sk_buff , data_end)), +BPF_LDX_MEM (BPF_W ,BPF_REG_4 ,BPF_REG_1 ,// 1. r4 = *(u32 *)(r1 + data) + offsetof(struct __sk_buff , data)), +BPF_MOV64_REG (BPF_REG_3 ,BPF_REG_4 ),// 2. r3 = r4 +BPF_ALU64_IMM (BPF_ADD ,BPF_REG_3 ,42 ),// 3. r3 += 42 +BPF_MOV64_IMM (BPF_REG_1 ,0 ),// 4. r1 = 0 +BPF_JMP_REG (BPF_JGT ,BPF_REG_3 ,BPF_REG_2 ,2 ),// 5. if r3 > r2 goto 8 +BPF_ALU64_IMM (BPF_ADD ,BPF_REG_4 ,14 ),// 6. r4 += 14 +BPF_MOV64_REG (BPF_REG_1 ,BPF_REG_4 ),// 7. r1 = r4 +BPF_JMP_REG (BPF_JGT ,BPF_REG_3 ,BPF_REG_2 ,1 ),// 8. if r3 > r2 goto 10 +BPF_LDX_MEM (BPF_H ,BPF_REG_2 ,BPF_REG_1 ,9 ),// 9. r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 9) +BPF_MOV64_IMM (BPF_REG_0 ,0 ),// 10. r0 = 0 +BPF_EXIT_INSN (),// 11. exit + }, + .result = ACCEPT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB, +}, {"overlapping checks for direct packet access SK_SKB" , .insns = {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.4
Quoted 17 lines · Jiri Olsa
hi,
we have a customer facing some odd verifier fails on followingsk_skbprogram:0. r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +
data_end)
1. r4 = *(u32 *)(r1 + data)
2. r3 = r4
3. r3 += 42
4. r1 = 0
5. if r3 > r2 goto 8
6. r4 += 14
7. r1 = r4
8. if r3 > r2 goto 10
9. r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 9)
10. r0 = 0
11. exit
Quoted 6 lines
The code checks if the skb data is big enough (5) and if it is, it prepares pointer in r1 (7), then there's again size check (8) and finally data load from r1 (9).
It's and odd code, but apparently this is something that can get produced by clang.
Could you provide a test case where clang generates the above code? I would like to see whether clang can do a better job to avoid such codes.
Quoted 20 lines
I made selftest out of it and it fails to load with:
# test_verifier -v 267 #267/p dead path check FAIL Failed to load prog 'Success'! 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 1: (61) r4 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 2: (bf) r3 = r4 3: (07) r3 += 42 4: (b7) r1 = 0 5: (2d) if r3 > r2 goto pc+2from 5 to 8: R1_w=inv0 R2_w=pkt_end(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R3_w=pkt(id=0,off=42,r=0,imm=0) R4_w=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 8: (2d) if r3 > r2 goto pc+1 R1_w=inv0 R2_w=pkt_end(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R3_w=pkt(id=0,off=42,r=42,imm=0) R4_w=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=42,imm=0) R10=fp0 9: (69) r2 = *(u16 *)(r1 +9) R1 invalid mem access 'inv' processed 15 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 1 peak_states 1 mark_read 0
Quoted 8 lines
The verifier does not seem to take into account that code can't ever reach instruction 9 if the size check fails and r1 will be always valid when size check succeeds.
My guess is that verifier does not have such check, but I'm still scratching on the surface of it, so I could be totally wrong and missing something.. before I dive in I was wondering you guys could help me out with some insights or suggestions.
There are no bits in reg_state to indicate a pkt pointer already goes beyond the packet_end. So insn 8 cannot conclude the condition r3 > r2 is always true...
If a bit to indicate packet pointer exceeding the end, it should work.
Fixing in verifier probably not too hard. But this should be a corner case and it will be good to check whether we can avoid it in clang.
