5.8.16-rc1 review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.8.16 release. There are 14 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 18 Oct 2020 09:04:25 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.8.16-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.8.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 5.8.16-rc1

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
reiserfs: Fix oops during mount

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
reiserfs: Initialize inode keys properly

Mychaela N. Falconia <[email protected]>
USB: serial: ftdi_sio: add support for FreeCalypso JTAG+UART adapters

Scott Chen <[email protected]>
USB: serial: pl2303: add device-id for HP GC device

Anant Thazhemadam <[email protected]>
staging: comedi: check validity of wMaxPacketSize of usb endpoints found

Leonid Bloch <[email protected]>
USB: serial: option: Add Telit FT980-KS composition

Wilken Gottwalt <[email protected]>
USB: serial: option: add Cellient MPL200 card

Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
media: usbtv: Fix refcounting mixup

Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: Disconnect if E0 is used for Level 4

Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix not checking if BT_HS is enabled

Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix calling sk_filter on non-socket based channel

Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: A2MP: Fix not initializing all members

Dominik Przychodni <[email protected]>
crypto: qat - check cipher length for aead AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA

Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
crypto: bcm - Verify GCM/CCM key length in setkey

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                 |  4 ++--
 drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c              | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c | 10 +++++++++-
 drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-core.c     |  3 ++-
 drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c |  3 +++
 drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c            |  5 +++++
 drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h        |  7 +++++++
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c              |  5 +++++
 drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c              |  1 +
 drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h              |  1 +
 fs/reiserfs/inode.c                      |  6 +-----
 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c                      |  7 +++++++
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h         | 10 ++++++----
 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h            |  2 ++
 net/bluetooth/a2mp.c                     | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c                 | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c                | 20 ++++++++------------
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c               |  7 ++++---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c               | 14 ++++++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c                     |  7 ++++++-
 20 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>

commit 10a2f0b311094ffd45463a529a410a51ca025f27 upstream.

The setkey function for GCM/CCM algorithms didn't verify the key length before copying the key and subtracting the salt length.

This patch delays the copying of the key til after the verification has been done. It also adds checks on the key length to ensure that it's at least as long as the salt.

---
 drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c |   15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2930,7 +2930,6 @@ static int aead_gcm_ccm_setkey(struct cr
 
 	ctx->enckeylen = keylen;
 	ctx->authkeylen = 0;
-	memcpy(ctx->enckey, key, ctx->enckeylen);
 
 	switch (ctx->enckeylen) {
 	case AES_KEYSIZE_128:

@@ -2946,6 +2945,8 @@ static int aead_gcm_ccm_setkey(struct cr
 		goto badkey;
 	}
 
+	memcpy(ctx->enckey, key, ctx->enckeylen);
+
 	flow_log("  enckeylen:%u authkeylen:%u\n", ctx->enckeylen,
 		 ctx->authkeylen);
 	flow_dump("  enc: ", ctx->enckey, ctx->enckeylen);

@@ -3000,6 +3001,10 @@ static int aead_gcm_esp_setkey(struct cr
 	struct iproc_ctx_s *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(cipher);
 
 	flow_log("%s\n", __func__);
+
+	if (keylen < GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ctx->salt_len = GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE;
 	ctx->salt_offset = GCM_ESP_SALT_OFFSET;
 	memcpy(ctx->salt, key + keylen - GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE, GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE);

@@ -3028,6 +3033,10 @@ static int rfc4543_gcm_esp_setkey(struct
 	struct iproc_ctx_s *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(cipher);
 
 	flow_log("%s\n", __func__);
+
+	if (keylen < GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ctx->salt_len = GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE;
 	ctx->salt_offset = GCM_ESP_SALT_OFFSET;
 	memcpy(ctx->salt, key + keylen - GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE, GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE);

@@ -3057,6 +3066,10 @@ static int aead_ccm_esp_setkey(struct cr
 	struct iproc_ctx_s *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(cipher);
 
 	flow_log("%s\n", __func__);
+
+	if (keylen < CCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ctx->salt_len = CCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE;
 	ctx->salt_offset = CCM_ESP_SALT_OFFSET;
 	memcpy(ctx->salt, key + keylen - CCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE, CCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE);

From: Dominik Przychodni <[email protected]>

commit 45cb6653b0c355fc1445a8069ba78a4ce8720511 upstream.

