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package/apache: security bump version to 2.4.46

PATCH New Bernd Kuhls 4 participants 7 messages Aug 7, 2020 – Aug 28, 2020

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PATCH 1/1 package/apache: security bump version to 2.4.46

Changelog: http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/CHANGES_2.4.46

Release notes: https://downloads.apache.org/httpd/Announcement2.4.html

Fixes CVE-2020-9490, CVE-2020-11984 & CVE-2020-11993:
https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html

Added all hashes provided by upstream.

---
 package/apache/apache.hash | 10 ++++++++--
 package/apache/apache.mk   |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
package/apache/apache.hash +8 -2
index 7b0e4ad8e7..4fe457d701 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
-# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.43.tar.bz2.sha256
-sha256  a497652ab3fc81318cdc2a203090a999150d86461acff97c1065dc910fe10f43  httpd-2.4.43.tar.bz2
+# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2.md5
+md5  7d661ea5e736dac5e2761d9f49fe8361  httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2
+# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2.sha1
+sha1  1b7cd10ff3a2a07a576d77e34f0204d95fa4aceb  httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2
+# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2.sha256
+sha256  740eddf6e1c641992b22359cabc66e6325868c3c5e2e3f98faf349b61ecf41ea  httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2
+# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2.sha512
+sha512  5936784bb662e9d8a4f7fe38b70c043b468114d931cd10ea831bfe74461ea5856b64f88f42c567ab791fc8907640a99884ba4b6a600f86d661781812735b6f13  httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2
 # Locally computed
 sha256  47b8c2b6c3309282a99d4a3001575c790fead690cc14734628c4667d2bbffc43  LICENSE
package/apache/apache.mk +1 -1
index 068f36e325..203d637fbb 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 ################################################################################
 
-APACHE_VERSION = 2.4.43
+APACHE_VERSION = 2.4.46
 APACHE_SOURCE = httpd-$(APACHE_VERSION).tar.bz2
 APACHE_SITE = http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd
 APACHE_LICENSE = Apache-2.0
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/apache: security bump version to 2.4.46

Bernd, All,

On 2020-08-07 19:11 +0200, Bernd Kuhls spake thusly:

Quoted 8 lines

Changelog: http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/CHANGES_2.4.46

Release notes: https://downloads.apache.org/httpd/Announcement2.4.html

Fixes CVE-2020-9490, CVE-2020-11984 & CVE-2020-11993:
https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html

Added all hashes provided by upstream.

md5 and sha1 are broken nowadays, so adding them is not interesting at all, when there are better hashes available, which is the case here.

So I've dropped md5 and sha1, and used a single comment to refer to both upstream locations.

Applied to master, thanks.

Quoted 43 lines
---
 package/apache/apache.hash | 10 ++++++++--
 package/apache/apache.mk   |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
package/apache/apache.hash +8 -2
index 7b0e4ad8e7..4fe457d701 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
-# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.43.tar.bz2.sha256
-sha256  a497652ab3fc81318cdc2a203090a999150d86461acff97c1065dc910fe10f43  httpd-2.4.43.tar.bz2
+# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2.md5
+md5  7d661ea5e736dac5e2761d9f49fe8361  httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2
+# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2.sha1
+sha1  1b7cd10ff3a2a07a576d77e34f0204d95fa4aceb  httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2
+# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2.sha256
+sha256  740eddf6e1c641992b22359cabc66e6325868c3c5e2e3f98faf349b61ecf41ea  httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2
+# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2.sha512
+sha512  5936784bb662e9d8a4f7fe38b70c043b468114d931cd10ea831bfe74461ea5856b64f88f42c567ab791fc8907640a99884ba4b6a600f86d661781812735b6f13  httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2
 # Locally computed
 sha256  47b8c2b6c3309282a99d4a3001575c790fead690cc14734628c4667d2bbffc43  LICENSE
package/apache/apache.mk +1 -1
index 068f36e325..203d637fbb 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 ################################################################################
 
-APACHE_VERSION = 2.4.43
+APACHE_VERSION = 2.4.46
 APACHE_SOURCE = httpd-$(APACHE_VERSION).tar.bz2
 APACHE_SITE = http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd
 APACHE_LICENSE = Apache-2.0
Signature · 6 lines
2.27.0

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Signature · 6 lines
.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------.
|  Yann E. MORIN  | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: |
| +33 662 376 056 | Software  Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN     |  ___               |
| +33 561 099 427 `------------.-------:  X  AGAINST      |  \e/  There is no  |
| http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL    |   v   conspiracy.  |
'------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------'
#2 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/apache: security bump version to 2.4.46

Hello Yann, *,

Quoted 7 lines · Yann E. MORIN

Bernd, All,

On 2020-08-07 19:11 +0200, Bernd Kuhls spake thusly:

Quoted 4 lines

Changelog: http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/CHANGES_2.4.46

Release notes: https://downloads.apache.org/httpd/Announcement2.4.html

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Fixes CVE-2020-9490, CVE-2020-11984 & CVE-2020-11993:
https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html

Added all hashes provided by upstream.

md5 and sha1 are broken nowadays, so adding them is not interesting at all, when there are better hashes available, which is the case here.

