4.9.240-rc1 review
Subsystems (2)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 4.9.240-rc1 review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.240 release. There are 16 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun, 18 Oct 2020 09:04:25 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.240-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.9.240-rc1
Dominik Przychodni <[email protected]>
crypto: qat - check cipher length for aead AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
reiserfs: Fix oops during mount
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
reiserfs: Initialize inode keys properly
Mychaela N. Falconia <[email protected]>
USB: serial: ftdi_sio: add support for FreeCalypso JTAG+UART adapters
Scott Chen <[email protected]>
USB: serial: pl2303: add device-id for HP GC device
Anant Thazhemadam <[email protected]>
staging: comedi: check validity of wMaxPacketSize of usb endpoints found
Leonid Bloch <[email protected]>
USB: serial: option: Add Telit FT980-KS composition
Wilken Gottwalt <[email protected]>
USB: serial: option: add Cellient MPL200 card
Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
media: usbtv: Fix refcounting mixup
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: Disconnect if E0 is used for Level 4
Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: Fix update of connection state in hci_encrypt_cfm
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm
Alain Michaud <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: fix kernel oops in store_pending_adv_report
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix not checking if BT_HS is enabled
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix calling sk_filter on non-socket based channel
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: A2MP: Fix not initializing all members
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c | 10 ++++- drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-core.c | 3 +- drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c | 3 ++ drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c | 5 +++ drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h | 7 ++++ drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 5 +++ drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c | 1 + drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h | 1 + fs/reiserfs/inode.c | 6 +-- fs/reiserfs/xattr.c | 7 ++++ include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 30 +++++++++++--- include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h | 2 + net/bluetooth/a2mp.c | 22 +++++++++- net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 17 ++++++++ net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 70 +++++++++++++------------------- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 7 ++-- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 14 +++++++ net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 7 +++- 19 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/16 Bluetooth: A2MP: Fix not initializing all members
From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
commit eddb7732119d53400f48a02536a84c509692faa8 upstream.
This fixes various places where a stack variable is used uninitialized.
--- net/bluetooth/a2mp.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/a2mp.c +21 -1
@@ -233,6 +233,9 @@ static int a2mp_discover_rsp(struct amp_struct a2mp_info_req req; found = true; + +memset (&req,0 ,sizeof (req)); + req.id = cl->id;a2mp_send (mgr,A2MP_GETINFO_REQ ,__next_ident (mgr),sizeof (req), &req);
@@ -312,6 +315,8 @@ static int a2mp_getinfo_req(struct amp_mif (!hdev || hdev->dev_type !=HCI_AMP ) {struct a2mp_info_rsp rsp; +memset (&rsp,0 ,sizeof (rsp)); + rsp.id = req->id; rsp.status =A2MP_STATUS_INVALID_CTRL_ID ;
@@ -355,6 +360,8 @@ static int a2mp_getinfo_rsp(struct amp_mif (!ctrl)return -ENOMEM ; +memset (&req,0 ,sizeof (req)); + req.id = rsp->id;a2mp_send (mgr,A2MP_GETAMPASSOC_REQ ,__next_ident (mgr),sizeof (req), &req);
@@ -383,6 +390,8 @@ static int a2mp_getampassoc_req(struct astruct a2mp_amp_assoc_rsp rsp; rsp.id = req->id; +memset (&rsp,0 ,sizeof (rsp)); +if (tmp) { rsp.status =A2MP_STATUS_COLLISION_OCCURED ;amp_mgr_put (tmp);
@@ -471,7 +480,6 @@ static int a2mp_createphyslink_req(struc struct a2mp_cmd *hdr) {struct a2mp_physlink_req *req = (void *) skb->data; -struct a2mp_physlink_rsp rsp;struct hci_dev *hdev;struct hci_conn *hcon;
@@ -482,6 +490,8 @@ static int a2mp_createphyslink_req(strucBT_DBG ("local_id %d, remote_id %d" , req->local_id, req->remote_id); +memset (&rsp,0 ,sizeof (rsp)); + rsp.local_id = req->remote_id; rsp.remote_id = req->local_id;
@@ -560,6 +570,8 @@ static int a2mp_discphyslink_req(structBT_DBG ("local_id %d remote_id %d" , req->local_id, req->remote_id); +memset (&rsp,0 ,sizeof (rsp)); + rsp.local_id = req->remote_id; rsp.remote_id = req->local_id; rsp.status =A2MP_STATUS_SUCCESS ;
@@ -682,6 +694,8 @@ static int a2mp_chan_recv_cb(struct l2caif (err) {struct a2mp_cmd_rej rej; +memset (&rej,0 ,sizeof (rej)); + rej.reason =cpu_to_le16 (0 ); hdr = (void *) skb->data;
@@ -905,6 +919,8 @@ void a2mp_send_getinfo_rsp(struct hci_deBT_DBG ("%s mgr %p" , hdev->name, mgr); +memset (&rsp,0 ,sizeof (rsp)); + rsp.id = hdev->id; rsp.status =A2MP_STATUS_INVALID_CTRL_ID ;
@@ -1002,6 +1018,8 @@ void a2mp_send_create_phy_link_rsp(strucif (!mgr)return ; +memset (&rsp,0 ,sizeof (rsp)); + hs_hcon =hci_conn_hash_lookup_state (hdev,AMP_LINK ,BT_CONNECT );if (!hs_hcon) { rsp.status =A2MP_STATUS_UNABLE_START_LINK_CREATION ;
@@ -1034,6 +1052,8 @@ void a2mp_discover_amp(struct l2cap_chan mgr->bredr_chan = chan; +memset (&req,0 ,sizeof (req)); + req.mtu =cpu_to_le16 (L2CAP_A2MP_DEFAULT_MTU ); req.ext_feat =0 ;a2mp_send (mgr,A2MP_DISCOVER_REQ ,1 ,sizeof (req), &req);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/16 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix calling sk_filter on non-socket based channel
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
commit f19425641cb2572a33cb074d5e30283720bd4d22 upstream.
Only sockets will have the chan->data set to an actual sk, channels like A2MP would have its own data which would likely cause a crash when calling sk_filter, in order to fix this a new callback has been introduced so channels can implement their own filtering if necessary.
--- include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h | 2 ++ net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 7 ++++--- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h +2 -0
@@ -619,6 +619,8 @@ struct l2cap_ops {struct sk_buff *(*alloc_skb) (struct l2cap_chan *chan,unsigned long hdr_len,unsigned long len,int nb); +int (*filter) (struct l2cap_chan * chan, +struct sk_buff *skb); };struct l2cap_conn {
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +4 -3
@@ -6675,9 +6675,10 @@ static int l2cap_data_rcv(struct l2cap_c goto drop; } -if ((chan->mode ==L2CAP_MODE_ERTM || - chan->mode ==L2CAP_MODE_STREAMING ) &&sk_filter (chan->data, skb)) - goto drop; +if (chan->ops->filter) { +if (chan->ops->filter (chan, skb)) + goto drop; + }if (!control->sframe) {int err;
net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +14 -0
@@ -1475,6 +1475,19 @@ static void l2cap_sock_suspend_cb(struct sk->sk_state_change (sk); } +static int l2cap_sock_filter (struct l2cap_chan *chan,struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +struct sock *sk = chan->data; + +switch (chan->mode) { +case L2CAP_MODE_ERTM : +case L2CAP_MODE_STREAMING : +return sk_filter (sk, skb); + } + +return 0 ; +} +static const struct l2cap_ops l2cap_chan_ops = { .name ="L2CAP Socket Interface" , .new_connection = l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb,
@@ -1489,6 +1502,7 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops l2cap_chan .set_shutdown = l2cap_sock_set_shutdown_cb, .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_sock_get_sndtimeo_cb, .alloc_skb = l2cap_sock_alloc_skb_cb, + .filter = l2cap_sock_filter, };static void l2cap_sock_destruct (struct sock *sk)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/16 Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix not checking if BT_HS is enabled
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
commit b560a208cda0297fef6ff85bbfd58a8f0a52a543 upstream.
This checks if BT_HS is enabled relecting it on MGMT_SETTING_HS instead of always reporting it as supported.
--- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +6 -1
@@ -635,7 +635,8 @@ static u32 get_supported_settings(structif (lmp_ssp_capable (hdev)) { settings |=MGMT_SETTING_SSP ; - settings |=MGMT_SETTING_HS ; +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_BT_HS )) + settings |=MGMT_SETTING_HS ; }if (lmp_sc_capable (hdev))
@@ -1645,6 +1646,10 @@ static int set_hs(struct sock *sk, strucBT_DBG ("request for %s" , hdev->name); +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_BT_HS )) +return mgmt_cmd_status (sk, hdev->id,MGMT_OP_SET_HS , +MGMT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + status =mgmt_bredr_support (hdev);if (status)return mgmt_cmd_status (sk, hdev->id,MGMT_OP_SET_HS , status);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/16 Bluetooth: fix kernel oops in store_pending_adv_report
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Alain Michaud <[email protected]>
commit a2ec905d1e160a33b2e210e45ad30445ef26ce0e upstream.
Fix kernel oops observed when an ext adv data is larger than 31 bytes.
This can be reproduced by setting up an advertiser with advertisement larger than 31 bytes. The issue is not sensitive to the advertisement content. In particular, this was reproduced with an advertisement of 229 bytes filled with 'A'. See stack trace below.
This is fixed by not catching ext_adv as legacy adv are only cached to be able to concatenate a scanable adv with its scan response before sending it up through mgmt.
With ext_adv, this is no longer necessary.
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 6 PID: 205 Comm: kworker/u17:0 Not tainted 5.4.0-37-generic #41-Ubuntu
Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 15 7590/0CF6RR, BIOS 1.7.0 05/11/2020
Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [bluetooth]
RIP: 0010:hci_bdaddr_list_lookup+0x1e/0x40 [bluetooth]
Code: ff ff e9 26 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 8b 07 48 89 e5 48 39 c7 75 0a eb 24 48 8b 00 48 39 f8 74 1c 44 8b 06 <44> 39 40 10 75 ef 44 0f b7 4e 04 66 44 39 48 14 75 e3 38 50 16 75
RSP: 0018:ffffbc6a40493c70 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 4141414141414141 RBX: 000000000000001b RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9903e76c100f RDI: ffff9904289d4b28
RBP: ffffbc6a40493c70 R08: 0000000093570362 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9904344eae38 R12: ffff9904289d4000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffa3 R15: ffff9903e76c100f
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff990434580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007feed125a000 CR3: 00000001b860a003 CR4: 00000000003606e0
Call Trace:
process_adv_report+0x12e/0x560 [bluetooth]
hci_le_meta_evt+0x7b2/0xba0 [bluetooth]
hci_event_packet+0x1c29/0x2a90 [bluetooth]
hci_rx_work+0x19b/0x360 [bluetooth]
process_one_work+0x1eb/0x3b0
worker_thread+0x4d/0x400
kthread+0x104/0x140--- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +17 -5
@@ -1133,6 +1133,9 @@ static void store_pending_adv_report(str {struct discovery_state *d = &hdev->discovery; +if (len >HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH ) +return ; +bacpy (&d->last_adv_addr, bdaddr); d->last_adv_addr_type = bdaddr_type; d->last_adv_rssi = rssi;
@@ -4779,6 +4782,11 @@ static void process_adv_report(struct hcreturn ; } +if (len >HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH ) { +pr_err_ratelimited ("legacy adv larger than 31 bytes" ); +return ; + } +/* Find the end of the data in case the report contains padded zero * bytes at the end causing an invalid length value. *
@@ -4839,7 +4847,7 @@ static void process_adv_report(struct hc*/ conn =check_pending_le_conn (hdev, bdaddr, bdaddr_type, type, direct_addr); -if (conn && type ==LE_ADV_IND ) { +if (conn && type ==LE_ADV_IND && len <=HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH ) {/* Store report for later inclusion by * mgmt_device_connected */
@@ -4964,10 +4972,14 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(structstruct hci_ev_le_advertising_info *ev = ptr;s8 rssi; - rssi = ev->data[ev->length]; -process_adv_report (hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr, - ev->bdaddr_type,NULL ,0 , rssi, - ev->data, ev->length); +if (ev->length <=HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH ) { + rssi = ev->data[ev->length]; +process_adv_report (hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr, + ev->bdaddr_type,NULL ,0 , rssi, + ev->data, ev->length); + }else { +bt_dev_err (hdev,"Dropping invalid advertising data" ); + } ptr +=sizeof (*ev) + ev->length +1 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/16 Bluetooth: Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
commit 3ca44c16b0dcc764b641ee4ac226909f5c421aa3 upstream.
