bash: fix CVE-2019-18276
PATCH 1/1 bash: fix CVE-2019-18276
From: De Huo <[email protected]>
An issue was discovered in disable_priv_mode in shell.c in GNU Bash through 5.0 patch 11. By default, if Bash is run with its effective UID not equal to its real UID, it will drop privileges by setting its effective UID to its real UID. However, it does so incorrectly. On Linux and other systems that support "saved UID" functionality, the saved UID is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in the shell can use "enable -f" for runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a shared object that calls setuid() and therefore regains privileges. However, binaries running with an effective UID of 0 are unaffected.
Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue.
[1] https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?h=devel&id=951bdaa
--- .../bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch | 386 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 387 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +386 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@ +From 951bdaad7a18cc0dc1036bba86b18b90874d39ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chet Ramey <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 09:03:53 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] commit bash-20190628 snapshot + +An issue was discovered in disable_priv_mode in shell.c in GNU Bash through 5.0 patch 11. +By default, if Bash is run with its effective UID not equal to its real UID, +it will drop privileges by setting its effective UID to its real UID. +However, it does so incorrectly. On Linux and other systems that support "saved UID" functionality, +the saved UID is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in the shell can use "enable -f" for +runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a shared object that calls setuid() and therefore +regains privileges. However, binaries running with an effective UID of 0 are unaffected. + +Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue. + +Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [the upstream thinks it doesn't increase the credibility of CVEs in general] +CVE: CVE-2019-18276 + +[1] https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?h=devel&id=951bdaa + +Signed-off-by: De Huo <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <[email protected]> +--- + MANIFEST | 2 ++ + bashline.c | 50 +------------------------------------------------- + builtins/help.def | 2 +- + config.h.in | 10 +++++++++- + configure.ac | 1 + + doc/bash.1 | 3 ++- + doc/bashref.texi | 3 ++- + lib/glob/glob.c | 5 ++++- + pathexp.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- + shell.c | 8 ++++++++ + tests/glob.tests | 2 ++ + tests/glob6.sub | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + tests/glob7.sub | 11 +++++++++++ + 14 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 tests/glob6.sub + create mode 100644 tests/glob7.sub + +diff --git a/MANIFEST b/MANIFEST +index 03de221..f9ccad7 100644 +--- a/MANIFEST ++++ b/MANIFEST +@@ -1037,6 +1037,8 @@ tests/extglob3.tests f + tests/extglob3.right f + tests/extglob4.sub f + tests/extglob5.sub f ++tests/glob6.sub f ++tests/glob7.sub f + tests/func.tests f + tests/func.right f + tests/func1.sub f +diff --git a/bashline.c b/bashline.c +index 824ea9d..d86b47d 100644 +--- a/bashline.c ++++ b/bashline.c +@@ -3718,55 +3718,7 @@ static int + completion_glob_pattern (string) + char *string; + { +- register int c; +- char *send; +- int open; +- +- DECLARE_MBSTATE; +- +- open = 0; +- send = string + strlen (string); +- +- while (c = *string++) +- { +- switch (c) +- { +- case '?': +- case '*': +- return (1); +- +- case '[': +- open++; +- continue; +- +- case ']': +- if (open) +- return (1); +- continue; +- +- case '+': +- case '@': +- case '!': +- if (*string == '(') /*)*/ +- return (1); +- continue; +- +- case '\\': +- if (*string++ == 0) +- return (0); +- } +- +- /* Advance one fewer byte than an entire multibyte character to +- account for the auto-increment in the loop above. */ +-#ifdef HANDLE_MULTIBYTE +- string--; +- ADVANCE_CHAR_P (string, send - string); +- string++; +-#else +- ADVANCE_CHAR_P (string, send - string); +-#endif +- } +- return (0); ++ return (glob_pattern_p (string) == 1); + } + + static char *globtext; +diff --git a/builtins/help.def b/builtins/help.def +index 006c4b5..92f9b38 100644 +--- a/builtins/help.def ++++ b/builtins/help.def +@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ help_builtin (list) + + /* We should consider making `help bash' do something. */ + +- if (glob_pattern_p (list->word->word)) ++ if (glob_pattern_p (list->word->word) == 1) + { + printf ("%s", ngettext ("Shell commands matching keyword `", "Shell commands matching keywords `", (list->next ? 2 : 1))); + print_word_list (list, ", "); +diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in +index 8554aec..ad4b1e8 100644 +--- a/config.h.in ++++ b/config.h.in +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* config.h -- Configuration file for bash. */ + +-/* Copyright (C) 1987-2009,2011-2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. ++/* Copyright (C) 1987-2009,2011-2012,2013-2019 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + + This file is part of GNU Bash, the Bourne Again SHell. + +@@ -807,6 +807,14 @@ + #undef HAVE_SETREGID + #undef HAVE_DECL_SETREGID + ++/* Define if you have the setregid function. */ ++#undef HAVE_SETRESGID ++#undef HAVE_DECL_SETRESGID ++ ++/* Define if you have the setresuid function. */ ++#undef HAVE_SETRESUID ++#undef HAVE_DECL_SETRESUID ++ + /* Define if you have the setvbuf function. */ + #undef HAVE_SETVBUF + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 52b4cdb..549adef 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -810,6 +810,7 @@ AC_CHECK_DECLS([confstr]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([printf]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([sbrk]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([setregid]) ++AC_CHECK_DECLS[(setresuid, setresgid]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([strcpy]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([strsignal]) + +diff --git a/doc/bash.1 b/doc/bash.1 +index e6cd08d..9e58a0b 100644 +--- a/doc/bash.1 ++++ b/doc/bash.1 +@@ -4681,7 +4681,8 @@ above). + .PD + .SH "SIMPLE COMMAND EXPANSION" + When a simple command is executed, the shell performs the following +-expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right. ++expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right, in ++the following order. + .IP 1. + The words that the parser has marked as variable assignments (those + preceding the command name) and redirections are saved for later +diff --git a/doc/bashref.texi b/doc/bashref.texi +index d33cd57..3065126 100644 +--- a/doc/bashref.texi ++++ b/doc/bashref.texi +@@ -2964,7 +2964,8 @@ is not specified. If the file does not exist, it is created. + @cindex command expansion + + When a simple command is executed, the shell performs the following +-expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right. ++expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right, in ++the following order. + + @enumerate + @item +diff --git a/lib/glob/glob.c b/lib/glob/glob.c +index 398253b..2eaa33e 100644 +--- a/lib/glob/glob.c ++++ b/lib/glob/glob.c +@@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ glob_vector (pat, dir, flags) + register unsigned int i; + int mflags; /* Flags passed to strmatch (). */ + int pflags; /* flags passed to sh_makepath () */ ++ int hasglob; /* return value from glob_pattern_p */ + int nalloca; + struct globval *firstmalloc, *tmplink; + char *convfn; +@@ -648,10 +649,12 @@ glob_vector (pat, dir, flags) + patlen = (pat && *pat) ? strlen (pat) : 0; + + /* If the filename pattern (PAT) does not contain any globbing characters, ++ or contains a pattern with only backslash escapes (hasglob == 2), + we can dispense with reading the directory, and just see if there is + a filename `DIR/PAT'. If there is, and we can access it, just make the + vector to return and bail immediately. */ +- if (skip == 0 && glob_pattern_p (pat) == 0) ++ hasglob = 0; ++ if (skip == 0 && (hasglob = glob_pattern_p (pat)) == 0 || hasglob == 2) + { + int dirlen; + struct stat finfo; +diff --git a/pathexp.c b/pathexp.c +index c1bf2d8..e6c5392 100644 +--- a/pathexp.c ++++ b/pathexp.c +@@ -58,7 +58,10 @@ int extended_glob = EXTGLOB_DEFAULT; + /* Control enabling special handling of `**' */ + int glob_star = 0; + +-/* Return nonzero if STRING has any unquoted special globbing chars in it. */ ++/* Return nonzero if STRING has any unquoted special globbing chars in it. ++ This is supposed to be called when pathname expansion is performed, so ++ it implements the rules in Posix 2.13.3, specifically that an unquoted ++ slash cannot appear in a bracket expression. */ + int + unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + register char *string; +@@ -85,10 +88,14 @@ unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + continue; + + case ']': +- if (open) ++ if (open) /* XXX - if --open == 0? */ + return (1); + continue; + ++ case '/': ++ if (open) ++ open = 0; ++ + case '+': + case '@': + case '!': +@@ -106,6 +113,11 @@ unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + string++; + continue; + } ++ else if (open && *string == '/') ++ { ++ string++; /* quoted slashes in bracket expressions are ok */ ++ continue; ++ } + else if (*string == 0) + return (0); + +diff --git a/shell.c b/shell.c +index a2b2a55..6adabc8 100644 +--- a/shell.c ++++ b/shell.c +@@ -1293,7 +1293,11 @@ disable_priv_mode () + { + int e; + ++#if HAVE_DECL_SETRESUID ++ if (setresuid (current_user.uid, current_user.uid, current_user.uid) < 0) ++#else + if (setuid (current_user.uid) < 0) ++#endif + { + e = errno; + sys_error (_("cannot set uid to %d: effective uid %d"), current_user.uid, current_user.euid); +@@ -1302,7 +1306,11 @@ disable_priv_mode () + exit (e); + #endif + } ++#if HAVE_DECL_SETRESGID ++ if (setresgid (current_user.gid, current_user.gid, current_user.gid) < 0) ++#else + if (setgid (current_user.gid) < 0) ++#endif + sys_error (_("cannot set gid to %d: effective gid %d"), current_user.gid, current_user.egid); + + current_user.euid = current_user.uid; +diff --git a/tests/glob.tests b/tests/glob.tests +index 01913bb..fb012f7 100644 +--- a/tests/glob.tests ++++ b/tests/glob.tests +@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ ${THIS_SH} ./glob1.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob2.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob3.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob4.sub ++${THIS_SH} ./glob6.sub ++${THIS_SH} ./glob7.sub + + MYDIR=$PWD # save where we are + +diff --git a/tests/glob6.sub b/tests/glob6.sub +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..b099811 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/glob6.sub +@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ ++# tests of the backslash-in-glob-patterns discussion on the austin-group ML ++ ++: ${TMPDIR:=/var/tmp} ++ ++ORIG=$PWD ++GLOBDIR=$TMPDIR/bash-glob-$$ ++mkdir $GLOBDIR && cd $GLOBDIR ++ ++# does the pattern matcher allow backslashes as escape characters and remove ++# them as part of matching? ++touch abcdefg ++pat='ab\cd*' ++printf '<%s>\n' $pat ++pat='\.' ++printf '<%s>\n' $pat ++rm abcdefg ++ ++# how about when escaping pattern characters? ++touch '*abc.c' ++a='\**.c' ++printf '%s\n' $a ++rm -f '*abc.c' ++ ++# how about when making the distinction between readable and searchable path ++# components? ++mkdir -m a=x searchable ++mkdir -m a=r readable ++ ++p='searchable/\.' ++printf "%s\n" $p ++ ++p='searchable/\./.' ++printf "%s\n" $p ++ ++p='readable/\.' ++printf "%s\n" $p ++ ++p='readable/\./.' ++printf "%s\n" $p ++ ++printf "%s\n" 'searchable/\.' ++printf "%s\n" 'readable/\.' ++ ++echo */. ++ ++p='*/\.' ++echo $p ++ ++echo */'.' ++ ++rmdir searchable readable ++ ++cd $ORIG ++rmdir $GLOBDIR +diff --git a/tests/glob7.sub b/tests/glob7.sub +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..0212b8e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/glob7.sub +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++# according to Posix 2.13.3, a slash in a bracket expression renders that ++# bracket expression invalid ++shopt -s nullglob ++ ++echo 1: [qwe/qwe] ++echo 2: [qwe/ ++echo 3: [qwe/] ++ ++echo 4: [qwe\/qwe] ++echo 5: [qwe\/ ++echo 6: [qwe\/] +-- +1.9.1 +
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb +1 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/bash/${BP}.tar.gz;name=tarball \ file://run-ptest \ file://run-bash-ptests \ file://fix-run-builtins.patch \ + file://bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch \ " SRC_URI[tarball.md5sum] = "2b44b47b905be16f45709648f671820b"
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Hi Mingli,
Quoted 17 lines · Mingli
From: De Huo <[email protected]>
An issue was discovered in
disable_priv_modeinshell.cin GNU Bash through 5.0 patch 11. By default, if Bash is run with its effective UID
not equal to its real UID, it will drop privileges by setting its effective UID to its real UID. However, it does so incorrectly. On Linux
and other systems that support "saved UID" functionality, the saved UID
is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in the shell can use
"enable -f" for runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a shared
object that callssetuid()and therefore regains privileges. However, binaries running with an effective UID of 0 are unaffected.
Quoted 4 lines
Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue.
[1]
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?h=devel&id=951bdaa
Has something changed from last time this patch was submitted and later reverted because of the failing ptest? I remember the author saying this isn't a real security bug and there were also changes in the patch that weren't related to the CVE ...
Thanks,
Anuj
Quoted 456 lines
Signed-off-by De Huo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kai Kang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mingli Yu <[email protected]>--- .../bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch | 386 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 387 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch
(quoted diff) +0
-018276.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- 18276.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7b2073201emeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@ +From 951bdaad7a18cc0dc1036bba86b18b90874d39ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +5
-0+From: Chet Ramey <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 09:03:53 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] commit bash-20190628 snapshot + +An issue was discovered in disable_priv_mode in shell.c in GNU Bashthrough 5.0 patch 11.
+By default, if Bash is run with its effective UID not equal to its real UID,
+it will drop privileges by setting its effective UID to its real UID.
+However, it does so incorrectly. On Linux and other systems that support "saved UID" functionality,
+the saved UID is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in the shell can use "enable -f" for
+runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a shared object that callssetuid()and therefore
+regains privileges. However, binaries running with an effective UID of 0 are unaffected.meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +4
-0+ +Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue. + +Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [the upstream thinks it doesn'tincrease the credibility of CVEs in general]
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +3
-0+CVE: CVE-2019-18276 + +[1]https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?h=devel&id=951bdaa
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +83
-1+ +Signed-off-by: De Huo <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <[email protected]> +--- + MANIFEST | 2 ++ + bashline.c | 50 +------------------------------------------- ------ + builtins/help.def | 2 +- + config.h.in | 10 +++++++++- + configure.ac | 1 + + doc/bash.1 | 3 ++- + doc/bashref.texi | 3 ++- + lib/glob/glob.c | 5 ++++- + pathexp.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- + shell.c | 8 ++++++++ + tests/glob.tests | 2 ++ + tests/glob6.sub | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + tests/glob7.sub | 11 +++++++++++ + 14 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 tests/glob6.sub + create mode 100644 tests/glob7.sub + +diff --git a/MANIFEST b/MANIFEST +index 03de221..f9ccad7 100644 +--- a/MANIFEST ++++ b/MANIFEST +@@ -1037,6 +1037,8 @@ tests/extglob3.tests f + tests/extglob3.right f + tests/extglob4.sub f + tests/extglob5.sub f ++tests/glob6.sub f ++tests/glob7.sub f + tests/func.tests f + tests/func.right f + tests/func1.sub f +diff --git a/bashline.c b/bashline.c +index 824ea9d..d86b47d 100644 +--- a/bashline.c ++++ b/bashline.c +@@ -3718,55 +3718,7 @@ static int + completion_glob_pattern (string) + char *string; + { +- register int c; +- char *send; +- int open; +- +- DECLARE_MBSTATE; +- +- open = 0; +- send = string + strlen (string); +- +- while (c = *string++) +- { +- switch (c) +- { +- case '?': +- case '*': +- return (1); +- +- case '[': +- open++; +- continue; +- +- case ']': +- if (open) +- return (1); +- continue; +- +- case '+': +- case '@': +- case '!': +- if (*string == '(') /*)*/ +- return (1); +- continue; +- +- case '\\': +- if (*string++ == 0) +- return (0); +- } +- +- /* Advance one fewer byte than an entire multibyte characterto
+- account for the auto-increment in the loop above. */ +-#ifdef HANDLE_MULTIBYTE +- string--; +- ADVANCE_CHAR_P (string, send - string); +- string++; +-#else +- ADVANCE_CHAR_P (string, send - string); +-#endif +- } +- return (0); ++ return (glob_pattern_p (string) == 1);+ }
+
+ static char *globtext;meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +12
-0+diff --git a/builtins/help.def b/builtins/help.def +index 006c4b5..92f9b38 100644 +--- a/builtins/help.def ++++ b/builtins/help.def +@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ help_builtin (list) + + /* We should consider making `help bash' do something. */ + +- if (glob_pattern_p (list->word->word)) ++ if (glob_pattern_p (list->word->word) == 1) + { + printf ("%s", ngettext ("Shell commands matching keyword `","Shell commands matching keywords `", (
list->next? 2 : 1)));meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +10
-0+ print_word_list (list, ", "); +diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in +index 8554aec..ad4b1e8 100644 +--- a/config.h.in ++++ b/config.h.in +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* config.h -- Configuration file for bash. */ + +-/* Copyright (C) 1987-2009,2011-2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. ++/* Copyright (C) 1987-2009,2011-2012,2013-2019 Free SoftwareFoundation, Inc.
+meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +48
-0+ This file is part of GNU Bash, the Bourne Again SHell. + +@@ -807,6 +807,14 @@ + #undef HAVE_SETREGID + #undef HAVE_DECL_SETREGID + ++/* Define if you have the setregid function. */ ++#undef HAVE_SETRESGID ++#undef HAVE_DECL_SETRESGID ++ ++/* Define if you have the setresuid function. */ ++#undef HAVE_SETRESUID ++#undef HAVE_DECL_SETRESUID ++ + /* Define if you have the setvbuf function. */ + #undef HAVE_SETVBUF + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 52b4cdb..549adef 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -810,6 +810,7 @@ AC_CHECK_DECLS([confstr]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([printf]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([sbrk]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([setregid]) ++AC_CHECK_DECLS[(setresuid, setresgid]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([strcpy]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([strsignal]) + +diff --git a/doc/bash.1 b/doc/bash.1 +index e6cd08d..9e58a0b 100644 +--- a/doc/bash.1 ++++ b/doc/bash.1 +@@ -4681,7 +4681,8 @@ above). + .PD + .SH "SIMPLE COMMAND EXPANSION" + When a simple command is executed, the shell performs the following +-expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right. ++expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right, in ++the following order. + .IP 1. + The words that the parser has marked as variable assignments (those + preceding the command name) and redirections are saved for later +diff --git a/doc/bashref.texi b/doc/bashref.texi +index d33cd57..3065126 100644 +--- a/doc/bashref.texi ++++ b/doc/bashref.texi +@@ -2964,7 +2964,8 @@ is not specified. If the file does not exist,it is created.
+ @cindex command expansion
+
+ When a simple command is executed, the shell performs the following +-expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right. ++expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right, in ++the following order.
+
+ @enumerate
+ @itemmeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +16
-0+diff --git a/lib/glob/glob.c b/lib/glob/glob.c +index 398253b..2eaa33e 100644 +--- a/lib/glob/glob.c ++++ b/lib/glob/glob.c +@@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ glob_vector (pat, dir, flags) + register unsigned int i; + int mflags; /* Flags passed to strmatch (). */ + int pflags; /* flags passed to sh_makepath () */ ++ int hasglob; /* return value from glob_pattern_p */ + int nalloca; + struct globval *firstmalloc, *tmplink; + char *convfn; +@@ -648,10 +649,12 @@ glob_vector (pat, dir, flags) + patlen = (pat && *pat) ? strlen (pat) : 0; + + /* If the filename pattern (PAT) does not contain any globbingcharacters,
++ or contains a pattern with only backslash escapes (hasglob ==
2),
+ we can dispense with reading the directory, and just see if
there is
+ a filename `DIR/PAT'. If there is, and we can access it, just
make the
+ vector to return and bail immediately. */+- if (skip == 0 && glob_pattern_p (pat) == 0) ++ hasglob = 0; ++ if (skip == 0 && (hasglob = glob_pattern_p (pat)) == 0 || hasglob== 2)
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +12
-0+ { + int dirlen; + struct stat finfo; +diff --git a/pathexp.c b/pathexp.c +index c1bf2d8..e6c5392 100644 +--- a/pathexp.c ++++ b/pathexp.c +@@ -58,7 +58,10 @@ int extended_glob = EXTGLOB_DEFAULT; + /* Control enabling special handling of `**' */ + int glob_star = 0; + +-/* Return nonzero if STRING has any unquoted special globbing charsin it. */
++/* Return nonzero if STRING has any unquoted special globbing chars in it.
++ This is supposed to be called when pathname expansion is
performed, so
++ it implements the rules in Posix 2.13.3, specifically that an
unquoted
++ slash cannot appear in a bracket expression. */
+ int
+unquoted_glob_pattern_p(string)meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +24
-0+ register char *string; +@@ -85,10 +88,14 @@ unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + continue; + + case ']': +- if (open) ++ if (open) /* XXX - if --open == 0? */ + return (1); + continue; + ++ case '/': ++ if (open) ++ open = 0; ++ + case '+': + case '@': + case '!': +@@ -106,6 +113,11 @@ unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + string++; + continue; + } ++ else if (open && *string == '/') ++ { ++ string++; /* quoted slashes in bracketexpressions are ok */
++ continue;
++ }meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +13
-0+ else if (*string == 0) + return (0); + +diff --git a/shell.c b/shell.c +index a2b2a55..6adabc8 100644 +--- a/shell.c ++++ b/shell.c +@@ -1293,7 +1293,11 @@ disable_priv_mode () + { + int e; + ++#if HAVE_DECL_SETRESUID ++ if (setresuid (current_user.uid, current_user.uid,current_user.uid) < 0)
++#elsemeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +5
-0+ if (setuid (current_user.uid) < 0) ++#endif + { + e = errno; + sys_error (_("cannot set uid to %d: effective uid %d"),current_user.uid, current_user.euid);
+@@ -1302,7 +1306,11 @@disable_priv_mode()meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +5
-0+ exit (e); + #endif + } ++#if HAVE_DECL_SETRESGID ++ if (setresgid (current_user.gid, current_user.gid,current_user.gid) < 0)
++#elsemeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +3
-0+ if (setgid (current_user.gid) < 0) ++#endif + sys_error (_("cannot set gid to %d: effective gid %d"),current_user.gid, current_user.egid);
+meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +21
-0+ current_user.euid = current_user.uid; +diff --git a/tests/glob.tests b/tests/glob.tests +index 01913bb..fb012f7 100644 +--- a/tests/glob.tests ++++ b/tests/glob.tests +@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ ${THIS_SH} ./glob1.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob2.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob3.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob4.sub ++${THIS_SH} ./glob6.sub ++${THIS_SH} ./glob7.sub + + MYDIR=$PWD # save where we are + +diff --git a/tests/glob6.sub b/tests/glob6.sub +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..b099811 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/glob6.sub +@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ ++# tests of the backslash-in-glob-patterns discussion on the austin-group ML
++
++: ${TMPDIR:=/var/tmp}
++
++ORIG=$PWD
++GLOBDIR=$TMPDIR/bash-glob-$$
++mkdir $GLOBDIR && cd $GLOBDIR
++
++# does the pattern matcher allow backslashes as escape characters and remove
++# them as part of matching?
++touch abcdefg
++pat='ab\cd*'
++printf '<%s>\n' $pat
++pat='\.'
++printf '<%s>\n' $pat
++rm abcdefg
++
++# how about when escaping pattern characters?
++touch '*abc.c'
++a='\**.c'
++printf '%s\n' $a
++rm -f '*abc.c'
++
++# how about when making the distinction between readable and searchable path
++# components?
++mkdir -m a=x searchable
++mkdir -m a=r readable
++
++p='searchable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='searchable/\./.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='readable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='readable/\./.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++printf "%s\n" 'searchable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" 'readable/\.'
++
++echo */.
++
++p='*/\.'
++echo $p
++
++echo */'.'
++
++rmdir searchable readable
++
++cd $ORIG
++rmdir $GLOBDIRmeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +7
-0+diff --git a/tests/glob7.sub b/tests/glob7.sub +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..0212b8e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/glob7.sub +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++# according to Posix 2.13.3, a slash in a bracket expressionrenders that
++# bracket expression invalid
++shopt -s nullglob
++
++echo 1: [qwe/qwe]
++echo 2: [qwe/
++echo 3: [qwe/]
++
++echo 4: [qwe\/qwe]
++echo 5: [qwe\/
++echo 6: [qwe\/]
+--
+1.9.1meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +1
-0+meta/recipes- renamed from meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb +0
-0extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb
index12d472be57..257a03bd8b100644meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb +1
-0@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/bash/${BP}.tar.gz;name=tarball \ file://run-ptest \ file://run-bash-ptests \ file://fix-run-builtins.patch \ + file://bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch \ "SRC_URI[tarball.md5sum] = "
2b44b47b905be16f45709648f671820b"
Hi Anuj,
Quoted 22 lines · Anuj Mittal
Hi Mingli,
Quoted 19 lines · Mingli
From: De Huo <[email protected]>
An issue was discovered in
disable_priv_modeinshell.cin GNU Bash through 5.0 patch 11. By default, if Bash is run with its effective UID
not equal to its real UID, it will drop privileges by setting its effective UID to its real UID. However, it does so incorrectly. On Linux
and other systems that support "saved UID" functionality, the saved UID
is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in the shell can use
"enable -f" for runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a shared
object that callssetuid()and therefore regains privileges. However, binaries running with an effective UID of 0 are unaffected.Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue.
Quoted 7 lines
Has something changed from last time this patch was submitted and later reverted because of the failing ptest? I remember the author saying this isn't a real security bug and there were also changes in the patch that weren't related to the CVE ...
Changed the patch a little to remove the configure file part to fix the reconfigure issue in v1 patch.
Yes, the author saying the patch did fix the issue stated in CVE-2019-18276 though the issue actually is't a big deal.
Thanks,
Quoted 465 lines
Thanks,
Anuj
Quoted 460 lines
Signed-off-by De Huo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kai Kang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mingli Yu <[email protected]>--- .../bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch | 386 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 387 insertions(+)create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-
18276.patch(quoted diff) +0
-018276.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- 18276.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7b2073201emeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@ +From 951bdaad7a18cc0dc1036bba86b18b90874d39ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +5
-0+From: Chet Ramey <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 09:03:53 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] commit bash-20190628 snapshot + +An issue was discovered in disable_priv_mode in shell.c in GNU Bashthrough 5.0 patch 11.
+By default, if Bash is run with its effective UID not equal to its real UID,
+it will drop privileges by setting its effective UID to its real UID.
+However, it does so incorrectly. On Linux and other systems that support "saved UID" functionality,
+the saved UID is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in the shell can use "enable -f" for
+runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a shared object that callssetuid()and therefore
+regains privileges. However, binaries running with an effective UID of 0 are unaffected.meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +4
-0+ +Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue. + +Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [the upstream thinks it doesn'tincrease the credibility of CVEs in general]
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +3
-0+CVE: CVE-2019-18276 + +[1]https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?h=devel&id=951bdaa
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +83
-1+ +Signed-off-by: De Huo <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <[email protected]> +--- + MANIFEST | 2 ++ + bashline.c | 50 +------------------------------------------- ------ + builtins/help.def | 2 +- + config.h.in | 10 +++++++++- + configure.ac | 1 + + doc/bash.1 | 3 ++- + doc/bashref.texi | 3 ++- + lib/glob/glob.c | 5 ++++- + pathexp.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- + shell.c | 8 ++++++++ + tests/glob.tests | 2 ++ + tests/glob6.sub | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + tests/glob7.sub | 11 +++++++++++ + 14 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 tests/glob6.sub + create mode 100644 tests/glob7.sub + +diff --git a/MANIFEST b/MANIFEST +index 03de221..f9ccad7 100644 +--- a/MANIFEST ++++ b/MANIFEST +@@ -1037,6 +1037,8 @@ tests/extglob3.tests f + tests/extglob3.right f + tests/extglob4.sub f + tests/extglob5.sub f ++tests/glob6.sub f ++tests/glob7.sub f + tests/func.tests f + tests/func.right f + tests/func1.sub f +diff --git a/bashline.c b/bashline.c +index 824ea9d..d86b47d 100644 +--- a/bashline.c ++++ b/bashline.c +@@ -3718,55 +3718,7 @@ static int + completion_glob_pattern (string) + char *string; + { +- register int c; +- char *send; +- int open; +- +- DECLARE_MBSTATE; +- +- open = 0; +- send = string + strlen (string); +- +- while (c = *string++) +- { +- switch (c) +- { +- case '?': +- case '*': +- return (1); +- +- case '[': +- open++; +- continue; +- +- case ']': +- if (open) +- return (1); +- continue; +- +- case '+': +- case '@': +- case '!': +- if (*string == '(') /*)*/ +- return (1); +- continue; +- +- case '\\': +- if (*string++ == 0) +- return (0); +- } +- +- /* Advance one fewer byte than an entire multibyte characterto
+- account for the auto-increment in the loop above. */ +-#ifdef HANDLE_MULTIBYTE +- string--; +- ADVANCE_CHAR_P (string, send - string); +- string++; +-#else +- ADVANCE_CHAR_P (string, send - string); +-#endif +- } +- return (0); ++ return (glob_pattern_p (string) == 1);+ }
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +14
-0+ + static char *globtext; +diff --git a/builtins/help.def b/builtins/help.def +index 006c4b5..92f9b38 100644 +--- a/builtins/help.def ++++ b/builtins/help.def +@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ help_builtin (list) + + /* We should consider making `help bash' do something. */ + +- if (glob_pattern_p (list->word->word)) ++ if (glob_pattern_p (list->word->word) == 1) + { + printf ("%s", ngettext ("Shell commands matching keyword `","Shell commands matching keywords `", (
list->next? 2 : 1)));meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +10
-0+ print_word_list (list, ", "); +diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in +index 8554aec..ad4b1e8 100644 +--- a/config.h.in ++++ b/config.h.in +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* config.h -- Configuration file for bash. */ + +-/* Copyright (C) 1987-2009,2011-2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. ++/* Copyright (C) 1987-2009,2011-2012,2013-2019 Free SoftwareFoundation, Inc.
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +49
-0+ + This file is part of GNU Bash, the Bourne Again SHell. + +@@ -807,6 +807,14 @@ + #undef HAVE_SETREGID + #undef HAVE_DECL_SETREGID + ++/* Define if you have the setregid function. */ ++#undef HAVE_SETRESGID ++#undef HAVE_DECL_SETRESGID ++ ++/* Define if you have the setresuid function. */ ++#undef HAVE_SETRESUID ++#undef HAVE_DECL_SETRESUID ++ + /* Define if you have the setvbuf function. */ + #undef HAVE_SETVBUF + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 52b4cdb..549adef 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -810,6 +810,7 @@ AC_CHECK_DECLS([confstr]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([printf]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([sbrk]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([setregid]) ++AC_CHECK_DECLS[(setresuid, setresgid]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([strcpy]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([strsignal]) + +diff --git a/doc/bash.1 b/doc/bash.1 +index e6cd08d..9e58a0b 100644 +--- a/doc/bash.1 ++++ b/doc/bash.1 +@@ -4681,7 +4681,8 @@ above). + .PD + .SH "SIMPLE COMMAND EXPANSION" + When a simple command is executed, the shell performs the following +-expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right. ++expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right, in ++the following order. + .IP 1. + The words that the parser has marked as variable assignments (those + preceding the command name) and redirections are saved for later +diff --git a/doc/bashref.texi b/doc/bashref.texi +index d33cd57..3065126 100644 +--- a/doc/bashref.texi ++++ b/doc/bashref.texi +@@ -2964,7 +2964,8 @@ is not specified. If the file does not exist,it is created.
+ @cindex command expansionmeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +24
-0+ + When a simple command is executed, the shell performs the following +-expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right. ++expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right, in ++the following order. + + @enumerate + @item +diff --git a/lib/glob/glob.c b/lib/glob/glob.c +index 398253b..2eaa33e 100644 +--- a/lib/glob/glob.c ++++ b/lib/glob/glob.c +@@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ glob_vector (pat, dir, flags) + register unsigned int i; + int mflags; /* Flags passed to strmatch (). */ + int pflags; /* flags passed to sh_makepath () */ ++ int hasglob; /* return value from glob_pattern_p */ + int nalloca; + struct globval *firstmalloc, *tmplink; + char *convfn; +@@ -648,10 +649,12 @@ glob_vector (pat, dir, flags) + patlen = (pat && *pat) ? strlen (pat) : 0; + + /* If the filename pattern (PAT) does not contain any globbingcharacters,
++ or contains a pattern with only backslash escapes (hasglob ==
2),
+ we can dispense with reading the directory, and just see if
there is
+ a filename `DIR/PAT'. If there is, and we can access it, just
make the
+ vector to return and bail immediately. */+- if (skip == 0 && glob_pattern_p (pat) == 0) ++ hasglob = 0; ++ if (skip == 0 && (hasglob = glob_pattern_p (pat)) == 0 || hasglob== 2)
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +12
-0+ { + int dirlen; + struct stat finfo; +diff --git a/pathexp.c b/pathexp.c +index c1bf2d8..e6c5392 100644 +--- a/pathexp.c ++++ b/pathexp.c +@@ -58,7 +58,10 @@ int extended_glob = EXTGLOB_DEFAULT; + /* Control enabling special handling of `**' */ + int glob_star = 0; + +-/* Return nonzero if STRING has any unquoted special globbing charsin it. */
++/* Return nonzero if STRING has any unquoted special globbing chars in it.
++ This is supposed to be called when pathname expansion is
performed, so
++ it implements the rules in Posix 2.13.3, specifically that an
unquoted
++ slash cannot appear in a bracket expression. */
+ int
+unquoted_glob_pattern_p(string)meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +24
-0+ register char *string; +@@ -85,10 +88,14 @@ unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + continue; + + case ']': +- if (open) ++ if (open) /* XXX - if --open == 0? */ + return (1); + continue; + ++ case '/': ++ if (open) ++ open = 0; ++ + case '+': + case '@': + case '!': +@@ -106,6 +113,11 @@ unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + string++; + continue; + } ++ else if (open && *string == '/') ++ { ++ string++; /* quoted slashes in bracketexpressions are ok */
++ continue;
++ }meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +13
-0+ else if (*string == 0) + return (0); + +diff --git a/shell.c b/shell.c +index a2b2a55..6adabc8 100644 +--- a/shell.c ++++ b/shell.c +@@ -1293,7 +1293,11 @@ disable_priv_mode () + { + int e; + ++#if HAVE_DECL_SETRESUID ++ if (setresuid (current_user.uid, current_user.uid,current_user.uid) < 0)
++#elsemeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +5
-0+ if (setuid (current_user.uid) < 0) ++#endif + { + e = errno; + sys_error (_("cannot set uid to %d: effective uid %d"),current_user.uid, current_user.euid);
+@@ -1302,7 +1306,11 @@disable_priv_mode()meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +5
-0+ exit (e); + #endif + } ++#if HAVE_DECL_SETRESGID ++ if (setresgid (current_user.gid, current_user.gid,current_user.gid) < 0)
++#elsemeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +3
-0+ if (setgid (current_user.gid) < 0) ++#endif + sys_error (_("cannot set gid to %d: effective gid %d"),current_user.gid, current_user.egid);
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +22
-0+ + current_user.euid = current_user.uid; +diff --git a/tests/glob.tests b/tests/glob.tests +index 01913bb..fb012f7 100644 +--- a/tests/glob.tests ++++ b/tests/glob.tests +@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ ${THIS_SH} ./glob1.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob2.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob3.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob4.sub ++${THIS_SH} ./glob6.sub ++${THIS_SH} ./glob7.sub + + MYDIR=$PWD # save where we are + +diff --git a/tests/glob6.sub b/tests/glob6.sub +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..b099811 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/glob6.sub +@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ ++# tests of the backslash-in-glob-patterns discussion on the austin-group ML
++
++: ${TMPDIR:=/var/tmp}
++
++ORIG=$PWD
++GLOBDIR=$TMPDIR/bash-glob-$$
++mkdir $GLOBDIR && cd $GLOBDIR
++
++# does the pattern matcher allow backslashes as escape characters and remove
++# them as part of matching?
++touch abcdefg
++pat='ab\cd*'
++printf '<%s>\n' $pat
++pat='\.'
++printf '<%s>\n' $pat
++rm abcdefg
++
++# how about when escaping pattern characters?
++touch '*abc.c'
++a='\**.c'
++printf '%s\n' $a
++rm -f '*abc.c'
++
++# how about when making the distinction between readable and searchable path
++# components?
++mkdir -m a=x searchable
++mkdir -m a=r readable
++
++p='searchable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='searchable/\./.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='readable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='readable/\./.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++printf "%s\n" 'searchable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" 'readable/\.'
++
++echo */.
++
++p='*/\.'
++echo $p
++
++echo */'.'
++
++rmdir searchable readable
++
++cd $ORIG
++rmdir $GLOBDIRmeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +7
-0+diff --git a/tests/glob7.sub b/tests/glob7.sub +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..0212b8e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/glob7.sub +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++# according to Posix 2.13.3, a slash in a bracket expressionrenders that
++# bracket expression invalid
++shopt -s nullglob
++
++echo 1: [qwe/qwe]
++echo 2: [qwe/
++echo 3: [qwe/]
++
++echo 4: [qwe\/qwe]
++echo 5: [qwe\/
++echo 6: [qwe\/]
+--
+1.9.1meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +1
-0+meta/recipes- renamed from meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb +0
-0extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb
index12d472be57..257a03bd8b100644meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb +1
-0@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/bash/${BP}.tar.gz;name=tarball \ file://run-ptest \ file://run-bash-ptests \ file://fix-run-builtins.patch \ + file://bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch \ "SRC_URI[tarball.md5sum] = "
2b44b47b905be16f45709648f671820b"
Quoted 34 lines · Mingli
Hi Anuj,
Quoted 22 lines · Anuj Mittal
Hi Mingli,
Quoted 19 lines · Mingli
From: De Huo <[email protected]>
An issue was discovered in
disable_priv_modeinshell.cin GNU Bash through 5.0 patch 11. By default, if Bash is run with its effective UID
not equal to its real UID, it will drop privileges by setting its effective UID to its real UID. However, it does so incorrectly. On Linux
and other systems that support "saved UID" functionality, the saved UID
is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in the shell can use
"enable -f" for runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a shared
object that callssetuid()and therefore regains privileges. However, binaries running with an effective UID of 0 are unaffected.Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue.
Quoted 7 lines
Has something changed from last time this patch was submitted and later reverted because of the failing ptest? I remember the author saying this isn't a real security bug and there were also changes in the patch that weren't related to the CVE ...
Quoted 6 lines
Changed the patch a little to remove the configure file part to fix the reconfigure issue in v1 patch.
Yes, the author saying the patch did fix the issue stated in CVE-2019-18276 though the issue actually is't a big deal.
This seems to be regressing bash ptests now.
ptestresult.bash.run-glob-test
ptestresult.bash.run-read
ptestresult.bash.run-trap
If its not a real security bug then perhaps its better to revert it.
Quoted 470 lines
Thanks,
Quoted 465 lines
Thanks,
Anuj
Quoted 460 lines
Signed-off-by De Huo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kai Kang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mingli Yu <[email protected]>--- .../bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch | 386 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 387 insertions(+)create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-
18276.patch(quoted diff) +0
-018276.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- 18276.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7b2073201emeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@ +From 951bdaad7a18cc0dc1036bba86b18b90874d39ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +5
-0+From: Chet Ramey <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 09:03:53 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] commit bash-20190628 snapshot + +An issue was discovered in disable_priv_mode in shell.c in GNU Bashthrough 5.0 patch 11.
+By default, if Bash is run with its effective UID not equal to its real UID,
+it will drop privileges by setting its effective UID to its real UID.
+However, it does so incorrectly. On Linux and other systems that support "saved UID" functionality,
+the saved UID is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in the shell can use "enable -f" for
+runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a shared object that callssetuid()and therefore
+regains privileges. However, binaries running with an effective UID of 0 are unaffected.meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +4
-0+ +Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue. + +Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [the upstream thinks it doesn'tincrease the credibility of CVEs in general]
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +3
-0+CVE: CVE-2019-18276 + +[1]https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?h=devel&id=951bdaa
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +83
-1+ +Signed-off-by: De Huo <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <[email protected]> +--- + MANIFEST | 2 ++ + bashline.c | 50 +------------------------------------------- ------ + builtins/help.def | 2 +- + config.h.in | 10 +++++++++- + configure.ac | 1 + + doc/bash.1 | 3 ++- + doc/bashref.texi | 3 ++- + lib/glob/glob.c | 5 ++++- + pathexp.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- + shell.c | 8 ++++++++ + tests/glob.tests | 2 ++ + tests/glob6.sub | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + tests/glob7.sub | 11 +++++++++++ + 14 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 tests/glob6.sub + create mode 100644 tests/glob7.sub + +diff --git a/MANIFEST b/MANIFEST +index 03de221..f9ccad7 100644 +--- a/MANIFEST ++++ b/MANIFEST +@@ -1037,6 +1037,8 @@ tests/extglob3.tests f + tests/extglob3.right f + tests/extglob4.sub f + tests/extglob5.sub f ++tests/glob6.sub f ++tests/glob7.sub f + tests/func.tests f + tests/func.right f + tests/func1.sub f +diff --git a/bashline.c b/bashline.c +index 824ea9d..d86b47d 100644 +--- a/bashline.c ++++ b/bashline.c +@@ -3718,55 +3718,7 @@ static int + completion_glob_pattern (string) + char *string; + { +- register int c; +- char *send; +- int open; +- +- DECLARE_MBSTATE; +- +- open = 0; +- send = string + strlen (string); +- +- while (c = *string++) +- { +- switch (c) +- { +- case '?': +- case '*': +- return (1); +- +- case '[': +- open++; +- continue; +- +- case ']': +- if (open) +- return (1); +- continue; +- +- case '+': +- case '@': +- case '!': +- if (*string == '(') /*)*/ +- return (1); +- continue; +- +- case '\\': +- if (*string++ == 0) +- return (0); +- } +- +- /* Advance one fewer byte than an entire multibyte characterto
+- account for the auto-increment in the loop above. */ +-#ifdef HANDLE_MULTIBYTE +- string--; +- ADVANCE_CHAR_P (string, send - string); +- string++; +-#else +- ADVANCE_CHAR_P (string, send - string); +-#endif +- } +- return (0); ++ return (glob_pattern_p (string) == 1);+ }
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +14
-0+ + static char *globtext; +diff --git a/builtins/help.def b/builtins/help.def +index 006c4b5..92f9b38 100644 +--- a/builtins/help.def ++++ b/builtins/help.def +@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ help_builtin (list) + + /* We should consider making `help bash' do something. */ + +- if (glob_pattern_p (list->word->word)) ++ if (glob_pattern_p (list->word->word) == 1) + { + printf ("%s", ngettext ("Shell commands matching keyword `","Shell commands matching keywords `", (
list->next? 2 : 1)));meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +10
-0+ print_word_list (list, ", "); +diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in +index 8554aec..ad4b1e8 100644 +--- a/config.h.in ++++ b/config.h.in +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* config.h -- Configuration file for bash. */ + +-/* Copyright (C) 1987-2009,2011-2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. ++/* Copyright (C) 1987-2009,2011-2012,2013-2019 Free SoftwareFoundation, Inc.
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +49
-0+ + This file is part of GNU Bash, the Bourne Again SHell. + +@@ -807,6 +807,14 @@ + #undef HAVE_SETREGID + #undef HAVE_DECL_SETREGID + ++/* Define if you have the setregid function. */ ++#undef HAVE_SETRESGID ++#undef HAVE_DECL_SETRESGID ++ ++/* Define if you have the setresuid function. */ ++#undef HAVE_SETRESUID ++#undef HAVE_DECL_SETRESUID ++ + /* Define if you have the setvbuf function. */ + #undef HAVE_SETVBUF + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 52b4cdb..549adef 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -810,6 +810,7 @@ AC_CHECK_DECLS([confstr]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([printf]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([sbrk]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([setregid]) ++AC_CHECK_DECLS[(setresuid, setresgid]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([strcpy]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([strsignal]) + +diff --git a/doc/bash.1 b/doc/bash.1 +index e6cd08d..9e58a0b 100644 +--- a/doc/bash.1 ++++ b/doc/bash.1 +@@ -4681,7 +4681,8 @@ above). + .PD + .SH "SIMPLE COMMAND EXPANSION" + When a simple command is executed, the shell performs the following +-expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right. ++expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right, in ++the following order. + .IP 1. + The words that the parser has marked as variable assignments (those + preceding the command name) and redirections are saved for later +diff --git a/doc/bashref.texi b/doc/bashref.texi +index d33cd57..3065126 100644 +--- a/doc/bashref.texi ++++ b/doc/bashref.texi +@@ -2964,7 +2964,8 @@ is not specified. If the file does not exist,it is created.
+ @cindex command expansionmeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +24
-0+ + When a simple command is executed, the shell performs the following +-expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right. ++expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right, in ++the following order. + + @enumerate + @item +diff --git a/lib/glob/glob.c b/lib/glob/glob.c +index 398253b..2eaa33e 100644 +--- a/lib/glob/glob.c ++++ b/lib/glob/glob.c +@@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ glob_vector (pat, dir, flags) + register unsigned int i; + int mflags; /* Flags passed to strmatch (). */ + int pflags; /* flags passed to sh_makepath () */ ++ int hasglob; /* return value from glob_pattern_p */ + int nalloca; + struct globval *firstmalloc, *tmplink; + char *convfn; +@@ -648,10 +649,12 @@ glob_vector (pat, dir, flags) + patlen = (pat && *pat) ? strlen (pat) : 0; + + /* If the filename pattern (PAT) does not contain any globbingcharacters,
++ or contains a pattern with only backslash escapes (hasglob ==
2),
+ we can dispense with reading the directory, and just see if
there is
+ a filename `DIR/PAT'. If there is, and we can access it, just
make the
+ vector to return and bail immediately. */+- if (skip == 0 && glob_pattern_p (pat) == 0) ++ hasglob = 0; ++ if (skip == 0 && (hasglob = glob_pattern_p (pat)) == 0 || hasglob== 2)
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +12
-0+ { + int dirlen; + struct stat finfo; +diff --git a/pathexp.c b/pathexp.c +index c1bf2d8..e6c5392 100644 +--- a/pathexp.c ++++ b/pathexp.c +@@ -58,7 +58,10 @@ int extended_glob = EXTGLOB_DEFAULT; + /* Control enabling special handling of `**' */ + int glob_star = 0; + +-/* Return nonzero if STRING has any unquoted special globbing charsin it. */
++/* Return nonzero if STRING has any unquoted special globbing chars in it.