If this handling is the new rule, then it is time to update the docs stating 'If upstream provides more than one type of hash (e.g. sha1 and sha512), then it is best to add all those hashes in the .hash file.'?

Regards,
Peter

Quoted 50 lines

So I've dropped md5 and sha1, and used a single comment to refer to both upstream locations.

Applied to master, thanks.

Quoted 43 lines
---
 package/apache/apache.hash | 10 ++++++++--
 package/apache/apache.mk   |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
package/apache/apache.hash +8 -2
index 7b0e4ad8e7..4fe457d701 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
-# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.43.tar.bz2.sha256
-sha256  a497652ab3fc81318cdc2a203090a999150d86461acff97c1065dc910fe10f43  httpd-2.4.43.tar.bz2
+# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2.md5
+md5  7d661ea5e736dac5e2761d9f49fe8361  httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2
+# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2.sha1
+sha1  1b7cd10ff3a2a07a576d77e34f0204d95fa4aceb  httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2
+# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2.sha256
+sha256  740eddf6e1c641992b22359cabc66e6325868c3c5e2e3f98faf349b61ecf41ea  httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2
+# From http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2.sha512
+sha512  5936784bb662e9d8a4f7fe38b70c043b468114d931cd10ea831bfe74461ea5856b64f88f42c567ab791fc8907640a99884ba4b6a600f86d661781812735b6f13  httpd-2.4.46.tar.bz2
 # Locally computed
 sha256  47b8c2b6c3309282a99d4a3001575c790fead690cc14734628c4667d2bbffc43  LICENSE
package/apache/apache.mk +1 -2
index 068f36e325..203d637fbb 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 ################################################################################
 
-APACHE_VERSION = 2.4.43
+APACHE_VERSION = 2.4.46
 APACHE_SOURCE = httpd-$(APACHE_VERSION).tar.bz2
 APACHE_SITE = http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd
 APACHE_LICENSE = Apache-2.0
--

2.27.0

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#3 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/apache: security bump version to 2.4.46

Peter, All,

On 2020-08-07 22:56 +0200, Peter Seiderer spake thusly:

Quoted 9 lines · Yann E. MORIN
Quoted 8 lines

On 2020-08-07 19:11 +0200, Bernd Kuhls spake thusly:

Quoted 7 lines

Changelog: http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/CHANGES_2.4.46

Release notes: https://downloads.apache.org/httpd/Announcement2.4.html

Fixes CVE-2020-9490, CVE-2020-11984 & CVE-2020-11993:
https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

Added all hashes provided by upstream.

md5 and sha1 are broken nowadays, so adding them is not interesting at all, when there are better hashes available, which is the case here.

If this handling is the new rule, then it is time to update the docs stating 'If upstream provides more than one type of hash (e.g. sha1 and sha512), then it is best to add all those hashes in the .hash file.'?

I wrote that more than 6 years ago now. ;-) Things have changed since then.

The hashes are there to guarantee that the archives have not be tampered with, so that we know that:

1. there was no technical issue downloading the archive (e.g. partial download, proxy playing tricks, etc...),

2. upstream did not re-release the same version with a different content, so that we know our patches would or would not apply for example,

3. the source code has not been tampered with, so that no ill source code has been injected (either in-transit, or if upstream got compromised).

md5 is broken, there is no point in using it. If that's the only thing upstream provides, we can carry it, but if upstream provides better hashes, md5 brings nothing to address the above, especially point 3.

sha1 is not yet fully broken, but it is no longer trusted, and everyone is moving away from it. If upstream only provides sha1, we can carry it, but if upstream provides better hashes, then we should not _add_ sha1 (but we can continue to update an existing one we already carry). While sha1 is still OK-ish to address accidental tampering (point 1) or non-malicious modifications (point 2, and even then), it is now useless to address malicious tampering (point 3).

This is the point of view hashes should be looked at from.

In this case, upstream provides two strong hashes, sha256 and sha512; adding md5 is totally useless, while adding sha1 is borderline useless.

For the records:

- md5 [0] was introduced 1991, and the first security issues were identified in 1993, and the first collisions reported in 1996.

- sha1 [1] was introduced in 1995, is considered weak since 2005 (15 years ago!), disallowed for signatures by NIST since 2013, and chosen-prefix attacks are a thing since this year.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD5
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-1

Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.

