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package/cryptsetup: security bump to version 2.3.4

PATCH New Fabrice Fontaine 3 participants 3 messages Oct 25, 2020 – Oct 30, 2020

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PATCH 1/1 package/cryptsetup: security bump to version 2.3.4

Fix CVE-2020-14382: A vulnerability was found in upstream release cryptsetup-2.2.0 where, there's a bug in LUKS2 format validation code, that is effectively invoked on every device/image presenting itself as LUKS2 container. The bug is in segments validation code in file 'lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c' in function hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj) where the code does not check for possible overflow on memory allocation used for intervals array (see statement "intervals = malloc(first_backup
* sizeof(*intervals));"). Due to the bug, library can be *tricked* to expect such allocation was successful but for far less memory then originally expected. Later it may read data FROM image crafted by an attacker and actually write such data BEYOND allocated memory.

https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/v2.3.4-ReleaseNotes

---
 package/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.hash | 2 +-
 package/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.mk   | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
package/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.hash +1 -1
index c47d701baa..3b58345611 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 # From https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/sha256sums.asc
-sha256  3bca4ffe39e2f94cef50f6ea65acb873a6dbce5db34fc6bcefe38b6d095e82df  cryptsetup-2.3.3.tar.xz
+sha256  9d16eebb96b53b514778e813019b8dd15fea9fec5aafde9fae5febf59df83773  cryptsetup-2.3.4.tar.xz
 sha256  45670cce8b6a0ddd66c8016cd8ccef6cd71f35717cbacc7f1e895b3855207b33  COPYING
 sha256  8c33cc37871654ec7ed87e6fbb896c8cf33ef5ef05b1611a5aed857596ffafa5  COPYING.LGPL
package/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.mk +1 -1
index 68cc1543dc..a2abf776cc 100644
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 ################################################################################
 
 CRYPTSETUP_VERSION_MAJOR = 2.3
-CRYPTSETUP_VERSION = $(CRYPTSETUP_VERSION_MAJOR).3
+CRYPTSETUP_VERSION = $(CRYPTSETUP_VERSION_MAJOR).4
 CRYPTSETUP_SOURCE = cryptsetup-$(CRYPTSETUP_VERSION).tar.xz
 CRYPTSETUP_SITE = $(BR2_KERNEL_MIRROR)/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v$(CRYPTSETUP_VERSION_MAJOR)
 CRYPTSETUP_DEPENDENCIES = lvm2 popt util-linux host-pkgconf json-c libargon2 \
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/cryptsetup: security bump to version 2.3.4

Quoted 13 lines · On Sun, 25 Oct 2020 15:39:12 +0100 Fabrice Fontaine…

Fix CVE-2020-14382: A vulnerability was found in upstream release cryptsetup-2.2.0 where, there's a bug in LUKS2 format validation code, that is effectively invoked on every device/image presenting itself as LUKS2 container. The bug is in segments validation code in file 'lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c' in function hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj) where the code does not check for possible overflow on memory allocation used for intervals array (see statement "intervals = malloc(first_backup
* sizeof(*intervals));"). Due to the bug, library can be *tricked* to expect such allocation was successful but for far less memory then originally expected. Later it may read data FROM image crafted by an attacker and actually write such data BEYOND allocated memory.

Quoted 7 lines

https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/v2.3.4-ReleaseNotes

---
 package/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.hash | 2 +-
 package/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.mk   | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Applied to master, thanks.

Thomas

Signature · 3 lines
Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Bootlin
Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering
https://bootlin.com
#2 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/cryptsetup: security bump to version 2.3.4

In reply to Fabrice Fontaine
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:

Fix CVE-2020-14382: A vulnerability was found in upstream release cryptsetup-2.2.0 where, there's a bug in LUKS2 format validation code, that is effectively invoked on every device/image presenting itself as LUKS2 container. The bug is in segments validation code in file 'lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c' in function hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj) where the code does not check for possible overflow on memory allocation used for intervals array (see statement "intervals = malloc(first_backup
* sizeof(*intervals));"). Due to the bug, library can be *tricked* to expect such allocation was successful but for far less memory then originally expected. Later it may read data FROM image crafted by an attacker and actually write such data BEYOND allocated memory.

Quoted 3 lines

https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/v2.3.4-ReleaseNotes

Committed to 2020.08.x, thanks.

For 2020.02.x I will instead backport the fixes.

Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard