security: add fault injection to LSM hooks
Subsystems (4)
v2 cover security: add fault injection to LSM hooks
From: Aleksandr Nogikh <[email protected]>
Fault injection capabilities[Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.rst] facilitate testing of the stability of the Linux kernel by providing means to force a number of kernel interfaces to return error codes. This RFC proposes adding such fault injection capability into LSM hooks.
The intent is to make it possible to test whether the existing kernel code properly handles negative return values of LSM hooks. Syzbot
[https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/syzbot.md] will automatically do that with the aid of instrumentation tools once these changes are merged.
Is the attached implementation consistent with the ideas behind LSM stacking in its current state? In particular, is it reasonable to expect the existing LSMs to operate normally when they are active and such fault injection happens?
Local fuzzing of a Linux kernel with this patch has almost instantly led to two crashes. I'm not sure whether they correspond to actual issues as the LSM fault injection implementation (and the concept itself) can be wrong. Here they are:
1. "general protection fault in selinux_inode_free_security". This is caused by executing security_inode_free() when a fault was injected to inode_alloc_security() and therefore selinux_inode_alloc_security() was not executed. In this case, the subsequent inode_free_security() call executes list_del_init() on an uninitialized list. Theoretically, this may happen if some other LSM precedes selinux in the hooks list and its inode_alloc_security hook fails.
A fault was injected to this call_int_hook():
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.9/source/security/security.c#L975
Below you can find a call trace for the subsequent crash.
__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:132 [inline] list_del_init include/linux/list.h:204 [inline] inode_free_security security/selinux/hooks.c:337 [inline] selinux_inode_free_security+0xf0/0x290 security/selinux/hooks.c:2839 security_inode_free+0x46/0xc0 security/security.c:1042 security_inode_alloc+0x161/0x1a0 security/security.c:1027 inode_init_always+0x5a7/0xd10 fs/inode.c:171 alloc_inode+0x82/0x230 fs/inode.c:239 new_inode_pseudo+0x14/0xe0 fs/inode.c:928 sock_alloc+0x3c/0x260 net/socket.c:573 __sock_create+0xb9/0x780 net/socket.c:1391 sock_create net/socket.c:1478 [inline] __sys_socket+0xef/0x200 net/socket.c:1520 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1529 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1527 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1527 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
2. BUG_ON inside security_skb_classify_flow(). Why is it needed there?
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.9/source/security/security.c#L2426
---
v2:
* Renamed should_fail_lsm_hook() to should_fail_lsm_hook().
* Extended the documentation.
Aleksandr Nogikh (2):
security: add fault injection capability
docs: add fail_lsm_hooks info to fault-injection.rst
.../fault-injection/fault-injection.rst | 6 +++ lib/Kconfig.debug | 6 +++ security/security.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
base-commit: 2ef991b5fdbe828dc8fb8af473dab160729570ed
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
RFC PATCH v2 1/2 security: add fault injection capability
From: Aleksandr Nogikh <[email protected]>
Add a fault injection capability to call_int_hook macro. This will facilitate testing of fault tolerance of the code that invokes security hooks as well as the fault tolerance of the LSM implementations themselves.
Add a KConfig option (CONFIG_FAIL_LSM_HOOKS) that controls whether the capability is enabled. In order to enable configuration from the user space, add the standard debugfs entries for fault injection (if CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS is enabled).
---
v2:
- Renamed should_fail_lsm_hook() to should_fail_lsm_hook().
--- lib/Kconfig.debug | 6 +++++ security/security.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
lib/Kconfig.debug +6 -0
@@ -1803,6 +1803,12 @@ config FAIL_MAKE_REQUEST help Provide fault-injection capability for disk IO. +config FAIL_LSM_HOOKS + bool "Fault-injection capability for LSM hooks" + depends on FAULT_INJECTION + help + Provide fault-injection capability for LSM hooks. + config FAIL_IO_TIMEOUT bool "Fault-injection capability for faking disk interrupts" depends on FAULT_INJECTION && BLOCK
security/security.c +50 -3
78 lines not on this page · raw message
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2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/2] security: add fault injection capability
Quoted 103 lines · Aleksandr Nogikh
From: Aleksandr Nogikh <[email protected]>
Add a fault injection capability to
call_int_hookmacro. This will facilitate testing of fault tolerance of the code that invokes security hooks as well as the fault tolerance of the LSM implementations themselves.Add a KConfig option (
CONFIG_FAIL_LSM_HOOKS) that controls whether the capability is enabled. In order to enable configuration from the user space, add the standard debugfs entries for fault injection (ifCONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FSis enabled).Signed-off-by Aleksandr Nogikh <[email protected]>---
v2:
- Renamedshould_fail_lsm_hook()toshould_fail_lsm_hook().--- lib/Kconfig.debug | 6 +++++ security/security.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)lib/Kconfig.debug +6
-0@@ -1803,6 +1803,12 @@ config FAIL_MAKE_REQUEST help Provide fault-injection capability for disk IO. +config FAIL_LSM_HOOKS + bool "Fault-injection capability for LSM hooks" + depends on FAULT_INJECTION + help + Provide fault-injection capability for LSM hooks. + config FAIL_IO_TIMEOUT bool "Fault-injection capability for faking disk interrupts" depends on FAULT_INJECTION && BLOCKsecurity/security.c +46
-0@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <linux/backing-dev.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/msg.h> +#include <linux/fault-inject.h> #include <net/flow.h> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2@@ -669,6 +670,51 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)panic ("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n" , __func__); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_LSM_HOOKS + +static struct { +struct fault_attr attr; +int retval; +} fail_lsm_hooks = { + .attr =FAULT_ATTR_INITIALIZER , + .retval = -EACCES +}; + +static int __init setup_fail_lsm_hooks (char *str) +{ +return setup_fault_attr (&fail_lsm_hooks.attr, str); +} +__setup ("fail_lsm_hooks=" , setup_fail_lsm_hooks); + +static int lsm_hooks_inject_fail (void ) +{ +return should_fail (&fail_lsm_hooks.attr,1 ) ? fail_lsm_hooks.retval :0 ; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS + +static int __init fail_lsm_hooks_debugfs (void ) +{ +umode_t mode =S_IFREG |0600 ; +struct dentry *dir; + + dir =fault_create_debugfs_attr ("fail_lsm_hooks" ,NULL , + &fail_lsm_hooks.attr); +debugfs_create_u32 ("retval" , mode, dir, &fail_lsm_hooks.retval); +return 0 ; +} + +late_initcall (fail_lsm_hooks_debugfs); + +#endif /* CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS */ + +#else + +static inline int lsm_hooks_inject_fail (void ) {return 0 ; } + +#endif /* CONFIG_FAIL_LSM_HOOKS */ +/* * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and * can be accessed with:
security/security.c static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) · line 757
Quoted 7 lines
security/security.c +2
-2@@ -707,16 +753,17 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) } while (0)#define call_int_hook (FUNC ,IRC , ...) ({ \ - int RC = IRC; \ - do { \ + int RC = lsm_hooks_inject_fail(); \ + if (RC == 0) { \
Injecting the failure here will prevent the loaded LSM hooks from being called.
security/security.c static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) · line 766
Quoted 10 lines
security/security.c +2
-1struct security_hook_list *P ; \ +RC =IRC ; \ \ hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \RC =P ->hook.FUNC (__VA_ARGS__); \if (RC !=0 ) \break ; \ } \ - }while (0 ); \ + } \
Injecting the failure here would allow the loaded LSM hooks to be called. It shouldn't make a difference, but hooks with side-effects are always possible. I don't have an issue either way.
Quoted 3 lines
security/security.c +0
-0RC ; \ })
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/2] security: add fault injection capability
(resending the previous message in a plain/text mode)
Quoted 1 line · Casey Schaufler
[...]
Quoted 7 lines
security/security.c static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) · line 757
Quoted 4 lines
security/security.c +2
-2-int RC =IRC ; \ - do { \ +int RC =lsm_hooks_inject_fail (); \ +if (RC ==0 ) { \Injecting the failure here will prevent the loaded LSM hooks from being called.
In this RFC, fault injection was intentionally placed before the code that invokes LSM hooks. The reasoning was that it would simultaneously check how the kernel code reacts to LSM denials and the effect of fault injections on LSM modules.
Quoted 12 lines
security/security.c static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) · line 766
Quoted 11 lines
struct security_hook_list *P; \security/security.c +2
-1+RC =IRC ; \ \ hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \RC =P ->hook.FUNC (__VA_ARGS__); \if (RC !=0 ) \break ; \ } \ - }while (0 ); \ + } \
Quoted 8 lines
Injecting the failure here would allow the loaded LSM hooks to be called. It shouldn't make a difference, but hooks with side-effects are always possible. I don't have an issue either way.
Quoted 3 lines
RC; \})
Should we expect LSM modules to properly handle the cases when their hooks with side effects were not invoked (unlike the selinux crash that is described in the cover letter)? From the source code it seems that a failure/denial from one module prevents the execution of the subsequent hooks, so this looks like a realistic scenario.
If that is not true in general and depends on the specific active modules, then it probably makes sense to introduce an option to control whether to inject faults at the beginning of call_int_hook() or after the hooks have been invoked.
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/2] security: add fault injection capability
Quoted 29 lines · Aleksandr Nogikh
(resending the previous message in a plain/text mode)
On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 7:20 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
[...]Quoted 6 lines
security/security.c static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) · line 757
Quoted 4 lines
security/security.c +2
-2-int RC =IRC ; \ - do { \ +int RC =lsm_hooks_inject_fail (); \ +if (RC ==0 ) { \Injecting the failure here will prevent the loaded LSM hooks from being called.
In this RFC, fault injection was intentionally placed before the code that invokes LSM hooks. The reasoning was that it would simultaneously check how the kernel code reacts to LSM denials and the effect of fault injections on LSM modules.
Quoted 14 lines
security/security.c static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) · line 766
Quoted 10 lines
struct security_hook_list *P; \security/security.c +2
-1+RC =IRC ; \ \ hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \RC =P ->hook.FUNC (__VA_ARGS__); \if (RC !=0 ) \break ; \ } \ - }while (0 ); \ + } \Injecting the failure here would allow the loaded LSM hooks to be called. It shouldn't make a difference, but hooks with side-effects are always possible. I don't have an issue either way.
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RC; \})
Should we expect LSM modules to properly handle the cases when their hooks with side effects were not invoked (unlike the selinux crash that is described in the cover letter)? From the source code it seems that a failure/denial from one module prevents the execution of the subsequent hooks, so this looks like a realistic scenario.
Yes. Security modules have to accept the possibility that something ahead of them in the stack will fail. This may be a DAC check, a capability check or another security module.
Quoted 4 lines
If that is not true in general and depends on the specific active modules, then it probably makes sense to introduce an option to control whether to inject faults at the beginning of
call_int_hook()or after the hooks have been invoked.
If you want to do that you could implement it as an LSM. You could place it anywhere in the stack that way. Based on what I see with the BPF lsm that might be more work than it is worth.
RFC PATCH v2 2/2 docs: add fail_lsm_hooks info to fault-injection.rst
In reply to Aleksandr NogikhFrom: Aleksandr Nogikh <[email protected]>
Describe fail_lsm_hooks fault injection capability.
---
v2:
- Added this commit.
--- Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.rst | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.rst +6 -0
@@ -48,6 +48,12 @@ Available fault injection capabilities status code is NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE with no retry. The status code and retry flag can be set via the debugfs. +- fail_lsm_hooks + + injects failures into LSM hooks. When a fault is injected, actual hooks + are not executed and a code from /sys/kernel/debug/fail_lsm_hooks/retval + is returned (the default value is -EACCES). + Configure fault-injection capabilities behavior -----------------------------------------------
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Akinobu Mita
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v2 2/2] docs: add fail_lsm_hooks info to fault-injection.rst
2020年10月26日(月) 21:52 Aleksandr Nogikh <[email protected]>:
Quoted 18 lines
From: Aleksandr Nogikh <[email protected]>
Describe
fail_lsm_hooksfault injection capability.Signed-off-by Aleksandr Nogikh <[email protected]>---
v2:
- Added this commit.--- Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.rst | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.rst +0
-0
Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.rst Available fault injection capabilities · line 55
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.rst +5
-0@@ -48,6 +48,12 @@ Available fault injection capabilities status code is NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE with no retry. The status code and retry flag can be set via the debugfs. +- fail_lsm_hooks + + injects failures into LSM hooks. When a fault is injected, actual hooks + are not executed and a code from /sys/kernel/debug/fail_lsm_hooks/retval + is returned (the default value is -EACCES).
In addition to this global one, what do you think about per-hook fault injection,
i.e. /sys/kernel/debug/fail_lsm_hooks/<FUNC>/retval ?
In this case, we need a fault_attr for each hook. (Maybe, we can use the same technique that is used to define security_hook_heads).
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/2] docs: add fail_lsm_hooks info to fault-injection.rst
Quoted 1 line · Akinobu Mita
[...]
Quoted 3 lines
In addition to this global one, what do you think about per-hook fault injection,
i.e. /sys/kernel/debug/fail_lsm_hooks/<FUNC>/retval ?
I was thinking about this, but decided to begin with a simple version that could definitely be useful in practice (for syzbot/syzkaller it is just necessary to have a fault injection capability that will be triggered via fail-nth). If per-hook fault injection can also be useful to someone, I can try to add it as well.
Quoted 2 lines
In this case, we need a
fault_attrfor each hook. (Maybe, we can use the same technique that is used to definesecurity_hook_heads).
Yes, that technique should help to implement the feature in a very concise way. Thanks for the suggestion.
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/2] docs: add fail_lsm_hooks info to fault-injection.rst
Quoted 10 lines · Aleksandr Nogikh
[...]
Quoted 3 lines
In addition to this global one, what do you think about per-hook fault injection,
i.e. /sys/kernel/debug/fail_lsm_hooks/<FUNC>/retval ?I was thinking about this, but decided to begin with a simple version that could definitely be useful in practice (for syzbot/syzkaller it is just necessary to have a fault injection capability that will be triggered via fail-nth). If per-hook fault injection can also be useful to someone, I can try to add it as well.
Yes, before we add it, it would be useful to have a clear use case (otherwise we can add an unused thing, or implement it in a way that slightly misses the use case).
Note that fail-nth allows to fail a single concrete site for testing, though it's not super convenient for this as one would need to figure out the right N first. But as a one-off test it should do.
Quoted 5 lines
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In this case, we need a
fault_attrfor each hook. (Maybe, we can use the same technique that is used to definesecurity_hook_heads).Yes, that technique should help to implement the feature in a very concise way. Thanks for the suggestion.