++ This is supposed to be called when pathname expansion is
performed, so
++ it implements the rules in Posix 2.13.3, specifically that an
unquoted
++ slash cannot appear in a bracket expression. */
+ int
+unquoted_glob_pattern_p(string)meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +24
-0+ register char *string; +@@ -85,10 +88,14 @@ unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + continue; + + case ']': +- if (open) ++ if (open) /* XXX - if --open == 0? */ + return (1); + continue; + ++ case '/': ++ if (open) ++ open = 0; ++ + case '+': + case '@': + case '!': +@@ -106,6 +113,11 @@ unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + string++; + continue; + } ++ else if (open && *string == '/') ++ { ++ string++; /* quoted slashes in bracketexpressions are ok */
++ continue;
++ }meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +13
-0+ else if (*string == 0) + return (0); + +diff --git a/shell.c b/shell.c +index a2b2a55..6adabc8 100644 +--- a/shell.c ++++ b/shell.c +@@ -1293,7 +1293,11 @@ disable_priv_mode () + { + int e; + ++#if HAVE_DECL_SETRESUID ++ if (setresuid (current_user.uid, current_user.uid,current_user.uid) < 0)
++#elsemeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +5
-0+ if (setuid (current_user.uid) < 0) ++#endif + { + e = errno; + sys_error (_("cannot set uid to %d: effective uid %d"),current_user.uid, current_user.euid);
+@@ -1302,7 +1306,11 @@disable_priv_mode()meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +5
-0+ exit (e); + #endif + } ++#if HAVE_DECL_SETRESGID ++ if (setresgid (current_user.gid, current_user.gid,current_user.gid) < 0)
++#elsemeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +3
-0+ if (setgid (current_user.gid) < 0) ++#endif + sys_error (_("cannot set gid to %d: effective gid %d"),current_user.gid, current_user.egid);
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +22
-0+ + current_user.euid = current_user.uid; +diff --git a/tests/glob.tests b/tests/glob.tests +index 01913bb..fb012f7 100644 +--- a/tests/glob.tests ++++ b/tests/glob.tests +@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ ${THIS_SH} ./glob1.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob2.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob3.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob4.sub ++${THIS_SH} ./glob6.sub ++${THIS_SH} ./glob7.sub + + MYDIR=$PWD # save where we are + +diff --git a/tests/glob6.sub b/tests/glob6.sub +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..b099811 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/glob6.sub +@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ ++# tests of the backslash-in-glob-patterns discussion on the austin-group ML
++
++: ${TMPDIR:=/var/tmp}
++
++ORIG=$PWD
++GLOBDIR=$TMPDIR/bash-glob-$$
++mkdir $GLOBDIR && cd $GLOBDIR
++
++# does the pattern matcher allow backslashes as escape characters and remove
++# them as part of matching?
++touch abcdefg
++pat='ab\cd*'
++printf '<%s>\n' $pat
++pat='\.'
++printf '<%s>\n' $pat
++rm abcdefg
++
++# how about when escaping pattern characters?
++touch '*abc.c'
++a='\**.c'
++printf '%s\n' $a
++rm -f '*abc.c'
++
++# how about when making the distinction between readable and searchable path
++# components?
++mkdir -m a=x searchable
++mkdir -m a=r readable
++
++p='searchable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='searchable/\./.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='readable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='readable/\./.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++printf "%s\n" 'searchable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" 'readable/\.'
++
++echo */.
++
++p='*/\.'
++echo $p
++
++echo */'.'
++
++rmdir searchable readable
++
++cd $ORIG
++rmdir $GLOBDIRmeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +7
-0+diff --git a/tests/glob7.sub b/tests/glob7.sub +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..0212b8e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/glob7.sub +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++# according to Posix 2.13.3, a slash in a bracket expressionrenders that
++# bracket expression invalid
++shopt -s nullglob
++
++echo 1: [qwe/qwe]
++echo 2: [qwe/
++echo 3: [qwe/]
++
++echo 4: [qwe\/qwe]
++echo 5: [qwe\/
++echo 6: [qwe\/]
+--
+1.9.1meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +1
-0+meta/recipes- renamed from meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb +0
-0extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb
index12d472be57..257a03bd8b100644meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb +1
-0@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/bash/${BP}.tar.gz;name=tarball \ file://run-ptest \ file://run-bash-ptests \ file://fix-run-builtins.patch \ + file://bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch \ "SRC_URI[tarball.md5sum] = "
2b44b47b905be16f45709648f671820b"
Quoted 43 lines · Khem Raj
Quoted 34 lines · Mingli
Hi Anuj,
Quoted 22 lines · Anuj Mittal
Hi Mingli,
Quoted 19 lines · Mingli
From: De Huo <[email protected]>
An issue was discovered in
disable_priv_modeinshell.cin GNU Bash through 5.0 patch 11. By default, if Bash is run with its effective UID
not equal to its real UID, it will drop privileges by setting its effective UID to its real UID. However, it does so incorrectly. On Linux
and other systems that support "saved UID" functionality, the saved UID
is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in the shell can use
"enable -f" for runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a shared
object that callssetuid()and therefore regains privileges. However, binaries running with an effective UID of 0 are unaffected.Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue.
Quoted 7 lines
Has something changed from last time this patch was submitted and later reverted because of the failing ptest? I remember the author saying this isn't a real security bug and there were also changes in the patch that weren't related to the CVE ...
Quoted 6 lines
Changed the patch a little to remove the configure file part to fix the reconfigure issue in v1 patch.
Yes, the author saying the patch did fix the issue stated in CVE-2019-18276 though the issue actually is't a big deal.
Quoted 6 lines
This seems to be regressing bash ptests now.
ptestresult.bash.run-glob-test
ptestresult.bash.run-read
ptestresult.bash.run-trap
These failures are happening without this patch too, so perhaps something else has caused it, could be perhaps setup related too.
ptestresult.bash.run-builtins
ptestresult.bash.run-glob-test
ptestresult.bash.run-intl
ptestresult.bash.run-printf
ptestresult.bash.run-read
ptestresult.bash.run-trap
Quoted 474 lines
If its not a real security bug then perhaps its better to revert it.
Quoted 470 lines
Thanks,
Quoted 465 lines
Thanks,
Anuj
Quoted 460 lines
Signed-off-by De Huo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kai Kang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mingli Yu <[email protected]>--- .../bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch | 386 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 387 insertions(+)create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-
18276.patch(quoted diff) +0
-018276.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- 18276.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7b2073201emeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@ +From 951bdaad7a18cc0dc1036bba86b18b90874d39ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +5
-0+From: Chet Ramey <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 09:03:53 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] commit bash-20190628 snapshot + +An issue was discovered in disable_priv_mode in shell.c in GNU Bashthrough 5.0 patch 11.
+By default, if Bash is run with its effective UID not equal to its real UID,
+it will drop privileges by setting its effective UID to its real UID.
+However, it does so incorrectly. On Linux and other systems that support "saved UID" functionality,
+the saved UID is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in the shell can use "enable -f" for
+runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a shared object that callssetuid()and therefore
+regains privileges. However, binaries running with an effective UID of 0 are unaffected.meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +4
-0+ +Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue. + +Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [the upstream thinks it doesn'tincrease the credibility of CVEs in general]
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +3
-0+CVE: CVE-2019-18276 + +[1]https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?h=devel&id=951bdaa
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +83
-1+ +Signed-off-by: De Huo <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <[email protected]> +--- + MANIFEST | 2 ++ + bashline.c | 50 +------------------------------------------- ------ + builtins/help.def | 2 +- + config.h.in | 10 +++++++++- + configure.ac | 1 + + doc/bash.1 | 3 ++- + doc/bashref.texi | 3 ++- + lib/glob/glob.c | 5 ++++- + pathexp.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- + shell.c | 8 ++++++++ + tests/glob.tests | 2 ++ + tests/glob6.sub | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + tests/glob7.sub | 11 +++++++++++ + 14 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 tests/glob6.sub + create mode 100644 tests/glob7.sub + +diff --git a/MANIFEST b/MANIFEST +index 03de221..f9ccad7 100644 +--- a/MANIFEST ++++ b/MANIFEST +@@ -1037,6 +1037,8 @@ tests/extglob3.tests f + tests/extglob3.right f + tests/extglob4.sub f + tests/extglob5.sub f ++tests/glob6.sub f ++tests/glob7.sub f + tests/func.tests f + tests/func.right f + tests/func1.sub f +diff --git a/bashline.c b/bashline.c +index 824ea9d..d86b47d 100644 +--- a/bashline.c ++++ b/bashline.c +@@ -3718,55 +3718,7 @@ static int + completion_glob_pattern (string) + char *string; + { +- register int c; +- char *send; +- int open; +- +- DECLARE_MBSTATE; +- +- open = 0; +- send = string + strlen (string); +- +- while (c = *string++) +- { +- switch (c) +- { +- case '?': +- case '*': +- return (1); +- +- case '[': +- open++; +- continue; +- +- case ']': +- if (open) +- return (1); +- continue; +- +- case '+': +- case '@': +- case '!': +- if (*string == '(') /*)*/ +- return (1); +- continue; +- +- case '\\': +- if (*string++ == 0) +- return (0); +- } +- +- /* Advance one fewer byte than an entire multibyte characterto
+- account for the auto-increment in the loop above. */ +-#ifdef HANDLE_MULTIBYTE +- string--; +- ADVANCE_CHAR_P (string, send - string); +- string++; +-#else +- ADVANCE_CHAR_P (string, send - string); +-#endif +- } +- return (0); ++ return (glob_pattern_p (string) == 1);+ }
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +14
-0+ + static char *globtext; +diff --git a/builtins/help.def b/builtins/help.def +index 006c4b5..92f9b38 100644 +--- a/builtins/help.def ++++ b/builtins/help.def +@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ help_builtin (list) + + /* We should consider making `help bash' do something. */ + +- if (glob_pattern_p (list->word->word)) ++ if (glob_pattern_p (list->word->word) == 1) + { + printf ("%s", ngettext ("Shell commands matching keyword `","Shell commands matching keywords `", (
list->next? 2 : 1)));meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +10
-0+ print_word_list (list, ", "); +diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in +index 8554aec..ad4b1e8 100644 +--- a/config.h.in ++++ b/config.h.in +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* config.h -- Configuration file for bash. */ + +-/* Copyright (C) 1987-2009,2011-2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. ++/* Copyright (C) 1987-2009,2011-2012,2013-2019 Free SoftwareFoundation, Inc.
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +49
-0+ + This file is part of GNU Bash, the Bourne Again SHell. + +@@ -807,6 +807,14 @@ + #undef HAVE_SETREGID + #undef HAVE_DECL_SETREGID + ++/* Define if you have the setregid function. */ ++#undef HAVE_SETRESGID ++#undef HAVE_DECL_SETRESGID ++ ++/* Define if you have the setresuid function. */ ++#undef HAVE_SETRESUID ++#undef HAVE_DECL_SETRESUID ++ + /* Define if you have the setvbuf function. */ + #undef HAVE_SETVBUF + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 52b4cdb..549adef 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -810,6 +810,7 @@ AC_CHECK_DECLS([confstr]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([printf]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([sbrk]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([setregid]) ++AC_CHECK_DECLS[(setresuid, setresgid]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([strcpy]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([strsignal]) + +diff --git a/doc/bash.1 b/doc/bash.1 +index e6cd08d..9e58a0b 100644 +--- a/doc/bash.1 ++++ b/doc/bash.1 +@@ -4681,7 +4681,8 @@ above). + .PD + .SH "SIMPLE COMMAND EXPANSION" + When a simple command is executed, the shell performs the following +-expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right. ++expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right, in ++the following order. + .IP 1. + The words that the parser has marked as variable assignments (those + preceding the command name) and redirections are saved for later +diff --git a/doc/bashref.texi b/doc/bashref.texi +index d33cd57..3065126 100644 +--- a/doc/bashref.texi ++++ b/doc/bashref.texi +@@ -2964,7 +2964,8 @@ is not specified. If the file does not exist,it is created.
+ @cindex command expansionmeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +24
-0+ + When a simple command is executed, the shell performs the following +-expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right. ++expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right, in ++the following order. + + @enumerate + @item +diff --git a/lib/glob/glob.c b/lib/glob/glob.c +index 398253b..2eaa33e 100644 +--- a/lib/glob/glob.c ++++ b/lib/glob/glob.c +@@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ glob_vector (pat, dir, flags) + register unsigned int i; + int mflags; /* Flags passed to strmatch (). */ + int pflags; /* flags passed to sh_makepath () */ ++ int hasglob; /* return value from glob_pattern_p */ + int nalloca; + struct globval *firstmalloc, *tmplink; + char *convfn; +@@ -648,10 +649,12 @@ glob_vector (pat, dir, flags) + patlen = (pat && *pat) ? strlen (pat) : 0; + + /* If the filename pattern (PAT) does not contain any globbingcharacters,
++ or contains a pattern with only backslash escapes (hasglob ==
2),
+ we can dispense with reading the directory, and just see if
there is
+ a filename `DIR/PAT'. If there is, and we can access it, just
make the
+ vector to return and bail immediately. */+- if (skip == 0 && glob_pattern_p (pat) == 0) ++ hasglob = 0; ++ if (skip == 0 && (hasglob = glob_pattern_p (pat)) == 0 || hasglob== 2)
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +12
-0+ { + int dirlen; + struct stat finfo; +diff --git a/pathexp.c b/pathexp.c +index c1bf2d8..e6c5392 100644 +--- a/pathexp.c ++++ b/pathexp.c +@@ -58,7 +58,10 @@ int extended_glob = EXTGLOB_DEFAULT; + /* Control enabling special handling of `**' */ + int glob_star = 0; + +-/* Return nonzero if STRING has any unquoted special globbing charsin it. */
++/* Return nonzero if STRING has any unquoted special globbing chars in it.
++ This is supposed to be called when pathname expansion is
performed, so
++ it implements the rules in Posix 2.13.3, specifically that an
unquoted
++ slash cannot appear in a bracket expression. */
+ int
+unquoted_glob_pattern_p(string)meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +24
-0+ register char *string; +@@ -85,10 +88,14 @@ unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + continue; + + case ']': +- if (open) ++ if (open) /* XXX - if --open == 0? */ + return (1); + continue; + ++ case '/': ++ if (open) ++ open = 0; ++ + case '+': + case '@': + case '!': +@@ -106,6 +113,11 @@ unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + string++; + continue; + } ++ else if (open && *string == '/') ++ { ++ string++; /* quoted slashes in bracketexpressions are ok */
++ continue;
++ }meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +13
-0+ else if (*string == 0) + return (0); + +diff --git a/shell.c b/shell.c +index a2b2a55..6adabc8 100644 +--- a/shell.c ++++ b/shell.c +@@ -1293,7 +1293,11 @@ disable_priv_mode () + { + int e; + ++#if HAVE_DECL_SETRESUID ++ if (setresuid (current_user.uid, current_user.uid,current_user.uid) < 0)
++#elsemeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +5
-0+ if (setuid (current_user.uid) < 0) ++#endif + { + e = errno; + sys_error (_("cannot set uid to %d: effective uid %d"),current_user.uid, current_user.euid);
+@@ -1302,7 +1306,11 @@disable_priv_mode()meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +5
-0+ exit (e); + #endif + } ++#if HAVE_DECL_SETRESGID ++ if (setresgid (current_user.gid, current_user.gid,current_user.gid) < 0)
++#elsemeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +3
-0+ if (setgid (current_user.gid) < 0) ++#endif + sys_error (_("cannot set gid to %d: effective gid %d"),current_user.gid, current_user.egid);
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +22
-0+ + current_user.euid = current_user.uid; +diff --git a/tests/glob.tests b/tests/glob.tests +index 01913bb..fb012f7 100644 +--- a/tests/glob.tests ++++ b/tests/glob.tests +@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ ${THIS_SH} ./glob1.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob2.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob3.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob4.sub ++${THIS_SH} ./glob6.sub ++${THIS_SH} ./glob7.sub + + MYDIR=$PWD # save where we are + +diff --git a/tests/glob6.sub b/tests/glob6.sub +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..b099811 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/glob6.sub +@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ ++# tests of the backslash-in-glob-patterns discussion on the austin-group ML
++
++: ${TMPDIR:=/var/tmp}
++
++ORIG=$PWD
++GLOBDIR=$TMPDIR/bash-glob-$$
++mkdir $GLOBDIR && cd $GLOBDIR
++
++# does the pattern matcher allow backslashes as escape characters and remove
++# them as part of matching?
++touch abcdefg
++pat='ab\cd*'
++printf '<%s>\n' $pat
++pat='\.'
++printf '<%s>\n' $pat
++rm abcdefg
++
++# how about when escaping pattern characters?
++touch '*abc.c'
++a='\**.c'
++printf '%s\n' $a
++rm -f '*abc.c'
++
++# how about when making the distinction between readable and searchable path
++# components?
++mkdir -m a=x searchable
++mkdir -m a=r readable
++
++p='searchable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='searchable/\./.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='readable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='readable/\./.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++printf "%s\n" 'searchable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" 'readable/\.'
++
++echo */.
++
++p='*/\.'
++echo $p
++
++echo */'.'
++
++rmdir searchable readable
++
++cd $ORIG
++rmdir $GLOBDIRmeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +7
-0+diff --git a/tests/glob7.sub b/tests/glob7.sub +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..0212b8e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/glob7.sub +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++# according to Posix 2.13.3, a slash in a bracket expressionrenders that
++# bracket expression invalid
++shopt -s nullglob
++
++echo 1: [qwe/qwe]
++echo 2: [qwe/
++echo 3: [qwe/]
++
++echo 4: [qwe\/qwe]
++echo 5: [qwe\/
++echo 6: [qwe\/]
+--
+1.9.1meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch new file +1
-0+meta/recipes- renamed from meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb +0
-0extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb
index12d472be57..257a03bd8b100644meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb +1
-0@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/bash/${BP}.tar.gz;name=tarball \ file://run-ptest \ file://run-bash-ptests \ file://fix-run-builtins.patch \ + file://bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch \ "SRC_URI[tarball.md5sum] = "
2b44b47b905be16f45709648f671820b"
Quoted 65 lines · Khem Raj
Quoted 54 lines · Khem Raj
Quoted 44 lines · Mingli
Hi Anuj,
Quoted 33 lines · Anuj Mittal
Hi Mingli,
Quoted 25 lines · Mingli
From: De Huo <[email protected]>
An issue was discovered in
disable_priv_modeinshell.cin GNU Bash
through 5.0 patch 11. By default, if Bash is run with its effective
UID
not equal to its real UID, it will drop privileges by setting its
effective UID to its real UID. However, it does so incorrectly. On
Linux
and other systems that support "saved UID" functionality, the saved
UID
is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in the shell can
use
"enable -f" for runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a
shared
object that callssetuid()and therefore regains privileges. However,
binaries running with an effective UID of 0 are unaffected.Quoted 4 lines
Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue.
[1]
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?h=devel&id=951bdaaQuoted 7 lines
Has something changed from last time this patch was submitted and later
reverted because of the failing ptest? I remember the author saying
this isn't a real security bug and there were also changes in the patch
that weren't related to the CVE ...Quoted 7 lines
Changed the patch a little to remove the configure file part to fix the
reconfigure issue in v1 patch.Yes, the author saying the patch did fix the issue stated in CVE-2019-18276 though the issue actually is't a big deal.
Quoted 6 lines
This seems to be regressing bash ptests now.
ptestresult.bash.run-glob-test
ptestresult.bash.run-read
ptestresult.bash.run-trapThese failures are happening without this patch too, so perhaps something else has caused it, could be perhaps setup related too.
Quoted 8 lines
ptestresult.bash.run-builtins
ptestresult.bash.run-glob-test
ptestresult.bash.run-intl
ptestresult.bash.run-printf
ptestresult.bash.run-read
ptestresult.bash.run-trap
Last time this was applied, it had introduced:
https://bugzilla.yoctoproject.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13795
because of the unrelated glob changes in this patch. Are you seeing this failure?
Thanks,
Anuj
Quoted 516 lines
Quoted 516 lines
If its not a real security bug then perhaps its better to revert it.
Quoted 511 lines
Thanks,
Quoted 506 lines
Thanks,
Anuj
Quoted 502 lines
Signed-off-by De Huo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kai Kang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mingli Yu <[email protected]>--- .../bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch | 386 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 387 insertions(+)create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-
CVE-2019-
18276.patch(quoted diff) +0
-018276.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- 18276.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7b2073201emeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +0
-018276.patch
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@ +From 951bdaad7a18cc0dc1036bba86b18b90874d39ff Mon Sep 1700:00:00
2001meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +5
-0+From: Chet Ramey <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 09:03:53 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] commit bash-20190628 snapshot + +An issue was discovered in disable_priv_mode in shell.c inGNU Bash
through 5.0 patch 11.
+By default, if Bash is run with its effective UID not equal to its
real UID,
+it will drop privileges by setting its effective UID to its real
UID.
+However, it does so incorrectly. On Linux and other systems that
support "saved UID" functionality,
+the saved UID is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in
the shell can use "enable -f" for
+runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a shared object that
callssetuid()and therefore
+regains privileges. However, binaries running with an effective UID
of 0 are unaffected.meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +4
-0+ +Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue. + +Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [the upstream thinks itdoesn't
increase the credibility of CVEs in general]meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +3
-0+CVE: CVE-2019-18276 + +[1]https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?h=devel&id=951bdaa
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +83
-2+ +Signed-off-by: De Huo <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <[email protected]> +--- + MANIFEST | 2 ++ + bashline.c | 50 +----------------------------------- -------- ------ + builtins/help.def | 2 +- + config.h.in | 10 +++++++++- + configure.ac | 1 + + doc/bash.1 | 3 ++- + doc/bashref.texi | 3 ++- + lib/glob/glob.c | 5 ++++- + pathexp.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- + shell.c | 8 ++++++++ + tests/glob.tests | 2 ++ + tests/glob6.sub | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + tests/glob7.sub | 11 +++++++++++ + 14 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 tests/glob6.sub + create mode 100644 tests/glob7.sub + +diff --git a/MANIFEST b/MANIFEST +index 03de221..f9ccad7 100644 +--- a/MANIFEST ++++ b/MANIFEST +@@ -1037,6 +1037,8 @@ tests/extglob3.tests f + tests/extglob3.right f + tests/extglob4.sub f + tests/extglob5.sub f ++tests/glob6.sub f ++tests/glob7.sub f + tests/func.tests f + tests/func.right f + tests/func1.sub f +diff --git a/bashline.c b/bashline.c +index 824ea9d..d86b47d 100644 +--- a/bashline.c ++++ b/bashline.c +@@ -3718,55 +3718,7 @@ static int + completion_glob_pattern (string) + char *string; + { +- register int c; +- char *send; +- int open; +- +- DECLARE_MBSTATE; +- +- open = 0; +- send = string + strlen (string); +- +- while (c = *string++) +- { +- switch (c) +- { +- case '?': +- case '*': +- return (1); +- +- case '[': +- open++; +- continue; +- +- case ']': +- if (open) +- return (1); +- continue; +- +- case '+': +- case '@': +- case '!': +- if (*string == '(') /*)*/ +- return (1); +- continue; +- +- case '\\': +- if (*string++ == 0) +- return (0); +- } +- +- /* Advance one fewer byte than an entire multibytecharacter
to+- account for the auto-increment in the loop above. */ +-#ifdef HANDLE_MULTIBYTE +- string--; +- ADVANCE_CHAR_P (string, send - string); +- string++; +-#else +- ADVANCE_CHAR_P (string, send - string); +-#endif +- } +- return (0); ++ return (glob_pattern_p (string) == 1);+ }
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +14
-0+ + static char *globtext; +diff --git a/builtins/help.def b/builtins/help.def +index 006c4b5..92f9b38 100644 +--- a/builtins/help.def ++++ b/builtins/help.def +@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ help_builtin (list) + + /* We should consider making `help bash' do something. */ + +- if (glob_pattern_p (list->word->word)) ++ if (glob_pattern_p (list->word->word) == 1) + { + printf ("%s", ngettext ("Shell commands matchingkeyword `",
"Shell commands matching keywords `", (list->next? 2 : 1)));meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +9
-0+ print_word_list (list, ", "); +diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in +index 8554aec..ad4b1e8 100644 +--- a/config.h.in ++++ b/config.h.in +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* config.h -- Configuration file for bash. */ + +-/* Copyright (C) 1987-2009,2011-2012 Free SoftwareFoundation, Inc.
++/* Copyright (C) 1987-2009,2011-2012,2013-2019 Free Software
Foundation, Inc.meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +38
-0+ + This file is part of GNU Bash, the Bourne Again SHell. + +@@ -807,6 +807,14 @@ + #undef HAVE_SETREGID + #undef HAVE_DECL_SETREGID + ++/* Define if you have the setregid function. */ ++#undef HAVE_SETRESGID ++#undef HAVE_DECL_SETRESGID ++ ++/* Define if you have the setresuid function. */ ++#undef HAVE_SETRESUID ++#undef HAVE_DECL_SETRESUID ++ + /* Define if you have the setvbuf function. */ + #undef HAVE_SETVBUF + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 52b4cdb..549adef 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -810,6 +810,7 @@ AC_CHECK_DECLS([confstr]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([printf]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([sbrk]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([setregid]) ++AC_CHECK_DECLS[(setresuid, setresgid]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([strcpy]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([strsignal]) + +diff --git a/doc/bash.1 b/doc/bash.1 +index e6cd08d..9e58a0b 100644 +--- a/doc/bash.1 ++++ b/doc/bash.1 +@@ -4681,7 +4681,8 @@ above). + .PD + .SH "SIMPLE COMMAND EXPANSION" + When a simple command is executed, the shell performs thefollowing
+-expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right.
++expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right, in
++the following order.
+ .IP 1.
+ The words that the parser has marked as variable assignments (those
+ preceding the command name) and redirections are saved for latermeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +5
-0+diff --git a/doc/bashref.texi b/doc/bashref.texi +index d33cd57..3065126 100644 +--- a/doc/bashref.texi ++++ b/doc/bashref.texi +@@ -2964,7 +2964,8 @@ is not specified. If the file doesnot exist,
it is created.
+ @cindex command expansion
+
+ When a simple command is executed, the shell performs the following
+-expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right.
++expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right, in
++the following order.meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +10
-0+ + @enumerate + @item +diff --git a/lib/glob/glob.c b/lib/glob/glob.c +index 398253b..2eaa33e 100644 +--- a/lib/glob/glob.c ++++ b/lib/glob/glob.c +@@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ glob_vector (pat, dir, flags) + register unsigned int i; + int mflags; /* Flags passed to strmatch ().*/
+ int pflags; /* flags passed tosh_makepath
() */
++ int hasglob; /* return value fromglob_pattern_p*/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +7
-0+ int nalloca; + struct globval *firstmalloc, *tmplink; + char *convfn; +@@ -648,10 +649,12 @@ glob_vector (pat, dir, flags) + patlen = (pat && *pat) ? strlen (pat) : 0; + + /* If the filename pattern (PAT) does not contain anyglobbing
characters,
++ or contains a pattern with only backslash escapes
(hasglob ==
2),
+ we can dispense with reading the directory, and just
see if
there is
+ a filename `DIR/PAT'. If there is, and we can access
it, just
make the
+ vector to return and bail immediately. */+- if (skip == 0 && glob_pattern_p (pat) == 0) ++ hasglob = 0; ++ if (skip == 0 && (hasglob = glob_pattern_p (pat)) == 0 ||hasglob
== 2)meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +12
-0+ { + int dirlen; + struct stat finfo; +diff --git a/pathexp.c b/pathexp.c +index c1bf2d8..e6c5392 100644 +--- a/pathexp.c ++++ b/pathexp.c +@@ -58,7 +58,10 @@ int extended_glob = EXTGLOB_DEFAULT; + /* Control enabling special handling of `**' */ + int glob_star = 0; + +-/* Return nonzero if STRING has any unquoted specialglobbing chars
in it. */
++/* Return nonzero if STRING has any unquoted special globbing chars
in it.
++ This is supposed to be called when pathname expansion is
performed, so
++ it implements the rules in Posix 2.13.3, specifically
that an
unquoted
++ slash cannot appear in a bracket expression. */
+ int
+unquoted_glob_pattern_p(string)meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +24
-0+ register char *string; +@@ -85,10 +88,14 @@ unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + continue; + + case ']': +- if (open) ++ if (open) /* XXX - if --open == 0? */ + return (1); + continue; + ++ case '/': ++ if (open) ++ open = 0; ++ + case '+': + case '@': + case '!': +@@ -106,6 +113,11 @@ unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + string++; + continue; + } ++ else if (open && *string == '/') ++ { ++ string++; /* quoted slashes in bracketexpressions are ok */
++ continue;
++ }meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +13
-0+ else if (*string == 0) + return (0); + +diff --git a/shell.c b/shell.c +index a2b2a55..6adabc8 100644 +--- a/shell.c ++++ b/shell.c +@@ -1293,7 +1293,11 @@ disable_priv_mode () + { + int e; + ++#if HAVE_DECL_SETRESUID ++ if (setresuid (current_user.uid, current_user.uid,current_user.uid) < 0)
++#elsemeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +5
-0+ if (setuid (current_user.uid) < 0) ++#endif + { + e = errno; + sys_error (_("cannot set uid to %d: effective uid%d"),
current_user.uid, current_user.euid);
+@@ -1302,7 +1306,11 @@disable_priv_mode()meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +5
-0+ exit (e); + #endif + } ++#if HAVE_DECL_SETRESGID ++ if (setresgid (current_user.gid, current_user.gid,current_user.gid) < 0)
++#elsemeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +3
-0+ if (setgid (current_user.gid) < 0) ++#endif + sys_error (_("cannot set gid to %d: effective gid %d"),current_user.gid, current_user.egid);
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +22
-0+ + current_user.euid = current_user.uid; +diff --git a/tests/glob.tests b/tests/glob.tests +index 01913bb..fb012f7 100644 +--- a/tests/glob.tests ++++ b/tests/glob.tests +@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ ${THIS_SH} ./glob1.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob2.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob3.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob4.sub ++${THIS_SH} ./glob6.sub ++${THIS_SH} ./glob7.sub + + MYDIR=$PWD # save where we are + +diff --git a/tests/glob6.sub b/tests/glob6.sub +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..b099811 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/glob6.sub +@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ ++# tests of the backslash-in-glob-patterns discussion on theaustin-
group ML
++
++: ${TMPDIR:=/var/tmp}
++
++ORIG=$PWD
++GLOBDIR=$TMPDIR/bash-glob-$$
++mkdir $GLOBDIR && cd $GLOBDIR
++
++# does the pattern matcher allow backslashes as escape characters
and remove
++# them as part of matching?
++touch abcdefg
++pat='ab\cd*'
++printf '<%s>\n' $pat
++pat='\.'
++printf '<%s>\n' $pat
++rm abcdefg
++
++# how about when escaping pattern characters? ++touch '*abc.c'
++a='\**.c'
++printf '%s\n' $a
++rm -f '*abc.c'
++
++# how about when making the distinction between readable and
searchable path
++# components?
++mkdir -m a=x searchable
++mkdir -m a=r readable
++
++p='searchable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='searchable/\./.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='readable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='readable/\./.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++printf "%s\n" 'searchable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" 'readable/\.'
++
++echo */.
++
++p='*/\.'
++echo $p
++
++echo */'.'
++
++rmdir searchable readable
++
++cd $ORIG
++rmdir $GLOBDIRmeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +7
-0+diff --git a/tests/glob7.sub b/tests/glob7.sub +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..0212b8e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/glob7.sub +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++# according to Posix 2.13.3, a slash in a bracketexpression
renders that
++# bracket expression invalid
++shopt -s nullglob
++
++echo 1: [qwe/qwe]
++echo 2: [qwe/
++echo 3: [qwe/]
++
++echo 4: [qwe\/qwe]
++echo 5: [qwe\/
++echo 6: [qwe\/]
+--
+1.9.1meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +1
-0+meta/recipes- renamed from meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb +0
-0extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb
index12d472be57..257a03bd8b100644meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb +1
-0@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/bash/${BP}.tar.gz;name=tarball \ file://run-ptest \ file://run-bash-ptests \ file://fix-run-builtins.patch \ + file://bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch \ "SRC_URI[tarball.md5sum] =
"2b44b47b905be16f45709648f671820b"
Quoted 76 lines · Anuj
Quoted 65 lines · Khem Raj
Quoted 54 lines · Khem Raj
Quoted 44 lines · Mingli
Hi Anuj,
Quoted 33 lines · Anuj Mittal
Hi Mingli,
Quoted 25 lines · Mingli
From: De Huo <[email protected]>
An issue was discovered in
disable_priv_modeinshell.cin GNU Bash
through 5.0 patch 11. By default, if Bash is run with its effective
UID
not equal to its real UID, it will drop privileges by setting its
effective UID to its real UID. However, it does so incorrectly. On
Linux
and other systems that support "saved UID" functionality, the saved
UID
is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in the shell can
use
"enable -f" for runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a
shared
object that callssetuid()and therefore regains privileges. However,
binaries running with an effective UID of 0 are unaffected.Quoted 4 lines
Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue.
[1]
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?h=devel&id=951bdaaQuoted 7 lines
Has something changed from last time this patch was submitted and later
reverted because of the failing ptest? I remember the author saying
this isn't a real security bug and there were also changes in the patch
that weren't related to the CVE ...Quoted 7 lines
Changed the patch a little to remove the configure file part to fix the
reconfigure issue in v1 patch.Yes, the author saying the patch did fix the issue stated in CVE-2019-18276 though the issue actually is't a big deal.
Quoted 6 lines
This seems to be regressing bash ptests now.
ptestresult.bash.run-glob-test
ptestresult.bash.run-read
ptestresult.bash.run-trapThese failures are happening without this patch too, so perhaps something else has caused it, could be perhaps setup related too.
Quoted 8 lines
ptestresult.bash.run-builtins
ptestresult.bash.run-glob-test
ptestresult.bash.run-intl
ptestresult.bash.run-printf
ptestresult.bash.run-read
ptestresult.bash.run-trap
Quoted 7 lines
Last time this was applied, it had introduced:
https://bugzilla.yoctoproject.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13795
because of the unrelated glob changes in this patch. Are you seeing this failure?
glob failures are seen without this patch as well as it seems
Quoted 520 lines
Thanks,
Anuj
Quoted 516 lines
Quoted 516 lines
If its not a real security bug then perhaps its better to revert it.
Quoted 511 lines
Thanks,
Quoted 506 lines
Thanks,
Anuj
Quoted 502 lines
Signed-off-by De Huo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kai Kang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mingli Yu <[email protected]>--- .../bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch | 386 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 387 insertions(+)create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-
CVE-2019-
18276.patch(quoted diff) +0
-018276.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- 18276.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7b2073201emeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +0
-018276.patch
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@ +From 951bdaad7a18cc0dc1036bba86b18b90874d39ff Mon Sep 1700:00:00
2001meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +5
-0+From: Chet Ramey <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 09:03:53 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] commit bash-20190628 snapshot + +An issue was discovered in disable_priv_mode in shell.c inGNU Bash
through 5.0 patch 11.
+By default, if Bash is run with its effective UID not equal to its
real UID,
+it will drop privileges by setting its effective UID to its real
UID.
+However, it does so incorrectly. On Linux and other systems that
support "saved UID" functionality,
+the saved UID is not dropped. An attacker with command execution in
the shell can use "enable -f" for
+runtime loading of a new builtin, which can be a shared object that
callssetuid()and therefore
+regains privileges. However, binaries running with an effective UID
of 0 are unaffected.meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +4
-0+ +Get the patch from [1] to fix the issue. + +Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [the upstream thinks itdoesn't
increase the credibility of CVEs in general]meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +3
-0+CVE: CVE-2019-18276 + +[1]https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/bash.git/commit/?h=devel&id=951bdaa
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +83
-2+ +Signed-off-by: De Huo <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <[email protected]> +--- + MANIFEST | 2 ++ + bashline.c | 50 +----------------------------------- -------- ------ + builtins/help.def | 2 +- + config.h.in | 10 +++++++++- + configure.ac | 1 + + doc/bash.1 | 3 ++- + doc/bashref.texi | 3 ++- + lib/glob/glob.c | 5 ++++- + pathexp.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- + shell.c | 8 ++++++++ + tests/glob.tests | 2 ++ + tests/glob6.sub | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + tests/glob7.sub | 11 +++++++++++ + 14 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 tests/glob6.sub + create mode 100644 tests/glob7.sub + +diff --git a/MANIFEST b/MANIFEST +index 03de221..f9ccad7 100644 +--- a/MANIFEST ++++ b/MANIFEST +@@ -1037,6 +1037,8 @@ tests/extglob3.tests f + tests/extglob3.right f + tests/extglob4.sub f + tests/extglob5.sub f ++tests/glob6.sub f ++tests/glob7.sub f + tests/func.tests f + tests/func.right f + tests/func1.sub f +diff --git a/bashline.c b/bashline.c +index 824ea9d..d86b47d 100644 +--- a/bashline.c ++++ b/bashline.c +@@ -3718,55 +3718,7 @@ static int + completion_glob_pattern (string) + char *string; + { +- register int c; +- char *send; +- int open; +- +- DECLARE_MBSTATE; +- +- open = 0; +- send = string + strlen (string); +- +- while (c = *string++) +- { +- switch (c) +- { +- case '?': +- case '*': +- return (1); +- +- case '[': +- open++; +- continue; +- +- case ']': +- if (open) +- return (1); +- continue; +- +- case '+': +- case '@': +- case '!': +- if (*string == '(') /*)*/ +- return (1); +- continue; +- +- case '\\': +- if (*string++ == 0) +- return (0); +- } +- +- /* Advance one fewer byte than an entire multibytecharacter
to+- account for the auto-increment in the loop above. */ +-#ifdef HANDLE_MULTIBYTE +- string--; +- ADVANCE_CHAR_P (string, send - string); +- string++; +-#else +- ADVANCE_CHAR_P (string, send - string); +-#endif +- } +- return (0); ++ return (glob_pattern_p (string) == 1);+ }
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +14
-0+ + static char *globtext; +diff --git a/builtins/help.def b/builtins/help.def +index 006c4b5..92f9b38 100644 +--- a/builtins/help.def ++++ b/builtins/help.def +@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ help_builtin (list) + + /* We should consider making `help bash' do something. */ + +- if (glob_pattern_p (list->word->word)) ++ if (glob_pattern_p (list->word->word) == 1) + { + printf ("%s", ngettext ("Shell commands matchingkeyword `",
"Shell commands matching keywords `", (list->next? 2 : 1)));meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +9
-0+ print_word_list (list, ", "); +diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in +index 8554aec..ad4b1e8 100644 +--- a/config.h.in ++++ b/config.h.in +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* config.h -- Configuration file for bash. */ + +-/* Copyright (C) 1987-2009,2011-2012 Free SoftwareFoundation, Inc.
++/* Copyright (C) 1987-2009,2011-2012,2013-2019 Free Software
Foundation, Inc.meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +38
-0+ + This file is part of GNU Bash, the Bourne Again SHell. + +@@ -807,6 +807,14 @@ + #undef HAVE_SETREGID + #undef HAVE_DECL_SETREGID + ++/* Define if you have the setregid function. */ ++#undef HAVE_SETRESGID ++#undef HAVE_DECL_SETRESGID ++ ++/* Define if you have the setresuid function. */ ++#undef HAVE_SETRESUID ++#undef HAVE_DECL_SETRESUID ++ + /* Define if you have the setvbuf function. */ + #undef HAVE_SETVBUF + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 52b4cdb..549adef 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -810,6 +810,7 @@ AC_CHECK_DECLS([confstr]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([printf]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([sbrk]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([setregid]) ++AC_CHECK_DECLS[(setresuid, setresgid]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([strcpy]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([strsignal]) + +diff --git a/doc/bash.1 b/doc/bash.1 +index e6cd08d..9e58a0b 100644 +--- a/doc/bash.1 ++++ b/doc/bash.1 +@@ -4681,7 +4681,8 @@ above). + .PD + .SH "SIMPLE COMMAND EXPANSION" + When a simple command is executed, the shell performs thefollowing
+-expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right.
++expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right, in
++the following order.
+ .IP 1.
+ The words that the parser has marked as variable assignments (those
+ preceding the command name) and redirections are saved for latermeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +5
-0+diff --git a/doc/bashref.texi b/doc/bashref.texi +index d33cd57..3065126 100644 +--- a/doc/bashref.texi ++++ b/doc/bashref.texi +@@ -2964,7 +2964,8 @@ is not specified. If the file doesnot exist,
it is created.
+ @cindex command expansion
+
+ When a simple command is executed, the shell performs the following
+-expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right.
++expansions, assignments, and redirections, from left to right, in
++the following order.meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +10
-0+ + @enumerate + @item +diff --git a/lib/glob/glob.c b/lib/glob/glob.c +index 398253b..2eaa33e 100644 +--- a/lib/glob/glob.c ++++ b/lib/glob/glob.c +@@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ glob_vector (pat, dir, flags) + register unsigned int i; + int mflags; /* Flags passed to strmatch ().*/
+ int pflags; /* flags passed tosh_makepath
() */
++ int hasglob; /* return value fromglob_pattern_p*/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +7
-0+ int nalloca; + struct globval *firstmalloc, *tmplink; + char *convfn; +@@ -648,10 +649,12 @@ glob_vector (pat, dir, flags) + patlen = (pat && *pat) ? strlen (pat) : 0; + + /* If the filename pattern (PAT) does not contain anyglobbing
characters,
++ or contains a pattern with only backslash escapes
(hasglob ==
2),
+ we can dispense with reading the directory, and just
see if
there is
+ a filename `DIR/PAT'. If there is, and we can access
it, just
make the
+ vector to return and bail immediately. */+- if (skip == 0 && glob_pattern_p (pat) == 0) ++ hasglob = 0; ++ if (skip == 0 && (hasglob = glob_pattern_p (pat)) == 0 ||hasglob
== 2)meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +12
-0+ { + int dirlen; + struct stat finfo; +diff --git a/pathexp.c b/pathexp.c +index c1bf2d8..e6c5392 100644 +--- a/pathexp.c ++++ b/pathexp.c +@@ -58,7 +58,10 @@ int extended_glob = EXTGLOB_DEFAULT; + /* Control enabling special handling of `**' */ + int glob_star = 0; + +-/* Return nonzero if STRING has any unquoted specialglobbing chars
in it. */
++/* Return nonzero if STRING has any unquoted special globbing chars
in it.
++ This is supposed to be called when pathname expansion is
performed, so
++ it implements the rules in Posix 2.13.3, specifically
that an
unquoted
++ slash cannot appear in a bracket expression. */
+ int
+unquoted_glob_pattern_p(string)meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +24
-0+ register char *string; +@@ -85,10 +88,14 @@ unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + continue; + + case ']': +- if (open) ++ if (open) /* XXX - if --open == 0? */ + return (1); + continue; + ++ case '/': ++ if (open) ++ open = 0; ++ + case '+': + case '@': + case '!': +@@ -106,6 +113,11 @@ unquoted_glob_pattern_p (string) + string++; + continue; + } ++ else if (open && *string == '/') ++ { ++ string++; /* quoted slashes in bracketexpressions are ok */
++ continue;
++ }meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +13
-0+ else if (*string == 0) + return (0); + +diff --git a/shell.c b/shell.c +index a2b2a55..6adabc8 100644 +--- a/shell.c ++++ b/shell.c +@@ -1293,7 +1293,11 @@ disable_priv_mode () + { + int e; + ++#if HAVE_DECL_SETRESUID ++ if (setresuid (current_user.uid, current_user.uid,current_user.uid) < 0)
++#elsemeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +5
-0+ if (setuid (current_user.uid) < 0) ++#endif + { + e = errno; + sys_error (_("cannot set uid to %d: effective uid%d"),
current_user.uid, current_user.euid);
+@@ -1302,7 +1306,11 @@disable_priv_mode()meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +5
-0+ exit (e); + #endif + } ++#if HAVE_DECL_SETRESGID ++ if (setresgid (current_user.gid, current_user.gid,current_user.gid) < 0)
++#elsemeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +3
-0+ if (setgid (current_user.gid) < 0) ++#endif + sys_error (_("cannot set gid to %d: effective gid %d"),current_user.gid, current_user.egid);
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +22
-0+ + current_user.euid = current_user.uid; +diff --git a/tests/glob.tests b/tests/glob.tests +index 01913bb..fb012f7 100644 +--- a/tests/glob.tests ++++ b/tests/glob.tests +@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ ${THIS_SH} ./glob1.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob2.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob3.sub + ${THIS_SH} ./glob4.sub ++${THIS_SH} ./glob6.sub ++${THIS_SH} ./glob7.sub + + MYDIR=$PWD # save where we are + +diff --git a/tests/glob6.sub b/tests/glob6.sub +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..b099811 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/glob6.sub +@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ ++# tests of the backslash-in-glob-patterns discussion on theaustin-
group ML
++
++: ${TMPDIR:=/var/tmp}
++
++ORIG=$PWD
++GLOBDIR=$TMPDIR/bash-glob-$$
++mkdir $GLOBDIR && cd $GLOBDIR
++
++# does the pattern matcher allow backslashes as escape characters
and remove
++# them as part of matching?
++touch abcdefg
++pat='ab\cd*'
++printf '<%s>\n' $pat
++pat='\.'
++printf '<%s>\n' $pat
++rm abcdefg
++
++# how about when escaping pattern characters? ++touch '*abc.c'
++a='\**.c'
++printf '%s\n' $a
++rm -f '*abc.c'
++
++# how about when making the distinction between readable and
searchable path
++# components?
++mkdir -m a=x searchable
++mkdir -m a=r readable
++
++p='searchable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='searchable/\./.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='readable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++p='readable/\./.'
++printf "%s\n" $p
++
++printf "%s\n" 'searchable/\.'
++printf "%s\n" 'readable/\.'
++
++echo */.
++
++p='*/\.'
++echo $p
++
++echo */'.'
++
++rmdir searchable readable
++
++cd $ORIG
++rmdir $GLOBDIRmeta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +7
-0+diff --git a/tests/glob7.sub b/tests/glob7.sub +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..0212b8e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/glob7.sub +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++# according to Posix 2.13.3, a slash in a bracketexpression
renders that
++# bracket expression invalid
++shopt -s nullglob
++
++echo 1: [qwe/qwe]
++echo 2: [qwe/
++echo 3: [qwe/]
++
++echo 4: [qwe\/qwe]
++echo 5: [qwe\/
++echo 6: [qwe\/]
+--
+1.9.1meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/bash-CVE-2019- new file +1
-0+meta/recipes- renamed from meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb +0
-0extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb
index12d472be57..257a03bd8b100644meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_5.0.bb +1
-0@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/bash/${BP}.tar.gz;name=tarball \ file://run-ptest \ file://run-bash-ptests \ file://fix-run-builtins.patch \ + file://bash-CVE-2019-18276.patch \ "SRC_URI[tarball.md5sum] =
"2b44b47b905be16f45709648f671820b"