Quoted 42 lines
thanks,
jirka--- .../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/ctx_skb.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/ctx_skb.c +21
-0@@ -346,6 +346,27 @@ .result = ACCEPT, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB, }, +{ + "dead path check", + .insns = { +BPF_LDX_MEM (BPF_W ,BPF_REG_2 ,BPF_REG_1 ,// 0. r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + data_end) + offsetof(struct __sk_buff , data_end)), +BPF_LDX_MEM (BPF_W ,BPF_REG_4 ,BPF_REG_1 ,// 1. r4 = *(u32 *)(r1 + data) + offsetof(struct __sk_buff , data)), +BPF_MOV64_REG (BPF_REG_3 ,BPF_REG_4 ),// 2. r3 = r4 +BPF_ALU64_IMM (BPF_ADD ,BPF_REG_3 ,42 ),// 3. r3 += 42 +BPF_MOV64_IMM (BPF_REG_1 ,0 ),// 4. r1 = 0 +BPF_JMP_REG (BPF_JGT ,BPF_REG_3 ,BPF_REG_2 ,2 ),// 5. if r3 > r2 goto 8 +BPF_ALU64_IMM (BPF_ADD ,BPF_REG_4 ,14 ),// 6. r4 += 14 +BPF_MOV64_REG (BPF_REG_1 ,BPF_REG_4 ),// 7. r1 = r4 +BPF_JMP_REG (BPF_JGT ,BPF_REG_3 ,BPF_REG_2 ,1 ),// 8. if r3 > r2 goto 10 +BPF_LDX_MEM (BPF_H ,BPF_REG_2 ,BPF_REG_1 ,9 ),// 9. r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 9) +BPF_MOV64_IMM (BPF_REG_0 ,0 ),// 10. r0 = 0 +BPF_EXIT_INSN (),// 11. exit + }, + .result = ACCEPT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB, +}, {"overlapping checks for direct packet access SK_SKB" , .insns = {
Quoted 24 lines · Yonghong Song
Quoted 21 lines · Jiri Olsa
hi,
we have a customer facing some odd verifier fails on followingsk_skbprogram:0. r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +
data_end)
1. r4 = *(u32 *)(r1 + data)
2. r3 = r4
3. r3 += 42
4. r1 = 0
5. if r3 > r2 goto 8
6. r4 += 14
7. r1 = r4
8. if r3 > r2 goto 10
9. r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 9)
10. r0 = 0
11. exitThe code checks if the skb data is big enough (5) and if it is, it prepares pointer in r1 (7), then there's again size check (8) and finally data load from r1 (9).
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
It's and odd code, but apparently this is something that can get produced by clang.
Could you provide a test case where clang generates the above code? I would like to see whether clang can do a better job to avoid such codes.
I get that code genrated by using recent enough upstream clang on the attached source.
/opt/clang/bin/clang --version clang version 11.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project.git 4cbfb98eb362b0629d5d1cd113af4427e2904763) Target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu Thread model: posix InstalledDir: /opt/clang/bin $ llvm-objdump -d verifier-cond-repro.o verifier-cond-repro.o: file format ELF64-BPF Disassembly of section .text: 0000000000000000 my_prog: 0: 61 12 50 00 00 00 00 00 r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) 1: 61 14 4c 00 00 00 00 00 r4 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 76) 2: bf 43 00 00 00 00 00 00 r3 = r4 3: 07 03 00 00 2a 00 00 00 r3 += 42 4: b7 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0 5: 2d 23 02 00 00 00 00 00 if r3 > r2 goto +2 <LBB0_2> 6: 07 04 00 00 0e 00 00 00 r4 += 14 7: bf 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = r4 0000000000000040 LBB0_2: 8: 2d 23 05 00 00 00 00 00 if r3 > r2 goto +5 <LBB0_5> 9: 71 12 09 00 00 00 00 00 r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 9) 10: 56 02 03 00 11 00 00 00 if w2 != 17 goto +3 <LBB0_5> 11: b4 00 00 00 d2 04 00 00 w0 = 1234 12: 69 11 16 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = *(u16 *)(r1 + 22) 13: 16 01 01 00 d2 04 00 00 if w1 == 1234 goto +1 <LBB0_6> 0000000000000070 LBB0_5: 14: b4 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff w0 = -1 0000000000000078 LBB0_6: 15: 95 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 exit
thanks,
jirka
---
// Copyright (c) 2019 Tigera, Inc. All rights reserved.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. // You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License.
