doc: fix ioctl name MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP -> KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
PATCH 1/1 doc: fix ioctl name MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP -> KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
Just for precision's sake :-)
While we're in there, fix some typos:
- fix colon placement before a list
- "provides" -> "provide"
- "destroy's" -> "destroys"
- fix a broken link, it had a space where there should have been an undescore
Signed-off-by Connor Kuehl <[email protected]>
--- docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt +4 -4
@@ -18,14 +18,14 @@ ioctls. Launching --------- Boot images (such as bios) must be encrypted before guest can be booted. -MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images :LAUNCH_START, +KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images: LAUNCH_START, LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, LAUNCH_MEASURE and LAUNCH_FINISH. These four commands together generate a fresh memory encryption key for the VM, encrypt the boot images and provide a measurement than can be used as an attestation of the successful launch. LAUNCH_START is called first to create a cryptographic launch context within -the firmware. To create this context, guest owner must provides guest policy, +the firmware. To create this context, guest owner must provide guest policy, its public Diffie-Hellman key (PDH) and session parameters. These inputs should be treated as binary blob and must be passed as-is to the SEV firmware.
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ Since the guest owner knows the initial contents of the guest at boot, the attestation measurement can be verified by comparing it to what the guest owner expects. -LAUNCH_FINISH command finalizes the guest launch and destroy's the cryptographic +LAUNCH_FINISH command finalizes the guest launch and destroys the cryptographic context. See SEV KM API Spec [1] 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper: http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf Secure Encrypted Virtualization Key Management: -[1] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf +[1] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf KVM Forum slides: http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf
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2.25.4