virtiofsd: avoid /proc/self/fd tempdir
PATCH 1/1 virtiofsd: avoid /proc/self/fd tempdir
In order to prevent /proc/self/fd escapes a temporary directory is created where /proc/self/fd is bind-mounted. This doesn't work on read-only file systems.
Avoid the temporary directory by bind-mounting /proc/self/fd over /proc. This does not affect other processes since we remounted / with MS_REC | MS_SLAVE. /proc must exist and virtiofsd does not use it so it's safe to do this.
Path traversal can be tested with the following function:
static void test_proc_fd_escape(struct lo_data *lo)
{
int fd;
int level = 0;
ino_t last_ino = 0; fd = lo->proc_self_fd;
for (;;) {
struct stat st;
if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
perror("fstat");
return;
}
if (last_ino && st.st_ino == last_ino) {
fprintf(stderr, "inode number unchanged, stopping\n");
return;
}
last_ino = st.st_ino;
fprintf(stderr, "Level %d dev %lu ino %lu\n", level,
(unsigned long)st.st_dev,
(unsigned long)last_ino);
fd = openat(fd, "..", O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
level++;
}}
Before and after this patch only Level 0 is displayed. Without /proc/self/fd bind-mount protection it is possible to traverse parent directories.
--- tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 34 +++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +11 -23
@@ -2393,8 +2393,6 @@ static void setup_wait_parent_capabilities(void)static void setup_namespaces (struct lo_data *lo,struct fuse_session *se) {pid_t child; -char template[] ="virtiofsd-XXXXXX" ; -char *tmpdir;/* * Create a new pid namespace for *child* processes. We'll have to
@@ -2458,33 +2456,23 @@ static void setup_namespaces(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se)exit (1 ); } - tmpdir =mkdtemp (template); -if (!tmpdir) { -fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"tmpdir(%s): %m\n" , template); +/* +* We only need /proc/self/fd. Prevent ".." from accessing parent +* directories of /proc/self/fd by bind-mounting it over /proc. Since / was +* previously remounted with MS_REC | MS_SLAVE this mount change only +* affects our process. +*/ +if (mount ("/proc/self/fd" ,"/proc" ,NULL ,MS_BIND ,NULL ) <0 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"mount(/proc/self/fd, MS_BIND): %m\n" );exit (1 ); } -if (mount ("/proc/self/fd" , tmpdir,NULL ,MS_BIND ,NULL ) <0 ) { -fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"mount(/proc/self/fd, %s, MS_BIND): %m\n" , - tmpdir); -exit (1 ); - } - -/* Now we can get our /proc/self/fd directory file descriptor */ - lo->proc_self_fd =open (tmpdir,O_PATH ); +/* Get the /proc (actually /proc/self/fd, see above) file descriptor */ + lo->proc_self_fd =open ("/proc" ,O_PATH );if (lo->proc_self_fd ==-1 ) { -fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"open(%s, O_PATH): %m\n" , tmpdir); +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"open(/proc, O_PATH): %m\n" );exit (1 ); } - -if (umount2 (tmpdir,MNT_DETACH ) <0 ) { -fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"umount2(%s, MNT_DETACH): %m\n" , tmpdir); -exit (1 ); - } - -if (rmdir (tmpdir) <0 ) { -fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"rmdir(%s): %m\n" , tmpdir); - } }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Quoted 39 lines · * Stefan Hajnoczi ([email protected]) wrote:
In order to prevent
/proc/self/fdescapes a temporary directory is created where/proc/self/fdis bind-mounted. This doesn't work on read-only file systems.Avoid the temporary directory by bind-mounting
/proc/self/fdover /proc. This does not affect other processes since we remounted / withMS_REC|MS_SLAVE. /proc must exist and virtiofsd does not use it so it's safe to do this.Path traversal can be tested with the following function:
static void test_proc_fd_escape(struct lo_data *lo) { int fd; int level = 0; ino_t last_ino = 0;fd = lo->proc_self_fd; for (;;) { struct stat st; if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) { perror("fstat"); return; } if (last_ino && st.st_ino == last_ino) { fprintf(stderr, "inode number unchanged, stopping\n"); return; } last_ino = st.st_ino; fprintf(stderr, "Level %d dev %lu ino %lu\n", level, (unsigned long)st.st_dev, (unsigned long)last_ino); fd = openat(fd, "..", O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW); level++; }}
Quoted 8 lines
Before and after this patch only Level 0 is displayed. Without
/proc/self/fdbind-mount protection it is possible to traverse parent directories.Fixes 397ae982f4df4 ("virtiofsd: jail lo->proc_self_fd")Cc Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>Cc Jens Freimann <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
Yes, getting rid of the tmpdir altogether seems better.
Quoted 65 lines
--- tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 34 +++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +11
-23@@ -2393,8 +2393,6 @@ static void setup_wait_parent_capabilities(void)static void setup_namespaces (struct lo_data *lo,struct fuse_session *se) {pid_t child; -char template[] ="virtiofsd-XXXXXX" ; -char *tmpdir;/* * Create a new pid namespace for *child* processes. We'll have to @@ -2458,33 +2456,23 @@ static void setup_namespaces(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se)exit (1 ); } - tmpdir =mkdtemp (template); -if (!tmpdir) { -fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"tmpdir(%s): %m\n" , template); +/* +* We only need /proc/self/fd. Prevent ".." from accessing parent +* directories of /proc/self/fd by bind-mounting it over /proc. Since / was +* previously remounted with MS_REC | MS_SLAVE this mount change only +* affects our process. +*/ +if (mount ("/proc/self/fd" ,"/proc" ,NULL ,MS_BIND ,NULL ) <0 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"mount(/proc/self/fd, MS_BIND): %m\n" );exit (1 ); } -if (mount ("/proc/self/fd" , tmpdir,NULL ,MS_BIND ,NULL ) <0 ) { -fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"mount(/proc/self/fd, %s, MS_BIND): %m\n" , - tmpdir); -exit (1 ); - } - -/* Now we can get our /proc/self/fd directory file descriptor */ - lo->proc_self_fd =open (tmpdir,O_PATH ); +/* Get the /proc (actually /proc/self/fd, see above) file descriptor */ + lo->proc_self_fd =open ("/proc" ,O_PATH );if (lo->proc_self_fd ==-1 ) { -fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"open(%s, O_PATH): %m\n" , tmpdir); +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"open(/proc, O_PATH): %m\n" );exit (1 ); } - -if (umount2 (tmpdir,MNT_DETACH ) <0 ) { -fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"umount2(%s, MNT_DETACH): %m\n" , tmpdir); -exit (1 ); - } - -if (rmdir (tmpdir) <0 ) { -fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"rmdir(%s): %m\n" , tmpdir); - } }/* Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
Quoted 39 lines · Stefan Hajnoczi
In order to prevent
/proc/self/fdescapes a temporary directory is created where/proc/self/fdis bind-mounted. This doesn't work on read-only file systems.Avoid the temporary directory by bind-mounting
/proc/self/fdover /proc. This does not affect other processes since we remounted / withMS_REC|MS_SLAVE. /proc must exist and virtiofsd does not use it so it's safe to do this.Path traversal can be tested with the following function:
static void
test_proc_fd_escape(struct lo_data *lo){ int fd; int level = 0; ino_t last_ino = 0; fd = lo->proc_self_fd; for (;;) { struct stat st; if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) { perror("fstat"); return; } if (last_ino && st.st_ino == last_ino) { fprintf(stderr, "inode number unchanged, stopping\n"); return; } last_ino = st.st_ino; fprintf(stderr, "Level %d dev %lu ino %lu\n", level, (unsigned long)st.st_dev, (unsigned long)last_ino); fd = openat(fd, "..", O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW); level++; }}
Quoted 8 lines
Before and after this patch only Level 0 is displayed. Without
/proc/self/fdbind-mount protection it is possible to traverse parent directories.Fixes 397ae982f4df4 ("virtiofsd: jail lo->proc_self_fd")Cc Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>Cc Jens Freimann <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
Thanks Stefan, it fixes the problem we had!
regards,
Jens