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docs: process: Add cross-link to security-bugs

PATCH In review Krzysztof Kozlowski 5 participants 8 messages Aug 27, 2020 – Aug 31, 2020

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 docs: process: Add cross-link to security-bugs

The submitting patches mentions criteria for a fix to be called "security fix". Add a link to document explaining the entire process of handling security bugs.

Cc Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
 Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst +2 -1
index 5219bf3cddfc..d5b3c5a74d5d 100644
@@ -299,7 +299,8 @@ sending him e-mail.
 If you have a patch that fixes an exploitable security bug, send that patch
 to [email protected].  For severe bugs, a short embargo may be considered
 to allow distributors to get the patch out to users; in such cases,
-obviously, the patch should not be sent to any public lists.
+obviously, the patch should not be sent to any public lists. See also
+:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst <security-bugs>`.
 
 Patches that fix a severe bug in a released kernel should be directed
 toward the stable maintainers by putting a line like this::
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 docs: admin-guide: Not every security bug should be kept hidden

Document describes the process of handling security bugs but does not mention any criteria what is a "security bug". Unlike submitting-patches.rst which explicitly says - publicly exploitable bug.

Many NULL pointer exceptions, off-by-one errors or overflows tend to look like security bug, so there might be a temptation to discuss them behind security list which is not an open list.

Such discussion limits the amount of testing and independent reviewing. Sacrificing open discussion is understandable in the case of real security issues but not for regular bugs. These should be discussed publicly.

At the end, "security problems are just bugs".

Cc Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>

---

Follow up to:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst +6 -0
index c32eb786201c..7ebddbd4bbcd 100644
@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
 the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
 <http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>
 
+Fixes for non-exploitable bugs which do not pose a real security risk, should
+be disclosed in a regular way of submitting patches to Linux kernel (see
+:ref:`Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst <submitting-patches>`).
+Just because patch fixes some off-by-one or NULL pointer exception, does not
+classify it as a security bug which should be discussed in closed channels.
+
 CVE assignment
 --------------
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/2] docs: admin-guide: Not every security bug should be kept hidden

Quoted 34 lines · Krzysztof Kozlowski

Document describes the process of handling security bugs but does not mention any criteria what is a "security bug". Unlike submitting-patches.rst which explicitly says - publicly exploitable bug.

Many NULL pointer exceptions, off-by-one errors or overflows tend to look like security bug, so there might be a temptation to discuss them behind security list which is not an open list.

Such discussion limits the amount of testing and independent reviewing. Sacrificing open discussion is understandable in the case of real security issues but not for regular bugs. These should be discussed publicly.

At the end, "security problems are just bugs".

Cc Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>

---

Follow up to:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst +0 -0
index c32eb786201c..7ebddbd4bbcd 100644

Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix · line 85

Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst +5 -0
@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
 the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
 <http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>
 
+Fixes for non-exploitable bugs which do not pose a real security risk, should
+be disclosed in a regular way of submitting patches to Linux kernel (see
+:ref:`Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst <submitting-patches>`).
+Just because patch fixes some off-by-one or NULL pointer exception, does not
+classify it as a security bug which should be discussed in closed channels.

I said this on another thread, but almost always, when we get reports like this on [email protected], we do push them back to public lists.

For the most part, this paragraph is not going to help much (mostly for the reason that no one seems to read it, but that's a different topic...) We get crazy reports all the time, and that's fine, because sometimes, there is a real issue in some of them. And for that, we do want to be careful. We also have many docuemented "off-by-one" bugs that were real security issues (there's a blog post somewhere about how a developer turned such a bug into a root hole, can't find it right now...)

So while I understand the temptation here, based on the current [email protected] traffic, I doubt this will really change much :(

Also, you should have cc:ed that group when you are changing things that will affect them.

thanks,

greg k-h

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/2] docs: admin-guide: Not every security bug should be kept hidden

Quoted 38 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 37 lines · Krzysztof Kozlowski

Document describes the process of handling security bugs but does not mention any criteria what is a "security bug". Unlike submitting-patches.rst which explicitly says - publicly exploitable bug.

Many NULL pointer exceptions, off-by-one errors or overflows tend to look like security bug, so there might be a temptation to discuss them behind security list which is not an open list.

Such discussion limits the amount of testing and independent reviewing. Sacrificing open discussion is understandable in the case of real security issues but not for regular bugs. These should be discussed publicly.

At the end, "security problems are just bugs".

Cc Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>

---

Follow up to:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst +0 -0
index c32eb786201c..7ebddbd4bbcd 100644
@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
 the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
 <http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>
 
Quoted 8 lines

Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix · line 85

Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst +5 -0
+Fixes for non-exploitable bugs which do not pose a real security risk, should
+be disclosed in a regular way of submitting patches to Linux kernel (see
+:ref:`Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst <submitting-patches>`).
+Just because patch fixes some off-by-one or NULL pointer exception, does not
+classify it as a security bug which should be discussed in closed channels.

I said this on another thread, but almost always, when we get reports like this on [email protected], we do push them back to public lists.

Then let's hope that next time someone will read this documentation before submitting such report to @security.

Quoted 4 lines

For the most part, this paragraph is not going to help much (mostly for the reason that no one seems to read it, but that's a different topic...)

All of our documentation is our wish that someone will read it and follow it. Just because people might not follow it, is not necessarily a reason to skip documentation.

Quoted 6 lines

We get crazy reports all the time, and that's fine, because sometimes, there is a real issue in some of them. And for that, we do want to be careful. We also have many docuemented "off-by-one" bugs that were real security issues (there's a blog post somewhere about how a developer turned such a bug into a root hole, can't find it right now...)

I understand. That's why I also mentioned the criteria of exploitable and posing a security risk. First case (even stricter - publicly exploitable) is already mentioned in submitting-patches so I am not changing the current status.

I merely want to document it based on recent discussion.

Quoted 5 lines

So while I understand the temptation here, based on the current [email protected] traffic, I doubt this will really change much :(

Also, you should have cc:ed that group when you are changing things that will affect them.

Indeed, I will update the maintainers as well.

Best regards,
Krzysztof

#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/2] docs: admin-guide: Not every security bug should be kept hidden

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 25 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix · line 85

Quoted 11 lines · Krzysztof Kozlowski
Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst +5 -0
@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
 the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
 <http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>
 
+Fixes for non-exploitable bugs which do not pose a real security risk, should
+be disclosed in a regular way of submitting patches to Linux kernel (see
+:ref:`Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst <submitting-patches>`).
+Just because patch fixes some off-by-one or NULL pointer exception, does not
+classify it as a security bug which should be discussed in closed channels.

I said this on another thread, but almost always, when we get reports like this on [email protected], we do push them back to public lists.

For the most part, this paragraph is not going to help much (mostly for the reason that no one seems to read it, but that's a different topic...) We get crazy reports all the time, and that's fine, because sometimes, there is a real issue in some of them. And for that, we do want to be careful. We also have many docuemented "off-by-one" bugs that were real security issues (there's a blog post somewhere about how a developer turned such a bug into a root hole, can't find it right now...)

Quoted 2 lines

So while I understand the temptation here, based on the current [email protected] traffic, I doubt this will really change much :(

And given our relatively low traffic, I'd rather we (the [email protected] folks) make the determination if things should be public or private. We should be the ones on the hook for those judgement calls, not the reporter reading our documentation. :)

Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Reviewed-by on v1 1/2
#5 lore raw
In reply to Krzysztof Kozlowski
Quoted 4 lines · Krzysztof Kozlowski

The submitting patches mentions criteria for a fix to be called "security fix". Add a link to document explaining the entire process of handling security bugs.

Quoted 8 lines
Cc Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
 Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Reviewed-by on v1 1/2
#6 lore raw
In reply to Krzysztof Kozlowski

Hi,

Quoted 29 lines · Krzysztof Kozlowski

The submitting patches mentions criteria for a fix to be called "security fix". Add a link to document explaining the entire process of handling security bugs.

Cc Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
 Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst +2 -2
index 5219bf3cddfc..d5b3c5a74d5d 100644
@@ -299,7 +299,8 @@ sending him e-mail.
 If you have a patch that fixes an exploitable security bug, send that patch
 to [email protected].  For severe bugs, a short embargo may be considered
 to allow distributors to get the patch out to users; in such cases,
-obviously, the patch should not be sent to any public lists.
+obviously, the patch should not be sent to any public lists. See also
+:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst <security-bugs>`.
 
 Patches that fix a severe bug in a released kernel should be directed
 toward the stable maintainers by putting a line like this::
--
Quoted 1 line

2.17.1

Signature · 1 line
balbi
maintainer
#7 lore raw
In reply to Krzysztof Kozlowski
Quoted 18 lines · On Thu, 27 Aug 2020 12:53:18 +0200 Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]> wrote:

The submitting patches mentions criteria for a fix to be called "security fix". Add a link to document explaining the entire process of handling security bugs.

Cc Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
 Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst +0 -0
index 5219bf3cddfc..d5b3c5a74d5d 100644

Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst sending him e-mail. · line 303

Quoted 6 lines
Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst +2 -1
@@ -299,7 +299,8 @@ sending him e-mail.
 If you have a patch that fixes an exploitable security bug, send that patch
 to [email protected].  For severe bugs, a short embargo may be considered
 to allow distributors to get the patch out to users; in such cases,
-obviously, the patch should not be sent to any public lists.
+obviously, the patch should not be sent to any public lists. See also
+:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst <security-bugs>`.

I've applied this (but not part 2).

Thanks,

jon