Return -EINVAL for authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes)), authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)) and authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(aes)) if the cipher length is not multiple of the AES block. This is to prevent an undefined device behaviour.

---
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c |   10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -871,6 +871,11 @@ static int qat_alg_aead_dec(struct aead_
 	struct icp_qat_fw_la_bulk_req *msg;
 	int digst_size = crypto_aead_authsize(aead_tfm);
 	int ret, ctr = 0;
+	u32 cipher_len;
+
+	cipher_len = areq->cryptlen - digst_size;
+	if (cipher_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	ret = qat_alg_sgl_to_bufl(ctx->inst, areq->src, areq->dst, qat_req);
 	if (unlikely(ret))

@@ -885,7 +890,7 @@ static int qat_alg_aead_dec(struct aead_
 	qat_req->req.comn_mid.src_data_addr = qat_req->buf.blp;
 	qat_req->req.comn_mid.dest_data_addr = qat_req->buf.bloutp;
 	cipher_param = (void *)&qat_req->req.serv_specif_rqpars;
-	cipher_param->cipher_length = areq->cryptlen - digst_size;
+	cipher_param->cipher_length = cipher_len;
 	cipher_param->cipher_offset = areq->assoclen;
 	memcpy(cipher_param->u.cipher_IV_array, areq->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	auth_param = (void *)((uint8_t *)cipher_param + sizeof(*cipher_param));

@@ -914,6 +919,9 @@ static int qat_alg_aead_enc(struct aead_
 	uint8_t *iv = areq->iv;
 	int ret, ctr = 0;
 
+	if (areq->cryptlen % AES_BLOCK_SIZE != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ret = qat_alg_sgl_to_bufl(ctx->inst, areq->src, areq->dst, qat_req);
 	if (unlikely(ret))
 		return ret;

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

commit eddb7732119d53400f48a02536a84c509692faa8 upstream.

This fixes various places where a stack variable is used uninitialized.

---
 net/bluetooth/a2mp.c |   22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -226,6 +226,9 @@ static int a2mp_discover_rsp(struct amp_
 			struct a2mp_info_req req;
 
 			found = true;
+
+			memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+
 			req.id = cl->id;
 			a2mp_send(mgr, A2MP_GETINFO_REQ, __next_ident(mgr),
 				  sizeof(req), &req);

@@ -305,6 +308,8 @@ static int a2mp_getinfo_req(struct amp_m
 	if (!hdev || hdev->dev_type != HCI_AMP) {
 		struct a2mp_info_rsp rsp;
 
+		memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp));
+
 		rsp.id = req->id;
 		rsp.status = A2MP_STATUS_INVALID_CTRL_ID;
 

@@ -348,6 +353,8 @@ static int a2mp_getinfo_rsp(struct amp_m
 	if (!ctrl)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+
 	req.id = rsp->id;
 	a2mp_send(mgr, A2MP_GETAMPASSOC_REQ, __next_ident(mgr), sizeof(req),
 		  &req);

@@ -376,6 +383,8 @@ static int a2mp_getampassoc_req(struct a
 		struct a2mp_amp_assoc_rsp rsp;
 		rsp.id = req->id;
 
+		memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp));
+
 		if (tmp) {
 			rsp.status = A2MP_STATUS_COLLISION_OCCURED;
 			amp_mgr_put(tmp);

@@ -464,7 +473,6 @@ static int a2mp_createphyslink_req(struc
 				   struct a2mp_cmd *hdr)
 {
 	struct a2mp_physlink_req *req = (void *) skb->data;
-
 	struct a2mp_physlink_rsp rsp;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon;

@@ -475,6 +483,8 @@ static int a2mp_createphyslink_req(struc
 
 	BT_DBG("local_id %d, remote_id %d", req->local_id, req->remote_id);
 
+	memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp));
+
 	rsp.local_id = req->remote_id;
 	rsp.remote_id = req->local_id;
 

@@ -553,6 +563,8 @@ static int a2mp_discphyslink_req(struct
 
 	BT_DBG("local_id %d remote_id %d", req->local_id, req->remote_id);
 
