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add ima_arch support for ARM64

PATCH Superseded Chester Lin 3 participants 12 messages Sep 4, 2020 – Oct 12, 2020

Subsystems (4)

v1 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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#0 lore raw

cover add ima_arch support for ARM64

Add IMA arch dependent support for ARM64. Some IMA functions can check arch-specific status before running. For example, the ima_load_data function or the boot param "ima_appraise=" should not be executed when UEFI secure boot is enabled. We want to fill the gap in order to complete the IMA support on ARM64.

Chester Lin (6):
efistub: pass uefi secureboot flag via fdt params efi/arm: a helper to parse secure boot param in fdt params
efi: add secure boot flag
efi/arm: check secure boot status in efi init arm64/ima: add ima arch support
docs/arm: add the description of uefi-secure-boot param

 Documentation/arm/uefi.rst         |  2 ++
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                 |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile         |  2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/ima_arch.c       | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c    |  3 +++
 drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c   | 23 ++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/linux/efi.h                |  2 ++
 8 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/ima_arch.c
Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/6 efistub: pass uefi secureboot flag via fdt params

Add a new UEFI parameter: "linux,uefi-secure-boot" in fdt boot params as other architectures have done in their own boot data. For example, the boot_params->secure_boot in x86.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c +38 -1
index 11ecf3c4640e..c9a341e4715f 100644
@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@ static efi_status_t update_fdt(void *orig_fdt, unsigned long orig_fdt_size,
 	if (status)
 		goto fdt_set_fail;
 
+	status = fdt_setprop_var(fdt, node, "linux,uefi-secure-boot", fdt_val32);
+	if (status)
+		goto fdt_set_fail;
+
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) {
 		efi_status_t efi_status;
 
@@ -199,6 +203,24 @@ static efi_status_t update_fdt_memmap(void *fdt, struct efi_boot_memmap *map)
 	return EFI_SUCCESS;
 }
 
+static efi_status_t update_fdt_secboot(void *fdt, u32 secboot)
+{
+	int node = fdt_path_offset(fdt, "/chosen");
+	u32 fdt_val32;
+	int err;
+
+	if (node < 0)
+		return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
+
+	fdt_val32 = cpu_to_fdt32(secboot);
+
+	err = fdt_setprop_inplace_var(fdt, node, "linux,uefi-secure-boot", fdt_val32);
+	if (err)
+		return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
+
+	return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
 struct exit_boot_struct {
 	efi_memory_desc_t	*runtime_map;
 	int			*runtime_entry_count;
@@ -208,6 +230,9 @@ struct exit_boot_struct {
 static efi_status_t exit_boot_func(struct efi_boot_memmap *map,
 				   void *priv)
 {
+	efi_status_t status;
+	enum efi_secureboot_mode secboot_status;
+	u32 secboot_var = 0;
 	struct exit_boot_struct *p = priv;
 	/*
 	 * Update the memory map with virtual addresses. The function will also
@@ -217,7 +242,19 @@ static efi_status_t exit_boot_func(struct efi_boot_memmap *map,
 	efi_get_virtmap(*map->map, *map->map_size, *map->desc_size,
 			p->runtime_map, p->runtime_entry_count);
 
-	return update_fdt_memmap(p->new_fdt_addr, map);
+	status = update_fdt_memmap(p->new_fdt_addr, map);
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return status;
+
+	secboot_status = efi_get_secureboot();
+
+	if (secboot_status == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
+		secboot_var = 1;
+
+	status = update_fdt_secboot(p->new_fdt_addr, secboot_var);
+
+	return status;
 }
 
 #ifndef MAX_FDT_SIZE
Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
maintainer
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/6] efistub: pass uefi secureboot flag via fdt params

Quoted 6 lines · Chester Lin

Add a new UEFI parameter: "linux,uefi-secure-boot" in fdt boot params as other architectures have done in their own boot data. For example, the boot_params->secure_boot in x86.

Why do we need this flag? Can't the OS simply check the variable directly?

Quoted 76 lines
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c +38 -2
index 11ecf3c4640e..c9a341e4715f 100644
@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@ static efi_status_t update_fdt(void *orig_fdt, unsigned long orig_fdt_size,
        if (status)
                goto fdt_set_fail;
 
+       status = fdt_setprop_var(fdt, node, "linux,uefi-secure-boot", fdt_val32);
+       if (status)
+               goto fdt_set_fail;
+
        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) {
                efi_status_t efi_status;
 
@@ -199,6 +203,24 @@ static efi_status_t update_fdt_memmap(void *fdt, struct efi_boot_memmap *map)
        return EFI_SUCCESS;
 }
 
+static efi_status_t update_fdt_secboot(void *fdt, u32 secboot)
+{
+       int node = fdt_path_offset(fdt, "/chosen");
+       u32 fdt_val32;
+       int err;
+
+       if (node < 0)
+               return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
+
+       fdt_val32 = cpu_to_fdt32(secboot);
+
+       err = fdt_setprop_inplace_var(fdt, node, "linux,uefi-secure-boot", fdt_val32);
+       if (err)
+               return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
+
+       return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
 struct exit_boot_struct {
        efi_memory_desc_t       *runtime_map;
        int                     *runtime_entry_count;
@@ -208,6 +230,9 @@ struct exit_boot_struct {
 static efi_status_t exit_boot_func(struct efi_boot_memmap *map,
                                   void *priv)
 {
+       efi_status_t status;
+       enum efi_secureboot_mode secboot_status;
+       u32 secboot_var = 0;
        struct exit_boot_struct *p = priv;
        /*
         * Update the memory map with virtual addresses. The function will also
@@ -217,7 +242,19 @@ static efi_status_t exit_boot_func(struct efi_boot_memmap *map,
        efi_get_virtmap(*map->map, *map->map_size, *map->desc_size,
                        p->runtime_map, p->runtime_entry_count);
 
-       return update_fdt_memmap(p->new_fdt_addr, map);
+       status = update_fdt_memmap(p->new_fdt_addr, map);
+
+       if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+               return status;
+
+       secboot_status = efi_get_secureboot();
+
+       if (secboot_status == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
+               secboot_var = 1;
+
+       status = update_fdt_secboot(p->new_fdt_addr, secboot_var);
+
+       return status;
 }
 
 #ifndef MAX_FDT_SIZE
--
Quoted 2 lines

2.26.1

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/6] efistub: pass uefi secureboot flag via fdt params

Hi Ard,

Quoted 10 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 6 lines · Chester Lin

Add a new UEFI parameter: "linux,uefi-secure-boot" in fdt boot params as other architectures have done in their own boot data. For example, the boot_params->secure_boot in x86.

Why do we need this flag? Can't the OS simply check the variable directly?

In fact, there's a difficulty to achieve this.

When linux kernel is booting on ARM, the runtime services are enabled later on. It's done by arm_enable_runtime_services(), which is registered as an early_initcall. Before it calls efi_native_runtime_setup(), all EFI runtime callbacks are still NULL so calling efi.get_variable() will cause NULL pointer dereference.

There's a case that arch_ima_get_secureboot() can be called in early boot stage. For example, when you try to set "ima_appraise=off" in kernel command line, it's actually handled early:

[    0.000000] Kernel command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/Image-5.9.0-rc3-9.gdd61cda-
vanilla root=UUID=a88bfb80-8abb-425c-a0f3-ad317465c28b splash=silent mitigations
=auto ignore_loglevel earlycon=pl011,mmio,0x9000000 console=ttyAMA0 ima_appraise=off
[    0.000000] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=off boot parameter option
[    0.000000] Dentry cache hash table entries: 1048576 (order: 11, 8388608 bytes, linear)

However EFI services are remapped and enabled afterwards.

[    0.082286] rcu: Hierarchical SRCU implementation.
[    0.089592] Remapping and enabling EFI services.
[    0.097509] smp: Bringing up secondary CPUs ...

Another problem is that efi_rts_wq is created in subsys_initcall so we have to wait for both EFI services mapping and the workqueue get initiated before calling efi.get_variable() on ARM.

The only way I can think of is to put a flag via fdt params. May I have your suggestions? I will appreciate if there's any better approach.

Thanks,
Chester

Quoted 74 lines
Quoted 74 lines
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c +38 -1
index 11ecf3c4640e..c9a341e4715f 100644
@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@ static efi_status_t update_fdt(void *orig_fdt, unsigned long orig_fdt_size,
        if (status)
                goto fdt_set_fail;
 
+       status = fdt_setprop_var(fdt, node, "linux,uefi-secure-boot", fdt_val32);
+       if (status)
+               goto fdt_set_fail;
+
        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) {
                efi_status_t efi_status;
 
@@ -199,6 +203,24 @@ static efi_status_t update_fdt_memmap(void *fdt, struct efi_boot_memmap *map)
        return EFI_SUCCESS;
 }
 
+static efi_status_t update_fdt_secboot(void *fdt, u32 secboot)
+{
+       int node = fdt_path_offset(fdt, "/chosen");
+       u32 fdt_val32;
+       int err;
+
+       if (node < 0)
+               return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
+
+       fdt_val32 = cpu_to_fdt32(secboot);
+
+       err = fdt_setprop_inplace_var(fdt, node, "linux,uefi-secure-boot", fdt_val32);
+       if (err)
+               return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
+
+       return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
 struct exit_boot_struct {
        efi_memory_desc_t       *runtime_map;
        int                     *runtime_entry_count;
@@ -208,6 +230,9 @@ struct exit_boot_struct {
 static efi_status_t exit_boot_func(struct efi_boot_memmap *map,
                                   void *priv)
 {
+       efi_status_t status;
+       enum efi_secureboot_mode secboot_status;
+       u32 secboot_var = 0;
        struct exit_boot_struct *p = priv;
        /*
         * Update the memory map with virtual addresses. The function will also
@@ -217,7 +242,19 @@ static efi_status_t exit_boot_func(struct efi_boot_memmap *map,
        efi_get_virtmap(*map->map, *map->map_size, *map->desc_size,
                        p->runtime_map, p->runtime_entry_count);
 
-       return update_fdt_memmap(p->new_fdt_addr, map);
+       status = update_fdt_memmap(p->new_fdt_addr, map);
+
+       if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+               return status;
+
+       secboot_status = efi_get_secureboot();
+
+       if (secboot_status == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
+               secboot_var = 1;
+
+       status = update_fdt_secboot(p->new_fdt_addr, secboot_var);
+
+       return status;
 }
 
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c +0 -1
 #ifndef MAX_FDT_SIZE
--

2.26.1

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/6] efistub: pass uefi secureboot flag via fdt params

Quoted 41 lines · Chester Lin

Hi Ard,

Quoted 10 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 6 lines · Chester Lin

Add a new UEFI parameter: "linux,uefi-secure-boot" in fdt boot params as other architectures have done in their own boot data. For example, the boot_params->secure_boot in x86.

Why do we need this flag? Can't the OS simply check the variable directly?

In fact, there's a difficulty to achieve this.

When linux kernel is booting on ARM, the runtime services are enabled later on. It's done by arm_enable_runtime_services(), which is registered as an early_initcall. Before it calls efi_native_runtime_setup(), all EFI runtime callbacks are still NULL so calling efi.get_variable() will cause NULL pointer dereference.

There's a case that arch_ima_get_secureboot() can be called in early boot stage. For example, when you try to set "ima_appraise=off" in kernel command line, it's actually handled early:

[    0.000000] Kernel command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/Image-5.9.0-rc3-9.gdd61cda-
vanilla root=UUID=a88bfb80-8abb-425c-a0f3-ad317465c28b splash=silent mitigations
=auto ignore_loglevel earlycon=pl011,mmio,0x9000000 console=ttyAMA0 ima_appraise=off
[    0.000000] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=off boot parameter option
[    0.000000] Dentry cache hash table entries: 1048576 (order: 11, 8388608 bytes, linear)

However EFI services are remapped and enabled afterwards.

[    0.082286] rcu: Hierarchical SRCU implementation.
[    0.089592] Remapping and enabling EFI services.
[    0.097509] smp: Bringing up secondary CPUs ...

Another problem is that efi_rts_wq is created in subsys_initcall so we have to wait for both EFI services mapping and the workqueue get initiated before calling efi.get_variable() on ARM.

Quoted 5 lines

The only way I can think of is to put a flag via fdt params. May I have your suggestions? I will appreciate if there's any better approach.

Thanks,
Chester

Ping. May I have some suggestions here?

Thanks,
Chester

Quoted 75 lines
Quoted 75 lines
Quoted 75 lines
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c +38 -1
index 11ecf3c4640e..c9a341e4715f 100644
@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@ static efi_status_t update_fdt(void *orig_fdt, unsigned long orig_fdt_size,
        if (status)
                goto fdt_set_fail;
 
+       status = fdt_setprop_var(fdt, node, "linux,uefi-secure-boot", fdt_val32);
+       if (status)
+               goto fdt_set_fail;
+
        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) {
                efi_status_t efi_status;
 
@@ -199,6 +203,24 @@ static efi_status_t update_fdt_memmap(void *fdt, struct efi_boot_memmap *map)
        return EFI_SUCCESS;
 }
 
+static efi_status_t update_fdt_secboot(void *fdt, u32 secboot)
+{
+       int node = fdt_path_offset(fdt, "/chosen");
+       u32 fdt_val32;
+       int err;
+
+       if (node < 0)
+               return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
+
+       fdt_val32 = cpu_to_fdt32(secboot);
+
+       err = fdt_setprop_inplace_var(fdt, node, "linux,uefi-secure-boot", fdt_val32);
+       if (err)
+               return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
+
+       return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
 struct exit_boot_struct {
        efi_memory_desc_t       *runtime_map;
        int                     *runtime_entry_count;
@@ -208,6 +230,9 @@ struct exit_boot_struct {
 static efi_status_t exit_boot_func(struct efi_boot_memmap *map,
                                   void *priv)
 {
+       efi_status_t status;
+       enum efi_secureboot_mode secboot_status;
+       u32 secboot_var = 0;
        struct exit_boot_struct *p = priv;
        /*
         * Update the memory map with virtual addresses. The function will also
@@ -217,7 +242,19 @@ static efi_status_t exit_boot_func(struct efi_boot_memmap *map,
        efi_get_virtmap(*map->map, *map->map_size, *map->desc_size,
                        p->runtime_map, p->runtime_entry_count);
 
-       return update_fdt_memmap(p->new_fdt_addr, map);
+       status = update_fdt_memmap(p->new_fdt_addr, map);
+
+       if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+               return status;
+
+       secboot_status = efi_get_secureboot();
+
+       if (secboot_status == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
+               secboot_var = 1;
+
+       status = update_fdt_secboot(p->new_fdt_addr, secboot_var);
+
+       return status;
 }
 
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c +0 -1
 #ifndef MAX_FDT_SIZE
--

2.26.1

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

maintainer
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/6] efistub: pass uefi secureboot flag via fdt params

Quoted 43 lines · Chester Lin
Quoted 41 lines · Chester Lin

Hi Ard,

Quoted 10 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 6 lines · Chester Lin

Add a new UEFI parameter: "linux,uefi-secure-boot" in fdt boot params as other architectures have done in their own boot data. For example, the boot_params->secure_boot in x86.

Why do we need this flag? Can't the OS simply check the variable directly?

In fact, there's a difficulty to achieve this.

When linux kernel is booting on ARM, the runtime services are enabled later on. It's done by arm_enable_runtime_services(), which is registered as an early_initcall. Before it calls efi_native_runtime_setup(), all EFI runtime callbacks are still NULL so calling efi.get_variable() will cause NULL pointer dereference.

There's a case that arch_ima_get_secureboot() can be called in early boot stage. For example, when you try to set "ima_appraise=off" in kernel command line, it's actually handled early:

[    0.000000] Kernel command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/Image-5.9.0-rc3-9.gdd61cda-
vanilla root=UUID=a88bfb80-8abb-425c-a0f3-ad317465c28b splash=silent mitigations
=auto ignore_loglevel earlycon=pl011,mmio,0x9000000 console=ttyAMA0 ima_appraise=off
[    0.000000] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=off boot parameter option
[    0.000000] Dentry cache hash table entries: 1048576 (order: 11, 8388608 bytes, linear)

However EFI services are remapped and enabled afterwards.

[    0.082286] rcu: Hierarchical SRCU implementation.
[    0.089592] Remapping and enabling EFI services.
[    0.097509] smp: Bringing up secondary CPUs ...

Another problem is that efi_rts_wq is created in subsys_initcall so we have to wait for both EFI services mapping and the workqueue get initiated before calling efi.get_variable() on ARM.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

The only way I can think of is to put a flag via fdt params. May I have your suggestions? I will appreciate if there's any better approach.

Thanks,
Chester

Ping. May I have some suggestions here?

IMA itself is initialized as a late initcall. The only reason you see this message early is because this is where the parsing of the command line parameter happens.

I'll send out a patch with a proposed solution for this issue.

#6 lore raw

PATCH 2/6 efi/arm: a helper to parse secure boot param in fdt params

In reply to Chester Lin

Add a helper to query the UEFI secureboot param from the chosen node in FDT.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/efi.h              |  1 +
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c +23 -0
index bb042ab7c2be..d58ec4119bcf 100644
@@ -124,3 +124,26 @@ u64 __init efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *mm)
 	pr_info("UEFI not found.\n");
 	return 0;
 }
+
+bool __init efi_secureboot_enabled_in_fdt(void)
+{
+	const void *fdt = initial_boot_params;
+	int node;
+	u32 secboot;
+
+
+	node = fdt_path_offset(fdt, "/chosen");
+
+	if (node < 0) {
+		pr_err("chosen node not found.\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (!efi_get_fdt_prop(fdt, node, "linux,uefi-secure-boot",
+			      "SECURE BOOT", &secboot, sizeof(secboot))) {
+		if (secboot)
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
include/linux/efi.h +1 -0
index 73db1ae04cef..315126b2f5e9 100644
@@ -663,6 +663,7 @@ extern int efi_mem_reserve_persistent(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size);
 extern void efi_initialize_iomem_resources(struct resource *code_resource,
 		struct resource *data_resource, struct resource *bss_resource);
 extern u64 efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *data);
+extern bool __init efi_secureboot_enabled_in_fdt(void);
 extern struct kobject *efi_kobj;
 
 extern int efi_reboot_quirk_mode;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
#7 lore raw

PATCH 3/6 efi: add secure boot flag

In reply to Chester Lin

Add a new EFI flag to indicate whether secure boot is enabled by UEFI firmware or not.

---
 include/linux/efi.h | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
include/linux/efi.h +1 -0
index 315126b2f5e9..82a19bb0237a 100644
@@ -784,6 +784,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
 #define EFI_MEM_ATTR		10	/* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
 #define EFI_MEM_NO_SOFT_RESERVE	11	/* Is the kernel configured to ignore soft reservations? */
 #define EFI_PRESERVE_BS_REGIONS	12	/* Are EFI boot-services memory segments available? */
+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT		13	/* Is EFI secure-boot enabled? */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
#8 lore raw

PATCH 4/6 efi/arm: check secure boot status in efi init

In reply to Chester Lin

set EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag when UEFI secure boot is eanbled on ARM.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c +3 -0
index 71c445d20258..70f2eaf5fb1a 100644
@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (efi_secureboot_enabled_in_fdt())
+		set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
+
 	reserve_regions();
 	efi_esrt_init();
 
Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
#9 lore raw

PATCH 5/6 arm64/ima: add ima arch support

In reply to Chester Lin

Add arm64 IMA arch support. The arch policy is inherited from x86.

---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig           |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile   |  2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/ima_arch.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/ima_arch.c
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1 -0
index 6d232837cbee..b5518e7b604d 100644
@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ config ARM64
 	select SWIOTLB
 	select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE
 	select THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
+	imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT    if EFI
 	help
 	  ARM 64-bit (AArch64) Linux support.
 
arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile +2 -0
index a561cbb91d4d..0300ab60785d 100644
@@ -71,3 +71,5 @@ extra-y					+= $(head-y) vmlinux.lds
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_DEBUG_EFI),y)
 AFLAGS_head.o += -DVMLINUX_PATH="\"$(realpath $(objtree)/vmlinux)\""
 endif
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT)	+= ima_arch.o
arch/arm64/kernel/ima_arch.c new file +37 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..46f5641c3da5
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation
+ */
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/* secureboot arch rules */
+static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
+#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
+	"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
+	"measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
+#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
+	"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
+#endif
+	"measure func=MODULE_CHECK",
+	NULL
+};
+
+const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
+			set_module_sig_enforced();
+		return sb_arch_rules;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.26.1
maintainer Reviewed-by on v1 5/6
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5/6] arm64/ima: add ima arch support

Quoted 3 lines · Chester Lin

Add arm64 IMA arch support. The arch policy is inherited from x86.

The "secureboot arch rules" comment should be updated to reflect that the policy is both "secure and trusted boot arch rules", both here and in x86.

thanks,

Mimi

Quoted 72 lines
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig           |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile   |  2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/ima_arch.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/ima_arch.c
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1 -0
index 6d232837cbee..b5518e7b604d 100644
@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ config ARM64
 	select SWIOTLB
 	select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE
 	select THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
+	imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT    if EFI
 	help
 	  ARM 64-bit (AArch64) Linux support.
 
arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile +2 -0
index a561cbb91d4d..0300ab60785d 100644
@@ -71,3 +71,5 @@ extra-y					+= $(head-y) vmlinux.lds
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_DEBUG_EFI),y)
 AFLAGS_head.o += -DVMLINUX_PATH="\"$(realpath $(objtree)/vmlinux)\""
 endif
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT)	+= ima_arch.o
arch/arm64/kernel/ima_arch.c new file +37 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..46f5641c3da5
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation
+ */
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/* secureboot arch rules */
+static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
+#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
+	"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
+	"measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
+#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
+	"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
+#endif
+	"measure func=MODULE_CHECK",
+	NULL
+};
+
+const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
+			set_module_sig_enforced();
+		return sb_arch_rules;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
#11 lore raw

PATCH 6/6 docs/arm: add the description of uefi-secure-boot param

In reply to Chester Lin

Add the description of "linux,uefi-secure-boot" param.

---
 Documentation/arm/uefi.rst | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
Documentation/arm/uefi.rst +2 -0
index f868330df6be..7d9c6a1697af 100644
@@ -64,4 +64,6 @@ linux,uefi-mmap-desc-size   32-bit   Size in bytes of each entry in the UEFI
                                      memory map.
 
 linux,uefi-mmap-desc-ver    32-bit   Version of the mmap descriptor format.
+
+linux,uefi-secure-boot      32-bit   UEFI Secure Boot [0: Disabled 1: Enabled]
 ==========================  ======   ===========================================
Signature · 1 line
2.26.1