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4.19.158-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 8 participants 110 messages Nov 17, 2020 – Nov 18, 2020

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Greg Kroah-Hartman

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover 4.19.158-rc1 review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.158 release. There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 19 Nov 2020 12:20:51 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.158-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.19.158-rc1

Boris Protopopov <[email protected]>
Convert trailing spaces and periods in path components

Yunsheng Lin <[email protected]>
net: sch_generic: fix the missing new qdisc assignment bug

Matteo Croce <[email protected]>
reboot: fix overflow parsing reboot cpu number

Matteo Croce <[email protected]>
Revert "kernel/reboot.c: convert simple_strtoul to kstrtoint"

Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
perf/core: Fix race in the perf_mmap_close() function

Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf scripting python: Avoid declaring function pointers with a visibility attribute

Anand K Mistry <[email protected]>
x86/speculation: Allow IBPB to be conditionally enabled on CPUs with always-on STIBP

George Spelvin <[email protected]>
random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable

Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>
r8169: fix potential skb double free in an error path

Martin Willi <[email protected]>
vrf: Fix fast path output packet handling with async Netfilter rules

Wang Hai <[email protected]>
tipc: fix memory leak in tipc_topsrv_start()

Martin Schiller <[email protected]>
net/x25: Fix null-ptr-deref in x25_connect

Mao Wenan <[email protected]>
net: Update window_clamp if SOCK_RCVBUF is set

Ursula Braun <[email protected]>
net/af_iucv: fix null pointer dereference on shutdown

Oliver Herms <[email protected]>
IPv6: Set SIT tunnel hard_header_len to zero

Stefano Stabellini <[email protected]>
swiotlb: fix "x86: Don't panic if can not alloc buffer for swiotlb"

Gao Xiang <[email protected]>
erofs: derive atime instead of leaving it empty

Coiby Xu <[email protected]>
pinctrl: amd: fix incorrect way to disable debounce filter

Coiby Xu <[email protected]>
pinctrl: amd: use higher precision for 512 RtcClk

Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>

    drm/gma500: Fix out-of-bounds access to struct drm_device.vblank[]

Al Viro <[email protected]>
don't dump the threads that had been already exiting when zapped.

Yoshihiro Shimoda <[email protected]>
mmc: renesas_sdhi_core: Add missing tmio_mmc_host_free() at remove

Arnaud de Turckheim <[email protected]>
gpio: pcie-idio-24: Enable PEX8311 interrupts

Arnaud de Turckheim <[email protected]>
gpio: pcie-idio-24: Fix IRQ Enable Register value

Arnaud de Turckheim <[email protected]>
gpio: pcie-idio-24: Fix irq mask when masking

Chen Zhou <[email protected]>
selinux: Fix error return code in sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow()

Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
btrfs: fix potential overflow in cluster_pages_for_defrag on 32bit arch

Wengang Wang <[email protected]>
ocfs2: initialize ip_next_orphan

Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
futex: Don't enable IRQs unconditionally in put_pi_state()

Alexander Usyskin <[email protected]>
mei: protect mei_cl_mtu from null dereference

Zhang Qilong <[email protected]>
xhci: hisilicon: fix refercence leak in xhci_histb_probe

Chris Brandt <[email protected]>
usb: cdc-acm: Add DISABLE_ECHO for Renesas USB Download mode

Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]>
uio: Fix use-after-free in uio_unregister_device()

Jing Xiangfeng <[email protected]>
thunderbolt: Add the missed ida_simple_remove() in ring_request_msix()

Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
thunderbolt: Fix memory leak if ida_simple_get() fails in enumerate_services()

Anand Jain <[email protected]>
btrfs: dev-replace: fail mount if we don't have replace item with target device

Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>
btrfs: ref-verify: fix memory leak in btrfs_ref_tree_mod

Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
ext4: unlock xattr_sem properly in ext4_inline_data_truncate()

Kaixu Xia <[email protected]>
ext4: correctly report "not supported" for {usr,grp}jquota when !CONFIG_QUOTA

Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
perf: Fix get_recursion_context()

Wang Hai <[email protected]>
cosa: Add missing kfree in error path of cosa_write

Evan Nimmo <[email protected]>
of/address: Fix of_node memory leak in of_dma_is_coherent

Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
xfs: fix a missing unlock on error in xfs_fs_map_blocks

Sven Van Asbroeck <[email protected]>
lan743x: fix "BUG: invalid wait context" when setting rx mode

Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
xfs: fix brainos in the refcount scrubber's rmap fragment processor

Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
xfs: fix rmap key and record comparison functions

Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
xfs: set the unwritten bit in rmap lookup flags in xchk_bmap_get_rmapextents

Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
xfs: fix flags argument to rmap lookup when converting shared file rmaps

Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
nbd: fix a block_device refcount leak in nbd_release

Billy Tsai <[email protected]>
pinctrl: aspeed: Fix GPI only function problem.

Andrew Jeffery <[email protected]>
ARM: 9019/1: kprobes: Avoid fortify_panic() when copying optprobe template

Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
pinctrl: intel: Set default bias in case no particular value given

Baolin Wang <[email protected]>
mfd: sprd: Add wakeup capability for PMIC IRQ

Chunyan Zhang <[email protected]>
tick/common: Touch watchdog in tick_unfreeze() on all CPUs

Jerry Snitselaar <[email protected]>
tpm_tis: Disable interrupts on ThinkPad T490s

Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
selftests: proc: fix warning: _GNU_SOURCE redefined

Zhang Qilong <[email protected]>
vfio: platform: fix reference leak in vfio_platform_open

Qian Cai <[email protected]>
s390/smp: move rcu_cpu_starting() earlier

Suravee Suthikulpanit <[email protected]>
iommu/amd: Increase interrupt remapping table limit to 512 entries

Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
scsi: scsi_dh_alua: Avoid crash during alua_bus_detach()

Ye Bin <[email protected]>
cfg80211: regulatory: Fix inconsistent format argument

Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
mac80211: always wind down STA state

Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
mac80211: fix use of skb payload instead of header

Evan Quan <[email protected]>
drm/amd/pm: do not use ixFEATURE_STATUS for checking smc running

Evan Quan <[email protected]>
drm/amd/pm: perform SMC reset on suspend/hibernation

Evan Quan <[email protected]>
drm/amdgpu: perform srbm soft reset always on SDMA resume

Keita Suzuki <[email protected]>
scsi: hpsa: Fix memory leak in hpsa_init_one()

Bob Peterson <[email protected]>
gfs2: check for live vs. read-only file system in gfs2_fitrim

Bob Peterson <[email protected]>
gfs2: Add missing truncate_inode_pages_final for sd_aspace

Bob Peterson <[email protected]>
gfs2: Free rd_bits later in gfs2_clear_rgrpd to fix use-after-free

Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda: Reinstate runtime_allow() for all hda controllers

Evgeny Novikov <[email protected]>
usb: gadget: goku_udc: fix potential crashes in probe

Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
crypto: arm64/aes-modes - get rid of literal load of addend vector

Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
netfilter: use actual socket sk rather than skb sk when routing harder

Masashi Honma <[email protected]>
ath9k_htc: Use appropriate rs_datalen type

Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Btrfs: fix missing error return if writeback for extent buffer never started

Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
tpm: efi: Don't create binary_bios_measurements file for an empty log

Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
xfs: fix scrub flagging rtinherit even if there is no rt device

Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: flush new eof page on truncate to avoid post-eof corruption

Joakim Zhang <[email protected]>
can: flexcan: remove FLEXCAN_QUIRK_DISABLE_MECR quirk for LS1021A

Stephane Grosjean <[email protected]>
can: peak_canfd: pucan_handle_can_rx(): fix echo management when loopback is on

Stephane Grosjean <[email protected]>
can: peak_usb: peak_usb_get_ts_time(): fix timestamp wrapping

Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
can: peak_usb: add range checking in decode operations

Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]>
can: can_create_echo_skb(): fix echo skb generation: always use skb_clone()

Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
can: dev: __can_get_echo_skb(): fix real payload length return value for RTR frames

Vincent Mailhol <[email protected]>
can: dev: can_get_echo_skb(): prevent call to kfree_skb() in hard IRQ context

Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
can: rx-offload: don't call kfree_skb() from IRQ context

Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda: prevent undefined shift in snd_hdac_ext_bus_get_link()

Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
perf tools: Add missing swap for ino_generation

Stefano Brivio <[email protected]>
netfilter: ipset: Update byte and packet counters regardless of whether they match

Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
xfs: set xefi_discard when creating a deferred agfl free log intent item

zhuoliang zhang <[email protected]>
net: xfrm: fix a race condition during allocing spi

Olaf Hering <[email protected]>
hv_balloon: disable warning when floor reached

Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
genirq: Let GENERIC_IRQ_IPI select IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY

Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
btrfs: reschedule when cloning lots of extents

Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
btrfs: sysfs: init devices outside of the chunk_mutex

Thinh Nguyen <[email protected]>
usb: dwc3: gadget: Reclaim extra TRBs after request completion

Thinh Nguyen <[email protected]>
usb: dwc3: gadget: Continue to process pending requests

Ming Lei <[email protected]>
nbd: don't update block size after device is started

Zeng Tao <[email protected]>
time: Prevent undefined behaviour in timespec64_to_ns()

Michał Mirosław <[email protected]>
regulator: defer probe when trying to get voltage from unresolved supply

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/arm/include/asm/kprobes.h                     |  22 +-
 arch/arm/probes/kprobes/opt-arm.c                  |  18 +-
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S                      |  16 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/smp.c                             |   3 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                         |  52 ++-
 drivers/block/nbd.c                                |  10 +-
 drivers/char/random.c                              |   1 -
 drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/efi.c                    |   5 +
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c                         |  29 +-
 drivers/gpio/gpio-pcie-idio-24.c                   |  62 ++-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cik_sdma.c              |  27 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/hwmgr/smu7_hwmgr.c   |   4 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/hwmgr.h          |   1 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/smumgr.h         |   2 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/ci_smumgr.c   |  29 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/smumgr.c      |   8 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/psb_irq.c                   |  34 +-
 drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c                            |   2 +-
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h                    |   6 +-
 drivers/mfd/sprd-sc27xx-spi.c                      |  28 +-
 drivers/misc/mei/client.h                          |   4 +-
 drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c               |   1 +
 drivers/net/can/dev.c                              |  14 +-
 drivers/net/can/flexcan.c                          |   3 +-
 drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_canfd.c            |  11 +-
 drivers/net/can/rx-offload.c                       |   4 +-
 drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c       |  51 ++-
 drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_fd.c         |  48 ++-
 drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c      |  12 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h      |   3 -
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c               |   3 +-
 drivers/net/vrf.c                                  |  92 +++-
 drivers/net/wan/cosa.c                             |   1 +
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c      |   2 +-
 drivers/of/address.c                               |   4 +-
 drivers/pinctrl/aspeed/pinctrl-aspeed.c            |   7 +-
 drivers/pinctrl/intel/pinctrl-intel.c              |   8 +
 drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c                      |   6 +-
 drivers/regulator/core.c                           |   2 +
 drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c         |   9 +-
 drivers/scsi/hpsa.c                                |   4 +-
 drivers/staging/erofs/inode.c                      |  21 +-
 drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c                          |  19 +-
 drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c                      |   1 +
 drivers/uio/uio.c                                  |  10 +-
 drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c                        |   9 +
 drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c                          |  32 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c                  |   2 +-
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-histb.c                      |   2 +-
 drivers/vfio/platform/vfio_platform_common.c       |   3 +-
 fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c                             |  26 +-
 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c                               |   4 +
 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c                                   |  12 +-
 fs/btrfs/ref-verify.c                              |   1 +
 fs/btrfs/volumes.c                                 |  33 +-
 fs/cifs/cifs_unicode.c                             |   8 +-
 fs/ext4/inline.c                                   |   1 +
 fs/ext4/super.c                                    |   4 +-
 fs/gfs2/rgrp.c                                     |   5 +-
 fs/gfs2/super.c                                    |   1 +
 fs/ocfs2/super.c                                   |   1 +
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c                          |   1 +
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.h                           |   2 +-
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap.c                           |   2 +-
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap_btree.c                     |  16 +-
 fs/xfs/scrub/bmap.c                                |   2 +
 fs/xfs/scrub/inode.c                               |   3 +-
 fs/xfs/scrub/refcount.c                            |   8 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c                                  |  10 +
 fs/xfs/xfs_pnfs.c                                  |   2 +-
 include/linux/can/skb.h                            |  20 +-
 include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h                     |   2 +-
 include/linux/netfilter_ipv6.h                     |   2 +-
 include/linux/prandom.h                            |  36 +-
 include/linux/time64.h                             |   4 +
 kernel/dma/swiotlb.c                               |   6 +-
 kernel/events/core.c                               |   7 +-
 kernel/events/internal.h                           |   2 +-
 kernel/exit.c                                      |   5 +-
 kernel/futex.c                                     |   5 +-
 kernel/irq/Kconfig                                 |   1 +
 kernel/reboot.c                                    |  28 +-
 kernel/time/itimer.c                               |   4 -
 kernel/time/tick-common.c                          |   2 +
 kernel/time/timer.c                                |   7 -
 lib/random32.c                                     | 462 +++++++++++++--------
 net/ipv4/netfilter.c                               |  12 +-
 net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_SYNPROXY.c                  |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c                |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c           |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c                |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv4.c          |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/syncookies.c                              |   9 +-
 net/ipv6/netfilter.c                               |   6 +-
 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c               |   2 +-
 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c           |   2 +-
 net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv6.c          |   2 +-
 net/ipv6/sit.c                                     |   2 -
 net/ipv6/syncookies.c                              |  10 +-
 net/iucv/af_iucv.c                                 |   3 +-
 net/mac80211/sta_info.c                            |  18 +
 net/mac80211/tx.c                                  |  37 +-
 net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c                  |   3 +-
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c                    |   4 +-
 net/sched/sch_generic.c                            |   3 +
 net/tipc/topsrv.c                                  |  10 +-
 net/wireless/reg.c                                 |   2 +-
 net/x25/af_x25.c                                   |   2 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c                              |   8 +-
 security/selinux/ibpkey.c                          |   4 +-
 sound/hda/ext/hdac_ext_controller.c                |   2 +
 sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c                          |   1 +
 .../util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c    |   7 +-
 tools/perf/util/session.c                          |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-loadavg-001.c    |   1 -
 tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-self-syscall.c   |   1 -
 tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-uptime-002.c     |   1 -
 118 files changed, 1102 insertions(+), 547 deletions(-)
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/101 regulator: defer probe when trying to get voltage from unresolved supply

From: Michał Mirosław <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cf1ad559a20d1930aa7b47a52f54e1f8718de301 ]

regulator_get_voltage_rdev() is called in regulator probe() when applying machine constraints. The "fixed" commit exposed the problem that non-bypassed regulators can forward the request to its parent (like bypassed ones) supply. Return -EPROBE_DEFER when the supply is expected but not resolved yet.

---
 drivers/regulator/core.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/regulator/core.c +2 -0
index c290c89421314..ad5235ca8e4ee 100644
@@ -3405,6 +3405,8 @@ static int _regulator_get_voltage(struct regulator_dev *rdev)
 		ret = rdev->desc->fixed_uV;
 	} else if (rdev->supply) {
 		ret = _regulator_get_voltage(rdev->supply->rdev);
+	} else if (rdev->supply_name) {
+		return -EPROBE_DEFER;
 	} else {
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/101 time: Prevent undefined behaviour in timespec64_to_ns()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zeng Tao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cb47755725da7b90fecbb2aa82ac3b24a7adb89b ]

UBSAN reports:

Undefined behaviour in ./include/linux/time64.h:127:27 signed integer overflow:
17179869187 * 1000000000 cannot be represented in type 'long long int'

Call Trace:
 timespec64_to_ns include/linux/time64.h:127 [inline]
 set_cpu_itimer+0x65c/0x880 kernel/time/itimer.c:180
 do_setitimer+0x8e/0x740 kernel/time/itimer.c:245
 __x64_sys_setitimer+0x14c/0x2c0 kernel/time/itimer.c:336
 do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x540 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295

Commit bd40a175769d ("y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64") replaced the original conversion which handled time clamping correctly with timespec64_to_ns() which has no overflow protection.

Fix it in timespec64_to_ns() as this is not necessarily limited to the usage in itimers.

[ tglx: Added comment and adjusted the fixes tag ]

Fixes 361a3bf00582 ("time64: Add time64.h header and define struct timespec64")
---
 include/linux/time64.h | 4 ++++
 kernel/time/itimer.c   | 4 ----
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/time64.h +4 -0
index 4a45aea0f96e9..8dbdf6cae3e8b 100644
@@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ static inline bool timespec64_valid_settod(const struct timespec64 *ts)
  */
 static inline s64 timespec64_to_ns(const struct timespec64 *ts)
 {
+	/* Prevent multiplication overflow */
+	if ((unsigned long long)ts->tv_sec >= KTIME_SEC_MAX)
+		return KTIME_MAX;
+
 	return ((s64) ts->tv_sec * NSEC_PER_SEC) + ts->tv_nsec;
 }
 
kernel/time/itimer.c +0 -4
index 9a65713c83093..2e2b335ef1018 100644
@@ -154,10 +154,6 @@ static void set_cpu_itimer(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int clock_id,
 	u64 oval, nval, ointerval, ninterval;
 	struct cpu_itimer *it = &tsk->signal->it[clock_id];
 
-	/*
-	 * Use the to_ktime conversion because that clamps the maximum
-	 * value to KTIME_MAX and avoid multiplication overflows.
-	 */
 	nval = ktime_to_ns(timeval_to_ktime(value->it_value));
 	ninterval = ktime_to_ns(timeval_to_ktime(value->it_interval));
 
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/101 nbd: dont update block size after device is started

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ming Lei <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b40813ddcd6bf9f01d020804e4cb8febc480b9e4 ]

Mounted NBD device can be resized, one use case is rbd-nbd.

Fix the issue by setting up default block size, then not touch it in nbd_size_update() any more. This kind of usage is aligned with loop which has same use case too.

Fixes c8a83a6b54d0 ("nbd: Use set_blocksize() to set device blocksize")
Cc Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Cc Jan Kara <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/block/nbd.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/block/nbd.c +5 -4
index 52e1e71e81241..706115ecd9bee 100644
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static void nbd_size_clear(struct nbd_device *nbd)
 	}
 }
 
-static void nbd_size_update(struct nbd_device *nbd)
+static void nbd_size_update(struct nbd_device *nbd, bool start)
 {
 	struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config;
 	struct block_device *bdev = bdget_disk(nbd->disk, 0);
@@ -292,7 +292,8 @@ static void nbd_size_update(struct nbd_device *nbd)
 	if (bdev) {
 		if (bdev->bd_disk) {
 			bd_set_size(bdev, config->bytesize);
-			set_blocksize(bdev, config->blksize);
+			if (start)
+				set_blocksize(bdev, config->blksize);
 		} else
 			bdev->bd_invalidated = 1;
 		bdput(bdev);
@@ -307,7 +308,7 @@ static void nbd_size_set(struct nbd_device *nbd, loff_t blocksize,
 	config->blksize = blocksize;
 	config->bytesize = blocksize * nr_blocks;
 	if (nbd->task_recv != NULL)
-		nbd_size_update(nbd);
+		nbd_size_update(nbd, false);
 }
 
 static void nbd_complete_rq(struct request *req)
@@ -1244,7 +1245,7 @@ static int nbd_start_device(struct nbd_device *nbd)
 		args->index = i;
 		queue_work(nbd->recv_workq, &args->work);
 	}
-	nbd_size_update(nbd);
+	nbd_size_update(nbd, true);
 	return error;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/101 usb: dwc3: gadget: Continue to process pending requests

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Thinh Nguyen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d9feef974e0d8cb6842533c92476a1b32a41ba31 ]

If there are still pending requests because no TRB was available, prepare more when started requests are completed.

Introduce dwc3_gadget_ep_should_continue() to check for incomplete and pending requests to resume updating new TRBs to the controller's TRB cache.

---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +21 -3
index f0d2f0a4e9908..f24cfb3a6907b 100644
@@ -2403,10 +2403,8 @@ static int dwc3_gadget_ep_cleanup_completed_request(struct dwc3_ep *dep,
 
 	req->request.actual = req->request.length - req->remaining;
 
-	if (!dwc3_gadget_ep_request_completed(req)) {
-		__dwc3_gadget_kick_transfer(dep);
+	if (!dwc3_gadget_ep_request_completed(req))
 		goto out;
-	}
 
 	dwc3_gadget_giveback(dep, req, status);
 
@@ -2430,6 +2428,24 @@ static void dwc3_gadget_ep_cleanup_completed_requests(struct dwc3_ep *dep,
 	}
 }
 
+static bool dwc3_gadget_ep_should_continue(struct dwc3_ep *dep)
+{
+	struct dwc3_request	*req;
+
+	if (!list_empty(&dep->pending_list))
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * We only need to check the first entry of the started list. We can
+	 * assume the completed requests are removed from the started list.
+	 */
+	req = next_request(&dep->started_list);
+	if (!req)
+		return false;
+
+	return !dwc3_gadget_ep_request_completed(req);
+}
+
 static void dwc3_gadget_endpoint_frame_from_event(struct dwc3_ep *dep,
 		const struct dwc3_event_depevt *event)
 {
@@ -2459,6 +2475,8 @@ static void dwc3_gadget_endpoint_transfer_in_progress(struct dwc3_ep *dep,
 
 	if (stop)
 		dwc3_stop_active_transfer(dep, true, true);
+	else if (dwc3_gadget_ep_should_continue(dep))
+		__dwc3_gadget_kick_transfer(dep);
 
 	/*
 	 * WORKAROUND: This is the 2nd half of U1/U2 -> U0 workaround.
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/101 usb: dwc3: gadget: Reclaim extra TRBs after request completion

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Thinh Nguyen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 690e5c2dc29f8891fcfd30da67e0d5837c2c9df5 ]

An SG request may be partially completed (due to no available TRBs). Don't reclaim extra TRBs and clear the needs_extra_trb flag until the request is fully completed. Otherwise, the driver will reclaim the wrong TRB.

Fixes 1f512119a08c ("usb: dwc3: gadget: add remaining sg entries to ring")
---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +5 -5
index f24cfb3a6907b..6ab5c48f5d873 100644
@@ -2386,6 +2386,11 @@ static int dwc3_gadget_ep_cleanup_completed_request(struct dwc3_ep *dep,
 		ret = dwc3_gadget_ep_reclaim_trb_linear(dep, req, event,
 				status);
 
+	req->request.actual = req->request.length - req->remaining;
+
+	if (!dwc3_gadget_ep_request_completed(req))
+		goto out;
+
 	if (req->needs_extra_trb) {
 		unsigned int maxp = usb_endpoint_maxp(dep->endpoint.desc);
 
@@ -2401,11 +2406,6 @@ static int dwc3_gadget_ep_cleanup_completed_request(struct dwc3_ep *dep,
 		req->needs_extra_trb = false;
 	}
 
-	req->request.actual = req->request.length - req->remaining;
-
-	if (!dwc3_gadget_ep_request_completed(req))
-		goto out;
-
 	dwc3_gadget_giveback(dep, req, status);
 
 out:
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/101 btrfs: sysfs: init devices outside of the chunk_mutex

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ca10845a56856fff4de3804c85e6424d0f6d0cde ]

While running btrfs/061, btrfs/073, btrfs/078, or btrfs/178 we hit the following lockdep splat:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.9.0-rc3+ #4 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kswapd0/100 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff96ecc22ef4a0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8dd74700 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #3 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:

	 fs_reclaim_acquire+0x65/0x80
	 slab_pre_alloc_hook.constprop.0+0x20/0x200
	 kmem_cache_alloc+0x37/0x270
	 alloc_inode+0x82/0xb0
	 iget_locked+0x10d/0x2c0
	 kernfs_get_inode+0x1b/0x130
	 kernfs_get_tree+0x136/0x240
	 sysfs_get_tree+0x16/0x40
	 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
	 path_mount+0x434/0xc00
	 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120
	 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

-> #2 (kernfs_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:

	 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0
	 kernfs_add_one+0x23/0x150
	 kernfs_create_link+0x63/0xa0
	 sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x5e/0xd0
	 btrfs_sysfs_add_devices_dir+0x81/0x130
	 btrfs_init_new_device+0x67f/0x1250
	 btrfs_ioctl+0x1ef/0x2e20
	 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
	 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

-> #1 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:

	 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0
	 btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x125/0x3a0
	 find_free_extent+0xdf6/0x1210
	 btrfs_reserve_extent+0xb3/0x1b0
	 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb0/0x310
	 alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4a/0x60
	 __btrfs_cow_block+0x11a/0x530
	 btrfs_cow_block+0x104/0x220
	 btrfs_search_slot+0x52e/0x9d0
	 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x64/0xb0
	 btrfs_insert_delayed_items+0x90/0x4f0
	 btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x93/0x140
	 btrfs_log_inode+0x5de/0x2020
	 btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x429/0xc90
	 btrfs_log_new_name+0x95/0x9b
	 btrfs_rename2+0xbb9/0x1800
	 vfs_rename+0x64f/0x9f0
	 do_renameat2+0x320/0x4e0
	 __x64_sys_rename+0x1f/0x30
	 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

-> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:

	 __lock_acquire+0x119c/0x1fc0
	 lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0
	 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0
	 __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330
	 btrfs_evict_inode+0x24c/0x500
	 evict+0xcf/0x1f0
	 dispose_list+0x48/0x70
	 prune_icache_sb+0x44/0x50
	 super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1e0
	 do_shrink_slab+0x178/0x3c0
	 shrink_slab+0x17c/0x290
	 shrink_node+0x2b2/0x6d0
	 balance_pgdat+0x30a/0x670
	 kswapd+0x213/0x4c0
	 kthread+0x138/0x160
	 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

other info that might help us debug this:

  Chain exists of:
    &delayed_node->mutex --> kernfs_mutex --> fs_reclaim

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:
	 CPU0                    CPU1
	 ----                    ----
    lock(fs_reclaim);
				 lock(kernfs_mutex);
				 lock(fs_reclaim);
    lock(&delayed_node->mutex);

*** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by kswapd0/100:
#0: ffffffff8dd74700 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 #1: ffffffff8dd65c50 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: shrink_slab+0x115/0x290 #2: ffff96ed2ade30e0 (&type->s_umount_key#36){++++}-{3:3}, at: super_cache_scan+0x38/0x1e0

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 PID: 100 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc3+ #4
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x8b/0xb8
   check_noncircular+0x12d/0x150
   __lock_acquire+0x119c/0x1fc0
   lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0
   ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330
   __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0
   ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330
   ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330
   ? lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0
   ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
   __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330
   btrfs_evict_inode+0x24c/0x500
   evict+0xcf/0x1f0
   dispose_list+0x48/0x70
   prune_icache_sb+0x44/0x50
   super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1e0
   do_shrink_slab+0x178/0x3c0
   shrink_slab+0x17c/0x290
   shrink_node+0x2b2/0x6d0
   balance_pgdat+0x30a/0x670
   kswapd+0x213/0x4c0
   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x41/0x50
   ? add_wait_queue_exclusive+0x70/0x70
   ? balance_pgdat+0x670/0x670
   kthread+0x138/0x160
   ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40
   ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

This happens because we are holding the chunk_mutex at the time of adding in a new device. However we only need to hold the device_list_mutex, as we're going to iterate over the fs_devices devices. Move the sysfs init stuff outside of the chunk_mutex to get rid of this lockdep splat.

