x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits
Subsystems (11)
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
PATCH v37 2/24 x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Add X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, which informs whether or not the CPU supports SGX Launch Control.
Add MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}, which when combined contain a SHA256 hash of a 3072-bit RSA public key. SGX backed software packages, so called enclaves, are always signed. All enclaves signed with the public key are unconditionally allowed to initialize. [1]
Add FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED, which informs whether the aformentioned MSRs are writable or not. If the bit is off, the public key MSRs are read-only for the OS.
If the MSRs are read-only, the platform must provide a launch enclave (LE). LE can create cryptographic tokens for other enclaves that they can pass together with their signature to the ENCLS(EINIT) opcode, which is used to initialize enclaves.
Linux is unlikely to support the locked configuration because it takes away the control of the launch decisions from the kernel.
[1] Intel SDM: 38.1.4 Intel SGX Launch Control Configuration
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_CLDEMOTE (16*32+25)/* CLDEMOTE instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIRI (16*32+27)/* MOVDIRI instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B (16*32+28)/* MOVDIR64B instruction */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC (16*32+30)/* Software Guard Extensions Launch Control */ /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000007 (EBX), word 17 */ #define X86_FEATURE_OVERFLOW_RECOV (17*32+ 0)/* MCA overflow recovery support */
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +7 -0
@@ -602,6 +602,7 @@#define FEAT_CTL_LOCKED BIT(0)#define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX BIT(1)#define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX BIT(2) +#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED BIT(17)#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED BIT(18)#define FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED BIT(20)
@@ -622,6 +623,12 @@#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV 0x0000008b +/* Intel SGX Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs */ +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 0x0000008C +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH1 0x0000008D +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH2 0x0000008E +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3 0x0000008F +#define MSR_IA32_SMM_MONITOR_CTL 0x0000009b#define MSR_IA32_SMBASE 0x0000009e
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Hi Jarko,
It looks like some of the patches weren't delivered to the lists. Patches 0, 1, 8, 9, and 17 seem to be missing.
Lore agrees with me:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/
Quoted 75 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Add
X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, which informs whether or not the CPU supports SGX Launch Control.Add MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}, which when combined contain a SHA256 hash of a 3072-bit RSA public key. SGX backed software packages, so called enclaves, are always signed. All enclaves signed with the public key are unconditionally allowed to initialize. [1]
Add
FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED, which informs whether the aformentioned MSRs are writable or not. If the bit is off, the public key MSRs are read-only for the OS.If the MSRs are read-only, the platform must provide a launch enclave (LE). LE can create cryptographic tokens for other enclaves that they can pass together with their signature to the ENCLS(EINIT) opcode, which is used to initialize enclaves.
Linux is unlikely to support the locked configuration because it takes away the control of the launch decisions from the kernel.
[1] Intel SDM: 38.1.4 Intel SGX Launch Control Configuration
Reviewed-by Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Acked-by Jethro Beekman <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Darren Kenny <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1
-0@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_CLDEMOTE (16*32+25)/* CLDEMOTE instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIRI (16*32+27)/* MOVDIRI instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B (16*32+28)/* MOVDIR64B instruction */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC (16*32+30)/* Software Guard Extensions Launch Control */ /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000007 (EBX), word 17 */ #define X86_FEATURE_OVERFLOW_RECOV (17*32+ 0)/* MCA overflow recovery support */ arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +7
-0@@ -602,6 +602,7 @@#define FEAT_CTL_LOCKED BIT(0)#define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX BIT(1)#define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX BIT(2) +#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED BIT(17)#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED BIT(18)#define FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED BIT(20)@@ -622,6 +623,12 @@#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV 0x0000008b +/* Intel SGX Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs */ +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 0x0000008C +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH1 0x0000008D +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH2 0x0000008E +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3 0x0000008F +#define MSR_IA32_SMM_MONITOR_CTL 0x0000009b#define MSR_IA32_SMBASE 0x0000009eSignature · 1 line
2.25.1
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Quoted 8 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Hi Jarko,
It looks like some of the patches weren't delivered to the lists. Patches 0, 1, 8, 9, and 17 seem to be missing.
Lore agrees with me:
And my first email to you bounced, similar to an email I tried sending to Kristen a few weeks ago. Something weird going on with Intel mail servers?
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Quoted 6 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 5 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Hi Jarko,
It looks like some of the patches weren't delivered to the lists. Patches 0, 1, 8, 9, and 17 seem to be missing.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Lore agrees with me:
And my first email to you bounced, similar to an email I tried sending to Kristen a few weeks ago. Something weird going on with Intel mail servers?
Probably. Our exchange servers got upgraded and many of the endpoints got changed in the process. It wouldn't surprise me in the least if there are gremlins in the new setup.
Quoted 6 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 5 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Hi Jarko,
It looks like some of the patches weren't delivered to the lists. Patches 0, 1, 8, 9, and 17 seem to be missing.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Lore agrees with me:
And my first email to you bounced, similar to an email I tried sending to Kristen a few weeks ago. Something weird going on with Intel mail servers?
Possible. I don't honestly know what is going on.
At least now all the patches are out:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/
Not sure if a resend would make sense for the full patch set but maybe I just do quick iteration and send v38 soon. And just in case use some alt smtp server.
/Jarkko
Quoted 17 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 6 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 5 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Hi Jarko,
It looks like some of the patches weren't delivered to the lists. Patches 0, 1, 8, 9, and 17 seem to be missing.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Lore agrees with me:
And my first email to you bounced, similar to an email I tried sending to Kristen a few weeks ago. Something weird going on with Intel mail servers?
Possible. I don't honestly know what is going on.
Quoted 7 lines
At least now all the patches are out:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/
Not sure if a resend would make sense for the full patch set but maybe I just do quick iteration and send v38 soon. And just in case use some alt smtp server.
I see the v37 missing patches now, but they're not threaded with the original thread. v38 has some missing patches as well.
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
I see the v37 missing patches now, but they're not threaded with the original thread.
Probably because he bounced only the ones you didn't get, separately.
Quoted 1 line
v38 has some missing patches as well.
And I got them twice. Can we please stop the spamming?
And yeah, use another mail service - all those companies switching the o365 and mimecast, means time to move kernel development off of company mail because company mail simply can't handle it.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteQuoted 6 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
I see the v37 missing patches now, but they're not threaded with the original thread.
Probably because he bounced only the ones you didn't get, separately.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
v38 has some missing patches as well.
And I got them twice. Can we please stop the spamming?
And yeah, use another mail service - all those companies switching the o365 and mimecast, means time to move kernel development off of company mail because company mail simply can't handle it.
If you getting them (twice?) and vger's not, it sounds like vger is dropping them for some reason.
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
If you getting them (twice?) and vger's not, it sounds like vger is dropping them for some reason.
Yes, this has kinda been the case last and this week, for whatever reason. From the two v38 submissions, I have only this in my LKML mbox and it looks like someone is dropping mail...
109127 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( : 35K|) [PATCH v38 00/24] Intel SGX foundations 109128 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( : 14K|) ├─>[PATCH v38 04/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures 109129 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( : 10K|) ├─>[PATCH v38 05/24] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions 109130 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( :4.5K|) ├─>[PATCH v38 07/24] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter 109131 C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( : 60|) ├─>[PATCH v38 10/24] mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect() 109132 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( : 14K|) ├─>[PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES 109133 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( :9.1K|) ├─>[PATCH v38 15/24] x86/sgx: Enable provisioning for remote attestation 109134 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( : 15K|) ├─>[PATCH v38 18/24] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions 109135 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( :5.4K|) ├─>[PATCH v38 19/24] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code 109136 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( :7.4K|) ├─>[PATCH v38 20/24] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling 109137 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( : 34K|) ├─>[PATCH v38 22/24] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX 109138 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( : 12K|) ├─>[PATCH v38 23/24] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals 109139 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( :4.0K|) └─>[PATCH v38 24/24] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS
109147 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( :5.8K|) ┬─>[PATCH v38 17/24] x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver 109148 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( :5.4K|) ├─>[PATCH v38 19/24] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code 109149 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( :7.4K|) ├─>[PATCH v38 20/24] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling 109150 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( : 15K|) ├─>[PATCH v38 21/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call 109151 N C Sep 15 Jarkko Sakkinen ( : 12K|) └─>[PATCH v38 23/24] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteQuoted 9 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 8 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
I see the v37 missing patches now, but they're not threaded with the original thread.
Probably because he bounced only the ones you didn't get, separately.
Quoted 1 line
v38 has some missing patches as well.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
And I got them twice. Can we please stop the spamming?
And yeah, use another mail service - all those companies switching the o365 and mimecast, means time to move kernel development off of company mail because company mail simply can't handle it.
If you getting them (twice?) and vger's not, it sounds like vger is dropping them for some reason.
It was my fault.
First time when I sent with mail.kapsi.fi I did not see anything for like 20 minutes or so. I thought that things went wrong. So, I applied git send-email another time for v38. Over hours both came to LKML as can be seen from here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/
I'll try to sort out kernel.org account thing asap. Already sent my key for the 2nd time to [email protected] albeit my PGP skills are not good enough to check whether the signatures for my key are somewhere.
/Jarkko
Quoted 6 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
I see the v37 missing patches now, but they're not threaded with the original thread.
Probably because he bounced only the ones you didn't get, separately.
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 1 line
v38 has some missing patches as well.
And I got them twice. Can we please stop the spamming?
And yeah, use another mail service - all those companies switching the o365 and mimecast, means time to move kernel development off of company mail because company mail simply can't handle it.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
The duplicate versions of v38 are equal. The "backup" server was just really slow with vger. That's why I retried.
As can be seen here both v38's are also complete:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/
I've tried for months to get kernel.org account but I have troubles getting my PGP trusted. I really would like to move the whole thing over there. And use that account for email.
Three maintainers have signed my key but when I do gpg --refresh, I do not get any signatures for my key. The command uses keys.openpgp.org. I have no idea if that is the correct key server or not. And I have no idea how PGP servers mirror stuff with each other. And I have not found anything on this from kernel documentation (e.g. PGP maintainer guide).
/Jarkko
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
The duplicate versions of v38 are equal. The "backup" server was just really slow with vger. That's why I retried.
Well, vger has been really slow for a while now...
Quoted 6 lines
As can be seen here both v38's are also complete:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/
I've tried for months to get kernel.org account but I have troubles getting my PGP trusted.
Have you tried this:
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/accounts.html
?
I believe you'll find enough people within Intel who are in the web of trust.
Quoted 2 lines
I really would like to move the whole thing over there. And use that account for email.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/mail.html
You'd need mailbox hosting etc as k.org doesn't have that.
Quoted 5 lines
Three maintainers have signed my key but when I do gpg --refresh, I do not get any signatures for my key. The command uses keys.openpgp.org. I have no idea if that is the correct key server or not. And I have no idea how PGP servers mirror stuff with each other. And I have not found anything on this from kernel documentation (e.g. PGP maintainer guide).
Yeah, see that accounts.html link I pasted above - "Exporting your public key".
HTH.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteQuoted 20 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 19 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 6 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 5 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Hi Jarko,
It looks like some of the patches weren't delivered to the lists. Patches 0, 1, 8, 9, and 17 seem to be missing.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Lore agrees with me:
And my first email to you bounced, similar to an email I tried sending to Kristen a few weeks ago. Something weird going on with Intel mail servers?
Possible. I don't honestly know what is going on.
At least now all the patches are out:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/
Not sure if a resend would make sense for the full patch set but maybe I just do quick iteration and send v38 soon. And just in case use some alt smtp server.
I see the v37 missing patches now, but they're not threaded with the original thread. v38 has some missing patches as well.
Now, v38 is there as complete but it has a duplicate version (they have exact same contents). Through the alternative mail server it just took hours to get them to LKML so I did another git send-email :-(
Anyway, there is no difference between the patch sets marked as v38.
Quoted 4 lines
Signature · 2 lines
-- Josh
/Jarkko
PATCH v37 3/24 x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX
In reply to a message not in the archiveFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Include SGX bit to the PF error codes and throw SIGSEGV with PF_SGX when a #PF with SGX set happens.
CPU throws a #PF with the SGX set in the event of Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) conflict. The EPCM is a CPU-internal table, which describes the properties for a enclave page. Enclaves are measured and signed software entities, which SGX hosts. [1]
Although the primary purpose of the EPCM conflict checks is to prevent malicious accesses to an enclave, an illegit access can happen also for legit reasons.
All SGX reserved memory, including EPCM is encrypted with a transient key that does not survive from the power transition. Throwing a SIGSEGV allows user space software to react when this happens (e.g. recreate the enclave, which was invalidated).
[1] Intel SDM: 36.5.1 Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)
--- arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 14 ++++++++------ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +8 -6
@@ -44,12 +44,13 @@ void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,/* * Page fault error code bits: * -* bit 0 == 0: no page found 1: protection fault -* bit 1 == 0: read access 1: write access -* bit 2 == 0: kernel-mode access 1: user-mode access -* bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected -* bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch -* bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access +* bit 0 == 0: no page found 1: protection fault +* bit 1 == 0: read access 1: write access +* bit 2 == 0: kernel-mode access 1: user-mode access +* bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected +* bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch +* bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access +* bit 15 == 1: inside SGX enclave */ enum x86_pf_error_code {X86_PF_PROT =1 <<0 ,
@@ -58,5 +59,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {X86_PF_RSVD =1 <<3 ,X86_PF_INSTR =1 <<4 ,X86_PF_PK =1 <<5 , + X86_PF_SGX = 1 << 15, };#endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +13 -0
@@ -1054,6 +1054,19 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)if (error_code &X86_PF_PK )return 1 ; +/* +* Access is blocked by the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), i.e. the +* access is allowed by the PTE but not the EPCM. This usually happens +* when the EPCM is yanked out from under us, e.g. by hardware after a +* suspend/resume cycle. In any case, software, i.e. the kernel, can't +* fix the source of the fault as the EPCM can't be directly modified by +* software. Handle the fault as an access error in order to signal +* userspace so that userspace can rebuild their enclave(s), even though +* userspace may not have actually violated access permissions. +*/ +if (unlikely (error_code &X86_PF_SGX )) +return 1 ; +/* * Make sure to check the VMA so that we do not perform * faults just to hit a X86_PF_PK as soon as we fill in a
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 4/24 x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures
In reply to a message not in the archiveDefine the SGX microarchitectural data structures used by various SGX opcodes. This is not an exhaustive representation of all SGX data structures but only those needed by the kernel.
The data structures are described in:
Intel SDM: 37.6 INTEL® SGX DATA STRUCTURES OVERVIEW
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h | 341 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 341 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h new file +341 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */ +/** +* Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation. +* +* Contains data structures defined by the SGX architecture. Data structures +* defined by the Linux software stack should not be placed here. +*/ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H +#define _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H + +#include <linux/bits.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +#define SGX_CPUID 0x12 +#define SGX_CPUID_FIRST_VARIABLE_SUB_LEAF 2 + +/** +* enum sgx_return_code - The return code type for ENCLS, ENCLU and ENCLV +* %SGX_NOT_TRACKED: Previous ETRACK's shootdown sequence has not +* been completed yet. +* %SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN: EINITTOKEN is invalid and enclave signer's +* public key does not match IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH. +* %SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT: An unmasked event, e.g. INTR, was received +*/ +enum sgx_return_code { +SGX_NOT_TRACKED =11 , +SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN =16 , +SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT =128 , +}; + +/** +* enum sgx_sub_leaf_types - SGX CPUID variable sub-leaf types +* %SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_INVALID: Indicates this sub-leaf is invalid. +* %SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_EPC_SECTION: Sub-leaf enumerates an EPC section. +*/ +enum sgx_sub_leaf_types { +SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_INVALID =0x0 , +SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_EPC_SECTION =0x1 , +}; + +#define SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_TYPE_MASK GENMASK(3, 0) + +#define SGX_MODULUS_SIZE 384 + +/** +* enum sgx_miscselect - additional information to an SSA frame +* %SGX_MISC_EXINFO: Report #PF or #GP to the SSA frame. +* +* Save State Area (SSA) is a stack inside the enclave used to store processor +* state when an exception or interrupt occurs. This enum defines additional +* information stored to an SSA frame. +*/ +enum sgx_miscselect { +SGX_MISC_EXINFO =BIT (0 ), +}; + +#define SGX_MISC_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 1) + +#define SGX_SSA_GPRS_SIZE 184 +#define SGX_SSA_MISC_EXINFO_SIZE 16 + +/** +* enum sgx_attributes - the attributes field in &struct sgx_secs +* %SGX_ATTR_INIT: Enclave can be entered (is initialized). +* %SGX_ATTR_DEBUG: Allow ENCLS(EDBGRD) and ENCLS(EDBGWR). +* %SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT: Tell that this a 64-bit enclave. +* %SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY: Allow to use provisioning keys for remote +* attestation. +* %SGX_ATTR_KSS: Allow to use key separation and sharing (KSS). +* %SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY: Allow to use token signing key that is used to +* sign cryptographic tokens that can be passed to +* EINIT as an authorization to run an enclave. +*/ +enum sgx_attribute { +SGX_ATTR_INIT =BIT (0 ), +SGX_ATTR_DEBUG =BIT (1 ), +SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT =BIT (2 ), +SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY =BIT (4 ), +SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY =BIT (5 ), +SGX_ATTR_KSS =BIT (7 ), +}; + +#define SGX_ATTR_RESERVED_MASK (BIT_ULL(3) | BIT_ULL(6) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 8)) + +/** +* struct sgx_secs - SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) +* @size: size of the address space +* @base: base address of the address space +* @ssa_frame_size: size of an SSA frame +* @miscselect: additional information stored to an SSA frame +* @attributes: attributes for enclave +* @xfrm: XSave-Feature Request Mask (subset of XCR0) +* @mrenclave: SHA256-hash of the enclave contents +* @mrsigner: SHA256-hash of the public key used to sign the SIGSTRUCT +* @config_id: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation +* @isv_prod_id: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation +* @isv_svn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation +* @config_svn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation +* +* SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) is a special enclave page that is not +* visible in the address space. In fact, this structure defines the address +* range and other global attributes for the enclave and it is the first EPC +* page created for any enclave. It is moved from a temporary buffer to an EPC +* by the means of ENCLS(ECREATE) leaf. +*/ +struct sgx_secs { +u64 size; +u64 base; +u32 ssa_frame_size; +u32 miscselect; +u8 reserved1[24 ]; +u64 attributes; +u64 xfrm; +u32 mrenclave[8 ]; +u8 reserved2[32 ]; +u32 mrsigner[8 ]; +u8 reserved3[32 ]; +u32 config_id[16 ]; +u16 isv_prod_id; +u16 isv_svn; +u16 config_svn; +u8 reserved4[3834 ]; +} __packed; + +/** +* enum sgx_tcs_flags - execution flags for TCS +* %SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN: If enabled allows single-stepping and breakpoints +* inside an enclave. It is cleared by EADD but can +* be set later with EDBGWR. +*/ +enum sgx_tcs_flags { +SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN =0x01 , +}; + +#define SGX_TCS_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 1) +#define SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE 4024 + +/** +* struct sgx_tcs - Thread Control Structure (TCS) +* @state: used to mark an entered TCS +* @flags: execution flags (cleared by EADD) +* @ssa_offset: SSA stack offset relative to the enclave base +* @ssa_index: the current SSA frame index (cleard by EADD) +* @nr_ssa_frames: the number of frame in the SSA stack +* @entry_offset: entry point offset relative to the enclave base +* @exit_addr: address outside the enclave to exit on an exception or +* interrupt +* @fs_offset: offset relative to the enclave base to become FS +* segment inside the enclave +* @gs_offset: offset relative to the enclave base to become GS +* segment inside the enclave +* @fs_limit: size to become a new FS-limit (only 32-bit enclaves) +* @gs_limit: size to become a new GS-limit (only 32-bit enclaves) +* +* Thread Control Structure (TCS) is an enclave page visible in its address +* space that defines an entry point inside the enclave. A thread enters inside +* an enclave by supplying address of TCS to ENCLU(EENTER). A TCS can be entered +* by only one thread at a time. +*/ +struct sgx_tcs { +u64 state; +u64 flags; +u64 ssa_offset; +u32 ssa_index; +u32 nr_ssa_frames; +u64 entry_offset; +u64 exit_addr; +u64 fs_offset; +u64 gs_offset; +u32 fs_limit; +u32 gs_limit; +u8 reserved[SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE ]; +} __packed; + +/** +* struct sgx_pageinfo - an enclave page descriptor +* @addr: address of the enclave page +* @contents: pointer to the page contents +* @metadata: pointer either to a SECINFO or PCMD instance +* @secs: address of the SECS page +*/ +struct sgx_pageinfo { +u64 addr; +u64 contents; +u64 metadata; +u64 secs; +} __packed__aligned(32) ; + + +/** +* enum sgx_page_type - bits in the SECINFO flags defining the page type +* %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS: a SECS page +* %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS: a TCS page +* %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG: a regular page +* %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA: a VA page +* %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM: a page in trimmed state +*/ +enum sgx_page_type { +SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS , +SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS , +SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG , +SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA , +SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM , +}; + +#define SGX_NR_PAGE_TYPES 5 +#define SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK GENMASK(7, 0) + +/** +* enum sgx_secinfo_flags - the flags field in &struct sgx_secinfo +* %SGX_SECINFO_R: allow read +* %SGX_SECINFO_W: allow write +* %SGX_SECINFO_X: allow execution +* %SGX_SECINFO_SECS: a SECS page +* %SGX_SECINFO_TCS: a TCS page +* %SGX_SECINFO_REG: a regular page +* %SGX_SECINFO_VA: a VA page +* %SGX_SECINFO_TRIM: a page in trimmed state +*/ +enum sgx_secinfo_flags { +SGX_SECINFO_R =BIT (0 ), +SGX_SECINFO_W =BIT (1 ), +SGX_SECINFO_X =BIT (2 ), +SGX_SECINFO_SECS = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS <<8 ), +SGX_SECINFO_TCS = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS <<8 ), +SGX_SECINFO_REG = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG <<8 ), +SGX_SECINFO_VA = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA <<8 ), +SGX_SECINFO_TRIM = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM <<8 ), +}; + +#define SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK GENMASK_ULL(2, 0) +#define SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK << 8) +#define SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK ~(SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK | \ + SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) + +/** +* struct sgx_secinfo - describes attributes of an EPC page +* @flags: permissions and type +* +* Used together with ENCLS leaves that add or modify an EPC page to an +* enclave to define page permissions and type. +*/ +struct sgx_secinfo { +u64 flags; +u8 reserved[56 ]; +} __packed__aligned(64) ; + +#define SGX_PCMD_RESERVED_SIZE 40 + +/** +* struct sgx_pcmd - Paging Crypto Metadata (PCMD) +* @enclave_id: enclave identifier +* @mac: MAC over PCMD, page contents and isvsvn +* +* PCMD is stored for every swapped page to the regular memory. When ELDU loads +* the page back it recalculates the MAC by using a isvsvn number stored in a +* VA page. Together these two structures bring integrity and rollback +* protection. +*/ +struct sgx_pcmd { +struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; +u64 enclave_id; +u8 reserved[SGX_PCMD_RESERVED_SIZE ]; +u8 mac[16 ]; +} __packed__aligned(128) ; + +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED1_SIZE 84 +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED2_SIZE 20 +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED3_SIZE 32 +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED4_SIZE 12 + +/** +* struct sgx_sigstruct_header - defines author of the enclave +* @header1: constant byte string +* @vendor: must be either 0x0000 or 0x8086 +* @date: YYYYMMDD in BCD +* @header2: costant byte string +* @swdefined: software defined value +*/ +struct sgx_sigstruct_header { +u64 header1[2 ]; +u32 vendor; +u32 date; +u64 header2[2 ]; +u32 swdefined; +u8 reserved1[84 ]; +} __packed; + +/** +* struct sgx_sigstruct_body - defines contents of the enclave +* @miscselect: additional information stored to an SSA frame +* @misc_mask: required miscselect in SECS +* @attributes: attributes for enclave +* @xfrm: XSave-Feature Request Mask (subset of XCR0) +* @attributes_mask: required attributes in SECS +* @xfrm_mask: required XFRM in SECS +* @mrenclave: SHA256-hash of the enclave contents +* @isvprodid: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation +* @isvsvn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation +*/ +struct sgx_sigstruct_body { +u32 miscselect; +u32 misc_mask; +u8 reserved2[20 ]; +u64 attributes; +u64 xfrm; +u64 attributes_mask; +u64 xfrm_mask; +u8 mrenclave[32 ]; +u8 reserved3[32 ]; +u16 isvprodid; +u16 isvsvn; +} __packed; + +/** +* struct sgx_sigstruct - an enclave signature +* @header: defines author of the enclave +* @modulus: the modulus of the public key +* @exponent: the exponent of the public key +* @signature: the signature calculated over the fields except modulus, +* @body: defines contents of the enclave +* @q1: a value used in RSA signature verification +* @q2: a value used in RSA signature verification +* +* Header and body are the parts that are actual signed. The remaining fields +* define the signature of the enclave. +*/ +struct sgx_sigstruct { +struct sgx_sigstruct_header header; +u8 modulus[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE ]; +u32 exponent; +u8 signature[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE ]; +struct sgx_sigstruct_body body; +u8 reserved4[12 ]; +u8 q1[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE ]; +u8 q2[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE ]; +} __packed; + +#define SGX_LAUNCH_TOKEN_SIZE 304 + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 5/24 x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions
In reply to a message not in the archiveENCLS is a ring 0 instruction, which contains a set of leaf functions for managing an enclave. Enclaves are measured and signed software entities, which are protected by asserting the outside memory accesses and memory encryption.
Add a two-layer macro system along with an encoding scheme to allow wrappers to return trap numbers along ENCLS-specific error codes. The bottom layer of the macro system splits between the leafs that return an error code and those that do not. The second layer generates the correct input/output annotations based on the number of operands for each leaf function.
ENCLS leaf functions are documented in
Intel SDM: 36.6 ENCLAVE INSTRUCTIONS AND INTEL®
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 238 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 238 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h new file +238 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */ +#ifndef _X86_ENCLS_H +#define _X86_ENCLS_H + +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/rwsem.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <asm/asm.h> +#include <asm/traps.h> +#include "sgx.h" + +enum sgx_encls_leaf { +ECREATE =0x00 , +EADD =0x01 , +EINIT =0x02 , +EREMOVE =0x03 , +EDGBRD =0x04 , +EDGBWR =0x05 , +EEXTEND =0x06 , +ELDU =0x08 , +EBLOCK =0x09 , +EPA =0x0A , +EWB =0x0B , +ETRACK =0x0C , +}; + +/** +* ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG - flag signifying an ENCLS return code is a trapnr +* +* ENCLS has its own (positive value) error codes and also generates +* ENCLS specific #GP and #PF faults. And the ENCLS values get munged +* with system error codes as everything percolates back up the stack. +* Unfortunately (for us), we need to precisely identify each unique +* error code, e.g. the action taken if EWB fails varies based on the +* type of fault and on the exact SGX error code, i.e. we can't simply +* convert all faults to -EFAULT. +* +* To make all three error types coexist, we set bit 30 to identify an +* ENCLS fault. Bit 31 (technically bits N:31) is used to differentiate +* between positive (faults and SGX error codes) and negative (system +* error codes) values. +*/ +#define ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG 0x40000000 + +/* Retrieve the encoded trapnr from the specified return code. */ +#define ENCLS_TRAPNR (r) ((r) & ~ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) + +/* Issue a WARN() about an ENCLS leaf. */ +#define ENCLS_WARN (r, name) { \ + do { \ + int _r = (r); \ + WARN_ONCE(_r, "%s returned %d (0x%x)\n", (name), _r, _r); \ + } while (0); \ +} + +/** +* encls_failed() - Check if an ENCLS leaf function failed +* @ret: the return value of an ENCLS leaf function call +* +* Check if an ENCLS leaf function failed. This happens when the leaf function +* causes a fault that is not caused by an EPCM conflict or when the leaf +* function returns a non-zero value. +*/ +static inline bool encls_failed (int ret) +{ +int epcm_trapnr; + +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SGX2 )) + epcm_trapnr =X86_TRAP_PF ; +else + epcm_trapnr =X86_TRAP_GP ; + +if (ret &ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG ) +return ENCLS_TRAPNR (ret) != epcm_trapnr; + +return !!ret; +} + +/** +* __encls_ret_N - encode an ENCLS leaf that returns an error code in EAX +* @rax: leaf number +* @inputs: asm inputs for the leaf +* +* Emit assembly for an ENCLS leaf that returns an error code, e.g. EREMOVE. +* And because SGX isn't complex enough as it is, leafs that return an error +* code also modify flags. +* +* Return: +* 0 on success, +* SGX error code on failure +*/ +#define __encls_ret_N(rax, inputs...) \ + ({ \ + int ret; \ + asm volatile( \ + "1: .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xcf;\n\t" \ + "2:\n" \ + ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ + "3: orl $"__stringify(ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)",%%eax\n" \ + " jmp 2b\n" \ + ".previous\n" \ + _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(1b, 3b) \ + : "=a"(ret) \ + : "a"(rax), inputs \ + : "memory", "cc"); \ + ret; \ + }) + +#define __encls_ret_1 (rax, rcx) \ + ({ \ + __encls_ret_N(rax, "c"(rcx)); \ + }) + +#define __encls_ret_2 (rax, rbx, rcx) \ + ({ \ + __encls_ret_N(rax, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx)); \ + }) + +#define __encls_ret_3 (rax, rbx, rcx, rdx) \ + ({ \ + __encls_ret_N(rax, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx), "d"(rdx)); \ + }) + +/** +* __encls_N - encode an ENCLS leaf that doesn't return an error code +* @rax: leaf number +* @rbx_out: optional output variable +* @inputs: asm inputs for the leaf +* +* Emit assembly for an ENCLS leaf that does not return an error code, +* e.g. ECREATE. Leaves without error codes either succeed or fault. +* @rbx_out is an optional parameter for use by EDGBRD, which returns +* the requested value in RBX. +* +* Return: +* 0 on success, +* trapnr with ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG set on fault +*/ +#define __encls_N(rax, rbx_out, inputs...) \ + ({ \ + int ret; \ + asm volatile( \ + "1: .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xcf;\n\t" \ + " xor %%eax,%%eax;\n" \ + "2:\n" \ + ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ + "3: orl $"__stringify(ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)",%%eax\n" \ + " jmp 2b\n" \ + ".previous\n" \ + _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(1b, 3b) \ + : "=a"(ret), "=b"(rbx_out) \ + : "a"(rax), inputs \ + : "memory"); \ + ret; \ + }) + +#define __encls_2 (rax, rbx, rcx) \ + ({ \ + unsigned long ign_rbx_out; \ + __encls_N(rax, ign_rbx_out, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx)); \ + }) + +#define __encls_1_1 (rax, data, rcx) \ + ({ \ + unsigned long rbx_out; \ + int ret = __encls_N(rax, rbx_out, "c"(rcx)); \ + if (!ret) \ + data = rbx_out; \ + ret; \ + }) + +static inline int __ecreate (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *secs) +{ +return __encls_2 (ECREATE , pginfo, secs); +} + +static inline int __eextend (void *secs,void *addr) +{ +return __encls_2 (EEXTEND , secs, addr); +} + +static inline int __eadd (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr) +{ +return __encls_2 (EADD , pginfo, addr); +} + +static inline int __einit (void *sigstruct,void *token,void *secs) +{ +return __encls_ret_3 (EINIT , sigstruct, secs, token); +} + +static inline int __eremove (void *addr) +{ +return __encls_ret_1 (EREMOVE , addr); +} + +static inline int __edbgwr (void *addr,unsigned long *data) +{ +return __encls_2 (EDGBWR , *data, addr); +} + +static inline int __edbgrd (void *addr,unsigned long *data) +{ +return __encls_1_1 (EDGBRD , *data, addr); +} + +static inline int __etrack (void *addr) +{ +return __encls_ret_1 (ETRACK , addr); +} + +static inline int __eldu (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr, +void *va) +{ +return __encls_ret_3 (ELDU , pginfo, addr, va); +} + +static inline int __eblock (void *addr) +{ +return __encls_ret_1 (EBLOCK , addr); +} + +static inline int __epa (void *addr) +{ +unsigned long rbx =SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA ; + +return __encls_2 (EPA , rbx, addr); +} + +static inline int __ewb (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr, +void *va) +{ +return __encls_ret_3 (EWB , pginfo, addr, va); +} + +#endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 6/24 x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support
In reply to a message not in the archiveFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Configure SGX as part of feature control MSR initialization and update the associated X86_FEATURE flags accordingly. Because the kernel will require the LE hash MSRs to be writable when running native enclaves, disable X86_FEATURE_SGX (and all derivatives) if SGX Launch Control is not (or cannot) be fully enabled via feature control MSR.
The check is done for every CPU, not just BSP, in order to verify that MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL is correctly configured on all CPUs. The other parts of the kernel, like the enclave driver, expect the same configuration from all CPUs.
Note, unlike VMX, clear the X86_FEATURE_SGX* flags for all CPUs if any CPU lacks SGX support as the kernel expects SGX to be available on all CPUs. X86_FEATURE_VMX is intentionally cleared only for the current CPU so that KVM can provide additional information if KVM fails to load, e.g. print which CPU doesn't support VMX. KVM/VMX requires additional per-CPU enabling, e.g. to set CR4.VMXE and do VMXON, and so already has the necessary infrastructure to do per-CPU checks. SGX on the other hand doesn't require additional enabling, so clearing the feature flags on all CPUs means the SGX subsystem doesn't need to manually do support checks on a per-CPU basis.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +31 -1
@@ -93,16 +93,35 @@ static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) }#endif /* CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES */ +static void clear_sgx_caps (void ) +{ +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SGX ); +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC ); +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SGX1 ); +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SGX2 ); +} +void init_ia32_feat_ctl (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {bool tboot =tboot_enabled (); +bool enable_sgx;u64 msr;if (rdmsrl_safe (MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL , &msr)) {clear_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_VMX ); +clear_sgx_caps ();return ; } +/* +* Enable SGX if and only if the kernel supports SGX and Launch Control +* is supported, i.e. disable SGX if the LE hash MSRs can't be written. +*/ + enable_sgx =cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_SGX ) && +cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_SGX1 ) && +cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC ) && +IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEL_SGX ); +if (msr &FEAT_CTL_LOCKED ) goto update_caps;
@@ -124,13 +143,16 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) msr |=FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX ; } +if (enable_sgx) + msr |=FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED |FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED ; +wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL , msr); update_caps:set_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL );if (!cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_VMX )) -return ; + goto update_sgx;if ( (tboot && !(msr &FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX )) || (!tboot && !(msr &FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX ))) {
@@ -143,4 +165,12 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)init_vmx_capabilities (c);#endif } + +update_sgx: +if (!(msr &FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED ) || + !(msr &FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED ) || !enable_sgx) { +if (enable_sgx) +pr_err_once ("SGX disabled by BIOS\n" ); +clear_sgx_caps (); + } }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 7/24 x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter
In reply to a message not in the archiveAdd kernel parameter to disable Intel SGX kernel support.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +2 -0
@@ -3339,6 +3339,8 @@ nosep [BUGS=X86-32] Disables x86 SYSENTER/SYSEXIT support. + nosgx [X86-64,SGX] Disables Intel SGX kernel support. + nosmp [SMP] Tells an SMP kernel to act as a UP kernel, and disable the IO APIC. legacy for "maxcpus=0".
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +9 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,15 @@ static void clear_sgx_caps(void)setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SGX2 ); } +static int __init nosgx (char *str) +{ +clear_sgx_caps (); + +return 0 ; +} + +early_param ("nosgx" , nosgx); +void init_ia32_feat_ctl (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {bool tboot =tboot_enabled ();
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 10/24 mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect()
In reply to a message not in the archiveFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Add vm_ops()->mprotect() for additional constraints for a VMA.
Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) will use this callback to add two constraints:
1. Verify that the address range does not have holes: each page address must be filled with an enclave page.
2. Verify that VMA permissions won't surpass the permissions of any enclave page within the address range. Enclave cryptographically sealed permissions for each page address that set the upper limit for possible VMA permissions. Not respecting this can cause #GP's to be emitted.
--- include/linux/mm.h | 3 +++ mm/mprotect.c | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/mm.h +3 -0
@@ -547,6 +547,9 @@ struct vm_operations_struct {void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area);int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area,unsigned long addr);int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area); +int (*mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, +struct vm_area_struct **pprev,unsigned long start, +unsigned long end,unsigned long newflags);vm_fault_t (*fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf);vm_fault_t (*huge_fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf,enum page_entry_size pe_size);
mm/mprotect.c +4 -1
@@ -610,7 +610,10 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len, tmp = vma->vm_end;if (tmp > end) tmp = end; - error =mprotect_fixup (vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags); +if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->mprotect) + error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect (vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags); +else + error =mprotect_fixup (vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);if (error) goto out; nstart = tmp;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 11/24 x86/sgx: Add SGX enclave driver
In reply to a message not in the archiveIntel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the SGX hosted software entity is prevented from accessing the memory inside the enclave by the CPU. We call these entities as enclaves.
Add a driver that provides an ioctl API to construct and run enclaves. Enclaves are constructed from pages residing in reserved physical memory areas. The contents of these pages can only be accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware thread running inside the enclave.
The starting state of an enclave consists of a fixed measured set of pages that are copied to the EPC during the construction process by using the opcode ENCLS leaf functions and Software Enclave Control Structure (SECS) that defines the enclave properties.
Enclaves are constructed by using ENCLS leaf functions ECREATE, EADD and EINIT. ECREATE initializes SECS, EADD copies pages from system memory to the EPC and EINIT checks a given signed measurement and moves the enclave into a state ready for execution.
An initialized enclave can only be accessed through special Thread Control Structure (TCS) pages by using ENCLU (ring-3 only) leaf EENTER. This leaf function converts a thread into enclave mode and continues the execution in the offset defined by the TCS provided to EENTER. An enclave is exited through syscall, exception, interrupts or by explicitly calling another ENCLU leaf EEXIT.
The mmap() permissions are capped by the contained enclave page permissions. The mapped areas must also be populated, i.e. each page address must contain a page. This logic is implemented in sgx_encl_may_map().
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 173 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 29 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 331 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 85 ++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 11 + 6 files changed, 631 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@ obj-y += \ + driver.o \ + encl.o \ main.o
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c new file +173 -0
173 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h new file +29 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */ +#ifndef __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__ +#define __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__ + +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <linux/kref.h> +#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h> +#include <linux/radix-tree.h> +#include <linux/rwsem.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/workqueue.h> +#include "sgx.h" + +#define SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT 20 +#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT 50 +#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME 20 + +extern u64 sgx_encl_size_max_32; +extern u64 sgx_encl_size_max_64; +extern u32 sgx_misc_reserved_mask; +extern u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask; +extern u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask; +extern u32 sgx_xsave_size_tbl[64 ]; + +long sgx_ioctl (struct file *filep,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg); + +int sgx_drv_init (void ); + +#endif /* __ARCH_X86_SGX_DRIVER_H__ */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c new file +331 -0
331 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h new file +85 -0
85 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +11 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@#include <linux/sched/mm.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include "driver.h" +#include "encl.h" #include "encls.h" struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS ];
@@ -260,6 +262,8 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void)static void __init sgx_init (void ) { +int ret; +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SGX ))return ;
@@ -269,8 +273,15 @@ static void __init sgx_init(void)if (!sgx_page_reclaimer_init ()) goto err_page_cache; + ret =sgx_drv_init (); +if (ret) + goto err_kthread; +return ; +err_kthread: +kthread_stop (ksgxswapd_tsk); + err_page_cache:sgx_page_cache_teardown (); }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 12/24 x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE
In reply to a message not in the archiveAdd an ioctl that performs ENCLS[ECREATE], which creates SGX Enclave Control Structure for the enclave. SECS contains attributes about the enclave that are used by the hardware and cannot be directly accessed by software, as SECS resides in the EPC.
One essential field in SECS is a field that stores the SHA256 of the measured enclave pages. This field, MRENCLAVE, is initialized by the ECREATE instruction and updated by every EADD and EEXTEND operation. Finally, EINIT locks down the value.
--- .../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 25 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 12 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 220 ++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 260 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +1 -0
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Code Seq# Include File Comments <mailto:[email protected]> 0xA3 90-9F linux/dtlk.h 0xA4 00-1F uapi/linux/tee.h Generic TEE subsystem +0xA4 00-1F uapi/asm/sgx.h <mailto:[email protected]> 0xAA 00-3F linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h 0xAB 00-1F linux/nbd.h 0xAC 00-1F linux/raw.h
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h new file +25 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) */ +/* +* Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation. +*/ +#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H +#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/ioctl.h> + +#define SGX_MAGIC 0xA4 + +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE \ + _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create) + +/** +* struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the +* %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE ioctl +* @src: address for the SECS page data +*/ +struct sgx_enclave_create { +__u64 src; +}; + +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ obj-y += \ driver.o \ encl.o \ + ioctl.o \ main.o
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +12 -0
@@ -114,10 +114,22 @@ static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file,return current->mm->get_unmapped_area (file, addr, len, pgoff, flags); } +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +static long sgx_compat_ioctl (struct file *filep,unsigned int cmd, +unsigned long arg) +{ +return sgx_ioctl (filep, cmd, arg); +} +#endif +static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = { .owner =THIS_MODULE , .open = sgx_open, .release = sgx_release, + .unlocked_ioctl = sgx_ioctl, +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT + .compat_ioctl = sgx_compat_ioctl, +#endif .mmap = sgx_mmap, .get_unmapped_area = sgx_get_unmapped_area, };
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h +1 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/rwsem.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> +#include <uapi/asm/sgx.h> #include "sgx.h" #define SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT 20
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +220 -0
220 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 13/24 x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
In reply to a message not in the archiveAdd an ioctl, which performs ENCLS[EADD] that adds new visible page to an enclave, and optionally ENCLS[EEXTEND] operations that hash the page to the enclave measurement. By visible we mean a page that can be mapped to the address range of an enclave.
--- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 28 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 289 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 318 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +28 -0
@@ -8,10 +8,21 @@#include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/ioctl.h> +/** +* enum sgx_epage_flags - page control flags +* %SGX_PAGE_MEASURE: Measure the page contents with a sequence of +* ENCLS[EEXTEND] operations. +*/ +enum sgx_page_flags { +SGX_PAGE_MEASURE =0x01 , +}; +#define SGX_MAGIC 0xA4#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE \ _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES \ + _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages)/** * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -22,4 +33,21 @@ struct sgx_enclave_create { __u64 src; }; +/** +* struct sgx_enclave_add_pages - parameter structure for the +* %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE ioctl +* @src: start address for the page data +* @offset: starting page offset +* @length: length of the data (multiple of the page size) +* @secinfo: address for the SECINFO data +* @flags: page control flags +*/ +struct sgx_enclave_add_pages { +__u64 src; +__u64 offset; +__u64 length; +__u64 secinfo; +__u64 flags; +}; +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +289 -0
301 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +1 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct sgx_epc_section {#define SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK GENMASK(7, 0)#define SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS (SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK + 1) +#define SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTH 0x100000extern struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS ];
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v37 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
On Fri, 11 Sep 2020 07:40:08 -0500, Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> wrote:
...
Quoted 80 lines
+/**
+ *sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages()- The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @arg: a user pointer to a structsgx_enclave_add_pagesinstance
+ *
+ * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally extend the
+ * measurement with the contents of the page. The SECINFO and measurement mask
+ * are applied to all pages.
+ *
+ * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because
+ * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in
+ * the measurement.
+ *
+ * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For each page
+ * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following
+ * heuristics:
+ *
+ * 1. A regular page:PROT_R,PROT_WandPROT_Xmatch the SECINFO permissions.
+ * 2. A TCS page:PROT_R|PROT_W.
+ *
+ *mmap()is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum protection bits
+ * within the given address range.
+ *
+ * If ENCLS opcode fails, that effectively means that EPC has been invalidated.
+ * When this happens the enclave is destroyed and-EIOis returned to the
+ * caller.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * length of the data processed on success,
+ *-EACCESif an executable source page is located in a noexec
partition,
+ *-EIOif either ENCLS[EADD] or ENCLS[EEXTEND] fails
+ * -errno otherwise
+ */
+static longsgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +34
-0+{ +struct sgx_enclave_add_pages addp; +struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; +unsigned long c; +int ret; + +if ((atomic_read (&encl->flags) &SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED ) || + !(atomic_read (&encl->flags) &SGX_ENCL_CREATED )) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (copy_from_user (&addp, arg,sizeof (addp))) +return -EFAULT ; + +if (!IS_ALIGNED (addp.offset,PAGE_SIZE ) || + !IS_ALIGNED (addp.src,PAGE_SIZE )) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!(access_ok (addp.src,PAGE_SIZE ))) +return -EFAULT ; + +if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE -1 )) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (addp.offset + addp.length -PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (copy_from_user (&secinfo, (void __user *)addp.secinfo, +sizeof (secinfo))) +return -EFAULT ; + +if (sgx_validate_secinfo (&secinfo)) +return -EINVAL ; + +for (c =0 ; c < addp.length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) {
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) · line 469
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +10
-0+if (c ==SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTH ||signal_pending (current)) { + ret = c; +break ; + } + +if (need_resched ()) +cond_resched (); + + ret =sgx_encl_add_page (encl, addp.src + c, addp.offset + c, + addp.length - c, &secinfo, addp.flags);
no need passing addp.length - c?
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) · line 471
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2
-0+if (ret) +break ;
Some error cases here are fatal and should be passed back to user space so that it would not retry.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) · line 475
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +4
-0+ } + +if (copy_to_user (arg, &addp,sizeof (addp))) +return -EFAULT ;
This copy no longer needed?
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) · line 479
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +3
-0+return c; +} +
Thanks
Haitao
Re: [PATCH v37 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 89 lines · Haitao Huang
On Fri, 11 Sep 2020 07:40:08 -0500, Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> wrote:
...Quoted 84 lines
+/**
+ *sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages()- The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @arg: a user pointer to a structsgx_enclave_add_pagesinstance
+ *
+ * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally extend the
+ * measurement with the contents of the page. The SECINFO and measurement mask
+ * are applied to all pages.
+ *
+ * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because
+ * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in
+ * the measurement.
+ *
+ * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For each page
+ * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following
+ * heuristics:
+ *
+ * 1. A regular page:PROT_R,PROT_WandPROT_Xmatch the SECINFO permissions.
+ * 2. A TCS page:PROT_R|PROT_W.
+ *
+ *mmap()is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum protection bits
+ * within the given address range.
+ *
+ * If ENCLS opcode fails, that effectively means that EPC has been invalidated.
+ * When this happens the enclave is destroyed and-EIOis returned to the
+ * caller.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * length of the data processed on success,
+ *-EACCESif an executable source page is located in a noexec
partition,
+ *-EIOif either ENCLS[EADD] or ENCLS[EEXTEND] fails
+ * -errno otherwise
+ */
+static longsgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +38
-0+{ +struct sgx_enclave_add_pages addp; +struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; +unsigned long c; +int ret; + +if ((atomic_read (&encl->flags) &SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED ) || + !(atomic_read (&encl->flags) &SGX_ENCL_CREATED )) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (copy_from_user (&addp, arg,sizeof (addp))) +return -EFAULT ; + +if (!IS_ALIGNED (addp.offset,PAGE_SIZE ) || + !IS_ALIGNED (addp.src,PAGE_SIZE )) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!(access_ok (addp.src,PAGE_SIZE ))) +return -EFAULT ; + +if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE -1 )) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (addp.offset + addp.length -PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (copy_from_user (&secinfo, (void __user *)addp.secinfo, +sizeof (secinfo))) +return -EFAULT ; + +if (sgx_validate_secinfo (&secinfo)) +return -EINVAL ; + +for (c =0 ; c < addp.length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { +if (c ==SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTH ||signal_pending (current)) { + ret = c; +break ; + }
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) · line 469
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +6
-0+ +if (need_resched ()) +cond_resched (); + + ret =sgx_encl_add_page (encl, addp.src + c, addp.offset + c, + addp.length - c, &secinfo, addp.flags);no need passing addp.length - c?
True, it is cruft from the past.
I'll remove.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) · line 471
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2
-0+if (ret) +break ;Some error cases here are fatal and should be passed back to user space so that it would not retry.
I don't comprehend this. 'ret' is passed to the user space.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) · line 475
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +4
-0+ } + +if (copy_to_user (arg, &addp,sizeof (addp))) +return -EFAULT ;This copy no longer needed?
True, it is cruft from the past.
I'll remove.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) · line 479
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +3
-0+return c; +} +Thanks
Haitao
Thanks for the comments.
/Jarkko
Re: [PATCH v37 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 104 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 89 lines · Haitao Huang
On Fri, 11 Sep 2020 07:40:08 -0500, Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> wrote:
...Quoted 84 lines
+/**
+ *sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages()- The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @arg: a user pointer to a structsgx_enclave_add_pagesinstance
+ *
+ * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally extend the
+ * measurement with the contents of the page. The SECINFO and measurement mask
+ * are applied to all pages.
+ *
+ * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because
+ * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in
+ * the measurement.
+ *
+ * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For each page
+ * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following
+ * heuristics:
+ *
+ * 1. A regular page:PROT_R,PROT_WandPROT_Xmatch the SECINFO permissions.
+ * 2. A TCS page:PROT_R|PROT_W.
+ *
+ *mmap()is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum protection bits
+ * within the given address range.
+ *
+ * If ENCLS opcode fails, that effectively means that EPC has been invalidated.
+ * When this happens the enclave is destroyed and-EIOis returned to the
+ * caller.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * length of the data processed on success,
+ *-EACCESif an executable source page is located in a noexec
partition,
+ *-EIOif either ENCLS[EADD] or ENCLS[EEXTEND] fails
+ * -errno otherwise
+ */
+static longsgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +38
-0+{ +struct sgx_enclave_add_pages addp; +struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; +unsigned long c; +int ret; + +if ((atomic_read (&encl->flags) &SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED ) || + !(atomic_read (&encl->flags) &SGX_ENCL_CREATED )) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (copy_from_user (&addp, arg,sizeof (addp))) +return -EFAULT ; + +if (!IS_ALIGNED (addp.offset,PAGE_SIZE ) || + !IS_ALIGNED (addp.src,PAGE_SIZE )) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (!(access_ok (addp.src,PAGE_SIZE ))) +return -EFAULT ; + +if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE -1 )) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (addp.offset + addp.length -PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (copy_from_user (&secinfo, (void __user *)addp.secinfo, +sizeof (secinfo))) +return -EFAULT ; + +if (sgx_validate_secinfo (&secinfo)) +return -EINVAL ; + +for (c =0 ; c < addp.length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { +if (c ==SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTH ||signal_pending (current)) { + ret = c; +break ; + }Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) · line 469
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +6
-0+ +if (need_resched ()) +cond_resched (); + + ret =sgx_encl_add_page (encl, addp.src + c, addp.offset + c, + addp.length - c, &secinfo, addp.flags);no need passing addp.length - c?
True, it is cruft from the past.
I'll remove.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) · line 471
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2
-0+if (ret) +break ;Some error cases here are fatal and should be passed back to user space so that it would not retry.
I don't comprehend this. 'ret' is passed to the user space.
OK, spotted the regression, sorry about this. I'll fix it for v38, which I'm sending soon given the email server issues with v37.
/Jarkko
Re: [PATCH v37 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 2 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
OK, spotted the regression, sorry about this. I'll fix it for v38, which I'm sending soon given the email server issues with v37.
I'm going to cry uncle on the mail quantity too. Someone is going to think the mail relays are mining bitcoin.
Especially all of us on cc, we don't need multiple copies. I'd suggest throwing your series up on github and then make sure your cover letter gets through. If anyone is missing a patch, they can just yank it out of the git repo.
Re: [PATCH v37 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 11 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 2 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
OK, spotted the regression, sorry about this. I'll fix it for v38, which I'm sending soon given the email server issues with v37.
I'm going to cry uncle on the mail quantity too. Someone is going to think the mail relays are mining bitcoin.
Especially all of us on cc, we don't need multiple copies. I'd suggest throwing your series up on github and then make sure your cover letter gets through. If anyone is missing a patch, they can just yank it out of the git repo.
The v38 copies should be complete and good.
The only issue is that it has now two duplicate copies.
/Jarkko
PATCH v37 14/24 x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
In reply to a message not in the archiveAdd an ioctl that performs ENCLS[EINIT], which locks down the measurement and initializes the enclave for entrance. After this, new pages can no longer be added.
--- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 11 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 195 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 208 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +11 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags { _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create)#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES \ _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT \ + _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x02, struct sgx_enclave_init)/** * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -50,4 +52,13 @@ struct sgx_enclave_add_pages { __u64 flags; }; +/** +* struct sgx_enclave_init - parameter structure for the +* %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT ioctl +* @sigstruct: address for the SIGSTRUCT data +*/ +struct sgx_enclave_init { +__u64 sigstruct; +}; +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +2 -0
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ struct sgx_encl {struct xarray page_array;struct sgx_encl_page secs;cpumask_t cpumask; +unsigned long attributes; +unsigned long attributes_mask; };extern const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +195 -0
219 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 15/24 x86/sgx: Enable provisioning for remote attestation
In reply to a message not in the archiveProvisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key of a Quoting Enclave (QE), e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel signed PCE is used.
To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be only allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted parties can certify QE's.
Obviously the attestation service should know the public key of the used PCE and that way detect illegit attestation, but whitelisting the legit users still adds an additional layer of defence.
Add new device file called /dev/sgx/provision. The sole purpose of this file is to provide file descriptors that act as privilege tokens to allow to build enclaves with ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY set. A new ioctl called SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION is used to assign this token to an enclave.
--- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 11 ++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 18 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 78 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +11 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags { _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages)#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT \ _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x02, struct sgx_enclave_init) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION \ + _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x03, struct sgx_enclave_provision)/** * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -61,4 +63,13 @@ struct sgx_enclave_init { __u64 sigstruct; }; +/** +* struct sgx_enclave_provision - parameter structure for the +* %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION ioctl +* @attribute_fd: file handle of the attribute file in the securityfs +*/ +struct sgx_enclave_provision { +__u64 attribute_fd; +}; +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +18 -0
@@ -134,6 +134,10 @@ static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = { .get_unmapped_area = sgx_get_unmapped_area, }; +const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops = { + .owner =THIS_MODULE , +}; +static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = { .minor =MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR , .name ="enclave" ,
@@ -141,6 +145,13 @@ static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = { .fops = &sgx_encl_fops, }; +static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_provision = { + .minor =MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR , + .name ="provision" , + .nodename ="sgx/provision" , + .fops = &sgx_provision_fops, +}; +int __init sgx_drv_init (void ) {unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
@@ -181,5 +192,12 @@ int __init sgx_drv_init(void)return ret; } + ret =misc_register (&sgx_dev_provision); +if (ret) { +pr_err ("Creating /dev/sgx/provision failed with %d.\n" , ret); +misc_deregister (&sgx_dev_enclave); +return ret; + } +return 0 ; }
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h +2 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ extern u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask;extern u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask;extern u32 sgx_xsave_size_tbl[64 ]; +extern const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops; +long sgx_ioctl (struct file *filep,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg);int sgx_drv_init (void );
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +47 -0
59 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 16/24 x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer
In reply to a message not in the archiveThere is a limited amount of EPC available. Therefore, some of it must be copied to the regular memory, and only subset kept in the SGX reserved memory. While kernel cannot directly access enclave memory, SGX provides a set of ENCLS leaf functions to perform reclaiming.
This commits implements a page reclaimer by using these leaf functions. It picks the victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. The thread ksgxswapd reclaims pages on the event when the number of free EPC pages goes below SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES up until it reaches SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES.
sgx_alloc_epc_page() can optionally directly reclaim pages with @reclaim set true. A caller must also supply owner for each page so that the reclaimer can access the associated enclaves. This is needed for locking, as most of the ENCLS leafs cannot be executed concurrently for an enclave. The owner is also needed for accessing SECS, which is required to be resident when its child pages are being reclaimed.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 340 +++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 41 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 77 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 464 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 9 + 6 files changed, 925 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ static int sgx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)atomic_set (&encl->flags,0 );kref_init (&encl->refcount);xa_init (&encl->page_array); +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&encl->va_pages);mutex_init (&encl->lock);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&encl->mm_list);spin_lock_init (&encl->mm_lock);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +338 -2
390 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +41 -0
85 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +72 -5
144 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +464 -0
512 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +9 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@struct sgx_epc_page {unsigned long desc; +struct sgx_encl_page *owner;struct list_head list; };
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ struct sgx_epc_page {struct sgx_epc_section {unsigned long pa;void *va; +unsigned long free_cnt;struct list_head page_list;struct list_head unsanitized_page_list;spinlock_t lock;
@@ -35,6 +37,10 @@ struct sgx_epc_section {#define SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK GENMASK(7, 0)#define SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS (SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK + 1)#define SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTH 0x100000 +#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMABLE BIT(8) +#define SGX_NR_TO_SCAN 16 +#define SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES 32 +#define SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES 64extern struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS ];
@@ -50,7 +56,10 @@ static inline void *sgx_get_epc_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page) return section->va + (page->desc & PAGE_MASK) - section->pa; } +void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable (struct sgx_epc_page *page); +int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable (struct sgx_epc_page *page);struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page (void ); +struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page (void *owner,bool reclaim);void sgx_free_epc_page (struct sgx_epc_page *page);#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 18/24 x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions
In reply to a message not in the archiveFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
The basic concept and implementation is very similar to the kernel's exception fixup mechanism. The key differences are that the kernel handler is hardcoded and the fixup entry addresses are relative to the overall table as opposed to individual entries.
Hardcoding the kernel handler avoids the need to figure out how to get userspace code to point at a kernel function. Given that the expected usage is to propagate information to userspace, dumping all fault information into registers is likely the desired behavior for the vast majority of yet-to-be-created functions. Use registers DI, SI and DX to communicate fault information, which follows Linux's ABI for register consumption and hopefully avoids conflict with hardware features that might leverage the fixup capabilities, e.g. register usage for SGX instructions was at least partially designed with calling conventions in mind.
Making fixup addresses relative to the overall table allows the table to be stripped from the final vDSO image (it's a kernel construct) without complicating the offset logic, e.g. entry-relative addressing would also need to account for the table's location relative to the image.
Regarding stripping the table, modify vdso2c to extract the table from the raw, a.k.a. unstripped, data and dump it as a standalone byte array in the resulting .c file. The original base of the table, its length and a pointer to the byte array are captured in struct vdso_image. Alternatively, the table could be dumped directly into the struct, but because the number of entries can vary per image, that would require either hardcoding a max sized table into the struct definition or defining the table as a flexible length array. The flexible length array approach has zero benefits, e.g. the base/size are still needed, and prevents reusing the extraction code, while hardcoding the max size adds ongoing maintenance just to avoid exporting the explicit size.
The immediate use case is for Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX). SGX introduces a new CPL3-only "enclave" mode that runs as a sort of black box shared object that is hosted by an untrusted "normal" CPl3 process.
Entering an enclave can only be done through SGX-specific instructions, EENTER and ERESUME, and is a non-trivial process. Because of the complexity of transitioning to/from an enclave, the vast majority of enclaves are expected to utilize a library to handle the actual transitions. This is roughly analogous to how e.g. libc implementations are used by most applications.
Another crucial characteristic of SGX enclaves is that they can generate exceptions as part of their normal (at least as "normal" as SGX can be) operation that need to be handled *in* the enclave and/or are unique to SGX.
And because they are essentially fancy shared objects, a process can host any number of enclaves, each of which can execute multiple threads simultaneously.
Putting everything together, userspace enclaves will utilize a library that must be prepared to handle any and (almost) all exceptions any time at least one thread may be executing in an enclave. Leveraging signals to handle the enclave exceptions is unpleasant, to put it mildly, e.g. the SGX library must constantly (un)register its signal handler based on whether or not at least one thread is executing in an enclave, and filter and forward exceptions that aren't related to its enclaves. This becomes particularly nasty when using multiple levels of libraries that register signal handlers, e.g. running an enclave via cgo inside of the Go runtime.
Enabling exception fixup in vDSO allows the kernel to provide a vDSO function that wraps the low-level transitions to/from the enclave, i.e. the EENTER and ERESUME instructions. The vDSO function can intercept exceptions that would otherwise generate a signal and return the fault information directly to its caller, thus avoiding the need to juggle signal handlers.
Note that unlike the kernel's _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE implementation, the 'C' version of _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE doesn't use a pre-compiled assembly macro. Duplicating four lines of code is simpler than adding the necessary infrastructure to generate pre-compiled assembly and the intended benefit of massaging GCC's inlining algorithm is unlikely to realized in the vDSO any time soon, if ever.
--- arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 6 ++-- arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h | 29 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S | 9 ++++- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h | 5 +++ 6 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +3 -3
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o # files to link into kernel -obj-y += vma.o +obj-y += vma.o extable.o KASAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y UBSAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y KCSAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y
@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ $(obj)/%-x32.o: $(obj)/%.o FORCE targets += vdsox32.lds $(vobjx32s-y) -$(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S -$(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg FORCE +$(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S --remove-section __ex_table +$(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg $(call if_changed,objcopy) $(obj)/vdsox32.so.dbg: $(obj)/vdsox32.lds $(vobjx32s) FORCE
arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c new file +46 -0
46 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h new file +29 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __VDSO_EXTABLE_H +#define __VDSO_EXTABLE_H + +/* +* Inject exception fixup for vDSO code. Unlike normal exception fixup, +* vDSO uses a dedicated handler the addresses are relative to the overall +* exception table, not each individual entry. +*/ +#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ +#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE (from, to) \ + ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from to + +.macro ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from:req to:req + .pushsection __ex_table, "a" + .long (\from) - __ex_table + .long (\to) - __ex_table + .popsection +.endm +#else +#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE (from, to) \ + ".pushsection __ex_table, \"a\"\n" \ + ".long (" #from ") - __ex_table\n" \ + ".long (" #to ") - __ex_table\n" \ + ".popsection\n" +#endif + +#endif /* __VDSO_EXTABLE_H */ +
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S +8 -1
@@ -75,11 +75,18 @@ SECTIONS * stuff that isn't used at runtime in between. */ - .text : { *(.text*) } :text =0x90909090, + .text : { + *(.text*) + *(.fixup) + } :text =0x90909090, + + .altinstructions : { *(.altinstructions) } :text .altinstr_replacement : { *(.altinstr_replacement) } :text + __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) } :text + /DISCARD/ : { *(.discard) *(.discard.*)
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h +49 -1
80 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h +5 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ struct vdso_image {unsigned long size;/* Always a multiple of PAGE_SIZE */ unsigned long alt, alt_len; +unsigned long extable_base, extable_len; +const void *extable;long sym_vvar_start;/* Negative offset to the vvar area */
@@ -45,6 +47,9 @@ extern void __init init_vdso_image(const struct vdso_image *image);extern int map_vdso_once (const struct vdso_image *image,unsigned long addr); +extern bool fixup_vdso_exception (struct pt_regs *regs,int trapnr, +unsigned long error_code, +unsigned long fault_addr);#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_VDSO_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 19/24 x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code
In reply to a message not in the archiveFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Add helper function to sanitize error code to prepare for vDSO exception fixup, which will expose the error code to userspace and runs before set_signal_archinfo(), i.e. suppresses the signal when fixup is successful.
--- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +17 -7
@@ -555,6 +555,18 @@ pgtable_bad(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,oops_end (flags, regs, sig); } +static void sanitize_error_code (unsigned long address, +unsigned long *error_code) +{ +/* +* To avoid leaking information about the kernel page +* table layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to +* kernel addresses are always protection faults. +*/ +if (address >=TASK_SIZE_MAX ) + *error_code |=X86_PF_PROT ; +} +static void set_signal_archinfo (unsigned long address,unsigned long error_code) {
@@ -611,6 +623,8 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,* faulting through the emulate_vsyscall() logic. */ if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) { +sanitize_error_code (address, &error_code); +set_signal_archinfo (address, error_code);/* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */
@@ -759,13 +773,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,if (is_errata100 (regs, address))return ; -/* -* To avoid leaking information about the kernel page table -* layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to kernel addresses -* are always protection faults. -*/ -if (address >=TASK_SIZE_MAX ) - error_code |=X86_PF_PROT ; +sanitize_error_code (address, &error_code);if (likely (show_unhandled_signals))show_signal_msg (regs, error_code, address, tsk);
@@ -884,6 +892,8 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,if (is_prefetch (regs, error_code, address))return ; +sanitize_error_code (address, &error_code); +set_signal_archinfo (address, error_code);#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 20/24 x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling
In reply to a message not in the archiveFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
vDSO functions can now leverage an exception fixup mechanism similar to kernel exception fixup. For vDSO exception fixup, the initial user is Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), which will wrap the low-level transitions to/from the enclave, i.e. EENTER and ERESUME instructions, in a vDSO function and leverage fixup to intercept exceptions that would otherwise generate a signal. This allows the vDSO wrapper to return the fault information directly to its caller, obviating the need for SGX applications and libraries to juggle signal handlers.
Attempt to fixup vDSO exceptions immediately prior to populating and sending signal information. Except for the delivery mechanism, an exception in a vDSO function should be treated like any other exception in userspace, e.g. any fault that is successfully handled by the kernel should not be directly visible to userspace.
Although it's debatable whether or not all exceptions are of interest to enclaves, defer to the vDSO fixup to decide whether to do fixup or generate a signal. Future users of vDSO fixup, if there ever are any, will undoubtedly have different requirements than SGX enclaves, e.g. the fixup vs. signal logic can be made function specific if/when necessary.
--- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +16 -3
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@#include <asm/umip.h> #include <asm/insn.h> #include <asm/insn-eval.h> +#include <asm/vdso.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
@@ -116,6 +117,9 @@ do_trap_no_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, int trapnr, const char *str, tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; tsk->thread.trap_nr = trapnr;die (str, regs, error_code); + }else { +if (fixup_vdso_exception (regs, trapnr, error_code,0 )) +return 0 ; }/*
@@ -549,6 +553,9 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; tsk->thread.trap_nr =X86_TRAP_GP ; +if (fixup_vdso_exception (regs,X86_TRAP_GP , error_code,0 )) +return ; +show_signal (tsk,SIGSEGV ,"" , desc, regs, error_code);force_sig (SIGSEGV ); goto exit;
@@ -827,9 +834,12 @@ static void handle_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long dr6, bool user)#endif if (notify_die (DIE_DEBUG ,"debug" , regs, (long )&dr6,0 , -SIGTRAP ) ==NOTIFY_STOP ) { -return ; - } +SIGTRAP ) ==NOTIFY_STOP ) + goto out; + +if (user_mode (regs) && +fixup_vdso_exception (regs,X86_TRAP_DB ,0 ,0 )) + goto out;/* It's safe to allow irq's after DR6 has been saved */ cond_local_irq_enable (regs);
@@ -981,6 +991,9 @@ static void math_error(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)if (!si_code) goto exit; +if (fixup_vdso_exception (regs, trapnr,0 ,0 )) +return ; +force_sig_fault (SIGFPE , si_code, (void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr (regs)); exit:
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +8 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@#include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h> /* exception stack */ #include <asm/pgtable_areas.h> /* VMALLOC_START, ... */ #include <asm/kvm_para.h> /* kvm_handle_async_pf */ +#include <asm/vdso.h> /* fixup_vdso_exception() */ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <asm/trace/exceptions.h>
@@ -775,6 +776,10 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,sanitize_error_code (address, &error_code); +if (fixup_vdso_exception (regs,X86_TRAP_PF , error_code, + address)) +return ; +if (likely (show_unhandled_signals))show_signal_msg (regs, error_code, address, tsk);
@@ -894,6 +899,9 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,sanitize_error_code (address, &error_code); +if (fixup_vdso_exception (regs,X86_TRAP_PF , error_code, address)) +return ; +set_signal_archinfo (address, error_code);#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 21/24 x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call
In reply to a message not in the archiveFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
An SGX runtime must be aware of the exceptions, which happen inside an enclave. Introduce a vDSO call that wraps EENTER/ERESUME cycle and returns the CPU exception back to the caller exactly when it happens.
Kernel fixups the exception information to RDI, RSI and RDX. The SGX call vDSO handler fills this information to the user provided buffer or alternatively trigger user provided callback at the time of the exception.
The calling convention is custom and does not follow System V x86-64 ABI.
--- arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 1 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h | 8 ++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 128 ++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 296 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ VDSO32-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) := y vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o +vobjs-$(VDSO64-y) += vsgx_enter_enclave.o # files to link into kernel obj-y += vma.o extable.o
@@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ $(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS CFLAGS_REMOVE_vclock_gettime.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso32/vclock_gettime.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetcpu.o = -pg +CFLAGS_REMOVE_vsgx_enter_enclave.o = -pg # # X32 processes use x32 vDSO to access 64bit kernel data.
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S +1 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ VERSION { __vdso_time; clock_getres; __vdso_clock_getres; + __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave; local: *; }; }
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S new file +157 -0
157 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h new file +8 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H +#define _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H + +#define EENTER 0x02 +#define ERESUME 0x03 + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H */
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +128 -0
132 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 22/24 selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX
In reply to a message not in the archiveAdd a selftest for SGX. It is a trivial test where a simple enclave copies one 64-bit word of memory between two memory locations.
--- tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile | 53 +++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S | 44 ++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h | 21 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c | 277 ++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 232 ++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h | 38 ++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c | 395 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c | 20 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds | 40 ++ .../selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S | 89 ++++ 12 files changed, 1212 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ TARGETS += user TARGETS += vm TARGETS += x86 TARGETS += zram +TARGETS += sgx #Please keep the TARGETS list alphabetically sorted # Run "make quicktest=1 run_tests" or # "make quicktest=1 kselftest" from top level Makefile
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore new file +2 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +test_sgx +test_encl.elf
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile new file +53 -0
53 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S new file +44 -0
44 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h new file +21 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* +* Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation. +*/ + +#ifndef DEFINES_H +#define DEFINES_H + +#include <stdint.h> + +#define PAGE_SIZE 4096 +#define PAGE_MASK (~(PAGE_SIZE - 1)) + +#define __aligned (x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x))) +#define __packed __attribute__((packed)) + +#include "../../../../arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h" +#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h" +#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h" + +#endif /* DEFINES_H */
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c new file +277 -0
277 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c new file +232 -0
232 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h new file +38 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* +* Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation. +*/ + +#ifndef MAIN_H +#define MAIN_H + +struct encl_segment { +off_t offset; +size_t size; +unsigned int prot; +unsigned int flags; +}; + +struct encl { +int fd; +void *bin; +off_t bin_size; +void *src; +size_t src_size; +size_t encl_size; +off_t encl_base; +unsigned int nr_segments; +struct encl_segment *segment_tbl; +struct sgx_secs secs; +struct sgx_sigstruct sigstruct; +}; + +void encl_delete (struct encl *ctx); +bool encl_load (const char *path,struct encl *encl); +bool encl_measure (struct encl *encl); +bool encl_build (struct encl *encl); + +int sgx_call_vdso (void *rdi,void *rsi,long rdx,u32 leaf,void *r8,void *r9, +struct sgx_enclave_run *run); + +#endif /* MAIN_H */
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c new file +395 -0
395 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c new file +20 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) +// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation. + +#include <stddef.h> +#include "defines.h" + +static void *memcpy (void *dest,const void *src,size_t n) +{ +size_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < n; i++) + ((char *)dest)[i] = ((char *)src)[i]; + +return dest; +} + +void encl_body (void *rdi,void *rsi) +{ +memcpy (rsi, rdi,8 ); +}
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds new file +40 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf64-x86-64) + +PHDRS +{ + tcs PT_LOAD; + text PT_LOAD; + data PT_LOAD; +} + +SECTIONS +{ + . = 0; + .tcs : { + *(.tcs*) + } : tcs + + . = ALIGN(4096); + .text : { + *(.text*) + *(.rodata*) + } : text + + . = ALIGN(4096); + .data : { + *(.data*) + } : data + + /DISCARD/ : { + *(.comment*) + *(.note*) + *(.debug*) + *(.eh_frame*) + } +} + +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.altinstructions), "ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.altinstr_replacement), "ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.discard.retpoline_safe), "RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.discard.nospec), "RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.got.plt), "Libcalls are not supported in enclaves")
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S new file +89 -0
89 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 23/24 docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals
In reply to a message not in the archiveDocument the Intel SGX kernel architecture. The fine-grained micro architecture details can be looked up from Intel SDM Volume 3D.
--- Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/sgx.rst | 200 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 201 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst
Documentation/x86/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -30,3 +30,4 @@ x86-specific Documentation usb-legacy-support i386/index x86_64/index + sgx
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst new file +200 -0
200 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v37 24/24 x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS
In reply to a message not in the archiveAdd the maintainer information for the SGX subsystem.
--- MAINTAINERS | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
MAINTAINERS +11 -0
@@ -9051,6 +9051,17 @@ F: Documentation/x86/intel_txt.rst F: arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c F: include/linux/tboot.h +INTEL SGX +M: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> +M: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> +L: [email protected] +S: Maintained +Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/intel-sgx/list/ +T: git https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/linux-sgx.git +F: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +F: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/* +K: \bSGX_ + INTERCONNECT API M: Georgi Djakov <[email protected]> L: [email protected]
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1