security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree is used. It is better to use kvfree_sensitive instead, which is more readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call to memzero_explicit. Fix this.
--- security/keys/big_key.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
security/keys/big_key.c +3 -6
@@ -121,8 +121,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) *path = file->f_path;path_get (path);fput (file); -memzero_explicit (buf, enclen); -kvfree (buf); +kvfree_sensitive (buf, enclen); }else {/* Just store the data in a buffer */ void *data =kmalloc (datalen,GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -140,8 +139,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) err_enckey:kfree_sensitive (enckey); error: -memzero_explicit (buf, enclen); -kvfree (buf); +kvfree_sensitive (buf, enclen);return ret; }
@@ -273,8 +271,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) err_fput:fput (file); error: -memzero_explicit (buf, enclen); -kvfree (buf); +kvfree_sensitive (buf, enclen); }else { ret = datalen;memcpy (buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Quoted 4 lines · Alex Dewar
In
big_key.c, there are a few places wherememzero_explicit+ kvfree is used. It is better to usekvfree_sensitiveinstead, which is more readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call tomemzero_explicit. Fix this.
That last bit is untrue: the compiler can't elide memzero_explicit ... that's why it has the explicit suffix.
The original problem was a lot of people do memset(.., 0, ..); kfree() which the compiler can elide if it understands the memory is going out of scope. Or the even more problematic memset(..., 0, ...) on a stack variable before it goes out of scope.
We can argue about readability but there's no secret leak here.
James
Quoted 9 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 4 lines · Alex Dewar
In
big_key.c, there are a few places wherememzero_explicit+ kvfree is used. It is better to usekvfree_sensitiveinstead, which is more readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call tomemzero_explicit. Fix this.That last bit is untrue: the compiler can't elide
memzero_explicit... that's why it has the explicit suffix.
Quoted 6 lines
The original problem was a lot of people do
memset(.., 0, ..);kfree()which the compiler can elide if it understands the memory is going out of scope. Or the even more problematicmemset(..., 0, ...)on a stack variable before it goes out of scope.We can argue about readability but there's no secret leak here.
Ahh, my mistake. Thanks for the explanation.
I'll send a v2 with an updated commit message. I think it would still make sense to use kfree_sensitive here as on next-20200911 this is the last use of kzfree in the tree and it would be nice to excise it altogether.
Best,
Alex
Quoted 3 lines
James
Quoted 15 lines · Alex Dewar
Quoted 14 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 4 lines · Alex Dewar
In
big_key.c, there are a few places wherememzero_explicit+ kvfree is used. It is better to usekvfree_sensitiveinstead, which is more readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call tomemzero_explicit. Fix this.That last bit is untrue: the compiler can't elide
memzero_explicit... that's why it has the explicit suffix.The original problem was a lot of people do
memset(.., 0, ..);kfree()which the compiler can elide if it understands the memory is going out of scope. Or the even more problematicmemset(..., 0, ...)on a stack variable before it goes out of scope.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
We can argue about readability but there's no secret leak here.
Ahh, my mistake. Thanks for the explanation.
I'll send a v2 with an updated commit message. I think it would still make sense to use
kfree_sensitivehere as on next-20200911 this is the last use of kzfree in the tree and it would be nice to excise it altogether.
Ignore this! I thought we were talking about a different patch :-/
I'll send a respin with a better commit message anyways.
Cheers :-)
Quoted 7 lines
Best,
AlexQuoted 3 lines
James
PATCH v2 1/1 security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
In reply to Alex DewarIn big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree is used. Replace these with a single call to kvfree_sensitive, to make the code more readable.
---
v2 - Update commit message as per James Bottomley's suggestion
security/keys/big_key.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
security/keys/big_key.c +3 -6
@@ -121,8 +121,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) *path = file->f_path;path_get (path);fput (file); -memzero_explicit (buf, enclen); -kvfree (buf); +kvfree_sensitive (buf, enclen); }else {/* Just store the data in a buffer */ void *data =kmalloc (datalen,GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -140,8 +139,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) err_enckey:kfree_sensitive (enckey); error: -memzero_explicit (buf, enclen); -kvfree (buf); +kvfree_sensitive (buf, enclen);return ret; }
@@ -273,8 +271,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) err_fput:fput (file); error: -memzero_explicit (buf, enclen); -kvfree (buf); +kvfree_sensitive (buf, enclen); }else { ret = datalen;memcpy (buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Hi,
same patch
https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/27/168
Thanks,
Denis
Quoted 45 lines · Alex Dewar
In
big_key.c, there are a few places wherememzero_explicit+ kvfree is used. It is better to usekvfree_sensitiveinstead, which is more readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call tomemzero_explicit. Fix this.Signed-off-by Alex Dewar <[email protected]>--- security/keys/big_key.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)security/keys/big_key.c +3
-6@@ -121,8 +121,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) *path = file->f_path;path_get (path);fput (file); -memzero_explicit (buf, enclen); -kvfree (buf); +kvfree_sensitive (buf, enclen); }else {/* Just store the data in a buffer */ void *data =kmalloc (datalen,GFP_KERNEL );@@ -140,8 +139,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) err_enckey:kfree_sensitive (enckey); error: -memzero_explicit (buf, enclen); -kvfree (buf); +kvfree_sensitive (buf, enclen);return ret; }@@ -273,8 +271,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) err_fput:fput (file); error: -memzero_explicit (buf, enclen); -kvfree (buf); +kvfree_sensitive (buf, enclen); }else { ret = datalen;memcpy (buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
Quoted 8 lines · Denis Efremov
Hi,
same patch
https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/27/168
Thanks,
Denis
Ah ok. Sorry for the noise!
Quoted 47 lines · Alex Dewar
Quoted 45 lines
In
big_key.c, there are a few places wherememzero_explicit+ kvfree is used. It is better to usekvfree_sensitiveinstead, which is more readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call tomemzero_explicit. Fix this.Signed-off-by Alex Dewar <[email protected]>--- security/keys/big_key.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)security/keys/big_key.c +3
-6@@ -121,8 +121,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) *path = file->f_path;path_get (path);fput (file); -memzero_explicit (buf, enclen); -kvfree (buf); +kvfree_sensitive (buf, enclen); }else {/* Just store the data in a buffer */ void *data =kmalloc (datalen,GFP_KERNEL );@@ -140,8 +139,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) err_enckey:kfree_sensitive (enckey); error: -memzero_explicit (buf, enclen); -kvfree (buf); +kvfree_sensitive (buf, enclen);return ret; }@@ -273,8 +271,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) err_fput:fput (file); error: -memzero_explicit (buf, enclen); -kvfree (buf); +kvfree_sensitive (buf, enclen); }else { ret = datalen;memcpy (buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
Quoted 8 lines · Denis Efremov
Hi,
same patch
https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/27/168
Thanks,
Denis
David, can you pick this up?
/Jarkko