+	memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp));
+
 	rsp.local_id = req->remote_id;
 	rsp.remote_id = req->local_id;
 	rsp.status = A2MP_STATUS_SUCCESS;

@@ -675,6 +687,8 @@ static int a2mp_chan_recv_cb(struct l2ca
 	if (err) {
 		struct a2mp_cmd_rej rej;
 
+		memset(&rej, 0, sizeof(rej));
+
 		rej.reason = cpu_to_le16(0);
 		hdr = (void *) skb->data;
 

@@ -898,6 +912,8 @@ void a2mp_send_getinfo_rsp(struct hci_de
 
 	BT_DBG("%s mgr %p", hdev->name, mgr);
 
+	memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp));
+
 	rsp.id = hdev->id;
 	rsp.status = A2MP_STATUS_INVALID_CTRL_ID;
 

@@ -995,6 +1011,8 @@ void a2mp_send_create_phy_link_rsp(struc
 	if (!mgr)
 		return;
 
+	memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp));
+
 	hs_hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_state(hdev, AMP_LINK, BT_CONNECT);
 	if (!hs_hcon) {
 		rsp.status = A2MP_STATUS_UNABLE_START_LINK_CREATION;

@@ -1027,6 +1045,8 @@ void a2mp_discover_amp(struct l2cap_chan
 
 	mgr->bredr_chan = chan;
 
+	memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+
 	req.mtu = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_A2MP_DEFAULT_MTU);
 	req.ext_feat = 0;
 	a2mp_send(mgr, A2MP_DISCOVER_REQ, 1, sizeof(req), &req);

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

commit f19425641cb2572a33cb074d5e30283720bd4d22 upstream.

Only sockets will have the chan->data set to an actual sk, channels like A2MP would have its own data which would likely cause a crash when calling sk_filter, in order to fix this a new callback has been introduced so channels can implement their own filtering if necessary.

---
 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h |    2 ++
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c    |    7 ++++---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c    |   14 ++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -665,6 +665,8 @@ struct l2cap_ops {
 	struct sk_buff		*(*alloc_skb) (struct l2cap_chan *chan,
 					       unsigned long hdr_len,
 					       unsigned long len, int nb);
+	int			(*filter) (struct l2cap_chan * chan,
+					   struct sk_buff *skb);
 };
 
 struct l2cap_conn {

@@ -7302,9 +7302,10 @@ static int l2cap_data_rcv(struct l2cap_c
 		goto drop;
 	}
 
-	if ((chan->mode == L2CAP_MODE_ERTM ||
-	     chan->mode == L2CAP_MODE_STREAMING) && sk_filter(chan->data, skb))
-		goto drop;
+	if (chan->ops->filter) {
+		if (chan->ops->filter(chan, skb))
+			goto drop;
+	}
 
 	if (!control->sframe) {
 		int err;

@@ -1663,6 +1663,19 @@ static void l2cap_sock_suspend_cb(struct
 	sk->sk_state_change(sk);
 }
 
+static int l2cap_sock_filter(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = chan->data;
+
+	switch (chan->mode) {
+	case L2CAP_MODE_ERTM:
+	case L2CAP_MODE_STREAMING:
+		return sk_filter(sk, skb);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static const struct l2cap_ops l2cap_chan_ops = {
 	.name			= "L2CAP Socket Interface",
 	.new_connection		= l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb,

@@ -1678,6 +1691,7 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops l2cap_chan
 	.get_sndtimeo		= l2cap_sock_get_sndtimeo_cb,
 	.get_peer_pid		= l2cap_sock_get_peer_pid_cb,
 	.alloc_skb		= l2cap_sock_alloc_skb_cb,
+	.filter			= l2cap_sock_filter,
 };
 
 static void l2cap_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

commit b560a208cda0297fef6ff85bbfd58a8f0a52a543 upstream.

This checks if BT_HS is enabled relecting it on MGMT_SETTING_HS instead of always reporting it as supported.

