libproxy: fix CVE-2020-25219
PATCH 1/3 libproxy: fix CVE-2020-25219
From: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
--- .../libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-25219.patch | 61 +++++++++++++++++++ .../libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-25219.patch
meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-25219.patch new file +61 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From a83dae404feac517695c23ff43ce1e116e2bfbe0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Catanzaro <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2020 11:12:02 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite url::recvline to be nonrecursive + +This function processes network input. It's semi-trusted, because the +PAC ought to be trusted. But we still shouldn't allow it to control how +far we recurse. A malicious PAC can cause us to overflow the stack by +sending a sufficiently-long line without any '\n' character. + +Also, this function failed to properly handle EINTR, so let's fix that +too, for good measure. + +Fixes #134 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libproxy/libproxy/commit/836c10b60c65e947ff1e10eb02fbcc676d909ffa] +CVE: CVE-2020-25219 +Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <[email protected]> +--- + libproxy/url.cpp | 28 ++++++++++++++++++---------- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libproxy/url.cpp b/libproxy/url.cpp +index ee776b2..68d69cd 100644 +--- a/libproxy/url.cpp ++++ b/libproxy/url.cpp +@@ -388,16 +388,24 @@ string url::to_string() const { + return m_orig; + } + +-static inline string recvline(int fd) { +- // Read a character. +- // If we don't get a character, return empty string. +- // If we are at the end of the line, return empty string. +- char c = '\0'; +- +- if (recv(fd, &c, 1, 0) != 1 || c == '\n') +- return ""; +- +- return string(1, c) + recvline(fd); ++static string recvline(int fd) { ++ string line; ++ int ret; ++ ++ // Reserve arbitrary amount of space to avoid small memory reallocations. ++ line.reserve(128); ++ ++ do { ++ char c; ++ ret = recv(fd, &c, 1, 0); ++ if (ret == 1) { ++ if (c == '\n') ++ return line; ++ line += c; ++ } ++ } while (ret == 1 || (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR)); ++ ++ return line; + } + + char* url::get_pac() {
meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb +1 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ DEPENDS = "glib-2.0" SRC_URI = "https://github.com/${BPN}/${BPN}/releases/download/${PV}/${BP}.tar.xz \ file://0001-get-pac-test-Fix-build-with-clang-libc.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-25219.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f6b1d2a1e17a99cd3debaae6d04ab152" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "654db464120c9534654590b6683c7fa3887b3dad0ca1c4cd412af24fbfca6d4f"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH 2/3 python3: fix CVE-2020-26116
From: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
--- .../python/python3/CVE-2020-26116.patch | 104 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.2.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 105 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2020-26116.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2020-26116.patch new file +104 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +From 668d321476d974c4f51476b33aaca870272523bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Miss Islington (bot)" + <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2020 13:39:12 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] bpo-39603: Prevent header injection in http methods + (GH-18485) + +reject control chars in http method in http.client.putrequest to prevent http header injection +(cherry picked from commit 8ca8a2e8fb068863c1138f07e3098478ef8be12e) + +Co-authored-by: AMIR <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/668d321476d974c4f51476b33aaca870272523bf] +CVE: CVE-2020-26116 +Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <[email protected]> + +--- + Lib/http/client.py | 15 +++++++++++++ + Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 22 +++++++++++++++++++ + .../2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst | 2 ++ + 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py +index 019380a720318..c2ad0471bfee5 100644 +--- a/Lib/http/client.py ++++ b/Lib/http/client.py +@@ -147,6 +147,10 @@ + # _is_allowed_url_pchars_re = re.compile(r"^[/!$&'()*+,;=:@%a-zA-Z0-9._~-]+$") + # We are more lenient for assumed real world compatibility purposes. + ++# These characters are not allowed within HTTP method names ++# to prevent http header injection. ++_contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x1f]') ++ + # We always set the Content-Length header for these methods because some + # servers will otherwise respond with a 411 + _METHODS_EXPECTING_BODY = {'PATCH', 'POST', 'PUT'} +@@ -1087,6 +1091,8 @@ def putrequest(self, method, url, skip_host=False, + else: + raise CannotSendRequest(self.__state) + ++ self._validate_method(method) ++ + # Save the method for use later in the response phase + self._method = method + +@@ -1177,6 +1183,15 @@ def _encode_request(self, request): + # ASCII also helps prevent CVE-2019-9740. + return request.encode('ascii') + ++ def _validate_method(self, method): ++ """Validate a method name for putrequest.""" ++ # prevent http header injection ++ match = _contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re.search(method) ++ if match: ++ raise ValueError( ++ f"method can't contain control characters. {method!r} " ++ f"(found at least {match.group()!r})") ++ + def _validate_path(self, url): + """Validate a url for putrequest.""" + # Prevent CVE-2019-9740. +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py +index 8f0e27a1fb836..5a5fcecbc9c15 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py +@@ -364,6 +364,28 @@ def test_headers_debuglevel(self): + self.assertEqual(lines[3], "header: Second: val2") + + ++class HttpMethodTests(TestCase): ++ def test_invalid_method_names(self): ++ methods = ( ++ 'GET\r', ++ 'POST\n', ++ 'PUT\n\r', ++ 'POST\nValue', ++ 'POST\nHOST:abc', ++ 'GET\nrHost:abc\n', ++ 'POST\rRemainder:\r', ++ 'GET\rHOST:\n', ++ '\nPUT' ++ ) ++ ++ for method in methods: ++ with self.assertRaisesRegex( ++ ValueError, "method can't contain control characters"): ++ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com') ++ conn.sock = FakeSocket(None) ++ conn.request(method=method, url="/") ++ ++ + class TransferEncodingTest(TestCase): + expected_body = b"It's just a flesh wound" + +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000000..990affc3edd9d +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ ++Prevent http header injection by rejecting control characters in ++http.client.putrequest(...).
