changes for addding fchmodat2 syscall
Subsystems (17)
Rich Felker
maintainerv2 cover changes for addding fchmodat2 syscall
I'm resubmitting this split into two parts, first blocking chmod of symlinks in chmod_common, then adding the new syscall, as requested by Christoph. This will make it impossible to chmod symlinks via the O_PATH magic symlink path. I've also reordered the unsupported flags test to come first.
Rich
Rich Felker
maintainerPATCH v2 1/2 vfs: block chmod of symlinks
It was discovered while implementing userspace emulation of fchmodat AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW (using O_PATH and procfs magic symlinks; otherwise it's not possible to target symlinks with chmod operations) that some filesystems erroneously allow access mode of symlinks to be changed, but return failure with EOPNOTSUPP (see glibc issue #14578 and commit a492b1e5ef). This inconsistency is non-conforming and wrong, and the consensus seems to be that it was unintentional to allow link modes to be changed in the first place.
--- fs/open.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/open.c +6 -0
@@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)struct iattr newattrs;int error; +/* Block chmod from getting to fs layer. Ideally the fs would either +* allow it or fail with EOPNOTSUPP, but some are buggy and return +* an error but change the mode, which is non-conforming and wrong. */ +if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + error =mnt_want_write (path->mnt);if (error)return error;
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks
Quoted 19 lines · Rich Felker
It was discovered while implementing userspace emulation of fchmodat
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW(usingO_PATHand procfs magic symlinks; otherwise it's not possible to target symlinks with chmod operations) that some filesystems erroneously allow access mode of symlinks to be changed, but return failure with EOPNOTSUPP (see glibc issue #14578 and commita492b1e5ef). This inconsistency is non-conforming and wrong, and the consensus seems to be that it was unintentional to allow link modes to be changed in the first place.Signed-off-by Rich Felker <[email protected]>--- fs/open.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)fs/open.c +0
-0
fs/open.c int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) · line 577
Quoted 8 lines
fs/open.c +5
-0@@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)struct iattr newattrs;int error; +/* Block chmod from getting to fs layer. Ideally the fs would either +* allow it or fail with EOPNOTSUPP, but some are buggy and return +* an error but change the mode, which is non-conforming and wrong. */ +if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
I still fail to understand why these "buggy" filesystems can not be fixed. Why are you papering over a filesystem-specific-bug with this core kernel change that we will forever have to keep?
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks
Quoted 23 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 22 lines · Rich Felker
It was discovered while implementing userspace emulation of fchmodat
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW(usingO_PATHand procfs magic symlinks; otherwise it's not possible to target symlinks with chmod operations) that some filesystems erroneously allow access mode of symlinks to be changed, but return failure with EOPNOTSUPP (see glibc issue #14578 and commita492b1e5ef). This inconsistency is non-conforming and wrong, and the consensus seems to be that it was unintentional to allow link modes to be changed in the first place.Signed-off-by Rich Felker <[email protected]>--- fs/open.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)fs/open.c +0
-0@@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)struct iattr newattrs;int error;
Quoted 9 lines
fs/open.c int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) · line 577
Quoted 5 lines
fs/open.c +5
-0+/* Block chmod from getting to fs layer. Ideally the fs would either +* allow it or fail with EOPNOTSUPP, but some are buggy and return +* an error but change the mode, which is non-conforming and wrong. */ +if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;I still fail to understand why these "buggy" filesystems can not be fixed. Why are you papering over a filesystem-specific-bug with this core kernel change that we will forever have to keep?
Because checking this once in the VFS is much saner than trying to patch up a gazillion file systems.
Rich Felker
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks
In reply to Greg KHQuoted 23 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 22 lines · Rich Felker
It was discovered while implementing userspace emulation of fchmodat
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW(usingO_PATHand procfs magic symlinks; otherwise it's not possible to target symlinks with chmod operations) that some filesystems erroneously allow access mode of symlinks to be changed, but return failure with EOPNOTSUPP (see glibc issue #14578 and commita492b1e5ef). This inconsistency is non-conforming and wrong, and the consensus seems to be that it was unintentional to allow link modes to be changed in the first place.Signed-off-by Rich Felker <[email protected]>--- fs/open.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)fs/open.c +0
-0@@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)struct iattr newattrs;int error;
Quoted 8 lines
fs/open.c int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) · line 577
Quoted 5 lines
fs/open.c +5
-0+/* Block chmod from getting to fs layer. Ideally the fs would either +* allow it or fail with EOPNOTSUPP, but some are buggy and return +* an error but change the mode, which is non-conforming and wrong. */ +if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;I still fail to understand why these "buggy" filesystems can not be fixed. Why are you papering over a filesystem-specific-bug with this
Because that's what Christoph wanted, and it seems exposure of the vector for applying chmod to symlinks was unintentional to begin with. I have no preference how this is fixed as long as breakage is not exposed to userspace via the new fchmodat2 syscall (since a broken syscall would be worse than not having it at all).
Quoted 1 line
core kernel change that we will forever have to keep?
There's no fundamental reason it would have to be kept forever. The contract remains "either it works and reports success, or it makes no change and reports EOPNOTSUPP". It just can't do both.
Rich
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks
In reply to Rich FelkerQuoted 19 lines · Rich Felker
It was discovered while implementing userspace emulation of fchmodat
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW(usingO_PATHand procfs magic symlinks; otherwise it's not possible to target symlinks with chmod operations) that some filesystems erroneously allow access mode of symlinks to be changed, but return failure with EOPNOTSUPP (see glibc issue #14578 and commita492b1e5ef). This inconsistency is non-conforming and wrong, and the consensus seems to be that it was unintentional to allow link modes to be changed in the first place.Signed-off-by Rich Felker <[email protected]>--- fs/open.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)fs/open.c +0
-0
fs/open.c int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) · line 577
Quoted 8 lines
fs/open.c +5
-0@@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)struct iattr newattrs;int error; +/* Block chmod from getting to fs layer. Ideally the fs would either +* allow it or fail with EOPNOTSUPP, but some are buggy and return +* an error but change the mode, which is non-conforming and wrong. */ +if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
Our usualy place for this would be setattr_prepare. Also the comment style is off, and I don't think we should talk about buggy file systems here, but a policy to not allow the chmod. I also suspect the right error value is EINVAL - EOPNOTSUPP isn't really used in normal posix file system interfaces.
Rich Felker
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks
Quoted 23 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 22 lines · Rich Felker
It was discovered while implementing userspace emulation of fchmodat
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW(usingO_PATHand procfs magic symlinks; otherwise it's not possible to target symlinks with chmod operations) that some filesystems erroneously allow access mode of symlinks to be changed, but return failure with EOPNOTSUPP (see glibc issue #14578 and commita492b1e5ef). This inconsistency is non-conforming and wrong, and the consensus seems to be that it was unintentional to allow link modes to be changed in the first place.Signed-off-by Rich Felker <[email protected]>--- fs/open.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)fs/open.c +0
-0@@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)struct iattr newattrs;int error;
Quoted 11 lines
fs/open.c int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) · line 577
Quoted 5 lines
fs/open.c +5
-0+/* Block chmod from getting to fs layer. Ideally the fs would either +* allow it or fail with EOPNOTSUPP, but some are buggy and return +* an error but change the mode, which is non-conforming and wrong. */ +if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;Our usualy place for this would be
setattr_prepare. Also the comment style is off, and I don't think we should talk about buggy file systems here, but a policy to not allow the chmod. I also suspect the right error value is EINVAL - EOPNOTSUPP isn't really used in normal posix file system interfaces.
EINVAL is non-conforming here. POSIX defines it as unsupported mode or flag. Lack of support for setting an access mode on symlinks is a distinct failure reason, and POSIX does not allow overloading error codes like this.
Even if it were permitted, it would be bad to do this because it would make it impossible for the application to tell whether the cause of failure is an invalid mode or that the filesystem/implementation doesn't support modes on symlinks. This matters because one is usually a fatal error and the other is a condition to ignore. Moreover, the affected applications (e.g. coreutils, tar, etc.) already accept EOPNOTSUPP here from libc. Defining a new error would break them unless libc translated whatever the syscall returns to the expected EOPNOTSUPP.
Rich
Al Viro
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks
In reply to Christoph HellwigQuoted 23 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 22 lines · Rich Felker
It was discovered while implementing userspace emulation of fchmodat
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW(usingO_PATHand procfs magic symlinks; otherwise it's not possible to target symlinks with chmod operations) that some filesystems erroneously allow access mode of symlinks to be changed, but return failure with EOPNOTSUPP (see glibc issue #14578 and commita492b1e5ef). This inconsistency is non-conforming and wrong, and the consensus seems to be that it was unintentional to allow link modes to be changed in the first place.Signed-off-by Rich Felker <[email protected]>--- fs/open.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)fs/open.c +0
-0@@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)struct iattr newattrs;int error;
Quoted 11 lines
fs/open.c int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) · line 577
Quoted 5 lines
fs/open.c +5
-0+/* Block chmod from getting to fs layer. Ideally the fs would either +* allow it or fail with EOPNOTSUPP, but some are buggy and return +* an error but change the mode, which is non-conforming and wrong. */ +if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;Our usualy place for this would be
setattr_prepare. Also the comment style is off, and I don't think we should talk about buggy file systems here, but a policy to not allow the chmod. I also suspect the right error value is EINVAL - EOPNOTSUPP isn't really used in normal posix file system interfaces.
Er... Wasn't that an ACL-related crap? XFS calling posix_acl_chmod()
after it has committed to i_mode change, propagating the error to caller of ->notify_change(), IIRC...
Put it another way, why do we want
if (!inode->i_op->set_acl)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
in posix_acl_chmod(), when we have
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode))
return 0;
right next to it? If nothing else, make that
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode) || !inode->i_op->get_acl)
return 0; // piss off - nothing to adjust hereAl Viro
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks
Quoted 41 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 23 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 22 lines · Rich Felker
It was discovered while implementing userspace emulation of fchmodat
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW(usingO_PATHand procfs magic symlinks; otherwise it's not possible to target symlinks with chmod operations) that some filesystems erroneously allow access mode of symlinks to be changed, but return failure with EOPNOTSUPP (see glibc issue #14578 and commita492b1e5ef). This inconsistency is non-conforming and wrong, and the consensus seems to be that it was unintentional to allow link modes to be changed in the first place.Signed-off-by Rich Felker <[email protected]>--- fs/open.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)fs/open.c +0
-0@@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)struct iattr newattrs;int error;Quoted 11 lines
fs/open.c int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) · line 577
Quoted 5 lines
fs/open.c +5
-0+/* Block chmod from getting to fs layer. Ideally the fs would either +* allow it or fail with EOPNOTSUPP, but some are buggy and return +* an error but change the mode, which is non-conforming and wrong. */ +if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;Our usualy place for this would be
setattr_prepare. Also the comment style is off, and I don't think we should talk about buggy file systems here, but a policy to not allow the chmod. I also suspect the right error value is EINVAL - EOPNOTSUPP isn't really used in normal posix file system interfaces.Er... Wasn't that an ACL-related crap? XFS calling
posix_acl_chmod()
after it has committed toi_modechange, propagating the error to caller of ->notify_change(), IIRC...Put it another way, why do we want
Quoted 8 lines
if (!inode->i_op->set_acl)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
in posix_acl_chmod(), when we have
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode))
return 0;
right next to it? If nothing else, make that
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode) || !inode->i_op->get_acl)
return 0; // piss off - nothing to adjust hereArrgh... That'd break shmem and similar filesystems... Still, it feels like we should _not_ bother in cases when there's no ACL for that sucker; after all, if get_acl() returns NULL, we quietly return 0 and that's it.
How about something like this instead?
fs/posix_acl.c +4 -2
@@ -559,8 +559,6 @@ posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)if (!IS_POSIXACL (inode))return 0 ; -if (!inode->i_op->set_acl) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; acl =get_acl (inode,ACL_TYPE_ACCESS );if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (acl)) {
@@ -569,6 +567,10 @@ posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)return PTR_ERR (acl); } +if (!inode->i_op->set_acl) { +posix_acl_release (acl); +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + } ret =__posix_acl_chmod (&acl,GFP_KERNEL , mode);if (ret)return ret;
Rich Felker
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks
Quoted 72 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 41 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 23 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 22 lines · Rich Felker
It was discovered while implementing userspace emulation of fchmodat
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW(usingO_PATHand procfs magic symlinks; otherwise it's not possible to target symlinks with chmod operations) that some filesystems erroneously allow access mode of symlinks to be changed, but return failure with EOPNOTSUPP (see glibc issue #14578 and commita492b1e5ef). This inconsistency is non-conforming and wrong, and the consensus seems to be that it was unintentional to allow link modes to be changed in the first place.Signed-off-by Rich Felker <[email protected]>--- fs/open.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)fs/open.c +0
-0@@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)struct iattr newattrs;int error;Quoted 11 lines
fs/open.c int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) · line 577
Quoted 5 lines
fs/open.c +5
-0+/* Block chmod from getting to fs layer. Ideally the fs would either +* allow it or fail with EOPNOTSUPP, but some are buggy and return +* an error but change the mode, which is non-conforming and wrong. */ +if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;Our usualy place for this would be
setattr_prepare. Also the comment style is off, and I don't think we should talk about buggy file systems here, but a policy to not allow the chmod. I also suspect the right error value is EINVAL - EOPNOTSUPP isn't really used in normal posix file system interfaces.Er... Wasn't that an ACL-related crap? XFS calling
posix_acl_chmod()
after it has committed toi_modechange, propagating the error to caller of ->notify_change(), IIRC...Put it another way, why do we want
Quoted 8 lines
if (!inode->i_op->set_acl) return -EOPNOTSUPP; in posix_acl_chmod(), when we have if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode)) return 0; right next to it? If nothing else, make that if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode) || !inode->i_op->get_acl) return 0; // piss off - nothing to adjust hereArrgh... That'd break shmem and similar filesystems... Still, it feels like we should _not_ bother in cases when there's no ACL for that sucker; after all, if
get_acl()returns NULL, we quietly return 0 and that's it.How about something like this instead?
fs/posix_acl.c +0
-2@@ -559,8 +559,6 @@ posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)if (!IS_POSIXACL (inode))return 0 ; -if (!inode->i_op->set_acl) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; acl =get_acl (inode,ACL_TYPE_ACCESS );if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL (acl)) {
fs/posix_acl.c posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode) · line 576
Quoted 10 lines
fs/posix_acl.c +4
-0@@ -569,6 +567,10 @@ posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)return PTR_ERR (acl); } +if (!inode->i_op->set_acl) { +posix_acl_release (acl); +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + } ret =__posix_acl_chmod (&acl,GFP_KERNEL , mode);if (ret)return ret;
Does this make chmod of links behave consistently (either succeeding with return value 0, or returning -EOPNOTSUPP without doing anything) for all filesystems? I'm fine with (and would probably prefer) this fix if it's a complete one. If this goes in I think my patch 1/2 can just be dropped and patch 2/2 behaves as intended; does that sound correct to you?
Rich
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] vfs: block chmod of symlinks
In reply to Al ViroQuoted 6 lines · Al Viro
Arrgh... That'd break shmem and similar filesystems... Still, it feels like we should _not_ bother in cases when there's no ACL for that sucker; after all, if
get_acl()returns NULL, we quietly return 0 and that's it.How about something like this instead?
Do you plan to turn this into a submission?
Rich, can you share your original reproducer? I would be really helpful to have it wired up in xfstests as a regression tests.
Rich Felker
maintainerPATCH v2 2/2 vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall
In reply to Rich FelkerPOSIX defines fchmodat as having a 4th argument, flags, that can be AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. Support for changing the access mode of symbolic links is optional (EOPNOTSUPP allowed if not supported), but this flag is important even on systems where symlinks do not have access modes, since it's the only way to safely change the mode of a file which might be asynchronously replaced with a symbolic link, without a race condition whereby the link target is changed.
It's possible to emulate AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW in userspace, and both musl libc and glibc do this, by opening an O_PATH file descriptor and performing chmod on the corresponding magic symlink in /proc/self/fd. However, this requires procfs to be mounted and accessible.
--- arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 ++ arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 + arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + fs/open.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- include/linux/syscalls.h | 2 ++ include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 +++- 21 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -479,3 +479,4 @@ 547 common openat2 sys_openat2 548 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 549 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +550 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -453,3 +453,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -1
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@#define __ARM_NR_compat_set_tls (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 5)#define __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 0x800) -#define __NR_compat_syscalls 440 +#define __NR_compat_syscalls 441#endif #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h +2 -0
@@ -887,6 +887,8 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_openat2, sys_openat2) __SYSCALL(__NR_pidfd_getfd, sys_pidfd_getfd)#define __NR_faccessat2 439 __SYSCALL(__NR_faccessat2, sys_faccessat2) +#define __NR_fchmodat2 440 +__SYSCALL (__NR_fchmodat2, sys_fchmodat2)/* * Please add new compat syscalls above this comment and update
arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -360,3 +360,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -439,3 +439,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -445,3 +445,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl +1 -0
@@ -378,3 +378,4 @@ 437 n32 openat2 sys_openat2 438 n32 pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 n32 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 n32 fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -354,3 +354,4 @@ 437 n64 openat2 sys_openat2 438 n64 pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 n64 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 n64 fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl +1 -0
@@ -427,3 +427,4 @@ 437 o32 openat2 sys_openat2 438 o32 pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 o32 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 o32 fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -437,3 +437,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -529,3 +529,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -442,3 +442,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -442,3 +442,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -485,3 +485,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1 -0
@@ -444,3 +444,4 @@ 437 i386 openat2 sys_openat2 438 i386 pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 i386 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 i386 fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2 # # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -410,3 +410,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
fs/open.c +14 -3
@@ -616,11 +616,16 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fchmod, unsigned int, fd, umode_t, mode)return err; } -static int do_fchmodat (int dfd,const char __user *filename,umode_t mode) +static int do_fchmodat (int dfd,const char __user *filename,umode_t mode,int flags) {struct path path;int error;unsigned int lookup_flags =LOOKUP_FOLLOW ; + +if (flags & ~AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW ) +return -EINVAL ; +if (flags &AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW ) + lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW ; retry: error =user_path_at (dfd, filename, lookup_flags, &path);if (!error) {
@@ -634,15 +639,21 @@ static int do_fchmodat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, umode_t mode)return error; } +SYSCALL_DEFINE4(fchmodat2, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, + umode_t, mode, int, flags) +{ +return do_fchmodat (dfd, filename, mode, flags); +} + SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fchmodat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, umode_t, mode) { -return do_fchmodat (dfd, filename, mode); +return do_fchmodat (dfd, filename, mode,0 ); } SYSCALL_DEFINE2(chmod, const char __user *, filename, umode_t, mode) { -return do_fchmodat (AT_FDCWD , filename, mode); +return do_fchmodat (AT_FDCWD , filename, mode,0 ); }int chown_common (const struct path *path,uid_t user,gid_t group)
include/linux/syscalls.h +2 -0
@@ -435,6 +435,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __user *filename);asmlinkage long sys_fchmod (unsigned int fd,umode_t mode);asmlinkage long sys_fchmodat (int dfd,const char __user * filename,umode_t mode); +asmlinkage long sys_fchmodat2 (int dfd,const char __user * filename, +umode_t mode,int flags);asmlinkage long sys_fchownat (int dfd,const char __user *filename,uid_t user,gid_t group,int flag);asmlinkage long sys_fchown (unsigned int fd,uid_t user,gid_t group);
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +3 -1
@@ -859,9 +859,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_openat2, sys_openat2) __SYSCALL(__NR_pidfd_getfd, sys_pidfd_getfd)#define __NR_faccessat2 439 __SYSCALL(__NR_faccessat2, sys_faccessat2) +#define __NR_fchmodat2 440 +__SYSCALL(__NR_fchmodat2, sys_fchmodat2)#undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 440 +#define __NR_syscalls 441/* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall
Quoted 7 lines · Rich Felker
POSIX defines fchmodat as having a 4th argument, flags, that can be
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. Support for changing the access mode of symbolic links is optional (EOPNOTSUPP allowed if not supported), but this flag is important even on systems where symlinks do not have access modes, since it's the only way to safely change the mode of a file which might be asynchronously replaced with a symbolic link, without a race condition whereby the link target is changed.
Could we also add AT_EMPTY_PATH support, so that you can fchmod an open file in a race-free way without needing to go through procfs?
Quoted 282 lines
It's possible to emulate
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOWin userspace, and both musl libc and glibc do this, by opening anO_PATHfile descriptor and performing chmod on the corresponding magic symlink in/proc/self/fd. However, this requires procfs to be mounted and accessible.Signed-off-by Rich Felker <[email protected]>--- arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 ++ arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 + arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + fs/open.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- include/linux/syscalls.h | 2 ++ include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 +++- 21 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1
-0@@ -479,3 +479,4 @@ 547 common openat2 sys_openat2 548 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 549 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +550 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl +1
-0@@ -453,3 +453,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h +1
-1@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@#define __ARM_NR_compat_set_tls (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 5)#define __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 0x800) -#define __NR_compat_syscalls 440 +#define __NR_compat_syscalls 441#endif #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONEarch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h +2
-0@@ -887,6 +887,8 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_openat2, sys_openat2) __SYSCALL(__NR_pidfd_getfd, sys_pidfd_getfd)#define __NR_faccessat2 439 __SYSCALL(__NR_faccessat2, sys_faccessat2) +#define __NR_fchmodat2 440 +__SYSCALL (__NR_fchmodat2, sys_fchmodat2)/* * Please add new compat syscalls above this comment and update arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1
-0@@ -360,3 +360,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1
-0@@ -439,3 +439,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1
-0@@ -445,3 +445,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl +1
-0@@ -378,3 +378,4 @@ 437 n32 openat2 sys_openat2 438 n32 pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 n32 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 n32 fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl +1
-0@@ -354,3 +354,4 @@ 437 n64 openat2 sys_openat2 438 n64 pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 n64 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 n64 fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl +1
-0@@ -427,3 +427,4 @@ 437 o32 openat2 sys_openat2 438 o32 pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 o32 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 o32 fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1
-0@@ -437,3 +437,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1
-0@@ -529,3 +529,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1
-0@@ -442,3 +442,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1
-0@@ -442,3 +442,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1
-0@@ -485,3 +485,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1
-0@@ -444,3 +444,4 @@ 437 i386 openat2 sys_openat2 438 i386 pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 i386 faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 i386 fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1
-0@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2 # # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impactarch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1
-0@@ -410,3 +410,4 @@ 437 common openat2 sys_openat2 438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd 439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2 +440 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2fs/open.c +14
-3@@ -616,11 +616,16 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fchmod, unsigned int, fd, umode_t, mode)return err; } -static int do_fchmodat (int dfd,const char __user *filename,umode_t mode) +static int do_fchmodat (int dfd,const char __user *filename,umode_t mode,int flags) {struct path path;int error;unsigned int lookup_flags =LOOKUP_FOLLOW ; + +if (flags & ~AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW ) +return -EINVAL ; +if (flags &AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW ) + lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW ; retry: error =user_path_at (dfd, filename, lookup_flags, &path);if (!error) {@@ -634,15 +639,21 @@ static int do_fchmodat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, umode_t mode)return error; } +SYSCALL_DEFINE4(fchmodat2, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, + umode_t, mode, int, flags) +{ +return do_fchmodat (dfd, filename, mode, flags); +} + SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fchmodat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, umode_t, mode) { -return do_fchmodat (dfd, filename, mode); +return do_fchmodat (dfd, filename, mode,0 ); } SYSCALL_DEFINE2(chmod, const char __user *, filename, umode_t, mode) { -return do_fchmodat (AT_FDCWD , filename, mode); +return do_fchmodat (AT_FDCWD , filename, mode,0 ); }int chown_common (const struct path *path,uid_t user,gid_t group)include/linux/syscalls.h +2
-0@@ -435,6 +435,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __user *filename);asmlinkage long sys_fchmod (unsigned int fd,umode_t mode);asmlinkage long sys_fchmodat (int dfd,const char __user * filename,umode_t mode); +asmlinkage long sys_fchmodat2 (int dfd,const char __user * filename, +umode_t mode,int flags);asmlinkage long sys_fchownat (int dfd,const char __user *filename,uid_t user,gid_t group,int flag);asmlinkage long sys_fchown (unsigned int fd,uid_t user,gid_t group);include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +3
-1@@ -859,9 +859,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_openat2, sys_openat2) __SYSCALL(__NR_pidfd_getfd, sys_pidfd_getfd)#define __NR_faccessat2 439 __SYSCALL(__NR_faccessat2, sys_faccessat2) +#define __NR_fchmodat2 440 +__SYSCALL(__NR_fchmodat2, sys_fchmodat2)#undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 440 +#define __NR_syscalls 441/* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Signature · 4 lines
Aleksa Sarai Senior Software Engineer (Containers) SUSE Linux GmbH <https://www.cyphar.com/>
Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] vfs: add fchmodat2 syscall
In reply to Rich FelkerQuoted 8 lines · Rich Felker
POSIX defines fchmodat as having a 4th argument, flags, that can be
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. Support for changing the access mode of symbolic links is optional (EOPNOTSUPP allowed if not supported), but this flag is important even on systems where symlinks do not have access modes, since it's the only way to safely change the mode of a file which might be asynchronously replaced with a symbolic link, without a race condition whereby the link target is changed.
Quoted 6 lines
It's possible to emulate
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOWin userspace, and both musl libc and glibc do this, by opening anO_PATHfile descriptor and performing chmod on the corresponding magic symlink in/proc/self/fd. However, this requires procfs to be mounted and accessible.Signed-off-by Rich Felker <[email protected]>
No kselftest for this new system call, or man page? How do we know this actually works and what the expected outcome should be?
thanks,
greg k-h