This makes hci_encrypt_cfm calls hci_connect_cfm in case the connection state is BT_CONFIG so callers don't have to check the state.
--- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 28 +++------------------------- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +18 -2
@@ -1250,10 +1250,26 @@ static inline void hci_auth_cfm(struct h conn->security_cfm_cb (conn, status); } -static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm (struct hci_conn *conn,__u8 status, -__u8 encrypt) +static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm (struct hci_conn *conn,__u8 status) {struct hci_cb *cb; +__u8 encrypt; + +if (conn->state ==BT_CONFIG ) { +if (status) + conn->state =BT_CONNECTED ; + +hci_connect_cfm (conn, status); +hci_conn_drop (conn); +return ; + } + +if (!test_bit (HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT , &conn->flags)) + encrypt =0x00 ; +else if (test_bit (HCI_CONN_AES_CCM , &conn->flags)) + encrypt =0x02 ; +else + encrypt =0x01 ;if (conn->sec_level ==BT_SECURITY_SDP ) conn->sec_level =BT_SECURITY_LOW ;
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +3 -25
@@ -2493,7 +2493,7 @@ static void hci_auth_complete_evt(struct &cp); }else {clear_bit (HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND , &conn->flags); -hci_encrypt_cfm (conn, ev->status,0x00 ); +hci_encrypt_cfm (conn, ev->status); } }
@@ -2579,22 +2579,7 @@ static void read_enc_key_size_complete(s conn->enc_key_size = rp->key_size; } -if (conn->state ==BT_CONFIG ) { - conn->state =BT_CONNECTED ; -hci_connect_cfm (conn,0 ); -hci_conn_drop (conn); - }else { -u8 encrypt; - -if (!test_bit (HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT , &conn->flags)) - encrypt =0x00 ; -else if (test_bit (HCI_CONN_AES_CCM , &conn->flags)) - encrypt =0x02 ; -else - encrypt =0x01 ; - -hci_encrypt_cfm (conn,0 , encrypt); - } +hci_encrypt_cfm (conn,0 ); unlock:hci_dev_unlock (hdev);
@@ -2691,14 +2676,7 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struc } notify: -if (conn->state ==BT_CONFIG ) { -if (!ev->status) - conn->state =BT_CONNECTED ; - -hci_connect_cfm (conn, ev->status); -hci_conn_drop (conn); - }else -hci_encrypt_cfm (conn, ev->status, ev->encrypt); +hci_encrypt_cfm (conn, ev->status); unlock:hci_dev_unlock (hdev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/16 Bluetooth: Fix update of connection state in `hci_encrypt_cfm`
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
commit 339ddaa626995bc6218972ca241471f3717cc5f4 upstream.
Starting with the upgrade to v5.8-rc3, I've noticed I wasn't able to connect to my Bluetooth headset properly anymore. While connecting to the device would eventually succeed, bluetoothd seemed to be confused about the current connection state where the state was flapping hence and forth. Bisecting this issue led to commit 3ca44c16b0dc (Bluetooth:
Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm, 2020-05-19), which refactored hci_encrypt_cfm to also handle updating the connection state.
The commit in question changed the code to call hci_connect_cfm inside hci_encrypt_cfm and to change the connection state. But with the conversion, we now only update the connection state if a status was set already. In fact, the reverse should be true: the status should be updated if no status is yet set. So let's fix the isuse by reversing the condition.
--- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +1 -1
@@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@ static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struc__u8 encrypt;if (conn->state ==BT_CONFIG ) { -if (status) +if (!status) conn->state =BT_CONNECTED ;hci_connect_cfm (conn, status);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/16 Bluetooth: Disconnect if E0 is used for Level 4
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
commit 8746f135bb01872ff412d408ea1aa9ebd328c1f5 upstream.
E0 is not allowed with Level 4:
BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319:
'128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed, SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key not shortened'
SC enabled:
Quoted 1 line
HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (
0x23) plen 13
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 256
Page: 1/2
Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
LE Supported (Host)
Secure Connections (Host Support)Quoted 1 line
HCI Event: Encryption Change (
0x08) plen 4
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 256
Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02)SC disabled:
Quoted 1 line
HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (
0x23) plen 13
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 256
Page: 1/2
Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
LE Supported (Host)Quoted 1 line
HCI Event: Encryption Change (
0x08) plen 4
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 256
Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
[May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used
< HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3
Handle: 256
Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)--- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 10 ++++++---- net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 20 ++++++++------------ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +6 -4
@@ -1271,11 +1271,13 @@ static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(strucelse encrypt =0x01 ; -if (conn->sec_level ==BT_SECURITY_SDP ) - conn->sec_level =BT_SECURITY_LOW ; +if (!status) { +if (conn->sec_level ==BT_SECURITY_SDP ) + conn->sec_level =BT_SECURITY_LOW ; -if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level) - conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level; +if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level) + conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level; + }mutex_lock (&hci_cb_list_lock);list_for_each_entry (cb, &hci_cb_list, list) {
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +17 -0
@@ -1163,6 +1163,23 @@ int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_return 0 ; } +/* AES encryption is required for Level 4: +* +* BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C +* page 1319: +* +* 128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys +* required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed, +* SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key +* not shortened) +*/ +if (conn->sec_level ==BT_SECURITY_FIPS && + !test_bit (HCI_CONN_AES_CCM , &conn->flags)) { +bt_dev_err (conn->hdev, +"Invalid security: Missing AES-CCM usage" ); +return 0 ; + } +if (hci_conn_ssp_enabled (conn) && !test_bit (HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT , &conn->flags))return 0 ;
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +8 -12
@@ -2626,26 +2626,22 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(strucclear_bit (HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND , &conn->flags); +/* Check link security requirements are met */ +if (!hci_conn_check_link_mode (conn)) + ev->status =HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE ; +if (ev->status && conn->state ==BT_CONNECTED ) {if (ev->status ==HCI_ERROR_PIN_OR_KEY_MISSING )set_bit (HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE , &conn->flags); +/* Notify upper layers so they can cleanup before +* disconnecting. +*/ +hci_encrypt_cfm (conn, ev->status);hci_disconnect (conn,HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE );hci_conn_drop (conn); goto unlock; } - -/* In Secure Connections Only mode, do not allow any connections -* that are not encrypted with AES-CCM using a P-256 authenticated -* combination key. -*/ -if (hci_dev_test_flag (hdev,HCI_SC_ONLY ) && - (!test_bit (HCI_CONN_AES_CCM , &conn->flags) || - conn->key_type !=HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256 )) { -hci_connect_cfm (conn,HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE ); -hci_conn_drop (conn); - goto unlock; - }/* Try reading the encryption key size for encrypted ACL links */ if (!ev->status && ev->encrypt && conn->type ==ACL_LINK ) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/16 media: usbtv: Fix refcounting mixup
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
commit bf65f8aabdb37bc1a785884374e919477fe13e10 upstream.
The premature free in the error path is blocked by V4L refcounting, not USB refcounting. Thanks to Ben Hutchings for review.
[v2] corrected attributions
--- drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-core.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-core.c +2 -1
@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ static int usbtv_probe(struct usb_interf usbtv_audio_fail:/* we must not free at this point */ -usb_get_dev (usbtv->udev); +v4l2_device_get (&usbtv->v4l2_dev); +/* this will undo the v4l2_device_get() */ usbtv_video_free (usbtv); usbtv_video_fail:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/16 USB: serial: option: add Cellient MPL200 card
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Wilken Gottwalt <[email protected]>
commit 3e765cab8abe7f84cb80d4a7a973fc97d5742647 upstream.
Add usb ids of the Cellient MPL200 card.
--- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/option.c +3 -0
@@ -529,6 +529,7 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struc/* Cellient products */ #define CELLIENT_VENDOR_ID 0x2692#define CELLIENT_PRODUCT_MEN200 0x9005 +#define CELLIENT_PRODUCT_MPL200 0x9025/* Hyundai Petatel Inc. products */ #define PETATEL_VENDOR_ID 0x1ff4
@@ -1967,6 +1968,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(MEDIATEK_VENDOR_ID, MEDIATEK_PRODUCT_DC_4COM2, 0xff, 0x02, 0x01) }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(MEDIATEK_VENDOR_ID, MEDIATEK_PRODUCT_DC_4COM2, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00) }, { USB_DEVICE(CELLIENT_VENDOR_ID, CELLIENT_PRODUCT_MEN200) }, + { USB_DEVICE(CELLIENT_VENDOR_ID, CELLIENT_PRODUCT_MPL200), + .driver_info = RSVD(1) | RSVD(4) }, { USB_DEVICE(PETATEL_VENDOR_ID, PETATEL_PRODUCT_NP10T_600A) }, { USB_DEVICE(PETATEL_VENDOR_ID, PETATEL_PRODUCT_NP10T_600E) }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TPLINK_VENDOR_ID, TPLINK_PRODUCT_LTE, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00) }, /* TP-Link LTE Module */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/16 USB: serial: option: Add Telit FT980-KS composition
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Leonid Bloch <[email protected]>
commit 924a9213358fb92fa3c3225d6d042aa058167405 upstream.
This commit adds the following Telit FT980-KS composition:
0x1054: rndis, diag, adb, nmea, modem, modem, aux
AT commands can be sent to /dev/ttyUSB2.
--- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/option.c +2 -0
@@ -1172,6 +1172,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option .driver_info = NCTRL(2) | RSVD(3) }, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1053, 0xff), /* Telit FN980 (ECM) */ .driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(1) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1054, 0xff), /* Telit FT980-KS */ + .driver_info = NCTRL(2) | RSVD(3) }, { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_ME910), .driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(1) | RSVD(3) }, { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_ME910_DUAL_MODEM),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/16 staging: comedi: check validity of wMaxPacketSize of usb endpoints found
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Anant Thazhemadam <[email protected]>
commit e1f13c879a7c21bd207dc6242455e8e3a1e88b40 upstream.
While finding usb endpoints in vmk80xx_find_usb_endpoints(), check if wMaxPacketSize = 0 for the endpoints found.
Some devices have isochronous endpoints that have wMaxPacketSize = 0 (as required by the USB-2 spec).
However, since this doesn't apply here, wMaxPacketSize = 0 can be considered to be invalid.
--- drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c +3 -0
@@ -676,6 +676,9 @@ static int vmk80xx_find_usb_endpoints(stif (!devpriv->ep_rx || !devpriv->ep_tx)return -ENODEV ; +if (!usb_endpoint_maxp (devpriv->ep_rx) || !usb_endpoint_maxp (devpriv->ep_tx)) +return -EINVAL ; +return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/16 USB: serial: pl2303: add device-id for HP GC device
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Scott Chen <[email protected]>
commit 031f9664f8f9356cee662335bc56c93d16e75665 upstream.
This is adds a device id for HP LD381 which is a pl2303GC-base device.
--- drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c | 1 + drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c +1 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD220_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD220TA_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD381_PRODUCT_ID) }, + { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD381GC_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD960_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD960TA_PRODUCT_ID) }, { USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LCM220_PRODUCT_ID) },
drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h +1 -0
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@/* Hewlett-Packard POS Pole Displays */ #define HP_VENDOR_ID 0x03f0 +#define HP_LD381GC_PRODUCT_ID 0x0183#define HP_LM920_PRODUCT_ID 0x026b#define HP_TD620_PRODUCT_ID 0x0956#define HP_LD960_PRODUCT_ID 0x0b39
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/16 USB: serial: ftdi_sio: add support for FreeCalypso JTAG+UART adapters
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mychaela N. Falconia <[email protected]>
commit 6cf87e5edd9944e1d3b6efd966ea401effc304ee upstream.
There exist many FT2232-based JTAG+UART adapter designs in which FT2232 Channel A is used for JTAG and Channel B is used for UART. The best way to handle them in Linux is to have the ftdi_sio driver create a ttyUSB device only for Channel B and not for Channel A:
a ttyUSB device for Channel A would be bogus and will disappear as soon as the user runs OpenOCD or other applications that access Channel A for JTAG from userspace, causing undesirable noise for users. The ftdi_sio driver already has a dedicated quirk for such JTAG+UART FT2232 adapters, and it requires assigning custom USB IDs to such adapters and adding these IDs to the driver with the ftdi_jtag_quirk applied.
Boutique hardware manufacturer Falconia Partners LLC has created a couple of JTAG+UART adapter designs (one buffered, one unbuffered) as part of FreeCalypso project, and this hardware is specifically made to be used with Linux hosts, with the intent that Channel A will be accessed only from userspace via appropriate applications, and that Channel B will be supported by the ftdi_sio kernel driver, presenting a standard ttyUSB device to userspace. Toward this end the hardware manufacturer will be programming FT2232 EEPROMs with custom USB IDs, specifically with the intent that these IDs will be recognized by the ftdi_sio driver with the ftdi_jtag_quirk applied.
--- drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c | 5 +++++ drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c +5 -0
@@ -1032,6 +1032,11 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab/* U-Blox devices */ { USB_DEVICE(UBLOX_VID, UBLOX_C099F9P_ZED_PID) }, { USB_DEVICE(UBLOX_VID, UBLOX_C099F9P_ODIN_PID) }, +/* FreeCalypso USB adapters */ + { USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, FTDI_FALCONIA_JTAG_BUF_PID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&ftdi_jtag_quirk }, + { USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, FTDI_FALCONIA_JTAG_UNBUF_PID), + .driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&ftdi_jtag_quirk }, { } /* Terminating entry */ };
drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h +7 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,13 @@#define FTDI_LUMEL_PD12_PID 0x6002 +/* +* Custom USB adapters made by Falconia Partners LLC +* for FreeCalypso project, ID codes allocated to Falconia by FTDI. +*/ +#define FTDI_FALCONIA_JTAG_BUF_PID 0x7150 +#define FTDI_FALCONIA_JTAG_UNBUF_PID 0x7151 +/* Sienna Serial Interface by Secyourit GmbH */ #define FTDI_SIENNA_PID 0x8348
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/16 reiserfs: Initialize inode keys properly
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 4443390e08d34d5771ab444f601cf71b3c9634a4 upstream.
reiserfs_read_locked_inode() didn't initialize key length properly. Use _make_cpu_key() macro for key initialization so that all key member are properly initialized.
--- fs/reiserfs/inode.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/reiserfs/inode.c +1 -5
@@ -1554,11 +1554,7 @@ void reiserfs_read_locked_inode(struct i* set version 1, version 2 could be used too, because stat data * key is the same in both versions */ - key.version =KEY_FORMAT_3_5 ; - key.on_disk_key.k_dir_id = dirino; - key.on_disk_key.k_objectid = inode->i_ino; - key.on_disk_key.k_offset =0 ; - key.on_disk_key.k_type =0 ; +_make_cpu_key (&key,KEY_FORMAT_3_5 , dirino, inode->i_ino,0 ,0 ,3 );/* look for the object's stat data */ retval =search_item (inode->i_sb, &key, &path_to_sd);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/16 reiserfs: Fix oops during mount
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit c2bb80b8bdd04dfe32364b78b61b6a47f717af52 upstream.
With suitably crafted reiserfs image and mount command reiserfs will crash when trying to verify that XATTR_ROOT directory can be looked up in / as that recurses back to xattr code like:
xattr_lookup+0x24/0x280 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:395 reiserfs_xattr_get+0x89/0x540 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:677 reiserfs_get_acl+0x63/0x690 fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c:209 get_acl+0x152/0x2e0 fs/posix_acl.c:141 check_acl fs/namei.c:277 [inline] acl_permission_check fs/namei.c:309 [inline] generic_permission+0x2ba/0x550 fs/namei.c:353 do_inode_permission fs/namei.c:398 [inline] inode_permission+0x234/0x4a0 fs/namei.c:463 lookup_one_len+0xa6/0x200 fs/namei.c:2557 reiserfs_lookup_privroot+0x85/0x1e0 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:972 reiserfs_fill_super+0x2b51/0x3240 fs/reiserfs/super.c:2176 mount_bdev+0x24f/0x360 fs/super.c:1417
Fix the problem by bailing from reiserfs_xattr_get() when xattrs are not yet initialized.
--- fs/reiserfs/xattr.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/reiserfs/xattr.c +7 -0
@@ -664,6 +664,13 @@ reiserfs_xattr_get(struct inode *inode,if (get_inode_sd_version (inode) ==STAT_DATA_V1 )return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +/* +* priv_root needn't be initialized during mount so allow initial +* lookups to succeed. +*/ +if (!REISERFS_SB (inode->i_sb)->priv_root) +return 0 ; + dentry =xattr_lookup (inode, name,XATTR_REPLACE );if (IS_ERR (dentry)) { err =PTR_ERR (dentry);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/16 crypto: qat - check cipher length for aead AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dominik Przychodni <[email protected]>
commit 45cb6653b0c355fc1445a8069ba78a4ce8720511 upstream.
Return -EINVAL for authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes)), authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)) and authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(aes)) if the cipher length is not multiple of the AES block. This is to prevent an undefined device behaviour.
--- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c +9 -1
@@ -822,6 +822,11 @@ static int qat_alg_aead_dec(struct aead_struct icp_qat_fw_la_bulk_req *msg;int digst_size =crypto_aead_authsize (aead_tfm);int ret, ctr =0 ; +u32 cipher_len; + + cipher_len = areq->cryptlen - digst_size; +if (cipher_len %AES_BLOCK_SIZE !=0 ) +return -EINVAL ; ret =qat_alg_sgl_to_bufl (ctx->inst, areq->src, areq->dst, qat_req);if (unlikely (ret))
@@ -836,7 +841,7 @@ static int qat_alg_aead_dec(struct aead_ qat_req->req.comn_mid.src_data_addr = qat_req->buf.blp; qat_req->req.comn_mid.dest_data_addr = qat_req->buf.bloutp; cipher_param = (void *)&qat_req->req.serv_specif_rqpars; - cipher_param->cipher_length = areq->cryptlen - digst_size; + cipher_param->cipher_length = cipher_len; cipher_param->cipher_offset = areq->assoclen;memcpy (cipher_param->u.cipher_IV_array, areq->iv,AES_BLOCK_SIZE ); auth_param = (void *)((uint8_t *)cipher_param +sizeof (*cipher_param));
@@ -865,6 +870,9 @@ static int qat_alg_aead_enc(struct aead_uint8_t *iv = areq->iv;int ret, ctr =0 ; +if (areq->cryptlen %AES_BLOCK_SIZE !=0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + ret =qat_alg_sgl_to_bufl (ctx->inst, areq->src, areq->dst, qat_req);if (unlikely (ret))return ret;
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.240 release. There are 16 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun, 18 Oct 2020 09:04:25 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.240-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
All tests passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v4.9:
8 builds: 8 pass, 0 fail
16 boots: 16 pass, 0 fail
30 tests: 30 pass, 0 failLinux version: 4.9.240-rc1-geb0fbe0c6b1c
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,
tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04
Jon
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.240 release. There are 16 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun, 18 Oct 2020 09:04:25 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build results:
total: 168 pass: 168 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 386 pass: 386 fail: 0
Guenter
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.240 release. There are 16 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun, 18 Oct 2020 09:04:25 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.240-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.9.240-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.9.y
git commit: eb0fbe0c6b1c2863b26464de441a406275c47b6d
git describe: v4.9.239-17-geb0fbe0c6b1c
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-4.9.y/build/v4.9.239-17-geb0fbe0c6b1c
No regressions (compared to build v4.9.239)
No fixes (compared to build v4.9.239)
Ran 17816 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- juno-r2-compat
- juno-r2-kasan
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
- x86-kasan
Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* libhugetlbfs
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* perf
* v4l2-compliance
* network-basic-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ssuite
Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT https://lkft.linaro.org
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.240 release. There are 16 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun, 18 Oct 2020 09:04:25 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.240-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah