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PCI: allow sysfs file owner to read the config space with CAP_SYS_RAWIO

RFC In review Allen Pais 2 participants 7 messages Oct 16, 2020 – Oct 19, 2020 PCI

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Allen Pais

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#0 lore raw

RFC 1/1 PCI: allow sysfs file owner to read the config space with CAP_SYS_RAWIO

From: Allen Pais <[email protected]>

Access to pci config space is explictly checked with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in order to read configuration space past the frist 64B.

Since the path is only for reading, could we use CAP_SYS_RAWIO?
This patch contains a simpler fix, I would love to hear from the Maintainers on the approach.

The other approach that I considered was to introduce and API
which would check for multiple capabilities, something similar to perfmon_capable()/bpf_capable(). But I could not find more users for the API and hence dropped it.

The problem I am trying to solve is to avoid handing out
CAP_SYS_ADMIN for extended reads of the PCI config space.

---
 drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +2 -1
index 6d78df981d41..6574c0203475 100644
@@ -666,7 +666,8 @@ static ssize_t pci_read_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 	u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
 
 	/* Several chips lock up trying to read undefined config space */
-	if (file_ns_capable(filp, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (file_ns_capable(filp, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+	    file_ns_capable(filp, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
 		size = dev->cfg_size;
 	else if (dev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_CARDBUS)
 		size = 128;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Allen Pais

From: Allen Pais <[email protected]>

Access to pci config space is explictly checked with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in order to read configuration space past the frist 64B.

Since the path is only for reading, could we use CAP_SYS_RAWIO?

Why? What needs this reduced capability?

Quoted 10 lines

This patch contains a simpler fix, I would love to hear from the Maintainers on the approach.

The other approach that I considered was to introduce and API
which would check for multiple capabilities, something similar to perfmon_capable()/bpf_capable(). But I could not find more users for the API and hence dropped it.

The problem I am trying to solve is to avoid handing out
CAP_SYS_ADMIN for extended reads of the PCI config space.

Who is reading this config space that doesn't have admin rights? And what are they doing with it?

One big problem is that some devices will crash if you do this wrong, which is why we restricted it to root. Hopefully all of those devices are now gone, but I don't think you can count on it.

The "guaranteed safe" fields in the config space are already exported by sysfs for all users to read, are they not sufficient?

thanks,

greg k-h

author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Access to pci config space is explictly checked with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in order to read configuration space past the frist 64B.

Since the path is only for reading, could we use CAP_SYS_RAWIO?

Why? What needs this reduced capability?

Thanks for the review.

We need read access to /sys/bus/pci/devices/, We need write access to config, remove, rescan & enable files under the device directory for each PCIe functions & the downstream PCIe port.

We need r/w access to sysfs to unbind and rebind the root complex.

Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 11 lines

This patch contains a simpler fix, I would love to hear from the Maintainers on the approach.

The other approach that I considered was to introduce and API
which would check for multiple capabilities, something similar to perfmon_capable()/bpf_capable(). But I could not find more users for the API and hence dropped it.

The problem I am trying to solve is to avoid handing out
CAP_SYS_ADMIN for extended reads of the PCI config space.

Who is reading this config space that doesn't have admin rights? And what are they doing with it?

One big problem is that some devices will crash if you do this wrong, which is why we restricted it to root. Hopefully all of those devices are now gone, but I don't think you can count on it.

The "guaranteed safe" fields in the config space are already exported by sysfs for all users to read, are they not sufficient?

thanks,

greg k-h

Signature · 1 line
       - Allen
#3 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Allen
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Access to pci config space is explictly checked with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in order to read configuration space past the frist 64B.

Since the path is only for reading, could we use CAP_SYS_RAWIO?

Why? What needs this reduced capability?

Quoted 7 lines

Thanks for the review.

We need read access to /sys/bus/pci/devices/, We need write access to config, remove, rescan & enable files under the device directory for each PCIe functions & the downstream PCIe port.

We need r/w access to sysfs to unbind and rebind the root complex.

That didn't answer my question at all.

Why can't you have the process that wants to do all of the above, have admin rights as well? Doing all of that is _very_ low-level and can cause all sorts of horrible things to happen to your machine, and is not really "raw io" in the traditional sense at all, right?

greg k-h

author
#4 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Access to pci config space is explictly checked with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in order to read configuration space past the frist 64B.

Since the path is only for reading, could we use CAP_SYS_RAWIO?

Why? What needs this reduced capability?

Thanks for the review.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

We need read access to /sys/bus/pci/devices/, We need write access to config, remove, rescan & enable files under the device directory for each PCIe functions & the downstream PCIe port.

We need r/w access to sysfs to unbind and rebind the root complex.

That didn't answer my question at all.

Sorry about that, breaking it down:

When the machine first boots, the VFIO device bindings under /dev/vfio are not present.

root@localhost:/tmp# ls -l /dev/vfio/
total 0
crw-rw-rw-. 1 root root 10, 196 Jan  5 01:47 vfio

We have an agent which needs to run the following commands (We get access denied here and need permissions to do this).
echo -n xxxx yyyy > /sys/module/vfio_pci/drivers/pci:vfio-pci/new_id echo -n xxxx yyyy > /sys/module/vfio_pci/drivers/pci:vfio-pci/new_id

And we want to avoid handing CAP_SYS_ADMIN here. Which is why the thought about CAP_SYS_RAWIO.

Quoted 5 lines

Why can't you have the process that wants to do all of the above, have admin rights as well? Doing all of that is _very_ low-level and can cause all sorts of horrible things to happen to your machine, and is not really "raw io" in the traditional sense at all, right?

If the above approach is going to cause the system to do horrible things, then I'll drop the idea.

Signature · 1 line
       - Allen
#5 lore raw
Quoted 27 lines · Allen
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Access to pci config space is explictly checked with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in order to read configuration space past the frist 64B.

Since the path is only for reading, could we use CAP_SYS_RAWIO?

Why? What needs this reduced capability?

Thanks for the review.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

We need read access to /sys/bus/pci/devices/, We need write access to config, remove, rescan & enable files under the device directory for each PCIe functions & the downstream PCIe port.

We need r/w access to sysfs to unbind and rebind the root complex.

That didn't answer my question at all.

Sorry about that, breaking it down:

When the machine first boots, the VFIO device bindings under /dev/vfio are not present.

root@localhost:/tmp# ls -l /dev/vfio/
total 0
crw-rw-rw-. 1 root root 10, 196 Jan  5 01:47 vfio
Quoted 7 lines

We have an agent which needs to run the following commands (We get access denied here and need permissions to do this).
echo -n xxxx yyyy > /sys/module/vfio_pci/drivers/pci:vfio-pci/new_id echo -n xxxx yyyy > /sys/module/vfio_pci/drivers/pci:vfio-pci/new_id

And we want to avoid handing CAP_SYS_ADMIN here. Which is why the thought about CAP_SYS_RAWIO.

But that is not what you were asking this patch to do at all. So why bring it up?

new_id is NOT for "raw io" control, that should be only for admin priviliges.

And just because the vfio driver "abuses" this traditionally-debug-functionality doesn't mean you get to abuse the permission levels either.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Why can't you have the process that wants to do all of the above, have admin rights as well? Doing all of that is _very_ low-level and can cause all sorts of horrible things to happen to your machine, and is not really "raw io" in the traditional sense at all, right?

If the above approach is going to cause the system to do horrible things, then I'll drop the idea.

Of course it can cause the system to do horrible things, try it yourself and see!

greg k-h

author
#6 lore raw
Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Access to pci config space is explictly checked with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in order to read configuration space past the frist 64B.

Since the path is only for reading, could we use CAP_SYS_RAWIO?

Why? What needs this reduced capability?

Thanks for the review.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

We need read access to /sys/bus/pci/devices/, We need write access to config, remove, rescan & enable files under the device directory for each PCIe functions & the downstream PCIe port.

We need r/w access to sysfs to unbind and rebind the root complex.

That didn't answer my question at all.

Sorry about that, breaking it down:

When the machine first boots, the VFIO device bindings under /dev/vfio are not present.

root@localhost:/tmp# ls -l /dev/vfio/
total 0
crw-rw-rw-. 1 root root 10, 196 Jan  5 01:47 vfio

We have an agent which needs to run the following commands (We get access denied here and need permissions to do this).
echo -n xxxx yyyy > /sys/module/vfio_pci/drivers/pci:vfio-pci/new_id echo -n xxxx yyyy > /sys/module/vfio_pci/drivers/pci:vfio-pci/new_id

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

And we want to avoid handing CAP_SYS_ADMIN here. Which is why the thought about CAP_SYS_RAWIO.

But that is not what you were asking this patch to do at all. So why bring it up?

new_id is NOT for "raw io" control, that should be only for admin priviliges.

Okay. Thanks for the explanation.

Quoted 4 lines

And just because the vfio driver "abuses" this traditionally-debug-functionality doesn't mean you get to abuse the permission levels either.

This makes sense now. I will drop the patch.
Thank you very much for the review.

Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Why can't you have the process that wants to do all of the above, have admin rights as well? Doing all of that is _very_ low-level and can cause all sorts of horrible things to happen to your machine, and is not really "raw io" in the traditional sense at all, right?

If the above approach is going to cause the system to do horrible things, then I'll drop the idea.

Of course it can cause the system to do horrible things, try it yourself and see!

greg k-h

Signature · 1 line
       - Allen