Intel SGX foundations
Subsystems (11)
v38 cover Intel SGX foundations
Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the enclave is disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave by the CPU access control.
There is a new hardware unit in the processor called Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) starting from the Skylake microacrhitecture. BIOS can define one or many MEE regions that can hold enclave data by configuring them with PRMRR registers.
The MEE automatically encrypts the data leaving the processor package to the MEE regions. The data is encrypted using a random key whose life-time is exactly one power cycle.
The current implementation requires that the firmware sets IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH* MSRs as writable so that ultimately the kernel can decide what enclaves it wants run. The implementation does not create any bottlenecks to support read-only MSRs later on.
You can tell if your CPU supports SGX by looking into /proc/cpuinfo:
cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep sgx
v38:
* Fast iteration because I had email server issues with v37. Using temporary SMTP for this (mail.kapsi.fi).
* Return -EINTR when no data is processed, just like read().
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11773941/
* Remove cruft from SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES and fix the return value.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/T/#mc643ef2ab477f5f7aa5d463d883d1308eb44d6f1
v37:
* Remove MODULE_*().
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/
* Fix mmap() type check.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/20200827152051.GB22351@sjchrist-ice/
* Fix ioctl-number.txt.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/
* Fix SPDX identifier in arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/
* Consistently document "@encl: an enclave pointer".
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/
* Renamed SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE as SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION and
cleaned up associated code. Also fixed issues of code introduced too
early that were caused by the split. Now it should be more streamlined.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/
* Fixed signed integer shift overflow:
https://github.com/intel/linux-sgx-driver/pull/16/commits d27ca6071b2b28e2e789d265eda796dd9fc65a64
* Fixed off-by-one error in a size calculation:
https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives/commit/e44cc238becf584cc079aef40b557c6af9a03f38
* Rework vDSO API with a context structure for IO data.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/
* Refined commentary about retry-loop with ENCLS[EINIT] based on Sean's response.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/
* Return positive number from SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES indicating the
number of pages processed and set a fixed 1MB limit for length. In addition,
on interrupt, return 0 and number of processed pages instead of -EINTR.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/[email protected]/
v36:
* Make a self-contained mprotect() handler.
* Move from radix_tree to xarray, which is more modern and robust data structure for managing large sparse arrays. Rename encl->page_tree as encl->page_array.
v35:
* Add missing SGX_ENCL_DEAD check to sgx_ioctl().
v34:
* Remove SGX_ENCL_DEAD checks from ioctl.c, as the file is open while executing an ioctl.
* Split driver patch into base patch and one patch for each ioctl.
* Move encl->flags check to the beginning of each ioctl. Return consistently -EINVAL if they don't match the expected values. Before, sometimes -EFAULT was returned instead of -EINVAL.
* Rename vm_ops->may_mprotect as vm_ops->mprotect() and move the call right before call to mprotect_fixup().
v33:
* Rebased to v5.8-rc1. Given the core changes (mmap_lock and #DB handling), it made sense to update the series.
* Refined documentation about how remote attestation is done in SGX.
v32:
* v31 contained not fully cleaned up main.c after merger of main.c and reclaim.c. Fixed in this version.
* Rebased to v5.7. Forgot to do this for v31.
v31:
* Unset SGX_ENCL_IOCTL in the error path of checking encl->flags in order to prevent leaving it set and thus block any further ioctl calls.
* Added missing cleanup_srcu_struct() call to sgx_encl_release().
* Take encl->lock in sgx_encl_add_page() in order to prevent races with the page reclaimer.
* Fix a use-after-free bug from the page reclaimer. Call kref_put() for encl->refcount only after putting enclave page back to the active page list because it could be the last ref to the enclave.
* Filter any CPU disallowed values from sigstruct->vendor SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT.
* Use bits 0-7 of page descriptor for the EPC section index. This should be enough for long term needs.
* Refined naming for functions that allocate and free EPC pages to be more sound and consistent.
* Merge main.c and reclaim.c into one.
v30:
Bunch of tags added. No actual code changes.
v29:
* The selftest has been moved to selftests/sgx. Because SGX is an execution environment of its own, it really isn't a great fit with more "standard" x86 tests.
The RSA key is now generated on fly and the whole signing process has been made as part of the enclave loader instead of signing the enclave during the compilation time.
Finally, the enclave loader loads now the test enclave directly from its ELF file, which means that ELF file does not need to be coverted as raw binary during the build process.
* Version the mm_list instead of using on synchronize_mm() when adding new entries. We hold the write lock for the mm_struct, and dup_mm() can thus deadlock with the page reclaimer, which could hold the lock for the old mm_struct.
* Disallow mmap(PROT_NONE) from /dev/sgx. Any mapping (e.g. anonymous) can be used to reserve the address range. Now /dev/sgx supports only opaque mappings to the (initialized) enclave data.
* Make the vDSO callable directly from C by preserving RBX and taking leaf from RCX.
v28:
* Documented to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst how the kernel manages the enclave ownership.
* Removed non-LC flow from sgx_einit().
* Removed struct sgx_einittoken since only the size of the corresponding microarchitectural structure is used in the series ATM.
v27:
* Disallow RIE processes to use enclaves as there could a permission conflict between VMA and enclave permissions.
* In the documentation, replace "grep /proc/cpuinfo" with "grep sgx /proc/cpuinfo".
v26:
* Fixed the commit author in "x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver", which was changed in v25 by mistake.
* Addressed a bunch of grammar mistakes in sgx.rst (thanks Randy once again for such a detailed feedback).
* Added back the MAINTAINERS update commit, which was mistakenly removed in v25.
* EREMOVE's for SECS cannot be done while sanitizing an EPC section. The CPU does not allow to remove a SECS page before all of its children have been removed, and a child page can be in some other section than the one currently being processed. Thus, removed special SECS processing from sgx_sanitize_page() and instead put sections through it twice. In the 2nd round the lists should only contain SECS pages.
v25:
* Fix a double-free issue when SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
fails on executing ENCLS[EADD]. The rollback path executed radix_tree_delete() on the same address twice when this happened.
* Return -EINTR instead of -ERESTARTSYS in SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES when a signal is pending.
* As requested by Borislav, move the CPUID 0x12 features to their own word in cpufeatures.
* Sean fixed a bug from sgx_reclaimer_write() where sgx_encl_put_backing() was called with an uninitialized pointer when sgx_encl_get_backing() fails.
* Migrated /dev/sgx/* to misc. This is future-proof as struct miscdevice has 'groups' for setting up sysfs attributes for the device.
* Use device_initcall instead of subsys_initcall so that misc_class is initialized before SGX is initialized.
* Return -EACCES in SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT when caller tries to select enclave attributes that we the kernel does not allow it to set instead of -EINVAL.
* Unless SGX public key MSRs are writable always deny the feature from Linux. Previously this was only denied from driver. How VMs should be supported is not really part of initial patch set, which makes this an obvious choice.
* Cleaned up and refined documentation to be more approachable.
v24:
* Reclaim unmeasured and TCS pages (regression in v23).
* Replace usages of GFP_HIGHUSER with GFP_KERNEL.
* Return -EIO on when EADD or EEXTEND fails in %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES and use the same rollback (destroy enclave). This can happen when host suspends itself unknowingly to a VM running enclaves. From -EIO the user space can deduce what happened.
* Have a separate @count in struct sgx_enclave_add_pages to output number of bytes processed instead of overwriting the input parameters for clarity and more importantly that the API provides means for partial processing (@count could be less than @length in success case).
v23:
* Replace SGX_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE with SGX_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES. Replace @mrmask with %SGX_PAGE_MEASURE flag.
* Return -EIO instead of -ECANCELED when ptrace() fails to read a TCS page.
* In the reclaimer, pin page before ENCLS[EBLOCK] because pinning can fail (because of OOM) even in legit behaviour and after EBLOCK the reclaiming flow can be only reverted by killing the whole enclave.
* Fixed SGX_ATTR_RESERVED_MASK. Bit 7 was marked as reserved while in fact it should have been bit 6 (Table 37-3 in the SDM).
* Return -EPERM from SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT when ENCLS[EINIT] returns an SGX error code.
v22:
* Refined bunch commit messages and added associated SDM references as many of them were too exhausting and some outdated.
* Alignment checks have been removed from mmap() because it does not define the ELRANGE. VMAs only act as windows to the enclave. The semantics compare somewhat how mmap() works with regular files.
* We now require user space addresses given to SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE to be page aligned so that we can pass the page directly to EADD and do not have to do an extra copy. This was made effectively possible by removing the worker thread for adding pages.
* The selftest build files have been refined throughout of various glitches and work properly in a cross compilation environment such as BuildRoot. In addition, libcalls fail the build with an assertion in the linker script, if they end up to the enclave binary.
* CONFIG_INTEL_SGX_DRIVER has been removed because you cannot use SGX core for anything without having the driver. This could change when KVM support is added.
* We require zero permissions in SECINFO for TCS pages because the CPU overwrites SECINFO flags with zero permissions and measures the page only after that. Allowing to pass TCS with non-zero permissions would cause mismatching measurement between the one provided in SIGSTRUCT and the one computed by the CPU.
* Obviously lots of small fixes and clean ups (does make sense to document them all).
v21:
* Check on mmap() that the VMA does cover an area that does not have enclave pages. Only mapping with PROT_NONE can do that to reserve initial address space for an enclave.
* Check om mmap() and mprotect() that the VMA permissions do not surpass the enclave permissions.
* Remove two refcounts from vma_close(): mm_list and encl->refcount. Enclave refcount is only need for swapper/enclave sync and we can remove mm_list refcount by destroying mm_struct when the process is closed. By not having vm_close() the Linux MM can merge VMAs.
* Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address.
* Numerous small fixes and clean ups.
* Use SRCU for synchronizing the list of mm_struct's.
* Move to stack based call convention in the vDSO.
v20:
* Fine-tune Kconfig messages and spacing and remove MMU_NOTIFIER dependency as MMU notifiers are no longer used in the driver.
* Use mm_users instead of mm_count as refcount for mm_struct as mm_count only protects from deleting mm_struct, not removing its contents.
* Sanitize EPC when the reclaimer thread starts by doing EREMOVE for all of them. They could be in initialized state when the kernel starts because it might be spawned by kexec().
* Documentation overhaul.
* Use a device /dev/sgx/provision for delivering the provision token instead of securityfs.
* Create a reference to the enclave when already when opening /dev/sgx/enclave. The file is then associated with this enclave only. mmap() can be done at free at any point and always get a reference to the enclave. To summarize the file now represents the enclave.
v19:
* Took 3-4 months but in some sense this was more like a rewrite of most of the corners of the source code. If I've forgotten to deal with some feedback, please don't shout me. Make a remark and I will fix it for the next version. Hopefully there won't be this big turnovers anymore.
* Validate SECS attributes properly against CPUID given attributes and against allowed attributes. SECS attributes are the ones that are enforced whereas SIGSTRUCT attributes tell what is required to run the enclave.
* Add KSS (Key Sharing Support) to the enclave attributes.
* Deny MAP_PRIVATE as an enclave is always a shared memory entity.
* Revert back to shmem backing storage so that it can be easily shared by multiple processes.
* Split the recognization of an ENCLS leaf failure by using three functions to detect it: encsl_faulted(), encls_returned_code() and sgx_failed(). encls_failed() is only caused by a spurious expections that should never happen. Thus, it is not defined as an inline function in order to easily insert a kprobe to it.
* Move low-level enclave management routines, page fault handler and page reclaiming routines from driver to the core. These cannot be separated from each other as they are heavily interdependent. The rationale is that the core does not call any code from the driver.
* Allow the driver to be compiled as a module now that it no code is using its routines and it only uses exported symbols. Now the driver is essentially just a thin ioctl layer.
* Reworked the driver to maintain a list of mm_struct's. The VMA callbacks add new entries to this list as the process is forked. Each entry has its own refcount because they have a different life-cycle as the enclave does. In effect @tgid and @mm have been removed from struct sgx_encl and we allow forking by removing VM_DONTCOPY from vm flags.
* Generate a cpu mask in the reclaimer from the cpu mask's of all mm_struct's. This will kick out the hardware threads out of the enclave from multiple processes. It is not a local variable because it would eat too much of the stack space but instead a field in struct sgx_encl.
* Allow forking i.e. remove VM_DONTCOPY. I did not change the API because the old API scaled to the workload that Andy described. The codebase is now mostly API independent i.e. changing the API is a small task. For me the proper trigger to chanage it is a as concrete as possible workload that cannot be fulfilled. I hope you understand my thinking here. I don't want to change anything w/o proper basis but I'm ready to change anything if there is a proper basis. I do not have any kind of attachment to any particular type of API.
* Add Sean's vDSO ENCLS(EENTER) patches and update selftest to use the new vDSO.
v18:
* Update the ioctl-number.txt.
* Move the driver under arch/x86.
* Add SGX features (SGX, SGX1, SGX2) to the disabled-features.h.
* Rename the selftest as test_sgx (previously sgx-selftest).
* In order to enable process accounting, swap EPC pages and PCMD's to a VMA instead of shmem.
* Allow only to initialize and run enclaves with a subset of {DEBUG, MODE64BIT} set.
* Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE to allow an enclave to have privileged attributes e.g. PROVISIONKEY.
v17:
* Add a simple selftest.
* Fix a null pointer dereference to section->pages when its allocation fails.
* Add Sean's description of the exception handling to the documentation.
v16:
* Fixed SOB's in the commits that were a bit corrupted in v15.
* Implemented exceptio handling properly to detect_sgx().
* Use GENMASK() to define SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_TYPE_MASK.
* Updated the documentation to use rst definition lists.
* Added the missing Documentation/x86/index.rst, which has a link to intel_sgx.rst. Now the SGX and uapi documentation is properly generated with 'make htmldocs'.
* While enumerating EPC sections, if an undefined section is found, fail the driver initialization instead of continuing the initialization.
* Issue a warning if there are more than %SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS.
* Remove copyright notice from arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h.
* Migrated from ioremap_cache() to memremap().
v15:
* Split into more digestable size patches.
* Lots of small fixes and clean ups.
* Signal a "plain" SIGSEGV on an EPCM violation.
v14:
* Change the comment about X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC from “SGX launch configuration” to “SGX launch control”.
* Move the SGX-related CPU feature flags as part of the Linux defined virtual leaf 8.
* Add SGX_ prefix to the constants defining the ENCLS leaf functions.
* Use GENMASK*() and BIT*() in sgx_arch.h instead of raw hex numbers.
* Refine the long description for CONFIG_INTEL_SGX_CORE.
* Do not use pr_*_ratelimited() in the driver. The use of the rate limited versions is legacy cruft from the prototyping phase.
* Detect sleep with SGX_INVALID_EINIT_TOKEN instead of counting power cycles.
* Manually prefix with “sgx:” in the core SGX code instead of redefining pr_fmt.
* Report if IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHx MSRs are not writable in the driver instead of core because it is a driver requirement.
