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5.4.73-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 4 participants 412 messages Oct 27, 2020 – Oct 29, 2020 1 message not in the archive Page 3 of 3

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lore
author maintainer
#336 lore raw

PATCH 336/408 media: vsp1: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 98fae901c8883640202802174a4bd70a1b9118bd ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

---
 drivers/media/platform/vsp1/vsp1_drv.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/vsp1/vsp1_drv.c +8 -3
index c650e45bb0ad1..dc62533cf32ce 100644
@@ -562,7 +562,12 @@ int vsp1_device_get(struct vsp1_device *vsp1)
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(vsp1->dev);
-	return ret < 0 ? ret : 0;
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pm_runtime_put_noidle(vsp1->dev);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -845,12 +850,12 @@ static int vsp1_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	/* Configure device parameters based on the version register. */
 	pm_runtime_enable(&pdev->dev);
 
-	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(&pdev->dev);
+	ret = vsp1_device_get(vsp1);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto done;
 
 	vsp1->version = vsp1_read(vsp1, VI6_IP_VERSION);
-	pm_runtime_put_sync(&pdev->dev);
+	vsp1_device_put(vsp1);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vsp1_device_infos); ++i) {
 		if ((vsp1->version & VI6_IP_VERSION_MODEL_MASK) ==
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#337 lore raw

PATCH 337/408 media: platform: s3c-camif: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dafa3605fe60d5a61239d670919b2a36e712481e ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

Also, call pm_runtime_disable() when pm_runtime_get_sync() returns an error code.

---
 drivers/media/platform/s3c-camif/camif-core.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/s3c-camif/camif-core.c +2 -3
index c6fbcd7036d6d..ee624804862e2 100644
@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ static int s3c_camif_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	ret = camif_media_dev_init(camif);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto err_alloc;
+		goto err_pm;
 
 	ret = camif_register_sensor(camif);
 	if (ret < 0)
@@ -498,10 +498,9 @@ static int s3c_camif_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	media_device_unregister(&camif->media_dev);
 	media_device_cleanup(&camif->media_dev);
 	camif_unregister_media_entities(camif);
-err_alloc:
+err_pm:
 	pm_runtime_put(dev);
 	pm_runtime_disable(dev);
-err_pm:
 	camif_clk_put(camif);
 err_clk:
 	s3c_camif_unregister_subdev(camif);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#338 lore raw

PATCH 338/408 media: platform: sti: hva: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d912a1d9e9afe69c6066c1ceb6bfc09063074075 ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

---
 drivers/media/platform/sti/hva/hva-hw.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/platform/sti/hva/hva-hw.c +1 -1
index bb13348be0832..43f279e2a6a38 100644
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ int hva_hw_probe(struct platform_device *pdev, struct hva_dev *hva)
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(dev);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		dev_err(dev, "%s     failed to set PM\n", HVA_PREFIX);
-		goto err_clk;
+		goto err_pm;
 	}
 
 	/* check IP hardware version */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#339 lore raw

PATCH 339/408 media: bdisp: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dbd2f2dc025f9be8ae063e4f270099677238f620 ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

---
 drivers/media/platform/sti/bdisp/bdisp-v4l2.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/sti/bdisp/bdisp-v4l2.c +1 -2
index 675b5f2b4c2ee..a55ddf8d185d5 100644
@@ -1367,7 +1367,7 @@ static int bdisp_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(dev);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		dev_err(dev, "failed to set PM\n");
-		goto err_dbg;
+		goto err_pm;
 	}
 
 	/* Filters */
@@ -1395,7 +1395,6 @@ static int bdisp_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	bdisp_hw_free_filters(bdisp->dev);
 err_pm:
 	pm_runtime_put(dev);
-err_dbg:
 	bdisp_debugfs_remove(bdisp);
 err_v4l2:
 	v4l2_device_unregister(&bdisp->v4l2_dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#340 lore raw

PATCH 340/408 media: media/pci: prevent memory leak in bttv_probe

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xiaolong Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7b817585b730665126b45df5508dd69526448bc8 ]

In bttv_probe if some functions such as pci_enable_device, pci_set_dma_mask and request_mem_region fails the allocated
memory for btv should be released.

---
 drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c +10 -3
index a359da7773a90..ff2962cea6164 100644
@@ -4013,11 +4013,13 @@ static int bttv_probe(struct pci_dev *dev, const struct pci_device_id *pci_id)
 	btv->id  = dev->device;
 	if (pci_enable_device(dev)) {
 		pr_warn("%d: Can't enable device\n", btv->c.nr);
-		return -EIO;
+		result = -EIO;
+		goto free_mem;
 	}
 	if (pci_set_dma_mask(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32))) {
 		pr_warn("%d: No suitable DMA available\n", btv->c.nr);
-		return -EIO;
+		result = -EIO;
+		goto free_mem;
 	}
 	if (!request_mem_region(pci_resource_start(dev,0),
 				pci_resource_len(dev,0),
@@ -4025,7 +4027,8 @@ static int bttv_probe(struct pci_dev *dev, const struct pci_device_id *pci_id)
 		pr_warn("%d: can't request iomem (0x%llx)\n",
 			btv->c.nr,
 			(unsigned long long)pci_resource_start(dev, 0));
-		return -EBUSY;
+		result = -EBUSY;
+		goto free_mem;
 	}
 	pci_set_master(dev);
 	pci_set_command(dev);
@@ -4211,6 +4214,10 @@ static int bttv_probe(struct pci_dev *dev, const struct pci_device_id *pci_id)
 	release_mem_region(pci_resource_start(btv->c.pci,0),
 			   pci_resource_len(btv->c.pci,0));
 	pci_disable_device(btv->c.pci);
+
+free_mem:
+	bttvs[btv->c.nr] = NULL;
+	kfree(btv);
 	return result;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#341 lore raw

PATCH 341/408 x86/mce: Make mce_rdmsrl() panic on an inaccessible MSR

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e2def7d49d0812ea40a224161b2001b2e815dce2 ]

If an exception needs to be handled while reading an MSR - which is in most of the cases caused by a #GP on a non-existent MSR - then this is most likely the incarnation of a BIOS or a hardware bug. Such bug violates the architectural guarantee that MCA banks are present with all MSRs belonging to them.

The proper fix belongs in the hardware/firmware - not in the kernel.

Handling an #MC exception which is raised while an NMI is being handled would cause the nasty NMI nesting issue because of the shortcoming of IRET of reenabling NMIs when executed. And the machine is in an #MC context already so <Deity> be at its side.

Tracing MSR accesses while in #MC is another no-no due to tracing being inherently a bad idea in atomic context:

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: do_machine_check()+0x4a: call to mce_rdmsrl() leaves .noinstr.text section

so remove all that "additional" functionality from mce_rdmsrl() and provide it with a special exception handler which panics the machine when that MSR is not accessible.

The exception handler prints a human-readable message explaining what the panic reason is but, what is more, it panics while in the #GP handler and latter won't have executed an IRET, thus opening the NMI nesting issue in the case when the #MC has happened while handling an NMI. (#MC itself won't be reenabled until MCG_STATUS hasn't been cleared).

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c     | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h | 10 +++++
 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c +60 -12
index fd76e3733dd3d..92331de16d70e 100644
@@ -388,10 +388,28 @@ static int msr_to_offset(u32 msr)
 	return -1;
 }
 
+__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+				      struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+				      unsigned long error_code,
+				      unsigned long fault_addr)
+{
+	pr_emerg("MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n",
+		 (unsigned int)regs->cx, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip);
+
+	show_stack_regs(regs);
+
+	panic("MCA architectural violation!\n");
+
+	while (true)
+		cpu_relax();
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 /* MSR access wrappers used for error injection */
 static u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
 {
-	u64 v;
+	DECLARE_ARGS(val, low, high);
 
 	if (__this_cpu_read(injectm.finished)) {
 		int offset = msr_to_offset(msr);
@@ -401,21 +419,43 @@ static u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
 		return *(u64 *)((char *)this_cpu_ptr(&injectm) + offset);
 	}
 
-	if (rdmsrl_safe(msr, &v)) {
-		WARN_ONCE(1, "mce: Unable to read MSR 0x%x!\n", msr);
-		/*
-		 * Return zero in case the access faulted. This should
-		 * not happen normally but can happen if the CPU does
-		 * something weird, or if the code is buggy.
-		 */
-		v = 0;
-	}
+	/*
+	 * RDMSR on MCA MSRs should not fault. If they do, this is very much an
+	 * architectural violation and needs to be reported to hw vendor. Panic
+	 * the box to not allow any further progress.
+	 */
+	asm volatile("1: rdmsr\n"
+		     "2:\n"
+		     _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b, ex_handler_rdmsr_fault)
+		     : EAX_EDX_RET(val, low, high) : "c" (msr));
 
-	return v;
+
+	return EAX_EDX_VAL(val, low, high);
+}
+
+__visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+				      struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+				      unsigned long error_code,
+				      unsigned long fault_addr)
+{
+	pr_emerg("MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 0x%08x%08x) at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n",
+		 (unsigned int)regs->cx, (unsigned int)regs->dx, (unsigned int)regs->ax,
+		  regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip);
+
+	show_stack_regs(regs);
+
+	panic("MCA architectural violation!\n");
+
+	while (true)
+		cpu_relax();
+
+	return true;
 }
 
 static void mce_wrmsrl(u32 msr, u64 v)
 {
+	u32 low, high;
+
 	if (__this_cpu_read(injectm.finished)) {
 		int offset = msr_to_offset(msr);
 
@@ -423,7 +463,15 @@ static void mce_wrmsrl(u32 msr, u64 v)
 			*(u64 *)((char *)this_cpu_ptr(&injectm) + offset) = v;
 		return;
 	}
-	wrmsrl(msr, v);
+
+	low  = (u32)v;
+	high = (u32)(v >> 32);
+
+	/* See comment in mce_rdmsrl() */
+	asm volatile("1: wrmsr\n"
+		     "2:\n"
+		     _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b, ex_handler_wrmsr_fault)
+		     : : "c" (msr), "a"(low), "d" (high) : "memory");
 }
 
 /*
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h +10 -0
index 43031db429d24..231954fe5b4e6 100644
@@ -172,4 +172,14 @@ extern bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m);
 static inline bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m)			{ return false; };
 #endif
 
+__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+				      struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+				      unsigned long error_code,
+				      unsigned long fault_addr);
+
+__visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+				      struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+				      unsigned long error_code,
+				      unsigned long fault_addr);
+
 #endif /* __X86_MCE_INTERNAL_H__ */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#342 lore raw

PATCH 342/408 media: uvcvideo: Ensure all probed info is returned to v4l2

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Adam Goode <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8a652a17e3c005dcdae31b6c8fdf14382a29cbbe ]

bFrameIndex and bFormatIndex can be negotiated by the camera during probing, resulting in the camera choosing a different format than expected. v4l2 can already accommodate such changes, but the code was not updating the proper fields.

Without such a change, v4l2 would potentially interpret the payload incorrectly, causing corrupted output. This was happening on the Elgato HD60 S+, which currently always renegotiates to format 1.

As an aside, the Elgato firmware is buggy and should not be renegotating, but it is still a valid thing for the camera to do. Both macOS and Windows will properly probe and read uncorrupted images from this camera.

With this change, both qv4l2 and chromium can now read uncorrupted video from the Elgato HD60 S+.

[Add blank lines, remove periods at the of messages]

---
 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c +30 -0
index 0335e69b70abe..5e6f3153b5ff8 100644
@@ -247,11 +247,41 @@ static int uvc_v4l2_try_format(struct uvc_streaming *stream,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto done;
 
+	/* After the probe, update fmt with the values returned from
+	 * negotiation with the device.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < stream->nformats; ++i) {
+		if (probe->bFormatIndex == stream->format[i].index) {
+			format = &stream->format[i];
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (i == stream->nformats) {
+		uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_FORMAT, "Unknown bFormatIndex %u\n",
+			  probe->bFormatIndex);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < format->nframes; ++i) {
+		if (probe->bFrameIndex == format->frame[i].bFrameIndex) {
+			frame = &format->frame[i];
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (i == format->nframes) {
+		uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_FORMAT, "Unknown bFrameIndex %u\n",
+			  probe->bFrameIndex);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	fmt->fmt.pix.width = frame->wWidth;
 	fmt->fmt.pix.height = frame->wHeight;
 	fmt->fmt.pix.field = V4L2_FIELD_NONE;
 	fmt->fmt.pix.bytesperline = uvc_v4l2_get_bytesperline(format, frame);
 	fmt->fmt.pix.sizeimage = probe->dwMaxVideoFrameSize;
+	fmt->fmt.pix.pixelformat = format->fcc;
 	fmt->fmt.pix.colorspace = format->colorspace;
 
 	if (uvc_format != NULL)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#343 lore raw

PATCH 343/408 mmc: sdio: Check for CISTPL_VERS_1 buffer size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Pali Rohár <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ebe2607965d3e2dc02029e8c7dd35fbe508ffd0 ]

Before parsing CISTPL_VERS_1 structure check that its size is at least two bytes to prevent buffer overflow.

---
 drivers/mmc/core/sdio_cis.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/mmc/core/sdio_cis.c +3 -0
index e0655278c5c32..3efaa9534a777 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ static int cistpl_vers_1(struct mmc_card *card, struct sdio_func *func,
 	unsigned i, nr_strings;
 	char **buffer, *string;
 
+	if (size < 2)
+		return 0;
+
 	/* Find all null-terminated (including zero length) strings in
 	   the TPLLV1_INFO field. Trailing garbage is ignored. */
 	buf += 2;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#344 lore raw

PATCH 344/408 media: saa7134: avoid a shift overflow

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 15a36aae1ec1c1f17149b6113b92631791830740 ]

As reported by smatch:

	drivers/media/pci/saa7134//saa7134-tvaudio.c:686 saa_dsp_writel() warn: should 'reg << 2' be a 64 bit type?

On a 64-bits Kernel, the shift might be bigger than 32 bits.

In real, this should never happen, but let's shut up the warning.

---
 drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-tvaudio.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-tvaudio.c +2 -1
index 79e1afb710758..5cc4ef21f9d37 100644
@@ -683,7 +683,8 @@ int saa_dsp_writel(struct saa7134_dev *dev, int reg, u32 value)
 {
 	int err;
 
-	audio_dbg(2, "dsp write reg 0x%x = 0x%06x\n", reg << 2, value);
+	audio_dbg(2, "dsp write reg 0x%x = 0x%06x\n",
+		  (reg << 2) & 0xffffffff, value);
 	err = saa_dsp_wait_bit(dev,SAA7135_DSP_RWSTATE_WRR);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#345 lore raw

PATCH 345/408 media: venus: fixes for list corruption

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Vikash Garodia <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e1c69c4eef61ffe295b747992c6fd849e6cd747d ]

There are few list handling issues while adding and deleting node in the registered buf list in the driver.
1. list addition - buffer added into the list during buf_init while not deleted during cleanup.
2. list deletion - In capture streamoff, the list was reinitialized. As a result, if any node was present in the list, it would lead to issue while cleaning up that node during buf_cleanup.

Corresponding call traces below:

[  165.751014] Call trace:
[  165.753541]  __list_add_valid+0x58/0x88
[  165.757532]  venus_helper_vb2_buf_init+0x74/0xa8 [venus_core]
[  165.763450]  vdec_buf_init+0x34/0xb4 [venus_dec]
[  165.768271]  __buf_prepare+0x598/0x8a0 [videobuf2_common]
[  165.773820]  vb2_core_qbuf+0xb4/0x334 [videobuf2_common]
[  165.779298]  vb2_qbuf+0x78/0xb8 [videobuf2_v4l2]
[  165.784053]  v4l2_m2m_qbuf+0x80/0xf8 [v4l2_mem2mem]
[  165.789067]  v4l2_m2m_ioctl_qbuf+0x2c/0x38 [v4l2_mem2mem]
[  165.794624]  v4l_qbuf+0x48/0x58
[ 1797.556001] Call trace:
[ 1797.558516]  __list_del_entry_valid+0x88/0x9c
[ 1797.562989]  vdec_buf_cleanup+0x54/0x228 [venus_dec]
[ 1797.568088]  __buf_prepare+0x270/0x8a0 [videobuf2_common]
[ 1797.573625]  vb2_core_qbuf+0xb4/0x338 [videobuf2_common]
[ 1797.579082]  vb2_qbuf+0x78/0xb8 [videobuf2_v4l2]
[ 1797.583830]  v4l2_m2m_qbuf+0x80/0xf8 [v4l2_mem2mem]
[ 1797.588843]  v4l2_m2m_ioctl_qbuf+0x2c/0x38 [v4l2_mem2mem]
[ 1797.594389]  v4l_qbuf+0x48/0x58
---
 drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/vdec.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/vdec.c +8 -2
index 05b80a66e80ed..658825b4c4e8d 100644
@@ -993,8 +993,6 @@ static int vdec_stop_capture(struct venus_inst *inst)
 		break;
 	}
 
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&inst->registeredbufs);
-
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1091,6 +1089,14 @@ static int vdec_buf_init(struct vb2_buffer *vb)
 static void vdec_buf_cleanup(struct vb2_buffer *vb)
 {
 	struct venus_inst *inst = vb2_get_drv_priv(vb->vb2_queue);
+	struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vbuf = to_vb2_v4l2_buffer(vb);
+	struct venus_buffer *buf = to_venus_buffer(vbuf);
+
+	mutex_lock(&inst->lock);
+	if (vb->type == V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE)
+		if (!list_empty(&inst->registeredbufs))
+			list_del_init(&buf->reg_list);
+	mutex_unlock(&inst->lock);
 
 	inst->buf_count--;
 	if (!inst->buf_count)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#346 lore raw

PATCH 346/408 fs: dlm: fix configfs memory leak

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Alexander Aring <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3d2825c8c6105b0f36f3ff72760799fa2e71420e ]

This patch fixes the following memory detected by kmemleak and umount gfs2 filesystem which removed the last lockspace:

unreferenced object 0xffff9264f482f600 (size 192):
comm "dlm_controld", pid 325, jiffies 4294690276 (age 48.136s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):

    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 6e 6f 64 65 73 00 00 00  ........nodes...
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<00000000060481d7>] make_space+0x41/0x130
    [<000000008d905d46>] configfs_mkdir+0x1a2/0x5f0
    [<00000000729502cf>] vfs_mkdir+0x155/0x210
    [<000000000369bcf1>] do_mkdirat+0x6d/0x110
    [<00000000cc478a33>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
    [<00000000ce9ccf01>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The patch just remembers the "nodes" entry pointer in space as I think it's created as subdirectory when parent "spaces" is created. In function drop_space() we will lost the pointer reference to nds because configfs_remove_default_groups(). However as this subdirectory is always available when "spaces" exists it will just be freed when "spaces" will be freed.

---
 fs/dlm/config.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/dlm/config.c +3 -0
index 3b21082e1b550..3b1012a3c4396 100644
@@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ struct dlm_space {
 	struct list_head members;
 	struct mutex members_lock;
 	int members_count;
+	struct dlm_nodes *nds;
 };
 
 struct dlm_comms {
@@ -424,6 +425,7 @@ static struct config_group *make_space(struct config_group *g, const char *name)
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sp->members);
 	mutex_init(&sp->members_lock);
 	sp->members_count = 0;
+	sp->nds = nds;
 	return &sp->group;
 
  fail:
@@ -445,6 +447,7 @@ static void drop_space(struct config_group *g, struct config_item *i)
 static void release_space(struct config_item *i)
 {
 	struct dlm_space *sp = config_item_to_space(i);
+	kfree(sp->nds);
 	kfree(sp);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#347 lore raw

PATCH 347/408 media: venus: core: Fix runtime PM imbalance in venus_probe

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bbe516e976fce538db96bd2b7287df942faa14a3 ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced. For other error paths after this call, things are the same.

Fix this by adding pm_runtime_put_noidle() after 'err_runtime_disable' label. But in this case, the error path after pm_runtime_put_sync() will decrease PM usage counter twice. Thus add an extra pm_runtime_get_noresume() in this path to balance PM counter.

---
 drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/core.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/core.c +4 -1
index 84e982f259a06..bbc430a003443 100644
@@ -316,8 +316,10 @@ static int venus_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		goto err_core_deinit;
 
 	ret = pm_runtime_put_sync(dev);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
+		pm_runtime_get_noresume(dev);
 		goto err_dev_unregister;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 
@@ -328,6 +330,7 @@ static int venus_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 err_venus_shutdown:
 	venus_shutdown(core);
 err_runtime_disable:
+	pm_runtime_put_noidle(dev);
 	pm_runtime_set_suspended(dev);
 	pm_runtime_disable(dev);
 	hfi_destroy(core);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#348 lore raw

PATCH 348/408 ntfs: add check for mft record size in superblock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Rustam Kovhaev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4f8c94022f0bc3babd0a124c0a7dcdd7547bd94e ]

Number of bytes allocated for mft record should be equal to the mft record size stored in ntfs superblock as reported by syzbot, userspace might trigger out-of-bounds read by dereferencing ctx->attr in ntfs_attr_find()

---
 fs/ntfs/inode.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/ntfs/inode.c +6 -0
index d4359a1df3d5e..84933a0af49b6 100644
@@ -1809,6 +1809,12 @@ int ntfs_read_inode_mount(struct inode *vi)
 		brelse(bh);
 	}
 
+	if (le32_to_cpu(m->bytes_allocated) != vol->mft_record_size) {
+		ntfs_error(sb, "Incorrect mft record size %u in superblock, should be %u.",
+				le32_to_cpu(m->bytes_allocated), vol->mft_record_size);
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+
 	/* Apply the mst fixups. */
 	if (post_read_mst_fixup((NTFS_RECORD*)m, vol->mft_record_size)) {
 		/* FIXME: Try to use the $MFTMirr now. */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#349 lore raw

PATCH 349/408 ip_gre: set dev->hard_header_len and dev->needed_headroom properly

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fdafed459998e2be0e877e6189b24cb7a0183224 ]

GRE tunnel has its own header_ops, ipgre_header_ops, and sets it conditionally. When it is set, it assumes the outer IP header is already created before ipgre_xmit().

This is not true when we send packets through a raw packet socket, where L2 headers are supposed to be constructed by user. Packet socket calls dev_validate_header() to validate the header. But GRE tunnel does not set dev->hard_header_len, so that check can be simply bypassed, therefore uninit memory could be passed down to ipgre_xmit(). Similar for dev->needed_headroom.

dev->hard_header_len is supposed to be the length of the header created by dev->header_ops->create(), so it should be used whenever header_ops is set, and dev->needed_headroom should be used when it is not set.

---
 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/ip_gre.c +11 -4
index 85ba1453ba5ca..fedad3a3e61b8 100644
@@ -603,9 +603,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipgre_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	}
 
 	if (dev->header_ops) {
-		/* Need space for new headers */
-		if (skb_cow_head(skb, dev->needed_headroom -
-				      (tunnel->hlen + sizeof(struct iphdr))))
+		if (skb_cow_head(skb, 0))
 			goto free_skb;
 
 		tnl_params = (const struct iphdr *)skb->data;
@@ -723,7 +721,11 @@ static void ipgre_link_update(struct net_device *dev, bool set_mtu)
 	len = tunnel->tun_hlen - len;
 	tunnel->hlen = tunnel->hlen + len;
 
-	dev->needed_headroom = dev->needed_headroom + len;
+	if (dev->header_ops)
+		dev->hard_header_len += len;
+	else
+		dev->needed_headroom += len;
+
 	if (set_mtu)
 		dev->mtu = max_t(int, dev->mtu - len, 68);
 
@@ -926,6 +928,7 @@ static void __gre_tunnel_init(struct net_device *dev)
 	tunnel->parms.iph.protocol = IPPROTO_GRE;
 
 	tunnel->hlen = tunnel->tun_hlen + tunnel->encap_hlen;
+	dev->needed_headroom = tunnel->hlen + sizeof(tunnel->parms.iph);
 
 	dev->features		|= GRE_FEATURES;
 	dev->hw_features	|= GRE_FEATURES;
@@ -969,10 +972,14 @@ static int ipgre_tunnel_init(struct net_device *dev)
 				return -EINVAL;
 			dev->flags = IFF_BROADCAST;
 			dev->header_ops = &ipgre_header_ops;
+			dev->hard_header_len = tunnel->hlen + sizeof(*iph);
+			dev->needed_headroom = 0;
 		}
 #endif
 	} else if (!tunnel->collect_md) {
 		dev->header_ops = &ipgre_header_ops;
+		dev->hard_header_len = tunnel->hlen + sizeof(*iph);
+		dev->needed_headroom = 0;
 	}
 
 	return ip_tunnel_init(dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#350 lore raw

PATCH 350/408 mac80211: handle lack of sband->bitrates in rates

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Thomas Pedersen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8b783d104e7f40684333d2ec155fac39219beb2f ]

Even though a driver or mac80211 shouldn't produce a legacy bitrate if sband->bitrates doesn't exist, don't crash if that is the case either.

This fixes a kernel panic if station dump is run before last_rate can be updated with a data frame when sband->bitrates is missing (eg. in S1G bands).

---
 net/mac80211/cfg.c      | 3 ++-
 net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/mac80211/cfg.c +2 -1
index a9dda5c228f60..fa293feef935d 100644
@@ -698,7 +698,8 @@ void sta_set_rate_info_tx(struct sta_info *sta,
 		u16 brate;
 
 		sband = ieee80211_get_sband(sta->sdata);
-		if (sband) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(sband && !sband->bitrates);
+		if (sband && sband->bitrates) {
 			brate = sband->bitrates[rate->idx].bitrate;
 			rinfo->legacy = DIV_ROUND_UP(brate, 1 << shift);
 		}
net/mac80211/sta_info.c +4 -0
index f5d96107af6de..4f14d8a06915a 100644
@@ -2083,6 +2083,10 @@ static void sta_stats_decode_rate(struct ieee80211_local *local, u32 rate,
 		int rate_idx = STA_STATS_GET(LEGACY_IDX, rate);
 
 		sband = local->hw.wiphy->bands[band];
+
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sband->bitrates))
+			break;
+
 		brate = sband->bitrates[rate_idx].bitrate;
 		if (rinfo->bw == RATE_INFO_BW_5)
 			shift = 2;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#351 lore raw

PATCH 351/408 PM: hibernate: remove the bogus call to get_gendisk() in software_resume()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 428805c0c5e76ef643b1fbc893edfb636b3d8aef ]

get_gendisk grabs a reference on the disk and file operation, so this code will leak both of them while having absolutely no use for the gendisk itself.

This effectively reverts commit 2df83fa4bce421f ("PM / Hibernate: Use get_gendisk to verify partition if resume_file is integer format")

---
 kernel/power/hibernate.c | 11 -----------
 1 file changed, 11 deletions(-)
kernel/power/hibernate.c +0 -11
index b6c5895ced36b..69c4cd472def3 100644
@@ -839,17 +839,6 @@ static int software_resume(void)
 
 	/* Check if the device is there */
 	swsusp_resume_device = name_to_dev_t(resume_file);
-
-	/*
-	 * name_to_dev_t is ineffective to verify parition if resume_file is in
-	 * integer format. (e.g. major:minor)
-	 */
-	if (isdigit(resume_file[0]) && resume_wait) {
-		int partno;
-		while (!get_gendisk(swsusp_resume_device, &partno))
-			msleep(10);
-	}
-
 	if (!swsusp_resume_device) {
 		/*
 		 * Some device discovery might still be in progress; we need
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#352 lore raw

PATCH 352/408 scsi: mvumi: Fix error return in mvumi_io_attach()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jing Xiangfeng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 055f15ab2cb4a5cbc4c0a775ef3d0066e0fa9b34 ]

Return PTR_ERR() from the error handling case instead of 0.

---
 drivers/scsi/mvumi.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/scsi/mvumi.c +1 -0
index 8906aceda4c43..0354898d7cac1 100644
@@ -2425,6 +2425,7 @@ static int mvumi_io_attach(struct mvumi_hba *mhba)
 	if (IS_ERR(mhba->dm_thread)) {
 		dev_err(&mhba->pdev->dev,
 			"failed to create device scan thread\n");
+		ret = PTR_ERR(mhba->dm_thread);
 		mutex_unlock(&mhba->sas_discovery_mutex);
 		goto fail_create_thread;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#353 lore raw

PATCH 353/408 scsi: target: core: Add CONTROL field for trace events

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Roman Bolshakov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7010645ba7256992818b518163f46bd4cdf8002a ]

trace-cmd report doesn't show events from target subsystem because scsi_command_size() leaks through event format string:

[target:target_sequencer_start] function scsi_command_size not defined [target:target_cmd_complete] function scsi_command_size not defined

Addition of scsi_command_size() to plugin_scsi.c in trace-cmd doesn't help because an expression is used inside TP_printk(). trace-cmd event parser doesn't understand minus sign inside [ ]:

Error: expected ']' but read '-'

Rather than duplicating kernel code in plugin_scsi.c, provide a dedicated field for CONTROL byte.

---
 include/scsi/scsi_common.h    |  7 +++++++
 include/trace/events/target.h | 12 ++++++------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/scsi/scsi_common.h +7 -0
index 731ac09ed2313..5b567b43e1b16 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ scsi_command_size(const unsigned char *cmnd)
 		scsi_varlen_cdb_length(cmnd) : COMMAND_SIZE(cmnd[0]);
 }
 
+static inline unsigned char
+scsi_command_control(const unsigned char *cmnd)
+{
+	return (cmnd[0] == VARIABLE_LENGTH_CMD) ?
+		cmnd[1] : cmnd[COMMAND_SIZE(cmnd[0]) - 1];
+}
+
 /* Returns a human-readable name for the device */
 extern const char *scsi_device_type(unsigned type);
 
include/trace/events/target.h +6 -6
index 914a872dd3435..e87a3716b0ac9 100644
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(target_sequencer_start,
 		__field( unsigned int,	opcode		)
 		__field( unsigned int,	data_length	)
 		__field( unsigned int,	task_attribute  )
+		__field( unsigned char,	control		)
 		__array( unsigned char,	cdb, TCM_MAX_COMMAND_SIZE	)
 		__string( initiator,	cmd->se_sess->se_node_acl->initiatorname	)
 	),
@@ -149,6 +150,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(target_sequencer_start,
 		__entry->opcode		= cmd->t_task_cdb[0];
 		__entry->data_length	= cmd->data_length;
 		__entry->task_attribute	= cmd->sam_task_attr;
+		__entry->control	= scsi_command_control(cmd->t_task_cdb);
 		memcpy(__entry->cdb, cmd->t_task_cdb, TCM_MAX_COMMAND_SIZE);
 		__assign_str(initiator, cmd->se_sess->se_node_acl->initiatorname);
 	),
@@ -158,9 +160,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(target_sequencer_start,
 		  show_opcode_name(__entry->opcode),
 		  __entry->data_length, __print_hex(__entry->cdb, 16),
 		  show_task_attribute_name(__entry->task_attribute),
-		  scsi_command_size(__entry->cdb) <= 16 ?
-			__entry->cdb[scsi_command_size(__entry->cdb) - 1] :
-			__entry->cdb[1]
+		  __entry->control
 	)
 );
 
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(target_cmd_complete,
 		__field( unsigned int,	opcode		)
 		__field( unsigned int,	data_length	)
 		__field( unsigned int,	task_attribute  )
+		__field( unsigned char,	control		)
 		__field( unsigned char,	scsi_status	)
 		__field( unsigned char,	sense_length	)
 		__array( unsigned char,	cdb, TCM_MAX_COMMAND_SIZE	)
@@ -187,6 +188,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(target_cmd_complete,
 		__entry->opcode		= cmd->t_task_cdb[0];
 		__entry->data_length	= cmd->data_length;
 		__entry->task_attribute	= cmd->sam_task_attr;
+		__entry->control	= scsi_command_control(cmd->t_task_cdb);
 		__entry->scsi_status	= cmd->scsi_status;
 		__entry->sense_length	= cmd->scsi_status == SAM_STAT_CHECK_CONDITION ?
 			min(18, ((u8 *) cmd->sense_buffer)[SPC_ADD_SENSE_LEN_OFFSET] + 8) : 0;
@@ -203,9 +205,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(target_cmd_complete,
 		  show_opcode_name(__entry->opcode),
 		  __entry->data_length, __print_hex(__entry->cdb, 16),
 		  show_task_attribute_name(__entry->task_attribute),
-		  scsi_command_size(__entry->cdb) <= 16 ?
-			__entry->cdb[scsi_command_size(__entry->cdb) - 1] :
-			__entry->cdb[1]
+		  __entry->control
 	)
 );
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#354 lore raw

PATCH 354/408 mic: vop: copy data to kernel space then write to io memory

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sherry Sun <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 675f0ad4046946e80412896436164d172cd92238 ]

Read and write io memory should address align on ARCH ARM. Change to use memcpy_toio to avoid kernel panic caused by the address un-align issue.

---
 drivers/misc/mic/vop/vop_vringh.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/mic/vop/vop_vringh.c +14 -6
index 30eac172f0170..d069947b09345 100644
@@ -602,6 +602,7 @@ static int vop_virtio_copy_from_user(struct vop_vdev *vdev, void __user *ubuf,
 	size_t partlen;
 	bool dma = VOP_USE_DMA && vi->dma_ch;
 	int err = 0;
+	size_t offset = 0;
 
 	if (dma) {
 		dma_alignment = 1 << vi->dma_ch->device->copy_align;
@@ -655,13 +656,20 @@ static int vop_virtio_copy_from_user(struct vop_vdev *vdev, void __user *ubuf,
 	 * We are copying to IO below and should ideally use something
 	 * like copy_from_user_toio(..) if it existed.
 	 */
-	if (copy_from_user((void __force *)dbuf, ubuf, len)) {
-		err = -EFAULT;
-		dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
-			__func__, __LINE__, err);
-		goto err;
+	while (len) {
+		partlen = min_t(size_t, len, VOP_INT_DMA_BUF_SIZE);
+
+		if (copy_from_user(vvr->buf, ubuf + offset, partlen)) {
+			err = -EFAULT;
+			dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
+				__func__, __LINE__, err);
+			goto err;
+		}
+		memcpy_toio(dbuf + offset, vvr->buf, partlen);
+		offset += partlen;
+		vdev->out_bytes += partlen;
+		len -= partlen;
 	}
-	vdev->out_bytes += len;
 	err = 0;
 err:
 	vpdev->hw_ops->unmap(vpdev, dbuf);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#355 lore raw

PATCH 355/408 misc: vop: add round_up(x,4) for vring_size to avoid kernel panic

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sherry Sun <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cc1a2679865a94b83804822996eed010a50a7c1d ]

Since struct _mic_vring_info and vring are allocated together and follow vring, if the vring_size() is not four bytes aligned, which will cause the start address of struct _mic_vring_info is not four byte aligned. For example, when vring entries is 128, the vring_size() will be 5126 bytes. The _mic_vring_info struct layout in ddr looks like:
0x90002400: 00000000 00390000 EE010000 0000C0FF
Here 0x39 is the avail_idx member, and 0xC0FFEE01 is the magic member.

When EP use ioread32(magic) to reads the magic in RC's share memory, it will cause kernel panic on ARM64 platform due to the cross-byte io read. Here read magic in user space use le32toh(vr0->info->magic) will meet the same issue.
So add round_up(x,4) for vring_size, then the struct _mic_vring_info will store in this way:
0x90002400: 00000000 00000000 00000039 C0FFEE01
Which will avoid kernel panic when read magic in struct _mic_vring_info.

---
 drivers/misc/mic/vop/vop_main.c   | 2 +-
 drivers/misc/mic/vop/vop_vringh.c | 4 ++--
 samples/mic/mpssd/mpssd.c         | 4 ++--
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/mic/vop/vop_main.c +1 -1
index 85942f6717c57..8aadc6055df17 100644
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static struct virtqueue *vop_find_vq(struct virtio_device *dev,
 	/* First assign the vring's allocated in host memory */
 	vqconfig = _vop_vq_config(vdev->desc) + index;
 	memcpy_fromio(&config, vqconfig, sizeof(config));
-	_vr_size = vring_size(le16_to_cpu(config.num), MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN);
+	_vr_size = round_up(vring_size(le16_to_cpu(config.num), MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN), 4);
 	vr_size = PAGE_ALIGN(_vr_size + sizeof(struct _mic_vring_info));
 	va = vpdev->hw_ops->remap(vpdev, le64_to_cpu(config.address), vr_size);
 	if (!va)
drivers/misc/mic/vop/vop_vringh.c +2 -2
index d069947b09345..7014ffe88632e 100644
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static int vop_virtio_add_device(struct vop_vdev *vdev,
 
 		num = le16_to_cpu(vqconfig[i].num);
 		mutex_init(&vvr->vr_mutex);
-		vr_size = PAGE_ALIGN(vring_size(num, MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN) +
+		vr_size = PAGE_ALIGN(round_up(vring_size(num, MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN), 4) +
 			sizeof(struct _mic_vring_info));
 		vr->va = (void *)
 			__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO,
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static int vop_virtio_add_device(struct vop_vdev *vdev,
 			goto err;
 		}
 		vr->len = vr_size;
-		vr->info = vr->va + vring_size(num, MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN);
+		vr->info = vr->va + round_up(vring_size(num, MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN), 4);
 		vr->info->magic = cpu_to_le32(MIC_MAGIC + vdev->virtio_id + i);
 		vr_addr = dma_map_single(&vpdev->dev, vr->va, vr_size,
 					 DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
samples/mic/mpssd/mpssd.c +2 -2
index a11bf6c5b53b4..cd3f16a6f5caf 100644
@@ -403,9 +403,9 @@ mic_virtio_copy(struct mic_info *mic, int fd,
 
 static inline unsigned _vring_size(unsigned int num, unsigned long align)
 {
-	return ((sizeof(struct vring_desc) * num + sizeof(__u16) * (3 + num)
+	return _ALIGN_UP(((sizeof(struct vring_desc) * num + sizeof(__u16) * (3 + num)
 				+ align - 1) & ~(align - 1))
-		+ sizeof(__u16) * 3 + sizeof(struct vring_used_elem) * num;
+		+ sizeof(__u16) * 3 + sizeof(struct vring_used_elem) * num, 4);
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#356 lore raw

PATCH 356/408 usb: dwc3: Add splitdisable quirk for Hisilicon Kirin Soc

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yu Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f580170f135af14e287560d94045624d4242d712 ]

SPLIT_BOUNDARY_DISABLE should be set for DesignWare USB3 DRD Core of Hisilicon Kirin Soc when dwc3 core act as host.

[mchehab: dropped a dev_dbg() as only traces are now allowwed on this driver]

---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/usb/dwc3/core.h |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c +25 -0
index 526c275ad0bc5..4cbf295390062 100644
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ static void __dwc3_set_mode(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct dwc3 *dwc = work_to_dwc(work);
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret;
+	u32 reg;
 
 	if (dwc->dr_mode != USB_DR_MODE_OTG)
 		return;
@@ -168,6 +169,11 @@ static void __dwc3_set_mode(struct work_struct *work)
 				otg_set_vbus(dwc->usb2_phy->otg, true);
 			phy_set_mode(dwc->usb2_generic_phy, PHY_MODE_USB_HOST);
 			phy_set_mode(dwc->usb3_generic_phy, PHY_MODE_USB_HOST);
+			if (dwc->dis_split_quirk) {
+				reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUCTL3);
+				reg |= DWC3_GUCTL3_SPLITDISABLE;
+				dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUCTL3, reg);
+			}
 		}
 		break;
 	case DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_DEVICE:
@@ -1323,6 +1329,9 @@ static void dwc3_get_properties(struct dwc3 *dwc)
 	dwc->dis_metastability_quirk = device_property_read_bool(dev,
 				"snps,dis_metastability_quirk");
 
+	dwc->dis_split_quirk = device_property_read_bool(dev,
+				"snps,dis-split-quirk");
+
 	dwc->lpm_nyet_threshold = lpm_nyet_threshold;
 	dwc->tx_de_emphasis = tx_de_emphasis;
 
@@ -1835,10 +1844,26 @@ static int dwc3_resume(struct device *dev)
 
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static void dwc3_complete(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct dwc3	*dwc = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	u32		reg;
+
+	if (dwc->current_dr_role == DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_HOST &&
+			dwc->dis_split_quirk) {
+		reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUCTL3);
+		reg |= DWC3_GUCTL3_SPLITDISABLE;
+		dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUCTL3, reg);
+	}
+}
+#else
+#define dwc3_complete NULL
 #endif /* CONFIG_PM_SLEEP */
 
 static const struct dev_pm_ops dwc3_dev_pm_ops = {
 	SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(dwc3_suspend, dwc3_resume)
+	.complete = dwc3_complete,
 	SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(dwc3_runtime_suspend, dwc3_runtime_resume,
 			dwc3_runtime_idle)
 };
drivers/usb/dwc3/core.h +7 -0
index ce4acbf7fef90..4dfbffa944de1 100644
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@
 #define DWC3_GEVNTCOUNT(n)	(0xc40c + ((n) * 0x10))
 
 #define DWC3_GHWPARAMS8		0xc600
+#define DWC3_GUCTL3		0xc60c
 #define DWC3_GFLADJ		0xc630
 
 /* Device Registers */
@@ -375,6 +376,9 @@
 /* Global User Control Register 2 */
 #define DWC3_GUCTL2_RST_ACTBITLATER		BIT(14)
 
+/* Global User Control Register 3 */
+#define DWC3_GUCTL3_SPLITDISABLE		BIT(14)
+
 /* Device Configuration Register */
 #define DWC3_DCFG_DEVADDR(addr)	((addr) << 3)
 #define DWC3_DCFG_DEVADDR_MASK	DWC3_DCFG_DEVADDR(0x7f)
@@ -1038,6 +1042,7 @@ struct dwc3_scratchpad_array {
  * 	2	- No de-emphasis
  * 	3	- Reserved
  * @dis_metastability_quirk: set to disable metastability quirk.
+ * @dis_split_quirk: set to disable split boundary.
  * @imod_interval: set the interrupt moderation interval in 250ns
  *                 increments or 0 to disable.
  */
@@ -1229,6 +1234,8 @@ struct dwc3 {
 
 	unsigned		dis_metastability_quirk:1;
 
+	unsigned		dis_split_quirk:1;
+
 	u16			imod_interval;
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#357 lore raw

PATCH 357/408 usb: gadget: function: printer: fix use-after-free in __lock_acquire

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zqiang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e8d5f92b8d30bb4ade76494490c3c065e12411b1 ]

Fix this by increase object reference count.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x3fd4/0x4180
kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3831
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880683b0018 by task syz-executor.0/3377

CPU: 1 PID: 3377 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.11 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xce/0x128 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.4+0x21/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:374
 __kasan_report+0x131/0x1b0 mm/kasan/report.c:506
 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641
 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135
 __lock_acquire+0x3fd4/0x4180 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3831
 lock_acquire+0x127/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4488
 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
 printer_ioctl+0x4a/0x110 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c:723
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:47 [inline]
 ksys_ioctl+0xfb/0x130 fs/ioctl.c:763
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:772 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:770 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:770
 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x510 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4531a9
Code: ed 60 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48

89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 bb 60 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fd14ad72c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bfa8 RCX: 00000000004531a9
RDX: fffffffffffffff9 RSI: 000000000000009e RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004bbd61
R13: 00000000004d0a98 R14: 00007fd14ad736d4 R15: 00000000ffffffff

Allocated by task 2393:
 save_stack+0x21/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa7/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:515
 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:529
 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xfa/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2813
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:555 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline]
 gprinter_alloc+0xa1/0x870 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c:1416
 usb_get_function+0x58/0xc0 drivers/usb/gadget/functions.c:61
 config_usb_cfg_link+0x1ed/0x3e0 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:444
 configfs_symlink+0x527/0x11d0 fs/configfs/symlink.c:202
 vfs_symlink+0x33d/0x5b0 fs/namei.c:4201
 do_symlinkat+0x11b/0x1d0 fs/namei.c:4228
 __do_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4242 [inline]
 __se_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4239 [inline]
 __x64_sys_symlinkat+0x73/0xb0 fs/namei.c:4239
 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x510 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 3368:
 save_stack+0x21/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
 kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:337 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x135/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:476
 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:485
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1444 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1477 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3034 [inline]
 kfree+0xf7/0x410 mm/slub.c:3995
 gprinter_free+0x49/0xd0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c:1353
 usb_put_function+0x38/0x50 drivers/usb/gadget/functions.c:87
 config_usb_cfg_unlink+0x2db/0x3b0 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:485
 configfs_unlink+0x3b9/0x7f0 fs/configfs/symlink.c:250
 vfs_unlink+0x287/0x570 fs/namei.c:4073
 do_unlinkat+0x4f9/0x620 fs/namei.c:4137
 __do_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4184 [inline]
 __se_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4182 [inline]
 __x64_sys_unlink+0x42/0x50 fs/namei.c:4182
 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x510 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880683b0000
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
 1024-byte region [ffff8880683b0000, ffff8880683b0400)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0001a0ec00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88806c00e300
index:0xffff8880683b1800 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head)
raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 0000000600000001 ffff88806c00e300
raw: ffff8880683b1800 000000008010000a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c +14 -2
index 9c7ed2539ff77..8ed1295d7e350 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/ctype.h>
 #include <linux/cdev.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
 
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ struct printer_dev {
 	struct usb_gadget	*gadget;
 	s8			interface;
 	struct usb_ep		*in_ep, *out_ep;
-
+	struct kref             kref;
 	struct list_head	rx_reqs;	/* List of free RX structs */
 	struct list_head	rx_reqs_active;	/* List of Active RX xfers */
 	struct list_head	rx_buffers;	/* List of completed xfers */
@@ -218,6 +219,13 @@ static inline struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *ep_desc(struct usb_gadget *gadget,
 
 /*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
 
+static void printer_dev_free(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct printer_dev *dev = container_of(kref, struct printer_dev, kref);
+
+	kfree(dev);
+}
+
 static struct usb_request *
 printer_req_alloc(struct usb_ep *ep, unsigned len, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 {
@@ -348,6 +356,7 @@ printer_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *fd)
 
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
 
+	kref_get(&dev->kref);
 	DBG(dev, "printer_open returned %x\n", ret);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -365,6 +374,7 @@ printer_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *fd)
 	dev->printer_status &= ~PRINTER_SELECTED;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
 
+	kref_put(&dev->kref, printer_dev_free);
 	DBG(dev, "printer_close\n");
 
 	return 0;
@@ -1350,7 +1360,8 @@ static void gprinter_free(struct usb_function *f)
 	struct f_printer_opts *opts;
 
 	opts = container_of(f->fi, struct f_printer_opts, func_inst);
-	kfree(dev);
+
+	kref_put(&dev->kref, printer_dev_free);
 	mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
 	--opts->refcnt;
 	mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
@@ -1419,6 +1430,7 @@ static struct usb_function *gprinter_alloc(struct usb_function_instance *fi)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
 
+	kref_init(&dev->kref);
 	++opts->refcnt;
 	dev->minor = opts->minor;
 	dev->pnp_string = opts->pnp_string;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#358 lore raw

PATCH 358/408 udf: Limit sparing table size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 44ac6b829c4e173fdf6df18e6dd86aecf9a3dc99 ]

Although UDF standard allows it, we don't support sparing table larger than a single block. Check it during mount so that we don't try to access memory beyond end of buffer.

---
 fs/udf/super.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/udf/super.c +6 -0
index 4baa1ca91e9be..a0cd766b41cdb 100644
@@ -1352,6 +1352,12 @@ static int udf_load_sparable_map(struct super_block *sb,
 			(int)spm->numSparingTables);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
+	if (le32_to_cpu(spm->sizeSparingTable) > sb->s_blocksize) {
+		udf_err(sb, "error loading logical volume descriptor: "
+			"Too big sparing table size (%u)\n",
+			le32_to_cpu(spm->sizeSparingTable));
+		return -EIO;
+	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < spm->numSparingTables; i++) {
 		loc = le32_to_cpu(spm->locSparingTable[i]);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#359 lore raw

PATCH 359/408 udf: Avoid accessing uninitialized data on failed inode read

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 044e2e26f214e5ab26af85faffd8d1e4ec066931 ]

When we fail to read inode, some data accessed in udf_evict_inode() may be uninitialized. Move the accesses to !is_bad_inode() branch.

---
 fs/udf/inode.c | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/udf/inode.c +14 -11
index ea80036d7897b..97a192eb9949c 100644
@@ -139,21 +139,24 @@ void udf_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
 	struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
 	int want_delete = 0;
 
-	if (!inode->i_nlink && !is_bad_inode(inode)) {
-		want_delete = 1;
-		udf_setsize(inode, 0);
-		udf_update_inode(inode, IS_SYNC(inode));
+	if (!is_bad_inode(inode)) {
+		if (!inode->i_nlink) {
+			want_delete = 1;
+			udf_setsize(inode, 0);
+			udf_update_inode(inode, IS_SYNC(inode));
+		}
+		if (iinfo->i_alloc_type != ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB &&
+		    inode->i_size != iinfo->i_lenExtents) {
+			udf_warn(inode->i_sb,
+				 "Inode %lu (mode %o) has inode size %llu different from extent length %llu. Filesystem need not be standards compliant.\n",
+				 inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode,
+				 (unsigned long long)inode->i_size,
+				 (unsigned long long)iinfo->i_lenExtents);
+		}
 	}
 	truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
 	invalidate_inode_buffers(inode);
 	clear_inode(inode);
-	if (iinfo->i_alloc_type != ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB &&
-	    inode->i_size != iinfo->i_lenExtents) {
-		udf_warn(inode->i_sb, "Inode %lu (mode %o) has inode size %llu different from extent length %llu. Filesystem need not be standards compliant.\n",
-			 inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode,
-			 (unsigned long long)inode->i_size,
-			 (unsigned long long)iinfo->i_lenExtents);
-	}
 	kfree(iinfo->i_ext.i_data);
 	iinfo->i_ext.i_data = NULL;
 	udf_clear_extent_cache(inode);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#360 lore raw

PATCH 360/408 rtw88: increse the size of rx buffer size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tzu-En Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ee755732b7a16af018daa77d9562d2493fb7092f ]

The vht capability of MAX_MPDU_LENGTH is 11454 in rtw88; however, the rx buffer size for each packet is 8192. When receiving packets that are larger than rx buffer size, it will leads to rx buffer ring overflow.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.h +2 -2
index 87824a4caba98..a47d871ae506a 100644
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
 #define RTK_BEQ_TX_DESC_NUM	256
 
 #define RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM	512
-/* 8K + rx desc size */
-#define RTK_PCI_RX_BUF_SIZE	(8192 + 24)
+/* 11K + rx desc size */
+#define RTK_PCI_RX_BUF_SIZE	(11454 + 24)
 
 #define RTK_PCI_CTRL		0x300
 #define BIT_RST_TRXDMA_INTF	BIT(20)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#361 lore raw

PATCH 361/408 USB: cdc-acm: handle broken union descriptors

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 960c7339de27c6d6fec13b54880501c3576bb08d ]

Handle broken union functional descriptors where the master-interface doesn't exist or where its class is of neither Communication or Data type (as required by the specification) by falling back to "combined-interface" probing.

Note that this still allows for handling union descriptors with switched interfaces.

This specifically makes the Whistler radio scanners TRX series devices work with the driver without adding further quirks to the device-id table.

---
 drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c +12 -0
index 7499ba118665a..c02488d469185 100644
@@ -1243,9 +1243,21 @@ static int acm_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
 			}
 		}
 	} else {
+		int class = -1;
+
 		data_intf_num = union_header->bSlaveInterface0;
 		control_interface = usb_ifnum_to_if(usb_dev, union_header->bMasterInterface0);
 		data_interface = usb_ifnum_to_if(usb_dev, data_intf_num);
+
+		if (control_interface)
+			class = control_interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceClass;
+
+		if (class != USB_CLASS_COMM && class != USB_CLASS_CDC_DATA) {
+			dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "Broken union descriptor, assuming single interface\n");
+			combined_interfaces = 1;
+			control_interface = data_interface = intf;
+			goto look_for_collapsed_interface;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (!control_interface || !data_interface) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#362 lore raw

PATCH 362/408 usb: dwc3: simple: add support for Hikey 970

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b68d9251561f33661e53dd618f1cafe7ec9ec3c2 ]

This binding driver is needed for Hikey 970 to work, as otherwise a Serror is produced:

    [    1.837458] SError Interrupt on CPU0, code 0xbf000002 -- SError
    [    1.837462] CPU: 0 PID: 74 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.8.0+ #205
    [    1.837463] Hardware name: HiKey970 (DT)
    [    1.837465] Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
    [    1.837467] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
    [    1.837468] pc : _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x18/0x50
    [    1.837469] lr : regmap_unlock_spinlock+0x14/0x20
    [    1.837470] sp : ffff8000124dba60
    [    1.837471] x29: ffff8000124dba60 x28: 0000000000000000
    [    1.837474] x27: ffff0001b7e854c8 x26: ffff80001204ea18
    [    1.837476] x25: 0000000000000005 x24: ffff800011f918f8
    [    1.837479] x23: ffff800011fbb588 x22: ffff0001b7e40e00
    [    1.837481] x21: 0000000000000100 x20: 0000000000000000
    [    1.837483] x19: ffff0001b767ec00 x18: 00000000ff10c000
    [    1.837485] x17: 0000000000000002 x16: 0000b0740fdb9950
    [    1.837488] x15: ffff8000116c1198 x14: ffffffffffffffff
    [    1.837490] x13: 0000000000000030 x12: 0101010101010101
    [    1.837493] x11: 0000000000000020 x10: ffff0001bf17d130
    [    1.837495] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff0001b6938080
    [    1.837497] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
    [    1.837500] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
    [    1.837502] x3 : ffff80001096a880 x2 : 0000000000000000
    [    1.837505] x1 : ffff0001b7e40e00 x0 : 0000000100000001
    [    1.837507] Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt
    [    1.837509] CPU: 0 PID: 74 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.8.0+ #205
    [    1.837510] Hardware name: HiKey970 (DT)
    [    1.837511] Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
    [    1.837513] Call trace:
    [    1.837514]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1e0
    [    1.837515]  show_stack+0x18/0x24
    [    1.837516]  dump_stack+0xc0/0x11c
    [    1.837517]  panic+0x15c/0x324
    [    1.837518]  nmi_panic+0x8c/0x90
    [    1.837519]  arm64_serror_panic+0x78/0x84
    [    1.837520]  do_serror+0x158/0x15c
    [    1.837521]  el1_error+0x84/0x100
    [    1.837522]  _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x18/0x50
    [    1.837523]  regmap_write+0x58/0x80
    [    1.837524]  hi3660_reset_deassert+0x28/0x34
    [    1.837526]  reset_control_deassert+0x50/0x260
    [    1.837527]  reset_control_deassert+0xf4/0x260
    [    1.837528]  dwc3_probe+0x5dc/0xe6c
    [    1.837529]  platform_drv_probe+0x54/0xb0
    [    1.837530]  really_probe+0xe0/0x490
    [    1.837531]  driver_probe_device+0xf4/0x160
    [    1.837532]  __device_attach_driver+0x8c/0x114
    [    1.837533]  bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xcc
    [    1.837534]  __device_attach+0x108/0x1a0
    [    1.837535]  device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
    [    1.837537]  bus_probe_device+0x98/0xa0
    [    1.837538]  deferred_probe_work_func+0x88/0xe0
    [    1.837539]  process_one_work+0x1cc/0x350
    [    1.837540]  worker_thread+0x2c0/0x470
    [    1.837541]  kthread+0x154/0x160
    [    1.837542]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
    [    1.837569] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
    [    1.837570] Kernel Offset: 0x1d0000 from 0xffff800010000000
    [    1.837571] PHYS_OFFSET: 0x0
    [    1.837572] CPU features: 0x240002,20882004
    [    1.837573] Memory Limit: none
---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-of-simple.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-of-simple.c +1 -0
index bdac3e7d7b184..d055e00f81808 100644
@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ static const struct of_device_id of_dwc3_simple_match[] = {
 	{ .compatible = "amlogic,meson-axg-dwc3" },
 	{ .compatible = "amlogic,meson-gxl-dwc3" },
 	{ .compatible = "allwinner,sun50i-h6-dwc3" },
+	{ .compatible = "hisilicon,hi3670-dwc3" },
 	{ /* Sentinel */ }
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, of_dwc3_simple_match);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#363 lore raw

PATCH 363/408 can: flexcan: flexcan_chip_stop(): add error handling and propagate error value

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Joakim Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9ad02c7f4f279504bdd38ab706fdc97d5f2b2a9c ]

This patch implements error handling and propagates the error value of flexcan_chip_stop(). This function will be called from flexcan_suspend() in an upcoming patch in some SoCs which support LPSR mode.

Add a new function flexcan_chip_stop_disable_on_error() that tries to disable the chip even in case of errors.

[mkl: introduce flexcan_chip_stop_disable_on_error() and use it in flexcan_close()]
---
 drivers/net/can/flexcan.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/can/flexcan.c +28 -6
index e5c207ad3c77d..aaa7ed1dc97ee 100644
@@ -1232,18 +1232,23 @@ static int flexcan_chip_start(struct net_device *dev)
 	return err;
 }
 
-/* flexcan_chip_stop
+/* __flexcan_chip_stop
  *
- * this functions is entered with clocks enabled
+ * this function is entered with clocks enabled
  */
-static void flexcan_chip_stop(struct net_device *dev)
+static int __flexcan_chip_stop(struct net_device *dev, bool disable_on_error)
 {
 	struct flexcan_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
 	struct flexcan_regs __iomem *regs = priv->regs;
+	int err;
 
 	/* freeze + disable module */
-	flexcan_chip_freeze(priv);
-	flexcan_chip_disable(priv);
+	err = flexcan_chip_freeze(priv);
+	if (err && !disable_on_error)
+		return err;
+	err = flexcan_chip_disable(priv);
+	if (err && !disable_on_error)
+		goto out_chip_unfreeze;
 
 	/* Disable all interrupts */
 	priv->write(0, &regs->imask2);
@@ -1253,6 +1258,23 @@ static void flexcan_chip_stop(struct net_device *dev)
 
 	flexcan_transceiver_disable(priv);
 	priv->can.state = CAN_STATE_STOPPED;
+
+	return 0;
+
+ out_chip_unfreeze:
+	flexcan_chip_unfreeze(priv);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static inline int flexcan_chip_stop_disable_on_error(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	return __flexcan_chip_stop(dev, true);
+}
+
+static inline int flexcan_chip_stop(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	return __flexcan_chip_stop(dev, false);
 }
 
 static int flexcan_open(struct net_device *dev)
@@ -1341,7 +1363,7 @@ static int flexcan_close(struct net_device *dev)
 
 	netif_stop_queue(dev);
 	can_rx_offload_disable(&priv->offload);
-	flexcan_chip_stop(dev);
+	flexcan_chip_stop_disable_on_error(dev);
 
 	can_rx_offload_del(&priv->offload);
 	free_irq(dev->irq, dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#364 lore raw

PATCH 364/408 ath9k: hif_usb: fix race condition between usb_get_urb() and usb_kill_anchored_urbs()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Brooke Basile <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 03fb92a432ea5abe5909bca1455b7e44a9380480 ]

Calls to usb_kill_anchored_urbs() after usb_kill_urb() on multiprocessor systems create a race condition in which usb_kill_anchored_urbs() deallocates the URB before the completer callback is called in usb_kill_urb(), resulting in a use-after-free.
To fix this, add proper lock protection to usb_kill_urb() calls that can possibly run concurrently with usb_kill_anchored_urbs().

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c +19 -0
index 3f563e02d17da..2ed98aaed6fb5 100644
@@ -449,10 +449,19 @@ static void hif_usb_stop(void *hif_handle)
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
 	/* The pending URBs have to be canceled. */
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(tx_buf, tx_buf_tmp,
 				 &hif_dev->tx.tx_pending, list) {
+		usb_get_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 		usb_kill_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		list_del(&tx_buf->list);
+		usb_free_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		kfree(tx_buf->buf);
+		kfree(tx_buf);
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
 	usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&hif_dev->mgmt_submitted);
 }
@@ -762,27 +771,37 @@ static void ath9k_hif_usb_dealloc_tx_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 	struct tx_buf *tx_buf = NULL, *tx_buf_tmp = NULL;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(tx_buf, tx_buf_tmp,
 				 &hif_dev->tx.tx_buf, list) {
+		usb_get_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 		usb_kill_urb(tx_buf->urb);
 		list_del(&tx_buf->list);
 		usb_free_urb(tx_buf->urb);
 		kfree(tx_buf->buf);
 		kfree(tx_buf);
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	hif_dev->tx.flags |= HIF_USB_TX_FLUSH;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(tx_buf, tx_buf_tmp,
 				 &hif_dev->tx.tx_pending, list) {
+		usb_get_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 		usb_kill_urb(tx_buf->urb);
 		list_del(&tx_buf->list);
 		usb_free_urb(tx_buf->urb);
 		kfree(tx_buf->buf);
 		kfree(tx_buf);
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
 	usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&hif_dev->mgmt_submitted);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#365 lore raw

PATCH 365/408 drm/panfrost: add amlogic reset quirk callback

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Neil Armstrong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 110003002291525bb209f47e6dbf121a63249a97 ]

The T820, G31 & G52 GPUs integrated by Amlogic in the respective GXM, G12A/SM1 & G12B SoCs needs a quirk in the PWR registers at the GPU reset time.

Since the Amlogic's integration of the GPU cores with the SoC is not publicly documented we do not know what does these values, but they permit having a fully functional GPU running with Panfrost.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.c  | 11 +++++++++++
 drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.h  |  2 ++
 drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_regs.h |  4 ++++
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.c +11 -0
index 1431db13ec788..0d39a201c7591 100644
@@ -75,6 +75,17 @@ int panfrost_gpu_soft_reset(struct panfrost_device *pfdev)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+void panfrost_gpu_amlogic_quirk(struct panfrost_device *pfdev)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The Amlogic integrated Mali-T820, Mali-G31 & Mali-G52 needs
+	 * these undocumented bits in GPU_PWR_OVERRIDE1 to be set in order
+	 * to operate correctly.
+	 */
+	gpu_write(pfdev, GPU_PWR_KEY, GPU_PWR_KEY_UNLOCK);
+	gpu_write(pfdev, GPU_PWR_OVERRIDE1, 0xfff | (0x20 << 16));
+}
+
 static void panfrost_gpu_init_quirks(struct panfrost_device *pfdev)
 {
 	u32 quirks = 0;
drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.h +2 -0
index 4112412087b27..468c51e7e46db 100644
@@ -16,4 +16,6 @@ int panfrost_gpu_soft_reset(struct panfrost_device *pfdev);
 void panfrost_gpu_power_on(struct panfrost_device *pfdev);
 void panfrost_gpu_power_off(struct panfrost_device *pfdev);
 
+void panfrost_gpu_amlogic_quirk(struct panfrost_device *pfdev);
+
 #endif
drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_regs.h +4 -0
index ea38ac60581c6..eddaa62ad8b0e 100644
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@
 #define GPU_STATUS			0x34
 #define   GPU_STATUS_PRFCNT_ACTIVE	BIT(2)
 #define GPU_LATEST_FLUSH_ID		0x38
+#define GPU_PWR_KEY			0x50	/* (WO) Power manager key register */
+#define  GPU_PWR_KEY_UNLOCK		0x2968A819
+#define GPU_PWR_OVERRIDE0		0x54	/* (RW) Power manager override settings */
+#define GPU_PWR_OVERRIDE1		0x58	/* (RW) Power manager override settings */
 #define GPU_FAULT_STATUS		0x3C
 #define GPU_FAULT_ADDRESS_LO		0x40
 #define GPU_FAULT_ADDRESS_HI		0x44
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#366 lore raw

PATCH 366/408 bpf: Limit callers stack depth 256 for subprogs with tailcalls

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7f6e4312e15a5c370e84eaa685879b6bdcc717e4 ]

Protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 8k).

---
 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h |  1 +
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c        | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +1 -0
index 26a6d58ca78cc..81c7ea83e8079 100644
@@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ struct bpf_subprog_info {
 	u32 start; /* insn idx of function entry point */
 	u32 linfo_idx; /* The idx to the main_prog->aux->linfo */
 	u16 stack_depth; /* max. stack depth used by this function */
+	bool has_tail_call;
 };
 
 /* single container for all structs
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +29 -0
index ae27dd77a73cb..507474f79195f 100644
@@ -1160,6 +1160,10 @@ static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
 		u8 code = insn[i].code;
 
+		if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
+		    insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call &&
+		    insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
+			subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true;
 		if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32)
 			goto next;
 		if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL)
@@ -2612,6 +2616,31 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
 
 process_func:
+	/* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when
+	 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack
+	 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario
+	 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 =
+	 * 8k).
+	 *
+	 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example:
+	 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128
+	 *  subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256
+	 *  tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256
+	 *   func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320)
+	 *   subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64
+	 *   subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128
+	 *   tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128
+	 *    func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416)
+	 *
+	 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid
+	 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above.
+	 */
+	if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) {
+		verbose(env,
+			"tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n",
+			depth);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
 	/* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity
 	 * of interpreter stack size
 	 */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#367 lore raw

PATCH 367/408 misc: rtsx: Fix memory leak in rtsx_pci_probe

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Keita Suzuki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bc28369c6189009b66d9619dd9f09bd8c684bb98 ]

When mfd_add_devices() fail, pcr->slots should also be freed. However, the current implementation does not free the member, leading to a memory leak.

Fix this by adding a new goto label that frees pcr->slots.

---
 drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_pcr.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_pcr.c +3 -1
index 1958833b3b74e..4fd57052ddd3d 100644
@@ -1534,12 +1534,14 @@ static int rtsx_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pcidev,
 	ret = mfd_add_devices(&pcidev->dev, pcr->id, rtsx_pcr_cells,
 			ARRAY_SIZE(rtsx_pcr_cells), NULL, 0, NULL);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto disable_irq;
+		goto free_slots;
 
 	schedule_delayed_work(&pcr->idle_work, msecs_to_jiffies(200));
 
 	return 0;
 
+free_slots:
+	kfree(pcr->slots);
 disable_irq:
 	free_irq(pcr->irq, (void *)pcr);
 disable_msi:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#368 lore raw

PATCH 368/408 reiserfs: only call unlock_new_inode() if I_NEW

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8859bf2b1278d064a139e3031451524a49a56bd0 ]

unlock_new_inode() is only meant to be called after a new inode has already been inserted into the hash table. But reiserfs_new_inode() can call it even before it has inserted the inode, triggering the WARNING in unlock_new_inode(). Fix this by only calling unlock_new_inode() if the inode has the I_NEW flag set, indicating that it's in the table.

This addresses the syzbot report "WARNING in unlock_new_inode"
(https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=187510916eb6a14598f7).

---
 fs/reiserfs/inode.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/reiserfs/inode.c +2 -1
index 70387650436cf..ac35ddf0dd603 100644
@@ -2161,7 +2161,8 @@ int reiserfs_new_inode(struct reiserfs_transaction_handle *th,
 out_inserted_sd:
 	clear_nlink(inode);
 	th->t_trans_id = 0;	/* so the caller can't use this handle later */
-	unlock_new_inode(inode); /* OK to do even if we hadn't locked it */
+	if (inode->i_state & I_NEW)
+		unlock_new_inode(inode);
 	iput(inode);
 	return err;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#369 lore raw

PATCH 369/408 opp: Prevent memory leak in dev_pm_opp_attach_genpd()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Viresh Kumar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cb60e9602cce1593eb1e9cdc8ee562815078a354 ]

If dev_pm_opp_attach_genpd() is called multiple times (once for each CPU sharing the table), then it would result in unwanted behavior like memory leak, attaching the domain multiple times, etc.

Handle that by checking and returning earlier if the domains are already attached. Now that dev_pm_opp_detach_genpd() can get called multiple times as well, we need to protect that too.

Note that the virtual device pointers aren't returned in this case, as they may become unavailable to some callers during the middle of the operation.

---
 drivers/opp/core.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/opp/core.c +6 -0
index 29dfaa591f8b0..8867bab72e171 100644
@@ -1796,6 +1796,9 @@ static void _opp_detach_genpd(struct opp_table *opp_table)
 {
 	int index;
 
+	if (!opp_table->genpd_virt_devs)
+		return;
+
 	for (index = 0; index < opp_table->required_opp_count; index++) {
 		if (!opp_table->genpd_virt_devs[index])
 			continue;
@@ -1842,6 +1845,9 @@ struct opp_table *dev_pm_opp_attach_genpd(struct device *dev,
 	if (!opp_table)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
+	if (opp_table->genpd_virt_devs)
+		return opp_table;
+
 	/*
 	 * If the genpd's OPP table isn't already initialized, parsing of the
 	 * required-opps fail for dev. We should retry this after genpd's OPP
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#370 lore raw

PATCH 370/408 xfs: make sure the rt allocator doesnt run off the end

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2a6ca4baed620303d414934aa1b7b0a8e7bab05f ]

There's an overflow bug in the realtime allocator. If the rt volume is large enough to handle a single allocation request that is larger than the maximum bmap extent length and the rt bitmap ends exactly on a bitmap block boundary, it's possible that the near allocator will try to check the freeness of a range that extends past the end of the bitmap. This fails with a corruption error and shuts down the fs.

Therefore, constrain maxlen so that the range scan cannot run off the end of the rt bitmap.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_rtalloc.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
fs/xfs/xfs_rtalloc.c +11 -0
index 4a48a8c75b4f7..b583669370825 100644
@@ -247,6 +247,9 @@ xfs_rtallocate_extent_block(
 		end = XFS_BLOCKTOBIT(mp, bbno + 1) - 1;
 	     i <= end;
 	     i++) {
+		/* Make sure we don't scan off the end of the rt volume. */
+		maxlen = min(mp->m_sb.sb_rextents, i + maxlen) - i;
+
 		/*
 		 * See if there's a free extent of maxlen starting at i.
 		 * If it's not so then next will contain the first non-free.
@@ -442,6 +445,14 @@ xfs_rtallocate_extent_near(
 	 */
 	if (bno >= mp->m_sb.sb_rextents)
 		bno = mp->m_sb.sb_rextents - 1;
+
+	/* Make sure we don't run off the end of the rt volume. */
+	maxlen = min(mp->m_sb.sb_rextents, bno + maxlen) - bno;
+	if (maxlen < minlen) {
+		*rtblock = NULLRTBLOCK;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Try the exact allocation first.
 	 */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#371 lore raw

PATCH 371/408 usb: ohci: Default to per-port over-current protection

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hamish Martin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b77d2a0a223bc139ee8904991b2922d215d02636 ]

Some integrated OHCI controller hubs do not expose all ports of the hub to pins on the SoC. In some cases the unconnected ports generate spurious over-current events. For example the Broadcom 56060/Ranger 2 SoC contains a nominally 3 port hub but only the first port is wired.

Default behaviour for ohci-platform driver is to use global over-current protection mode (AKA "ganged"). This leads to the spurious over-current events affecting all ports in the hub.

We now alter the default to use per-port over-current protection.

This patch results in the following configuration changes depending on quirks:
- For quirk OHCI_QUIRK_SUPERIO no changes. These systems remain set up for ganged power switching and no over-current protection.
- For quirk OHCI_QUIRK_AMD756 or OHCI_QUIRK_HUB_POWER power switching remains at none, while over-current protection is now guaranteed to be set to per-port rather than the previous behaviour where it was either none or global over-current protection depending on the value at function entry.

---
 drivers/usb/host/ohci-hcd.c | 16 ++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/host/ohci-hcd.c +10 -6
index 4de91653a2c7b..5eb62240c7f87 100644
@@ -673,20 +673,24 @@ static int ohci_run (struct ohci_hcd *ohci)
 
 	/* handle root hub init quirks ... */
 	val = roothub_a (ohci);
-	val &= ~(RH_A_PSM | RH_A_OCPM);
+	/* Configure for per-port over-current protection by default */
+	val &= ~RH_A_NOCP;
+	val |= RH_A_OCPM;
 	if (ohci->flags & OHCI_QUIRK_SUPERIO) {
-		/* NSC 87560 and maybe others */
+		/* NSC 87560 and maybe others.
+		 * Ganged power switching, no over-current protection.
+		 */
 		val |= RH_A_NOCP;
-		val &= ~(RH_A_POTPGT | RH_A_NPS);
-		ohci_writel (ohci, val, &ohci->regs->roothub.a);
+		val &= ~(RH_A_POTPGT | RH_A_NPS | RH_A_PSM | RH_A_OCPM);
 	} else if ((ohci->flags & OHCI_QUIRK_AMD756) ||
 			(ohci->flags & OHCI_QUIRK_HUB_POWER)) {
 		/* hub power always on; required for AMD-756 and some
-		 * Mac platforms.  ganged overcurrent reporting, if any.
+		 * Mac platforms.
 		 */
 		val |= RH_A_NPS;
-		ohci_writel (ohci, val, &ohci->regs->roothub.a);
 	}
+	ohci_writel(ohci, val, &ohci->regs->roothub.a);
+
 	ohci_writel (ohci, RH_HS_LPSC, &ohci->regs->roothub.status);
 	ohci_writel (ohci, (val & RH_A_NPS) ? 0 : RH_B_PPCM,
 						&ohci->regs->roothub.b);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#372 lore raw

PATCH 372/408 Bluetooth: Only mark socket zapped after unlocking

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 20ae4089d0afeb24e9ceb026b996bfa55c983cc2 ]

Since l2cap_sock_teardown_cb doesn't acquire the channel lock before setting the socket as zapped, it could potentially race with l2cap_sock_release which frees the socket. Thus, wait until the cleanup is complete before marking the socket as zapped.

This race was reproduced on a JBL GO speaker after the remote device rejected L2CAP connection due to resource unavailability.

Here is a dmesg log with debug logs from a repro of this bug:

[ 3465.424086] Bluetooth: hci_core.c:hci_acldata_packet() hci0 len 16 handle 0x0003 flags 0x0002
[ 3465.424090] Bluetooth: hci_conn.c:hci_conn_enter_active_mode() hcon 00000000cfedd07d mode 0
[ 3465.424094] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_recv_acldata() conn 000000007eae8952 len 16 flags 0x2
[ 3465.424098] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_recv_frame() len 12, cid 0x0001
[ 3465.424102] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_raw_recv() conn 000000007eae8952
[ 3465.424175] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_sig_channel() code 0x03 len 8 id 0x0c
[ 3465.424180] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_connect_create_rsp() dcid 0x0045 scid 0x0000 result 0x02 status 0x00
[ 3465.424189] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_chan_put() chan 000000006acf9bff orig refcnt 4
[ 3465.424196] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_chan_del() chan 000000006acf9bff, conn 000000007eae8952, err 111, state BT_CONNECT
[ 3465.424203] Bluetooth: l2cap_sock.c:l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() chan 000000006acf9bff state BT_CONNECT
[ 3465.424221] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_chan_put() chan 000000006acf9bff orig refcnt 3
[ 3465.424226] Bluetooth: hci_core.h:hci_conn_drop() hcon 00000000cfedd07d orig refcnt 6
[ 3465.424234] BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#2, kworker/u17:0/159
[ 3465.425626] Bluetooth: hci_sock.c:hci_sock_sendmsg() sock 000000002bb0cb64 sk 00000000a7964053
[ 3465.430330]  lock: 0xffffff804410aac0, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0
[ 3465.430332] Causing a watchdog bite!
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +4 -3
index 40e96a610e2b4..8648c5211ebe6 100644
@@ -1344,8 +1344,6 @@ static void l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
 
 	parent = bt_sk(sk)->parent;
 
-	sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
-
 	switch (chan->state) {
 	case BT_OPEN:
 	case BT_BOUND:
@@ -1372,8 +1370,11 @@ static void l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
 
 		break;
 	}
-
 	release_sock(sk);
+
+	/* Only zap after cleanup to avoid use after free race */
+	sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
+
 }
 
 static void l2cap_sock_state_change_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int state,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#373 lore raw

PATCH 373/408 drm/msm/a6xx: fix a potential overflow issue

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhenzhong Duan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 08d3ab4b46339bc6f97e83b54a3fb4f8bf8f4cd9 ]

It's allocating an array of a6xx_gpu_state_obj structure rathor than its pointers.

This patch fix it.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_gpu_state.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_gpu_state.c +1 -1
index 691c1a277d91b..dfcbb2b7cdda3 100644
@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ static void a6xx_get_indexed_registers(struct msm_gpu *gpu,
 	int i;
 
 	a6xx_state->indexed_regs = state_kcalloc(a6xx_state, count,
-		sizeof(a6xx_state->indexed_regs));
+		sizeof(*a6xx_state->indexed_regs));
 	if (!a6xx_state->indexed_regs)
 		return;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#374 lore raw

PATCH 374/408 iomap: fix WARN_ON_ONCE() from unprivileged users

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Qian Cai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a805c111650cdba6ee880f528abdd03c1af82089 ]

It is trivial to trigger a WARN_ON_ONCE(1) in iomap_dio_actor() by unprivileged users which would taint the kernel, or worse - panic if panic_on_warn or panic_on_taint is set. Hence, just convert it to pr_warn_ratelimited() to let users know their workloads are racing. Thank Dave Chinner for the initial analysis of the racing reproducers.

---
 fs/iomap/direct-io.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
fs/iomap/direct-io.c +10 -0
index 7b5f76efef02d..8c98fd92bf665 100644
@@ -377,6 +377,16 @@ iomap_dio_actor(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length,
 		return iomap_dio_bio_actor(inode, pos, length, dio, iomap);
 	case IOMAP_INLINE:
 		return iomap_dio_inline_actor(inode, pos, length, dio, iomap);
+	case IOMAP_DELALLOC:
+		/*
+		 * DIO is not serialised against mmap() access at all, and so
+		 * if the page_mkwrite occurs between the writeback and the
+		 * iomap_apply() call in the DIO path, then it will see the
+		 * DELALLOC block that the page-mkwrite allocated.
+		 */
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("Direct I/O collision with buffered writes! File: %pD4 Comm: %.20s\n",
+				    dio->iocb->ki_filp, current->comm);
+		return -EIO;
 	default:
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
 		return -EIO;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#375 lore raw

PATCH 375/408 scsi: ibmvfc: Fix error return in ibmvfc_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jing Xiangfeng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5e48a084f4e824e1b624d3fd7ddcf53d2ba69e53 ]

Fix to return error code PTR_ERR() from the error handling case instead of 0.

---
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c +1 -0
index df897df5cafee..8a76284b59b08 100644
@@ -4788,6 +4788,7 @@ static int ibmvfc_probe(struct vio_dev *vdev, const struct vio_device_id *id)
 	if (IS_ERR(vhost->work_thread)) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Couldn't create kernel thread: %ld\n",
 			PTR_ERR(vhost->work_thread));
+		rc = PTR_ERR(vhost->work_thread);
 		goto free_host_mem;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#376 lore raw

PATCH 376/408 scsi: qla2xxx: Warn if done() or free() are called on an already freed srb

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Daniel Wagner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c0014f94218ea3a312f6235febea0d626c5f2154 ]

Emit a warning when ->done or ->free are called on an already freed srb. There is a hidden use-after-free bug in the driver which corrupts the srb memory pool which originates from the cleanup callbacks.

An extensive search didn't bring any lights on the real problem. The initial fix was to set both pointers to NULL and try to catch invalid accesses. But instead the memory corruption was gone and the driver didn't crash. Since not all calling places check for NULL pointer, add explicitly default handlers. With this we workaround the memory corruption and add a debug help.

---
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c   | 10 ++++++++++
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_inline.h |  5 +++++
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c +10 -0
index 62d2ee825c97a..b300e11095828 100644
@@ -71,6 +71,16 @@ void qla2x00_sp_free(srb_t *sp)
 	qla2x00_rel_sp(sp);
 }
 
+void qla2xxx_rel_done_warning(srb_t *sp, int res)
+{
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "Calling done() of an already freed srb %p object\n", sp);
+}
+
+void qla2xxx_rel_free_warning(srb_t *sp)
+{
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "Calling free() of an already freed srb %p object\n", sp);
+}
+
 /* Asynchronous Login/Logout Routines -------------------------------------- */
 
 unsigned long
drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_inline.h +5 -0
index 0c3d907af7692..6dfde42d799b5 100644
@@ -183,10 +183,15 @@ qla2xxx_get_qpair_sp(scsi_qla_host_t *vha, struct qla_qpair *qpair,
 	return sp;
 }
 
+void qla2xxx_rel_done_warning(srb_t *sp, int res);
+void qla2xxx_rel_free_warning(srb_t *sp);
+
 static inline void
 qla2xxx_rel_qpair_sp(struct qla_qpair *qpair, srb_t *sp)
 {
 	sp->qpair = NULL;
+	sp->done = qla2xxx_rel_done_warning;
+	sp->free = qla2xxx_rel_free_warning;
 	mempool_free(sp, qpair->srb_mempool);
 	QLA_QPAIR_MARK_NOT_BUSY(qpair);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#377 lore raw

PATCH 377/408 selftests/bpf: Fix test_sysctl_loop{1, 2} failure due to clang change

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7fb5eefd76394cfefb380724a87ca40b47d44405 ]

Andrii reported that with latest clang, when building selftests, we have
error likes:
error: progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c:23:16: in function sysctl_tcp_mem i32 (%struct.bpf_sysctl*):
Looks like the BPF stack limit of 512 bytes is exceeded.
Please move large on stack variables into BPF per-cpu array map.

The error is triggered by the following LLVM patch:
https://reviews.llvm.org/D87134

For example, the following code is from test_sysctl_loop1.c:
static __always_inline int is_tcp_mem(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx)

  {
    volatile char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string";
    ...

}
Without the above LLVM patch, the compiler did optimization to load the string (59 bytes long) with 7 64bit loads, 1 8bit load and 1 16bit load, occupying 64 byte stack size.

With the above LLVM patch, the compiler only uses 8bit loads, but subregister is 32bit. So stack requirements become 4 * 59 = 236 bytes. Together with other stuff on the stack, total stack size exceeds 512 bytes, hence compiler complains and quits.

To fix the issue, removing "volatile" key word or changing "volatile" to "const"/"static const" does not work, the string is put in .rodata.str1.1 section, which libbpf did not process it and errors out with
libbpf: elf: skipping unrecognized data section(6) .rodata.str1.1
libbpf: prog 'sysctl_tcp_mem': bad map relo against '.L__const.is_tcp_mem.tcp_mem_name'

          in section '.rodata.str1.1'

Defining the string const as global variable can fix the issue as it puts the string constant in '.rodata' section which is recognized by libbpf. In the future, when libbpf can process '.rodata.str*.*' properly, the global definition can be changed back to local definition.

Defining tcp_mem_name as a global, however, triggered a verifier failure.
./test_progs -n 7/21
libbpf: load bpf program failed: Permission denied
libbpf: -- BEGIN DUMP LOG ---
libbpf:
invalid stack off=0 size=1
verification time 6975 usec
stack depth 160+64
processed 889 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 4 total_states 14 peak_states 14 mark_read 10

libbpf: -- END LOG --
libbpf: failed to load program 'sysctl_tcp_mem'
libbpf: failed to load object 'test_sysctl_loop2.o' test_bpf_verif_scale:FAIL:114
#7/21 test_sysctl_loop2.o:FAIL
This actually exposed a bpf program bug. In test_sysctl_loop{1,2}, we have code like
const char tcp_mem_name[] = "<...long string...>";
...
char name[64];
...
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tcp_mem_name); ++i)

      if (name[i] != tcp_mem_name[i])
          return 0;

In the above code, if sizeof(tcp_mem_name) > 64, name[i] access may be out of bound. The sizeof(tcp_mem_name) is 59 for test_sysctl_loop1.c and 79 for test_sysctl_loop2.c.

Without promotion-to-global change, old compiler generates code where the overflowed stack access is actually filled with valid value, so hiding the bpf program bug. With promotion-to-global change, the code is different, more specifically, the previous loading constants to stack is gone, and "name" occupies stack[-64:0] and overflow access triggers a verifier error. To fix the issue, adjust "name" buffer size properly.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c | 4 ++--
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop2.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c +2 -2
index d22e438198cf7..9af8822ece477 100644
@@ -18,11 +18,11 @@
 #define MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN 7
 #define MAX_VALUE_STR_LEN (TCP_MEM_LOOPS * MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN)
 
+const char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string";
 static __always_inline int is_tcp_mem(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx)
 {
-	volatile char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string";
 	unsigned char i;
-	char name[64];
+	char name[sizeof(tcp_mem_name)];
 	int ret;
 
 	memset(name, 0, sizeof(name));
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop2.c +2 -2
index cb201cbe11e77..55251046c9b73 100644
@@ -18,11 +18,11 @@
 #define MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN 7
 #define MAX_VALUE_STR_LEN (TCP_MEM_LOOPS * MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN)
 
+const char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string_to_stress_byte_loop";
 static __attribute__((noinline)) int is_tcp_mem(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx)
 {
-	volatile char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string_to_stress_byte_loop";
 	unsigned char i;
-	char name[64];
+	char name[sizeof(tcp_mem_name)];
 	int ret;
 
 	memset(name, 0, sizeof(name));
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#378 lore raw

PATCH 378/408 brcmsmac: fix memory leak in wlc_phy_attach_lcnphy

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Keita Suzuki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f4443293d741d1776b86ed1dd8c4e4285d0775fc ]

When wlc_phy_txpwr_srom_read_lcnphy fails in wlc_phy_attach_lcnphy, the allocated pi->u.pi_lcnphy is leaked, since struct brcms_phy will be freed in the caller function.

Fix this by calling wlc_phy_detach_lcnphy in the error handler of wlc_phy_txpwr_srom_read_lcnphy before returning.

---
 .../net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_lcn.c    | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_lcn.c +3 -1
index 7ef36234a25dc..66797dc5e90d5 100644
@@ -5065,8 +5065,10 @@ bool wlc_phy_attach_lcnphy(struct brcms_phy *pi)
 	pi->pi_fptr.radioloftget = wlc_lcnphy_get_radio_loft;
 	pi->pi_fptr.detach = wlc_phy_detach_lcnphy;
 
-	if (!wlc_phy_txpwr_srom_read_lcnphy(pi))
+	if (!wlc_phy_txpwr_srom_read_lcnphy(pi)) {
+		kfree(pi->u.pi_lcnphy);
 		return false;
+	}
 
 	if (LCNREV_IS(pi->pubpi.phy_rev, 1)) {
 		if (pi_lcn->lcnphy_tempsense_option == 3) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#379 lore raw

PATCH 379/408 rtl8xxxu: prevent potential memory leak

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Chris Chiu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 86279456a4d47782398d3cb8193f78f672e36cac ]

Free the skb if usb_submit_urb fails on rx_urb. And free the urb no matter usb_submit_urb succeeds or not in rtl8xxxu_submit_int_urb.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/rtl8xxxu_core.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/rtl8xxxu_core.c +9 -1
index 3499b211dad51..048984ca81fdb 100644
@@ -5447,7 +5447,6 @@ static int rtl8xxxu_submit_int_urb(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
 	ret = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (ret) {
 		usb_unanchor_urb(urb);
-		usb_free_urb(urb);
 		goto error;
 	}
 
@@ -5456,6 +5455,7 @@ static int rtl8xxxu_submit_int_urb(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
 	rtl8xxxu_write32(priv, REG_USB_HIMR, val32);
 
 error:
+	usb_free_urb(urb);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -5781,6 +5781,7 @@ static int rtl8xxxu_start(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
 	struct rtl8xxxu_priv *priv = hw->priv;
 	struct rtl8xxxu_rx_urb *rx_urb;
 	struct rtl8xxxu_tx_urb *tx_urb;
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret, i;
 
@@ -5831,6 +5832,13 @@ static int rtl8xxxu_start(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
 		rx_urb->hw = hw;
 
 		ret = rtl8xxxu_submit_rx_urb(priv, rx_urb);
+		if (ret) {
+			if (ret != -ENOMEM) {
+				skb = (struct sk_buff *)rx_urb->urb.context;
+				dev_kfree_skb(skb);
+			}
+			rtl8xxxu_queue_rx_urb(priv, rx_urb);
+		}
 	}
 exit:
 	/*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#380 lore raw

PATCH 380/408 Fix use after free in get_capset_info callback.

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Doug Horn <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e219688fc5c3d0d9136f8d29d7e0498388f01440 ]

If a response to virtio_gpu_cmd_get_capset_info takes longer than five seconds to return, the callback will access freed kernel memory in vg->capsets.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_kms.c |  2 ++
 drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_vq.c  | 10 +++++++---
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_kms.c +2 -0
index c190702fab726..6dcc05ab31eba 100644
@@ -96,8 +96,10 @@ static void virtio_gpu_get_capsets(struct virtio_gpu_device *vgdev,
 					 vgdev->capsets[i].id > 0, 5 * HZ);
 		if (ret == 0) {
 			DRM_ERROR("timed out waiting for cap set %d\n", i);
+			spin_lock(&vgdev->display_info_lock);
 			kfree(vgdev->capsets);
 			vgdev->capsets = NULL;
+			spin_unlock(&vgdev->display_info_lock);
 			return;
 		}
 		DRM_INFO("cap set %d: id %d, max-version %d, max-size %d\n",
drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_vq.c +7 -3
index 7ac20490e1b4c..92022a83bbd5e 100644
@@ -572,9 +572,13 @@ static void virtio_gpu_cmd_get_capset_info_cb(struct virtio_gpu_device *vgdev,
 	int i = le32_to_cpu(cmd->capset_index);
 
 	spin_lock(&vgdev->display_info_lock);
-	vgdev->capsets[i].id = le32_to_cpu(resp->capset_id);
-	vgdev->capsets[i].max_version = le32_to_cpu(resp->capset_max_version);
-	vgdev->capsets[i].max_size = le32_to_cpu(resp->capset_max_size);
+	if (vgdev->capsets) {
+		vgdev->capsets[i].id = le32_to_cpu(resp->capset_id);
+		vgdev->capsets[i].max_version = le32_to_cpu(resp->capset_max_version);
+		vgdev->capsets[i].max_size = le32_to_cpu(resp->capset_max_size);
+	} else {
+		DRM_ERROR("invalid capset memory.");
+	}
 	spin_unlock(&vgdev->display_info_lock);
 	wake_up(&vgdev->resp_wq);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#381 lore raw

PATCH 381/408 HID: ite: Add USB id match for Acer One S1003 keyboard dock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5bf2f2f331ad812c9b7eea6e14a3ea328acbffc0 ]

The Acer One S1003 2-in-1 keyboard dock uses a Synaptics S910xx touchpad which is connected to an ITE 8910 USB keyboard controller chip.

This keyboard has the same quirk for its rfkill / airplane mode hotkey as other keyboards with ITE keyboard chips, it only sends a single release event when pressed and released, it never sends a press event.

This commit adds this keyboards USB id to the hid-ite id-table, fixing the rfkill key not working on this keyboard. Note that like for the Acer Aspire Switch 10 (SW5-012) the id-table entry matches on the HID_GROUP_GENERIC generic group so that hid-ite only binds to the keyboard interface and the mouse/touchpad interface is left untouched so that hid-multitouch can bind to it.

---
 drivers/hid/hid-ids.h | 1 +
 drivers/hid/hid-ite.c | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +1 -0
index e03a4d794240c..7363d0b488bd8 100644
@@ -1119,6 +1119,7 @@
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_DELL_K12A	0x2819
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_ACER_SWITCH5_012	0x2968
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_TP_V103	0x5710
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_ACER_ONE_S1003	0x73f5
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_ACER_SWITCH5	0x81a7
 
 #define USB_VENDOR_ID_TEXAS_INSTRUMENTS	0x2047
drivers/hid/hid-ite.c +4 -0
index 6c55682c59740..044a93f3c1178 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ static const struct hid_device_id ite_devices[] = {
 	{ HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_GENERIC,
 		     USB_VENDOR_ID_SYNAPTICS,
 		     USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_ACER_SWITCH5_012) },
+	/* ITE8910 USB kbd ctlr, with Synaptics touchpad connected to it. */
+	{ HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_GENERIC,
+		     USB_VENDOR_ID_SYNAPTICS,
+		     USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_ACER_ONE_S1003) },
 	{ }
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(hid, ite_devices);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#382 lore raw

PATCH 382/408 scsi: qedf: Return SUCCESS if stale rport is encountered

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Saurav Kashyap <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 10aff62fab263ad7661780816551420cea956ebb ]

If SUCCESS is not returned, error handling will escalate. Return SUCCESS similar to other conditions in this function.

---
 drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.c +1 -1
index 3d0e345947c1f..9c0955c334e3e 100644
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ static int qedf_eh_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *sc_cmd)
 	rdata = fcport->rdata;
 	if (!rdata || !kref_get_unless_zero(&rdata->kref)) {
 		QEDF_ERR(&qedf->dbg_ctx, "stale rport, sc_cmd=%p\n", sc_cmd);
-		rc = 1;
+		rc = SUCCESS;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#383 lore raw

PATCH 383/408 scsi: qedi: Protect active command list to avoid list corruption

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nilesh Javali <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c0650e28448d606c84f76c34333dba30f61de993 ]

Protect active command list for non-I/O commands like login response, logout response, text response, and recovery cleanup of active list to avoid list corruption.

---
 drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_fw.c    | 8 ++++++++
 drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_iscsi.c | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_fw.c +8 -0
index 946cebc4c9322..32586800620bd 100644
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static void qedi_process_logout_resp(struct qedi_ctx *qedi,
 		  "Freeing tid=0x%x for cid=0x%x\n",
 		  cmd->task_id, qedi_conn->iscsi_conn_id);
 
+	spin_lock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 	if (likely(cmd->io_cmd_in_list)) {
 		cmd->io_cmd_in_list = false;
 		list_del_init(&cmd->io_cmd);
@@ -69,6 +70,7 @@ static void qedi_process_logout_resp(struct qedi_ctx *qedi,
 			  cmd->task_id, qedi_conn->iscsi_conn_id,
 			  &cmd->io_cmd);
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 
 	cmd->state = RESPONSE_RECEIVED;
 	qedi_clear_task_idx(qedi, cmd->task_id);
@@ -122,6 +124,7 @@ static void qedi_process_text_resp(struct qedi_ctx *qedi,
 		  "Freeing tid=0x%x for cid=0x%x\n",
 		  cmd->task_id, qedi_conn->iscsi_conn_id);
 
+	spin_lock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 	if (likely(cmd->io_cmd_in_list)) {
 		cmd->io_cmd_in_list = false;
 		list_del_init(&cmd->io_cmd);
@@ -132,6 +135,7 @@ static void qedi_process_text_resp(struct qedi_ctx *qedi,
 			  cmd->task_id, qedi_conn->iscsi_conn_id,
 			  &cmd->io_cmd);
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 
 	cmd->state = RESPONSE_RECEIVED;
 	qedi_clear_task_idx(qedi, cmd->task_id);
@@ -222,11 +226,13 @@ static void qedi_process_tmf_resp(struct qedi_ctx *qedi,
 
 	tmf_hdr = (struct iscsi_tm *)qedi_cmd->task->hdr;
 
+	spin_lock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 	if (likely(qedi_cmd->io_cmd_in_list)) {
 		qedi_cmd->io_cmd_in_list = false;
 		list_del_init(&qedi_cmd->io_cmd);
 		qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 
 	if (((tmf_hdr->flags & ISCSI_FLAG_TM_FUNC_MASK) ==
 	      ISCSI_TM_FUNC_LOGICAL_UNIT_RESET) ||
@@ -288,11 +294,13 @@ static void qedi_process_login_resp(struct qedi_ctx *qedi,
 		  ISCSI_LOGIN_RESPONSE_HDR_DATA_SEG_LEN_MASK;
 	qedi_conn->gen_pdu.resp_wr_ptr = qedi_conn->gen_pdu.resp_buf + pld_len;
 
+	spin_lock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 	if (likely(cmd->io_cmd_in_list)) {
 		cmd->io_cmd_in_list = false;
 		list_del_init(&cmd->io_cmd);
 		qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 
 	memset(task_ctx, '\0', sizeof(*task_ctx));
 
drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_iscsi.c +2 -0
index 0f2622a48311c..755f66b1ff9c7 100644
@@ -972,11 +972,13 @@ static void qedi_cleanup_active_cmd_list(struct qedi_conn *qedi_conn)
 {
 	struct qedi_cmd *cmd, *cmd_tmp;
 
+	spin_lock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(cmd, cmd_tmp, &qedi_conn->active_cmd_list,
 				 io_cmd) {
 		list_del_init(&cmd->io_cmd);
 		qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 }
 
 static void qedi_ep_disconnect(struct iscsi_endpoint *ep)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#384 lore raw

PATCH 384/408 scsi: qedi: Fix list_del corruption while removing active I/O

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nilesh Javali <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 28b35d17f9f8573d4646dd8df08917a4076a6b63 ]

While aborting the I/O, the firmware cleanup task timed out and driver deleted the I/O from active command list. Some time later the firmware sent the cleanup task response and driver again deleted the I/O from active command list causing firmware to send completion for non-existent I/O and list_del corruption of active command list.

Add fix to check if I/O is present before deleting it from the active command list to ensure firmware sends valid I/O completion and protect against list_del corruption.

---
 drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_fw.c | 15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_fw.c +11 -4
index 32586800620bd..90aa64604ad78 100644
@@ -825,8 +825,11 @@ static void qedi_process_cmd_cleanup_resp(struct qedi_ctx *qedi,
 			qedi_clear_task_idx(qedi_conn->qedi, rtid);
 
 			spin_lock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
-			list_del_init(&dbg_cmd->io_cmd);
-			qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
+			if (likely(dbg_cmd->io_cmd_in_list)) {
+				dbg_cmd->io_cmd_in_list = false;
+				list_del_init(&dbg_cmd->io_cmd);
+				qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
+			}
 			spin_unlock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 			qedi_cmd->state = CLEANUP_RECV;
 			wake_up_interruptible(&qedi_conn->wait_queue);
@@ -1244,6 +1247,7 @@ int qedi_cleanup_all_io(struct qedi_ctx *qedi, struct qedi_conn *qedi_conn,
 		qedi_conn->cmd_cleanup_req++;
 		qedi_iscsi_cleanup_task(ctask, true);
 
+		cmd->io_cmd_in_list = false;
 		list_del_init(&cmd->io_cmd);
 		qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
 		QEDI_WARN(&qedi->dbg_ctx,
@@ -1455,8 +1459,11 @@ static void qedi_tmf_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	spin_unlock_bh(&qedi_conn->tmf_work_lock);
 
 	spin_lock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
-	list_del_init(&cmd->io_cmd);
-	qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
+	if (likely(cmd->io_cmd_in_list)) {
+		cmd->io_cmd_in_list = false;
+		list_del_init(&cmd->io_cmd);
+		qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
+	}
 	spin_unlock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 
 	clear_bit(QEDI_CONN_FW_CLEANUP, &qedi_conn->flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#385 lore raw

PATCH 385/408 fbmem: add margin check to fb_check_caps()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: George Kennedy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a49145acfb975d921464b84fe00279f99827d816 ]

A fb_ioctl() FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO call with invalid xres setting or yres setting in struct fb_var_screeninfo will result in a

KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds failure in bitfill_aligned() as

the margins are being cleared. The margins are cleared in chunks and if the xres setting or yres setting is a value of zero upto the chunk size, the failure will occur.

Add a margin check to validate xres and yres settings.

---
 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +4 -0
index 97abcd497c7e0..bf76dadbed87f 100644
@@ -1001,6 +1001,10 @@ fb_set_var(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_var_screeninfo *var)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	/* bitfill_aligned() assumes that it's at least 8x8 */
+	if (var->xres < 8 || var->yres < 8)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ret = info->fbops->fb_check_var(var, info);
 
 	if (ret)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#386 lore raw

PATCH 386/408 tty: ipwireless: fix error handling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tong Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit db332356222d9429731ab9395c89cca403828460 ]

ipwireless_send_packet() can only return 0 on success and -ENOMEM on error, the caller should check non zero for error condition

---
 drivers/tty/ipwireless/network.c | 4 ++--
 drivers/tty/ipwireless/tty.c     | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/ipwireless/network.c +2 -2
index cf20616340a1a..fe569f6294a24 100644
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static int ipwireless_ppp_start_xmit(struct ppp_channel *ppp_channel,
 					       skb->len,
 					       notify_packet_sent,
 					       network);
-			if (ret == -1) {
+			if (ret < 0) {
 				skb_pull(skb, 2);
 				return 0;
 			}
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static int ipwireless_ppp_start_xmit(struct ppp_channel *ppp_channel,
 					       notify_packet_sent,
 					       network);
 			kfree(buf);
-			if (ret == -1)
+			if (ret < 0)
 				return 0;
 		}
 		kfree_skb(skb);
drivers/tty/ipwireless/tty.c +1 -1
index fad3401e604d9..23584769fc292 100644
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int ipw_write(struct tty_struct *linux_tty,
 	ret = ipwireless_send_packet(tty->hardware, IPW_CHANNEL_RAS,
 			       buf, count,
 			       ipw_write_packet_sent_callback, tty);
-	if (ret == -1) {
+	if (ret < 0) {
 		mutex_unlock(&tty->ipw_tty_mutex);
 		return 0;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#387 lore raw

PATCH 387/408 Bluetooth: btusb: Fix memleak in btusb_mtk_submit_wmt_recv_urb

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d33fe77bdf75806d785dabf90d21d962122e5296 ]

When kmalloc() on buf fails, urb should be freed just like when kmalloc() on dr fails.

---
 drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c +1 -0
index f3f0529564da0..b326eeddaadf0 100644
@@ -2664,6 +2664,7 @@ static int btusb_mtk_submit_wmt_recv_urb(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 	buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!buf) {
 		kfree(dr);
+		usb_free_urb(urb);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#388 lore raw

PATCH 388/408 ipvs: Fix uninit-value in do_ip_vs_set_ctl()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Peilin Ye <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c5a8a8498eed1c164afc94f50a939c1a10abf8ad ]

do_ip_vs_set_ctl() is referencing uninitialized stack value when len is zero. Fix it.

---
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c +4 -3
index 3cccc88ef817b..99168af0c28d9 100644
@@ -2465,6 +2465,10 @@ do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 		/* Set timeout values for (tcp tcpfin udp) */
 		ret = ip_vs_set_timeout(ipvs, (struct ip_vs_timeout_user *)arg);
 		goto out_unlock;
+	} else if (!len) {
+		/* No more commands with len == 0 below */
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
 	usvc_compat = (struct ip_vs_service_user *)arg;
@@ -2541,9 +2545,6 @@ do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 		break;
 	case IP_VS_SO_SET_DELDEST:
 		ret = ip_vs_del_dest(svc, &udest);
-		break;
-	default:
-		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
 
   out_unlock:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#389 lore raw

PATCH 389/408 reiserfs: Fix memory leak in reiserfs_parse_options()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e9d4709fcc26353df12070566970f080e651f0c9 ]

When a usrjquota or grpjquota mount option is used multiple times, we will leak memory allocated for the file name. Make sure the last setting is used and all the previous ones are properly freed.

---
 fs/reiserfs/super.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/reiserfs/super.c +4 -4
index a6bce5b1fb1dc..1b9c7a387dc71 100644
@@ -1258,6 +1258,10 @@ static int reiserfs_parse_options(struct super_block *s,
 						 "turned on.");
 				return 0;
 			}
+			if (qf_names[qtype] !=
+			    REISERFS_SB(s)->s_qf_names[qtype])
+				kfree(qf_names[qtype]);
+			qf_names[qtype] = NULL;
 			if (*arg) {	/* Some filename specified? */
 				if (REISERFS_SB(s)->s_qf_names[qtype]
 				    && strcmp(REISERFS_SB(s)->s_qf_names[qtype],
@@ -1287,10 +1291,6 @@ static int reiserfs_parse_options(struct super_block *s,
 				else
 					*mount_options |= 1 << REISERFS_GRPQUOTA;
 			} else {
-				if (qf_names[qtype] !=
-				    REISERFS_SB(s)->s_qf_names[qtype])
-					kfree(qf_names[qtype]);
-				qf_names[qtype] = NULL;
 				if (qtype == USRQUOTA)
 					*mount_options &= ~(1 << REISERFS_USRQUOTA);
 				else
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#390 lore raw

PATCH 390/408 mwifiex: dont call del_timer_sync() on uninitialized timer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 621a3a8b1c0ecf16e1e5667ea5756a76a082b738 ]

syzbot is reporting that del_timer_sync() is called from mwifiex_usb_cleanup_tx_aggr() from mwifiex_unregister_dev() without checking timer_setup() from mwifiex_usb_tx_init() was called [1].

Ganapathi Bhat proposed a possibly cleaner fix, but it seems that that fix was forgotten [2].

"grep -FrB1 'del_timer' drivers/ | grep -FA1 '.function)'" says that currently there are 28 locations which call del_timer[_sync]() only if that timer's function field was initialized (because timer_setup() sets that timer's function field). Therefore, let's use same approach here.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=26525f643f454dd7be0078423e3cdb0d57744959
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+ASDXMHt2gq9Hy+iP_BYkWXsSreWdp3_bAfMkNcuqJ3K+-jbQ@mail.gmail.com

---
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/usb.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/usb.c +2 -1
index c2365eeb70168..528107d70c1cb 100644
@@ -1353,7 +1353,8 @@ static void mwifiex_usb_cleanup_tx_aggr(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter)
 				skb_dequeue(&port->tx_aggr.aggr_list)))
 				mwifiex_write_data_complete(adapter, skb_tmp,
 							    0, -1);
-		del_timer_sync(&port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.hold_timer);
+		if (port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.hold_timer.function)
+			del_timer_sync(&port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.hold_timer);
 		port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.is_hold_timer_set = false;
 		port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.hold_tmo_msecs = 0;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#391 lore raw

PATCH 391/408 ALSA: hda/ca0132 - Add AE-7 microphone selection commands.

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Connor McAdams <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ed93f9750c6c2ed371347d0aac3dcd31cb9cf256 ]

Add AE-7 quirk data for setting of microphone. The AE-7 has no front panel connector, so only rear-mic/line-in have new commands.

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c +21 -1
index 6aa39339db0ab..98a11c38e7a8e 100644
@@ -4674,6 +4674,15 @@ static int ca0132_alt_select_in(struct hda_codec *codec)
 			ca0113_mmio_command_set(codec, 0x30, 0x28, 0x00);
 			tmp = FLOAT_THREE;
 			break;
+		case QUIRK_AE7:
+			ca0113_mmio_command_set(codec, 0x30, 0x28, 0x00);
+			tmp = FLOAT_THREE;
+			chipio_set_conn_rate(codec, MEM_CONNID_MICIN2,
+					SR_96_000);
+			chipio_set_conn_rate(codec, MEM_CONNID_MICOUT2,
+					SR_96_000);
+			dspio_set_uint_param(codec, 0x80, 0x01, FLOAT_ZERO);
+			break;
 		default:
 			tmp = FLOAT_ONE;
 			break;
@@ -4719,6 +4728,14 @@ static int ca0132_alt_select_in(struct hda_codec *codec)
 		case QUIRK_AE5:
 			ca0113_mmio_command_set(codec, 0x30, 0x28, 0x00);
 			break;
+		case QUIRK_AE7:
+			ca0113_mmio_command_set(codec, 0x30, 0x28, 0x3f);
+			chipio_set_conn_rate(codec, MEM_CONNID_MICIN2,
+					SR_96_000);
+			chipio_set_conn_rate(codec, MEM_CONNID_MICOUT2,
+					SR_96_000);
+			dspio_set_uint_param(codec, 0x80, 0x01, FLOAT_ZERO);
+			break;
 		default:
 			break;
 		}
@@ -4728,7 +4745,10 @@ static int ca0132_alt_select_in(struct hda_codec *codec)
 		if (ca0132_quirk(spec) == QUIRK_R3DI)
 			chipio_set_conn_rate(codec, 0x0F, SR_96_000);
 
-		tmp = FLOAT_ZERO;
+		if (ca0132_quirk(spec) == QUIRK_AE7)
+			tmp = FLOAT_THREE;
+		else
+			tmp = FLOAT_ZERO;
 		dspio_set_uint_param(codec, 0x80, 0x00, tmp);
 
 		switch (ca0132_quirk(spec)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#392 lore raw

PATCH 392/408 ALSA: hda/ca0132 - Add new quirk ID for SoundBlaster AE-7.

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Connor McAdams <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 620f08eea6d6961b789af3fa3ea86725c8c93ece ]

Add a new PCI subsystem ID for the SoundBlaster AE-7 card.

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c +2 -0
index 98a11c38e7a8e..459aff6c10bc5 100644
@@ -1065,6 +1065,7 @@ enum {
 	QUIRK_R3DI,
 	QUIRK_R3D,
 	QUIRK_AE5,
+	QUIRK_AE7,
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PCI
@@ -1184,6 +1185,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk ca0132_quirks[] = {
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1102, 0x0013, "Recon3D", QUIRK_R3D),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1102, 0x0018, "Recon3D", QUIRK_R3D),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1102, 0x0051, "Sound Blaster AE-5", QUIRK_AE5),
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1102, 0x0081, "Sound Blaster AE-7", QUIRK_AE7),
 	{}
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#393 lore raw

PATCH 393/408 scsi: smartpqi: Avoid crashing kernel for controller issues

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kevin Barnett <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9e68cccc8ef7206f0bccd590378d0dca8f9b4f57 ]

Eliminate kernel panics when getting invalid responses from controller. Take controller offline instead of causing kernel panics.

---
 drivers/scsi/smartpqi/smartpqi.h      |   2 +-
 drivers/scsi/smartpqi/smartpqi_init.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/smartpqi/smartpqi.h +1 -1
index 7a3a942b40df0..dd2175e9bfa17 100644
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ struct pqi_event_response {
 	struct pqi_iu_header header;
 	u8	event_type;
 	u8	reserved2 : 7;
-	u8	request_acknowlege : 1;
+	u8	request_acknowledge : 1;
 	__le16	event_id;
 	__le32	additional_event_id;
 	union {
drivers/scsi/smartpqi/smartpqi_init.c +67 -34

191 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#394 lore raw

PATCH 394/408 brcm80211: fix possible memleak in brcmf_proto_msgbuf_attach

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Yufen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c151410d5b57e6bb0d91a735ac511459539a7bf ]

When brcmf_proto_msgbuf_attach fail and msgbuf->txflow_wq != NULL, we should destroy the workqueue.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/msgbuf.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/msgbuf.c +2 -0
index e3dd8623be4ec..c2705d7a4247e 100644
@@ -1619,6 +1619,8 @@ int brcmf_proto_msgbuf_attach(struct brcmf_pub *drvr)
 					  BRCMF_TX_IOCTL_MAX_MSG_SIZE,
 					  msgbuf->ioctbuf,
 					  msgbuf->ioctbuf_handle);
+		if (msgbuf->txflow_wq)
+			destroy_workqueue(msgbuf->txflow_wq);
 		kfree(msgbuf);
 	}
 	return -ENOMEM;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#395 lore raw

PATCH 395/408 usb: core: Solve race condition in anchor cleanup functions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eli Billauer <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fbc299437c06648afcc7891e6e2e6638dd48d4df ]

usb_kill_anchored_urbs() is commonly used to cancel all URBs on an anchor just before releasing resources which the URBs rely on. By doing so, users of this function rely on that no completer callbacks will take place from any URB on the anchor after it returns.

However if this function is called in parallel with __usb_hcd_giveback_urb processing a URB on the anchor, the latter may call the completer callback after usb_kill_anchored_urbs() returns. This can lead to a kernel panic due to use after release of memory in interrupt context.

The race condition is that __usb_hcd_giveback_urb() first unanchors the URB and then makes the completer callback. Such URB is hence invisible to usb_kill_anchored_urbs(), allowing it to return before the completer has been called, since the anchor's urb_list is empty.

Even worse, if the racing completer callback resubmits the URB, it may remain in the system long after usb_kill_anchored_urbs() returns.

Hence list_empty(&anchor->urb_list), which is used in the existing while-loop, doesn't reliably ensure that all URBs of the anchor are gone.

A similar problem exists with usb_poison_anchored_urbs() and usb_scuttle_anchored_urbs().

This patch adds an external do-while loop, which ensures that all URBs are indeed handled before these three functions return. This change has no effect at all unless the race condition occurs, in which case the loop will busy-wait until the racing completer callback has finished. This is a rare condition, so the CPU waste of this spinning is negligible.

The additional do-while loop relies on usb_anchor_check_wakeup(), which returns true iff the anchor list is empty, and there is no __usb_hcd_giveback_urb() in the system that is in the middle of the unanchor-before-complete phase. The @suspend_wakeups member of struct usb_anchor is used for this purpose, which was introduced to solve another problem which the same race condition causes, in commit 6ec4147e7bdb ("usb-anchor: Delay usb_wait_anchor_empty_timeout wake up till completion is done").

The surely_empty variable is necessary, because usb_anchor_check_wakeup() must be called with the lock held to prevent races. However the spinlock must be released and reacquired if the outer loop spins with an empty URB list while waiting for the unanchor-before-complete passage to finish:
The completer callback may very well attempt to take the very same lock.

To summarize, using usb_anchor_check_wakeup() means that the patched functions can return only when the anchor's list is empty, and there is no invisible URB being processed. Since the inner while loop finishes on the empty list condition, the new do-while loop will terminate as well, except for when the said race condition occurs.

---
 drivers/usb/core/urb.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/core/urb.c +54 -35
index da923ec176122..31ca5abb4c12a 100644
@@ -772,11 +772,12 @@ void usb_block_urb(struct urb *urb)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_block_urb);
 
 /**
- * usb_kill_anchored_urbs - cancel transfer requests en masse
+ * usb_kill_anchored_urbs - kill all URBs associated with an anchor
  * @anchor: anchor the requests are bound to
  *
- * this allows all outstanding URBs to be killed starting
- * from the back of the queue
+ * This kills all outstanding URBs starting from the back of the queue,
+ * with guarantee that no completer callbacks will take place from the
+ * anchor after this function returns.
  *
  * This routine should not be called by a driver after its disconnect
  * method has returned.
@@ -784,20 +785,26 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_block_urb);
 void usb_kill_anchored_urbs(struct usb_anchor *anchor)
 {
 	struct urb *victim;
+	int surely_empty;
 
-	spin_lock_irq(&anchor->lock);
-	while (!list_empty(&anchor->urb_list)) {
-		victim = list_entry(anchor->urb_list.prev, struct urb,
-				    anchor_list);
-		/* we must make sure the URB isn't freed before we kill it*/
-		usb_get_urb(victim);
-		spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
-		/* this will unanchor the URB */
-		usb_kill_urb(victim);
-		usb_put_urb(victim);
+	do {
 		spin_lock_irq(&anchor->lock);
-	}
-	spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+		while (!list_empty(&anchor->urb_list)) {
+			victim = list_entry(anchor->urb_list.prev,
+					    struct urb, anchor_list);
+			/* make sure the URB isn't freed before we kill it */
+			usb_get_urb(victim);
+			spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+			/* this will unanchor the URB */
+			usb_kill_urb(victim);
+			usb_put_urb(victim);
+			spin_lock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+		}
+		surely_empty = usb_anchor_check_wakeup(anchor);
+
+		spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+		cpu_relax();
+	} while (!surely_empty);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_kill_anchored_urbs);
 
@@ -816,21 +823,27 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_kill_anchored_urbs);
 void usb_poison_anchored_urbs(struct usb_anchor *anchor)
 {
 	struct urb *victim;
+	int surely_empty;
 
-	spin_lock_irq(&anchor->lock);
-	anchor->poisoned = 1;
-	while (!list_empty(&anchor->urb_list)) {
-		victim = list_entry(anchor->urb_list.prev, struct urb,
-				    anchor_list);
-		/* we must make sure the URB isn't freed before we kill it*/
-		usb_get_urb(victim);
-		spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
-		/* this will unanchor the URB */
-		usb_poison_urb(victim);
-		usb_put_urb(victim);
+	do {
 		spin_lock_irq(&anchor->lock);
-	}
-	spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+		anchor->poisoned = 1;
+		while (!list_empty(&anchor->urb_list)) {
+			victim = list_entry(anchor->urb_list.prev,
+					    struct urb, anchor_list);
+			/* make sure the URB isn't freed before we kill it */
+			usb_get_urb(victim);
+			spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+			/* this will unanchor the URB */
+			usb_poison_urb(victim);
+			usb_put_urb(victim);
+			spin_lock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+		}
+		surely_empty = usb_anchor_check_wakeup(anchor);
+
+		spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+		cpu_relax();
+	} while (!surely_empty);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_poison_anchored_urbs);
 
@@ -970,14 +983,20 @@ void usb_scuttle_anchored_urbs(struct usb_anchor *anchor)
 {
 	struct urb *victim;
 	unsigned long flags;
+	int surely_empty;
+
+	do {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&anchor->lock, flags);
+		while (!list_empty(&anchor->urb_list)) {
+			victim = list_entry(anchor->urb_list.prev,
+					    struct urb, anchor_list);
+			__usb_unanchor_urb(victim, anchor);
+		}
+		surely_empty = usb_anchor_check_wakeup(anchor);
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&anchor->lock, flags);
-	while (!list_empty(&anchor->urb_list)) {
-		victim = list_entry(anchor->urb_list.prev, struct urb,
-				    anchor_list);
-		__usb_unanchor_urb(victim, anchor);
-	}
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&anchor->lock, flags);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&anchor->lock, flags);
+		cpu_relax();
+	} while (!surely_empty);
 }
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_scuttle_anchored_urbs);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#396 lore raw

PATCH 396/408 scsi: ufs: ufs-qcom: Fix race conditions caused by ufs_qcom_testbus_config()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Can Guo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 89dd87acd40a44de8ff3358138aedf8f73f4efc6 ]

If ufs_qcom_dump_dbg_regs() calls ufs_qcom_testbus_config() from ufshcd_suspend/resume and/or clk gate/ungate context, pm_runtime_get_sync() and ufshcd_hold() will cause a race condition. Fix this by removing the unnecessary calls of pm_runtime_get_sync() and ufshcd_hold().

---
 drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs-qcom.c | 5 -----
 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs-qcom.c +0 -5
index c49e9f6c46f87..4f066e3b19af1 100644
@@ -1492,9 +1492,6 @@ int ufs_qcom_testbus_config(struct ufs_qcom_host *host)
 	 */
 	}
 	mask <<= offset;
-
-	pm_runtime_get_sync(host->hba->dev);
-	ufshcd_hold(host->hba, false);
 	ufshcd_rmwl(host->hba, TEST_BUS_SEL,
 		    (u32)host->testbus.select_major << 19,
 		    REG_UFS_CFG1);
@@ -1507,8 +1504,6 @@ int ufs_qcom_testbus_config(struct ufs_qcom_host *host)
 	 * committed before returning.
 	 */
 	mb();
-	ufshcd_release(host->hba);
-	pm_runtime_put_sync(host->hba->dev);
 
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#397 lore raw

PATCH 397/408 dmaengine: dw: Add DMA-channels mask cell support

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Serge Semin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e8ee6c8cb61b676f1a2d6b942329e98224bd8ee9 ]

DW DMA IP-core provides a way to synthesize the DMA controller with channels having different parameters like maximum burst-length, multi-block support, maximum data width, etc. Those parameters both explicitly and implicitly affect the channels performance. Since DMA slave devices might be very demanding to the DMA performance, let's provide a functionality for the slaves to be assigned with DW DMA channels, which performance according to the platform engineer fulfill their requirements. After this patch is applied it can be done by passing the mask of suitable DMA-channels either directly in the dw_dma_slave structure instance or as a fifth cell of the DMA DT-property. If mask is zero or not provided, then there is no limitation on the channels allocation.

For instance Baikal-T1 SoC is equipped with a DW DMAC engine, which first two channels are synthesized with max burst length of 16, while the rest of the channels have been created with max-burst-len=4. It would seem that the first two channels must be faster than the others and should be more preferable for the time-critical DMA slave devices. In practice it turned out that the situation is quite the opposite. The channels with max-burst-len=4 demonstrated a better performance than the channels with max-burst-len=16 even when they both had been initialized with the same settings. The performance drop of the first two DMA-channels made them unsuitable for the DW APB SSI slave device. No matter what settings they are configured with, full-duplex SPI transfers occasionally experience the Rx FIFO overflow. It means that the DMA-engine doesn't keep up with incoming data pace even though the SPI-bus is enabled with speed of 25MHz while the DW DMA controller is clocked with 50MHz signal. There is no such problem has been noticed for the channels synthesized with max-burst-len=4.

---
 drivers/dma/dw/core.c                | 4 ++++
 drivers/dma/dw/of.c                  | 7 +++++--
 include/linux/platform_data/dma-dw.h | 2 ++
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/dma/dw/core.c +4 -0
index a1b56f52db2f2..5e7fdc0b6e3db 100644
@@ -772,6 +772,10 @@ bool dw_dma_filter(struct dma_chan *chan, void *param)
 	if (dws->dma_dev != chan->device->dev)
 		return false;
 
+	/* permit channels in accordance with the channels mask */
+	if (dws->channels && !(dws->channels & dwc->mask))
+		return false;
+
 	/* We have to copy data since dws can be temporary storage */
 	memcpy(&dwc->dws, dws, sizeof(struct dw_dma_slave));
 
drivers/dma/dw/of.c +5 -2
index 9e27831dee324..43e975fb67142 100644
@@ -22,18 +22,21 @@ static struct dma_chan *dw_dma_of_xlate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec,
 	};
 	dma_cap_mask_t cap;
 
-	if (dma_spec->args_count != 3)
+	if (dma_spec->args_count < 3 || dma_spec->args_count > 4)
 		return NULL;
 
 	slave.src_id = dma_spec->args[0];
 	slave.dst_id = dma_spec->args[0];
 	slave.m_master = dma_spec->args[1];
 	slave.p_master = dma_spec->args[2];
+	if (dma_spec->args_count >= 4)
+		slave.channels = dma_spec->args[3];
 
 	if (WARN_ON(slave.src_id >= DW_DMA_MAX_NR_REQUESTS ||
 		    slave.dst_id >= DW_DMA_MAX_NR_REQUESTS ||
 		    slave.m_master >= dw->pdata->nr_masters ||
-		    slave.p_master >= dw->pdata->nr_masters))
+		    slave.p_master >= dw->pdata->nr_masters ||
+		    slave.channels >= BIT(dw->pdata->nr_channels)))
 		return NULL;
 
 	dma_cap_zero(cap);
include/linux/platform_data/dma-dw.h +2 -0
index f3eaf9ec00a1b..70078be166e3c 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
  * @dst_id:	dst request line
  * @m_master:	memory master for transfers on allocated channel
  * @p_master:	peripheral master for transfers on allocated channel
+ * @channels:	mask of the channels permitted for allocation (zero value means any)
  * @hs_polarity:set active low polarity of handshake interface
  */
 struct dw_dma_slave {
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ struct dw_dma_slave {
 	u8			dst_id;
 	u8			m_master;
 	u8			p_master;
+	u8			channels;
 	bool			hs_polarity;
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#398 lore raw

PATCH 398/408 dmaengine: dw: Activate FIFO-mode for memory peripherals only

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Serge Semin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6d9459d04081c796fc67c2bb771f4e4ebb5744c4 ]

CFGx.FIFO_MODE field controls a DMA-controller "FIFO readiness" criterion. In other words it determines when to start pushing data out of a DW DMAC channel FIFO to a destination peripheral or from a source peripheral to the DW DMAC channel FIFO. Currently FIFO-mode is set to one for all DW DMAC channels. It means they are tuned to flush data out of FIFO (to a memory peripheral or by accepting the burst transaction requests) when FIFO is at least half-full (except at the end of the block transfer, when FIFO-flush mode is activated) and are configured to get data to the FIFO when it's at least half-empty.

Such configuration is a good choice when there is no slave device involved in the DMA transfers. In that case the number of bursts per block is less than when CFGx.FIFO_MODE = 0 and, hence, the bus utilization will improve. But the latency of DMA transfers may increase when CFGx.FIFO_MODE = 1, since DW DMAC will wait for the channel FIFO contents to be either half-full or half-empty depending on having the destination or the source transfers. Such latencies might be dangerous in case if the DMA transfers are expected to be performed from/to a slave device. Since normally peripheral devices keep data in internal FIFOs, any latency at some critical moment may cause one being overflown and consequently losing data. This especially concerns a case when either a peripheral device is relatively fast or the DW DMAC engine is relatively slow with respect to the incoming data pace.

In order to solve problems, which might be caused by the latencies described above, let's enable the FIFO half-full/half-empty "FIFO readiness" criterion only for DMA transfers with no slave device involved. Thanks to the commit 99ba8b9b0d97 ("dmaengine: dw: Initialize channel before each transfer") we can freely do that in the generic dw_dma_initialize_chan() method.

---
 drivers/dma/dw/dw.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dma/dw/dw.c +1 -1
index 7a085b3c1854c..d9810980920a1 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 static void dw_dma_initialize_chan(struct dw_dma_chan *dwc)
 {
 	struct dw_dma *dw = to_dw_dma(dwc->chan.device);
-	u32 cfghi = DWC_CFGH_FIFO_MODE;
+	u32 cfghi = is_slave_direction(dwc->direction) ? 0 : DWC_CFGH_FIFO_MODE;
 	u32 cfglo = DWC_CFGL_CH_PRIOR(dwc->priority);
 	bool hs_polarity = dwc->dws.hs_polarity;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#399 lore raw

PATCH 399/408 ath10k: check idx validity in __ath10k_htt_rx_ring_fill_n()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zekun Shen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bad60b8d1a7194df38fd7fe4b22f3f4dcf775099 ]

The idx in __ath10k_htt_rx_ring_fill_n function lives in consistent dma region writable by the device. Malfunctional or malicious device could manipulate such idx to have a OOB write. Either by

    htt->rx_ring.netbufs_ring[idx] = skb;
or by
    ath10k_htt_set_paddrs_ring(htt, paddr, idx);

The idx can also be negative as it's signed, giving a large memory space to write to.

It's possibly exploitable by corruptting a legit pointer with a skb pointer. And then fill skb with payload as rougue object.

Part of the log here. Sometimes it appears as UAF when writing to a freed memory by chance.

 [   15.594376] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff887f5c1804f0
 [   15.595483] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
 [   15.596250] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
 [   15.597013] PGD 0 P4D 0
 [   15.597395] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
 [   15.597967] CPU: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kworker/u2:2 Not tainted 5.6.0 #69
 [   15.598843] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
 BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 [   15.600438] Workqueue: ath10k_wq ath10k_core_register_work [ath10k_core]
 [   15.601389] RIP: 0010:__ath10k_htt_rx_ring_fill_n
 (linux/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c:173) ath10k_core
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c +8 -0
index 9f0e7b4943ec6..8ca0a808a644d 100644
@@ -142,6 +142,14 @@ static int __ath10k_htt_rx_ring_fill_n(struct ath10k_htt *htt, int num)
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(HTT_RX_RING_FILL_LEVEL >= HTT_RX_RING_SIZE / 2);
 
 	idx = __le32_to_cpu(*htt->rx_ring.alloc_idx.vaddr);
+
+	if (idx < 0 || idx >= htt->rx_ring.size) {
+		ath10k_err(htt->ar, "rx ring index is not valid, firmware malfunctioning?\n");
+		idx &= htt->rx_ring.size_mask;
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
 	while (num > 0) {
 		skb = dev_alloc_skb(HTT_RX_BUF_SIZE + HTT_RX_DESC_ALIGN);
 		if (!skb) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#400 lore raw

PATCH 400/408 net: korina: cast KSEG0 address to pointer in kfree

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Valentin Vidic <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3bd57b90554b4bb82dce638e0668ef9dc95d3e96 ]

Fixes gcc warning:

passing argument 1 of 'kfree' makes pointer from integer without a cast

Fixes 3af5f0f5c74e ("net: korina: fix kfree of rx/tx descriptor array")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/korina.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/korina.c +2 -2
index 5bdff77c0ad10..993f495e2bf7b 100644
@@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ static int korina_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	return rc;
 
 probe_err_register:
-	kfree(KSEG0ADDR(lp->td_ring));
+	kfree((struct dma_desc *)KSEG0ADDR(lp->td_ring));
 probe_err_td_ring:
 	iounmap(lp->tx_dma_regs);
 probe_err_dma_tx:
@@ -1133,7 +1133,7 @@ static int korina_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	iounmap(lp->eth_regs);
 	iounmap(lp->rx_dma_regs);
 	iounmap(lp->tx_dma_regs);
-	kfree(KSEG0ADDR(lp->td_ring));
+	kfree((struct dma_desc *)KSEG0ADDR(lp->td_ring));
 
 	unregister_netdev(bif->dev);
 	free_netdev(bif->dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#401 lore raw

PATCH 401/408 s390/qeth: dont let HW override the configured port role

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Julian Wiedmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a04f0ecacdb0639d416614619225a39de3927e22 ]

The only time that our Bridgeport role should change is when we change the configuration ourselves. In which case we also adjust our internal state tracking, no need to do it again when we receive the corresponding event.

Removing the locked section helps a subsequent patch that needs to flush the workqueue while under sbp_lock.

It would be nice to raise a warning here in case HW does weird things after all, but this could end up generating false-positives when we change the configuration ourselves.

---
 drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c | 6 ------
 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c +0 -6
index 4ce28aa490cdb..8c4613617ef11 100644
@@ -1168,12 +1168,6 @@ static void qeth_bridge_state_change_worker(struct work_struct *work)
 		NULL
 	};
 
-	/* Role should not change by itself, but if it did, */
-	/* information from the hardware is authoritative.  */
-	mutex_lock(&data->card->sbp_lock);
-	data->card->options.sbp.role = entry->role;
-	mutex_unlock(&data->card->sbp_lock);
-
 	snprintf(env_locrem, sizeof(env_locrem), "BRIDGEPORT=statechange");
 	snprintf(env_role, sizeof(env_role), "ROLE=%s",
 		(entry->role == QETH_SBP_ROLE_NONE) ? "none" :
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#402 lore raw

PATCH 402/408 tty: serial: lpuart: fix lpuart32_write usage

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Peng Fan <[email protected]>

commit 9ea40db477c024dcb87321b7f32bd6ea12130ac2 upstream.

The 2nd and 3rd parameter were wrongly used, and cause kernel abort when doing kgdb debug.

Fixes 1da17d7cf8e2 ("tty: serial: fsl_lpuart: Use appropriate lpuart32_* I/O funcs")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c |   14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c +6 -8
@@ -635,26 +635,24 @@ static int lpuart32_poll_init(struct uar
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&sport->port.lock, flags);
 
 	/* Disable Rx & Tx */
-	lpuart32_write(&sport->port, UARTCTRL, 0);
+	lpuart32_write(&sport->port, 0, UARTCTRL);
 
 	temp = lpuart32_read(&sport->port, UARTFIFO);
 
 	/* Enable Rx and Tx FIFO */
-	lpuart32_write(&sport->port, UARTFIFO,
-		       temp | UARTFIFO_RXFE | UARTFIFO_TXFE);
+	lpuart32_write(&sport->port, temp | UARTFIFO_RXFE | UARTFIFO_TXFE, UARTFIFO);
 
 	/* flush Tx and Rx FIFO */
-	lpuart32_write(&sport->port, UARTFIFO,
-		       UARTFIFO_TXFLUSH | UARTFIFO_RXFLUSH);
+	lpuart32_write(&sport->port, UARTFIFO_TXFLUSH | UARTFIFO_RXFLUSH, UARTFIFO);
 
 	/* explicitly clear RDRF */
 	if (lpuart32_read(&sport->port, UARTSTAT) & UARTSTAT_RDRF) {
 		lpuart32_read(&sport->port, UARTDATA);
-		lpuart32_write(&sport->port, UARTFIFO, UARTFIFO_RXUF);
+		lpuart32_write(&sport->port, UARTFIFO_RXUF, UARTFIFO);
 	}
 
 	/* Enable Rx and Tx */
-	lpuart32_write(&sport->port, UARTCTRL, UARTCTRL_RE | UARTCTRL_TE);
+	lpuart32_write(&sport->port, UARTCTRL_RE | UARTCTRL_TE, UARTCTRL);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sport->port.lock, flags);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -663,7 +661,7 @@ static int lpuart32_poll_init(struct uar
 static void lpuart32_poll_put_char(struct uart_port *port, unsigned char c)
 {
 	lpuart32_wait_bit_set(port, UARTSTAT, UARTSTAT_TDRE);
-	lpuart32_write(port, UARTDATA, c);
+	lpuart32_write(port, c, UARTDATA);
 }
 
 static int lpuart32_poll_get_char(struct uart_port *port)
author maintainer
#403 lore raw

PATCH 403/408 tty: serial: fsl_lpuart: fix lpuart32_poll_get_char

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Peng Fan <[email protected]>

commit 29788ab1d2bf26c130de8f44f9553ee78a27e8d5 upstream.

The watermark is set to 1, so we need to input two chars to trigger RDRF using the original logic. With the new logic, we could always get the char when there is data in FIFO.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c +1 -1
@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ static void lpuart32_poll_put_char(struc
 
 static int lpuart32_poll_get_char(struct uart_port *port)
 {
-	if (!(lpuart32_read(port, UARTSTAT) & UARTSTAT_RDRF))
+	if (!(lpuart32_read(port, UARTWATER) >> UARTWATER_RXCNT_OFF))
 		return NO_POLL_CHAR;
 
 	return lpuart32_read(port, UARTDATA);
author maintainer
#404 lore raw

PATCH 404/408 usb: cdc-acm: add quirk to blacklist ETAS ES58X devices

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Vincent Mailhol <[email protected]>

commit a4f88430af896bf34ec25a7a5f0e053fb3d928e0 upstream.

The ES58X devices has a CDC ACM interface (used for debug
purpose). During probing, the device is thus recognized as USB Modem (CDC ACM), preventing the etas-es58x module to load:
usbcore: registered new interface driver etas_es58x
usb 1-1.1: new full-speed USB device number 14 using xhci_hcd
usb 1-1.1: New USB device found, idVendor=108c, idProduct=0159, bcdDevice= 1.00 usb 1-1.1: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3 usb 1-1.1: Product: ES581.4
usb 1-1.1: Manufacturer: ETAS GmbH
usb 1-1.1: SerialNumber: 2204355
cdc_acm 1-1.1:1.0: No union descriptor, testing for castrated device cdc_acm 1-1.1:1.0: ttyACM0: USB ACM device

Thus, these have been added to the ignore list in
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c

N.B. Future firmware release of the ES58X will remove the CDC-ACM interface.

lsusb -v of the three devices variant (ES581.4, ES582.1 and ES584.1):

Bus 001 Device 011: ID 108c:0159 Robert Bosch GmbH ES581.4 Device Descriptor:
bLength 18
bDescriptorType 1
bcdUSB 1.10
bDeviceClass 2 Communications
bDeviceSubClass 0
bDeviceProtocol 0
bMaxPacketSize0 64
idVendor 0x108c Robert Bosch GmbH
idProduct 0x0159
bcdDevice 1.00
iManufacturer 1 ETAS GmbH
iProduct 2 ES581.4
iSerial 3 2204355
bNumConfigurations 1
Configuration Descriptor:
bLength 9
bDescriptorType 2
wTotalLength 0x0035
bNumInterfaces 1
bConfigurationValue 1
iConfiguration 5 Bus Powered Configuration
bmAttributes 0x80
(Bus Powered)
MaxPower 100mA
Interface Descriptor:
bLength 9
bDescriptorType 4
bInterfaceNumber 0
bAlternateSetting 0
bNumEndpoints 3
bInterfaceClass 2 Communications
bInterfaceSubClass 2 Abstract (modem)
bInterfaceProtocol 0
iInterface 4 ACM Control Interface
CDC Header:
bcdCDC 1.10
CDC Call Management:
bmCapabilities 0x01
call management
bDataInterface 0
CDC ACM:
bmCapabilities 0x06
sends break
line coding and serial state
Endpoint Descriptor:
bLength 7
bDescriptorType 5
bEndpointAddress 0x81 EP 1 IN
bmAttributes 3
Transfer Type Interrupt
Synch Type None
Usage Type Data
wMaxPacketSize 0x0010 1x 16 bytes
bInterval 10
Endpoint Descriptor:
bLength 7
bDescriptorType 5
bEndpointAddress 0x82 EP 2 IN
bmAttributes 2
Transfer Type Bulk
Synch Type None
Usage Type Data
wMaxPacketSize 0x0040 1x 64 bytes
bInterval 0
Endpoint Descriptor:
bLength 7
bDescriptorType 5
bEndpointAddress 0x03 EP 3 OUT
bmAttributes 2
Transfer Type Bulk
Synch Type None
Usage Type Data
wMaxPacketSize 0x0040 1x 64 bytes
bInterval 0
Device Status: 0x0000
(Bus Powered)

Bus 001 Device 012: ID 108c:0168 Robert Bosch GmbH ES582 Device Descriptor:
bLength 18
bDescriptorType 1
bcdUSB 2.00
bDeviceClass 2 Communications
bDeviceSubClass 0
bDeviceProtocol 0
bMaxPacketSize0 64
idVendor 0x108c Robert Bosch GmbH
idProduct 0x0168
bcdDevice 1.00
iManufacturer 1 ETAS GmbH
iProduct 2 ES582
iSerial 3 0108933
bNumConfigurations 1
Configuration Descriptor:
bLength 9
bDescriptorType 2
wTotalLength 0x0043
bNumInterfaces 2
bConfigurationValue 1
iConfiguration 0
bmAttributes 0x80
(Bus Powered)
MaxPower 500mA
Interface Descriptor:
bLength 9
bDescriptorType 4
bInterfaceNumber 0
bAlternateSetting 0
bNumEndpoints 1
bInterfaceClass 2 Communications
bInterfaceSubClass 2 Abstract (modem)
bInterfaceProtocol 1 AT-commands (v.25ter)
iInterface 0
CDC Header:
bcdCDC 1.10
CDC ACM:
bmCapabilities 0x02
line coding and serial state
CDC Union:
bMasterInterface 0
bSlaveInterface 1
CDC Call Management:
bmCapabilities 0x03
call management
use DataInterface
bDataInterface 1
Endpoint Descriptor:
bLength 7
bDescriptorType 5
bEndpointAddress 0x83 EP 3 IN
bmAttributes 3
Transfer Type Interrupt
Synch Type None
Usage Type Data
wMaxPacketSize 0x0040 1x 64 bytes
bInterval 16
Interface Descriptor:
bLength 9
bDescriptorType 4
bInterfaceNumber 1
bAlternateSetting 0
bNumEndpoints 2
bInterfaceClass 10 CDC Data
bInterfaceSubClass 0
bInterfaceProtocol 0
iInterface 0
Endpoint Descriptor:
bLength 7
bDescriptorType 5
bEndpointAddress 0x81 EP 1 IN
bmAttributes 2
Transfer Type Bulk
Synch Type None
Usage Type Data
wMaxPacketSize 0x0200 1x 512 bytes
bInterval 0
Endpoint Descriptor:
bLength 7
bDescriptorType 5
bEndpointAddress 0x02 EP 2 OUT
bmAttributes 2
Transfer Type Bulk
Synch Type None
Usage Type Data
wMaxPacketSize 0x0200 1x 512 bytes
bInterval 0
Device Qualifier (for other device speed):
bLength 10
bDescriptorType 6
bcdUSB 2.00
bDeviceClass 2 Communications
bDeviceSubClass 0
bDeviceProtocol 0
bMaxPacketSize0 64
bNumConfigurations 1
Device Status: 0x0000
(Bus Powered)

Bus 001 Device 013: ID 108c:0169 Robert Bosch GmbH ES584.1 Device Descriptor:
bLength 18
bDescriptorType 1
bcdUSB 2.00
bDeviceClass 2 Communications
bDeviceSubClass 0
bDeviceProtocol 0
bMaxPacketSize0 64
idVendor 0x108c Robert Bosch GmbH
idProduct 0x0169
bcdDevice 1.00
iManufacturer 1 ETAS GmbH
iProduct 2 ES584.1
iSerial 3 0100320
bNumConfigurations 1
Configuration Descriptor:
bLength 9
bDescriptorType 2
wTotalLength 0x0043
bNumInterfaces 2
bConfigurationValue 1
iConfiguration 0
bmAttributes 0x80
(Bus Powered)
MaxPower 500mA
Interface Descriptor:
bLength 9
bDescriptorType 4
bInterfaceNumber 0
bAlternateSetting 0
bNumEndpoints 1
bInterfaceClass 2 Communications
bInterfaceSubClass 2 Abstract (modem)
bInterfaceProtocol 1 AT-commands (v.25ter)
iInterface 0
CDC Header:
bcdCDC 1.10
CDC ACM:
bmCapabilities 0x02
line coding and serial state
CDC Union:
bMasterInterface 0
bSlaveInterface 1
CDC Call Management:
bmCapabilities 0x03
call management
use DataInterface
bDataInterface 1
Endpoint Descriptor:
bLength 7
bDescriptorType 5
bEndpointAddress 0x83 EP 3 IN
bmAttributes 3
Transfer Type Interrupt
Synch Type None
Usage Type Data
wMaxPacketSize 0x0040 1x 64 bytes
bInterval 16
Interface Descriptor:
bLength 9
bDescriptorType 4
bInterfaceNumber 1
bAlternateSetting 0
bNumEndpoints 2
bInterfaceClass 10 CDC Data
bInterfaceSubClass 0
bInterfaceProtocol 0
iInterface 0
Endpoint Descriptor:
bLength 7
bDescriptorType 5
bEndpointAddress 0x81 EP 1 IN
bmAttributes 2
Transfer Type Bulk
Synch Type None
Usage Type Data
wMaxPacketSize 0x0200 1x 512 bytes
bInterval 0
Endpoint Descriptor:
bLength 7
bDescriptorType 5
bEndpointAddress 0x02 EP 2 OUT
bmAttributes 2
Transfer Type Bulk
Synch Type None
Usage Type Data
wMaxPacketSize 0x0200 1x 512 bytes
bInterval 0
Device Qualifier (for other device speed):
bLength 10
bDescriptorType 6
bcdUSB 2.00
bDeviceClass 2 Communications
bDeviceSubClass 0
bDeviceProtocol 0
bMaxPacketSize0 64
bNumConfigurations 1
Device Status: 0x0000
(Bus Powered)

---
 drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c +11 -0
@@ -1912,6 +1912,17 @@ static const struct usb_device_id acm_id
 	.driver_info = IGNORE_DEVICE,
 	},
 
+	/* Exclude ETAS ES58x */
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x108c, 0x0159), /* ES581.4 */
+	.driver_info = IGNORE_DEVICE,
+	},
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x108c, 0x0168), /* ES582.1 */
+	.driver_info = IGNORE_DEVICE,
+	},
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x108c, 0x0169), /* ES584.1 */
+	.driver_info = IGNORE_DEVICE,
+	},
+
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x1bc7, 0x0021), /* Telit 3G ACM only composition */
 	.driver_info = SEND_ZERO_PACKET,
 	},
author maintainer
#405 lore raw

PATCH 405/408 USB: cdc-wdm: Make wdm_flush() interruptible and add wdm_fsync().

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>

commit 37d2a36394d954413a495da61da1b2a51ecd28ab upstream.

syzbot is reporting hung task at wdm_flush() [1], for there is a circular dependency that wdm_flush() from flip_close() for /dev/cdc-wdm0 forever waits for /dev/raw-gadget to be closed while close() for /dev/raw-gadget cannot be called unless close() for /dev/cdc-wdm0 completes.

Tetsuo Handa considered that such circular dependency is an usage error [2] which corresponds to an unresponding broken hardware [3]. But Alan Stern responded that we should be prepared for such hardware [4]. Therefore, this patch changes wdm_flush() to use wait_event_interruptible_timeout() which gives up after 30 seconds, for hardware that remains silent must be ignored. The 30 seconds are coming out of thin air.

Changing wait_event() to wait_event_interruptible_timeout() makes error reporting from close() syscall less reliable. To compensate it, this patch also implements wdm_fsync() which does not use timeout. Those who want to be very sure that data has gone out to the device are now advised to call fsync(), with a caveat that fsync() can return -EINVAL when running on older kernels which do not implement wdm_fsync().

This patch also fixes three more problems (listed below) found during exhaustive discussion and testing.

Since multiple threads can concurrently call wdm_write()/wdm_flush(), we need to use wake_up_all() whenever clearing WDM_IN_USE in order to make sure that all waiters are woken up. Also, error reporting needs to use fetch-and-clear approach in order not to report same error for multiple times.

Since wdm_flush() checks WDM_DISCONNECTING, wdm_write() should as well check WDM_DISCONNECTING.

In wdm_flush(), since locks are not held, it is not safe to dereference desc->intf after checking that WDM_DISCONNECTING is not set [5]. Thus, remove dev_err() from wdm_flush().

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=e7b761593b23eb50855b9ea31e3be5472b711186
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[3] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[4] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[5] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

---
 drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c |   70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c +54 -16
@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (usb, wdm_ids);
 
 #define WDM_MAX			16
 
+/* we cannot wait forever at flush() */
+#define WDM_FLUSH_TIMEOUT	(30 * HZ)
+
 /* CDC-WMC r1.1 requires wMaxCommand to be "at least 256 decimal (0x100)" */
 #define WDM_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE	256
 
@@ -151,7 +154,7 @@ static void wdm_out_callback(struct urb
 	kfree(desc->outbuf);
 	desc->outbuf = NULL;
 	clear_bit(WDM_IN_USE, &desc->flags);
-	wake_up(&desc->wait);
+	wake_up_all(&desc->wait);
 }
 
 static void wdm_in_callback(struct urb *urb)
@@ -393,6 +396,9 @@ static ssize_t wdm_write
 	if (test_bit(WDM_RESETTING, &desc->flags))
 		r = -EIO;
 
+	if (test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags))
+		r = -ENODEV;
+
 	if (r < 0) {
 		rv = r;
 		goto out_free_mem_pm;
@@ -424,6 +430,7 @@ static ssize_t wdm_write
 	if (rv < 0) {
 		desc->outbuf = NULL;
 		clear_bit(WDM_IN_USE, &desc->flags);
+		wake_up_all(&desc->wait); /* for wdm_wait_for_response() */
 		dev_err(&desc->intf->dev, "Tx URB error: %d\n", rv);
 		rv = usb_translate_errors(rv);
 		goto out_free_mem_pm;
@@ -583,28 +590,58 @@ err:
 	return rv;
 }
 
-static int wdm_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t id)
+static int wdm_wait_for_response(struct file *file, long timeout)
 {
 	struct wdm_device *desc = file->private_data;
+	long rv; /* Use long here because (int) MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT < 0. */
 
-	wait_event(desc->wait,
-			/*
-			 * needs both flags. We cannot do with one
-			 * because resetting it would cause a race
-			 * with write() yet we need to signal
-			 * a disconnect
-			 */
-			!test_bit(WDM_IN_USE, &desc->flags) ||
-			test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags));
+	/*
+	 * Needs both flags. We cannot do with one because resetting it would
+	 * cause a race with write() yet we need to signal a disconnect.
+	 */
+	rv = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(desc->wait,
+			      !test_bit(WDM_IN_USE, &desc->flags) ||
+			      test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags),
+			      timeout);
 
-	/* cannot dereference desc->intf if WDM_DISCONNECTING */
+	/*
+	 * To report the correct error. This is best effort.
+	 * We are inevitably racing with the hardware.
+	 */
 	if (test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags))
 		return -ENODEV;
-	if (desc->werr < 0)
-		dev_err(&desc->intf->dev, "Error in flush path: %d\n",
-			desc->werr);
+	if (!rv)
+		return -EIO;
+	if (rv < 0)
+		return -EINTR;
+
+	spin_lock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
+	rv = desc->werr;
+	desc->werr = 0;
+	spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
 
-	return usb_translate_errors(desc->werr);
+	return usb_translate_errors(rv);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * You need to send a signal when you react to malicious or defective hardware.
+ * Also, don't abort when fsync() returned -EINVAL, for older kernels which do
+ * not implement wdm_flush() will return -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int wdm_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync)
+{
+	return wdm_wait_for_response(file, MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Same with wdm_fsync(), except it uses finite timeout in order to react to
+ * malicious or defective hardware which ceased communication after close() was
+ * implicitly called due to process termination.
+ */
+static int wdm_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t id)
+{
+	return wdm_wait_for_response(file, WDM_FLUSH_TIMEOUT);
 }
 
 static __poll_t wdm_poll(struct file *file, struct poll_table_struct *wait)
@@ -729,6 +766,7 @@ static const struct file_operations wdm_
 	.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
 	.read =		wdm_read,
 	.write =	wdm_write,
+	.fsync =	wdm_fsync,
 	.open =		wdm_open,
 	.flush =	wdm_flush,
 	.release =	wdm_release,
author maintainer
#406 lore raw

PATCH 406/408 usb: cdns3: gadget: free interrupt after gadget has deleted

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Peter Chen <[email protected]>

commit 98df91f8840cf750a0bc7c4c5d6b6085bac945b3 upstream.

The interrupt may occur during the gadget deletion, it fixes the below oops.

[ 2394.974604] configfs-gadget gadget: suspend
[ 2395.042578] configfs-gadget 5b130000.usb: unregistering UDC driver [g1]
[ 2395.382562] irq 229: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option)
[ 2395.389362] CPU: 0 PID: 301 Comm: kworker/u12:6 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc3-next-20200703-00060-g2f13b83cbf30-dirty #456
[ 2395.399712] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QM MEK (DT)
[ 2395.404782] Workqueue: 2-0051 tcpm_state_machine_work
[ 2395.409832] Call trace:
[ 2395.412289]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1d0
[ 2395.415950]  show_stack+0x1c/0x28
[ 2395.419271]  dump_stack+0xbc/0x118
[ 2395.422678]  __report_bad_irq+0x50/0xe0
[ 2395.426513]  note_interrupt+0x2cc/0x38c
[ 2395.430355]  handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x90
[ 2395.434800]  handle_irq_event+0x4c/0xe8
[ 2395.438640]  handle_fasteoi_irq+0xbc/0x168
[ 2395.442740]  generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x48
[ 2395.446752]  __handle_domain_irq+0x68/0xc0
[ 2395.450846]  gic_handle_irq+0x64/0x150
[ 2395.454596]  el1_irq+0xb8/0x180
[ 2395.457733]  __do_softirq+0xac/0x3b8
[ 2395.461310]  irq_exit+0xc0/0xe0
[ 2395.464448]  __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 2395.468540]  gic_handle_irq+0x64/0x150
[ 2395.472295]  el1_irq+0xb8/0x180
[ 2395.475436]  _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x14/0x48
[ 2395.480232]  usb_gadget_disconnect+0x120/0x140
[ 2395.484678]  usb_gadget_remove_driver+0xb4/0xd0
[ 2395.489208]  usb_del_gadget+0x6c/0xc8
[ 2395.492872]  cdns3_gadget_exit+0x5c/0x120
[ 2395.496882]  cdns3_role_stop+0x60/0x90
[ 2395.500634]  cdns3_role_set+0x64/0xd8
[ 2395.504301]  usb_role_switch_set_role.part.0+0x3c/0x90
[ 2395.509444]  usb_role_switch_set_role+0x20/0x30
[ 2395.513978]  tcpm_mux_set+0x60/0xf8
[ 2395.517470]  tcpm_reset_port+0xa4/0xf0
[ 2395.521222]  tcpm_detach.part.0+0x44/0x50
[ 2395.525227]  tcpm_state_machine_work+0x8b0/0x2360
[ 2395.529932]  process_one_work+0x1c8/0x470
[ 2395.533939]  worker_thread+0x50/0x420
[ 2395.537603]  kthread+0x148/0x168
[ 2395.540830]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[ 2395.544399] handlers:
[ 2395.546671] [<000000008dea28da>] cdns3_wakeup_irq
[ 2395.551375] [<000000009fee5c61>] cdns3_drd_irq threaded [<000000005148eaec>] cdns3_drd_thread_irq
[ 2395.560255] Disabling IRQ #229
[ 2395.563454] configfs-gadget gadget: unbind function 'Mass Storage Function'/000000000132f835
[ 2395.563657] configfs-gadget gadget: unbind
[ 2395.563917] udc 5b130000.usb: releasing '5b130000.usb'
Fixes 7733f6c32e36 ("usb: cdns3: Add Cadence USB3 DRD Driver")
---
 drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c +1 -1
@@ -2545,12 +2545,12 @@ void cdns3_gadget_exit(struct cdns3 *cdn
 
 	priv_dev = cdns->gadget_dev;
 
-	devm_free_irq(cdns->dev, cdns->dev_irq, priv_dev);
 
 	pm_runtime_mark_last_busy(cdns->dev);
 	pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(cdns->dev);
 
 	usb_del_gadget_udc(&priv_dev->gadget);
+	devm_free_irq(cdns->dev, cdns->dev_irq, priv_dev);
 
 	cdns3_free_all_eps(priv_dev);
 
author maintainer
#407 lore raw

PATCH 407/408 eeprom: at25: set minimum read/write access stride to 1

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christian Eggers <[email protected]>

commit 284f52ac1c6cfa1b2e5c11b84653dd90e4e91de7 upstream.

SPI eeproms are addressed by byte.

---
 drivers/misc/eeprom/at25.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/misc/eeprom/at25.c +1 -1
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static int at25_probe(struct spi_device
 	at25->nvmem_config.reg_read = at25_ee_read;
 	at25->nvmem_config.reg_write = at25_ee_write;
 	at25->nvmem_config.priv = at25;
-	at25->nvmem_config.stride = 4;
+	at25->nvmem_config.stride = 1;
 	at25->nvmem_config.word_size = 1;
 	at25->nvmem_config.size = chip.byte_len;
 
author maintainer
#408 lore raw

PATCH 408/408 usb: gadget: f_ncm: allow using NCM in SuperSpeed Plus gadgets.

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Lorenzo Colitti <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7974ecd7d3c0f42a98566f281e44ea8573a2ad88 ]

Currently, enabling f_ncm at SuperSpeed Plus speeds results in an oops in config_ep_by_speed because ncm_set_alt passes in NULL ssp_descriptors. Fix this by re-using the SuperSpeed descriptors. This is safe because usb_assign_descriptors calls usb_copy_descriptors.

Tested: enabled f_ncm on a dwc3 gadget and 10Gbps link, ran iperf

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c +1 -1
index 7672fa25085b0..92a7c3a839454 100644
@@ -1536,7 +1536,7 @@ static int ncm_bind(struct usb_configuration *c, struct usb_function *f)
 		fs_ncm_notify_desc.bEndpointAddress;
 
 	status = usb_assign_descriptors(f, ncm_fs_function, ncm_hs_function,
-			ncm_ss_function, NULL);
+			ncm_ss_function, ncm_ss_function);
 	if (status)
 		goto fail;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]

#410 lore raw

Retry.

Quoted 18 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.73 release. There are 408 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 29 Oct 2020 13:53:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 157 pass: 157 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 426 pass: 426 fail: 0

Guenter

Tested-by Linux Kernel Functional Testing on the v1 series
#411 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.73 release. There are 408 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 29 Oct 2020 13:53:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.73-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 5.4.73-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-5.4.y
git commit: ab6643bad070b82c2f3cf336bc18c87eaa5c92d0
git describe: v5.4.72-409-gab6643bad070
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-5.4.y/build/v5.4.72-409-gab6643bad070

No regressions (compared to build v5.4.72)

No fixes (compared to build v5.4.72)

Ran 30609 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c
- hi6220-hikey
- i386
- juno-r2
- juno-r2-compat
- juno-r2-kasan
- nxp-ls2088
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15
- x86
- x86-kasan

Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* libhugetlbfs
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* v4l2-compliance
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* network-basic-tests
* perf
* kselftest
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests

Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
maintainer Tested-by on the v1 series
#412 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.73 release. There are 408 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 29 Oct 2020 13:53:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.73-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v5.4:

    15 builds:	15 pass, 0 fail
    26 boots:	26 pass, 0 fail
    56 tests:	56 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 5.4.73-rc1-gab6643bad070
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra210-p3450-0000,
                tegra30-cardhu-a04

Jon