Add tst_secureboot_enabled() helper function
PATCH v3 1/2 Add tst_secureboot_enabled() helper function
Also check for SecureBoot status in tst_lockdown_enabled() if the lockdown sysfile is not available/readable
---
Changes since v1:
- check whether machine is in EFI mode first
Changes since v2:
- move tst_secureboot_enabled() code to a separate header file
- move EFIVAR_CFLAGS and EFIVAR_LIBS out of global CFLAGS and LDLIBS
configure.ac | 1 + include/mk/config.mk.in | 2 ++ include/tst_lockdown.h | 4 +++ include/tst_secureboot.h | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ m4/ltp-libefivar.m4 | 9 +++++++ 5 files changed, 69 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/tst_secureboot.h create mode 100644 m4/ltp-libefivar.m4
configure.ac +1 -0
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ LTP_CHECK_CAPABILITY_SUPPORT LTP_CHECK_CC_WARN_OLDSTYLE LTP_CHECK_CLONE_SUPPORTS_7_ARGS LTP_CHECK_CRYPTO +LTP_CHECK_EFIVAR LTP_CHECK_FORTIFY_SOURCE LTP_CHECK_KERNEL_DEVEL LTP_CHECK_KEYUTILS_SUPPORT
include/mk/config.mk.in +2 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ KEYUTILS_LIBS := @KEYUTILS_LIBS@ HAVE_FTS_H := @HAVE_FTS_H@ LIBMNL_LIBS := @LIBMNL_LIBS@ LIBMNL_CFLAGS := @LIBMNL_CFLAGS@ +EFIVAR_CFLAGS := @EFIVAR_CFLAGS@ +EFIVAR_LIBS := @EFIVAR_LIBS@ prefix := @prefix@
include/tst_lockdown.h +4 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@#define PATH_LOCKDOWN "/sys/kernel/security/lockdown" +/* +* Note: Also check tst_secureboot_enabled(). It may indicate integrity +* lockdown even if tst_lockdown_enabled() returns 0. +*/ int tst_lockdown_enabled (void );#endif /* TST_LOCKDOWN_H */
include/tst_secureboot.h new file +53 -0
53 lines not on this page · raw message
m4/ltp-libefivar.m4 new file +9 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +dnl SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +dnl Copyright (c) 2020 SUSE LLC <[email protected]> + +AC_DEFUN([LTP_CHECK_EFIVAR], [ + dnl efivar library and headers + PKG_CHECK_MODULES([EFIVAR], [efivar], [ + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EFIVAR], [1], [Define to 1 if you have libefivar library and headers]) + ], [have_efivar=no]) +])
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
PATCH v3 2/2 syscalls/iopl, ioperm: Check for SecureBoot lockdown
SecureBoot implies integrity lockdown even if tst_lockdown_enabled() cannot check lockdown status directly. Udpate skip condition in ioperm() and iopl() tests.
---
Changes since v2:
- new patch
testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/Makefile | 3 +++ testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm01.c | 3 ++- testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm02.c | 5 +++++ testcases/kernel/syscalls/iopl/Makefile | 3 +++ testcases/kernel/syscalls/iopl/iopl01.c | 3 ++- testcases/kernel/syscalls/iopl/iopl02.c | 6 ++++++ 6 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/Makefile +3 -0
@@ -5,4 +5,7 @@ top_srcdir ?= ../../../.. include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/testcases.mk +CFLAGS += $(EFIVAR_CFLAGS) +LDLIBS += $(EFIVAR_LIBS) + include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/generic_leaf_target.mk
testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm01.c +2 -1
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include <unistd.h> #include "tst_test.h" +#include "tst_secureboot.h" #if defined __i386__ || defined(__x86_64__)#include <sys/io.h>
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ static void verify_ioperm(void)static void setup (void ) {/* ioperm() is restricted under kernel lockdown. */ -if (tst_lockdown_enabled ()) +if (tst_lockdown_enabled () ||tst_secureboot_enabled () >0 )tst_brk (TCONF ,"Kernel is locked down, skip this test" );/*
testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm02.c +5 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <pwd.h> #include "tst_test.h" #include "tst_safe_macros.h" +#include "tst_secureboot.h" #if defined __i386__ || defined(__x86_64__)#include <sys/io.h>
@@ -45,6 +46,10 @@ static struct tcase_t {static void setup (void ) { +/* ioperm() is restricted under kernel lockdown. */ +if (tst_lockdown_enabled () ||tst_secureboot_enabled () >0 ) +tst_brk (TCONF ,"Kernel is locked down, skip this test" ); +/* * The value of IO_BITMAP_BITS (include/asm-i386/processor.h) changed * from kernel 2.6.8 to permit 16-bits (65536) ioperm
testcases/kernel/syscalls/iopl/Makefile +3 -0
@@ -5,4 +5,7 @@ top_srcdir ?= ../../../.. include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/testcases.mk +CFLAGS += $(EFIVAR_CFLAGS) +LDLIBS += $(EFIVAR_LIBS) + include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/generic_leaf_target.mk
testcases/kernel/syscalls/iopl/iopl01.c +2 -1
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include <unistd.h> #include "tst_test.h" +#include "tst_secureboot.h" #if defined __i386__ || defined(__x86_64__)#include <sys/io.h>
@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ static void verify_iopl(void)static void setup (void ) {/* iopl() is restricted under kernel lockdown. */ -if (tst_lockdown_enabled ()) +if (tst_lockdown_enabled () ||tst_secureboot_enabled () >0 )tst_brk (TCONF ,"Kernel is locked down, skip this test" ); }
testcases/kernel/syscalls/iopl/iopl02.c +6 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@#include <pwd.h> #include "tst_test.h" #include "tst_safe_macros.h" +#include "tst_secureboot.h" #if defined __i386__ || defined(__x86_64__)#include <sys/io.h>
@@ -52,6 +53,11 @@ static void verify_iopl(unsigned int i)static void setup (void ) {struct passwd *pw; + +/* ioperm() is restricted under kernel lockdown. */ +if (tst_lockdown_enabled () ||tst_secureboot_enabled () >0 ) +tst_brk (TCONF ,"Kernel is locked down, skip this test" ); + pw =SAFE_GETPWNAM ("nobody" );SAFE_SETEUID (pw->pw_uid); }
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
PATCH v3 2/2 syscalls/iopl, ioperm: Check for SecureBoot lockdown
Review
Quoted 7 lines · Martin Doucha
...
include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/testcases.mk
(quoted diff) +2
-0+CFLAGS += $(EFIVAR_CFLAGS) +LDLIBS += $(EFIVAR_LIBS)
Where can we get the value of these two variables? Shouldn't we add AC_SUBST() in the m4 file?
Quoted 11 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm02.c +1
-0@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <pwd.h> #include "tst_test.h" #include "tst_safe_macros.h" +#include "tst_secureboot.h" #if defined __i386__ || defined(__x86_64__)#include <sys/io.h>
testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm02.c static struct tcase_t { · line 52
Quoted 7 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm02.c +3
-0@@ -45,6 +46,10 @@ static struct tcase_t {static void setup (void ) { +/* ioperm() is restricted under kernel lockdown. */ +if (tst_lockdown_enabled () ||tst_secureboot_enabled () >0 ) +tst_brk (TCONF ,"Kernel is locked down, skip this test" );
The ioperm02 is an error test for ioperm(), it doesn't matter without the lockdown/secure-boot status. Better to remove this from setup().
iopl02 as well.
Signature · 5 lines
Regards, Li Wang -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.linux.it/pipermail/ltp/attachments/20201110/bdfdaaa4/attachment.htm>
PATCH v3 2/2 syscalls/iopl, ioperm: Check for SecureBoot lockdown
Hi!
Quoted 10 lines
Review
Quoted 7 lines
...
include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/testcases.mk
(quoted diff) +2
-0+CFLAGS += $(EFIVAR_CFLAGS) +LDLIBS += $(EFIVAR_LIBS)Where can we get the value of these two variables? Shouldn't we add
AC_SUBST()in the m4 file?
These are exported by the PKG_CHECK_MODULES() pkgconfig autotools macro.
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 11 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm02.c +1
-0@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <pwd.h> #include "tst_test.h" #include "tst_safe_macros.h" +#include "tst_secureboot.h" #if defined __i386__ || defined(__x86_64__)#include <sys/io.h> testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm02.c static struct tcase_t { · line 52
Quoted 7 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm02.c +3
-0@@ -45,6 +46,10 @@ static struct tcase_t {static void setup (void ) { +/* ioperm() is restricted under kernel lockdown. */ +if (tst_lockdown_enabled () ||tst_secureboot_enabled () >0 ) +tst_brk (TCONF ,"Kernel is locked down, skip this test" );The ioperm02 is an error test for
ioperm(), it doesn't matter without the lockdown/secure-boot status. Better to remove this fromsetup().
Quoted 1 line
iopl02 as well.
Actually I think that this is correct, since there is no imposed order on the checks in kernel, so we may not get the errors we expect to get.
What we are actually missing are tests that iopl() and ioperm() does fail with EPERM when either of lockdown or secureboot are enabled.
Signature · 2 lines
Cyril Hrubis [email protected]
PATCH v3 2/2 syscalls/iopl, ioperm: Check for SecureBoot lockdown
Quoted 5 lines · Cyril Hrubis
Hi!
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
...
include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/testcases.mk
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Review
Quoted 3 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+CFLAGS += $(EFIVAR_CFLAGS) +LDLIBS += $(EFIVAR_LIBS)Where can we get the value of these two variables? Shouldn't we add
AC_SUBST()in the m4 file?These are exported by the
PKG_CHECK_MODULES()pkgconfig autotools macro.
Good to know this.
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm02.c +1
-0@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <pwd.h> #include "tst_test.h" #include "tst_safe_macros.h" +#include "tst_secureboot.h" #if defined __i386__ || defined(__x86_64__)#include <sys/io.h> @@ -45,6 +46,10 @@ static struct tcase_t {Quoted 5 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm02.c static struct tcase_t {
Quoted 5 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm02.c +3
-0static void setup (void ) { +/* ioperm() is restricted under kernel lockdown. */ +if (tst_lockdown_enabled () ||tst_secureboot_enabled () >0 ) + tst_brk(TCONF, "Kernel is locked down, skip thistest");
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
The ioperm02 is an error test for
ioperm(), it doesn't matter without the lockdown/secure-boot status. Better to remove this fromsetup().
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
iopl02 as well.
Actually I think that this is correct, since there is no imposed order on the checks in kernel, so we may not get the errors we expect to get.
What we are actually missing are tests that
iopl()andioperm()does fail with EPERM when either of lockdown or secureboot are enabled.
I remember they(ioperm02, iopl02) works well with secure-boot enabled/disabled.
(I did that test when reviewing Erico's tst_lockdown.c patch)
Okay, but I agree that it's safer to add this check because it may change in the newer kernel someday.
Feel free to add:
Signature · 5 lines
Regards, Li Wang -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.linux.it/pipermail/ltp/attachments/20201110/23fbd2f2/attachment.htm>
PATCH v3 2/2 syscalls/iopl, ioperm: Check for SecureBoot lockdown
In reply to Cyril HrubisHi,
...
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Review
Quoted 4 lines
include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/testcases.mk
(quoted diff) +2
-0+CFLAGS += $(EFIVAR_CFLAGS) +LDLIBS += $(EFIVAR_LIBS)Where can we get the value of these two variables? Shouldn't we add
AC_SUBST()in the m4 file?These are exported by the
PKG_CHECK_MODULES()pkgconfig autotools macro.
FYI: I added a fix for old pkg-config (< 0.24) into m4/ltp-tirpc.m4 (the first m4 file which started to use pkg-config)
https://autotools.io/pkgconfig/pkg_check_modules.html
But 0.24 is probably old enough (2010; 0.23 was released 2008), thus we should probably remove it.
Kind regards,
Petr
PATCH v3 2/2 syscalls/iopl, ioperm: Check for SecureBoot lockdown
In reply to Martin DouchaHi,
Quoted 3 lines
SecureBoot implies integrity lockdown even if
tst_lockdown_enabled()cannot check lockdown status directly. Udpate skip condition inioperm()andiopl()tests.
...
testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm02.c static struct tcase_t { · line 52
Quoted 4 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/ioperm/ioperm02.c +4
-0+/* ioperm() is restricted under kernel lockdown. */ +if (tst_lockdown_enabled () ||tst_secureboot_enabled () >0 ) +tst_brk (TCONF ,"Kernel is locked down, skip this test" ); +
I wonder if this could be interesting for docparse to have this functionality exposed as a struct tst_test flag:
.tst_lockdown_restricted = 1
Kind regards,
Petr
PATCH v3 2/2 syscalls/iopl, ioperm: Check for SecureBoot lockdown
Hi!
Quoted 3 lines
I wonder if this could be interesting for docparse to have this functionality exposed as a struct
tst_testflag:
.tst_lockdown_restricted = 1
Well if we happen to have more than two testcases in the future it would make sense to move the checks to the library like this instead.
Signature · 2 lines
Cyril Hrubis [email protected]
PATCH v3 1/2 Add tst_secureboot_enabled() helper function
In reply to Martin DouchaQuoted 2 lines
Also check for SecureBoot status in
tst_lockdown_enabled()if the lockdown sysfile is not available/readable
Kind regards,
Petr
PATCH v3 1/2 Add tst_secureboot_enabled() helper function
Quoted 7 lines · Petr Vorel
Quoted 2 lines
Also check for SecureBoot status in
tst_lockdown_enabled()if the lockdown sysfile is not available/readableReviewed-by Petr Vorel <[email protected]>Kind regards,
Petr
Ah, yes, I guess that part of commit message should be dropped. Sorry about that.
Signature · 7 lines
Martin Doucha [email protected] QA Engineer for Software Maintenance SUSE LINUX, s.r.o. CORSO IIa Krizikova 148/34 186 00 Prague 8 Czech Republic
PATCH v3 1/2 Add tst_secureboot_enabled() helper function
Quoted 11 lines · Petr Vorel
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Also check for SecureBoot status in
tst_lockdown_enabled()if the lockdown sysfile is not available/readableReviewed-by Petr Vorel <[email protected]>Kind regards,
PetrAh, yes, I guess that part of commit message should be dropped. Sorry about that.
np, maintainer will drop that.
Kind regards,
Petr
PATCH v3 1/2 Add tst_secureboot_enabled() helper function
In reply to Martin DouchaHi!
I've looked into the library and what it actually does in this case is that it opens a sysfs file and reads a few bytes from there. I guess that we can even avoid linking the library in this case, since we just want to know a value of the single bit in the SecureBoot file.
The full path is:
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c
The SecureBoot is the name of the variable and the hex numbers represends the global GUID.
Now on my system with secure boot disabled the content of the file looks like:
cat /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c |xxd
00000000: 0600 0000 00 .....
The first four bytes are attributes, we can ingore them and the last byte is the data byte, which tells us if secure boot is enabled or not.
So it may be as well easier to:
* Check if that file exists
* Read five bytes and return the last one
Signature · 2 lines
Cyril Hrubis [email protected]
PATCH v3 1/2 Add tst_secureboot_enabled() helper function
Quoted 9 lines · Cyril Hrubis
Hi!
I've looked into the library and what it actually does in this case is that it opens a sysfs file and reads a few bytes from there. I guess that we can even avoid linking the library in this case, since we just want to know a value of the single bit in the SecureBoot file.The full path is:
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c
Yes, we could read the sysfile directly. But do we want to deal with potential compatibility issues and test breakage if the UEFI vars API changes in the future? The binary format of those sysfiles is controlled by the UEFI Forum, not by kernel devs. The efivars library is available on basically all modern distros and we most likely won't do any SecureBoot tests on distros that don't have it.
Signature · 7 lines
Martin Doucha [email protected] QA Engineer for Software Maintenance SUSE LINUX, s.r.o. CORSO IIa Krizikova 148/34 186 00 Prague 8 Czech Republic
PATCH v3 1/2 Add tst_secureboot_enabled() helper function
Hi,
Quoted 9 lines · Cyril Hrubis
Quoted 7 lines
Hi!
I've looked into the library and what it actually does in this case is that it opens a sysfs file and reads a few bytes from there. I guess that we can even avoid linking the library in this case, since we just want to know a value of the single bit in the SecureBoot file.The full path is:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8cYes, we could read the sysfile directly. But do we want to deal with potential compatibility issues and test breakage if the UEFI vars API changes in the future? The binary format of those sysfiles is controlled by the UEFI Forum, not by kernel devs. The efivars library is available on basically all modern distros and we most likely won't do any SecureBoot tests on distros that don't have it.
I also don't see a big deal to use the efivars library.
Kind regards,
Petr
PATCH v3 1/2 Add tst_secureboot_enabled() helper function
Quoted 14 lines · Petr Vorel
Hi,
Quoted 10 lines · Cyril Hrubis
Quoted 9 lines
Hi!
I've looked into the library and what it actually does in this case is that it opens a sysfs file and reads a few bytes from there. I guess that we can even avoid linking the library in this case, since we just want to know a value of the single bit in the SecureBoot file.The full path is:
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Yes, we could read the sysfile directly. But do we want to deal with potential compatibility issues and test breakage if the UEFI vars API changes in the future? The binary format of those sysfiles is controlled by the UEFI Forum, not by kernel devs. The efivars library is available on basically all modern distros and we most likely won't do any SecureBoot tests on distros that don't have it.
I also don't see a big deal to use the efivars library.
That's true. I have no objection to the patchset.
But we always try to avoid the LTP dependency on other libraries, in this point, I agree with Cyril.
Signature · 5 lines
Regards, Li Wang -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.linux.it/pipermail/ltp/attachments/20201113/f273b39a/attachment.htm>
PATCH v3 1/2 Add tst_secureboot_enabled() helper function
In reply to Martin DouchaHi!
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
I've looked into the library and what it actually does in this case is that it opens a sysfs file and reads a few bytes from there. I guess that we can even avoid linking the library in this case, since we just want to know a value of the single bit in the SecureBoot file.
The full path is:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8cYes, we could read the sysfile directly. But do we want to deal with potential compatibility issues and test breakage if the UEFI vars API changes in the future? The binary format of those sysfiles is controlled by the UEFI Forum, not by kernel devs. The efivars library is available on basically all modern distros and we most likely won't do any SecureBoot tests on distros that don't have it.
I do not see how the code that uses the library is actually better. If the format changes you will need a newer UEFI library that will presumbly handle the difference. Which is even worse than hardcoding the stuff in LTP because the UEFI library has to be updated by a distribution.
In that case patching the code in LTP will be faster and work everywhere and not only on distributions that are fast enough to update packages.
Signature · 2 lines
Cyril Hrubis [email protected]