Netfilter OOB memory access security patch
Subsystems (4)
cover Netfilter OOB memory access security patch
Hi,
The attached patch fixes an OOB memory access security bug. The bug is already fixed in the upstream kernel due to the vulnerable code being refactored in commit fe2d0020994c ("netfilter: nat: remove l4proto->in_range") and commit d6c4c8ffb5e5 ("netfilter: nat: remove l3proto struct"), but the 4.19 and below LTS branches remain vulnerable. I have verifed the OOB kernel panic is fixed with this patch on both the 4.19 and 4.14 kernels using the approariate hardware.
Please review the fix and apply to branches 4.19.y, 4.14.y, 4.9.y and 4.4.y.
Thanks,
Will
Will McVicker (1):
netfilter: nat: add range checks for access to nf_nat_l[34]protos[]
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c | 6 ++++-- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c | 5 +++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog
PATCH 1/1 netfilter: nat: add range checks for access to nf_nat_l[34]protos[]
The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So we need to make sure that before indexing the arrays, we verify the index is within the array bounds in order to prevent an OOB memory access. Here is an example kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in:... Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121) CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S W O 4.14.180-g051355490483 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121 pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 ... Call trace: __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468 nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258 ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x4c/0x228 ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x590/0xc40 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x31c/0x4d4 netlink_rcv_skb+0x100/0x184 nfnetlink_rcv+0xf4/0x180 netlink_unicast+0x360/0x770 netlink_sendmsg+0x5a0/0x6a4 ___sys_sendmsg+0x314/0x46c SyS_sendmsg+0xb4/0x108 el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c | 6 ++++-- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c | 5 +++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c +4 -2
@@ -218,7 +218,8 @@ int nf_nat_icmp_reply_translation(struct sk_buff *skb,return 1 ; l4proto =__nf_nat_l4proto_find (NFPROTO_IPV4 , inside->ip.protocol); -if (!nf_nat_ipv4_manip_pkt (skb, hdrlen +sizeof (inside->icmp), +if (!l4proto || + !nf_nat_ipv4_manip_pkt (skb, hdrlen +sizeof (inside->icmp), l4proto, &ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple, !manip))return 0 ;
@@ -234,7 +235,8 @@ int nf_nat_icmp_reply_translation(struct sk_buff *skb,/* Change outer to look like the reply to an incoming packet */ nf_ct_invert_tuplepr (&target, &ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple); l4proto =__nf_nat_l4proto_find (NFPROTO_IPV4 ,0 ); -if (!nf_nat_ipv4_manip_pkt (skb,0 , l4proto, &target, manip)) +if (!l4proto || + !nf_nat_ipv4_manip_pkt (skb,0 , l4proto, &target, manip))return 0 ;return 1 ;
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c +3 -2
@@ -228,7 +228,8 @@ int nf_nat_icmpv6_reply_translation(struct sk_buff *skb,return 1 ; l4proto =__nf_nat_l4proto_find (NFPROTO_IPV6 , inside->ip6.nexthdr); -if (!nf_nat_ipv6_manip_pkt (skb, hdrlen +sizeof (inside->icmp6), +if (!l4proto || + !nf_nat_ipv6_manip_pkt (skb, hdrlen +sizeof (inside->icmp6), l4proto, &ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple, !manip))return 0 ;
@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@ int nf_nat_icmpv6_reply_translation(struct sk_buff *skb,nf_ct_invert_tuplepr (&target, &ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple); l4proto =__nf_nat_l4proto_find (NFPROTO_IPV6 ,IPPROTO_ICMPV6 ); -if (!nf_nat_ipv6_manip_pkt (skb,0 , l4proto, &target, manip)) +if (!l4proto || !nf_nat_ipv6_manip_pkt (skb,0 , l4proto, &target, manip))return 0 ;return 1 ;
net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c +25 -2
@@ -64,12 +64,16 @@ struct nat_net {inline const struct nf_nat_l3proto *__nf_nat_l3proto_find (u8 family) { +if (family >=NFPROTO_NUMPROTO ) +return NULL ;return rcu_dereference (nf_nat_l3protos[family]); }inline const struct nf_nat_l4proto *__nf_nat_l4proto_find (u8 family,u8 protonum) { +if (family >=NFPROTO_NUMPROTO ) +return NULL ;return rcu_dereference (nf_nat_l4protos[family][protonum]); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__nf_nat_l4proto_find);
@@ -317,7 +321,7 @@ find_best_ips_proto(const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone,* range. It might not be possible to get a unique tuple, but we try. * At worst (or if we race), we will end up with a final duplicate in * __ip_conntrack_confirm and drop the packet. */ -static void +static int get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *orig_tuple, const struct nf_nat_range2 *range,
@@ -328,13 +332,22 @@ get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,const struct nf_nat_l3proto *l3proto;const struct nf_nat_l4proto *l4proto;struct net *net =nf_ct_net (ct); +int ret =0 ; zone =nf_ct_zone (ct);rcu_read_lock (); l3proto =__nf_nat_l3proto_find (orig_tuple->src.l3num); +if (!l3proto) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } l4proto =__nf_nat_l4proto_find (orig_tuple->src.l3num, orig_tuple->dst.protonum); +if (!l4proto) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + }/* 1) If this srcip/proto/src-proto-part is currently mapped, * and that same mapping gives a unique tuple within the given
@@ -387,6 +400,7 @@ get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, l4proto->unique_tuple (l3proto, tuple, range, maniptype, ct); out:rcu_read_unlock (); +return ret; }struct nf_conn_nat *nf_ct_nat_ext_add (struct nf_conn *ct)
@@ -409,6 +423,7 @@ nf_nat_setup_info(struct nf_conn *ct, {struct net *net =nf_ct_net (ct);struct nf_conntrack_tuple curr_tuple, new_tuple; +int err;/* Can't setup nat info for confirmed ct. */ if (nf_ct_is_confirmed (ct))
@@ -428,7 +443,9 @@ nf_nat_setup_info(struct nf_conn *ct,nf_ct_invert_tuplepr (&curr_tuple, &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY ].tuple); -get_unique_tuple (&new_tuple, &curr_tuple, range, ct, maniptype); + err =get_unique_tuple (&new_tuple, &curr_tuple, range, ct, maniptype); +if (err <0 ) +return NF_DROP ;if (!nf_ct_tuple_equal (&new_tuple, &curr_tuple)) {struct nf_conntrack_tuple reply;
@@ -509,8 +526,12 @@ static unsigned int nf_nat_manip_pkt(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct,nf_ct_invert_tuplepr (&target, &ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple); l3proto =__nf_nat_l3proto_find (target.src.l3num); +if (!l3proto) +return NF_DROP ; l4proto =__nf_nat_l4proto_find (target.src.l3num, target.dst.protonum); +if (!l4proto) +return NF_DROP ;if (!l3proto->manip_pkt (skb,0 , l4proto, &target, mtype))return NF_DROP ;
@@ -816,6 +837,8 @@ static int nfnetlink_parse_nat_proto(struct nlattr *attr,return err; l4proto =__nf_nat_l4proto_find (nf_ct_l3num (ct),nf_ct_protonum (ct)); +if (!l4proto) +return -EINVAL ;if (l4proto->nlattr_to_range) err = l4proto->nlattr_to_range (tb, range);
net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c +4 -0
@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ bool __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, datalen = skb->len - protoff; l3proto =__nf_nat_l3proto_find (nf_ct_l3num (ct)); +if (!l3proto) +return false; l3proto->csum_recalc (skb,IPPROTO_TCP , tcph, &tcph->check, datalen, oldlen);
@@ -179,6 +181,8 @@ nf_nat_mangle_udp_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,return true; l3proto =__nf_nat_l3proto_find (nf_ct_l3num (ct)); +if (!l3proto) +return false; l3proto->csum_recalc (skb,IPPROTO_UDP , udph, &udph->check, datalen, oldlen);
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog
Adding [email protected]. Please see the original message regarding this OOB memory access security fix. The patch is intended for the LTS branches 4.19.y, 4.14.y, 4.9.y and 4.4.y.
Thanks,
Will
cover Netfilter OOB memory access security patch
Hi,
The attached patch fixes an OOB memory access security bug. The bug is already fixed in the upstream kernel due to the vulnerable code being refactored in commit fe2d0020994c ("netfilter: nat: remove l4proto->in_range") and commit d6c4c8ffb5e5 ("netfilter: nat: remove l3proto struct"), but the 4.19 and below LTS branches remain vulnerable. I have verifed the OOB kernel panic is fixed with this patch on both the 4.19 and 4.14 kernels using the approariate hardware.
Please review the fix and apply to branches 4.19.y, 4.14.y, 4.9.y and 4.4.y.
Thanks,
Will
Will McVicker (1):
netfilter: nat: add range checks for access to nf_nat_l[34]protos[]
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c | 6 ++++-- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c | 5 +++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog
Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · Will McVicker
Hi,
The attached patch fixes an OOB memory access security bug. The bug is already fixed in the upstream kernel due to the vulnerable code being refactored in commitfe2d0020994c("netfilter: nat: removel4proto->in_range") and commitd6c4c8ffb5e5("netfilter: nat: remove l3proto struct"), but the 4.19 and below LTS branches remain vulnerable. I have verifed the OOB kernel panic is fixed with this patch on both the 4.19 and 4.14 kernels using the approariate hardware.Please review the fix and apply to branches 4.19.y, 4.14.y, 4.9.y and 4.4.y.
This patch only applied to the 4.19.y tree, it failed to apply to all of the other branches:
Applying patch netfilter-nat-add-range-checks-for-access-to-nf_nat_lprotos.patch patching file net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c
patching file net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c
patching file net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c
Hunk #1 succeeded at 45 (offset -19 lines).
Hunk #2 succeeded at 298 with fuzz 1 (offset -23 lines).
Hunk #3 succeeded at 309 (offset -23 lines).
Hunk #4 succeeded at 376 (offset -24 lines).
Hunk #5 succeeded at 399 (offset -24 lines).
Hunk #6 succeeded at 419 (offset -24 lines).
Hunk #7 FAILED at 526.
Hunk #8 succeeded at 733 (offset -100 lines).
1 out of 8 hunks FAILED -- rejects in file net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c patching file net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c
And you didn't cc: the netfilter developers for this, are they ok with this? I need an ack from them to be able to take this.
Can you fix this up, resend working versions for all branches, and get their acks?
thanks,
greg k-h
Hi Greg,
I have a follow up fix for this patch that is a lot cleaner and will hopefully apply cleanly to all the LTS branches. Let me upload the new patch and get the final ACK from the netfilter devs.
Thanks,
Will
Quoted 41 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 11 lines · Will McVicker
Hi,
The attached patch fixes an OOB memory access security bug. The bug is already fixed in the upstream kernel due to the vulnerable code being refactored in commitfe2d0020994c("netfilter: nat: removel4proto->in_range") and commitd6c4c8ffb5e5("netfilter: nat: remove l3proto struct"), but the 4.19 and below LTS branches remain vulnerable. I have verifed the OOB kernel panic is fixed with this patch on both the 4.19 and 4.14 kernels using the approariate hardware.Please review the fix and apply to branches 4.19.y, 4.14.y, 4.9.y and 4.4.y.
This patch only applied to the 4.19.y tree, it failed to apply to all of the other branches:
Applying patch netfilter-nat-add-range-checks-for-access-to-nf_nat_lprotos.patch patching file
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c
patching filenet/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c
patching filenet/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c
Hunk #1 succeeded at 45 (offset -19 lines).
Hunk #2 succeeded at 298 with fuzz 1 (offset -23 lines).
Hunk #3 succeeded at 309 (offset -23 lines).
Hunk #4 succeeded at 376 (offset -24 lines).
Hunk #5 succeeded at 399 (offset -24 lines).
Hunk #6 succeeded at 419 (offset -24 lines).
Hunk #7 FAILED at 526.
Hunk #8 succeeded at 733 (offset -100 lines).
1 out of 8 hunks FAILED -- rejects in filenet/netfilter/nf_nat_core.cpatching filenet/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.cAnd you didn't cc: the netfilter developers for this, are they ok with this? I need an ack from them to be able to take this.
Can you fix this up, resend working versions for all branches, and get their acks?
thanks,
greg k-h
PATCH 1/1 netfilter: nat: add range checks for access to nf_nat_l[34]protos[]
In reply to Will McVickerThe indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So we need to make sure that before indexing the arrays, we verify the index is within the array bounds in order to prevent an OOB memory access. Here is an example kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in:... Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121) CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S W O 4.14.180-g051355490483 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121 pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 ... Call trace: __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468 nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258 ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x4c/0x228 ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x590/0xc40 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x31c/0x4d4 netlink_rcv_skb+0x100/0x184 nfnetlink_rcv+0xf4/0x180 netlink_unicast+0x360/0x770 netlink_sendmsg+0x5a0/0x6a4 ___sys_sendmsg+0x314/0x46c SyS_sendmsg+0xb4/0x108 el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c | 6 ++++-- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c | 5 +++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c +4 -2
@@ -218,7 +218,8 @@ int nf_nat_icmp_reply_translation(struct sk_buff *skb,return 1 ; l4proto =__nf_nat_l4proto_find (NFPROTO_IPV4 , inside->ip.protocol); -if (!nf_nat_ipv4_manip_pkt (skb, hdrlen +sizeof (inside->icmp), +if (!l4proto || + !nf_nat_ipv4_manip_pkt (skb, hdrlen +sizeof (inside->icmp), l4proto, &ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple, !manip))return 0 ;
@@ -234,7 +235,8 @@ int nf_nat_icmp_reply_translation(struct sk_buff *skb,/* Change outer to look like the reply to an incoming packet */ nf_ct_invert_tuplepr (&target, &ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple); l4proto =__nf_nat_l4proto_find (NFPROTO_IPV4 ,0 ); -if (!nf_nat_ipv4_manip_pkt (skb,0 , l4proto, &target, manip)) +if (!l4proto || + !nf_nat_ipv4_manip_pkt (skb,0 , l4proto, &target, manip))return 0 ;return 1 ;
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c +3 -2
@@ -228,7 +228,8 @@ int nf_nat_icmpv6_reply_translation(struct sk_buff *skb,return 1 ; l4proto =__nf_nat_l4proto_find (NFPROTO_IPV6 , inside->ip6.nexthdr); -if (!nf_nat_ipv6_manip_pkt (skb, hdrlen +sizeof (inside->icmp6), +if (!l4proto || + !nf_nat_ipv6_manip_pkt (skb, hdrlen +sizeof (inside->icmp6), l4proto, &ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple, !manip))return 0 ;
@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@ int nf_nat_icmpv6_reply_translation(struct sk_buff *skb,nf_ct_invert_tuplepr (&target, &ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple); l4proto =__nf_nat_l4proto_find (NFPROTO_IPV6 ,IPPROTO_ICMPV6 ); -if (!nf_nat_ipv6_manip_pkt (skb,0 , l4proto, &target, manip)) +if (!l4proto || !nf_nat_ipv6_manip_pkt (skb,0 , l4proto, &target, manip))return 0 ;return 1 ;
net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c +25 -2
@@ -64,12 +64,16 @@ struct nat_net {inline const struct nf_nat_l3proto *__nf_nat_l3proto_find (u8 family) { +if (family >=NFPROTO_NUMPROTO ) +return NULL ;return rcu_dereference (nf_nat_l3protos[family]); }inline const struct nf_nat_l4proto *__nf_nat_l4proto_find (u8 family,u8 protonum) { +if (family >=NFPROTO_NUMPROTO ) +return NULL ;return rcu_dereference (nf_nat_l4protos[family][protonum]); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__nf_nat_l4proto_find);
@@ -317,7 +321,7 @@ find_best_ips_proto(const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone,* range. It might not be possible to get a unique tuple, but we try. * At worst (or if we race), we will end up with a final duplicate in * __ip_conntrack_confirm and drop the packet. */ -static void +static int get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *orig_tuple, const struct nf_nat_range2 *range,
@@ -328,13 +332,22 @@ get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,const struct nf_nat_l3proto *l3proto;const struct nf_nat_l4proto *l4proto;struct net *net =nf_ct_net (ct); +int ret =0 ; zone =nf_ct_zone (ct);rcu_read_lock (); l3proto =__nf_nat_l3proto_find (orig_tuple->src.l3num); +if (!l3proto) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } l4proto =__nf_nat_l4proto_find (orig_tuple->src.l3num, orig_tuple->dst.protonum); +if (!l4proto) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + }/* 1) If this srcip/proto/src-proto-part is currently mapped, * and that same mapping gives a unique tuple within the given
@@ -387,6 +400,7 @@ get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, l4proto->unique_tuple (l3proto, tuple, range, maniptype, ct); out:rcu_read_unlock (); +return ret; }struct nf_conn_nat *nf_ct_nat_ext_add (struct nf_conn *ct)
@@ -409,6 +423,7 @@ nf_nat_setup_info(struct nf_conn *ct, {struct net *net =nf_ct_net (ct);struct nf_conntrack_tuple curr_tuple, new_tuple; +int err;/* Can't setup nat info for confirmed ct. */ if (nf_ct_is_confirmed (ct))
@@ -428,7 +443,9 @@ nf_nat_setup_info(struct nf_conn *ct,nf_ct_invert_tuplepr (&curr_tuple, &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY ].tuple); -get_unique_tuple (&new_tuple, &curr_tuple, range, ct, maniptype); + err =get_unique_tuple (&new_tuple, &curr_tuple, range, ct, maniptype); +if (err <0 ) +return NF_DROP ;if (!nf_ct_tuple_equal (&new_tuple, &curr_tuple)) {struct nf_conntrack_tuple reply;
@@ -509,8 +526,12 @@ static unsigned int nf_nat_manip_pkt(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct,nf_ct_invert_tuplepr (&target, &ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple); l3proto =__nf_nat_l3proto_find (target.src.l3num); +if (!l3proto) +return NF_DROP ; l4proto =__nf_nat_l4proto_find (target.src.l3num, target.dst.protonum); +if (!l4proto) +return NF_DROP ;if (!l3proto->manip_pkt (skb,0 , l4proto, &target, mtype))return NF_DROP ;
@@ -816,6 +837,8 @@ static int nfnetlink_parse_nat_proto(struct nlattr *attr,return err; l4proto =__nf_nat_l4proto_find (nf_ct_l3num (ct),nf_ct_protonum (ct)); +if (!l4proto) +return -EINVAL ;if (l4proto->nlattr_to_range) err = l4proto->nlattr_to_range (tb, range);
net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c +4 -0
@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ bool __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, datalen = skb->len - protoff; l3proto =__nf_nat_l3proto_find (nf_ct_l3num (ct)); +if (!l3proto) +return false; l3proto->csum_recalc (skb,IPPROTO_TCP , tcph, &tcph->check, datalen, oldlen);
@@ -179,6 +181,8 @@ nf_nat_mangle_udp_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,return true; l3proto =__nf_nat_l3proto_find (nf_ct_l3num (ct)); +if (!l3proto) +return false; l3proto->csum_recalc (skb,IPPROTO_UDP , udph, &udph->check, datalen, oldlen);
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.rc0.142.g3c755180ce-goog
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/1] netfilter: nat: add range checks for access to nf_nat_l[34]protos[]
In reply to Will McVickerHi Will,
Quoted 6 lines · Will McVicker
The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So we need to make sure that before indexing the arrays, we verify the index is within the array bounds in order to prevent an OOB memory access. Here is an example kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than
NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.
Quoted 13 lines
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in:... Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121) CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S W O 4.14.180-g051355490483 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121 pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 ... Call trace: __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468 nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258
If this oops is only triggerable from userspace, I think a sanity check in nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup should suffice to reject unsupported layer 3 and layer 4 protocols.
I mean, in this patch I see more chunks in the packet path, such as nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4 that should never happen. I would just fix the userspace ctnetlink path.
BTW, do you have a Fixes: tag for this? This will be useful for -stable maintainer to pick up this fix.
Thanks.
Re: [PATCH 1/1] netfilter: nat: add range checks for access to nf_nat_l[34]protos[]
Hi Pablo,
Yes, I believe this oops is only triggered by userspace when the user specifically passes in an invalid nf_nat_l3protos index. I'm happy to re-work the patch to check for this in ctnetlink_create_conntrack().
Quoted 2 lines
BTW, do you have a Fixes: tag for this? This will be useful for -stable maintainer to pick up this fix.
Regarding the Fixes: tag, I don't have one offhand since this bug was reported to me, but I can search through the code history to find the commit that exposed this vulnerability.
Thanks,
Will
Quoted 35 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Hi Will,
Quoted 6 lines · Will McVicker
The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So we need to make sure that before indexing the arrays, we verify the index is within the array bounds in order to prevent an OOB memory access. Here is an example kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than
NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.Quoted 13 lines
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in:... Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121) CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S W O 4.14.180-g051355490483 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121 pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 ... Call trace: __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468 nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258If this oops is only triggerable from userspace, I think a sanity check in
nfnetlink_parse_nat_setupshould suffice to reject unsupported layer 3 and layer 4 protocols.I mean, in this patch I see more chunks in the packet path, such as
nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4that should never happen. I would just fix the userspace ctnetlink path.BTW, do you have a Fixes: tag for this? This will be useful for -stable maintainer to pick up this fix.
Thanks.
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/1] netfilter: nat: add range checks for access to nf_nat_l[34]protos[]
Hi William,
Quoted 5 lines · William Mcvicker
Hi Pablo,
Yes, I believe this oops is only triggered by userspace when the user specifically passes in an invalid
nf_nat_l3protosindex. I'm happy to re-work the patch to check for this inctnetlink_create_conntrack().
Great.
Note that this code does not exist in the tree anymore. I'm not sure if this problem still exists upstream, this patch does not apply to nf.git. This fix should only go for -stable maintainers.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
BTW, do you have a Fixes: tag for this? This will be useful for -stable maintainer to pick up this fix.
Regarding the Fixes: tag, I don't have one offhand since this bug was reported to me, but I can search through the code history to find the commit that exposed this vulnerability.
That would be great.
Thank you.
Re: [PATCH 1/1] netfilter: nat: add range checks for access to nf_nat_l[34]protos[]
Hi Pablo,
Quoted 3 lines
Note that this code does not exist in the tree anymore. I'm not sure if this problem still exists upstream, this patch does not apply to nf.git. This fix should only go for -stable maintainers.
Right, the vulnerability has been fixed by the refactor commit fe2d0020994cd ("netfilter: nat: remove l4proto->in_range"), but this patch is a part of a full re-work of the code and doesn't backport very cleanly to the LTS branches. So this fix is only applicable to the 4.19, 4.14, 4.9, and 4.4 LTS branches. I missed the -stable email, but will re-add it to this thread with the re-worked patch.
Thanks,
Will
Quoted 25 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Hi William,
Quoted 5 lines · William Mcvicker
Hi Pablo,
Yes, I believe this oops is only triggered by userspace when the user specifically passes in an invalid
nf_nat_l3protosindex. I'm happy to re-work the patch to check for this inctnetlink_create_conntrack().Great.
Note that this code does not exist in the tree anymore. I'm not sure if this problem still exists upstream, this patch does not apply to nf.git. This fix should only go for -stable maintainers.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
BTW, do you have a Fixes: tag for this? This will be useful for -stable maintainer to pick up this fix.
Regarding the Fixes: tag, I don't have one offhand since this bug was reported to me, but I can search through the code history to find the commit that exposed this vulnerability.
That would be great.
Thank you.
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] netfilter: nat: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum
Hi,
I have attached the follow up fix that checks for the proto index during conntrack creation.
Thanks,
Will
Quoted 13 lines · William Mcvicker
Hi Pablo,
Quoted 3 lines
Note that this code does not exist in the tree anymore. I'm not sure if this problem still exists upstream, this patch does not apply to nf.git. This fix should only go for -stable maintainers.
Right, the vulnerability has been fixed by the refactor commit
fe2d0020994cd("netfilter: nat: removel4proto->in_range"), but this patch is a part of a full re-work of the code and doesn't backport very cleanly to the LTS branches. So this fix is only applicable to the 4.19, 4.14, 4.9, and 4.4 LTS branches. I missed the -stable email, but will re-add it to this thread with the re-worked patch.
Quoted 29 lines
Thanks,
WillQuoted 25 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Hi William,
Quoted 5 lines · William Mcvicker
Hi Pablo,
Yes, I believe this oops is only triggered by userspace when the user specifically passes in an invalid
nf_nat_l3protosindex. I'm happy to re-work the patch to check for this inctnetlink_create_conntrack().Great.
Note that this code does not exist in the tree anymore. I'm not sure if this problem still exists upstream, this patch does not apply to nf.git. This fix should only go for -stable maintainers.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
BTW, do you have a Fixes: tag for this? This will be useful for -stable maintainer to pick up this fix.
Regarding the Fixes: tag, I don't have one offhand since this bug was reported to me, but I can search through the code history to find the commit that exposed this vulnerability.
That would be great.
Thank you.
From 2a9d621fa5c225e6aece6b4622a9a816c6fcfa0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Will McVicker <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 13:10:43 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] netfilter: nat: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum
The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So check the tuple's family, e.g. l3num, when creating the conntrack in order to prevent an OOB memory access during setup. Here is an example kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in:... Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121) CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S W O 4.14.180-g051355490483 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121 pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 ... Call trace: __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468 nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258 ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x4c/0x228 ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x590/0xc40 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x31c/0x4d4 netlink_rcv_skb+0x100/0x184 nfnetlink_rcv+0xf4/0x180 netlink_unicast+0x360/0x770 netlink_sendmsg+0x5a0/0x6a4 ___sys_sendmsg+0x314/0x46c SyS_sendmsg+0xb4/0x108 el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +2 -0
@@ -1129,6 +1129,8 @@ ctnetlink_parse_tuple(const struct nlattr * const cda[],if (!tb[CTA_TUPLE_IP ])return -EINVAL ; +if (l3num >=NFPROTO_NUMPROTO ) +return -EINVAL ; tuple->src.l3num = l3num; err =ctnetlink_parse_tuple_ip (tb[CTA_TUPLE_IP ], tuple);
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.163.g6104cc2f0b6-goog
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 1/1] netfilter: nat: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum
Hi,
This patch is much smaller and if you confirm this is address the issue, then this is awesome.
On Mon, Aug 03, 2020 at 06:31:56PM +0000, William Mcvicker wrote:
[...]
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c ctnetlink_parse_tuple(const struct nlattr * const cda[], · line 1133
Quoted 10 lines
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +2
-0@@ -1129,6 +1129,8 @@ ctnetlink_parse_tuple(const struct nlattr * const cda[],if (!tb[CTA_TUPLE_IP ])return -EINVAL ; +if (l3num >=NFPROTO_NUMPROTO ) +return -EINVAL ;
l3num can only be either NFPROTO_IPV4 or NFPROTO_IPV6.
Other than that, bail out with EOPNOTSUPP.
Thank you.
v3 cover netfilter: nat: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum
Hi Pablo,
Quoted 2 lines
This patch is much smaller and if you confirm this is address the issue, then this is awesome.
Yes, I can confirm the updated patch does fix the kernel panic. I have retested on the Pixel 4 XL with version 4.14.180. Please see the updated patchset v3.
Thanks,
Will
Will McVicker (1):
netfilter: nat: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.297.g1956fa8f8d-goog
PATCH v3 1/1 netfilter: nat: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum
The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So check the tuple's family, e.g. l3num, when creating the conntrack in order to prevent an OOB memory access during setup. Here is an example kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in:... Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121) CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S W O 4.14.180-g051355490483 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121 pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 ... Call trace: __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468 nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258 ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x4c/0x228 ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x590/0xc40 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x31c/0x4d4 netlink_rcv_skb+0x100/0x184 nfnetlink_rcv+0xf4/0x180 netlink_unicast+0x360/0x770 netlink_sendmsg+0x5a0/0x6a4 ___sys_sendmsg+0x314/0x46c SyS_sendmsg+0xb4/0x108 el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +2 -0
@@ -1129,6 +1129,8 @@ ctnetlink_parse_tuple(const struct nlattr * const cda[],if (!tb[CTA_TUPLE_IP ])return -EINVAL ; +if (l3num !=NFPROTO_IPV4 && l3num !=NFPROTO_IPV6 ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; tuple->src.l3num = l3num; err =ctnetlink_parse_tuple_ip (tb[CTA_TUPLE_IP ], tuple);
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.297.g1956fa8f8d-goog
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 1/1] netfilter: nat: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum
Hi Will,
Given this is for -stable maintainers only, I'd suggest:
1) Specify what -stable kernel versions this patch applies to. Explain that this problem is gone since what kernel version.
2) Maybe clarify that this is only for stable in the patch subject, e.g. [PATCH -stable v3] netfilter: nat: add a range check for l3/l4
Otherwise, this -stable maintainers might not identify this patch as something that is targetted to them.
Thanks.
Quoted 52 lines · Will McVicker
The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So check the tuple's family, e.g. l3num, when creating the conntrack in order to prevent an OOB memory access during setup. Here is an example kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than
NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in:... Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121) CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S W O 4.14.180-g051355490483 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121 pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 ... Call trace: __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468 nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258 ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x4c/0x228 ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x590/0xc40 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x31c/0x4d4 netlink_rcv_skb+0x100/0x184 nfnetlink_rcv+0xf4/0x180 netlink_unicast+0x360/0x770 netlink_sendmsg+0x5a0/0x6a4 ___sys_sendmsg+0x314/0x46c SyS_sendmsg+0xb4/0x108 el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38Fixes c1d10adb4a521 ("[NETFILTER]: Add ctnetlink port for nf_conntrack")Signed-off-by Will McVicker <[email protected]>--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +2
-0@@ -1129,6 +1129,8 @@ ctnetlink_parse_tuple(const struct nlattr * const cda[],if (!tb[CTA_TUPLE_IP ])return -EINVAL ; +if (l3num !=NFPROTO_IPV4 && l3num !=NFPROTO_IPV6 ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; tuple->src.l3num = l3num; err =ctnetlink_parse_tuple_ip (tb[CTA_TUPLE_IP ], tuple);Signature · 1 line
2.28.0.297.g1956fa8f8d-goog
Florian Westphal
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 1/1] netfilter: nat: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum
Quoted 9 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Hi Will,
Given this is for -stable maintainers only, I'd suggest:
1) Specify what -stable kernel versions this patch applies to. Explain that this problem is gone since what kernel version.
2) Maybe clarify that this is only for stable in the patch subject, e.g. [PATCH -stable v3] netfilter: nat: add a range check for l3/l4
Hmm, we silently accept a tuple that we can't really deal with, no?
Quoted 2 lines
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c ctnetlink_parse_tuple(const struct nlattr * const cda[], · line 1133
Quoted 2 lines
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +2
-0+if (l3num !=NFPROTO_IPV4 && l3num !=NFPROTO_IPV6 ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
I vote to apply this to nf.git
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 1/1] netfilter: nat: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum
Quoted 5 lines · Florian Westphal
Quoted 4 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Hi Will,
Given this is for -stable maintainers only, I'd suggest:
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
1) Specify what -stable kernel versions this patch applies to. Explain that this problem is gone since what kernel version.
2) Maybe clarify that this is only for stable in the patch subject, e.g. [PATCH -stable v3] netfilter: nat: add a range check for l3/l4
Hmm, we silently accept a tuple that we can't really deal with, no?
Oh, I overlook, existing kernels are affected. You're right.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+ if (l3num != NFPROTO_IPV4 && l3num != NFPROTO_IPV6) + return -EOPNOTSUPP;I vote to apply this to nf.git
I have rebased this patch on top of nf.git, attached what I'll apply to nf.git.
From 4d3426b91eba6eb28f38a2b06ee024aff861aa16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Will McVicker <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 19:38:32 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] netfilter: ctnetlink: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum
The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So check the tuple's family, e.g. l3num, when creating the conntrack in order to prevent an OOB memory access during setup. Here is an example kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in:... Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121) CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S W O 4.14.180-g051355490483 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121 pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 ... Call trace: __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468 nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258 ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x4c/0x228 ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x590/0xc40 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x31c/0x4d4 netlink_rcv_skb+0x100/0x184 nfnetlink_rcv+0xf4/0x180 netlink_unicast+0x360/0x770 netlink_sendmsg+0x5a0/0x6a4 ___sys_sendmsg+0x314/0x46c SyS_sendmsg+0xb4/0x108 el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +2 -1
@@ -1404,7 +1404,8 @@ ctnetlink_parse_tuple_filter(const struct nlattr * const cda[],if (err <0 )return err; - +if (l3num !=NFPROTO_IPV4 && l3num !=NFPROTO_IPV6 ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; tuple->src.l3num = l3num; if (flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_IP_DST) ||
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] netfilter: nat: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum
In reply to Pablo Neira AyusoHi Will, Pablo,
Quoted 2 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
This patch is much smaller and if you confirm this is address the issue, then this is awesome.
Did that ever get confirmed? AFAICT, nothing ended up landing in the stable trees for this.
Cheers,
Will
Quoted 18 lines · William Mcvicker
[...]
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c ctnetlink_parse_tuple(const struct nlattr * const cda[], · line 1133
Quoted 10 lines
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +2
-0@@ -1129,6 +1129,8 @@ ctnetlink_parse_tuple(const struct nlattr * const cda[],if (!tb[CTA_TUPLE_IP ])return -EINVAL ; +if (l3num >=NFPROTO_NUMPROTO ) +return -EINVAL ;l3num can only be either
NFPROTO_IPV4orNFPROTO_IPV6.Other than that, bail out with EOPNOTSUPP.
Thank you.
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] netfilter: nat: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum
Hi Will,
Pablo is going to add the latest patch to the nf.git tree. Once that happens, I'm going to propose the patch in nf.git get cherry-picked to the -stable branches.
Thanks,
Will
Quoted 33 lines · Will Deacon
Hi Will, Pablo,
Quoted 2 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
This patch is much smaller and if you confirm this is address the issue, then this is awesome.
Did that ever get confirmed? AFAICT, nothing ended up landing in the stable trees for this.
Cheers,
Will
Quoted 18 lines · William Mcvicker
[...]
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c ctnetlink_parse_tuple(const struct nlattr * const cda[], · line 1133
Quoted 10 lines
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +2
-0@@ -1129,6 +1129,8 @@ ctnetlink_parse_tuple(const struct nlattr * const cda[],if (!tb[CTA_TUPLE_IP ])return -EINVAL ; +if (l3num >=NFPROTO_NUMPROTO ) +return -EINVAL ;l3num can only be either
NFPROTO_IPV4orNFPROTO_IPV6.Other than that, bail out with EOPNOTSUPP.
Thank you.