Bluetooth: Fix the vulnerable issue on enc key size
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 Bluetooth: Fix the vulnerable issue on enc key size
When someone attacks the service provider, it creates connection, authenticates. Then it requests key size of one byte and it identifies the key with brute force methods.
After l2cap info req/resp exchange is complete. the attacker sends l2cap connect with specific PSM.
In above procedure, there is no chance for the service provider to check the encryption key size before l2cap_connect(). Because the state of l2cap chan in conn->chan_l is BT_LISTEN, there is no l2cap chan with the state of BT_CONNECT or BT_CONNECT2.
So service provider should check the encryption key size in l2cap_connect()
--- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +7 -0
@@ -4150,6 +4150,13 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_connect(struct l2cap_conn *conn,if (conn->info_state &L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE ) {if (l2cap_chan_check_security (chan, false)) { +if (!l2cap_check_enc_key_size (conn->hcon)) { +l2cap_state_change (chan,BT_DISCONN ); +__set_chan_timer (chan,L2CAP_DISC_TIMEOUT ); + result =L2CAP_CR_SEC_BLOCK ; + status =L2CAP_CS_NO_INFO ; + goto response; + }if (test_bit (FLAG_DEFER_SETUP , &chan->flags)) {l2cap_state_change (chan,BT_CONNECT2 ); result =L2CAP_CR_PEND ;
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Marcel Holtmann
maintainerHi Alex,
Quoted 28 lines
When someone attacks the service provider, it creates connection, authenticates. Then it requests key size of one byte and it identifies the key with brute force methods.
After l2cap info req/resp exchange is complete. the attacker sends l2cap connect with specific PSM.
In above procedure, there is no chance for the service provider to check the encryption key size before
l2cap_connect(). Because the state of l2cap chan inconn->chan_lisBT_LISTEN, there is no l2cap chan with the state ofBT_CONNECTorBT_CONNECT2.So service provider should check the encryption key size in
l2cap_connect()Signed-off-by Alex Lu <[email protected]>---
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c| 7 +++++++1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +0
-0@@ -4150,6 +4150,13 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_connect(struct l2cap_conn *conn,if (conn->info_state &L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE ) {if (l2cap_chan_check_security (chan, false)) {
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_connect(struct l2cap_conn *conn, · line 4162
Quoted 10 lines
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +7
-0+if (!l2cap_check_enc_key_size (conn->hcon)) { +l2cap_state_change (chan,BT_DISCONN ); +__set_chan_timer (chan,L2CAP_DISC_TIMEOUT ); + result =L2CAP_CR_SEC_BLOCK ; + status =L2CAP_CS_NO_INFO ; + goto response; + }if (test_bit (FLAG_DEFER_SETUP , &chan->flags)) {l2cap_state_change (chan,BT_CONNECT2 ); result =L2CAP_CR_PEND ;
I am not following what you are trying to fix here. Can you show this with a btmon trace from an attacking device?
Regards
Marcel