Signature · 6 lines
.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------.
|  Yann E. MORIN  | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: |
| +33 662 376 056 | Software  Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN     |  ___               |
| +33 561 099 427 `------------.-------:  X  AGAINST      |  \e/  There is no  |
| http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL    |   v   conspiracy.  |
'------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------'
#4 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/apache: security bump version to 2.4.46

Quoted 1 line
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Quoted 1 line

"Yann" == Yann E MORIN <[email protected]> writes:

Hi,

Quoted 31 lines

The hashes are there to guarantee that the archives have not be tampered with, so that we know that:

1. there was no technical issue downloading the archive (e.g. partial download, proxy playing tricks, etc...),

2. upstream did not re-release the same version with a different content, so that we know our patches would or would not apply for example,

3. the source code has not been tampered with, so that no ill source code has been injected (either in-transit, or if upstream got compromised).

md5 is broken, there is no point in using it. If that's the only thing upstream provides, we can carry it, but if upstream provides better hashes, md5 brings nothing to address the above, especially point 3.

sha1 is not yet fully broken, but it is no longer trusted, and everyone is moving away from it. If upstream only provides sha1, we can carry it, but if upstream provides better hashes, then we should not _add_ sha1 (but we can continue to update an existing one we already carry). While sha1 is still OK-ish to address accidental tampering (point 1) or non-malicious modifications (point 2, and even then), it is now useless to address malicious tampering (point 3).

This is the point of view hashes should be looked at from.

In this case, upstream provides two strong hashes, sha256 and sha512; adding md5 is totally useless, while adding sha1 is borderline useless.

Quoted 8 lines

For the records:

- md5 [0] was introduced 1991, and the first security issues were identified in 1993, and the first collisions reported in 1996.

- sha1 [1] was introduced in 1995, is considered weak since 2005 (15 years ago!), disallowed for signatures by NIST since 2013, and chosen-prefix attacks are a thing since this year.

This is all true, but generating a single rogue file with BOTH a md5 and sha1 collision and still being a valid compressed tarball is extremely unlikely, so I have no issues with listing them (together with a manually calculated sha256) if upstream doesn't provide sha256 or better.

If upstream does provide sha256 or better then there indeed isn't much point in adding the older hashes as well.

Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
#5 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/apache: security bump version to 2.4.46

Hello Yann, Peter,

Quoted 44 lines · Peter Korsgaard
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

"Yann" == Yann E MORIN <[email protected]> writes:

Hi,

Quoted 31 lines

The hashes are there to guarantee that the archives have not be tampered with, so that we know that:

1. there was no technical issue downloading the archive (e.g. partial download, proxy playing tricks, etc...),

2. upstream did not re-release the same version with a different content, so that we know our patches would or would not apply for example,

3. the source code has not been tampered with, so that no ill source code has been injected (either in-transit, or if upstream got compromised).

md5 is broken, there is no point in using it. If that's the only thing upstream provides, we can carry it, but if upstream provides better hashes, md5 brings nothing to address the above, especially point 3.

sha1 is not yet fully broken, but it is no longer trusted, and everyone is moving away from it. If upstream only provides sha1, we can carry it, but if upstream provides better hashes, then we should not _add_ sha1 (but we can continue to update an existing one we already carry). While sha1 is still OK-ish to address accidental tampering (point 1) or non-malicious modifications (point 2, and even then), it is now useless to address malicious tampering (point 3).

This is the point of view hashes should be looked at from.

In this case, upstream provides two strong hashes, sha256 and sha512; adding md5 is totally useless, while adding sha1 is borderline useless.

Quoted 8 lines

For the records:

- md5 [0] was introduced 1991, and the first security issues were identified in 1993, and the first collisions reported in 1996.

- sha1 [1] was introduced in 1995, is considered weak since 2005 (15 years ago!), disallowed for signatures by NIST since 2013, and chosen-prefix attacks are a thing since this year.

Quoted 9 lines

This is all true, but generating a single rogue file with BOTH a md5 and sha1 collision and still being a valid compressed tarball is extremely unlikely, so I have no issues with listing them (together with a manually calculated sha256) if upstream doesn't provide sha256 or better.

If upstream does provide sha256 or better then there indeed isn't much point in adding the older hashes as well.

Totally agree with the given arguments for omitting redundant hashes (and always wondered why the docs suggested otherwise)...., time to update the docs to reflect this?

Regards,
Peter

#6 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/apache: security bump version to 2.4.46

In reply to Bernd Kuhls
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

"Bernd" == Bernd Kuhls <[email protected]> writes:

Changelog: http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/CHANGES_2.4.46
Release notes: https://downloads.apache.org/httpd/Announcement2.4.html

Fixes CVE-2020-9490, CVE-2020-11984 & CVE-2020-11993:
https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html

Added all hashes provided by upstream.

Committed to 2020.02.x and 2020.05.x, thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard