Fix misuse of security_capable()
Subsystems (3)
cover Fix misuse of security_capable()
This series replaces all the use of security_capable(current_cred(), ...) with ns_capable{,_noaudit}() which set PF_SUPERPRIV.
This initially come from a review of Landlock by Jann Horn:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1FQVkt78129WozBwFbVhAPyAr9oJAHFHAbbNxEBr9h1g@mail.gmail.com/
Mickaël Salaün (2):
ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
kernel/ptrace.c | 18 ++++++------------ kernel/seccomp.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
base-commit: 3650b228f83adda7e5ee532e2b90429c03f7b9ec
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
PATCH 1/2 ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Commit 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat") replaced the use of ns_capable() with has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() which doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV.
Commit 6b3ad6649a4c ("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in ptrace_has_cap()") replaced has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() with security_capable(), which doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV neither.
Since commit 98f368e9e263 ("kernel: Add noaudit variant of ns_capable()"), a new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available. Let's use it!
As a result, the signature of ptrace_has_cap() is restored to its original one.
--- kernel/ptrace.c | 18 ++++++------------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
kernel/ptrace.c +6 -12
@@ -264,23 +264,17 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)return ret; } -static bool ptrace_has_cap (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns, -unsigned int mode) +static bool ptrace_has_cap (struct user_namespace *ns,unsigned int mode) { -int ret; -if (mode &PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT ) - ret =security_capable (cred, ns,CAP_SYS_PTRACE ,CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT ); -else - ret =security_capable (cred, ns,CAP_SYS_PTRACE ,CAP_OPT_NONE ); - -return ret ==0 ; +return ns_capable_noaudit (ns,CAP_SYS_PTRACE ); +return ns_capable (ns,CAP_SYS_PTRACE ); }/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */ static int __ptrace_may_access (struct task_struct *task,unsigned int mode) { -const struct cred *cred =current_cred (), *tcred; +const struct cred *const cred =current_cred (), *tcred;struct mm_struct *mm;kuid_t caller_uid;kgid_t caller_gid;
@@ -326,7 +320,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) && gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid)) goto ok; -if (ptrace_has_cap (cred, tcred->user_ns, mode)) +if (ptrace_has_cap (tcred->user_ns, mode)) goto ok;rcu_read_unlock ();return -EPERM ;
@@ -345,7 +339,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) mm = task->mm;if (mm && ((get_dumpable (mm) !=SUID_DUMP_USER ) && - !ptrace_has_cap (cred, mm->user_ns, mode))) + !ptrace_has_cap (mm->user_ns, mode)))return -EPERM ;return security_ptrace_access_check (task, mode);
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
Quoted 13 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Commit
69f594a38967("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing/proc/pid/stat") replaced the use ofns_capable()with has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() which doesn't setPF_SUPERPRIV.Commit
6b3ad6649a4c("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials inptrace_has_cap()") replaced has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() withsecurity_capable(), which doesn't setPF_SUPERPRIVneither.Since commit
98f368e9e263("kernel: Add noaudit variant ofns_capable()"), a newns_capable_noaudit()helper is available. Let's use it!As a result, the signature of
ptrace_has_cap()is restored to its original one.
Quoted 11 lines
Cc Christian Brauner <[email protected]>Cc Eric Paris <[email protected]>Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>Cc Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>Cc Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>Fixes 6b3ad6649a4c ("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in ptrace_has_cap()")Fixes 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Yeah... I guess this makes sense. (We'd have to undo or change it if we ever end up needing to use a different set of credentials, e.g. from ->f_cred, but I guess that's really something we should avoid anyway.)
with one nit:
[...]
kernel/ptrace.c static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state) · line 277
Quoted 5 lines
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
static int__ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode){kernel/ptrace.c +1
-1-const struct cred *cred =current_cred (), *tcred; +const struct cred *const cred =current_cred (), *tcred;
This is an unrelated change, and almost no kernel code marks local pointer variables as "const". I would drop this change from the patch.
Quoted 3 lines
struct mm_struct *mm;
kuid_t caller_uid;
kgid_t caller_gid;Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
Quoted 37 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 13 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Commit
69f594a38967("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing/proc/pid/stat") replaced the use ofns_capable()with has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() which doesn't setPF_SUPERPRIV.Commit
6b3ad6649a4c("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials inptrace_has_cap()") replaced has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() withsecurity_capable(), which doesn't setPF_SUPERPRIVneither.Since commit
98f368e9e263("kernel: Add noaudit variant ofns_capable()"), a newns_capable_noaudit()helper is available. Let's use it!As a result, the signature of
ptrace_has_cap()is restored to its original one.Quoted 11 lines
Cc Christian Brauner <[email protected]>Cc Eric Paris <[email protected]>Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>Cc Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>Cc Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>Fixes 6b3ad6649a4c ("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in ptrace_has_cap()")Fixes 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>Yeah... I guess this makes sense. (We'd have to undo or change it if we ever end up needing to use a different set of credentials, e.g. from ->f_cred, but I guess that's really something we should avoid anyway.)
Reviewed-by Jann Horn <[email protected]>with one nit:
[...]
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/ptrace.c static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state) · line 277
Quoted 5 lines
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
static int__ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode){kernel/ptrace.c +1
-1-const struct cred *cred =current_cred (), *tcred; +const struct cred *const cred =current_cred (), *tcred;This is an unrelated change, and almost no kernel code marks local pointer variables as "const". I would drop this change from the patch.
This give guarantee that the cred variable will not be used for something else than current_cred(), which kinda prove that this patch doesn't change the behavior of __ptrace_may_access() by not using cred in ptrace_has_cap(). It doesn't hurt and I think it could be useful to spot issues when backporting.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
struct mm_struct *mm; kuid_t caller_uid; kgid_t caller_gid;
Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
Quoted 44 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 43 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 13 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Commit
69f594a38967("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing/proc/pid/stat") replaced the use ofns_capable()with has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() which doesn't setPF_SUPERPRIV.Commit
6b3ad6649a4c("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials inptrace_has_cap()") replaced has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() withsecurity_capable(), which doesn't setPF_SUPERPRIVneither.Since commit
98f368e9e263("kernel: Add noaudit variant ofns_capable()"), a newns_capable_noaudit()helper is available. Let's use it!As a result, the signature of
ptrace_has_cap()is restored to its original one.Quoted 11 lines
Cc Christian Brauner <[email protected]>Cc Eric Paris <[email protected]>Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>Cc Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>Cc Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>Fixes 6b3ad6649a4c ("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in ptrace_has_cap()")Fixes 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>Yeah... I guess this makes sense. (We'd have to undo or change it if we ever end up needing to use a different set of credentials, e.g. from ->f_cred, but I guess that's really something we should avoid anyway.)
Reviewed-by Jann Horn <[email protected]>with one nit:
[...]
Quoted 5 lines
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
static int__ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode){kernel/ptrace.c +1
-1-const struct cred *cred =current_cred (), *tcred; +const struct cred *const cred =current_cred (), *tcred;
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This is an unrelated change, and almost no kernel code marks local pointer variables as "const". I would drop this change from the patch.
This give guarantee that the cred variable will not be used for something else than
current_cred(), which kinda prove that this patch doesn't change the behavior of__ptrace_may_access()by not using cred inptrace_has_cap(). It doesn't hurt and I think it could be useful to spot issues when backporting.
And it might require an extra fixup while backporting because the next line is different and that might cause the patch to not apply.
PATCH 2/2 seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Replace the use of security_capable(current_cred(), ...) with ns_capable_noaudit() which set PF_SUPERPRIV.
Since commit 98f368e9e263 ("kernel: Add noaudit variant of ns_capable()"), a new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available. Let's use it!
--- kernel/seccomp.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/seccomp.c +2 -3
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@#include <linux/filter.h> #include <linux/pid.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> -#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
@@ -558,8 +558,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)* behavior of privileged children. */ if (!task_no_new_privs (current) && -security_capable (current_cred (),current_user_ns (), -CAP_SYS_ADMIN ,CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT ) !=0 ) + !ns_capable_noaudit (current_user_ns (),CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return ERR_PTR (-EACCES );/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
Quoted 7 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Replace the use of
security_capable(current_cred(), ...)withns_capable_noaudit()which setPF_SUPERPRIV.Since commit
98f368e9e263("kernel: Add noaudit variant ofns_capable()"), a newns_capable_noaudit()helper is available. Let's use it!
Quoted 7 lines
Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>Cc Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>Cc Will Drewry <[email protected]>Fixes e2cfabdfd075 ("seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF")Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Kees Cook
AppliedQuoted 11 lines · Mickaël Salaün
This series replaces all the use of
security_capable(current_cred(), ...)with ns_capable{,_noaudit}() which setPF_SUPERPRIV.This initially come from a review of Landlock by Jann Horn:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1FQVkt78129WozBwFbVhAPyAr9oJAHFHAbbNxEBr9h1g@mail.gmail.com/Mickaël Salaün (2):
ptrace: SetPF_SUPERPRIVwhen checking capability
seccomp: SetPF_SUPERPRIVwhen checking capability[...]
Applied to for-linus/seccomp, thanks!
[1/2] ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/cf23705244c9 [2/2] seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/fb14528e4436
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook