tcp: fix race condition when creating child sockets from syncookies
Subsystems (3)
PATCH v3 1/1 tcp: fix race condition when creating child sockets from syncookies
When the TCP stack is in SYN flood mode, the server child socket is created from the SYN cookie received in a TCP packet with the ACK flag set.
The child socket is created when the server receives the first TCP packet with a valid SYN cookie from the client. Usually, this packet corresponds to the final step of the TCP 3-way handshake, the ACK packet. But is also possible to receive a valid SYN cookie from the first TCP data packet sent by the client, and thus create a child socket from that SYN cookie.
Since a client socket is ready to send data as soon as it receives the SYN+ACK packet from the server, the client can send the ACK packet (sent by the TCP stack code), and the first data packet (sent by the userspace program) almost at the same time, and thus the server will equally receive the two TCP packets with valid SYN cookies almost at the same instant.
When such event happens, the TCP stack code has a race condition that occurs between the momement a lookup is done to the established connections hashtable to check for the existence of a connection for the same client, and the moment that the child socket is added to the established connections hashtable. As a consequence, this race condition can lead to a situation where we add two child sockets to the established connections hashtable and deliver two sockets to the userspace program to the same client.
This patch fixes the race condition by checking if an existing child socket exists for the same client when we are adding the second child socket to the established connections socket. If an existing child socket exists, we return that socket and use it to process the TCP packet received, and discard the second child socket to the same client.
---
v3 (2020-11-11):
* Fixed IPv6 handling in inet_ehash_insert
* Removed unecessary comparison while traversing the ehash bucket list.
v2 (2020-11-09):
* Changed the author's email domain.
* Removed the helper function inet_ehash_insert_chk_dup and moved the logic to the existing inet_ehash_insert.
* Updated the callers of iner_ehash_nolisten to deal with the new logic.
include/net/inet_hashtables.h | 6 +-- net/dccp/ipv4.c | 4 +- net/dccp/ipv6.c | 4 +- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 5 ++- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 10 ++++- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 17 ++++++++- 7 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
include/net/inet_hashtables.h +3 -3
@@ -247,9 +247,9 @@ void inet_hashinfo2_init(struct inet_hashinfo *h, const char *name, unsigned long high_limit);int inet_hashinfo2_init_mod (struct inet_hashinfo *h); -bool inet_ehash_insert (struct sock *sk,struct sock *osk); -bool inet_ehash_nolisten (struct sock *sk,struct sock *osk); -int __inet_hash (struct sock *sk,struct sock *osk); +bool inet_ehash_insert (struct sock *sk,struct sock **osk); +bool inet_ehash_nolisten (struct sock *sk,struct sock **osk); +int __inet_hash (struct sock *sk,struct sock **osk);int inet_hash (struct sock *sk);void inet_unhash (struct sock *sk);
net/dccp/ipv4.c +3 -1
@@ -400,6 +400,7 @@ struct sock *dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,struct inet_request_sock *ireq;struct inet_sock *newinet;struct sock *newsk; +struct sock *osk;if (sk_acceptq_is_full (sk)) goto exit_overflow;
@@ -427,7 +428,8 @@ struct sock *dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,if (__inet_inherit_port (sk, newsk) <0 ) goto put_and_exit; - *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk,req_to_sk (req_unhash)); + osk =req_to_sk (req_unhash); + *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk, &osk);if (*own_req) ireq->ireq_opt =NULL ;else
net/dccp/ipv6.c +3 -1
@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,struct inet_sock *newinet;struct dccp6_sock *newdp6;struct sock *newsk; +struct sock *osk;if (skb->protocol ==htons (ETH_P_IP )) {/*
@@ -533,7 +534,8 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,dccp_done (newsk); goto out; } - *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk,req_to_sk (req_unhash)); + osk =req_to_sk (req_unhash); + *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk, &osk);/* Clone pktoptions received with SYN, if we own the req */ if (*own_req && ireq->pktopts) { newnp->pktoptions =skb_clone (ireq->pktopts,GFP_ATOMIC );
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +59 -10
113 lines not on this page · raw message
net/ipv4/syncookies.c +4 -1
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, child = icsk->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock (sk, skb, req, dst,NULL , &own_req); -if (child) { +if (child && own_req) {refcount_set (&req->rsk_refcnt,1 );tcp_sk (child)->tsoffset = tsoff;sock_rps_save_rxhash (child, skb);
@@ -223,6 +223,9 @@ struct sock *tcp_get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,bh_unlock_sock (child);sock_put (child); + }else if (child && !own_req) { +__reqsk_free (req); +return child; }__reqsk_free (req);
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +9 -1
@@ -1501,6 +1501,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,int l3index;#endif struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt; +struct sock *osk;if (sk_acceptq_is_full (sk)) goto exit_overflow;
@@ -1565,11 +1566,18 @@ struct sock *tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,if (__inet_inherit_port (sk, newsk) <0 ) goto put_and_exit; - *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk,req_to_sk (req_unhash)); + osk =req_to_sk (req_unhash); + *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk, &osk);if (likely (*own_req)) {tcp_move_syn (newtp, req); ireq->ireq_opt =NULL ; }else { +if (!req_unhash && osk) { +/* This code path should only be executed in the +* syncookie case only +*/ + newsk = osk; + } newinet->inet_opt =NULL ; }return newsk;
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +16 -1
@@ -1190,6 +1190,7 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *struct inet_sock *newinet;struct tcp_sock *newtp;struct sock *newsk; +struct sock *osk;#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;int l3index;
@@ -1206,6 +1207,12 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *if (!newsk)return NULL ; +else if (!own_req) { +/* We're returning an existing child socket, probably +* created by a previous syncookie ACK. +*/ +return newsk; + }inet_sk (newsk)->pinet6 =tcp_inet6_sk (newsk);
@@ -1359,7 +1366,8 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *tcp_done (newsk); goto out; } - *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk,req_to_sk (req_unhash)); + osk =req_to_sk (req_unhash); + *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk, &osk);if (*own_req) {tcp_move_syn (newtp, req);
@@ -1374,6 +1382,13 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb_set_owner_r (newnp->pktoptions, newsk); } } + }else { +if (!req_unhash && osk) { +/* This code path should only be executed in the +* syncookie case only +*/ + newsk = osk; + } }return newsk;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Quoted 133 lines · Ricardo Dias
When the TCP stack is in SYN flood mode, the server child socket is created from the SYN cookie received in a TCP packet with the ACK flag set.
The child socket is created when the server receives the first TCP packet with a valid SYN cookie from the client. Usually, this packet corresponds to the final step of the TCP 3-way handshake, the ACK packet. But is also possible to receive a valid SYN cookie from the first TCP data packet sent by the client, and thus create a child socket from that SYN cookie.
Since a client socket is ready to send data as soon as it receives the SYN+ACK packet from the server, the client can send the ACK packet (sent by the TCP stack code), and the first data packet (sent by the userspace program) almost at the same time, and thus the server will equally receive the two TCP packets with valid SYN cookies almost at the same instant.
When such event happens, the TCP stack code has a race condition that occurs between the momement a lookup is done to the established connections hashtable to check for the existence of a connection for the same client, and the moment that the child socket is added to the established connections hashtable. As a consequence, this race condition can lead to a situation where we add two child sockets to the established connections hashtable and deliver two sockets to the userspace program to the same client.
This patch fixes the race condition by checking if an existing child socket exists for the same client when we are adding the second child socket to the established connections socket. If an existing child socket exists, we return that socket and use it to process the TCP packet received, and discard the second child socket to the same client.
Signed-off-by Ricardo Dias <[email protected]>---
v3 (2020-11-11):
* Fixed IPv6 handling ininet_ehash_insert
* Removed unecessary comparison while traversing the ehash bucket list.v2 (2020-11-09):
* Changed the author's email domain.
* Removed the helper functioninet_ehash_insert_chk_dupand moved the logic to the existinginet_ehash_insert.
* Updated the callers ofiner_ehash_nolistento deal with the new logic.include/net/inet_hashtables.h | 6 +-- net/dccp/ipv4.c | 4 +- net/dccp/ipv6.c | 4 +- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 5 ++- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 10 ++++- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 17 ++++++++- 7 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)include/net/inet_hashtables.h +3
-3@@ -247,9 +247,9 @@ void inet_hashinfo2_init(struct inet_hashinfo *h, const char *name, unsigned long high_limit);int inet_hashinfo2_init_mod (struct inet_hashinfo *h); -bool inet_ehash_insert (struct sock *sk,struct sock *osk); -bool inet_ehash_nolisten (struct sock *sk,struct sock *osk); -int __inet_hash (struct sock *sk,struct sock *osk); +bool inet_ehash_insert (struct sock *sk,struct sock **osk); +bool inet_ehash_nolisten (struct sock *sk,struct sock **osk); +int __inet_hash (struct sock *sk,struct sock **osk);int inet_hash (struct sock *sk);void inet_unhash (struct sock *sk);net/dccp/ipv4.c +3
-1@@ -400,6 +400,7 @@ struct sock *dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,struct inet_request_sock *ireq;struct inet_sock *newinet;struct sock *newsk; +struct sock *osk;if (sk_acceptq_is_full (sk)) goto exit_overflow;@@ -427,7 +428,8 @@ struct sock *dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,if (__inet_inherit_port (sk, newsk) <0 ) goto put_and_exit; - *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk,req_to_sk (req_unhash)); + osk =req_to_sk (req_unhash); + *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk, &osk);if (*own_req) ireq->ireq_opt =NULL ;else net/dccp/ipv6.c +3
-1@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,struct inet_sock *newinet;struct dccp6_sock *newdp6;struct sock *newsk; +struct sock *osk;if (skb->protocol ==htons (ETH_P_IP )) {/* @@ -533,7 +534,8 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,dccp_done (newsk); goto out; } - *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk,req_to_sk (req_unhash)); + osk =req_to_sk (req_unhash); + *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk, &osk);/* Clone pktoptions received with SYN, if we own the req */ if (*own_req && ireq->pktopts) { newnp->pktoptions =skb_clone (ireq->pktopts,GFP_ATOMIC );net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +3
-0@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@#include <net/addrconf.h> #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h> #include <net/inet_hashtables.h> +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 ) +#include <net/inet6_hashtables.h> +#endif #include <net/secure_seq.h> #include <net/ip.h> #include <net/tcp.h>
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c static u32 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk) · line 519
Quoted 9 lines
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +4
-2@@ -510,17 +513,27 @@ static u32 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk) inet->inet_dport); } -/* insert a socket into ehash, and eventually remove another one -* (The another one can be a SYN_RECV or TIMEWAIT +/* Insert a socket into ehash, and eventually remove another one +* (The another one can be a SYN_RECV or TIMEWAIT) +* If an existing socket already exists, it returns that socket +* through the osk parameter.
I think this deserves a third parameter, to avoid confusion.
Quoted 32 lines
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +13
-5*/ -bool inet_ehash_insert (struct sock *sk,struct sock *osk) +bool inet_ehash_insert (struct sock *sk,struct sock **osk) {struct inet_hashinfo *hashinfo = sk->sk_prot->h.hashinfo;struct hlist_nulls_head *list;struct inet_ehash_bucket *head; -spinlock_t *lock; +const struct hlist_nulls_node *node; +struct sock *esk; +spinlock_t *lock;/* protects hashinfo socket entry */ +struct net *net =sock_net (sk); +const int dif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if; +const int sdif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;bool ret = true; +INET_ADDR_COOKIE (acookie, sk->sk_daddr, sk->sk_rcv_saddr); +const __portpair ports =INET_COMBINED_PORTS (sk->sk_dport, sk->sk_num); +WARN_ON_ONCE (!sk_unhashed (sk)); sk->sk_hash =sk_ehashfn (sk);@@ -529,17 +542,53 @@ bool inet_ehash_insert(struct sock *sk, struct sock *osk) lock =inet_ehash_lockp (hashinfo, sk->sk_hash);spin_lock (lock); -if (osk) { -WARN_ON_ONCE (sk->sk_hash != osk->sk_hash); - ret =sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu (osk); +if (osk && *osk) { +WARN_ON_ONCE (sk->sk_hash != (*osk)->sk_hash); + ret =sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu (*osk);
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c bool inet_ehash_insert(struct sock *sk, struct sock *osk) · line 557
Quoted 10 lines
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +10
-0+ }else if (osk && !*osk) { +sk_nulls_for_each_rcu (esk, node, list) { +if (esk->sk_hash != sk->sk_hash) +continue ; +if (sk->sk_family ==AF_INET ) { +if (unlikely (INET_MATCH (esk, net, acookie, + sk->sk_daddr, + sk->sk_rcv_saddr, + ports, dif, sdif))) { +if (unlikely (!refcount_inc_not_zero (&esk->sk_refcnt)))
Can you explain how this could happen ?
Again, we own the lock here, finding a socket in ehash, with a zero refcount can not happen.
Only a true rcu lookup could see a zero refcount.
Quoted 48 lines
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +28
-2+ goto out; + goto found; + } + } +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 ) + else if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) { +if (unlikely (INET6_MATCH (esk, net, + &sk->sk_v6_daddr, + &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr, + ports, dif, sdif))) { +if (unlikely (!refcount_inc_not_zero (&esk->sk_refcnt))) + goto out; + goto found; + } + } +#endif + } + } +out: + esk =NULL ;if (ret)__sk_nulls_add_node_rcu (sk, list); + +found:spin_unlock (lock); +if (esk) { + *osk = esk; + ret = false; + }return ret; } -bool inet_ehash_nolisten (struct sock *sk,struct sock *osk) +bool inet_ehash_nolisten (struct sock *sk,struct sock **osk) {bool ok =inet_ehash_insert (sk, osk);@@ -578,7 +627,7 @@ static int inet_reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk,return reuseport_alloc (sk,inet_rcv_saddr_any (sk)); } -int __inet_hash (struct sock *sk,struct sock *osk) +int __inet_hash (struct sock *sk,struct sock **osk) {struct inet_hashinfo *hashinfo = sk->sk_prot->h.hashinfo;struct inet_listen_hashbucket *ilb;
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, · line 812
Quoted 5 lines
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +1
-1@@ -760,7 +809,7 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,inet_bind_hash (sk, tb, port);if (sk_unhashed (sk)) {inet_sk (sk)->inet_sport =htons (port); -inet_ehash_nolisten (sk, (struct sock *)tw); +inet_ehash_nolisten (sk, (struct sock **)&tw);
Why could not we 'find' a prior socket, and since you ignore the result, leave a refcount increment, and a socket leak ?
Same remark for all callers.
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, · line 814
Quoted 2 lines
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +0
-0}if (tw)
See the problem here ?
If tw was initially NULL, then inet_ehash_nolisten() could have overwritten tw with another socket.
Surely calling inet_twsk_bind_unhash() could be disastrous.
Quoted 108 lines
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +0
-0inet_twsk_bind_unhash (tw, hinfo);net/ipv4/syncookies.c +4
-1@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, child = icsk->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock (sk, skb, req, dst,NULL , &own_req); -if (child) { +if (child && own_req) {refcount_set (&req->rsk_refcnt,1 );tcp_sk (child)->tsoffset = tsoff;sock_rps_save_rxhash (child, skb);@@ -223,6 +223,9 @@ struct sock *tcp_get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,bh_unlock_sock (child);sock_put (child); + }else if (child && !own_req) { +__reqsk_free (req); +return child; }__reqsk_free (req);net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +9
-1@@ -1501,6 +1501,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,int l3index;#endif struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt; +struct sock *osk;if (sk_acceptq_is_full (sk)) goto exit_overflow;@@ -1565,11 +1566,18 @@ struct sock *tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,if (__inet_inherit_port (sk, newsk) <0 ) goto put_and_exit; - *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk,req_to_sk (req_unhash)); + osk =req_to_sk (req_unhash); + *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk, &osk);if (likely (*own_req)) {tcp_move_syn (newtp, req); ireq->ireq_opt =NULL ; }else { +if (!req_unhash && osk) { +/* This code path should only be executed in the +* syncookie case only +*/ + newsk = osk; + } newinet->inet_opt =NULL ; }return newsk;net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +16
-2@@ -1190,6 +1190,7 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *struct inet_sock *newinet;struct tcp_sock *newtp;struct sock *newsk; +struct sock *osk;#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;int l3index;@@ -1206,6 +1207,12 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *if (!newsk)return NULL ; +else if (!own_req) { +/* We're returning an existing child socket, probably +* created by a previous syncookie ACK. +*/ +return newsk; + }inet_sk (newsk)->pinet6 =tcp_inet6_sk (newsk);@@ -1359,7 +1366,8 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *tcp_done (newsk); goto out; } - *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk,req_to_sk (req_unhash)); + osk =req_to_sk (req_unhash); + *own_req =inet_ehash_nolisten (newsk, &osk);if (*own_req) {tcp_move_syn (newtp, req);@@ -1374,6 +1382,13 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb_set_owner_r (newnp->pktoptions, newsk); } } + }else { +if (!req_unhash && osk) { +/* This code path should only be executed in the +* syncookie case only +*/ + newsk = osk; + } }return newsk; --2.25.1
Quoted 9 lines · Eric Dumazet
On Wed, Nov 11, 2020 at 8:35 AM Ricardo Dias <[email protected]> wrote:
...
Quoted 2 lines
+ * If an existing socket already exists, it returns that socket
+ * through the osk parameter.I think this deserves a third parameter, to avoid confusion.
Yes, I agree. It will make much clearer the semantics of this function.
Quoted 9 lines
...
Quoted 1 line
+ if (unlikely(!refcount_inc_not_zero(&esk->sk_refcnt)))
Can you explain how this could happen ?
Again, we own the lock here, finding a socket in ehash, with a zero refcount can not happen.Only a true rcu lookup could see a zero refcount.
Ah! Now I understand what you are saying. Indeed we just need to increment the ref counter. We don't need to check if it's zero.
Quoted 13 lines
...
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, · line 812
Quoted 2 lines
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +1
-1-inet_ehash_nolisten (sk, (struct sock *)tw); +inet_ehash_nolisten (sk, (struct sock **)&tw);Why could not we 'find' a prior socket, and since you ignore the result, leave a refcount increment, and a socket leak ?
Same remark for all callers.
Quoted 2 lines
} if (tw)
Quoted 6 lines
See the problem here ?
If tw was initially NULL, then
inet_ehash_nolisten()could have overwritten tw with another socket.Surely calling
inet_twsk_bind_unhash()could be disastrous.
Yes, you're right.
I adapted this call to match the new signature assuming tw would never be NULL. Shame on me for not noticing the if (tw) statement right below :-).
I'll check each caller code, to make sure I'm not leaking the socket.
Thanks for your reviews. I'm learning more and more with each review iteration.