#include <stddef.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/if_ether.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/pkt_cls.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_endian.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#define INLINE inline __attribute__((always_inline))
#define skb_shorter(skb, len) ((void *)(long)(skb)->data + (len) > (void *)(long)skb->data_end)
#define ETH_IPV4_UDP_SIZE (14+20+8)
static INLINE struct iphdr *get_iphdr (struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iphdr *ip = NULL;
struct ethhdr *eth;
if (skb_shorter(skb, ETH_IPV4_UDP_SIZE))
goto out;
eth = (void *)(long)skb->data;
ip = (void *)(eth + 1);out:
return ip; }
int my_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iphdr *ip = NULL;
struct udphdr *udp;
__u8 proto = 0;
if (!(ip = get_iphdr(skb)))
goto out;
proto = ip->protocol;
if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP)
goto out;
udp = (void*)(ip + 1);
if (udp->dest != 1234)
goto out;
if (!udp)
goto out;
return udp->dest;out:
return -1; }
Quoted 28 lines · Jiri Olsa
Quoted 27 lines · Yonghong Song
Quoted 23 lines · Jiri Olsa
hi,
we have a customer facing some odd verifier fails on followingsk_skbprogram:0. r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +
data_end)
1. r4 = *(u32 *)(r1 + data)
2. r3 = r4
3. r3 += 42
4. r1 = 0
5. if r3 > r2 goto 8
6. r4 += 14
7. r1 = r4
8. if r3 > r2 goto 10
9. r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 9)
10. r0 = 0
11. exitThe code checks if the skb data is big enough (5) and if it is, it prepares pointer in r1 (7), then there's again size check (8) and finally data load from r1 (9).
It's and odd code, but apparently this is something that can get produced by clang.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Could you provide a test case where clang generates the above code? I would like to see whether clang can do a better job to avoid such codes.
I get that code genrated by using recent enough upstream clang on the attached source.
Thanks for the test case. I can reproduce the issue. The following is why this happens in llvm.
the pseudo IR code looks like
data = skb->data
data_end = skb->data_end
comp = data + 42 > data_end
ip = select "comp" nullptr "data + some offset"
<=== select return one of nullptr or "data + some offset"
based on "comp"
if comp // original skb_shorter condition
.... ...
= ip
In llvm, bpf backend "select" actually inlined "comp" to generate proper control flow. Therefore, comp is computed twice like below
data = skb->data
data_end = skb->data_end
if (data + 42 > data_end) {
ip = nullptr; goto block1;
} else {
ip = data + some_offset;
goto block2; }
...
if (data + 42 > data_end) // original skb_shorter condition
The issue can be workarounded the source. Just check data + 42 > data_end and if failure return. Then you will be able to assign a value to "ip" conditionally.
Will try to fix this issue in llvm12 as well.
Thanks!
Quoted 123 lines
/opt/clang/bin/clang --version clang version 11.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project.git 4cbfb98eb362b0629d5d1cd113af4427e2904763) Target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu Thread model: posix InstalledDir: /opt/clang/bin $ llvm-objdump -d verifier-cond-repro.o verifier-cond-repro.o: file format ELF64-BPF Disassembly of section .text: 0000000000000000 my_prog: 0: 61 12 50 00 00 00 00 00 r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) 1: 61 14 4c 00 00 00 00 00 r4 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 76) 2: bf 43 00 00 00 00 00 00 r3 = r4 3: 07 03 00 00 2a 00 00 00 r3 += 42 4: b7 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0 5: 2d 23 02 00 00 00 00 00 if r3 > r2 goto +2 <LBB0_2> 6: 07 04 00 00 0e 00 00 00 r4 += 14 7: bf 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = r4 0000000000000040 LBB0_2: 8: 2d 23 05 00 00 00 00 00 if r3 > r2 goto +5 <LBB0_5> 9: 71 12 09 00 00 00 00 00 r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 9) 10: 56 02 03 00 11 00 00 00 if w2 != 17 goto +3 <LBB0_5> 11: b4 00 00 00 d2 04 00 00 w0 = 1234 12: 69 11 16 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = *(u16 *)(r1 + 22) 13: 16 01 01 00 d2 04 00 00 if w1 == 1234 goto +1 <LBB0_6> 0000000000000070 LBB0_5: 14: b4 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff w0 = -1 0000000000000078 LBB0_6: 15: 95 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 exitthanks,
jirka---
// Copyright (c) 2019 Tigera, Inc. All rights reserved.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. // You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.apache.org_licenses_LICENSE-2D2.0&d=DwIBAg&c=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw&r=DA8e1B5r073vIqRrFz7MRA&m=bsFf5gOsaXXCIBYvnl6AK78aRCaFS1zhqvVCYbn4JBA&s=5MVLZXPlXMo2B2K5wDP5P3Lmn4-TQTKHvQfvZupEFvs&e=
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License.#include <
stddef.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/if_ether.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/pkt_cls.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_endian.h>#include <
stddef.h>#define INLINE inline __attribute__((always_inline))
#define
skb_shorter(skb, len)((void *)(long)(skb)->data + (len) > (void *)(long)skb->data_end)#define
ETH_IPV4_UDP_SIZE(14+20+8)static INLINE struct iphdr
*get_iphdr(struct__sk_buff*skb){ struct iphdr *ip = NULL; struct ethhdr *eth; if (skb_shorter(skb, ETH_IPV4_UDP_SIZE)) goto out; eth = (void *)(long)skb->data; ip = (void *)(eth + 1);out:
return ip; }int
my_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb){ struct iphdr *ip = NULL; struct udphdr *udp; __u8 proto = 0; if (!(ip = get_iphdr(skb))) goto out; proto = ip->protocol; if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP) goto out; udp = (void*)(ip + 1); if (udp->dest != 1234) goto out; if (!udp) goto out; return udp->dest;out:
return -1; }
On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 10:16:12AM -0700, Yonghong Song wrote:
SNIP
Quoted 24 lines
Thanks for the test case. I can reproduce the issue. The following is why this happens in llvm.
the pseudo IR code looks like
data =skb->data
data_end=skb->data_end
comp = data + 42 >data_end
ip = select "comp" nullptr "data + some offset"<=== select return one of nullptr or "data + some offset" based on "comp" if comp // original skb_shorter condition .......
= ipIn llvm, bpf backend "select" actually inlined "comp" to generate proper control flow. Therefore, comp is computed twice like below
data =skb->data
data_end=skb->data_endif (data + 42 > data_end) { ip = nullptr; goto block1; } else { ip = data + some_offset; goto block2;
Quoted 7 lines
}
...
if (data + 42 >data_end) // originalskb_shorterconditionThe issue can be workarounded the source. Just check data + 42 >
data_endand if failure return. Then you will be able to assign
a value to "ip" conditionally.
is the change below what you mean? it produces the same code for me:
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c index 2f11027d7e67..9c401bd00ab7 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c @@ -41,12 +41,10 @@ static INLINE struct iphdr *get_iphdr (struct __sk_buff *skb) struct ethhdr *eth; if (skb_shorter(skb, ETH_IPV4_UDP_SIZE)) - goto out; + return NULL; eth = (void *)(long)skb->data; ip = (void *)(eth + 1); - -out: return ip; }
I also tried this one:
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c index 2f11027d7e67..00ff06fe6fdd 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int my_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) __u8 proto = 0; if (!(ip = get_iphdr(skb))) - goto out; + return -1; proto = ip->protocol;
it did just slight change in generated code - added 'w0 = -1' before the second condition
Quoted 3 lines
Will try to fix this issue in llvm12 as well.
Thanks!
great, could you please CC me on the changes?
thanks a lot!
jirka
Quoted 35 lines · Jiri Olsa
On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 10:16:12AM -0700, Yonghong Song wrote:
SNIP
Quoted 31 lines
Thanks for the test case. I can reproduce the issue. The following is why this happens in llvm.
the pseudo IR code looks likedata = skb->data data_end = skb->data_end comp = data + 42 > data_end ip = select "comp" nullptr "data + some offset" <=== select return one of nullptr or "data + some offset" based on "comp" if comp // original skb_shorter condition .... ... = ipIn llvm, bpf backend "select" actually inlined "comp" to generate proper control flow. Therefore, comp is computed twice like below
data = skb->data data_end = skb->data_end if (data + 42 > data_end) { ip = nullptr; goto block1; } else { ip = data + some_offset; goto block2; } ... if (data + 42 > data_end) // original skb_shorter conditionThe issue can be workarounded the source. Just check data + 42 >
data_endand if failure return. Then you will be able to assign
a value to "ip" conditionally.
sorry for typo. The above should be "conditionally" -> "unconditionally".
Quoted 37 lines
is the change below what you mean? it produces the same code for me:
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c index 2f11027d7e67..9c401bd00ab7 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c @@ -41,12 +41,10 @@ static INLINE struct iphdr *get_iphdr (struct __sk_buff *skb) struct ethhdr *eth; if (skb_shorter(skb, ETH_IPV4_UDP_SIZE)) - goto out; + return NULL; eth = (void *)(long)skb->data; ip = (void *)(eth + 1); - -out: return ip; }I also tried this one:
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c index 2f11027d7e67..00ff06fe6fdd 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier-cond-repro.c @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int my_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) __u8 proto = 0; if (!(ip = get_iphdr(skb))) - goto out; + return -1; proto = ip->protocol;
Quoted 2 lines
it did just slight change in generated code - added 'w0 = -1' before the second condition
The following is what I mean:
t.c +3 -9
@@ -37,17 +37,10 @@ static INLINE struct iphdr *get_iphdr (struct __sk_buff *skb) { -struct iphdr *ip =NULL ;struct ethhdr *eth; -if (skb_shorter (skb,ETH_IPV4_UDP_SIZE )) - goto out; - eth = (void *)(long )skb->data; - ip = (void *)(eth +1 ); - -out: -return ip; +return (void *)(eth +1 ); }int my_prog (struct __sk_buff *skb)
@@ -56,9 +49,10 @@ int my_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb)struct udphdr *udp;__u8 proto =0 ; -if (!(ip =get_iphdr (skb))) +if (skb_shorter (skb,ETH_IPV4_UDP_SIZE )) goto out; + ip =get_iphdr (skb); proto = ip->protocol;if (proto !=IPPROTO_UDP )
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Will try to fix this issue in llvm12 as well.
Thanks!great, could you please CC me on the changes?
This will be a llvm change. Do you have llvm phabricator login name
https://reviews.llvm.org/
so I can add you as a subscriber?
Quoted 4 lines
thanks a lot!
jirka
Quoted 35 lines · Yonghong Song
Quoted 32 lines · Jiri Olsa
On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 10:16:12AM -0700, Yonghong Song wrote:
SNIP
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Thanks for the test case. I can reproduce the issue. The following is why this happens in llvm.
the pseudo IR code looks likedata = skb->data data_end = skb->data_end comp = data + 42 > data_end ip = select "comp" nullptr "data + some offset" <=== select return one of nullptr or "data + some offset" based on "comp" if comp // original skb_shorter condition .... ... = ipIn llvm, bpf backend "select" actually inlined "comp" to generate proper control flow. Therefore, comp is computed twice like below
data = skb->data data_end = skb->data_end if (data + 42 > data_end) { ip = nullptr; goto block1; } else { ip = data + some_offset; goto block2; } ... if (data + 42 > data_end) // original skb_shorter condition
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The issue can be workarounded the source. Just check data + 42 >
data_endand if failure return. Then you will be able to assign
a value to "ip" conditionally.sorry for typo. The above should be "conditionally" -> "unconditionally".
aaah, ok ;-)
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The following is what I mean:
t.c +3
-9@@ -37,17 +37,10 @@ static INLINE struct iphdr *get_iphdr (struct __sk_buff *skb) { -struct iphdr *ip =NULL ;struct ethhdr *eth; -if (skb_shorter (skb,ETH_IPV4_UDP_SIZE )) - goto out; - eth = (void *)(long )skb->data; - ip = (void *)(eth +1 ); - -out: -return ip; +return (void *)(eth +1 ); }int my_prog (struct __sk_buff *skb)@@ -56,9 +49,10 @@ int my_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb)struct udphdr *udp;__u8 proto =0 ; -if (!(ip =get_iphdr (skb))) +if (skb_shorter (skb,ETH_IPV4_UDP_SIZE )) goto out; + ip =get_iphdr (skb); proto = ip->protocol;if (proto !=IPPROTO_UDP )Quoted 3 lines
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Will try to fix this issue in llvm12 as well.
Thanks!great, could you please CC me on the changes?
This will be a llvm change. Do you have llvm phabricator login name
https://reviews.llvm.org/
so I can add you as a subscriber?
Jiri (Olsa)
[email protected]
thank,
jirka