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.2.bb +1 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.python.org/ftp/python/${PV}/Python-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://0020-configure.ac-setup.py-do-not-add-a-curses-include-pa.patch \ file://0001-bpo-39503-CVE-2020-8492-Fix-AbstractBasicAuthHandler.patch \ file://CVE-2020-14422.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-26116.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_class-native = " \
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH 3/3 grub2: fix CVE-2020-10713
In reply to Lee Chee YangFrom: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
--- .../grub/files/CVE-2020-10713.patch | 73 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 74 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-10713.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-10713.patch new file +73 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +From a4d3fbdff1e3ca8f87642af2ac8752c30c617a3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Jones <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 15:45:02 -0400 +Subject: yylex: Make lexer fatal errors actually be fatal + +When presented with a command that can't be tokenized to anything +smaller than YYLMAX characters, the parser calls YY_FATAL_ERROR(errmsg), +expecting that will stop further processing, as such: + + #define YY_DO_BEFORE_ACTION \ + yyg->yytext_ptr = yy_bp; \ + yyleng = (int) (yy_cp - yy_bp); \ + yyg->yy_hold_char = *yy_cp; \ + *yy_cp = '\0'; \ + if ( yyleng >= YYLMAX ) \ + YY_FATAL_ERROR( "token too large, exceeds YYLMAX" ); \ + yy_flex_strncpy( yytext, yyg->yytext_ptr, yyleng + 1 , yyscanner); \ + yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yy_cp; + +The code flex generates expects that YY_FATAL_ERROR() will either return +for it or do some form of longjmp(), or handle the error in some way at +least, and so the strncpy() call isn't in an "else" clause, and thus if +YY_FATAL_ERROR() is *not* actually fatal, it does the call with the +questionable limit, and predictable results ensue. + +Unfortunately, our implementation of YY_FATAL_ERROR() is: + + #define YY_FATAL_ERROR(msg) \ + do { \ + grub_printf (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg)); \ + } while (0) + +The same pattern exists in yyless(), and similar problems exist in users +of YY_INPUT(), several places in the main parsing loop, +yy_get_next_buffer(), yy_load_buffer_state(), yyensure_buffer_stack, +yy_scan_buffer(), etc. + +All of these callers expect YY_FATAL_ERROR() to actually be fatal, and +the things they do if it returns after calling it are wildly unsafe. + +Fixes: CVE-2020-10713 + +Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=a4d3fbdff1e3ca8f87642af2ac8752c30c617a3e] +CVE: CVE-2020-10713 +Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/script/yylex.l | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/script/yylex.l b/grub-core/script/yylex.l +index 7b44c37b7..b7203c823 100644 +--- a/grub-core/script/yylex.l ++++ b/grub-core/script/yylex.l +@@ -37,11 +37,11 @@ + + /* + * As we don't have access to yyscanner, we cannot do much except to +- * print the fatal error. ++ * print the fatal error and exit. + */ + #define YY_FATAL_ERROR(msg) \ + do { \ +- grub_printf (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg)); \ ++ grub_fatal (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg));\ + } while (0) + + #define COPY(str, hint) \ +-- +cgit v1.2.1 +
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://autogen.sh-exclude-pc.patch \ file://grub-module-explicitly-keeps-symbole-.module_license.patch \ file://0001-grub.d-10_linux.in-add-oe-s-kernel-name.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-10713.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1