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hdlc_ppp: add range checks in ppp_cp_parse_cr()

PATCH Superseded Dan Carpenter 2 participants 4 messages Sep 8, 2020 – Sep 10, 2020 2 messages not in the archive

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A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]

#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 hdlc_ppp: add range checks in ppp_cp_parse_cr()

There were two bugs here:
1) If opt[1] is zero then this results in a forever loop. If the value is less than 2 then it is invalid.
2) We assume that "len" is more than sizeof(valid_accm) or 6 which can result in memory corruption.

Fixes e022c2f07ae5 ("WAN: new synchronous PPP implementation for generic HDLC.")

---
This was sent to the security list, but we normally just handle networking driver bugs through the regular netdev list.

 drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c +11 -5
index 48ced3912576..4e906b79a85f 100644
@@ -383,11 +383,8 @@ static void ppp_cp_parse_cr(struct net_device *dev, u16 pid, u8 id,
 	}
 
 	for (opt = data; len; len -= opt[1], opt += opt[1]) {
-		if (len < 2 || len < opt[1]) {
-			dev->stats.rx_errors++;
-			kfree(out);
-			return; /* bad packet, drop silently */
-		}
+		if (len < 2 || opt[1] < 2 || len < opt[1])
+			goto err_out;
 
 		if (pid == PID_LCP)
 			switch (opt[0]) {
@@ -395,6 +392,8 @@ static void ppp_cp_parse_cr(struct net_device *dev, u16 pid, u8 id,
 				continue; /* MRU always OK and > 1500 bytes? */
 
 			case LCP_OPTION_ACCM: /* async control character map */
+				if (len < sizeof(valid_accm))
+					goto err_out;
 				if (!memcmp(opt, valid_accm,
 					    sizeof(valid_accm)))
 					continue;
@@ -406,6 +405,8 @@ static void ppp_cp_parse_cr(struct net_device *dev, u16 pid, u8 id,
 				}
 				break;
 			case LCP_OPTION_MAGIC:
+				if (len < 6)
+					goto err_out;
 				if (opt[1] != 6 || (!opt[2] && !opt[3] &&
 						    !opt[4] && !opt[5]))
 					break; /* reject invalid magic number */
@@ -424,6 +425,11 @@ static void ppp_cp_parse_cr(struct net_device *dev, u16 pid, u8 id,
 		ppp_cp_event(dev, pid, RCR_GOOD, CP_CONF_ACK, id, req_len, data);
 
 	kfree(out);
+	return;
+
+err_out:
+	dev->stats.rx_errors++;
+	kfree(out);
 }
 
 static int ppp_rx(struct sk_buff *skb)
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): CAMnVd19nWToENW3X7v_PZN4snoXAoLgqKqn=dezXnd=z89zL7Q@mail.gmail.com

#3 lore raw
Quoted 17 lines · nan chen

Looks like the judgment of len <sizeof(valid_accm) has a problem. The judgment cannot avoid the memory overflow of the memcpy below.
case LCP_OPTION_ACCM: /* async control character
map */

drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c +2 -0
+                               if (len < sizeof(valid_accm))
+                                       goto err_out;

Assume that the initial value of len is 10.Then the length of 'out' memory is 10.
And assume the value of opt[1] in each loop is 2.
Then it will loop 3 times.
3 times memcpy will cause the 'out' memory to be overwritten by 18 bytes (

Quoted 1 line

10 bytes). This will be memory overflow.

I think the correct way is to judge the value of opt[1] like this:
. case LCP_OPTION_ACCM: /* async control character
map */

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2 -0
+                               if (opt[1] < sizeof(valid_accm))
+                                       goto err_out;

Yeah. You're right. The "nak_len" count would grow faster than it should leading to memory corruption. I'll resend.

regards,
dan carpenter

#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 hdlc_ppp: add range checks in ppp_cp_parse_cr()

In reply to a message not in the archive

There are a couple bugs here:
1) If opt[1] is zero then this results in a forever loop. If the value is less than 2 then it is invalid.
2) It assumes that "len" is more than sizeof(valid_accm) or 6 which can result in memory corruption.

In the case of LCP_OPTION_ACCM, then we should check "opt[1]" instead of "len" because, if "opt[1]" is less than sizeof(valid_accm) then "nak_len" gets out of sync and it can lead to memory corruption in the next iterations through the loop. In case of LCP_OPTION_MAGIC, the only valid value for opt[1] is 6, but the code is trying to log invalid data so we should only discard the data when "len" is less than 6 because that leads to a read overflow.

Fixes e022c2f07ae5 ("WAN: new synchronous PPP implementation for generic HDLC.")

---
v2: check opt[1] < 6 instead of len < 6 for the LCP_OPTION_ACCM case.

 drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c +11 -5
index 48ced3912576..16f33d1ffbfb 100644
@@ -383,11 +383,8 @@ static void ppp_cp_parse_cr(struct net_device *dev, u16 pid, u8 id,
 	}
 
 	for (opt = data; len; len -= opt[1], opt += opt[1]) {
-		if (len < 2 || len < opt[1]) {
-			dev->stats.rx_errors++;
-			kfree(out);
-			return; /* bad packet, drop silently */
-		}
+		if (len < 2 || opt[1] < 2 || len < opt[1])
+			goto err_out;
 
 		if (pid == PID_LCP)
 			switch (opt[0]) {
@@ -395,6 +392,8 @@ static void ppp_cp_parse_cr(struct net_device *dev, u16 pid, u8 id,
 				continue; /* MRU always OK and > 1500 bytes? */
 
 			case LCP_OPTION_ACCM: /* async control character map */
+				if (opt[1] < sizeof(valid_accm))
+					goto err_out;
 				if (!memcmp(opt, valid_accm,
 					    sizeof(valid_accm)))
 					continue;
@@ -406,6 +405,8 @@ static void ppp_cp_parse_cr(struct net_device *dev, u16 pid, u8 id,
 				}
 				break;
 			case LCP_OPTION_MAGIC:
+				if (len < 6)
+					goto err_out;
 				if (opt[1] != 6 || (!opt[2] && !opt[3] &&
 						    !opt[4] && !opt[5]))
 					break; /* reject invalid magic number */
@@ -424,6 +425,11 @@ static void ppp_cp_parse_cr(struct net_device *dev, u16 pid, u8 id,
 		ppp_cp_event(dev, pid, RCR_GOOD, CP_CONF_ACK, id, req_len, data);
 
 	kfree(out);
+	return;
+
+err_out:
+	dev->stats.rx_errors++;
+	kfree(out);
 }
 
 static int ppp_rx(struct sk_buff *skb)
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
maintainer
#5 lore raw

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2020 12:46:48 +0300

Quoted 14 lines

There are a couple bugs here:
1) If opt[1] is zero then this results in a forever loop. If the value is less than 2 then it is invalid.
2) It assumes that "len" is more than sizeof(valid_accm) or 6 which can result in memory corruption.

In the case of LCP_OPTION_ACCM, then we should check "opt[1]" instead of "len" because, if "opt[1]" is less than sizeof(valid_accm) then "nak_len" gets out of sync and it can lead to memory corruption in the next iterations through the loop. In case of LCP_OPTION_MAGIC, the only valid value for opt[1] is 6, but the code is trying to log invalid data so we should only discard the data when "len" is less than 6 because that leads to a read overflow.

Quoted 7 lines
Fixes e022c2f07ae5 ("WAN: new synchronous PPP implementation for generic HDLC.")

---
v2: check opt[1] < 6 instead of len < 6 for the LCP_OPTION_ACCM case.

Applied and queued up for -stable, thanks Dan.