---
 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -766,7 +766,8 @@ static u32 get_supported_settings(struct
 
 		if (lmp_ssp_capable(hdev)) {
 			settings |= MGMT_SETTING_SSP;
-			settings |= MGMT_SETTING_HS;
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_HS))
+				settings |= MGMT_SETTING_HS;
 		}
 
 		if (lmp_sc_capable(hdev))

@@ -1794,6 +1795,10 @@ static int set_hs(struct sock *sk, struc
 
 	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "sock %p", sk);
 
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_HS))
+		return mgmt_cmd_status(sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_SET_HS,
+				       MGMT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+
 	status = mgmt_bredr_support(hdev);
 	if (status)
 		return mgmt_cmd_status(sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_SET_HS, status);

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

commit 8746f135bb01872ff412d408ea1aa9ebd328c1f5 upstream.

E0 is not allowed with Level 4:

BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319:

'128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed, SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key not shortened'

SC enabled:

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Page: 1/2
        Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
          Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
          LE Supported (Host)
          Secure Connections (Host Support)

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02)

SC disabled:

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Page: 1/2
        Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
          Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
          LE Supported (Host)

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
[May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used
< HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3
        Handle: 256
        Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)

---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |   10 ++++++----
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c         |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        |   20 ++++++++------------
 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

@@ -1402,11 +1402,13 @@ static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struc
 	else
 		encrypt = 0x01;
 
-	if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
-		conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
+	if (!status) {
+		if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
+			conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
 
-	if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
-		conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
+		if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
+			conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
+	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) {

@@ -1323,6 +1323,23 @@ int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_
 			return 0;
 	}
 
+	 /* AES encryption is required for Level 4:
+	  *
+	  * BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C
+	  * page 1319:
+	  *
+	  * 128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
+	  * required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed,
+	  * SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key
+	  * not shortened)
+	  */
+	if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS &&
+	    !test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags)) {
+		bt_dev_err(conn->hdev,
+			   "Invalid security: Missing AES-CCM usage");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn) &&
 	    !test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
 		return 0;

@@ -3068,26 +3068,22 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struc
 
 	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags);
 
+	/* Check link security requirements are met */
+	if (!hci_conn_check_link_mode(conn))
+		ev->status = HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE;
+
 	if (ev->status && conn->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
 		if (ev->status == HCI_ERROR_PIN_OR_KEY_MISSING)
 			set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE, &conn->flags);
 
+		/* Notify upper layers so they can cleanup before
+		 * disconnecting.
+		 */
+		hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status);
 		hci_disconnect(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
 		hci_conn_drop(conn);
 		goto unlock;
 	}
-
-	/* In Secure Connections Only mode, do not allow any connections
-	 * that are not encrypted with AES-CCM using a P-256 authenticated
-	 * combination key.
-	 */
-	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) &&
-	    (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags) ||
-	     conn->key_type != HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256)) {
-		hci_connect_cfm(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
-		hci_conn_drop(conn);
-		goto unlock;
-	}
 
 	/* Try reading the encryption key size for encrypted ACL links */
 	if (!ev->status && ev->encrypt && conn->type == ACL_LINK) {

From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>

commit bf65f8aabdb37bc1a785884374e919477fe13e10 upstream.

The premature free in the error path is blocked by V4L refcounting, not USB refcounting. Thanks to Ben Hutchings for review.

[v2] corrected attributions

---
 drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-core.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ static int usbtv_probe(struct usb_interf
 
 usbtv_audio_fail:
 	/* we must not free at this point */
-	usb_get_dev(usbtv->udev);
+	v4l2_device_get(&usbtv->v4l2_dev);
+	/* this will undo the v4l2_device_get() */
 	usbtv_video_free(usbtv);
 
 usbtv_video_fail:

From: Wilken Gottwalt <[email protected]>

commit 3e765cab8abe7f84cb80d4a7a973fc97d5742647 upstream.

Add usb ids of the Cellient MPL200 card.

---
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -528,6 +528,7 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struc
 /* Cellient products */
 #define CELLIENT_VENDOR_ID			0x2692
 #define CELLIENT_PRODUCT_MEN200			0x9005
+#define CELLIENT_PRODUCT_MPL200			0x9025
 
 /* Hyundai Petatel Inc. products */
 #define PETATEL_VENDOR_ID			0x1ff4

@@ -1982,6 +1983,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(MEDIATEK_VENDOR_ID, MEDIATEK_PRODUCT_DC_4COM2, 0xff, 0x02, 0x01) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(MEDIATEK_VENDOR_ID, MEDIATEK_PRODUCT_DC_4COM2, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(CELLIENT_VENDOR_ID, CELLIENT_PRODUCT_MEN200) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(CELLIENT_VENDOR_ID, CELLIENT_PRODUCT_MPL200),
+	  .driver_info = RSVD(1) | RSVD(4) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(PETATEL_VENDOR_ID, PETATEL_PRODUCT_NP10T_600A) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(PETATEL_VENDOR_ID, PETATEL_PRODUCT_NP10T_600E) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TPLINK_VENDOR_ID, TPLINK_PRODUCT_LTE, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00) },	/* TP-Link LTE Module */

From: Leonid Bloch <[email protected]>

commit 924a9213358fb92fa3c3225d6d042aa058167405 upstream.

This commit adds the following Telit FT980-KS composition:

0x1054: rndis, diag, adb, nmea, modem, modem, aux

AT commands can be sent to /dev/ttyUSB2.

---
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -1187,6 +1187,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option
 	  .driver_info = NCTRL(2) | RSVD(3) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1053, 0xff),	/* Telit FN980 (ECM) */
 	  .driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(1) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1054, 0xff),	/* Telit FT980-KS */
+	  .driver_info = NCTRL(2) | RSVD(3) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_ME910),
 	  .driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(1) | RSVD(3) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_ME910_DUAL_MODEM),

From: Anant Thazhemadam <[email protected]>

commit e1f13c879a7c21bd207dc6242455e8e3a1e88b40 upstream.

While finding usb endpoints in vmk80xx_find_usb_endpoints(), check if wMaxPacketSize = 0 for the endpoints found.

Some devices have isochronous endpoints that have wMaxPacketSize = 0 (as required by the USB-2 spec).
However, since this doesn't apply here, wMaxPacketSize = 0 can be considered to be invalid.

---
 drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -667,6 +667,9 @@ static int vmk80xx_find_usb_endpoints(st
 	if (!devpriv->ep_rx || !devpriv->ep_tx)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
+	if (!usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_rx) || !usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_tx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 

From: Scott Chen <[email protected]>

commit 031f9664f8f9356cee662335bc56c93d16e75665 upstream.

This is adds a device id for HP LD381 which is a pl2303GC-base device.

---
 drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c |    1 +
 drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
 	{ USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD220_PRODUCT_ID) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD220TA_PRODUCT_ID) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD381_PRODUCT_ID) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD381GC_PRODUCT_ID) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD960_PRODUCT_ID) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD960TA_PRODUCT_ID) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LCM220_PRODUCT_ID) },

@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@
 
 /* Hewlett-Packard POS Pole Displays */
 #define HP_VENDOR_ID		0x03f0
+#define HP_LD381GC_PRODUCT_ID	0x0183
 #define HP_LM920_PRODUCT_ID	0x026b
 #define HP_TD620_PRODUCT_ID	0x0956
 #define HP_LD960_PRODUCT_ID	0x0b39

From: Mychaela N. Falconia <[email protected]>

commit 6cf87e5edd9944e1d3b6efd966ea401effc304ee upstream.

There exist many FT2232-based JTAG+UART adapter designs in which FT2232 Channel A is used for JTAG and Channel B is used for UART. The best way to handle them in Linux is to have the ftdi_sio driver create a ttyUSB device only for Channel B and not for Channel A:
a ttyUSB device for Channel A would be bogus and will disappear as soon as the user runs OpenOCD or other applications that access Channel A for JTAG from userspace, causing undesirable noise for users. The ftdi_sio driver already has a dedicated quirk for such JTAG+UART FT2232 adapters, and it requires assigning custom USB IDs to such adapters and adding these IDs to the driver with the ftdi_jtag_quirk applied.

Boutique hardware manufacturer Falconia Partners LLC has created a couple of JTAG+UART adapter designs (one buffered, one unbuffered) as part of FreeCalypso project, and this hardware is specifically made to be used with Linux hosts, with the intent that Channel A will be accessed only from userspace via appropriate applications, and that Channel B will be supported by the ftdi_sio kernel driver, presenting a standard ttyUSB device to userspace. Toward this end the hardware manufacturer will be programming FT2232 EEPROMs with custom USB IDs, specifically with the intent that these IDs will be recognized by the ftdi_sio driver with the ftdi_jtag_quirk applied.

---
 drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c     |    5 +++++
 drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h |    7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)

@@ -1037,6 +1037,11 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
 	/* U-Blox devices */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(UBLOX_VID, UBLOX_C099F9P_ZED_PID) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(UBLOX_VID, UBLOX_C099F9P_ODIN_PID) },
+	/* FreeCalypso USB adapters */
+	{ USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, FTDI_FALCONIA_JTAG_BUF_PID),
+		.driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&ftdi_jtag_quirk },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, FTDI_FALCONIA_JTAG_UNBUF_PID),
+		.driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&ftdi_jtag_quirk },
 	{ }					/* Terminating entry */
 };
 

@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@
 
 #define FTDI_LUMEL_PD12_PID	0x6002
 
+/*
+ * Custom USB adapters made by Falconia Partners LLC
+ * for FreeCalypso project, ID codes allocated to Falconia by FTDI.
+ */
+#define FTDI_FALCONIA_JTAG_BUF_PID	0x7150
+#define FTDI_FALCONIA_JTAG_UNBUF_PID	0x7151
+
 /* Sienna Serial Interface by Secyourit GmbH */
 #define FTDI_SIENNA_PID		0x8348
 

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit 4443390e08d34d5771ab444f601cf71b3c9634a4 upstream.

reiserfs_read_locked_inode() didn't initialize key length properly. Use _make_cpu_key() macro for key initialization so that all key member are properly initialized.

---
 fs/reiserfs/inode.c |    6 +-----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -1551,11 +1551,7 @@ void reiserfs_read_locked_inode(struct i
 	 * set version 1, version 2 could be used too, because stat data
 	 * key is the same in both versions
 	 */
-	key.version = KEY_FORMAT_3_5;
-	key.on_disk_key.k_dir_id = dirino;
-	key.on_disk_key.k_objectid = inode->i_ino;
-	key.on_disk_key.k_offset = 0;
-	key.on_disk_key.k_type = 0;
+	_make_cpu_key(&key, KEY_FORMAT_3_5, dirino, inode->i_ino, 0, 0, 3);
 
 	/* look for the object's stat data */
 	retval = search_item(inode->i_sb, &key, &path_to_sd);

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit c2bb80b8bdd04dfe32364b78b61b6a47f717af52 upstream.

With suitably crafted reiserfs image and mount command reiserfs will crash when trying to verify that XATTR_ROOT directory can be looked up in / as that recurses back to xattr code like:

 xattr_lookup+0x24/0x280 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:395
 reiserfs_xattr_get+0x89/0x540 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:677
 reiserfs_get_acl+0x63/0x690 fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c:209
 get_acl+0x152/0x2e0 fs/posix_acl.c:141
 check_acl fs/namei.c:277 [inline]
 acl_permission_check fs/namei.c:309 [inline]
 generic_permission+0x2ba/0x550 fs/namei.c:353
 do_inode_permission fs/namei.c:398 [inline]
 inode_permission+0x234/0x4a0 fs/namei.c:463
 lookup_one_len+0xa6/0x200 fs/namei.c:2557
 reiserfs_lookup_privroot+0x85/0x1e0 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:972
 reiserfs_fill_super+0x2b51/0x3240 fs/reiserfs/super.c:2176
 mount_bdev+0x24f/0x360 fs/super.c:1417

Fix the problem by bailing from reiserfs_xattr_get() when xattrs are not yet initialized.

---
 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

@@ -674,6 +674,13 @@ reiserfs_xattr_get(struct inode *inode,
 	if (get_inode_sd_version(inode) == STAT_DATA_V1)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+	/*
+	 * priv_root needn't be initialized during mount so allow initial
+	 * lookups to succeed.
+	 */
+	if (!REISERFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->priv_root)
+		return 0;
+
 	dentry = xattr_lookup(inode, name, XATTR_REPLACE);
 	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
 		err = PTR_ERR(dentry);

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v5.8:

    15 builds:	15 pass, 0 fail
    26 boots:	26 pass, 0 fail
    60 tests:	60 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 5.8.16-rc1-ga69084e6863a
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra210-p3450-0000,
                tegra30-cardhu-a04

Jon

hello,

Compiled and booted 5.8.16-rc1+ .Every thing looks clean except "dmesg -l warn"

------x--------------x-----------------------------x-----------

$dmesg -l warn

[    0.601699] MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See 
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for
more details.
[    0.603104]  #3
[    0.749457] ENERGY_PERF_BIAS: Set to 'normal', was 'performance'
[   10.718252] i8042: PNP: PS/2 appears to have AUX port disabled, if
this is incorrect please boot with i8042.nopnp
[   12.651483] sdhci-pci 0000:00:1e.6: failed to setup card detect gpio
[   14.398378] i2c_hid i2c-ELAN1300:00: supply vdd not found, using
dummy regulator
[   14.399033] i2c_hid i2c-ELAN1300:00: supply vddl not found, using
dummy regulator
[   23.866580] systemd[1]: /lib/systemd/system/plymouth-

start.service:16: Unit configured to use KillMode=none. This is unsafe, as it disables systemd's process lifecycle management for the service. Please update your service to use a safer KillMode=, such as 'mixed' or 'control-group'. Support for KillMode=none is deprecated and will eventually be removed.

[   37.208082] uvcvideo 1-6:1.0: Entity type for entity Extension 4 was
not initialized!
[   37.208092] uvcvideo 1-6:1.0: Entity type for entity Processing 2
was not initialized!
[   37.208098] uvcvideo 1-6:1.0: Entity type for entity Camera 1 was
not initialized!
[   40.088516] FAT-fs (sda1): Volume was not properly unmounted. Some

data may be corrupt. Please run fsck. ---------------x-------x-----------------x-------------------------

software engineer
rajagiri school of engineering and technology

Please see that link for more details :)

Odd.

Why is this a warning? Oh well.

Is this incorrect?

Normal.

Both normal

Not the kernel.

Crummy device :(

Please run fsck :)

thanks,

greg k-h

I still have to encounter a usb video camera where I don't get at least one of those messages. As in:

uvcvideo: Found UVC 1.00 device Logitech Webcam C925e (046d:085b) uvcvideo 1-2.3:1.0: Entity type for entity Processing 3 was not initialized! uvcvideo 1-2.3:1.0: Entity type for entity Extension 6 was not initialized! uvcvideo 1-2.3:1.0: Entity type for entity Extension 12 was not initialized! uvcvideo 1-2.3:1.0: Entity type for entity Camera 1 was not initialized! uvcvideo 1-2.3:1.0: Entity type for entity Extension 8 was not initialized! uvcvideo 1-2.3:1.0: Entity type for entity Extension 9 was not initialized! uvcvideo 1-2.3:1.0: Entity type for entity Extension 10 was not initialized! uvcvideo 1-2.3:1.0: Entity type for entity Extension 11 was not initialized!

I suspect they are all "crummy".

Guenter

it seems to be incorrect for me, because the warning disappeared when i passed i8042.nopnp to kernel.

software engineer
rajagiri school of engineering and technology

That is "normal". I see that all the time on all systems with usb video camera.

That is a problem with your usb stick.

Guenter

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 5.8.16-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-5.8.y
git commit: a69084e6863a56b57c00d2ab5f4da07ea351cdd7
git describe: v5.8.15-15-ga69084e6863a
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-5.8.y/build/v5.8.15-15-ga69084e6863a

No regressions (compared to build v5.8.15)

No fixes (compared to build v5.8.15)

Ran 29148 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c
- hi6220-hikey
- i386
- juno-r2
- juno-r2-compat
- juno-r2-kasan
- nxp-ls2088
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15
- x86
- x86-kasan

Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* perf
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-sched-tests
* network-basic-tests
* v4l2-compliance
* ltp-quickhit-tests
* kselftest
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
* ssuite

Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Build results:

	total: 154 pass: 154 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 430 pass: 430 fail: 0

Guenter

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah