PCI: allow sysfs file owner to read the config space with CAP_SYS_RAWIO
RFC 1/1 PCI: allow sysfs file owner to read the config space with CAP_SYS_RAWIO
From: Allen Pais <[email protected]>
Access to pci config space is explictly checked with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in order to read configuration space past the frist 64B.
Since the path is only for reading, could we use CAP_SYS_RAWIO?
This patch contains a simpler fix, I would love to hear from the Maintainers on the approach.
The other approach that I considered was to introduce and API
which would check for multiple capabilities, something similar to perfmon_capable()/bpf_capable(). But I could not find more users for the API and hence dropped it.
The problem I am trying to solve is to avoid handing outCAP_SYS_ADMIN for extended reads of the PCI config space.
--- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +2 -1
@@ -666,7 +666,8 @@ static ssize_t pci_read_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;/* Several chips lock up trying to read undefined config space */ -if (file_ns_capable (filp, &init_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (file_ns_capable (filp, &init_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) || +file_ns_capable (filp, &init_user_ns,CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) size = dev->cfg_size;else if (dev->hdr_type ==PCI_HEADER_TYPE_CARDBUS ) size =128 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Quoted 6 lines · Allen Pais
From: Allen Pais <[email protected]>
Access to pci config space is explictly checked with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in order to read configuration space past the frist 64B.Since the path is only for reading, could we use
CAP_SYS_RAWIO?
Why? What needs this reduced capability?
Quoted 10 lines
This patch contains a simpler fix, I would love to hear from the Maintainers on the approach.
The other approach that I considered was to introduce and API
which would check for multiple capabilities, something similar to perfmon_capable()/bpf_capable(). But I could not find more users for the API and hence dropped it.The problem I am trying to solve is to avoid handing out
CAP_SYS_ADMINfor extended reads of the PCI config space.
Who is reading this config space that doesn't have admin rights? And what are they doing with it?
One big problem is that some devices will crash if you do this wrong, which is why we restricted it to root. Hopefully all of those devices are now gone, but I don't think you can count on it.
The "guaranteed safe" fields in the config space are already exported by sysfs for all users to read, are they not sufficient?
thanks,
greg k-h
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Access to pci config space is explictly checked with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in order to read configuration space past the frist 64B.Since the path is only for reading, could we use
CAP_SYS_RAWIO?Why? What needs this reduced capability?
Thanks for the review.
We need read access to /sys/bus/pci/devices/, We need write access to config, remove, rescan & enable files under the device directory for each PCIe functions & the downstream PCIe port.
We need r/w access to sysfs to unbind and rebind the root complex.
Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 11 lines
This patch contains a simpler fix, I would love to hear from the Maintainers on the approach.
The other approach that I considered was to introduce and API
which would check for multiple capabilities, something similar to perfmon_capable()/bpf_capable(). But I could not find more users for the API and hence dropped it.The problem I am trying to solve is to avoid handing out
CAP_SYS_ADMINfor extended reads of the PCI config space.Who is reading this config space that doesn't have admin rights? And what are they doing with it?
One big problem is that some devices will crash if you do this wrong, which is why we restricted it to root. Hopefully all of those devices are now gone, but I don't think you can count on it.
The "guaranteed safe" fields in the config space are already exported by sysfs for all users to read, are they not sufficient?
thanks,
greg k-h
Signature · 1 line
- Allen
Quoted 8 lines · Allen
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Access to pci config space is explictly checked with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in order to read configuration space past the frist 64B.Since the path is only for reading, could we use
CAP_SYS_RAWIO?Why? What needs this reduced capability?
Quoted 7 lines
Thanks for the review.
We need read access to
/sys/bus/pci/devices/, We need write access to config, remove, rescan & enable files under the device directory for each PCIe functions & the downstream PCIe port.We need r/w access to sysfs to unbind and rebind the root complex.
That didn't answer my question at all.
Why can't you have the process that wants to do all of the above, have admin rights as well? Doing all of that is _very_ low-level and can cause all sorts of horrible things to happen to your machine, and is not really "raw io" in the traditional sense at all, right?
greg k-h
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Access to pci config space is explictly checked with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in order to read configuration space past the frist 64B.Since the path is only for reading, could we use
CAP_SYS_RAWIO?Why? What needs this reduced capability?
Thanks for the review.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
We need read access to
/sys/bus/pci/devices/, We need write access to config, remove, rescan & enable files under the device directory for each PCIe functions & the downstream PCIe port.We need r/w access to sysfs to unbind and rebind the root complex.
That didn't answer my question at all.
Sorry about that, breaking it down:
When the machine first boots, the VFIO device bindings under /dev/vfio are not present.
root@localhost:/tmp# ls -l /dev/vfio/ total 0 crw-rw-rw-. 1 root root 10, 196 Jan 5 01:47 vfio
We have an agent which needs to run the following commands (We get access denied here and need permissions to do this).
echo -n xxxx yyyy > /sys/module/vfio_pci/drivers/pci:vfio-pci/new_id echo -n xxxx yyyy > /sys/module/vfio_pci/drivers/pci:vfio-pci/new_id
And we want to avoid handing CAP_SYS_ADMIN here. Which is why the thought about CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Quoted 5 lines
Why can't you have the process that wants to do all of the above, have admin rights as well? Doing all of that is _very_ low-level and can cause all sorts of horrible things to happen to your machine, and is not really "raw io" in the traditional sense at all, right?
If the above approach is going to cause the system to do horrible things, then I'll drop the idea.
Signature · 1 line
- Allen
Quoted 27 lines · Allen
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Access to pci config space is explictly checked with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in order to read configuration space past the frist 64B.Since the path is only for reading, could we use
CAP_SYS_RAWIO?Why? What needs this reduced capability?
Thanks for the review.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
We need read access to
/sys/bus/pci/devices/, We need write access to config, remove, rescan & enable files under the device directory for each PCIe functions & the downstream PCIe port.We need r/w access to sysfs to unbind and rebind the root complex.
That didn't answer my question at all.
Sorry about that, breaking it down:
When the machine first boots, the VFIO device bindings under
/dev/vfioare not present.root@localhost:/tmp# ls -l /dev/vfio/ total 0 crw-rw-rw-. 1 root root 10, 196 Jan 5 01:47 vfio
Quoted 7 lines
We have an agent which needs to run the following commands (We get access denied here and need permissions to do this).
echo -n xxxx yyyy > /sys/module/vfio_pci/drivers/pci:vfio-pci/new_id echo -n xxxx yyyy > /sys/module/vfio_pci/drivers/pci:vfio-pci/new_idAnd we want to avoid handing
CAP_SYS_ADMINhere. Which is why the thought aboutCAP_SYS_RAWIO.
But that is not what you were asking this patch to do at all. So why bring it up?
new_id is NOT for "raw io" control, that should be only for admin priviliges.
And just because the vfio driver "abuses" this traditionally-debug-functionality doesn't mean you get to abuse the permission levels either.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Why can't you have the process that wants to do all of the above, have admin rights as well? Doing all of that is _very_ low-level and can cause all sorts of horrible things to happen to your machine, and is not really "raw io" in the traditional sense at all, right?
If the above approach is going to cause the system to do horrible things, then I'll drop the idea.
Of course it can cause the system to do horrible things, try it yourself and see!
greg k-h
Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Access to pci config space is explictly checked with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in order to read configuration space past the frist 64B.Since the path is only for reading, could we use
CAP_SYS_RAWIO?Why? What needs this reduced capability?
Thanks for the review.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
We need read access to
/sys/bus/pci/devices/, We need write access to config, remove, rescan & enable files under the device directory for each PCIe functions & the downstream PCIe port.We need r/w access to sysfs to unbind and rebind the root complex.
That didn't answer my question at all.
Sorry about that, breaking it down:
When the machine first boots, the VFIO device bindings under
/dev/vfioare not present.root@localhost:/tmp# ls -l /dev/vfio/ total 0 crw-rw-rw-. 1 root root 10, 196 Jan 5 01:47 vfioWe have an agent which needs to run the following commands (We get access denied here and need permissions to do this).
echo -n xxxx yyyy > /sys/module/vfio_pci/drivers/pci:vfio-pci/new_id echo -n xxxx yyyy > /sys/module/vfio_pci/drivers/pci:vfio-pci/new_id
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
And we want to avoid handing
CAP_SYS_ADMINhere. Which is why the thought aboutCAP_SYS_RAWIO.But that is not what you were asking this patch to do at all. So why bring it up?
new_idis NOT for "raw io" control, that should be only for admin priviliges.
Okay. Thanks for the explanation.
Quoted 4 lines
And just because the vfio driver "abuses" this traditionally-debug-functionality doesn't mean you get to abuse the permission levels either.
This makes sense now. I will drop the patch.
Thank you very much for the review.
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Why can't you have the process that wants to do all of the above, have admin rights as well? Doing all of that is _very_ low-level and can cause all sorts of horrible things to happen to your machine, and is not really "raw io" in the traditional sense at all, right?
If the above approach is going to cause the system to do horrible things, then I'll drop the idea.
Of course it can cause the system to do horrible things, try it yourself and see!
greg k-h
Signature · 1 line
- Allen