* Change prompt to bool in the entry for CONFIG_INTEL_SGX_CORE because the default is ‘n’.
* Rename struct sgx_epc_bank as struct sgx_epc_section in order to match the SDM.
* Allocate struct sgx_epc_page instances one at a time.
* Use “__iomem void *” pointers for the mapped EPC memory consistently.
* Retry once on SGX_INVALID_TOKEN in sgx_einit() instead of counting power cycles.
* Call enclave swapping operations directly from the driver instead of calling them .indirectly through struct sgx_epc_page_ops because indirect calls are not required yet as the patch set does not contain the KVM support.
* Added special signal SEGV_SGXERR to notify about SGX EPCM violation errors.
v13:
* Always use SGX_CPUID constant instead of a hardcoded value.
* Simplified and documented the macros and functions for ENCLS leaves.
* Enable sgx_free_page() to free active enclave pages on demand in order to allow sgx_invalidate() to delete enclave pages. It no longer performs EREMOVE if a page is in the process of being reclaimed.
* Use PM notifier per enclave so that we don't have to traverse the global list of active EPC pages to find enclaves.
* Removed unused SGX_LE_ROLLBACK constant from uapi/asm/sgx.h
* Always use ioremap() to map EPC banks as we only support 64-bit kernel.
* Invalidate IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH cache used by sgx_einit() when going to sleep.
v12:
* Split to more narrow scoped commits in order to ease the review process and use co-developed-by tag for co-authors of commits instead of listing them in the source files.
* Removed cruft EXPORT_SYMBOL() declarations and converted to static variables.
* Removed in-kernel LE i.e. this version of the SGX software stack only supports unlocked IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHx MSRs.
* Refined documentation on launching enclaves, swapping and enclave construction.
* Refined sgx_arch.h to include alignment information for every struct that requires it and removed structs that are not needed without an LE.
* Got rid of SGX_CPUID.
* SGX detection now prints log messages about firmware configuration issues.
v11:
* Polished ENCLS wrappers with refined exception handling.
* ksgxswapd was not stopped (regression in v5) in sgx_page_cache_teardown(), which causes a leaked kthread after driver deinitialization.
* Shutdown sgx_le_proxy when going to suspend because its EPC pages will be invalidated when resuming, which will cause it not function properly anymore.
* Set EINITTOKEN.VALID to zero for a token that is passed when SGXLEPUBKEYHASH matches MRSIGNER as alloc_page() does not give a zero page.
* Fixed the check in sgx_edbgrd() for a TCS page. Allowed to read offsets around the flags field, which causes a #GP. Only flags read is readable.
* On read access memcpy() call inside sgx_vma_access() had src and dest parameters in wrong order.
* The build issue with CONFIG_KASAN is now fixed. Added undefined symbols to LE even if “KASAN_SANITIZE := false” was set in the makefile.
* Fixed a regression in the #PF handler. If a page has SGX_ENCL_PAGE_RESERVED flag the #PF handler should unconditionally fail. It did not, which caused weird races when trying to change other parts of swapping code.
* EPC management has been refactored to a flat LRU cache and moved to arch/x86. The swapper thread reads a cluster of EPC pages and swaps all of them. It can now swap from multiple enclaves in the same round.
* For the sake of consistency with SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE, return -EINVAL when an enclave is already initialized or dead instead of zero.
v10:
* Cleaned up anon inode based IPC between the ring-0 and ring-3 parts of the driver.
* Unset the reserved flag from an enclave page if EDBGRD/WR fails (regression in v6).
* Close the anon inode when LE is stopped (regression in v9).
* Update the documentation with a more detailed description of SGX.
v9:
* Replaced kernel-LE IPC based on pipes with an anonymous inode. The driver does not require anymore new exports.
v8:
* Check that public key MSRs match the LE public key hash in the driver initialization when the MSRs are read-only.
* Fix the race in VA slot allocation by checking the fullness immediately after succeesful allocation.
* Fix the race in hash mrsigner calculation between the launch enclave and user enclaves by having a separate lock for hash calculation.
v7:
* Fixed offset calculation in sgx_edbgr/wr(). Address was masked with PAGE_MASK when it should have been masked with ~PAGE_MASK.
* Fixed a memory leak in sgx_ioc_enclave_create().
* Simplified swapping code by using a pointer array for a cluster instead of a linked list.
* Squeezed struct sgx_encl_page to 32 bytes.
* Fixed deferencing of an RSA key on OpenSSL 1.1.0.
* Modified TC's CMAC to use kernel AES-NI. Restructured the code
a bit in order to better align with kernel conventions.
v6:
* Fixed semaphore underrun when accessing /dev/sgx from the launch enclave.
* In sgx_encl_create() s/IS_ERR(secs)/IS_ERR(encl)/.
* Removed virtualization chapter from the documentation.
* Changed the default filename for the signing key as signing_key.pem.
* Reworked EPC management in a way that instead of a linked list of struct sgx_epc_page instances there is an array of integers that encodes address and bank of an EPC page (the same data as 'pa' field earlier). The locking has been moved to the EPC bank level instead of a global lock.
* Relaxed locking requirements for EPC management. EPC pages can be released back to the EPC bank concurrently.
* Cleaned up ptrace() code.
* Refined commit messages for new architectural constants.
* Sorted includes in every source file.
* Sorted local variable declarations according to the line length in every function.
* Style fixes based on Darren's comments to sgx_le.c.
v5:
* Described IPC between the Launch Enclave and kernel in the commit messages.
* Fixed all relevant checkpatch.pl issues that I have forgot fix in earlier versions except those that exist in the imported TinyCrypt code.
* Fixed spelling mistakes in the documentation.
* Forgot to check the return value of sgx_drv_subsys_init().
* Encapsulated properly page cache init and teardown.
* Collect epc pages to a temp list in sgx_add_epc_bank
* Removed SGX_ENCLAVE_INIT_ARCH constant.
v4:
* Tied life-cycle of the sgx_le_proxy process to /dev/sgx.
* Removed __exit annotation from sgx_drv_subsys_exit().
* Fixed a leak of a backing page in sgx_process_add_page_req() in the case when vm_insert_pfn() fails.
* Removed unused symbol exports for sgx_page_cache.c.
* Updated sgx_alloc_page() to require encl parameter and documented the behavior (Sean Christopherson).
* Refactored a more lean API for sgx_encl_find() and documented the behavior.
* Moved #PF handler to sgx_fault.c.
* Replaced subsys_system_register() with plain bus_register().
* Retry EINIT 2nd time only if MSRs are not locked.
v3:
* Check that FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED and FEATURE_CONTROL_SGX_ENABLE are set.
* Return -ERESTARTSYS in __sgx_encl_add_page() when sgx_alloc_page() fails.
* Use unused bits in epc_page->pa to store the bank number.
* Removed #ifdef for WQ_NONREENTRANT.
* If mmu_notifier_register() fails with -EINTR, return -ERESTARTSYS.
* Added --remove-section=.got.plt to objcopy flags in order to prevent a dummy .got.plt, which will cause an inconsistent size for the LE.
* Documented sgx_encl_* functions.
* Added remark about AES implementation used inside the LE.
* Removed redundant sgx_sys_exit() from le/main.c.
* Fixed struct sgx_secinfo alignment from 128 to 64 bytes.
* Validate miscselect in sgx_encl_create().
* Fixed SSA frame size calculation to take the misc region into account.
* Implemented consistent exception handling to __encls() and __encls_ret().
* Implemented a proper device model in order to allow sysfs attributes and in-kernel API.
* Cleaned up various "find enclave" implementations to the unified sgx_encl_find().
* Validate that vm_pgoff is zero.
* Discard backing pages with shmem_truncate_range() after EADD.
* Added missing EEXTEND operations to LE signing and launch.
* Fixed SSA size for GPRS region from 168 to 184 bytes.
* Fixed the checks for TCS flags. Now DBGOPTIN is allowed.
* Check that TCS addresses are in ELRANGE and not just page aligned.
* Require kernel to be compiled with X64_64 and CPU_SUP_INTEL.
* Fixed an incorrect value for SGX_ATTR_DEBUG from 0x01 to 0x02.
v2:
* get_rand_uint32() changed the value of the pointer instead of value where it is pointing at.
* Launch enclave incorrectly used sigstruct attributes-field instead of enclave attributes-field.
* Removed unused struct sgx_add_page_req from sgx_ioctl.c
* Removed unused sgx_has_sgx2.
* Updated arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h so that it provides stub implementations when sgx in not enabled.
* Removed cruft rdmsr-calls from sgx_set_pubkeyhash_msrs().
* return -ENOMEM in sgx_alloc_page() when VA pages consume too much space
* removed unused global sgx_nr_pids
* moved sgx_encl_release to sgx_encl.c
* return -ERESTARTSYS instead of -EINTR in sgx_encl_init()
Jarkko Sakkinen (14):
x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter
x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page() x86/sgx: Add SGX enclave driver
x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE
x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
x86/sgx: Enable provisioning for remote attestation x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer
x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX
docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS
Sean Christopherson (10):
x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support
x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections
mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect()
x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 + .../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/sgx.rst | 200 +++++ MAINTAINERS | 11 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 17 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 8 +- arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c | 46 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h | 29 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S | 9 +- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 1 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h | 50 +- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S | 157 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 5 +- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 18 +- arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h | 8 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 8 + arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 14 +- arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h | 5 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 203 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 41 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 5 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h | 341 ++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 204 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 32 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 754 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 128 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 238 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 823 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 753 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 65 ++ arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 19 +- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 45 +- include/linux/mm.h | 3 + mm/mprotect.c | 5 +- tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile | 53 ++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S | 44 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h | 21 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c | 277 ++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 232 +++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h | 38 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c | 395 +++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c | 20 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds | 40 + .../selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S | 89 ++ 51 files changed, 5446 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 1/24 x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Add X86_FEATURE_SGX from CPUID.(EAX=7, ECX=1), which informs whether the CPU has SGX.
Add X86_FEATURE_SGX1 and X86_FEATURE_SGX2 from CPUID.(EAX=12H, ECX=0), which describe the level of SGX support available [1].
Add IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL.SGX_ENABLE. BIOS can use this bit to opt-in SGX before locking the feature control MSR [2].
[1] Intel SDM: 36.7.2 Intel® SGX Resource Enumeration Leaves
[2] Intel SDM: 36.7.1 Intel® SGX Opt-In Configuration
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 5 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 7 ++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 18 +++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++++ 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +3 -2
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafsCPUID_7_ECX ,CPUID_8000_0007_EBX ,CPUID_7_EDX , + CPUID_12_EAX, };#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))#define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET (feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \
@@ -112,7 +113,7 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20))#define cpu_has (c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +6 -1
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@/* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 19/* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NCAPINTS 20/* N 32-bit words worth of info */ #define NBUGINTS 1/* N 32-bit bug flags */ /*
@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */ #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE ( 9*32+ 0)/* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/ #define X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST ( 9*32+ 1)/* TSC adjustment MSR 0x3B */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SGX ( 9*32+ 2)/* Software Guard Extensions */ #define X86_FEATURE_BMI1 ( 9*32+ 3)/* 1st group bit manipulation extensions */ #define X86_FEATURE_HLE ( 9*32+ 4)/* Hardware Lock Elision */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX2 ( 9*32+ 5)/* AVX2 instructions */
@@ -377,6 +378,10 @@#define X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES (18*32+30)/* "" IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES MSR */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31)/* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +/* Intel-defined SGX features, CPUID level 0x00000012:0 (EAX), word 19 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (19*32+ 0)/* SGX1 leaf functions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (19*32+ 1)/* SGX2 leaf functions */ +/* * BUG word(s) */
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +15 -3
@@ -28,13 +28,18 @@# define DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR (1<<(X86_FEATURE_CYRIX_ARR & 31))# define DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR (1<<(X86_FEATURE_CENTAUR_MCR & 31))# define DISABLE_PCID 0 +# define DISABLE_SGX1 0 +# define DISABLE_SGX2 0#else # define DISABLE_VME 0# define DISABLE_K6_MTRR 0# define DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR 0# define DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR 0# define DISABLE_PCID (1<<(X86_FEATURE_PCID & 31)) -#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ +# define DISABLE_SGX1 (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SGX1 & 31)) +# define DISABLE_SGX2 (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SGX2 & 31)) +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS # define DISABLE_PKU 0
@@ -56,6 +61,12 @@# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX +# define DISABLE_SGX 0 +#else +# define DISABLE_SGX (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SGX & 31)) +#endif +/* * Make sure to add features to the correct mask */
@@ -68,7 +79,7 @@#define DISABLED_MASK6 0#define DISABLED_MASK7 (DISABLE_PTI)#define DISABLED_MASK8 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SMAP) +#define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SMAP|DISABLE_SGX)#define DISABLED_MASK10 0#define DISABLED_MASK11 0#define DISABLED_MASK12 0
@@ -78,6 +89,7 @@#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)#define DISABLED_MASK17 0#define DISABLED_MASK18 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) +#define DISABLED_MASK19 (DISABLE_SGX1|DISABLE_SGX2) +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)#endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +1 -0
@@ -602,6 +602,7 @@#define FEAT_CTL_LOCKED BIT(0)#define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX BIT(1)#define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX BIT(2) +#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED BIT(18)#define FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED BIT(20)#define MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST 0x0000003b
arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +1 -1
@@ -101,6 +101,6 @@#define REQUIRED_MASK16 0#define REQUIRED_MASK17 0#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)#endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +4 -0
@@ -931,6 +931,10 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_capability[CPUID_D_1_EAX ] = eax; } +/* Additional Intel-defined SGX flags: level 0x00000012 */ +if (c->cpuid_level >=0x00000012 ) + c->x86_capability[CPUID_12_EAX ] =cpuid_eax (0x00000012 ); +/* AMD-defined flags: level 0x80000001 */ eax =cpuid_eax (0x80000000 ); c->extended_cpuid_level = eax;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 2/24 x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control hardware bits
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Add X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, which informs whether or not the CPU supports SGX Launch Control.
Add MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}, which when combined contain a SHA256 hash of a 3072-bit RSA public key. SGX backed software packages, so called enclaves, are always signed. All enclaves signed with the public key are unconditionally allowed to initialize. [1]
Add FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED, which informs whether the aformentioned MSRs are writable or not. If the bit is off, the public key MSRs are read-only for the OS.
If the MSRs are read-only, the platform must provide a launch enclave (LE). LE can create cryptographic tokens for other enclaves that they can pass together with their signature to the ENCLS(EINIT) opcode, which is used to initialize enclaves.
Linux is unlikely to support the locked configuration because it takes away the control of the launch decisions from the kernel.
[1] Intel SDM: 38.1.4 Intel SGX Launch Control Configuration
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_CLDEMOTE (16*32+25)/* CLDEMOTE instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIRI (16*32+27)/* MOVDIRI instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B (16*32+28)/* MOVDIR64B instruction */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC (16*32+30)/* Software Guard Extensions Launch Control */ /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000007 (EBX), word 17 */ #define X86_FEATURE_OVERFLOW_RECOV (17*32+ 0)/* MCA overflow recovery support */
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +7 -0
@@ -602,6 +602,7 @@#define FEAT_CTL_LOCKED BIT(0)#define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX BIT(1)#define FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX BIT(2) +#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED BIT(17)#define FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED BIT(18)#define FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED BIT(20)
@@ -622,6 +623,12 @@#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV 0x0000008b +/* Intel SGX Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs */ +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 0x0000008C +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH1 0x0000008D +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH2 0x0000008E +#define MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3 0x0000008F +#define MSR_IA32_SMM_MONITOR_CTL 0x0000009b#define MSR_IA32_SMBASE 0x0000009e
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 3/24 x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Include SGX bit to the PF error codes and throw SIGSEGV with PF_SGX when a #PF with SGX set happens.
CPU throws a #PF with the SGX set in the event of Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) conflict. The EPCM is a CPU-internal table, which describes the properties for a enclave page. Enclaves are measured and signed software entities, which SGX hosts. [1]
Although the primary purpose of the EPCM conflict checks is to prevent malicious accesses to an enclave, an illegit access can happen also for legit reasons.
All SGX reserved memory, including EPCM is encrypted with a transient key that does not survive from the power transition. Throwing a SIGSEGV allows user space software to react when this happens (e.g. recreate the enclave, which was invalidated).
[1] Intel SDM: 36.5.1 Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)
--- arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 14 ++++++++------ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +8 -6
@@ -44,12 +44,13 @@ void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,/* * Page fault error code bits: * -* bit 0 == 0: no page found 1: protection fault -* bit 1 == 0: read access 1: write access -* bit 2 == 0: kernel-mode access 1: user-mode access -* bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected -* bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch -* bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access +* bit 0 == 0: no page found 1: protection fault +* bit 1 == 0: read access 1: write access +* bit 2 == 0: kernel-mode access 1: user-mode access +* bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected +* bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch +* bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access +* bit 15 == 1: inside SGX enclave */ enum x86_pf_error_code {X86_PF_PROT =1 <<0 ,
@@ -58,5 +59,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {X86_PF_RSVD =1 <<3 ,X86_PF_INSTR =1 <<4 ,X86_PF_PK =1 <<5 , + X86_PF_SGX = 1 << 15, };#endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +13 -0
@@ -1054,6 +1054,19 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)if (error_code &X86_PF_PK )return 1 ; +/* +* Access is blocked by the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), i.e. the +* access is allowed by the PTE but not the EPCM. This usually happens +* when the EPCM is yanked out from under us, e.g. by hardware after a +* suspend/resume cycle. In any case, software, i.e. the kernel, can't +* fix the source of the fault as the EPCM can't be directly modified by +* software. Handle the fault as an access error in order to signal +* userspace so that userspace can rebuild their enclave(s), even though +* userspace may not have actually violated access permissions. +*/ +if (unlikely (error_code &X86_PF_SGX )) +return 1 ; +/* * Make sure to check the VMA so that we do not perform * faults just to hit a X86_PF_PK as soon as we fill in a
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 4/24 x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenDefine the SGX microarchitectural data structures used by various SGX opcodes. This is not an exhaustive representation of all SGX data structures but only those needed by the kernel.
The data structures are described in:
Intel SDM: 37.6 INTEL® SGX DATA STRUCTURES OVERVIEW
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h | 341 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 341 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h new file +341 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */ +/** +* Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation. +* +* Contains data structures defined by the SGX architecture. Data structures +* defined by the Linux software stack should not be placed here. +*/ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H +#define _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H + +#include <linux/bits.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +#define SGX_CPUID 0x12 +#define SGX_CPUID_FIRST_VARIABLE_SUB_LEAF 2 + +/** +* enum sgx_return_code - The return code type for ENCLS, ENCLU and ENCLV +* %SGX_NOT_TRACKED: Previous ETRACK's shootdown sequence has not +* been completed yet. +* %SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN: EINITTOKEN is invalid and enclave signer's +* public key does not match IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH. +* %SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT: An unmasked event, e.g. INTR, was received +*/ +enum sgx_return_code { +SGX_NOT_TRACKED =11 , +SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN =16 , +SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT =128 , +}; + +/** +* enum sgx_sub_leaf_types - SGX CPUID variable sub-leaf types +* %SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_INVALID: Indicates this sub-leaf is invalid. +* %SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_EPC_SECTION: Sub-leaf enumerates an EPC section. +*/ +enum sgx_sub_leaf_types { +SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_INVALID =0x0 , +SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_EPC_SECTION =0x1 , +}; + +#define SGX_CPUID_SUB_LEAF_TYPE_MASK GENMASK(3, 0) + +#define SGX_MODULUS_SIZE 384 + +/** +* enum sgx_miscselect - additional information to an SSA frame +* %SGX_MISC_EXINFO: Report #PF or #GP to the SSA frame. +* +* Save State Area (SSA) is a stack inside the enclave used to store processor +* state when an exception or interrupt occurs. This enum defines additional +* information stored to an SSA frame. +*/ +enum sgx_miscselect { +SGX_MISC_EXINFO =BIT (0 ), +}; + +#define SGX_MISC_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 1) + +#define SGX_SSA_GPRS_SIZE 184 +#define SGX_SSA_MISC_EXINFO_SIZE 16 + +/** +* enum sgx_attributes - the attributes field in &struct sgx_secs +* %SGX_ATTR_INIT: Enclave can be entered (is initialized). +* %SGX_ATTR_DEBUG: Allow ENCLS(EDBGRD) and ENCLS(EDBGWR). +* %SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT: Tell that this a 64-bit enclave. +* %SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY: Allow to use provisioning keys for remote +* attestation. +* %SGX_ATTR_KSS: Allow to use key separation and sharing (KSS). +* %SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY: Allow to use token signing key that is used to +* sign cryptographic tokens that can be passed to +* EINIT as an authorization to run an enclave. +*/ +enum sgx_attribute { +SGX_ATTR_INIT =BIT (0 ), +SGX_ATTR_DEBUG =BIT (1 ), +SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT =BIT (2 ), +SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY =BIT (4 ), +SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY =BIT (5 ), +SGX_ATTR_KSS =BIT (7 ), +}; + +#define SGX_ATTR_RESERVED_MASK (BIT_ULL(3) | BIT_ULL(6) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 8)) + +/** +* struct sgx_secs - SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) +* @size: size of the address space +* @base: base address of the address space +* @ssa_frame_size: size of an SSA frame +* @miscselect: additional information stored to an SSA frame +* @attributes: attributes for enclave +* @xfrm: XSave-Feature Request Mask (subset of XCR0) +* @mrenclave: SHA256-hash of the enclave contents +* @mrsigner: SHA256-hash of the public key used to sign the SIGSTRUCT +* @config_id: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation +* @isv_prod_id: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation +* @isv_svn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation +* @config_svn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation +* +* SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) is a special enclave page that is not +* visible in the address space. In fact, this structure defines the address +* range and other global attributes for the enclave and it is the first EPC +* page created for any enclave. It is moved from a temporary buffer to an EPC +* by the means of ENCLS(ECREATE) leaf. +*/ +struct sgx_secs { +u64 size; +u64 base; +u32 ssa_frame_size; +u32 miscselect; +u8 reserved1[24 ]; +u64 attributes; +u64 xfrm; +u32 mrenclave[8 ]; +u8 reserved2[32 ]; +u32 mrsigner[8 ]; +u8 reserved3[32 ]; +u32 config_id[16 ]; +u16 isv_prod_id; +u16 isv_svn; +u16 config_svn; +u8 reserved4[3834 ]; +} __packed; + +/** +* enum sgx_tcs_flags - execution flags for TCS +* %SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN: If enabled allows single-stepping and breakpoints +* inside an enclave. It is cleared by EADD but can +* be set later with EDBGWR. +*/ +enum sgx_tcs_flags { +SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN =0x01 , +}; + +#define SGX_TCS_RESERVED_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, 1) +#define SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE 4024 + +/** +* struct sgx_tcs - Thread Control Structure (TCS) +* @state: used to mark an entered TCS +* @flags: execution flags (cleared by EADD) +* @ssa_offset: SSA stack offset relative to the enclave base +* @ssa_index: the current SSA frame index (cleard by EADD) +* @nr_ssa_frames: the number of frame in the SSA stack +* @entry_offset: entry point offset relative to the enclave base +* @exit_addr: address outside the enclave to exit on an exception or +* interrupt +* @fs_offset: offset relative to the enclave base to become FS +* segment inside the enclave +* @gs_offset: offset relative to the enclave base to become GS +* segment inside the enclave +* @fs_limit: size to become a new FS-limit (only 32-bit enclaves) +* @gs_limit: size to become a new GS-limit (only 32-bit enclaves) +* +* Thread Control Structure (TCS) is an enclave page visible in its address +* space that defines an entry point inside the enclave. A thread enters inside +* an enclave by supplying address of TCS to ENCLU(EENTER). A TCS can be entered +* by only one thread at a time. +*/ +struct sgx_tcs { +u64 state; +u64 flags; +u64 ssa_offset; +u32 ssa_index; +u32 nr_ssa_frames; +u64 entry_offset; +u64 exit_addr; +u64 fs_offset; +u64 gs_offset; +u32 fs_limit; +u32 gs_limit; +u8 reserved[SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE ]; +} __packed; + +/** +* struct sgx_pageinfo - an enclave page descriptor +* @addr: address of the enclave page +* @contents: pointer to the page contents +* @metadata: pointer either to a SECINFO or PCMD instance +* @secs: address of the SECS page +*/ +struct sgx_pageinfo { +u64 addr; +u64 contents; +u64 metadata; +u64 secs; +} __packed__aligned(32) ; + + +/** +* enum sgx_page_type - bits in the SECINFO flags defining the page type +* %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS: a SECS page +* %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS: a TCS page +* %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG: a regular page +* %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA: a VA page +* %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM: a page in trimmed state +*/ +enum sgx_page_type { +SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS , +SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS , +SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG , +SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA , +SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM , +}; + +#define SGX_NR_PAGE_TYPES 5 +#define SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK GENMASK(7, 0) + +/** +* enum sgx_secinfo_flags - the flags field in &struct sgx_secinfo +* %SGX_SECINFO_R: allow read +* %SGX_SECINFO_W: allow write +* %SGX_SECINFO_X: allow execution +* %SGX_SECINFO_SECS: a SECS page +* %SGX_SECINFO_TCS: a TCS page +* %SGX_SECINFO_REG: a regular page +* %SGX_SECINFO_VA: a VA page +* %SGX_SECINFO_TRIM: a page in trimmed state +*/ +enum sgx_secinfo_flags { +SGX_SECINFO_R =BIT (0 ), +SGX_SECINFO_W =BIT (1 ), +SGX_SECINFO_X =BIT (2 ), +SGX_SECINFO_SECS = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS <<8 ), +SGX_SECINFO_TCS = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS <<8 ), +SGX_SECINFO_REG = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG <<8 ), +SGX_SECINFO_VA = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA <<8 ), +SGX_SECINFO_TRIM = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM <<8 ), +}; + +#define SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK GENMASK_ULL(2, 0) +#define SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK << 8) +#define SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK ~(SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK | \ + SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) + +/** +* struct sgx_secinfo - describes attributes of an EPC page +* @flags: permissions and type +* +* Used together with ENCLS leaves that add or modify an EPC page to an +* enclave to define page permissions and type. +*/ +struct sgx_secinfo { +u64 flags; +u8 reserved[56 ]; +} __packed__aligned(64) ; + +#define SGX_PCMD_RESERVED_SIZE 40 + +/** +* struct sgx_pcmd - Paging Crypto Metadata (PCMD) +* @enclave_id: enclave identifier +* @mac: MAC over PCMD, page contents and isvsvn +* +* PCMD is stored for every swapped page to the regular memory. When ELDU loads +* the page back it recalculates the MAC by using a isvsvn number stored in a +* VA page. Together these two structures bring integrity and rollback +* protection. +*/ +struct sgx_pcmd { +struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; +u64 enclave_id; +u8 reserved[SGX_PCMD_RESERVED_SIZE ]; +u8 mac[16 ]; +} __packed__aligned(128) ; + +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED1_SIZE 84 +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED2_SIZE 20 +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED3_SIZE 32 +#define SGX_SIGSTRUCT_RESERVED4_SIZE 12 + +/** +* struct sgx_sigstruct_header - defines author of the enclave +* @header1: constant byte string +* @vendor: must be either 0x0000 or 0x8086 +* @date: YYYYMMDD in BCD +* @header2: costant byte string +* @swdefined: software defined value +*/ +struct sgx_sigstruct_header { +u64 header1[2 ]; +u32 vendor; +u32 date; +u64 header2[2 ]; +u32 swdefined; +u8 reserved1[84 ]; +} __packed; + +/** +* struct sgx_sigstruct_body - defines contents of the enclave +* @miscselect: additional information stored to an SSA frame +* @misc_mask: required miscselect in SECS +* @attributes: attributes for enclave +* @xfrm: XSave-Feature Request Mask (subset of XCR0) +* @attributes_mask: required attributes in SECS +* @xfrm_mask: required XFRM in SECS +* @mrenclave: SHA256-hash of the enclave contents +* @isvprodid: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation +* @isvsvn: a user-defined value that is used in key derivation +*/ +struct sgx_sigstruct_body { +u32 miscselect; +u32 misc_mask; +u8 reserved2[20 ]; +u64 attributes; +u64 xfrm; +u64 attributes_mask; +u64 xfrm_mask; +u8 mrenclave[32 ]; +u8 reserved3[32 ]; +u16 isvprodid; +u16 isvsvn; +} __packed; + +/** +* struct sgx_sigstruct - an enclave signature +* @header: defines author of the enclave +* @modulus: the modulus of the public key +* @exponent: the exponent of the public key +* @signature: the signature calculated over the fields except modulus, +* @body: defines contents of the enclave +* @q1: a value used in RSA signature verification +* @q2: a value used in RSA signature verification +* +* Header and body are the parts that are actual signed. The remaining fields +* define the signature of the enclave. +*/ +struct sgx_sigstruct { +struct sgx_sigstruct_header header; +u8 modulus[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE ]; +u32 exponent; +u8 signature[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE ]; +struct sgx_sigstruct_body body; +u8 reserved4[12 ]; +u8 q1[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE ]; +u8 q2[SGX_MODULUS_SIZE ]; +} __packed; + +#define SGX_LAUNCH_TOKEN_SIZE 304 + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 5/24 x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenENCLS is a ring 0 instruction, which contains a set of leaf functions for managing an enclave. Enclaves are measured and signed software entities, which are protected by asserting the outside memory accesses and memory encryption.
Add a two-layer macro system along with an encoding scheme to allow wrappers to return trap numbers along ENCLS-specific error codes. The bottom layer of the macro system splits between the leafs that return an error code and those that do not. The second layer generates the correct input/output annotations based on the number of operands for each leaf function.
ENCLS leaf functions are documented in
Intel SDM: 36.6 ENCLAVE INSTRUCTIONS AND INTEL®
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 238 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 238 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h new file +238 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */ +#ifndef _X86_ENCLS_H +#define _X86_ENCLS_H + +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/rwsem.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <asm/asm.h> +#include <asm/traps.h> +#include "sgx.h" + +enum sgx_encls_leaf { +ECREATE =0x00 , +EADD =0x01 , +EINIT =0x02 , +EREMOVE =0x03 , +EDGBRD =0x04 , +EDGBWR =0x05 , +EEXTEND =0x06 , +ELDU =0x08 , +EBLOCK =0x09 , +EPA =0x0A , +EWB =0x0B , +ETRACK =0x0C , +}; + +/** +* ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG - flag signifying an ENCLS return code is a trapnr +* +* ENCLS has its own (positive value) error codes and also generates +* ENCLS specific #GP and #PF faults. And the ENCLS values get munged +* with system error codes as everything percolates back up the stack. +* Unfortunately (for us), we need to precisely identify each unique +* error code, e.g. the action taken if EWB fails varies based on the +* type of fault and on the exact SGX error code, i.e. we can't simply +* convert all faults to -EFAULT. +* +* To make all three error types coexist, we set bit 30 to identify an +* ENCLS fault. Bit 31 (technically bits N:31) is used to differentiate +* between positive (faults and SGX error codes) and negative (system +* error codes) values. +*/ +#define ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG 0x40000000 + +/* Retrieve the encoded trapnr from the specified return code. */ +#define ENCLS_TRAPNR (r) ((r) & ~ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) + +/* Issue a WARN() about an ENCLS leaf. */ +#define ENCLS_WARN (r, name) { \ + do { \ + int _r = (r); \ + WARN_ONCE(_r, "%s returned %d (0x%x)\n", (name), _r, _r); \ + } while (0); \ +} + +/** +* encls_failed() - Check if an ENCLS leaf function failed +* @ret: the return value of an ENCLS leaf function call +* +* Check if an ENCLS leaf function failed. This happens when the leaf function +* causes a fault that is not caused by an EPCM conflict or when the leaf +* function returns a non-zero value. +*/ +static inline bool encls_failed (int ret) +{ +int epcm_trapnr; + +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SGX2 )) + epcm_trapnr =X86_TRAP_PF ; +else + epcm_trapnr =X86_TRAP_GP ; + +if (ret &ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG ) +return ENCLS_TRAPNR (ret) != epcm_trapnr; + +return !!ret; +} + +/** +* __encls_ret_N - encode an ENCLS leaf that returns an error code in EAX +* @rax: leaf number +* @inputs: asm inputs for the leaf +* +* Emit assembly for an ENCLS leaf that returns an error code, e.g. EREMOVE. +* And because SGX isn't complex enough as it is, leafs that return an error +* code also modify flags. +* +* Return: +* 0 on success, +* SGX error code on failure +*/ +#define __encls_ret_N(rax, inputs...) \ + ({ \ + int ret; \ + asm volatile( \ + "1: .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xcf;\n\t" \ + "2:\n" \ + ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ + "3: orl $"__stringify(ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)",%%eax\n" \ + " jmp 2b\n" \ + ".previous\n" \ + _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(1b, 3b) \ + : "=a"(ret) \ + : "a"(rax), inputs \ + : "memory", "cc"); \ + ret; \ + }) + +#define __encls_ret_1 (rax, rcx) \ + ({ \ + __encls_ret_N(rax, "c"(rcx)); \ + }) + +#define __encls_ret_2 (rax, rbx, rcx) \ + ({ \ + __encls_ret_N(rax, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx)); \ + }) + +#define __encls_ret_3 (rax, rbx, rcx, rdx) \ + ({ \ + __encls_ret_N(rax, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx), "d"(rdx)); \ + }) + +/** +* __encls_N - encode an ENCLS leaf that doesn't return an error code +* @rax: leaf number +* @rbx_out: optional output variable +* @inputs: asm inputs for the leaf +* +* Emit assembly for an ENCLS leaf that does not return an error code, +* e.g. ECREATE. Leaves without error codes either succeed or fault. +* @rbx_out is an optional parameter for use by EDGBRD, which returns +* the requested value in RBX. +* +* Return: +* 0 on success, +* trapnr with ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG set on fault +*/ +#define __encls_N(rax, rbx_out, inputs...) \ + ({ \ + int ret; \ + asm volatile( \ + "1: .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xcf;\n\t" \ + " xor %%eax,%%eax;\n" \ + "2:\n" \ + ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \ + "3: orl $"__stringify(ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)",%%eax\n" \ + " jmp 2b\n" \ + ".previous\n" \ + _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(1b, 3b) \ + : "=a"(ret), "=b"(rbx_out) \ + : "a"(rax), inputs \ + : "memory"); \ + ret; \ + }) + +#define __encls_2 (rax, rbx, rcx) \ + ({ \ + unsigned long ign_rbx_out; \ + __encls_N(rax, ign_rbx_out, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx)); \ + }) + +#define __encls_1_1 (rax, data, rcx) \ + ({ \ + unsigned long rbx_out; \ + int ret = __encls_N(rax, rbx_out, "c"(rcx)); \ + if (!ret) \ + data = rbx_out; \ + ret; \ + }) + +static inline int __ecreate (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *secs) +{ +return __encls_2 (ECREATE , pginfo, secs); +} + +static inline int __eextend (void *secs,void *addr) +{ +return __encls_2 (EEXTEND , secs, addr); +} + +static inline int __eadd (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr) +{ +return __encls_2 (EADD , pginfo, addr); +} + +static inline int __einit (void *sigstruct,void *token,void *secs) +{ +return __encls_ret_3 (EINIT , sigstruct, secs, token); +} + +static inline int __eremove (void *addr) +{ +return __encls_ret_1 (EREMOVE , addr); +} + +static inline int __edbgwr (void *addr,unsigned long *data) +{ +return __encls_2 (EDGBWR , *data, addr); +} + +static inline int __edbgrd (void *addr,unsigned long *data) +{ +return __encls_1_1 (EDGBRD , *data, addr); +} + +static inline int __etrack (void *addr) +{ +return __encls_ret_1 (ETRACK , addr); +} + +static inline int __eldu (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr, +void *va) +{ +return __encls_ret_3 (ELDU , pginfo, addr, va); +} + +static inline int __eblock (void *addr) +{ +return __encls_ret_1 (EBLOCK , addr); +} + +static inline int __epa (void *addr) +{ +unsigned long rbx =SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA ; + +return __encls_2 (EPA , rbx, addr); +} + +static inline int __ewb (struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo,void *addr, +void *va) +{ +return __encls_ret_3 (EWB , pginfo, addr, va); +} + +#endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 6/24 x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Configure SGX as part of feature control MSR initialization and update the associated X86_FEATURE flags accordingly. Because the kernel will require the LE hash MSRs to be writable when running native enclaves, disable X86_FEATURE_SGX (and all derivatives) if SGX Launch Control is not (or cannot) be fully enabled via feature control MSR.
The check is done for every CPU, not just BSP, in order to verify that MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL is correctly configured on all CPUs. The other parts of the kernel, like the enclave driver, expect the same configuration from all CPUs.
Note, unlike VMX, clear the X86_FEATURE_SGX* flags for all CPUs if any CPU lacks SGX support as the kernel expects SGX to be available on all CPUs. X86_FEATURE_VMX is intentionally cleared only for the current CPU so that KVM can provide additional information if KVM fails to load, e.g. print which CPU doesn't support VMX. KVM/VMX requires additional per-CPU enabling, e.g. to set CR4.VMXE and do VMXON, and so already has the necessary infrastructure to do per-CPU checks. SGX on the other hand doesn't require additional enabling, so clearing the feature flags on all CPUs means the SGX subsystem doesn't need to manually do support checks on a per-CPU basis.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +31 -1
@@ -93,16 +93,35 @@ static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) }#endif /* CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES */ +static void clear_sgx_caps (void ) +{ +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SGX ); +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC ); +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SGX1 ); +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SGX2 ); +} +void init_ia32_feat_ctl (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {bool tboot =tboot_enabled (); +bool enable_sgx;u64 msr;if (rdmsrl_safe (MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL , &msr)) {clear_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_VMX ); +clear_sgx_caps ();return ; } +/* +* Enable SGX if and only if the kernel supports SGX and Launch Control +* is supported, i.e. disable SGX if the LE hash MSRs can't be written. +*/ + enable_sgx =cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_SGX ) && +cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_SGX1 ) && +cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC ) && +IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INTEL_SGX ); +if (msr &FEAT_CTL_LOCKED ) goto update_caps;
@@ -124,13 +143,16 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) msr |=FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX ; } +if (enable_sgx) + msr |=FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED |FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED ; +wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL , msr); update_caps:set_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL );if (!cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_VMX )) -return ; + goto update_sgx;if ( (tboot && !(msr &FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX )) || (!tboot && !(msr &FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX ))) {
@@ -143,4 +165,12 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)init_vmx_capabilities (c);#endif } + +update_sgx: +if (!(msr &FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED ) || + !(msr &FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED ) || !enable_sgx) { +if (enable_sgx) +pr_err_once ("SGX disabled by BIOS\n" ); +clear_sgx_caps (); + } }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 7/24 x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenAdd kernel parameter to disable Intel SGX kernel support.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +2 -0
@@ -3339,6 +3339,8 @@ nosep [BUGS=X86-32] Disables x86 SYSENTER/SYSEXIT support. + nosgx [X86-64,SGX] Disables Intel SGX kernel support. + nosmp [SMP] Tells an SMP kernel to act as a UP kernel, and disable the IO APIC. legacy for "maxcpus=0".
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +9 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,15 @@ static void clear_sgx_caps(void)setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SGX2 ); } +static int __init nosgx (char *str) +{ +clear_sgx_caps (); + +return 0 ; +} + +early_param ("nosgx" , nosgx); +void init_ia32_feat_ctl (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {bool tboot =tboot_enabled ();
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 8/24 x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Enumerate Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections via CPUID and add the data structures necessary to track EPC pages so that they can be easily borrowed for different uses.
Embed section index to the first eight bits of the EPC page descriptor. Existing client hardware supports only a single section, while upcoming server hardware will support at most eight sections. Thus, eight bits should be enough for long term needs.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 17 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 216 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 52 ++++++++ 5 files changed, 288 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
arch/x86/Kconfig +17 -0
@@ -1927,6 +1927,23 @@ config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO side channel attacks- equals the tsx=auto command line parameter. endchoice +config INTEL_SGX + bool "Intel SGX" + depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL + depends on CRYPTO=y + depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y + select SRCU + select MMU_NOTIFIER + help + Intel(R) Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions + that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code + and data, referred to as enclaves. An enclave's private memory can + only be accessed by code running within the enclave. Accesses from + outside the enclave, including other enclaves, are disallowed by + hardware. + + If unsure, say N. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPI
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MCE) += mce/ obj-$(CONFIG_MTRR) += mtrr/ obj-$(CONFIG_MICROCODE) += microcode/ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL) += resctrl/ +obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_SGX) += sgx/ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) += perfctr-watchdog.o
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile new file +2 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +obj-y += \ + main.o
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c new file +216 -0
216 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h new file +52 -0
52 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 9/24 x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page()
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenAdd __sgx_alloc_epc_page(), which iterates through EPC sections and borrows a page structure that is not used by anyone else. When a page is no longer needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page(). This function implicitly calls ENCLS[EREMOVE], which will return the page to the uninitialized state (i.e. not required from caller part).
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 3 ++ 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +62 -0
@@ -83,6 +83,68 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void)return true; } +static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section (struct sgx_epc_section *section) +{ +struct sgx_epc_page *page; + +if (list_empty (§ion->page_list)) +return NULL ; + + page = list_first_entry(§ion->page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list); +list_del_init (&page->list); + +return page; +} + +/** +* __sgx_alloc_epc_page() - Allocate an EPC page +* +* Iterate through EPC sections and borrow a free EPC page to the caller. When a +* page is no longer needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page(). +* +* Return: +* an EPC page, +* -errno on error +*/ +struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page (void ) +{ +struct sgx_epc_section *section; +struct sgx_epc_page *page; +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) { + section = &sgx_epc_sections[i]; +spin_lock (§ion->lock); + page =__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_section (section); +spin_unlock (§ion->lock); + +if (page) +return page; + } + +return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); +} + +/** +* sgx_free_epc_page() - Free an EPC page +* @page: an EPC page +* +* Call EREMOVE for an EPC page and insert it back to the list of free pages. +*/ +void sgx_free_epc_page (struct sgx_epc_page *page) +{ +struct sgx_epc_section *section =sgx_get_epc_section (page); +int ret; + + ret =__eremove (sgx_get_epc_addr (page)); +if (WARN_ONCE (ret,"EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)" , ret, ret)) +return ; + +spin_lock (§ion->lock); +list_add_tail (&page->list, §ion->page_list); +spin_unlock (§ion->lock); +} +static void __init sgx_free_epc_section (struct sgx_epc_section *section) {struct sgx_epc_page *page;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +3 -0
@@ -49,4 +49,7 @@ static inline void *sgx_get_epc_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page) return section->va + (page->desc & PAGE_MASK) - section->pa; } +struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page (void ); +void sgx_free_epc_page (struct sgx_epc_page *page); +#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 10/24 mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect()
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Add vm_ops()->mprotect() for additional constraints for a VMA.
Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) will use this callback to add two constraints:
1. Verify that the address range does not have holes: each page address must be filled with an enclave page.
2. Verify that VMA permissions won't surpass the permissions of any enclave page within the address range. Enclave cryptographically sealed permissions for each page address that set the upper limit for possible VMA permissions. Not respecting this can cause #GP's to be emitted.
--- include/linux/mm.h | 3 +++ mm/mprotect.c | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/mm.h +3 -0
@@ -547,6 +547,9 @@ struct vm_operations_struct {void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area);int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area,unsigned long addr);int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area); +int (*mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, +struct vm_area_struct **pprev,unsigned long start, +unsigned long end,unsigned long newflags);vm_fault_t (*fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf);vm_fault_t (*huge_fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf,enum page_entry_size pe_size);
mm/mprotect.c +4 -1
@@ -610,7 +610,10 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len, tmp = vma->vm_end;if (tmp > end) tmp = end; - error =mprotect_fixup (vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags); +if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->mprotect) + error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect (vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags); +else + error =mprotect_fixup (vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);if (error) goto out; nstart = tmp;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 11/24 x86/sgx: Add SGX enclave driver
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenIntel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the SGX hosted software entity is prevented from accessing the memory inside the enclave by the CPU. We call these entities as enclaves.
Add a driver that provides an ioctl API to construct and run enclaves. Enclaves are constructed from pages residing in reserved physical memory areas. The contents of these pages can only be accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware thread running inside the enclave.
The starting state of an enclave consists of a fixed measured set of pages that are copied to the EPC during the construction process by using the opcode ENCLS leaf functions and Software Enclave Control Structure (SECS) that defines the enclave properties.
Enclaves are constructed by using ENCLS leaf functions ECREATE, EADD and EINIT. ECREATE initializes SECS, EADD copies pages from system memory to the EPC and EINIT checks a given signed measurement and moves the enclave into a state ready for execution.
An initialized enclave can only be accessed through special Thread Control Structure (TCS) pages by using ENCLU (ring-3 only) leaf EENTER. This leaf function converts a thread into enclave mode and continues the execution in the offset defined by the TCS provided to EENTER. An enclave is exited through syscall, exception, interrupts or by explicitly calling another ENCLU leaf EEXIT.
The mmap() permissions are capped by the contained enclave page permissions. The mapped areas must also be populated, i.e. each page address must contain a page. This logic is implemented in sgx_encl_may_map().
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 173 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 29 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 331 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 85 ++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 11 + 6 files changed, 631 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@ obj-y += \ + driver.o \ + encl.o \ main.o
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c new file +173 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h new file +29 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */ +#ifndef __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__ +#define __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__ + +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <linux/kref.h> +#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h> +#include <linux/radix-tree.h> +#include <linux/rwsem.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/workqueue.h> +#include "sgx.h" + +#define SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT 20 +#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT 50 +#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME 20 + +extern u64 sgx_encl_size_max_32; +extern u64 sgx_encl_size_max_64; +extern u32 sgx_misc_reserved_mask; +extern u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask; +extern u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask; +extern u32 sgx_xsave_size_tbl[64 ]; + +long sgx_ioctl (struct file *filep,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg); + +int sgx_drv_init (void ); + +#endif /* __ARCH_X86_SGX_DRIVER_H__ */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c new file +331 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h new file +85 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +11 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@#include <linux/sched/mm.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include "driver.h" +#include "encl.h" #include "encls.h" struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS ];
@@ -260,6 +262,8 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void)static void __init sgx_init (void ) { +int ret; +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SGX ))return ;
@@ -269,8 +273,15 @@ static void __init sgx_init(void)if (!sgx_page_reclaimer_init ()) goto err_page_cache; + ret =sgx_drv_init (); +if (ret) + goto err_kthread; +return ; +err_kthread: +kthread_stop (ksgxswapd_tsk); + err_page_cache:sgx_page_cache_teardown (); }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 12/24 x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenAdd an ioctl that performs ENCLS[ECREATE], which creates SGX Enclave Control Structure for the enclave. SECS contains attributes about the enclave that are used by the hardware and cannot be directly accessed by software, as SECS resides in the EPC.
One essential field in SECS is a field that stores the SHA256 of the measured enclave pages. This field, MRENCLAVE, is initialized by the ECREATE instruction and updated by every EADD and EEXTEND operation. Finally, EINIT locks down the value.
--- .../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 25 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 12 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 220 ++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 260 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +1 -0
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Code Seq# Include File Comments <mailto:[email protected]> 0xA3 90-9F linux/dtlk.h 0xA4 00-1F uapi/linux/tee.h Generic TEE subsystem +0xA4 00-1F uapi/asm/sgx.h <mailto:[email protected]> 0xAA 00-3F linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h 0xAB 00-1F linux/nbd.h 0xAC 00-1F linux/raw.h
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h new file +25 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) */ +/* +* Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation. +*/ +#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H +#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/ioctl.h> + +#define SGX_MAGIC 0xA4 + +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE \ + _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create) + +/** +* struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the +* %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE ioctl +* @src: address for the SECS page data +*/ +struct sgx_enclave_create { +__u64 src; +}; + +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ obj-y += \ driver.o \ encl.o \ + ioctl.o \ main.o
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +12 -0
@@ -114,10 +114,22 @@ static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file,return current->mm->get_unmapped_area (file, addr, len, pgoff, flags); } +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +static long sgx_compat_ioctl (struct file *filep,unsigned int cmd, +unsigned long arg) +{ +return sgx_ioctl (filep, cmd, arg); +} +#endif +static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = { .owner =THIS_MODULE , .open = sgx_open, .release = sgx_release, + .unlocked_ioctl = sgx_ioctl, +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT + .compat_ioctl = sgx_compat_ioctl, +#endif .mmap = sgx_mmap, .get_unmapped_area = sgx_get_unmapped_area, };
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h +1 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/rwsem.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> +#include <uapi/asm/sgx.h> #include "sgx.h" #define SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT 20
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c new file +220 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 13/24 x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenAdd an ioctl, which performs ENCLS[EADD] that adds new visible page to an enclave, and optionally ENCLS[EEXTEND] operations that hash the page to the enclave measurement. By visible we mean a page that can be mapped to the address range of an enclave.
--- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 28 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 294 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 323 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +28 -0
@@ -8,10 +8,21 @@#include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/ioctl.h> +/** +* enum sgx_epage_flags - page control flags +* %SGX_PAGE_MEASURE: Measure the page contents with a sequence of +* ENCLS[EEXTEND] operations. +*/ +enum sgx_page_flags { +SGX_PAGE_MEASURE =0x01 , +}; +#define SGX_MAGIC 0xA4#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE \ _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES \ + _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages)/** * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -22,4 +33,21 @@ struct sgx_enclave_create { __u64 src; }; +/** +* struct sgx_enclave_add_pages - parameter structure for the +* %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE ioctl +* @src: start address for the page data +* @offset: starting page offset +* @length: length of the data (multiple of the page size) +* @secinfo: address for the SECINFO data +* @flags: page control flags +*/ +struct sgx_enclave_add_pages { +__u64 src; +__u64 offset; +__u64 length; +__u64 secinfo; +__u64 flags; +}; +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +294 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +1 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct sgx_epc_section {#define SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK GENMASK(7, 0)#define SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS (SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK + 1) +#define SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTH 0x100000extern struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS ];
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Re: [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 149 lines · Haitao Huang
On Tue, 15 Sep 2020 06:05:11 -0500, Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> wrote:
...Quoted 128 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +39
-0+static int __sgx_encl_add_page (struct sgx_encl *encl, +struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page, +struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, +struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo,unsigned long src) +{ +struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; +struct vm_area_struct *vma; +struct page *src_page; +int ret; + +/* Query vma's VM_MAYEXEC as an indirect path_noexec() check. */ +if (encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits &VM_EXEC ) { + vma =find_vma (current->mm, src); +if (!vma) +return -EFAULT ; + +if (!(vma->vm_flags &VM_MAYEXEC )) +return -EACCES ; + } + + ret =get_user_pages (src,1 ,0 , &src_page,NULL ); +if (ret <1 ) +return ret; + + pginfo.secs = (unsigned long )sgx_get_epc_addr (encl->secs.epc_page); + pginfo.addr =SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR (encl_page); + pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long )secinfo; + pginfo.contents = (unsigned long )kmap_atomic (src_page); + + ret =__eadd (&pginfo,sgx_get_epc_addr (epc_page)); + +kunmap_atomic ((void *)pginfo.contents); +put_page (src_page); + +return ret ? -EIO :0 ; +} + +/* +* If the caller requires measurement of the page as a proof for the content,
+ * use EEXTEND to add a measurement for 256 bytes of the page. Repeat this
+ * operation until the entire page is measured."
+ */arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +84
-0+static int __sgx_encl_extend (struct sgx_encl *encl, +struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page) +{ +int ret; +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <16 ; i++) { + ret =__eextend (sgx_get_epc_addr (encl->secs.epc_page), +sgx_get_epc_addr (epc_page) + (i *0x100 )); +if (ret) { +if (encls_failed (ret)) +ENCLS_WARN (ret,"EEXTEND" ); +return -EIO ; + } + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static int sgx_encl_add_page (struct sgx_encl *encl,unsigned long src, +unsigned long offset,struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, +unsigned long flags) +{ +struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; +struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; +int ret; + + encl_page =sgx_encl_page_alloc (encl, offset, secinfo->flags); +if (IS_ERR (encl_page)) +return PTR_ERR (encl_page); + + epc_page =__sgx_alloc_epc_page (); +if (IS_ERR (epc_page)) { +kfree (encl_page); +return PTR_ERR (epc_page); + } + +mmap_read_lock (current->mm); +mutex_lock (&encl->lock); + +/* +* Insert prior to EADD in case of OOM. EADD modifies MRENCLAVE, i.e. +* can't be gracefully unwound, while failure on EADD/EXTEND is limited +* to userspace errors (or kernel/hardware bugs). +*/ + ret =xa_insert (&encl->page_array,PFN_DOWN (encl_page->desc), + encl_page,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (ret) + goto err_out_unlock; + + ret =__sgx_encl_add_page (encl, encl_page, epc_page, secinfo, + src); +if (ret) + goto err_out; + +/* +* Complete the "add" before doing the "extend" so that the "add" +* isn't in a half-baked state in the extremely unlikely scenario +* the enclave will be destroyed in response to EEXTEND failure. +*/ + encl_page->encl = encl; + encl_page->epc_page = epc_page; + encl->secs_child_cnt++; + +if (flags &SGX_PAGE_MEASURE ) { + ret =__sgx_encl_extend (encl, epc_page); +if (ret) + goto err_out; + } + +mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +mmap_read_unlock (current->mm); +return ret; + +err_out: +xa_erase (&encl->page_array,PFN_DOWN (encl_page->desc)); + +err_out_unlock: +mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +mmap_read_unlock (current->mm); + +sgx_free_epc_page (epc_page); +kfree (encl_page); +arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) · line 388
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +10
-0+/* +* Destroy enclave on ENCLS failure as this means that EPC has been +* invalidated. +*/ +if (ret == -EIO ) { +mutex_lock (&encl->lock); +sgx_encl_destroy (encl); +mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); + } +I think originally we return both count of succeeded EADDs and the errors. So we only destroy enclaves in cases of fatal ENCLS failures.
Now we only return errors in all failures other than interrupted operations or
SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTHis reached.
Quoted 7 lines
So, for the new design we should destroy enclaves in all cases here, not just for
-EIO.On the other hand, I do like the old way returning both the count and error better. It helps greatly for debugging any issues in enclave image or user space code, and also keeps flexibility for user space to recover in certain errors, such as out of EPC.
Right, I do get the OOM case but wouldn't in that case the reasonable thing to do destroy the enclave that is not even running? I mean that means that we are globally out of EPC.
/Jarkko
Re: [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 156 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 155 lines · Haitao Huang
On Tue, 15 Sep 2020 06:05:11 -0500, Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> wrote:
...Quoted 54 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +39
-0+static int __sgx_encl_add_page (struct sgx_encl *encl, +struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page, +struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, +struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo,unsigned long src) +{ +struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; +struct vm_area_struct *vma; +struct page *src_page; +int ret; + +/* Query vma's VM_MAYEXEC as an indirect path_noexec() check. */ +if (encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits &VM_EXEC ) { + vma =find_vma (current->mm, src); +if (!vma) +return -EFAULT ; + +if (!(vma->vm_flags &VM_MAYEXEC )) +return -EACCES ; + } + + ret =get_user_pages (src,1 ,0 , &src_page,NULL ); +if (ret <1 ) +return ret; + + pginfo.secs = (unsigned long )sgx_get_epc_addr (encl->secs.epc_page); + pginfo.addr =SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR (encl_page); + pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long )secinfo; + pginfo.contents = (unsigned long )kmap_atomic (src_page); + + ret =__eadd (&pginfo,sgx_get_epc_addr (epc_page)); + +kunmap_atomic ((void *)pginfo.contents); +put_page (src_page); + +return ret ? -EIO :0 ; +} + +/* +* If the caller requires measurement of the page as a proof for the content,
+ * use EEXTEND to add a measurement for 256 bytes of the page. Repeat this
+ * operation until the entire page is measured."
+ */arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +10
-0+static int __sgx_encl_extend (struct sgx_encl *encl, +struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page) +{ +int ret; +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <16 ; i++) { + ret =__eextend (sgx_get_epc_addr (encl->secs.epc_page), +sgx_get_epc_addr (epc_page) + (i *0x100 )); +if (ret) {arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +10
-0+if (encls_failed (ret)) +ENCLS_WARN (ret,"EEXTEND" ); +return -EIO ; + } + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned longsrc,
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +12
-0+ unsigned long offset, struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, + unsigned long flags) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; +struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; +int ret; + + encl_page =sgx_encl_page_alloc (encl, offset, secinfo->flags); +if (IS_ERR (encl_page)) +return PTR_ERR (encl_page); + + epc_page =__sgx_alloc_epc_page ();arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +10
-0+if (IS_ERR (epc_page)) { +kfree (encl_page); +return PTR_ERR (epc_page); + } + +mmap_read_lock (current->mm); +mutex_lock (&encl->lock); + +/* +* Insert prior to EADD in case of OOM. EADD modifies MRENCLAVE, i.e.
Review
Quoted 1 line
(quoted diff) +1
-0+ * can't be gracefully unwound, while failure on EADD/EXTEND islimited
Quoted 41 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +41
-0+* to userspace errors (or kernel/hardware bugs). +*/ + ret =xa_insert (&encl->page_array,PFN_DOWN (encl_page->desc), + encl_page,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (ret) + goto err_out_unlock; + + ret =__sgx_encl_add_page (encl, encl_page, epc_page, secinfo, + src); +if (ret) + goto err_out; + +/* +* Complete the "add" before doing the "extend" so that the "add" +* isn't in a half-baked state in the extremely unlikely scenario +* the enclave will be destroyed in response to EEXTEND failure. +*/ + encl_page->encl = encl; + encl_page->epc_page = epc_page; + encl->secs_child_cnt++; + +if (flags &SGX_PAGE_MEASURE ) { + ret =__sgx_encl_extend (encl, epc_page); +if (ret) + goto err_out; + } + +mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +mmap_read_unlock (current->mm); +return ret; + +err_out: +xa_erase (&encl->page_array,PFN_DOWN (encl_page->desc)); + +err_out_unlock: +mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); +mmap_read_unlock (current->mm); + +sgx_free_epc_page (epc_page); +kfree (encl_page); +arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) · line 388
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +10
-0+/* +* Destroy enclave on ENCLS failure as this means that EPC has been +* invalidated. +*/ +if (ret == -EIO ) { +mutex_lock (&encl->lock); +sgx_encl_destroy (encl); +mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); + } +I think originally we return both count of succeeded EADDs and the errors. So we only destroy enclaves in cases of fatal ENCLS failures.
Now we only return errors in all failures other than interrupted operations or
SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTHis reached.So, for the new design we should destroy enclaves in all cases here, not just for
-EIO.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
On the other hand, I do like the old way returning both the count and error better. It helps greatly for debugging any issues in enclave image or user space code, and also keeps flexibility for user space to recover in certain errors, such as out of EPC.
Right, I do get the OOM case but wouldn't in that case the reasonable thing to do destroy the enclave that is not even running? I mean that means that we are globally out of EPC.
I would say it could be a policy, but not the only one. If it does not make much difference to kernel, IMHO we should not set it in stone now. Debugging is also huge benefit to me.
Re: [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 11 lines · Haitao Huang
Quoted 5 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Right, I do get the OOM case but wouldn't in that case the reasonable thing to do destroy the enclave that is not even running? I mean that means that we are globally out of EPC.
I would say it could be a policy, but not the only one. If it does not make much difference to kernel, IMHO we should not set it in stone now. Debugging is also huge benefit to me.
Agreed, an EPC cgroup is the proper way to define/enforce what happens when there is EPC pressure. E.g. if process A is consuming 99% of the EPC, then it doesn't make sense to unconditionally kill enclaves from process B. If the admin wants to give process A priority, so be it, but such a decision shouldn't be baked into the kernel.
This series obviously doesn't provide an EPC cgroup, but that doesn't mean we can't make decisions that will play nice with a cgroup in the future.
Re: [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 13 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 11 lines · Haitao Huang
Quoted 5 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Right, I do get the OOM case but wouldn't in that case the reasonable thing to do destroy the enclave that is not even running? I mean that means that we are globally out of EPC.
I would say it could be a policy, but not the only one. If it does not make much difference to kernel, IMHO we should not set it in stone now. Debugging is also huge benefit to me.
Quoted 8 lines
Agreed, an EPC cgroup is the proper way to define/enforce what happens when there is EPC pressure. E.g. if process A is consuming 99% of the EPC, then it doesn't make sense to unconditionally kill enclaves from process B. If the admin wants to give process A priority, so be it, but such a decision shouldn't be baked into the kernel.
This series obviously doesn't provide an EPC cgroup, but that doesn't mean we can't make decisions that will play nice with a cgroup in the future.
Here's the core issue why the API "as is used to be" does not work:
if (ret == -EIO) {
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
}It would be better to instead whitelist *when* the enclave is preserved.
if (ret != -ENOMEM) {
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
}That is the information we *deterministically* want to know. Otherwise, we will live in ultimate chaos.
Only this way can caller know when there are means to continue, and when to quit. I.e. the code is whitelisting wrong way around currently.
/Jarkko
Re: [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 39 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 13 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 11 lines · Haitao Huang
Quoted 5 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Right, I do get the OOM case but wouldn't in that case the reasonable thing to do destroy the enclave that is not even running? I mean that means that we are globally out of EPC.
I would say it could be a policy, but not the only one. If it does not make much difference to kernel, IMHO we should not set it in stone now. Debugging is also huge benefit to me.
Quoted 8 lines
Agreed, an EPC cgroup is the proper way to define/enforce what happens when there is EPC pressure. E.g. if process A is consuming 99% of the EPC, then it doesn't make sense to unconditionally kill enclaves from process B. If the admin wants to give process A priority, so be it, but such a decision shouldn't be baked into the kernel.
This series obviously doesn't provide an EPC cgroup, but that doesn't mean we can't make decisions that will play nice with a cgroup in the future.
Here's the core issue why the API "as is used to be" does not work:
if (ret == -EIO) { mutex_lock(&encl->lock); sgx_encl_destroy(encl); mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); }It would be better to instead whitelist *when* the enclave is preserved.
if (ret != -ENOMEM) { mutex_lock(&encl->lock); sgx_encl_destroy(encl); mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); }
Quoted 5 lines
That is the information we *deterministically* want to know. Otherwise, we will live in ultimate chaos.
Only this way can caller know when there are means to continue, and when to quit. I.e. the code is whitelisting wrong way around currently.
Actually since the state cannot corrupt unless EADD or EEXTEND fails it is fine to have the enclave alive on any other error condition. I think what I do is that I move the check out sgx_encl_add_page() to the main ioctl and update the kdoc. It is not too clear on persistence. I'll fix this.
/Jarkko
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): 20200919000918.GB21189@sjchrist-ice
Re: [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 47 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 46 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 44 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 13 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 11 lines · Haitao Huang
Quoted 5 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Right, I do get the OOM case but wouldn't in that case the reasonable thing to do destroy the enclave that is not even running? I mean that means that we are globally out of EPC.
I would say it could be a policy, but not the only one. If it does not make much difference to kernel, IMHO we should not set it in stone now. Debugging is also huge benefit to me.
Quoted 8 lines
Agreed, an EPC cgroup is the proper way to define/enforce what happens when there is EPC pressure. E.g. if process A is consuming 99% of the EPC, then it doesn't make sense to unconditionally kill enclaves from process B. If the admin wants to give process A priority, so be it, but such a decision shouldn't be baked into the kernel.
This series obviously doesn't provide an EPC cgroup, but that doesn't mean we can't make decisions that will play nice with a cgroup in the future.
Here's the core issue why the API "as is used to be" does not work:
if (ret == -EIO) { mutex_lock(&encl->lock); sgx_encl_destroy(encl); mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); }It would be better to instead whitelist *when* the enclave is preserved.
if (ret != -ENOMEM) { mutex_lock(&encl->lock); sgx_encl_destroy(encl); mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); }That is the information we *deterministically* want to know. Otherwise, we will live in ultimate chaos.
Only this way can caller know when there are means to continue, and when to quit. I.e. the code is whitelisting wrong way around currently.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Actually since the state cannot corrupt unless EADD or EEXTEND fails it is fine to have the enclave alive on any other error condition. I think
EADD and EEXTEND failure don't corrupt state. Killing the enclave if EEXTEND fails makes sense because failure at that point is either due to a kernel bug or loss of EPC, both of which are fatal to the enclave.
This is also true. I meant by corrupt state e.g. a kernel bug, which causes uninitalizes pages go the free queue.
I'd rephrase this in kdoc as: "The function deinitializes enclave and returns -EIO when EPC is lost, while entering to a new power cycle".
Documentation describes only legit behaviour, let's ignore the corrupt part.
Quoted 5 lines
EADD is a little different, e.g. it could fault due to a bad source address, in which case the failure is not technically fatal. But, Jarkko wanted to have consistent behavior for EADD and EEXTEND failures, and practically speaking the enclave is probably hosed anyways if EADD fails, i.e. killing the enclave on EADD failure isn't a sticking point (for me).
We need to figure out own return value for EADD, but I agree with this.
I would go with -EFAULT as we do when source VMA is no available. Does this make sense to you?
/Jarkko
Re: [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 55 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 47 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 46 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 44 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 13 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 11 lines · Haitao Huang
Quoted 5 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Right, I do get the OOM case but wouldn't in that case the reasonable thing to do destroy the enclave that is not even running? I mean that means that we are globally out of EPC.
I would say it could be a policy, but not the only one. If it does not make much difference to kernel, IMHO we should not set it in stone now. Debugging is also huge benefit to me.
Quoted 8 lines
Agreed, an EPC cgroup is the proper way to define/enforce what happens when there is EPC pressure. E.g. if process A is consuming 99% of the EPC, then it doesn't make sense to unconditionally kill enclaves from process B. If the admin wants to give process A priority, so be it, but such a decision shouldn't be baked into the kernel.
This series obviously doesn't provide an EPC cgroup, but that doesn't mean we can't make decisions that will play nice with a cgroup in the future.
Here's the core issue why the API "as is used to be" does not work:
if (ret == -EIO) { mutex_lock(&encl->lock); sgx_encl_destroy(encl); mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); }It would be better to instead whitelist *when* the enclave is preserved.
if (ret != -ENOMEM) { mutex_lock(&encl->lock); sgx_encl_destroy(encl); mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); }That is the information we *deterministically* want to know. Otherwise, we will live in ultimate chaos.
Only this way can caller know when there are means to continue, and when to quit. I.e. the code is whitelisting wrong way around currently.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Actually since the state cannot corrupt unless EADD or EEXTEND fails it is fine to have the enclave alive on any other error condition. I think
EADD and EEXTEND failure don't corrupt state. Killing the enclave if EEXTEND fails makes sense because failure at that point is either due to a kernel bug or loss of EPC, both of which are fatal to the enclave.
Quoted 5 lines
This is also true. I meant by corrupt state e.g. a kernel bug, which causes uninitalizes pages go the free queue.
I'd rephrase this in kdoc as: "The function deinitializes enclave and returns
-EIOwhen EPC is lost, while entering to a new power cycle".
The kdocs shouldn't speculate on why EEXTEND might fail. E.g. in some (and possibility most) environments, the most common scenario of EEXTEND failure will be EPC invalidation due to virtual machine migration.
This is why I'd prefer that the kernel kill the enclave if and only if the error is guaranteed to be fatal, e.g. the docs can have a blanket statement along the lines of:
An enclave will be killed and its EPC resources will be freed if an error that is guaranteed to be fatal is encountered at any time, e.g. if EEXTEND fails as EEXTEND can only fail due to loss of EPC, a kernel bug, or silicon bug, all of which are unrecoverable.
Quoted 9 lines
Documentation describes only legit behaviour, let's ignore the corrupt part.
Quoted 5 lines
EADD is a little different, e.g. it could fault due to a bad source address, in which case the failure is not technically fatal. But, Jarkko wanted to have consistent behavior for EADD and EEXTEND failures, and practically speaking the enclave is probably hosed anyways if EADD fails, i.e. killing the enclave on EADD failure isn't a sticking point (for me).
Quoted 4 lines
We need to figure out own return value for EADD, but I agree with this.
I would go with
-EFAULTas we do when source VMA is no available. Does this make sense to you?
If only EEXTEND will be treated as fatal, then I see no need to worry about the return code for EADD. In that case, simply kill the enclave on EEXTEND failure instead of on a specific return code.
Re: [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 5 lines
This is also true. I meant by corrupt state e.g. a kernel bug, which causes uninitalizes pages go the free queue.
I'd rephrase this in kdoc as: "The function deinitializes enclave and returns
-EIOwhen EPC is lost, while entering to a new power cycle".The kdocs shouldn't speculate on why EEXTEND might fail. E.g. in some (and possibility most) environments, the most common scenario of EEXTEND failure will be EPC invalidation due to virtual machine migration.
Quoted 8 lines
This is why I'd prefer that the kernel kill the enclave if and only if the error is guaranteed to be fatal, e.g. the docs can have a blanket statement along the lines of:
An enclave will be killed and its EPC resources will be freed if an error that is guaranteed to be fatal is encountered at any time, e.g. if EEXTEND fails as EEXTEND can only fail due to loss of EPC, a kernel bug, or silicon bug, all of which are unrecoverable.
Kernel bug is not a legit condition. Neither is a silicon failure. We do not document speculated kernel bugs. If we used that kind of pattern for documentation, we would have to put similar statements about every single line of code.
Describing legit failure conditions with the best knowledge available is the whole point why people read documentation in the first place. Otherwise, the documentation has absolutely no value.
Documentation is also always, without exception, inaccurate. Lacking something is not an issue, if it is not done on purpose.
I'd refine what I did as
"The function deinitializes enclave and returns -EIO when EPC was lost,
while entering to a new power cycle, or any other condition where EPC gets invalidated."
It is not perfect, nothing ever is, but it is heck a lot more useful than being too generic to fail.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
EADD is a little different, e.g. it could fault due to a bad source address, in which case the failure is not technically fatal. But, Jarkko wanted to have consistent behavior for EADD and EEXTEND failures, and practically speaking the enclave is probably hosed anyways if EADD fails, i.e. killing the enclave on EADD failure isn't a sticking point (for me).
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
We need to figure out own return value for EADD, but I agree with this.
I would go with
-EFAULTas we do when source VMA is no available. Does this make sense to you?If only EEXTEND will be treated as fatal, then I see no need to worry about the return code for EADD. In that case, simply kill the enclave on EEXTEND failure instead of on a specific return code.
To have understandable semantics you have to map error codes to conditions rather than opcodes. -EIO means loss of enclave in the event of EPC gone invalid. Enclave is already lost, that is the reason why we deinitialize the kernel data structures.
EADD must have a different error code because nothing is actually lost but the failure conditions are triggered outside. -EFAULT would be probably the most reasonable choice for that.
/Jarkko
Re: [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 8 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
To have understandable semantics you have to map error codes to conditions rather than opcodes.
-EIOmeans loss of enclave in the event of EPC gone invalid. Enclave is already lost, that is the reason why we deinitialize the kernel data structures.EADD must have a different error code because nothing is actually lost but the failure conditions are triggered outside.
-EFAULTwould be probably the most reasonable choice for that.
Now that I did all the changes discussed and then I remember why EADD and EEXTEND had a common error code, and common behaviour. Obviously EADD can also fail because of EPC reset because it depends on a valid SECS page.
If we cannot distinct from EADD caused by EPC loss and EADD caused by problems with the source, it should have the same error code, and also the enclave should be deinitialized, whenver this happens.
So I would just revert to v38 behaviour, keeping of course the whole check more visible in sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(), and just refine the documentation better describe the whole situation.
/Jarkko
Re: [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 10 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 8 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
To have understandable semantics you have to map error codes to conditions rather than opcodes.
-EIOmeans loss of enclave in the event of EPC gone invalid. Enclave is already lost, that is the reason why we deinitialize the kernel data structures.EADD must have a different error code because nothing is actually lost but the failure conditions are triggered outside.
-EFAULTwould be probably the most reasonable choice for that.
Quoted 8 lines
Now that I did all the changes discussed and then I remember why EADD and EEXTEND had a common error code, and common behaviour. Obviously EADD can also fail because of EPC reset because it depends on a valid SECS page.
If we cannot distinct from EADD caused by EPC loss and EADD caused by problems with the source, it should have the same error code, and also the enclave should be deinitialized, whenver this happens.
Hmm, on SGX2 hardware the kernel can precisely and accurately identify loss of EPC, or at least "problem with the EPCM", as such a condition will be a page fault with PFEC.SGX=1.
But getting that info back to the ENCLS invocation would require adding a new exception fixup handler in order to "return" the error code. Given that this is the only case where that level of precision makes a difference, I think it's ok to just kill the enclave on any EADD failure. Practically speaking I highly doubt the overzealous killing will impact userspace, I would imagine any SGX runtime would treat -EFAULT as fatal anyways.
Side topic, this does invalidate my argument for not killing the enclave on EADD failure. If EADD fails due to loss of EPC, it's theoretically possible userspace could get stuck in an infinite loop if it does a naive retry on -EIO or whatever.
Quoted 5 lines
So I would just revert to v38 behaviour, keeping of course the whole check more visible in
sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(), and just refine the documentation better describe the whole situation./Jarkko
Re: [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Quoted 16 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 15 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 8 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
To have understandable semantics you have to map error codes to conditions rather than opcodes.
-EIOmeans loss of enclave in the event of EPC gone invalid. Enclave is already lost, that is the reason why we deinitialize the kernel data structures.EADD must have a different error code because nothing is actually lost but the failure conditions are triggered outside.
-EFAULTwould be probably the most reasonable choice for that.Now that I did all the changes discussed and then I remember why EADD and EEXTEND had a common error code, and common behaviour. Obviously EADD can also fail because of EPC reset because it depends on a valid SECS page.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
If we cannot distinct from EADD caused by EPC loss and EADD caused by problems with the source, it should have the same error code, and also the enclave should be deinitialized, whenver this happens.
Hmm, on SGX2 hardware the kernel can precisely and accurately identify loss of EPC, or at least "problem with the EPCM", as such a condition will be a page fault with PFEC.SGX=1.
True.
Quoted 6 lines
But getting that info back to the ENCLS invocation would require adding a new exception fixup handler in order to "return" the error code. Given that this is the only case where that level of precision makes a difference, I think it's ok to just kill the enclave on any EADD failure. Practically speaking I highly doubt the overzealous killing will impact userspace, I would imagine any SGX runtime would treat
-EFAULTas fatal anyways.
This is true. We could do this if wanted. Most of the time bad source address would require either badly behaving run-time or doing it on purpose. For the former case, since it is badly behaving by definition, this granularity would not improve situation. For the latter case, we do not want to do any active support.
I guess I'll still have to correct the documentation just a bit.
Quoted 4 lines
Side topic, this does invalidate my argument for not killing the enclave on EADD failure. If EADD fails due to loss of EPC, it's theoretically possible userspace could get stuck in an infinite loop if it does a naive retry on
-EIOor whatever.
I don't think we care about that unless it renders out any legit correctly working feature for a run-time.
/Jarkko
Re: [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenQuoted 15 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 8 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
To have understandable semantics you have to map error codes to conditions rather than opcodes.
-EIOmeans loss of enclave in the event of EPC gone invalid. Enclave is already lost, that is the reason why we deinitialize the kernel data structures.EADD must have a different error code because nothing is actually lost but the failure conditions are triggered outside.
-EFAULTwould be probably the most reasonable choice for that.Now that I did all the changes discussed and then I remember why EADD and EEXTEND had a common error code, and common behaviour. Obviously EADD can also fail because of EPC reset because it depends on a valid SECS page.
Quoted 7 lines
If we cannot distinct from EADD caused by EPC loss and EADD caused by problems with the source, it should have the same error code, and also the enclave should be deinitialized, whenver this happens.
So I would just revert to v38 behaviour, keeping of course the whole check more visible in
sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(), and just refine the documentation better describe the whole situation.
So now the behaviour is reverted back to same as it was before [*] and I refined the documenation as:
"
* The function deinitializes kernel data structures for enclave and returns
* -EIO in any of the following conditions:
*
* - Enclave Page Cache (EPC), the physical memory holding enclaves, has
* been invalidated. This will cause EADD and EEXTEND to fail.
* - If the source address is corrupted somehow when executing EADD.
"
/Jarkko
Re: [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
In reply to a message not in the archiveQuoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) · line 466
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +8
-0+for (c =0 ; c < addp.length; c +=PAGE_SIZE ) { +if (signal_pending (current)) { +if (!c) + ret = -EINTR ; + +break ; + } +Return
-ERESTARTSYSso that kernel can restart this IOC whenSA_RESTARTis set?
Yes, this is quite obvious. I will change it, thank you.
/Jarkko
PATCH v38 14/24 x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenAdd an ioctl that performs ENCLS[EINIT], which locks down the measurement and initializes the enclave for entrance. After this, new pages can no longer be added.
--- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 11 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 195 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 208 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +11 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags { _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create)#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES \ _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT \ + _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x02, struct sgx_enclave_init)/** * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -50,4 +52,13 @@ struct sgx_enclave_add_pages { __u64 flags; }; +/** +* struct sgx_enclave_init - parameter structure for the +* %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT ioctl +* @sigstruct: address for the SIGSTRUCT data +*/ +struct sgx_enclave_init { +__u64 sigstruct; +}; +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +2 -0
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ struct sgx_encl {struct xarray page_array;struct sgx_encl_page secs;cpumask_t cpumask; +unsigned long attributes; +unsigned long attributes_mask; };extern const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +195 -0
219 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 15/24 x86/sgx: Enable provisioning for remote attestation
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenProvisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key of a Quoting Enclave (QE), e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the hardware if the Intel signed PCE is used.
To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be only allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted parties can certify QE's.
Obviously the attestation service should know the public key of the used PCE and that way detect illegit attestation, but whitelisting the legit users still adds an additional layer of defence.
Add new device file called /dev/sgx/provision. The sole purpose of this file is to provide file descriptors that act as privilege tokens to allow to build enclaves with ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY set. A new ioctl called SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION is used to assign this token to an enclave.
--- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 11 ++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 18 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 78 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +11 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags { _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages)#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT \ _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x02, struct sgx_enclave_init) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION \ + _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x03, struct sgx_enclave_provision)/** * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -61,4 +63,13 @@ struct sgx_enclave_init { __u64 sigstruct; }; +/** +* struct sgx_enclave_provision - parameter structure for the +* %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION ioctl +* @attribute_fd: file handle of the attribute file in the securityfs +*/ +struct sgx_enclave_provision { +__u64 attribute_fd; +}; +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +18 -0
@@ -134,6 +134,10 @@ static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = { .get_unmapped_area = sgx_get_unmapped_area, }; +const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops = { + .owner =THIS_MODULE , +}; +static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = { .minor =MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR , .name ="enclave" ,
@@ -141,6 +145,13 @@ static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = { .fops = &sgx_encl_fops, }; +static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_provision = { + .minor =MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR , + .name ="provision" , + .nodename ="sgx/provision" , + .fops = &sgx_provision_fops, +}; +int __init sgx_drv_init (void ) {unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
@@ -181,5 +192,12 @@ int __init sgx_drv_init(void)return ret; } + ret =misc_register (&sgx_dev_provision); +if (ret) { +pr_err ("Creating /dev/sgx/provision failed with %d.\n" , ret); +misc_deregister (&sgx_dev_enclave); +return ret; + } +return 0 ; }
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h +2 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ extern u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask;extern u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask;extern u32 sgx_xsave_size_tbl[64 ]; +extern const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops; +long sgx_ioctl (struct file *filep,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg);int sgx_drv_init (void );
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +47 -0
59 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v38 15/24] x86/sgx: Enable provisioning for remote attestation
Quoted 28 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +28
-0+/** +* sgx_ioc_enclave_set_attribute - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION +* @filep: open file to /dev/sgx +* @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_provision instance +* +* Mark the enclave as being allowed to access a restricted attribute bit. +* The requested attribute is specified via the attribute_fd field in the +* provided struct sgx_enclave_provision. The attribute_fd must be a +* handle to an SGX attribute file, e.g. "/dev/sgx/provision". +* +* Failure to explicitly request access to a restricted attribute will cause +* sgx_ioc_enclave_init() to fail. Currently, the only restricted attribute +* is access to the PROVISION_KEY. +* +* Note, access to the EINITTOKEN_KEY is disallowed entirely. +* +* Return: 0 on success, -errno otherwise +*/ +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_provision (struct sgx_encl *encl, +void __user *arg) +{ +struct sgx_enclave_provision params; +struct file *attribute_file; +int ret; + +if (copy_from_user (¶ms, arg,sizeof (params))) +return -EFAULT ; +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) · line 713
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +10
-0+ attribute_file =fget (params.attribute_fd); +if (!attribute_file) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (attribute_file->f_op != &sgx_provision_fops) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + + encl->attributes |=SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY ;
This is wrong, it needs to be
encl->attributes_mask |= SGX_ATTR_PROVISION;
else sgx_encl_init() will fail this check
if (encl->attributes & ~encl->attributes_mask) return -EACCES;
This obviously needs a selftest...
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +6
-0+ ret =0 ; + +out: +fput (attribute_file); +return ret; +}
PATCH v38 16/24 x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenThere is a limited amount of EPC available. Therefore, some of it must be copied to the regular memory, and only subset kept in the SGX reserved memory. While kernel cannot directly access enclave memory, SGX provides a set of ENCLS leaf functions to perform reclaiming.
This commits implements a page reclaimer by using these leaf functions. It picks the victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. The thread ksgxswapd reclaims pages on the event when the number of free EPC pages goes below SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES up until it reaches SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES.
sgx_alloc_epc_page() can optionally directly reclaim pages with @reclaim set true. A caller must also supply owner for each page so that the reclaimer can access the associated enclaves. This is needed for locking, as most of the ENCLS leafs cannot be executed concurrently for an enclave. The owner is also needed for accessing SECS, which is required to be resident when its child pages are being reclaimed.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 340 +++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 41 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 77 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 464 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 9 + 6 files changed, 925 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ static int sgx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)atomic_set (&encl->flags,0 );kref_init (&encl->refcount);xa_init (&encl->page_array); +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&encl->va_pages);mutex_init (&encl->lock);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&encl->mm_list);spin_lock_init (&encl->mm_lock);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +338 -2
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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +41 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +72 -5
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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +464 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +9 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@struct sgx_epc_page {unsigned long desc; +struct sgx_encl_page *owner;struct list_head list; };
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ struct sgx_epc_page {struct sgx_epc_section {unsigned long pa;void *va; +unsigned long free_cnt;struct list_head page_list;struct list_head unsanitized_page_list;spinlock_t lock;
@@ -35,6 +37,10 @@ struct sgx_epc_section {#define SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK GENMASK(7, 0)#define SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS (SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK + 1)#define SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTH 0x100000 +#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMABLE BIT(8) +#define SGX_NR_TO_SCAN 16 +#define SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES 32 +#define SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES 64extern struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS ];
@@ -50,7 +56,10 @@ static inline void *sgx_get_epc_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page) return section->va + (page->desc & PAGE_MASK) - section->pa; } +void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable (struct sgx_epc_page *page); +int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable (struct sgx_epc_page *page);struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page (void ); +struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page (void *owner,bool reclaim);void sgx_free_epc_page (struct sgx_epc_page *page);#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 17/24 x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenAdd VMA callbacks for ptrace() that can be used with debug enclaves. With debug enclaves data can be read and write the memory word at a time by using ENCLS(EDBGRD) and ENCLS(EDBGWR) leaf instructions.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +87 -0
@@ -333,10 +333,97 @@ static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,return mprotect_fixup (vma, pprev, start, end, newflags); } +static int sgx_edbgrd (struct sgx_encl *encl,struct sgx_encl_page *page, +unsigned long addr,void *data) +{ +unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK ; +int ret; + + + ret =__edbgrd (sgx_get_epc_addr (page->epc_page) + offset, data); +if (ret) +return -EIO ; + +return 0 ; +} + +static int sgx_edbgwr (struct sgx_encl *encl,struct sgx_encl_page *page, +unsigned long addr,void *data) +{ +unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK ; +int ret; + + ret =__edbgwr (sgx_get_epc_addr (page->epc_page) + offset, data); +if (ret) +return -EIO ; + +return 0 ; +} + +static int sgx_vma_access (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long addr, +void *buf,int len,int write) +{ +struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data; +struct sgx_encl_page *entry =NULL ; +char data[sizeof (unsigned long )]; +unsigned long align; +unsigned int flags; +int offset; +int cnt; +int ret =0 ; +int i; + +/* If process was forked, VMA is still there but vm_private_data is set +* to NULL. +*/ +if (!encl) +return -EFAULT ; + + flags =atomic_read (&encl->flags); + +if (!(flags &SGX_ENCL_DEBUG ) || !(flags &SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED ) || + (flags &SGX_ENCL_DEAD )) +return -EFAULT ; + +for (i =0 ; i < len; i += cnt) { + entry =sgx_encl_reserve_page (encl, (addr + i) &PAGE_MASK ); +if (IS_ERR (entry)) { + ret =PTR_ERR (entry); +break ; + } + + align =ALIGN_DOWN (addr + i,sizeof (unsigned long )); + offset = (addr + i) & (sizeof (unsigned long ) -1 ); + cnt =sizeof (unsigned long ) - offset; + cnt =min (cnt, len - i); + + ret =sgx_edbgrd (encl, entry, align, data); +if (ret) + goto out; + +if (write) { +memcpy (data + offset, buf + i, cnt); + ret =sgx_edbgwr (encl, entry, align, data); +if (ret) + goto out; + }else +memcpy (buf + i, data + offset, cnt); + +out: +mutex_unlock (&encl->lock); + +if (ret) +break ; + } + +return ret <0 ? ret : i; +} +const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = { .open = sgx_vma_open, .fault = sgx_vma_fault, .mprotect = sgx_vma_mprotect, + .access = sgx_vma_access, };/**
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 18/24 x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
The basic concept and implementation is very similar to the kernel's exception fixup mechanism. The key differences are that the kernel handler is hardcoded and the fixup entry addresses are relative to the overall table as opposed to individual entries.
Hardcoding the kernel handler avoids the need to figure out how to get userspace code to point at a kernel function. Given that the expected usage is to propagate information to userspace, dumping all fault information into registers is likely the desired behavior for the vast majority of yet-to-be-created functions. Use registers DI, SI and DX to communicate fault information, which follows Linux's ABI for register consumption and hopefully avoids conflict with hardware features that might leverage the fixup capabilities, e.g. register usage for SGX instructions was at least partially designed with calling conventions in mind.
Making fixup addresses relative to the overall table allows the table to be stripped from the final vDSO image (it's a kernel construct) without complicating the offset logic, e.g. entry-relative addressing would also need to account for the table's location relative to the image.
Regarding stripping the table, modify vdso2c to extract the table from the raw, a.k.a. unstripped, data and dump it as a standalone byte array in the resulting .c file. The original base of the table, its length and a pointer to the byte array are captured in struct vdso_image. Alternatively, the table could be dumped directly into the struct, but because the number of entries can vary per image, that would require either hardcoding a max sized table into the struct definition or defining the table as a flexible length array. The flexible length array approach has zero benefits, e.g. the base/size are still needed, and prevents reusing the extraction code, while hardcoding the max size adds ongoing maintenance just to avoid exporting the explicit size.
The immediate use case is for Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX). SGX introduces a new CPL3-only "enclave" mode that runs as a sort of black box shared object that is hosted by an untrusted "normal" CPl3 process.
Entering an enclave can only be done through SGX-specific instructions, EENTER and ERESUME, and is a non-trivial process. Because of the complexity of transitioning to/from an enclave, the vast majority of enclaves are expected to utilize a library to handle the actual transitions. This is roughly analogous to how e.g. libc implementations are used by most applications.
Another crucial characteristic of SGX enclaves is that they can generate exceptions as part of their normal (at least as "normal" as SGX can be) operation that need to be handled *in* the enclave and/or are unique to SGX.
And because they are essentially fancy shared objects, a process can host any number of enclaves, each of which can execute multiple threads simultaneously.
Putting everything together, userspace enclaves will utilize a library that must be prepared to handle any and (almost) all exceptions any time at least one thread may be executing in an enclave. Leveraging signals to handle the enclave exceptions is unpleasant, to put it mildly, e.g. the SGX library must constantly (un)register its signal handler based on whether or not at least one thread is executing in an enclave, and filter and forward exceptions that aren't related to its enclaves. This becomes particularly nasty when using multiple levels of libraries that register signal handlers, e.g. running an enclave via cgo inside of the Go runtime.
Enabling exception fixup in vDSO allows the kernel to provide a vDSO function that wraps the low-level transitions to/from the enclave, i.e. the EENTER and ERESUME instructions. The vDSO function can intercept exceptions that would otherwise generate a signal and return the fault information directly to its caller, thus avoiding the need to juggle signal handlers.
Note that unlike the kernel's _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE implementation, the 'C' version of _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE doesn't use a pre-compiled assembly macro. Duplicating four lines of code is simpler than adding the necessary infrastructure to generate pre-compiled assembly and the intended benefit of massaging GCC's inlining algorithm is unlikely to realized in the vDSO any time soon, if ever.
--- arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 6 ++-- arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h | 29 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S | 9 ++++- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h | 5 +++ 6 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +3 -3
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o # files to link into kernel -obj-y += vma.o +obj-y += vma.o extable.o KASAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y UBSAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y KCSAN_SANITIZE_vma.o := y
@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ $(obj)/%-x32.o: $(obj)/%.o FORCE targets += vdsox32.lds $(vobjx32s-y) -$(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S -$(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg FORCE +$(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S --remove-section __ex_table +$(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg $(call if_changed,objcopy) $(obj)/vdsox32.so.dbg: $(obj)/vdsox32.lds $(vobjx32s) FORCE
arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.c new file +46 -0
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arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.h new file +29 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __VDSO_EXTABLE_H +#define __VDSO_EXTABLE_H + +/* +* Inject exception fixup for vDSO code. Unlike normal exception fixup, +* vDSO uses a dedicated handler the addresses are relative to the overall +* exception table, not each individual entry. +*/ +#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ +#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE (from, to) \ + ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from to + +.macro ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE from:req to:req + .pushsection __ex_table, "a" + .long (\from) - __ex_table + .long (\to) - __ex_table + .popsection +.endm +#else +#define _ASM_VDSO_EXTABLE_HANDLE (from, to) \ + ".pushsection __ex_table, \"a\"\n" \ + ".long (" #from ") - __ex_table\n" \ + ".long (" #to ") - __ex_table\n" \ + ".popsection\n" +#endif + +#endif /* __VDSO_EXTABLE_H */ +
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-layout.lds.S +8 -1
@@ -75,11 +75,18 @@ SECTIONS * stuff that isn't used at runtime in between. */ - .text : { *(.text*) } :text =0x90909090, + .text : { + *(.text*) + *(.fixup) + } :text =0x90909090, + + .altinstructions : { *(.altinstructions) } :text .altinstr_replacement : { *(.altinstr_replacement) } :text + __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) } :text + /DISCARD/ : { *(.discard) *(.discard.*)
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h +49 -1
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arch/x86/include/asm/vdso.h +5 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ struct vdso_image {unsigned long size;/* Always a multiple of PAGE_SIZE */ unsigned long alt, alt_len; +unsigned long extable_base, extable_len; +const void *extable;long sym_vvar_start;/* Negative offset to the vvar area */
@@ -45,6 +47,9 @@ extern void __init init_vdso_image(const struct vdso_image *image);extern int map_vdso_once (const struct vdso_image *image,unsigned long addr); +extern bool fixup_vdso_exception (struct pt_regs *regs,int trapnr, +unsigned long error_code, +unsigned long fault_addr);#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_VDSO_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 19/24 x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Add helper function to sanitize error code to prepare for vDSO exception fixup, which will expose the error code to userspace and runs before set_signal_archinfo(), i.e. suppresses the signal when fixup is successful.
--- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +17 -7
@@ -555,6 +555,18 @@ pgtable_bad(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,oops_end (flags, regs, sig); } +static void sanitize_error_code (unsigned long address, +unsigned long *error_code) +{ +/* +* To avoid leaking information about the kernel page +* table layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to +* kernel addresses are always protection faults. +*/ +if (address >=TASK_SIZE_MAX ) + *error_code |=X86_PF_PROT ; +} +static void set_signal_archinfo (unsigned long address,unsigned long error_code) {
@@ -611,6 +623,8 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,* faulting through the emulate_vsyscall() logic. */ if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) { +sanitize_error_code (address, &error_code); +set_signal_archinfo (address, error_code);/* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */
@@ -759,13 +773,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,if (is_errata100 (regs, address))return ; -/* -* To avoid leaking information about the kernel page table -* layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to kernel addresses -* are always protection faults. -*/ -if (address >=TASK_SIZE_MAX ) - error_code |=X86_PF_PROT ; +sanitize_error_code (address, &error_code);if (likely (show_unhandled_signals))show_signal_msg (regs, error_code, address, tsk);
@@ -884,6 +892,8 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,if (is_prefetch (regs, error_code, address))return ; +sanitize_error_code (address, &error_code); +set_signal_archinfo (address, error_code);#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 20/24 x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
vDSO functions can now leverage an exception fixup mechanism similar to kernel exception fixup. For vDSO exception fixup, the initial user is Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), which will wrap the low-level transitions to/from the enclave, i.e. EENTER and ERESUME instructions, in a vDSO function and leverage fixup to intercept exceptions that would otherwise generate a signal. This allows the vDSO wrapper to return the fault information directly to its caller, obviating the need for SGX applications and libraries to juggle signal handlers.
Attempt to fixup vDSO exceptions immediately prior to populating and sending signal information. Except for the delivery mechanism, an exception in a vDSO function should be treated like any other exception in userspace, e.g. any fault that is successfully handled by the kernel should not be directly visible to userspace.
Although it's debatable whether or not all exceptions are of interest to enclaves, defer to the vDSO fixup to decide whether to do fixup or generate a signal. Future users of vDSO fixup, if there ever are any, will undoubtedly have different requirements than SGX enclaves, e.g. the fixup vs. signal logic can be made function specific if/when necessary.
--- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +16 -3
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@#include <asm/umip.h> #include <asm/insn.h> #include <asm/insn-eval.h> +#include <asm/vdso.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
@@ -116,6 +117,9 @@ do_trap_no_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, int trapnr, const char *str, tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; tsk->thread.trap_nr = trapnr;die (str, regs, error_code); + }else { +if (fixup_vdso_exception (regs, trapnr, error_code,0 )) +return 0 ; }/*
@@ -549,6 +553,9 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; tsk->thread.trap_nr =X86_TRAP_GP ; +if (fixup_vdso_exception (regs,X86_TRAP_GP , error_code,0 )) +return ; +show_signal (tsk,SIGSEGV ,"" , desc, regs, error_code);force_sig (SIGSEGV ); goto exit;
@@ -827,9 +834,12 @@ static void handle_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long dr6, bool user)#endif if (notify_die (DIE_DEBUG ,"debug" , regs, (long )&dr6,0 , -SIGTRAP ) ==NOTIFY_STOP ) { -return ; - } +SIGTRAP ) ==NOTIFY_STOP ) + goto out; + +if (user_mode (regs) && +fixup_vdso_exception (regs,X86_TRAP_DB ,0 ,0 )) + goto out;/* It's safe to allow irq's after DR6 has been saved */ cond_local_irq_enable (regs);
@@ -981,6 +991,9 @@ static void math_error(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)if (!si_code) goto exit; +if (fixup_vdso_exception (regs, trapnr,0 ,0 )) +return ; +force_sig_fault (SIGFPE , si_code, (void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr (regs)); exit:
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +8 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@#include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h> /* exception stack */ #include <asm/pgtable_areas.h> /* VMALLOC_START, ... */ #include <asm/kvm_para.h> /* kvm_handle_async_pf */ +#include <asm/vdso.h> /* fixup_vdso_exception() */ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <asm/trace/exceptions.h>
@@ -775,6 +776,10 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,sanitize_error_code (address, &error_code); +if (fixup_vdso_exception (regs,X86_TRAP_PF , error_code, + address)) +return ; +if (likely (show_unhandled_signals))show_signal_msg (regs, error_code, address, tsk);
@@ -894,6 +899,9 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,sanitize_error_code (address, &error_code); +if (fixup_vdso_exception (regs,X86_TRAP_PF , error_code, address)) +return ; +set_signal_archinfo (address, error_code);#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v38 21/24 x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
An SGX runtime must be aware of the exceptions, which happen inside an enclave. Introduce a vDSO call that wraps EENTER/ERESUME cycle and returns the CPU exception back to the caller exactly when it happens.
Kernel fixups the exception information to RDI, RSI and RDX. The SGX call vDSO handler fills this information to the user provided buffer or alternatively trigger user provided callback at the time of the exception.
The calling convention is custom and does not follow System V x86-64 ABI.
--- arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 1 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h | 8 ++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 128 ++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 296 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ VDSO32-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) := y vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o +vobjs-$(VDSO64-y) += vsgx_enter_enclave.o # files to link into kernel obj-y += vma.o extable.o
@@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ $(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS CFLAGS_REMOVE_vclock_gettime.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso32/vclock_gettime.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetcpu.o = -pg +CFLAGS_REMOVE_vsgx_enter_enclave.o = -pg # # X32 processes use x32 vDSO to access 64bit kernel data.
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S +1 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ VERSION { __vdso_time; clock_getres; __vdso_clock_getres; + __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave; local: *; }; }
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S new file +157 -0
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arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h new file +8 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H +#define _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H + +#define EENTER 0x02 +#define ERESUME 0x03 + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_ENCLU_H */
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +128 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v38 21/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h struct sgx_enclave_provision { · line 134
Quoted 9 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +9
-0+struct sgx_enclave_run { +__u64 tcs; +__u32 flags; +__u32 exit_reason; + +union { +sgx_enclave_exit_handler_t user_handler; +__u64 __user_handler; + };
I will replace this with just:
__u64 user_handler;
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h struct sgx_enclave_provision { · line 143
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +9
-0+__u64 user_data; + +union { +struct sgx_enclave_exception exception; + +/* Pad the entire struct to 256 bytes. */ +__u8 pad[256 -32 ]; + }; +};
Resulting:
struct sgx_enclave_run {
__u64 tcs;
__u32 flags;
__u32 exit_reason;
__u64 user_handler;
__u64 user_data;
union {
struct sgx_enclave_exception exception;
/* Pad the entire struct to 256 bytes. */
__u8 pad[256 - 32];
};
};BTW, why there is that padding?
/Jarkko
PATCH v38 22/24 selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenAdd a selftest for SGX. It is a trivial test where a simple enclave copies one 64-bit word of memory between two memory locations.
--- tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile | 53 +++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S | 44 ++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h | 21 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c | 277 ++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 232 ++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h | 38 ++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c | 395 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c | 20 + tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds | 40 ++ .../selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S | 89 ++++ 12 files changed, 1212 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ TARGETS += user TARGETS += vm TARGETS += x86 TARGETS += zram +TARGETS += sgx #Please keep the TARGETS list alphabetically sorted # Run "make quicktest=1 run_tests" or # "make quicktest=1 kselftest" from top level Makefile
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore new file +2 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +test_sgx +test_encl.elf
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile new file +53 -0
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tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S new file +44 -0
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tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h new file +21 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* +* Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation. +*/ + +#ifndef DEFINES_H +#define DEFINES_H + +#include <stdint.h> + +#define PAGE_SIZE 4096 +#define PAGE_MASK (~(PAGE_SIZE - 1)) + +#define __aligned (x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x))) +#define __packed __attribute__((packed)) + +#include "../../../../arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h" +#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h" +#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h" + +#endif /* DEFINES_H */
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c new file +277 -0
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tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c new file +232 -0
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tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h new file +38 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* +* Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation. +*/ + +#ifndef MAIN_H +#define MAIN_H + +struct encl_segment { +off_t offset; +size_t size; +unsigned int prot; +unsigned int flags; +}; + +struct encl { +int fd; +void *bin; +off_t bin_size; +void *src; +size_t src_size; +size_t encl_size; +off_t encl_base; +unsigned int nr_segments; +struct encl_segment *segment_tbl; +struct sgx_secs secs; +struct sgx_sigstruct sigstruct; +}; + +void encl_delete (struct encl *ctx); +bool encl_load (const char *path,struct encl *encl); +bool encl_measure (struct encl *encl); +bool encl_build (struct encl *encl); + +int sgx_call_vdso (void *rdi,void *rsi,long rdx,u32 leaf,void *r8,void *r9, +struct sgx_enclave_run *run); + +#endif /* MAIN_H */
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c new file +395 -0
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tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c new file +20 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) +// Copyright(c) 2016-18 Intel Corporation. + +#include <stddef.h> +#include "defines.h" + +static void *memcpy (void *dest,const void *src,size_t n) +{ +size_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < n; i++) + ((char *)dest)[i] = ((char *)src)[i]; + +return dest; +} + +void encl_body (void *rdi,void *rsi) +{ +memcpy (rsi, rdi,8 ); +}
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds new file +40 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf64-x86-64) + +PHDRS +{ + tcs PT_LOAD; + text PT_LOAD; + data PT_LOAD; +} + +SECTIONS +{ + . = 0; + .tcs : { + *(.tcs*) + } : tcs + + . = ALIGN(4096); + .text : { + *(.text*) + *(.rodata*) + } : text + + . = ALIGN(4096); + .data : { + *(.data*) + } : data + + /DISCARD/ : { + *(.comment*) + *(.note*) + *(.debug*) + *(.eh_frame*) + } +} + +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.altinstructions), "ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.altinstr_replacement), "ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.discard.retpoline_safe), "RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.discard.nospec), "RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves") +ASSERT(!DEFINED(.got.plt), "Libcalls are not supported in enclaves")
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S new file +89 -0
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2.25.1
PATCH v38 23/24 docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenDocument the Intel SGX kernel architecture. The fine-grained micro architecture details can be looked up from Intel SDM Volume 3D.
--- Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/sgx.rst | 200 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 201 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/sgx.rst
Documentation/x86/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -30,3 +30,4 @@ x86-specific Documentation usb-legacy-support i386/index x86_64/index + sgx
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst new file +200 -0
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2.25.1
PATCH v38 24/24 x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS
In reply to Jarkko SakkinenAdd the maintainer information for the SGX subsystem.
--- MAINTAINERS | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
MAINTAINERS +11 -0
@@ -9051,6 +9051,17 @@ F: Documentation/x86/intel_txt.rst F: arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c F: include/linux/tboot.h +INTEL SGX +M: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> +M: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> +L: [email protected] +S: Maintained +Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/intel-sgx/list/ +T: git https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/linux-sgx.git +F: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +F: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/* +K: \bSGX_ + INTERCONNECT API M: Georgi Djakov <[email protected]> L: [email protected]
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2.25.1