CC [email protected] # 4.4.x: f3cd2c58110dad14e: btrfs: sysfs, rename device_link add/remove functions
---
 fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/volumes.c +4 -3
index 05daa2b816c31..4067d0196556e 100644
@@ -2459,9 +2459,6 @@ int btrfs_init_new_device(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, const char *device_path
 	btrfs_set_super_num_devices(fs_info->super_copy,
 				    orig_super_num_devices + 1);
 
-	/* add sysfs device entry */
-	btrfs_sysfs_add_device_link(fs_devices, device);
-
 	/*
 	 * we've got more storage, clear any full flags on the space
 	 * infos
@@ -2469,6 +2466,10 @@ int btrfs_init_new_device(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, const char *device_path
 	btrfs_clear_space_info_full(fs_info);
 
 	mutex_unlock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex);
+
+	/* Add sysfs device entry */
+	btrfs_sysfs_add_device_link(fs_devices, device);
+
 	mutex_unlock(&fs_devices->device_list_mutex);
 
 	if (seeding_dev) {
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/101 btrfs: reschedule when cloning lots of extents

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6b613cc97f0ace77f92f7bc112b8f6ad3f52baf8 ]

We have several occurrences of a soft lockup from fstest's generic/175 testcase, which look more or less like this one:

  watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [xfs_io:10030]
  Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks
  CPU: 0 PID: 10030 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G             L    5.9.0-rc5+ #768
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   dump_stack+0x77/0xa0
   panic+0xfa/0x2cb
   watchdog_timer_fn.cold+0x85/0xa5
   ? lockup_detector_update_enable+0x50/0x50
   __hrtimer_run_queues+0x99/0x4c0
   ? recalibrate_cpu_khz+0x10/0x10
   hrtimer_run_queues+0x9f/0xb0
   update_process_times+0x28/0x80
   tick_handle_periodic+0x1b/0x60
   __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0x210
   asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20
   </IRQ>
   sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x7f/0x90
   asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_tree_unlock+0x91/0x1a0 [btrfs]
  RSP: 0018:ffffc90007123a58 EFLAGS: 00000282
  RAX: ffff8881cea2fbe0 RBX: ffff8881cea2fbe0 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: ffff8881d23fd200 RSI: ffffffff82045220 RDI: ffff8881cea2fba0
  RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000032
  R10: 0000160000000000 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: 0000000000001000
  R13: ffff8882357fd5b0 R14: ffff88816fa76e70 R15: ffff8881cea2fad0
   ? btrfs_tree_unlock+0x15b/0x1a0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_release_path+0x67/0x80 [btrfs]
   btrfs_insert_replace_extent+0x177/0x2c0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_replace_file_extents+0x472/0x7c0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_clone+0x9ba/0xbd0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_clone_files.isra.0+0xeb/0x140 [btrfs]
   ? file_update_time+0xcd/0x120
   btrfs_remap_file_range+0x322/0x3b0 [btrfs]
   do_clone_file_range+0xb7/0x1e0
   vfs_clone_file_range+0x30/0xa0
   ioctl_file_clone+0x8a/0xc0
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x5b2/0x6f0
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x37/0xa0
   do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  RIP: 0033:0x7f87977fc247
  RSP: 002b:00007ffd51a2f6d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f87977fc247
  RDX: 00007ffd51a2f710 RSI: 000000004020940d RDI: 0000000000000003
  RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007ffd51a79080 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 00005621f11352f2 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005621f128b958 R15: 0000000080000000
  Kernel Offset: disabled
  ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks ]---

All of these lockup reports have the call chain btrfs_clone_files() -> btrfs_clone() in common. btrfs_clone_files() calls btrfs_clone() with both source and destination extents locked and loops over the source extent to create the clones.

Conditionally reschedule in the btrfs_clone() loop, to give some time back to other processes.

---
 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +2 -0
index 01a90fa03c24f..f0e71aa05d229 100644
@@ -4217,6 +4217,8 @@ process_slot:
 			ret = -EINTR;
 			goto out;
 		}
+
+		cond_resched();
 	}
 	ret = 0;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/101 genirq: Let GENERIC_IRQ_IPI select IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 151a535171be6ff824a0a3875553ea38570f4c05 ]

kernel/irq/ipi.c otherwise fails to compile if nothing else selects it.

---
 kernel/irq/Kconfig | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
kernel/irq/Kconfig +1 -0
index 5f3e2baefca92..d532bf0c5a672 100644
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ config IRQ_FASTEOI_HIERARCHY_HANDLERS
 # Generic IRQ IPI support
 config GENERIC_IRQ_IPI
 	bool
+	select IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY
 
 # Generic MSI interrupt support
 config GENERIC_MSI_IRQ
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/101 hv_balloon: disable warning when floor reached

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Olaf Hering <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2c3bd2a5c86fe744e8377733c5e511a5ca1e14f5 ]

It is not an error if the host requests to balloon down, but the VM refuses to do so. Without this change a warning is logged in dmesg every five minutes.

Fixes b3bb97b8a49f3 ("Drivers: hv: balloon: Add logging for dynamic memory operations")
---
 drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c +1 -1
index 9ca0706a9d402..e5fc719a34e70 100644
@@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ static void balloon_up(struct work_struct *dummy)
 
 	/* Refuse to balloon below the floor. */
 	if (avail_pages < num_pages || avail_pages - num_pages < floor) {
-		pr_warn("Balloon request will be partially fulfilled. %s\n",
+		pr_info("Balloon request will be partially fulfilled. %s\n",
 			avail_pages < num_pages ? "Not enough memory." :
 			"Balloon floor reached.");
 
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/101 net: xfrm: fix a race condition during allocing spi

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: zhuoliang zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a779d91314ca7208b7feb3ad817b62904397c56d ]

we found that the following race condition exists in xfrm_alloc_userspi flow:

user thread state_hash_work thread
---- ----
xfrm_alloc_userspi()
__find_acq_core()
/*alloc new xfrm_state:x*/
xfrm_state_alloc()
/*schedule state_hash_work thread*/
xfrm_hash_grow_check() xfrm_hash_resize()
xfrm_alloc_spi /*hold lock*/

      x->id.spi = htonl(spi)                     spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock)
      /*waiting lock release*/                     xfrm_hash_transfer()
      spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock)      /*add x into hlist:net->xfrm.state_byspi*/
	                                                hlist_add_head_rcu(&x->byspi)
                                                 spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock)

    /*add x into hlist:net->xfrm.state_byspi 2 times*/
    hlist_add_head_rcu(&x->byspi)

1. a new state x is alloced in xfrm_state_alloc() and added into the bydst hlist in __find_acq_core() on the LHS;
2. on the RHS, state_hash_work thread travels the old bydst and tranfers every xfrm_state (include x) into the new bydst hlist and new byspi hlist;
3. user thread on the LHS gets the lock and adds x into the new byspi hlist again.

So the same xfrm_state (x) is added into the same list_hash (net->xfrm.state_byspi) 2 times that makes the list_hash become an inifite loop.

To fix the race, x->id.spi = htonl(spi) in the xfrm_alloc_spi() is moved to the back of spin_lock_bh, sothat state_hash_work thread no longer add x which id.spi is zero into the hash_list.

Fixes f034b5d4efdf ("[XFRM]: Dynamic xfrm_state hash table sizing.")
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +5 -3
index a649d7c2f48ca..84dea0ad16661 100644
@@ -1825,6 +1825,7 @@ int xfrm_alloc_spi(struct xfrm_state *x, u32 low, u32 high)
 	int err = -ENOENT;
 	__be32 minspi = htonl(low);
 	__be32 maxspi = htonl(high);
+	__be32 newspi = 0;
 	u32 mark = x->mark.v & x->mark.m;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
@@ -1843,21 +1844,22 @@ int xfrm_alloc_spi(struct xfrm_state *x, u32 low, u32 high)
 			xfrm_state_put(x0);
 			goto unlock;
 		}
-		x->id.spi = minspi;
+		newspi = minspi;
 	} else {
 		u32 spi = 0;
 		for (h = 0; h < high-low+1; h++) {
 			spi = low + prandom_u32()%(high-low+1);
 			x0 = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &x->id.daddr, htonl(spi), x->id.proto, x->props.family);
 			if (x0 == NULL) {
-				x->id.spi = htonl(spi);
+				newspi = htonl(spi);
 				break;
 			}
 			xfrm_state_put(x0);
 		}
 	}
-	if (x->id.spi) {
+	if (newspi) {
 		spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
+		x->id.spi = newspi;
 		h = xfrm_spi_hash(net, &x->id.daddr, x->id.spi, x->id.proto, x->props.family);
 		hlist_add_head_rcu(&x->byspi, net->xfrm.state_byspi + h);
 		spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/101 xfs: set xefi_discard when creating a deferred agfl free log intent item

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2c334e12f957cd8c6bb66b4aa3f79848b7c33cab ]

Make sure that we actually initialize xefi_discard when we're scheduling a deferred free of an AGFL block. This was (eventually) found by the UBSAN while I was banging on realtime rmap problems, but it exists in the upstream codebase. While we're at it, rearrange the structure to reduce the struct size from 64 to 56 bytes.

Fixes fcb762f5de2e ("xfs: add bmapi nodiscard flag")
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c | 1 +
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.h  | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c +1 -0
index 1eb7933dac83e..b3a9043b0c9ee 100644
@@ -2213,6 +2213,7 @@ xfs_defer_agfl_block(
 	new->xefi_startblock = XFS_AGB_TO_FSB(mp, agno, agbno);
 	new->xefi_blockcount = 1;
 	new->xefi_oinfo = *oinfo;
+	new->xefi_skip_discard = false;
 
 	trace_xfs_agfl_free_defer(mp, agno, 0, agbno, 1);
 
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.h +1 -1
index 488dc8860fd7c..50242ba3cdb72 100644
@@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ struct xfs_extent_free_item
 {
 	xfs_fsblock_t		xefi_startblock;/* starting fs block number */
 	xfs_extlen_t		xefi_blockcount;/* number of blocks in extent */
+	bool			xefi_skip_discard;
 	struct list_head	xefi_list;
 	struct xfs_owner_info	xefi_oinfo;	/* extent owner */
-	bool			xefi_skip_discard;
 };
 
 #define	XFS_BMAP_MAX_NMAP	4
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/101 netfilter: ipset: Update byte and packet counters regardless of whether they match

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stefano Brivio <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7d10e62c2ff8e084c136c94d32d9a94de4d31248 ]

In ip_set_match_extensions(), for sets with counters, we take care of updating counters themselves by calling ip_set_update_counter(), and of checking if the given comparison and values match, by calling ip_set_match_counter() if needed.

However, if a given comparison on counters doesn't match the configured values, that doesn't mean the set entry itself isn't matching.

This fix restores the behaviour we had before commit 4750005a85f7 ("netfilter: ipset: Fix "don't update counters" mode when counters used at the matching"), without reintroducing the issue fixed there: back then, mtype_data_match() first updated counters in any case, and then took care of matching on counters.

Now, if the IPSET_FLAG_SKIP_COUNTER_UPDATE flag is set, ip_set_update_counter() will anyway skip counter updates if desired.

The issue observed is illustrated by this reproducer:

  ipset create c hash:ip counters
  ipset add c 192.0.2.1
  iptables -I INPUT -m set --match-set c src --bytes-gt 800 -j DROP

if we now send packets from 192.0.2.1, bytes and packets counters for the entry as shown by 'ipset list' are always zero, and, no matter how many bytes we send, the rule will never match, because counters themselves are not updated.

Fixes 4750005a85f7 ("netfilter: ipset: Fix "don't update counters" mode when counters used at the matching")
---
 net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c +2 -1
index 36ebc40a4313c..0427e66bc4786 100644
@@ -488,13 +488,14 @@ ip_set_match_extensions(struct ip_set *set, const struct ip_set_ext *ext,
 	if (SET_WITH_COUNTER(set)) {
 		struct ip_set_counter *counter = ext_counter(data, set);
 
+		ip_set_update_counter(counter, ext, flags);
+
 		if (flags & IPSET_FLAG_MATCH_COUNTERS &&
 		    !(ip_set_match_counter(ip_set_get_packets(counter),
 				mext->packets, mext->packets_op) &&
 		      ip_set_match_counter(ip_set_get_bytes(counter),
 				mext->bytes, mext->bytes_op)))
 			return false;
-		ip_set_update_counter(counter, ext, flags);
 	}
 	if (SET_WITH_SKBINFO(set))
 		ip_set_get_skbinfo(ext_skbinfo(data, set),
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/101 perf tools: Add missing swap for ino_generation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fe01adb72356a4e2f8735e4128af85921ca98fa1 ]

We are missing swap for ino_generation field.

---
 tools/perf/util/session.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/perf/util/session.c +1 -0
index f016d1b330e54..6a2037b52098b 100644
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ static void perf_event__mmap2_swap(union perf_event *event,
 	event->mmap2.maj   = bswap_32(event->mmap2.maj);
 	event->mmap2.min   = bswap_32(event->mmap2.min);
 	event->mmap2.ino   = bswap_64(event->mmap2.ino);
+	event->mmap2.ino_generation = bswap_64(event->mmap2.ino_generation);
 
 	if (sample_id_all) {
 		void *data = &event->mmap2.filename;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/101 ALSA: hda: prevent undefined shift in snd_hdac_ext_bus_get_link()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 158e1886b6262c1d1c96a18c85fac5219b8bf804 ]

This is harmless, but the "addr" comes from the user and it could lead to a negative shift or to shift wrapping if it's too high.

Fixes 0b00a5615dc4 ("ALSA: hdac_ext: add hdac extended controller")
---
 sound/hda/ext/hdac_ext_controller.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
sound/hda/ext/hdac_ext_controller.c +2 -0
index 84b44cdae28a1..b96abebcfd1a4 100644
@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ struct hdac_ext_link *snd_hdac_ext_bus_get_link(struct hdac_bus *bus,
 		return NULL;
 	if (bus->idx != bus_idx)
 		return NULL;
+	if (addr < 0 || addr > 31)
+		return NULL;
 
 	list_for_each_entry(hlink, &bus->hlink_list, list) {
 		for (i = 0; i < HDA_MAX_CODECS; i++) {
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 15/101 can: rx-offload: dont call kfree_skb() from IRQ context

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2ddd6bfe7bdbb6c661835c3ff9cab8e0769940a6 ]

A CAN driver, using the rx-offload infrastructure, is reading CAN frames (usually in IRQ context) from the hardware and placing it into the rx-offload queue to be delivered to the networking stack via NAPI.

In case the rx-offload queue is full, trying to add more skbs results in the skbs being dropped using kfree_skb(). If done from hard-IRQ context this results in the following warning:

[  682.552693] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  682.557360] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3057 at net/core/skbuff.c:650 skb_release_head_state+0x74/0x84
[  682.566075] Modules linked in: can_raw can coda_vpu flexcan dw_hdmi_ahb_audio v4l2_jpeg imx_vdoa can_dev
[  682.575597] CPU: 0 PID: 3057 Comm: cansend Tainted: G        W         5.7.0+ #18
[  682.583098] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
[  682.589657] [<c0112628>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010c1c4>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[  682.597423] [<c010c1c4>] (show_stack) from [<c06c481c>] (dump_stack+0xe0/0x114)
[  682.604759] [<c06c481c>] (dump_stack) from [<c0128f10>] (__warn+0xc0/0x10c)
[  682.611742] [<c0128f10>] (__warn) from [<c0129314>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0xc0)
[  682.619248] [<c0129314>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0b95dec>] (skb_release_head_state+0x74/0x84)
[  682.628143] [<c0b95dec>] (skb_release_head_state) from [<c0b95e08>] (skb_release_all+0xc/0x24)
[  682.636774] [<c0b95e08>] (skb_release_all) from [<c0b95eac>] (kfree_skb+0x74/0x1c8)
[  682.644479] [<c0b95eac>] (kfree_skb) from [<bf001d1c>] (can_rx_offload_queue_sorted+0xe0/0xe8 [can_dev])
[  682.654051] [<bf001d1c>] (can_rx_offload_queue_sorted [can_dev]) from [<bf001d6c>] (can_rx_offload_get_echo_skb+0x48/0x94 [can_dev])
[  682.666007] [<bf001d6c>] (can_rx_offload_get_echo_skb [can_dev]) from [<bf01efe4>] (flexcan_irq+0x194/0x5dc [flexcan])
[  682.676734] [<bf01efe4>] (flexcan_irq [flexcan]) from [<c019c1ec>] (__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4c/0x3ec)
[  682.686322] [<c019c1ec>] (__handle_irq_event_percpu) from [<c019c5b8>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x2c/0x88)
[  682.695993] [<c019c5b8>] (handle_irq_event_percpu) from [<c019c64c>] (handle_irq_event+0x38/0x5c)
[  682.704887] [<c019c64c>] (handle_irq_event) from [<c01a1058>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc8/0x180)
[  682.713432] [<c01a1058>] (handle_fasteoi_irq) from [<c019b2c0>] (generic_handle_irq+0x30/0x44)
[  682.722063] [<c019b2c0>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<c019b8f8>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x64/0xdc)
[  682.730783] [<c019b8f8>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c06df4a4>] (gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x9c)
[  682.739158] [<c06df4a4>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0100b30>] (__irq_svc+0x70/0x98)
[  682.746656] Exception stack(0xe80e9dd8 to 0xe80e9e20)
[  682.751725] 9dc0:                                                       00000001 e80e8000
[  682.759922] 9de0: e820cf80 00000000 ffffe000 00000000 eaf08fe4 00000000 600d0013 00000000
[  682.768117] 9e00: c1732e3c c16093a8 e820d4c0 e80e9e28 c018a57c c018b870 600d0013 ffffffff
[  682.776315] [<c0100b30>] (__irq_svc) from [<c018b870>] (lock_acquire+0x108/0x4e8)
[  682.783821] [<c018b870>] (lock_acquire) from [<c0e938e4>] (down_write+0x48/0xa8)
[  682.791242] [<c0e938e4>] (down_write) from [<c02818dc>] (unlink_file_vma+0x24/0x40)
[  682.798922] [<c02818dc>] (unlink_file_vma) from [<c027a258>] (free_pgtables+0x34/0xb8)
[  682.806858] [<c027a258>] (free_pgtables) from [<c02835a4>] (exit_mmap+0xe4/0x170)
[  682.814361] [<c02835a4>] (exit_mmap) from [<c01248e0>] (mmput+0x5c/0x110)
[  682.821171] [<c01248e0>] (mmput) from [<c012e910>] (do_exit+0x374/0xbe4)
[  682.827892] [<c012e910>] (do_exit) from [<c0130888>] (do_group_exit+0x38/0xb4)
[  682.835132] [<c0130888>] (do_group_exit) from [<c0130914>] (__wake_up_parent+0x0/0x14)
[  682.843063] irq event stamp: 1936
[  682.846399] hardirqs last  enabled at (1935): [<c02938b0>] rmqueue+0xf4/0xc64
[  682.853553] hardirqs last disabled at (1936): [<c0100b20>] __irq_svc+0x60/0x98
[  682.860799] softirqs last  enabled at (1878): [<bf04cdcc>] raw_release+0x108/0x1f0 [can_raw]
[  682.869256] softirqs last disabled at (1876): [<c0b8f478>] release_sock+0x18/0x98
[  682.876753] ---[ end trace 7bca4751ce44c444 ]---

This patch fixes the problem by replacing the kfree_skb() by dev_kfree_skb_any(), as rx-offload might be called from threaded IRQ handlers as well.

Fixes ca913f1ac024 ("can: rx-offload: can_rx_offload_queue_sorted(): fix error handling, avoid skb mem leak")
Fixes 6caf8a6d6586 ("can: rx-offload: can_rx_offload_queue_tail(): fix error handling, avoid skb mem leak")
---
 drivers/net/can/rx-offload.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/can/rx-offload.c +2 -2
index 5f7e97d54733c..5cf4171df1f42 100644
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ int can_rx_offload_queue_sorted(struct can_rx_offload *offload,
 
 	if (skb_queue_len(&offload->skb_queue) >
 	    offload->skb_queue_len_max) {
-		kfree_skb(skb);
+		dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
 		return -ENOBUFS;
 	}
 
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ int can_rx_offload_queue_tail(struct can_rx_offload *offload,
 {
 	if (skb_queue_len(&offload->skb_queue) >
 	    offload->skb_queue_len_max) {
-		kfree_skb(skb);
+		dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
 		return -ENOBUFS;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 16/101 can: dev: can_get_echo_skb(): prevent call to kfree_skb() in hard IRQ context

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Vincent Mailhol <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2283f79b22684d2812e5c76fc2280aae00390365 ]

If a driver calls can_get_echo_skb() during a hardware IRQ (which is often, but not always, the case), the 'WARN_ON(in_irq)' in net/core/skbuff.c#skb_release_head_state() might be triggered, under network congestion circumstances, together with the potential risk of a NULL pointer dereference.

The root cause of this issue is the call to kfree_skb() instead of dev_kfree_skb_irq() in net/core/dev.c#enqueue_to_backlog().

This patch prevents the skb to be freed within the call to netif_rx() by incrementing its reference count with skb_get(). The skb is finally freed by one of the in-irq-context safe functions: dev_consume_skb_any() or dev_kfree_skb_any(). The "any" version is used because some drivers might call can_get_echo_skb() in a normal context.

The reason for this issue to occur is that initially, in the core network stack, loopback skb were not supposed to be received in hardware IRQ context. The CAN stack is an exeption.

This bug was previously reported back in 2017 in [1] but the proposed patch never got accepted.

While [1] directly modifies net/core/dev.c, we try to propose here a smoother modification local to CAN network stack (the assumption behind is that only CAN devices are affected by this issue).

[1] http://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Fixes 39549eef3587 ("can: CAN Network device driver and Netlink interface")
---
 drivers/net/can/dev.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/can/dev.c +5 -1
index 1545f2b299d06..be532eb64baa2 100644
@@ -520,7 +520,11 @@ unsigned int can_get_echo_skb(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int idx)
 	if (!skb)
 		return 0;
 
-	netif_rx(skb);
+	skb_get(skb);
+	if (netif_rx(skb) == NET_RX_SUCCESS)
+		dev_consume_skb_any(skb);
+	else
+		dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
 
 	return len;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 17/101 can: dev: __can_get_echo_skb(): fix real payload length return value for RTR frames

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ed3320cec279407a86bc4c72edc4a39eb49165ec ]

The can_get_echo_skb() function returns the number of received bytes to be used for netdev statistics. In the case of RTR frames we get a valid (potential non-zero) data length value which has to be passed for further operations. But on the wire RTR frames have no payload length. Therefore the value to be used in the statistics has to be zero for RTR frames.

Fixes cf5046b309b3 ("can: dev: let can_get_echo_skb() return dlc of CAN frame")
---
 drivers/net/can/dev.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/can/dev.c +6 -2
index be532eb64baa2..1950b13f22dfc 100644
@@ -493,9 +493,13 @@ struct sk_buff *__can_get_echo_skb(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int idx, u8
 		 */
 		struct sk_buff *skb = priv->echo_skb[idx];
 		struct canfd_frame *cf = (struct canfd_frame *)skb->data;
-		u8 len = cf->len;
 
-		*len_ptr = len;
+		/* get the real payload length for netdev statistics */
+		if (cf->can_id & CAN_RTR_FLAG)
+			*len_ptr = 0;
+		else
+			*len_ptr = cf->len;
+
 		priv->echo_skb[idx] = NULL;
 
 		return skb;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 18/101 can: can_create_echo_skb(): fix echo skb generation: always use skb_clone()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 286228d382ba6320f04fa2e7c6fc8d4d92e428f4 ]

All user space generated SKBs are owned by a socket (unless injected into the key via AF_PACKET). If a socket is closed, all associated skbs will be cleaned up.

This leads to a problem when a CAN driver calls can_put_echo_skb() on a unshared SKB. If the socket is closed prior to the TX complete handler, can_get_echo_skb() and the subsequent delivering of the echo SKB to all registered callbacks, a SKB with a refcount of 0 is delivered.

To avoid the problem, in can_get_echo_skb() the original SKB is now always cloned, regardless of shared SKB or not. If the process exists it can now safely discard its SKBs, without disturbing the delivery of the echo SKB.

The problem shows up in the j1939 stack, when it clones the incoming skb, which detects the already 0 refcount.

We can easily reproduce this with following example:

testj1939 -B -r can0: &
cansend can0 1823ff40#0123

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
Modules linked in: coda_vpu imx_vdoa videobuf2_vmalloc dw_hdmi_ahb_audio vcan
CPU: 0 PID: 293 Comm: cansend Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00376-g9e20dcb7040d #1
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
Backtrace:
[<c010f570>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c010f90c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<c010f8ec>] (show_stack) from [<c0c3e1a4>] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0)
[<c0c3e118>] (dump_stack) from [<c0127fec>] (__warn+0xe0/0x108)
[<c0127f0c>] (__warn) from [<c01283c8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa8/0xcc)
[<c0128324>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0539c0c>] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174)
[<c0539b04>] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [<c0ad2cac>] (j1939_can_recv+0x20c/0x210)
[<c0ad2aa0>] (j1939_can_recv) from [<c0ac9dc8>] (can_rcv_filter+0xb4/0x268)
[<c0ac9d14>] (can_rcv_filter) from [<c0aca2cc>] (can_receive+0xb0/0xe4)
[<c0aca21c>] (can_receive) from [<c0aca348>] (can_rcv+0x48/0x98)
[<c0aca300>] (can_rcv) from [<c09b1fdc>] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x64/0x88)
[<c09b1f78>] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core) from [<c09b2070>] (__netif_receive_skb+0x38/0x94)
[<c09b2038>] (__netif_receive_skb) from [<c09b2130>] (netif_receive_skb_internal+0x64/0xf8)
[<c09b20cc>] (netif_receive_skb_internal) from [<c09b21f8>] (netif_receive_skb+0x34/0x19c)
[<c09b21c4>] (netif_receive_skb) from [<c0791278>] (can_rx_offload_napi_poll+0x58/0xb4)
---
 include/linux/can/skb.h | 20 ++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
include/linux/can/skb.h +8 -12
index b3379a97245c1..a34694e675c9a 100644
@@ -61,21 +61,17 @@ static inline void can_skb_set_owner(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
  */
 static inline struct sk_buff *can_create_echo_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	if (skb_shared(skb)) {
-		struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	struct sk_buff *nskb;
 
-		if (likely(nskb)) {
-			can_skb_set_owner(nskb, skb->sk);
-			consume_skb(skb);
-			return nskb;
-		} else {
-			kfree_skb(skb);
-			return NULL;
-		}
+	nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (unlikely(!nskb)) {
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+		return NULL;
 	}
 
-	/* we can assume to have an unshared skb with proper owner */
-	return skb;
+	can_skb_set_owner(nskb, skb->sk);
+	consume_skb(skb);
+	return nskb;
 }
 
 #endif /* !_CAN_SKB_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 19/101 can: peak_usb: add range checking in decode operations

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a6921dd524fe31d1f460c161d3526a407533b6db ]

These values come from skb->data so Smatch considers them untrusted. I believe Smatch is correct but I don't have a way to test this.

The usb_if->dev[] array has 2 elements but the index is in the 0-15 range without checks. The cfd->len can be up to 255 but the maximum valid size is CANFD_MAX_DLEN (64) so that could lead to memory corruption.

Fixes 0a25e1f4f185 ("can: peak_usb: add support for PEAK new CANFD USB adapters")
---
 drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_fd.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_fd.c +37 -11
index 41988358f63c8..19600d35aac55 100644
@@ -476,12 +476,18 @@ static int pcan_usb_fd_decode_canmsg(struct pcan_usb_fd_if *usb_if,
 				     struct pucan_msg *rx_msg)
 {
 	struct pucan_rx_msg *rm = (struct pucan_rx_msg *)rx_msg;
-	struct peak_usb_device *dev = usb_if->dev[pucan_msg_get_channel(rm)];
-	struct net_device *netdev = dev->netdev;
+	struct peak_usb_device *dev;
+	struct net_device *netdev;
 	struct canfd_frame *cfd;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	const u16 rx_msg_flags = le16_to_cpu(rm->flags);
 
+	if (pucan_msg_get_channel(rm) >= ARRAY_SIZE(usb_if->dev))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	dev = usb_if->dev[pucan_msg_get_channel(rm)];
+	netdev = dev->netdev;
+
 	if (rx_msg_flags & PUCAN_MSG_EXT_DATA_LEN) {
 		/* CANFD frame case */
 		skb = alloc_canfd_skb(netdev, &cfd);
@@ -527,15 +533,21 @@ static int pcan_usb_fd_decode_status(struct pcan_usb_fd_if *usb_if,
 				     struct pucan_msg *rx_msg)
 {
 	struct pucan_status_msg *sm = (struct pucan_status_msg *)rx_msg;
-	struct peak_usb_device *dev = usb_if->dev[pucan_stmsg_get_channel(sm)];
-	struct pcan_usb_fd_device *pdev =
-			container_of(dev, struct pcan_usb_fd_device, dev);
+	struct pcan_usb_fd_device *pdev;
 	enum can_state new_state = CAN_STATE_ERROR_ACTIVE;
 	enum can_state rx_state, tx_state;
-	struct net_device *netdev = dev->netdev;
+	struct peak_usb_device *dev;
+	struct net_device *netdev;
 	struct can_frame *cf;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 
+	if (pucan_stmsg_get_channel(sm) >= ARRAY_SIZE(usb_if->dev))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	dev = usb_if->dev[pucan_stmsg_get_channel(sm)];
+	pdev = container_of(dev, struct pcan_usb_fd_device, dev);
+	netdev = dev->netdev;
+
 	/* nothing should be sent while in BUS_OFF state */
 	if (dev->can.state == CAN_STATE_BUS_OFF)
 		return 0;
@@ -587,9 +599,14 @@ static int pcan_usb_fd_decode_error(struct pcan_usb_fd_if *usb_if,
 				    struct pucan_msg *rx_msg)
 {
 	struct pucan_error_msg *er = (struct pucan_error_msg *)rx_msg;
-	struct peak_usb_device *dev = usb_if->dev[pucan_ermsg_get_channel(er)];
-	struct pcan_usb_fd_device *pdev =
-			container_of(dev, struct pcan_usb_fd_device, dev);
+	struct pcan_usb_fd_device *pdev;
+	struct peak_usb_device *dev;
+
+	if (pucan_ermsg_get_channel(er) >= ARRAY_SIZE(usb_if->dev))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	dev = usb_if->dev[pucan_ermsg_get_channel(er)];
+	pdev = container_of(dev, struct pcan_usb_fd_device, dev);
 
 	/* keep a trace of tx and rx error counters for later use */
 	pdev->bec.txerr = er->tx_err_cnt;
@@ -603,11 +620,17 @@ static int pcan_usb_fd_decode_overrun(struct pcan_usb_fd_if *usb_if,
 				      struct pucan_msg *rx_msg)
 {
 	struct pcan_ufd_ovr_msg *ov = (struct pcan_ufd_ovr_msg *)rx_msg;
-	struct peak_usb_device *dev = usb_if->dev[pufd_omsg_get_channel(ov)];
-	struct net_device *netdev = dev->netdev;
+	struct peak_usb_device *dev;
+	struct net_device *netdev;
 	struct can_frame *cf;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 
+	if (pufd_omsg_get_channel(ov) >= ARRAY_SIZE(usb_if->dev))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	dev = usb_if->dev[pufd_omsg_get_channel(ov)];
+	netdev = dev->netdev;
+
 	/* allocate an skb to store the error frame */
 	skb = alloc_can_err_skb(netdev, &cf);
 	if (!skb)
@@ -724,6 +747,9 @@ static int pcan_usb_fd_encode_msg(struct peak_usb_device *dev,
 	u16 tx_msg_size, tx_msg_flags;
 	u8 can_dlc;
 
+	if (cfd->len > CANFD_MAX_DLEN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	tx_msg_size = ALIGN(sizeof(struct pucan_tx_msg) + cfd->len, 4);
 	tx_msg->size = cpu_to_le16(tx_msg_size);
 	tx_msg->type = cpu_to_le16(PUCAN_MSG_CAN_TX);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.19 019/101] can: peak_usb: add range checking in decode operations

HI!

Quoted 11 lines

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a6921dd524fe31d1f460c161d3526a407533b6db ]

These values come from skb->data so Smatch considers them untrusted. I believe Smatch is correct but I don't have a way to test this.

The usb_if->dev[] array has 2 elements but the index is in the 0-15 range without checks. The cfd->len can be up to 255 but the maximum valid size is CANFD_MAX_DLEN (64) so that could lead to memory corruption.

If this is untrusted, does it need to use _nospec() variants?

Quoted 6 lines

index 41988358f63c8..19600d35aac55 100644

drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_fd.c +0 -0
@@ -476,12 +476,18 @@ static int pcan_usb_fd_decode_canmsg(struct pcan_usb_fd_if *usb_if,
 				     struct pucan_msg *rx_msg)
 {

...

drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_fd.c static int pcan_usb_fd_decode_canmsg(struct pcan_usb_fd_if *usb_if, · line 486

Quoted 4 lines
drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_fd.c +2 -0
 	const u16 rx_msg_flags = le16_to_cpu(rm->flags);
 
+	if (pucan_msg_get_channel(rm) >= ARRAY_SIZE(usb_if->dev))
+		return -ENOMEM;

Furthermore, should it use -EINVAL here

drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_fd.c static int pcan_usb_fd_decode_status(struct pcan_usb_fd_if *usb_if, · line 545

Quoted 2 lines
drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_fd.c +2 -0
+	if (pucan_stmsg_get_channel(sm) >= ARRAY_SIZE(usb_if->dev))
+		return -ENOMEM;

and here, and perhaps use a helper function?

Best regards,
Pavel

Signature · 1 line
http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
author maintainer
#21 lore raw

PATCH 20/101 can: peak_usb: peak_usb_get_ts_time(): fix timestamp wrapping

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stephane Grosjean <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ecc7b4187dd388549544195fb13a11b4ea8e6a84 ]

Fabian Inostroza <[email protected]> has discovered a potential problem in the hardware timestamp reporting from the PCAN-USB USB CAN interface (only), related to the fact that a timestamp of an event may precede the timestamp used for synchronization when both records are part of the same USB packet. However, this case was used to detect the wrapping of the time counter.

This patch details and fixes the two identified cases where this problem can occur.

Fixes bb4785551f64 ("can: usb: PEAK-System Technik USB adapters driver core")
---
 drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c +46 -5
index afc8d978124ef..db156a11e6db5 100644
@@ -138,14 +138,55 @@ void peak_usb_get_ts_time(struct peak_time_ref *time_ref, u32 ts, ktime_t *time)
 	/* protect from getting time before setting now */
 	if (ktime_to_ns(time_ref->tv_host)) {
 		u64 delta_us;
+		s64 delta_ts = 0;
+
+		/* General case: dev_ts_1 < dev_ts_2 < ts, with:
+		 *
+		 * - dev_ts_1 = previous sync timestamp
+		 * - dev_ts_2 = last sync timestamp
+		 * - ts = event timestamp
+		 * - ts_period = known sync period (theoretical)
+		 *             ~ dev_ts2 - dev_ts1
+		 * *but*:
+		 *
+		 * - time counters wrap (see adapter->ts_used_bits)
+		 * - sometimes, dev_ts_1 < ts < dev_ts2
+		 *
+		 * "normal" case (sync time counters increase):
+		 * must take into account case when ts wraps (tsw)
+		 *
+		 *      < ts_period > <          >
+		 *     |             |            |
+		 *  ---+--------+----+-------0-+--+-->
+		 *     ts_dev_1 |    ts_dev_2  |
+		 *              ts             tsw
+		 */
+		if (time_ref->ts_dev_1 < time_ref->ts_dev_2) {
+			/* case when event time (tsw) wraps */
+			if (ts < time_ref->ts_dev_1)
+				delta_ts = 1 << time_ref->adapter->ts_used_bits;
+
+		/* Otherwise, sync time counter (ts_dev_2) has wrapped:
+		 * handle case when event time (tsn) hasn't.
+		 *
+		 *      < ts_period > <          >
+		 *     |             |            |
+		 *  ---+--------+--0-+---------+--+-->
+		 *     ts_dev_1 |    ts_dev_2  |
+		 *              tsn            ts
+		 */
+		} else if (time_ref->ts_dev_1 < ts) {
+			delta_ts = -(1 << time_ref->adapter->ts_used_bits);
+		}
 
-		delta_us = ts - time_ref->ts_dev_2;
-		if (ts < time_ref->ts_dev_2)
-			delta_us &= (1 << time_ref->adapter->ts_used_bits) - 1;
+		/* add delay between last sync and event timestamps */
+		delta_ts += (signed int)(ts - time_ref->ts_dev_2);
 
-		delta_us += time_ref->ts_total;
+		/* add time from beginning to last sync */
+		delta_ts += time_ref->ts_total;
 
-		delta_us *= time_ref->adapter->us_per_ts_scale;
+		/* convert ticks number into microseconds */
+		delta_us = delta_ts * time_ref->adapter->us_per_ts_scale;
 		delta_us >>= time_ref->adapter->us_per_ts_shift;
 
 		*time = ktime_add_us(time_ref->tv_host_0, delta_us);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#22 lore raw

PATCH 21/101 can: peak_canfd: pucan_handle_can_rx(): fix echo management when loopback is on

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stephane Grosjean <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 93ef65e5a6357cc7381f85fcec9283fe29970045 ]

Echo management is driven by PUCAN_MSG_LOOPED_BACK bit, while loopback frames are identified with PUCAN_MSG_SELF_RECEIVE bit. Those bits are set for each outgoing frame written to the IP core so that a copy of each one will be placed into the rx path. Thus,

- when PUCAN_MSG_LOOPED_BACK is set then the rx frame is an echo of a previously sent frame,
- when PUCAN_MSG_LOOPED_BACK+PUCAN_MSG_SELF_RECEIVE are set, then the rx frame is an echo AND a loopback frame. Therefore, this frame must be put into the socket rx path too.

This patch fixes how CAN frames are handled when these are sent while the can interface is configured in "loopback on" mode.

Fixes 8ac8321e4a79 ("can: peak: add support for PEAK PCAN-PCIe FD CAN-FD boards")
---
 drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_canfd.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/can/peak_canfd/peak_canfd.c +8 -3
index 5696d7e807513..4bc5d522c74bb 100644
@@ -256,8 +256,7 @@ static int pucan_handle_can_rx(struct peak_canfd_priv *priv,
 		cf_len = get_can_dlc(pucan_msg_get_dlc(msg));
 
 	/* if this frame is an echo, */
-	if ((rx_msg_flags & PUCAN_MSG_LOOPED_BACK) &&
-	    !(rx_msg_flags & PUCAN_MSG_SELF_RECEIVE)) {
+	if (rx_msg_flags & PUCAN_MSG_LOOPED_BACK) {
 		unsigned long flags;
 
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->echo_lock, flags);
@@ -271,7 +270,13 @@ static int pucan_handle_can_rx(struct peak_canfd_priv *priv,
 		netif_wake_queue(priv->ndev);
 
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->echo_lock, flags);
-		return 0;
+
+		/* if this frame is only an echo, stop here. Otherwise,
+		 * continue to push this application self-received frame into
+		 * its own rx queue.
+		 */
+		if (!(rx_msg_flags & PUCAN_MSG_SELF_RECEIVE))
+			return 0;
 	}
 
 	/* otherwise, it should be pushed into rx fifo */
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#23 lore raw

PATCH 22/101 can: flexcan: remove FLEXCAN_QUIRK_DISABLE_MECR quirk for LS1021A

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Joakim Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 018799649071a1638c0c130526af36747df4355a ]

After double check with Layerscape CAN owner (Pankaj Bansal), confirm that LS1021A doesn't support ECC feature, so remove FLEXCAN_QUIRK_DISABLE_MECR quirk.

Fixes 99b7668c04b27 ("can: flexcan: adding platform specific details for LS1021A")
Cc Pankaj Bansal <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/net/can/flexcan.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/can/flexcan.c +1 -2
index 0be8db6ab3195..92fe345e48ab7 100644
@@ -301,8 +301,7 @@ static const struct flexcan_devtype_data fsl_vf610_devtype_data = {
 
 static const struct flexcan_devtype_data fsl_ls1021a_r2_devtype_data = {
 	.quirks = FLEXCAN_QUIRK_DISABLE_RXFG | FLEXCAN_QUIRK_ENABLE_EACEN_RRS |
-		FLEXCAN_QUIRK_DISABLE_MECR | FLEXCAN_QUIRK_BROKEN_PERR_STATE |
-		FLEXCAN_QUIRK_USE_OFF_TIMESTAMP,
+		FLEXCAN_QUIRK_BROKEN_PERR_STATE | FLEXCAN_QUIRK_USE_OFF_TIMESTAMP,
 };
 
 static const struct can_bittiming_const flexcan_bittiming_const = {
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#24 lore raw

PATCH 23/101 xfs: flush new eof page on truncate to avoid post-eof corruption

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 869ae85dae64b5540e4362d7fe4cd520e10ec05c ]

It is possible to expose non-zeroed post-EOF data in XFS if the new EOF page is dirty, backed by an unwritten block and the truncate happens to race with writeback. iomap_truncate_page() will not zero the post-EOF portion of the page if the underlying block is unwritten. The subsequent call to truncate_setsize() will, but doesn't dirty the page. Therefore, if writeback happens to complete after iomap_truncate_page() (so it still sees the unwritten block) but before truncate_setsize(), the cached page becomes inconsistent with the on-disk block. A mapped read after the associated page is reclaimed or invalidated exposes non-zero post-EOF data.

For example, consider the following sequence when run on a kernel modified to explicitly flush the new EOF page within the race window:

$ xfs_io -fc "falloc 0 4k" -c fsync /mnt/file
$ xfs_io -c "pwrite 0 4k" -c "truncate 1k" /mnt/file
  ...
$ xfs_io -c "mmap 0 4k" -c "mread -v 1k 8" /mnt/file
00000400:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ........
$ umount /mnt/; mount <dev> /mnt/
$ xfs_io -c "mmap 0 4k" -c "mread -v 1k 8" /mnt/file
00000400:  cd cd cd cd cd cd cd cd  ........

Update xfs_setattr_size() to explicitly flush the new EOF page prior to the page truncate to ensure iomap has the latest state of the underlying block.

Fixes 68a9f5e7007c ("xfs: implement iomap based buffered write path")
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c +10 -0
index e427ad097e2ee..948ac1290121b 100644
@@ -895,6 +895,16 @@ xfs_setattr_size(
 		error = iomap_zero_range(inode, oldsize, newsize - oldsize,
 				&did_zeroing, &xfs_iomap_ops);
 	} else {
+		/*
+		 * iomap won't detect a dirty page over an unwritten block (or a
+		 * cow block over a hole) and subsequently skips zeroing the
+		 * newly post-EOF portion of the page. Flush the new EOF to
+		 * convert the block before the pagecache truncate.
+		 */
+		error = filemap_write_and_wait_range(inode->i_mapping, newsize,
+						     newsize);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
 		error = iomap_truncate_page(inode, newsize, &did_zeroing,
 				&xfs_iomap_ops);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#25 lore raw

PATCH 24/101 xfs: fix scrub flagging rtinherit even if there is no rt device

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c1f6b1ac00756a7108e5fcb849a2f8230c0b62a5 ]

The kernel has always allowed directories to have the rtinherit flag set, even if there is no rt device, so this check is wrong.

Fixes 80e4e1268802 ("xfs: scrub inodes")
---
 fs/xfs/scrub/inode.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/scrub/inode.c +1 -2
index e386c9b0b4ab7..8d45d60832db9 100644
@@ -131,8 +131,7 @@ xchk_inode_flags(
 		goto bad;
 
 	/* rt flags require rt device */
-	if ((flags & (XFS_DIFLAG_REALTIME | XFS_DIFLAG_RTINHERIT)) &&
-	    !mp->m_rtdev_targp)
+	if ((flags & XFS_DIFLAG_REALTIME) && !mp->m_rtdev_targp)
 		goto bad;
 
 	/* new rt bitmap flag only valid for rbmino */
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#26 lore raw

PATCH 25/101 tpm: efi: Dont create binary_bios_measurements file for an empty log

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ffd778aff45be760292225049e0141255d4ad6e ]

Mimic the pre-existing ACPI and Device Tree event log behavior by not creating the binary_bios_measurements file when the EFI TPM event log is empty.

This fixes the following NULL pointer dereference that can occur when reading /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements after the kernel received an empty event log from the firmware:

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002c
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 PGD 0 P4D 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
 CPU: 2 PID: 3932 Comm: fwupdtpmevlog Not tainted 5.9.0-00003-g629990edad62 #17
 Hardware name: LENOVO 20LCS03L00/20LCS03L00, BIOS N27ET38W (1.24 ) 11/28/2019
 RIP: 0010:tpm2_bios_measurements_start+0x3a/0x550
 Code: 54 53 48 83 ec 68 48 8b 57 70 48 8b 1e 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 48 8b 82 c0 06 00 00 48 8b 8a c8 06 00 00 <44> 8b 60 1c 48 89 4d a0 4c 89 e2 49 83 c4 20 48 83 fb 00 75 2a 49
 RSP: 0018:ffffa9c901203db0 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000010
 RDX: ffff8ba1eb99c000 RSI: ffff8ba1e4ce8280 RDI: ffff8ba1e4ce8258
 RBP: ffffa9c901203e40 R08: ffffa9c901203dd8 R09: ffff8ba1ec443300
 R10: ffffa9c901203e50 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8ba1e4ce8280
 R13: ffffa9c901203ef0 R14: ffffa9c901203ef0 R15: ffff8ba1e4ce8258
 FS:  00007f6595460880(0000) GS:ffff8ba1ef880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 000000000000002c CR3: 00000007d8d18003 CR4: 00000000003706e0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Call Trace:
  ? __kmalloc_node+0x113/0x320
  ? kvmalloc_node+0x31/0x80
  seq_read+0x94/0x420
  vfs_read+0xa7/0x190
  ksys_read+0xa7/0xe0
  __x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

In this situation, the bios_event_log pointer in the tpm_bios_log struct was not NULL but was equal to the ZERO_SIZE_PTR (0x10) value. This was due to the following kmemdup() in tpm_read_log_efi():

int tpm_read_log_efi(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
...

	/* malloc EventLog space */
	log->bios_event_log = kmemdup(log_tbl->log, log_size, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!log->bios_event_log) {
		ret = -ENOMEM;
		goto out;
	}

...
}

When log_size is zero, due to an empty event log from firmware, ZERO_SIZE_PTR is returned from kmemdup(). Upon a read of the binary_bios_measurements file, the tpm2_bios_measurements_start() function does not perform a ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() check on the bios_event_log pointer before dereferencing it.

Rather than add a ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() check in functions that make use of the bios_event_log pointer, simply avoid creating the binary_bios_measurements_file as is done in other event log retrieval backends.

Explicitly ignore all of the events in the final event log when the main event log is empty. The list of events in the final event log cannot be accurately parsed without referring to the first event in the main event log (the event log header) so the final event log is useless in such a situation.

---
 drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/efi.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/efi.c +5 -0
index 3e673ab22cb45..abd3beeb51589 100644
@@ -43,6 +43,11 @@ int tpm_read_log_efi(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	log_size = log_tbl->size;
 	memunmap(log_tbl);
 
+	if (!log_size) {
+		pr_warn("UEFI TPM log area empty\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	log_tbl = memremap(efi.tpm_log, sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size,
 			   MEMREMAP_WB);
 	if (!log_tbl) {
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#27 lore raw

PATCH 26/101 Btrfs: fix missing error return if writeback for extent buffer never started

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0607eb1d452d45c5ac4c745a9e9e0d95152ea9d0 ]

If lock_extent_buffer_for_io() fails, it returns a negative value, but its caller btree_write_cache_pages() ignores such error. This means that a call to flush_write_bio(), from lock_extent_buffer_for_io(), might have failed. We should make btree_write_cache_pages() notice such error values and stop immediatelly, making sure filemap_fdatawrite_range() returns an error to the transaction commit path. A failure from flush_write_bio() should also result in the endio callback end_bio_extent_buffer_writepage() being invoked, which sets the BTRFS_FS_*_ERR bits appropriately, so that there's no risk a transaction or log commit doesn't catch a writeback failure.

---
 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/extent_io.c +4 -0
index 301111922a1a2..dabf153843e90 100644
@@ -3913,6 +3913,10 @@ int btree_write_cache_pages(struct address_space *mapping,
 			if (!ret) {
 				free_extent_buffer(eb);
 				continue;
+			} else if (ret < 0) {
+				done = 1;
+				free_extent_buffer(eb);
+				break;
 			}
 
 			ret = write_one_eb(eb, fs_info, wbc, &epd);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#28 lore raw

PATCH 27/101 ath9k_htc: Use appropriate rs_datalen type

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Masashi Honma <[email protected]>

commit 5024f21c159f8c1668f581fff37140741c0b1ba9 upstream.

kernel test robot says:
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c:987:20: sparse: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c:987:20: sparse: expected restricted __be16 [usertype] rs_datalen
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c:987:20: sparse: got unsigned short [usertype]
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c:988:13: sparse: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to integer drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c:1001:13: sparse: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to integer

Indeed rs_datalen has host byte order, so modify it's own type.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c +1 -1
@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ static bool ath9k_rx_prepare(struct ath9
 	struct ath_htc_rx_status *rxstatus;
 	struct ath_rx_status rx_stats;
 	bool decrypt_error = false;
-	__be16 rs_datalen;
+	u16 rs_datalen;
 	bool is_phyerr;
 
 	if (skb->len < HTC_RX_FRAME_HEADER_SIZE) {
author maintainer
#29 lore raw

PATCH 28/101 netfilter: use actual socket sk rather than skb sk when routing harder

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>

commit 46d6c5ae953cc0be38efd0e469284df7c4328cf8 upstream.

If netfilter changes the packet mark when mangling, the packet is rerouted using the route_me_harder set of functions. Prior to this commit, there's one big difference between route_me_harder and the ordinary initial routing functions, described in the comment above __ip_queue_xmit():

/* Note: skb->sk can be different from sk, in case of tunnels */ int __ip_queue_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl,

That function goes on to correctly make use of sk->sk_bound_dev_if, rather than skb->sk->sk_bound_dev_if. And indeed the comment is true: a tunnel will receive a packet in ndo_start_xmit with an initial skb->sk. It will make some transformations to that packet, and then it will send the encapsulated packet out of a *new* socket. That new socket will basically always have a different sk_bound_dev_if (otherwise there'd be a routing loop). So for the purposes of routing the encapsulated packet, the routing information as it pertains to the socket should come from that socket's sk, rather than the packet's original skb->sk. For that reason __ip_queue_xmit() and related functions all do the right thing.

One might argue that all tunnels should just call skb_orphan(skb) before transmitting the encapsulated packet into the new socket. But tunnels do *not* do this -- and this is wisely avoided in skb_scrub_packet() too -- because features like TSQ rely on skb->destructor() being called when that buffer space is truely available again. Calling skb_orphan(skb) too early would result in buffers filling up unnecessarily and accounting info being all wrong. Instead, additional routing must take into account the new sk, just as __ip_queue_xmit() notes.

So, this commit addresses the problem by fishing the correct sk out of state->sk -- it's already set properly in the call to nf_hook() in __ip_local_out(), which receives the sk as part of its normal functionality. So we make sure to plumb state->sk through the various route_me_harder functions, and then make correct use of it following the example of __ip_queue_xmit().

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
[Jason: backported to 4.19 from Sasha's 5.4 backport]
---
 include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h            |    2 +-
 include/linux/netfilter_ipv6.h            |    2 +-
 net/ipv4/netfilter.c                      |   12 +++++++-----
 net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_SYNPROXY.c         |    2 +-
 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c       |    2 +-
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c  |    2 +-
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c       |    2 +-
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv4.c |    2 +-
 net/ipv6/netfilter.c                      |    6 +++---
 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c      |    2 +-
 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c  |    2 +-
 net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv6.c |    2 +-
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c           |    4 ++--
 13 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h +1 -1
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ struct ip_rt_info {
 	u_int32_t mark;
 };
 
-int ip_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned addr_type);
+int ip_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned addr_type);
 
 struct nf_queue_entry;
 
include/linux/netfilter_ipv6.h +1 -1
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct nf_ipv6_ops {
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
-int ip6_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb);
+int ip6_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 __sum16 nf_ip6_checksum(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int hook,
 			unsigned int dataoff, u_int8_t protocol);
 
net/ipv4/netfilter.c +7 -5
@@ -17,17 +17,19 @@
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_queue.h>
 
 /* route_me_harder function, used by iptable_nat, iptable_mangle + ip_queue */
-int ip_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int addr_type)
+int ip_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int addr_type)
 {
 	const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
 	struct rtable *rt;
 	struct flowi4 fl4 = {};
 	__be32 saddr = iph->saddr;
-	const struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
-	__u8 flags = sk ? inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk) : 0;
+	__u8 flags;
 	struct net_device *dev = skb_dst(skb)->dev;
 	unsigned int hh_len;
 
+	sk = sk_to_full_sk(sk);
+	flags = sk ? inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk) : 0;
+
 	if (addr_type == RTN_UNSPEC)
 		addr_type = inet_addr_type_dev_table(net, dev, saddr);
 	if (addr_type == RTN_LOCAL || addr_type == RTN_UNICAST)
@@ -91,8 +93,8 @@ int nf_ip_reroute(struct sk_buff *skb, c
 		      skb->mark == rt_info->mark &&
 		      iph->daddr == rt_info->daddr &&
 		      iph->saddr == rt_info->saddr))
-			return ip_route_me_harder(entry->state.net, skb,
-						  RTN_UNSPEC);
+			return ip_route_me_harder(entry->state.net, entry->state.sk,
+						  skb, RTN_UNSPEC);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_SYNPROXY.c +1 -1
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ synproxy_send_tcp(struct net *net,
 
 	skb_dst_set_noref(nskb, skb_dst(skb));
 	nskb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
-	if (ip_route_me_harder(net, nskb, RTN_UNSPEC))
+	if (ip_route_me_harder(net, nskb->sk, nskb, RTN_UNSPEC))
 		goto free_nskb;
 
 	if (nfct) {
net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c +1 -1
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ ipt_mangle_out(struct sk_buff *skb, cons
 		    iph->daddr != daddr ||
 		    skb->mark != mark ||
 		    iph->tos != tos) {
-			err = ip_route_me_harder(state->net, skb, RTN_UNSPEC);
+			err = ip_route_me_harder(state->net, state->sk, skb, RTN_UNSPEC);
 			if (err < 0)
 				ret = NF_DROP_ERR(err);
 		}
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c +1 -1
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ nf_nat_ipv4_local_fn(void *priv, struct
 
 		if (ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst.u3.ip !=
 		    ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src.u3.ip) {
-			err = ip_route_me_harder(state->net, skb, RTN_UNSPEC);
+			err = ip_route_me_harder(state->net, state->sk, skb, RTN_UNSPEC);
 			if (err < 0)
 				ret = NF_DROP_ERR(err);
 		}
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c +1 -1
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ void nf_send_reset(struct net *net, stru
 				   ip4_dst_hoplimit(skb_dst(nskb)));
 	nf_reject_ip_tcphdr_put(nskb, oldskb, oth);
 
-	if (ip_route_me_harder(net, nskb, RTN_UNSPEC))
+	if (ip_route_me_harder(net, nskb->sk, nskb, RTN_UNSPEC))
 		goto free_nskb;
 
 	niph = ip_hdr(nskb);
net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv4.c +1 -1
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static unsigned int nf_route_table_hook(
 		    iph->daddr != daddr ||
 		    skb->mark != mark ||
 		    iph->tos != tos) {
-			err = ip_route_me_harder(state->net, skb, RTN_UNSPEC);
+			err = ip_route_me_harder(state->net, state->sk, skb, RTN_UNSPEC);
 			if (err < 0)
 				ret = NF_DROP_ERR(err);
 		}
net/ipv6/netfilter.c +3 -3
@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_queue.h>
 
-int ip6_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb)
+int ip6_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sock *sk_partial, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	const struct ipv6hdr *iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
-	struct sock *sk = sk_to_full_sk(skb->sk);
+	struct sock *sk = sk_to_full_sk(sk_partial);
 	unsigned int hh_len;
 	struct dst_entry *dst;
 	int strict = (ipv6_addr_type(&iph->daddr) &
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static int nf_ip6_reroute(struct sk_buff
 		if (!ipv6_addr_equal(&iph->daddr, &rt_info->daddr) ||
 		    !ipv6_addr_equal(&iph->saddr, &rt_info->saddr) ||
 		    skb->mark != rt_info->mark)
-			return ip6_route_me_harder(entry->state.net, skb);
+			return ip6_route_me_harder(entry->state.net, entry->state.sk, skb);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c +1 -1
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ ip6t_mangle_out(struct sk_buff *skb, con
 	     skb->mark != mark ||
 	     ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit != hop_limit ||
 	     flowlabel != *((u_int32_t *)ipv6_hdr(skb)))) {
-		err = ip6_route_me_harder(state->net, skb);
+		err = ip6_route_me_harder(state->net, state->sk, skb);
 		if (err < 0)
 			ret = NF_DROP_ERR(err);
 	}
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c +1 -1
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ nf_nat_ipv6_local_fn(void *priv, struct
 
 		if (!nf_inet_addr_cmp(&ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst.u3,
 				      &ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src.u3)) {
-			err = ip6_route_me_harder(state->net, skb);
+			err = ip6_route_me_harder(state->net, state->sk, skb);
 			if (err < 0)
 				ret = NF_DROP_ERR(err);
 		}
net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv6.c +1 -1
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static unsigned int nf_route_table_hook(
 	     skb->mark != mark ||
 	     ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit != hop_limit ||
 	     flowlabel != *((u_int32_t *)ipv6_hdr(skb)))) {
-		err = ip6_route_me_harder(state->net, skb);
+		err = ip6_route_me_harder(state->net, state->sk, skb);
 		if (err < 0)
 			ret = NF_DROP_ERR(err);
 	}
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c +2 -2
@@ -725,12 +725,12 @@ static int ip_vs_route_me_harder(struct
 		struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
 
 		if (dst->dev && !(dst->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) &&
-		    ip6_route_me_harder(ipvs->net, skb) != 0)
+		    ip6_route_me_harder(ipvs->net, skb->sk, skb) != 0)
 			return 1;
 	} else
 #endif
 		if (!(skb_rtable(skb)->rt_flags & RTCF_LOCAL) &&
-		    ip_route_me_harder(ipvs->net, skb, RTN_LOCAL) != 0)
+		    ip_route_me_harder(ipvs->net, skb->sk, skb, RTN_LOCAL) != 0)
 			return 1;
 
 	return 0;
author maintainer
#30 lore raw

PATCH 29/101 crypto: arm64/aes-modes - get rid of literal load of addend vector

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>

commit ed6ed11830a9ded520db31a6e2b69b6b0a1eb0e2 upstream.

Replace the literal load of the addend vector with a sequence that performs each add individually. This sequence is only 2 instructions longer than the original, and 2% faster on Cortex-A53.

This is an improvement by itself, but also works around a Clang issue, whose integrated assembler does not implement the GNU ARM asm syntax completely, and does not support the =literal notation for FP registers (more info at https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=38642)

---
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S |   16 +++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S +9 -7
@@ -232,17 +232,19 @@ AES_ENTRY(aes_ctr_encrypt)
 	bmi		.Lctr1x
 	cmn		w6, #4			/* 32 bit overflow? */
 	bcs		.Lctr1x
-	ldr		q8, =0x30000000200000001	/* addends 1,2,3[,0] */
-	dup		v7.4s, w6
+	add		w7, w6, #1
 	mov		v0.16b, v4.16b
-	add		v7.4s, v7.4s, v8.4s
+	add		w8, w6, #2
 	mov		v1.16b, v4.16b
-	rev32		v8.16b, v7.16b
+	add		w9, w6, #3
 	mov		v2.16b, v4.16b
+	rev		w7, w7
 	mov		v3.16b, v4.16b
-	mov		v1.s[3], v8.s[0]
-	mov		v2.s[3], v8.s[1]
-	mov		v3.s[3], v8.s[2]
+	rev		w8, w8
+	mov		v1.s[3], w7
+	rev		w9, w9
+	mov		v2.s[3], w8
+	mov		v3.s[3], w9
 	ld1		{v5.16b-v7.16b}, [x20], #48	/* get 3 input blocks */
 	bl		aes_encrypt_block4x
 	eor		v0.16b, v5.16b, v0.16b
author maintainer
#31 lore raw

PATCH 30/101 usb: gadget: goku_udc: fix potential crashes in probe

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Evgeny Novikov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0d66e04875c5aae876cf3d4f4be7978fa2b00523 ]

goku_probe() goes to error label "err" and invokes goku_remove() in case of failures of pci_enable_device(), pci_resource_start() and ioremap(). goku_remove() gets a device from pci_get_drvdata(pdev) and works with it without any checks, in particular it dereferences a corresponding pointer. But goku_probe() did not set this device yet. So, one can expect various crashes. The patch moves setting the device just after allocation of memory for it.

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c +1 -1
index c3721225b61ed..b706ad3034bc1 100644
@@ -1757,6 +1757,7 @@ static int goku_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
 		goto err;
 	}
 
+	pci_set_drvdata(pdev, dev);
 	spin_lock_init(&dev->lock);
 	dev->pdev = pdev;
 	dev->gadget.ops = &goku_ops;
@@ -1790,7 +1791,6 @@ static int goku_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
 	}
 	dev->regs = (struct goku_udc_regs __iomem *) base;
 
-	pci_set_drvdata(pdev, dev);
 	INFO(dev, "%s\n", driver_desc);
 	INFO(dev, "version: " DRIVER_VERSION " %s\n", dmastr());
 	INFO(dev, "irq %d, pci mem %p\n", pdev->irq, base);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#32 lore raw

PATCH 31/101 ALSA: hda: Reinstate runtime_allow() for all hda controllers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9fc149c3bce7bdbb94948a8e6bd025e3b3538603 ]

The broken jack detection should be fixed by commit a6e7d0a4bdb0 ("ALSA:
hda: fix jack detection with Realtek codecs when in D3"), let's try enabling runtime PM by default again.

---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c +1 -0
index d43245937db7e..8e1eb5f243a27 100644
@@ -2478,6 +2478,7 @@ static int azx_probe_continue(struct azx *chip)
 
 	if (azx_has_pm_runtime(chip)) {
 		pm_runtime_use_autosuspend(&pci->dev);
+		pm_runtime_allow(&pci->dev);
 		pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(&pci->dev);
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
#33 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.19 031/101] ALSA: hda: Reinstate runtime_allow() for all hda controllers

Hi!

Quoted 7 lines

From: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9fc149c3bce7bdbb94948a8e6bd025e3b3538603 ]

The broken jack detection should be fixed by commit a6e7d0a4bdb0 ("ALSA:
hda: fix jack detection with Realtek codecs when in D3"), let's try enabling runtime PM by default again.

I believe experiments should be done in mainline, not in stable.

Worse problem is that a6e7d0a4bdb0 is not in 4.19-stable, so this will likely break jack detection.

Best regards,
Pavel

Signature · 1 line
http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
maintainer
#34 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.19 031/101] ALSA: hda: Reinstate runtime_allow() for all hda controllers

Quoted 6 lines · Pavel Machek

Hi!

Quoted 4 lines

From: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9fc149c3bce7bdbb94948a8e6bd025e3b3538603 ]

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

The broken jack detection should be fixed by commit a6e7d0a4bdb0 ("ALSA:
hda: fix jack detection with Realtek codecs when in D3"), let's try enabling runtime PM by default again.

I believe experiments should be done in mainline, not in stable.

Worse problem is that a6e7d0a4bdb0 is not in 4.19-stable, so this will likely break jack detection.

I've dropped it from 4.19, thanks!

Signature · 2 lines
Thanks,
Sasha
author maintainer
#35 lore raw

PATCH 32/101 gfs2: Free rd_bits later in gfs2_clear_rgrpd to fix use-after-free

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Bob Peterson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d0f17d3883f1e3f085d38572c2ea8edbd5150172 ]

Function gfs2_clear_rgrpd calls kfree(rgd->rd_bits) before calling return_all_reservations, but return_all_reservations still dereferences rgd->rd_bits in __rs_deltree. Fix that by moving the call to kfree below the call to return_all_reservations.

---
 fs/gfs2/rgrp.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/gfs2/rgrp.c +1 -1
index c94c4ac1ae78b..1686a40099f21 100644
@@ -739,9 +739,9 @@ void gfs2_clear_rgrpd(struct gfs2_sbd *sdp)
 		}
 
 		gfs2_free_clones(rgd);
+		return_all_reservations(rgd);
 		kfree(rgd->rd_bits);
 		rgd->rd_bits = NULL;
-		return_all_reservations(rgd);
 		kmem_cache_free(gfs2_rgrpd_cachep, rgd);
 	}
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#36 lore raw

PATCH 33/101 gfs2: Add missing truncate_inode_pages_final for sd_aspace

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Bob Peterson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a9dd945ccef07a904e412f208f8de708a3d7159e ]

Gfs2 creates an address space for its rgrps called sd_aspace, but it never called truncate_inode_pages_final on it. This confused vfs greatly which tried to reference the address space after gfs2 had freed the superblock that contained it.

This patch adds a call to truncate_inode_pages_final for sd_aspace, thus avoiding the use-after-free.

---
 fs/gfs2/super.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/gfs2/super.c +1 -0
index a971862b186e3..22cd68bd8c9b0 100644
@@ -934,6 +934,7 @@ restart:
 	gfs2_jindex_free(sdp);
 	/*  Take apart glock structures and buffer lists  */
 	gfs2_gl_hash_clear(sdp);
+	truncate_inode_pages_final(&sdp->sd_aspace);
 	gfs2_delete_debugfs_file(sdp);
 	/*  Unmount the locking protocol  */
 	gfs2_lm_unmount(sdp);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#37 lore raw

PATCH 34/101 gfs2: check for live vs. read-only file system in gfs2_fitrim

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Bob Peterson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c5c68724696e7d2f8db58a5fce3673208d35c485 ]

Before this patch, gfs2_fitrim was not properly checking for a "live" file system. If the file system had something to trim and the file system was read-only (or spectator) it would start the trim, but when it starts the transaction, gfs2_trans_begin returns -EROFS (read-only file system) and it errors out. However, if the file system was already trimmed so there's no work to do, it never called gfs2_trans_begin. That code is bypassed so it never returns the error. Instead, it returns a good return code with 0 work. All this makes for inconsistent behavior:
The same fstrim command can return -EROFS in one case and 0 in another. This tripped up xfstests generic/537 which reports the error as:

+fstrim with unrecovered metadata just ate your filesystem

This patch adds a check for a "live" (iow, active journal, iow, RW) file system, and if not, returns the error properly.

---
 fs/gfs2/rgrp.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/gfs2/rgrp.c +3 -0
index 1686a40099f21..de9b561b1c385 100644
@@ -1387,6 +1387,9 @@ int gfs2_fitrim(struct file *filp, void __user *argp)
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	if (!test_bit(SDF_JOURNAL_LIVE, &sdp->sd_flags))
+		return -EROFS;
+
 	if (!blk_queue_discard(q))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#38 lore raw

PATCH 35/101 scsi: hpsa: Fix memory leak in hpsa_init_one()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Keita Suzuki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit af61bc1e33d2c0ec22612b46050f5b58ac56a962 ]

When hpsa_scsi_add_host() fails, h->lastlogicals is leaked since it is missing a free() in the error handler.

Fix this by adding free() when hpsa_scsi_add_host() fails.

---
 drivers/scsi/hpsa.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/hpsa.c +3 -1
index 11de2198bb87d..0fe21cbdf0ca7 100644
@@ -8781,7 +8781,7 @@ reinit_after_soft_reset:
 	/* hook into SCSI subsystem */
 	rc = hpsa_scsi_add_host(h);
 	if (rc)
-		goto clean7; /* perf, sg, cmd, irq, shost, pci, lu, aer/h */
+		goto clean8; /* lastlogicals, perf, sg, cmd, irq, shost, pci, lu, aer/h */
 
 	/* Monitor the controller for firmware lockups */
 	h->heartbeat_sample_interval = HEARTBEAT_SAMPLE_INTERVAL;
@@ -8796,6 +8796,8 @@ reinit_after_soft_reset:
 				HPSA_EVENT_MONITOR_INTERVAL);
 	return 0;
 
+clean8: /* lastlogicals, perf, sg, cmd, irq, shost, pci, lu, aer/h */
+	kfree(h->lastlogicals);
 clean7: /* perf, sg, cmd, irq, shost, pci, lu, aer/h */
 	hpsa_free_performant_mode(h);
 	h->access.set_intr_mask(h, HPSA_INTR_OFF);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#39 lore raw

PATCH 36/101 drm/amdgpu: perform srbm soft reset always on SDMA resume

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Evan Quan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 253475c455eb5f8da34faa1af92709e7bb414624 ]

This can address the random SDMA hang after pci config reset seen on Hawaii.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cik_sdma.c | 27 ++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/cik_sdma.c +12 -15
index d0fa2aac23888..ca66c2f797584 100644
@@ -1086,22 +1086,19 @@ static int cik_sdma_soft_reset(void *handle)
 {
 	u32 srbm_soft_reset = 0;
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = (struct amdgpu_device *)handle;
-	u32 tmp = RREG32(mmSRBM_STATUS2);
+	u32 tmp;
 
-	if (tmp & SRBM_STATUS2__SDMA_BUSY_MASK) {
-		/* sdma0 */
-		tmp = RREG32(mmSDMA0_F32_CNTL + SDMA0_REGISTER_OFFSET);
-		tmp |= SDMA0_F32_CNTL__HALT_MASK;
-		WREG32(mmSDMA0_F32_CNTL + SDMA0_REGISTER_OFFSET, tmp);
-		srbm_soft_reset |= SRBM_SOFT_RESET__SOFT_RESET_SDMA_MASK;
-	}
-	if (tmp & SRBM_STATUS2__SDMA1_BUSY_MASK) {
-		/* sdma1 */
-		tmp = RREG32(mmSDMA0_F32_CNTL + SDMA1_REGISTER_OFFSET);
-		tmp |= SDMA0_F32_CNTL__HALT_MASK;
-		WREG32(mmSDMA0_F32_CNTL + SDMA1_REGISTER_OFFSET, tmp);
-		srbm_soft_reset |= SRBM_SOFT_RESET__SOFT_RESET_SDMA1_MASK;
-	}
+	/* sdma0 */
+	tmp = RREG32(mmSDMA0_F32_CNTL + SDMA0_REGISTER_OFFSET);
+	tmp |= SDMA0_F32_CNTL__HALT_MASK;
+	WREG32(mmSDMA0_F32_CNTL + SDMA0_REGISTER_OFFSET, tmp);
+	srbm_soft_reset |= SRBM_SOFT_RESET__SOFT_RESET_SDMA_MASK;
+
+	/* sdma1 */
+	tmp = RREG32(mmSDMA0_F32_CNTL + SDMA1_REGISTER_OFFSET);
+	tmp |= SDMA0_F32_CNTL__HALT_MASK;
+	WREG32(mmSDMA0_F32_CNTL + SDMA1_REGISTER_OFFSET, tmp);
+	srbm_soft_reset |= SRBM_SOFT_RESET__SOFT_RESET_SDMA1_MASK;
 
 	if (srbm_soft_reset) {
 		tmp = RREG32(mmSRBM_SOFT_RESET);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#40 lore raw

PATCH 37/101 drm/amd/pm: perform SMC reset on suspend/hibernation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Evan Quan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 277b080f98803cb73a83fb234f0be83a10e63958 ]

So that the succeeding resume can be performed based on a clean state.

---
 .../gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/hwmgr/smu7_hwmgr.c  |  4 ++++
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/hwmgr.h     |  1 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/smumgr.h    |  2 ++
 .../gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/ci_smumgr.c  | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/smumgr.c |  8 +++++++
 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/hwmgr/smu7_hwmgr.c +4 -0
index 058898b321b8a..d8e624d64ae38 100644
@@ -1531,6 +1531,10 @@ int smu7_disable_dpm_tasks(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr)
 	PP_ASSERT_WITH_CODE((tmp_result == 0),
 			"Failed to reset to default!", result = tmp_result);
 
+	tmp_result = smum_stop_smc(hwmgr);
+	PP_ASSERT_WITH_CODE((tmp_result == 0),
+			"Failed to stop smc!", result = tmp_result);
+
 	tmp_result = smu7_force_switch_to_arbf0(hwmgr);
 	PP_ASSERT_WITH_CODE((tmp_result == 0),
 			"Failed to force to switch arbf0!", result = tmp_result);
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/hwmgr.h +1 -0
index 6ee864455a12a..f59e1e737735f 100644
@@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ struct pp_smumgr_func {
 	bool (*is_hw_avfs_present)(struct pp_hwmgr  *hwmgr);
 	int (*update_dpm_settings)(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, void *profile_setting);
 	int (*smc_table_manager)(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, uint8_t *table, uint16_t table_id, bool rw); /*rw: true for read, false for write */
+	int (*stop_smc)(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr);
 };
 
 struct pp_hwmgr_func {
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/smumgr.h +2 -0
index 82550a8a3a3fc..ef4f2392e2e7d 100644
@@ -113,4 +113,6 @@ extern int smum_update_dpm_settings(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, void *profile_settin
 
 extern int smum_smc_table_manager(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, uint8_t *table, uint16_t table_id, bool rw);
 
+extern int smum_stop_smc(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr);
+
 #endif
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/ci_smumgr.c +24 -0
index db87cb8930d24..0d4dd607e85c8 100644
@@ -2934,6 +2934,29 @@ static int ci_update_smc_table(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, uint32_t type)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void ci_reset_smc(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr)
+{
+	PHM_WRITE_INDIRECT_FIELD(hwmgr->device, CGS_IND_REG__SMC,
+				  SMC_SYSCON_RESET_CNTL,
+				  rst_reg, 1);
+}
+
+
+static void ci_stop_smc_clock(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr)
+{
+	PHM_WRITE_INDIRECT_FIELD(hwmgr->device, CGS_IND_REG__SMC,
+				  SMC_SYSCON_CLOCK_CNTL_0,
+				  ck_disable, 1);
+}
+
+static int ci_stop_smc(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr)
+{
+	ci_reset_smc(hwmgr);
+	ci_stop_smc_clock(hwmgr);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 const struct pp_smumgr_func ci_smu_funcs = {
 	.smu_init = ci_smu_init,
 	.smu_fini = ci_smu_fini,
@@ -2957,4 +2980,5 @@ const struct pp_smumgr_func ci_smu_funcs = {
 	.is_dpm_running = ci_is_dpm_running,
 	.update_dpm_settings = ci_update_dpm_settings,
 	.update_smc_table = ci_update_smc_table,
+	.stop_smc = ci_stop_smc,
 };
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/smumgr.c +8 -0
index a6edd5df33b0f..20ecf994d47f3 100644
@@ -213,3 +213,11 @@ int smum_smc_table_manager(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, uint8_t *table, uint16_t tabl
 
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
+
+int smum_stop_smc(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr)
+{
+	if (hwmgr->smumgr_funcs->stop_smc)
+		return hwmgr->smumgr_funcs->stop_smc(hwmgr);
+
+	return 0;
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#41 lore raw

PATCH 38/101 drm/amd/pm: do not use ixFEATURE_STATUS for checking smc running

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Evan Quan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 786436b453001dafe81025389f96bf9dac1e9690 ]

This reverts commit f87812284172a9809820d10143b573d833cd3f75 ("drm/amdgpu:
Fix bug where DPM is not enabled after hibernate and resume"). It was intended to fix Hawaii S4(hibernation) issue but break S3. As ixFEATURE_STATUS is filled with garbage data on resume which can be only cleared by reloading smc firmware(but that will involve many changes). So, we will revert this S4 fix and seek a new way.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/ci_smumgr.c | 5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/ci_smumgr.c +1 -4
index 0d4dd607e85c8..c05bec5effb2e 100644
@@ -2723,10 +2723,7 @@ static int ci_initialize_mc_reg_table(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr)
 
 static bool ci_is_dpm_running(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr)
 {
-	return (1 == PHM_READ_INDIRECT_FIELD(hwmgr->device,
-					     CGS_IND_REG__SMC, FEATURE_STATUS,
-					     VOLTAGE_CONTROLLER_ON))
-		? true : false;
+	return ci_is_smc_ram_running(hwmgr);
 }
 
 static int ci_smu_init(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr)
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#42 lore raw

PATCH 39/101 mac80211: fix use of skb payload instead of header

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 14f46c1e5108696ec1e5a129e838ecedf108c7bf ]

When ieee80211_skb_resize() is called from ieee80211_build_hdr() the skb has no 802.11 header yet, in fact it consist only of the payload as the ethernet frame is removed. As such, we're using the payload data for ieee80211_is_mgmt(), which is of course completely wrong. This didn't really hurt us because these are always data frames, so we could only have added more tailroom than we needed if we determined it was a management frame and sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt was false.

However, syzbot found that of course there need not be any payload, so we're using at best uninitialized memory for the check.

Fix this to pass explicitly the kind of frame that we have instead of checking there, by replacing the "bool may_encrypt" argument with an argument that can carry the three possible states - it's not going to be encrypted, it's a management frame, or it's a data frame (and then we check sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt).

---
 net/mac80211/tx.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
net/mac80211/tx.c +24 -13
index 3160ffd93a153..98d048630ad2f 100644
@@ -1908,19 +1908,24 @@ static bool ieee80211_tx(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 
 /* device xmit handlers */
 
+enum ieee80211_encrypt {
+	ENCRYPT_NO,
+	ENCRYPT_MGMT,
+	ENCRYPT_DATA,
+};
+
 static int ieee80211_skb_resize(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
-				int head_need, bool may_encrypt)
+				int head_need,
+				enum ieee80211_encrypt encrypt)
 {
 	struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
-	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
 	bool enc_tailroom;
 	int tail_need = 0;
 
-	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
-	enc_tailroom = may_encrypt &&
-		       (sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt ||
-			ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control));
+	enc_tailroom = encrypt == ENCRYPT_MGMT ||
+		       (encrypt == ENCRYPT_DATA &&
+			sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt);
 
 	if (enc_tailroom) {
 		tail_need = IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM;
@@ -1952,23 +1957,29 @@ void ieee80211_xmit(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 {
 	struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
-	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
 	int headroom;
-	bool may_encrypt;
+	enum ieee80211_encrypt encrypt;
 
-	may_encrypt = !(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_DONT_ENCRYPT);
+	if (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_DONT_ENCRYPT)
+		encrypt = ENCRYPT_NO;
+	else if (ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
+		encrypt = ENCRYPT_MGMT;
+	else
+		encrypt = ENCRYPT_DATA;
 
 	headroom = local->tx_headroom;
-	if (may_encrypt)
+	if (encrypt != ENCRYPT_NO)
 		headroom += sdata->encrypt_headroom;
 	headroom -= skb_headroom(skb);
 	headroom = max_t(int, 0, headroom);
 
-	if (ieee80211_skb_resize(sdata, skb, headroom, may_encrypt)) {
+	if (ieee80211_skb_resize(sdata, skb, headroom, encrypt)) {
 		ieee80211_free_txskb(&local->hw, skb);
 		return;
 	}
 
+	/* reload after potential resize */
 	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
 	info->control.vif = &sdata->vif;
 
@@ -2751,7 +2762,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *ieee80211_build_hdr(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 		head_need += sdata->encrypt_headroom;
 		head_need += local->tx_headroom;
 		head_need = max_t(int, 0, head_need);
-		if (ieee80211_skb_resize(sdata, skb, head_need, true)) {
+		if (ieee80211_skb_resize(sdata, skb, head_need, ENCRYPT_DATA)) {
 			ieee80211_free_txskb(&local->hw, skb);
 			skb = NULL;
 			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
@@ -3414,7 +3425,7 @@ static bool ieee80211_xmit_fast(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 	if (unlikely(ieee80211_skb_resize(sdata, skb,
 					  max_t(int, extra_head + hw_headroom -
 						     skb_headroom(skb), 0),
-					  false))) {
+					  ENCRYPT_NO))) {
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 		return true;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#43 lore raw

PATCH 40/101 mac80211: always wind down STA state

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dcd479e10a0510522a5d88b29b8f79ea3467d501 ]

When (for example) an IBSS station is pre-moved to AUTHORIZED before it's inserted, and then the insertion fails, we don't clean up the fast RX/TX states that might already have been created, since we don't go through all the state transitions again on the way down.

Do that, if it hasn't been done already, when the station is freed. I considered only freeing the fast TX/RX state there, but we might add more state so it's more robust to wind down the state properly.

Note that we warn if the station was ever inserted, it should have been properly cleaned up in that case, and the driver will probably not like things happening out of order.

---
 net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
net/mac80211/sta_info.c +18 -0
index 9968b8a976f19..d11eb5139c92a 100644
@@ -244,6 +244,24 @@ struct sta_info *sta_info_get_by_idx(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
  */
 void sta_info_free(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sta_info *sta)
 {
+	/*
+	 * If we had used sta_info_pre_move_state() then we might not
+	 * have gone through the state transitions down again, so do
+	 * it here now (and warn if it's inserted).
+	 *
+	 * This will clear state such as fast TX/RX that may have been
+	 * allocated during state transitions.
+	 */
+	while (sta->sta_state > IEEE80211_STA_NONE) {
+		int ret;
+
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_INSERTED));
+
+		ret = sta_info_move_state(sta, sta->sta_state - 1);
+		if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "sta_info_move_state() returned %d\n", ret))
+			break;
+	}
+
 	if (sta->rate_ctrl)
 		rate_control_free_sta(sta);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#44 lore raw

PATCH 41/101 cfg80211: regulatory: Fix inconsistent format argument

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ye Bin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit db18d20d1cb0fde16d518fb5ccd38679f174bc04 ]

Fix follow warning:
[net/wireless/reg.c:3619]: (warning) %d in format string (no. 2) requires 'int' but the argument type is 'unsigned int'.

---
 net/wireless/reg.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/wireless/reg.c +1 -1
index 935aebf150107..c7825b951f725 100644
@@ -3374,7 +3374,7 @@ static void print_rd_rules(const struct ieee80211_regdomain *rd)
 		power_rule = &reg_rule->power_rule;
 
 		if (reg_rule->flags & NL80211_RRF_AUTO_BW)
-			snprintf(bw, sizeof(bw), "%d KHz, %d KHz AUTO",
+			snprintf(bw, sizeof(bw), "%d KHz, %u KHz AUTO",
 				 freq_range->max_bandwidth_khz,
 				 reg_get_max_bandwidth(rd, reg_rule));
 		else
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#45 lore raw

PATCH 42/101 scsi: scsi_dh_alua: Avoid crash during alua_bus_detach()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5faf50e9e9fdc2117c61ff7e20da49cd6a29e0ca ]

alua_bus_detach() might be running concurrently with alua_rtpg_work(), so we might trip over h->sdev == NULL and call BUG_ON(). The correct way of handling it is to not set h->sdev to NULL in alua_bus_detach(), and call rcu_synchronize() before the final delete to ensure that all concurrent threads have left the critical section. Then we can get rid of the BUG_ON() and replace it with a simple if condition.

---
 drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c +5 -4
index c95c782b93a53..60c48dc5d9453 100644
@@ -672,8 +672,8 @@ static int alua_rtpg(struct scsi_device *sdev, struct alua_port_group *pg)
 					rcu_read_lock();
 					list_for_each_entry_rcu(h,
 						&tmp_pg->dh_list, node) {
-						/* h->sdev should always be valid */
-						BUG_ON(!h->sdev);
+						if (!h->sdev)
+							continue;
 						h->sdev->access_state = desc[0];
 					}
 					rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -719,7 +719,8 @@ static int alua_rtpg(struct scsi_device *sdev, struct alua_port_group *pg)
 			pg->expiry = 0;
 			rcu_read_lock();
 			list_for_each_entry_rcu(h, &pg->dh_list, node) {
-				BUG_ON(!h->sdev);
+				if (!h->sdev)
+					continue;
 				h->sdev->access_state =
 					(pg->state & SCSI_ACCESS_STATE_MASK);
 				if (pg->pref)
@@ -1160,7 +1161,6 @@ static void alua_bus_detach(struct scsi_device *sdev)
 	spin_lock(&h->pg_lock);
 	pg = rcu_dereference_protected(h->pg, lockdep_is_held(&h->pg_lock));
 	rcu_assign_pointer(h->pg, NULL);
-	h->sdev = NULL;
 	spin_unlock(&h->pg_lock);
 	if (pg) {
 		spin_lock_irq(&pg->lock);
@@ -1169,6 +1169,7 @@ static void alua_bus_detach(struct scsi_device *sdev)
 		kref_put(&pg->kref, release_port_group);
 	}
 	sdev->handler_data = NULL;
+	synchronize_rcu();
 	kfree(h);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
#46 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.19 042/101] scsi: scsi_dh_alua: Avoid crash during alua_bus_detach()

Hi!

Quoted 10 lines

From: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5faf50e9e9fdc2117c61ff7e20da49cd6a29e0ca ]

alua_bus_detach() might be running concurrently with alua_rtpg_work(), so we might trip over h->sdev == NULL and call BUG_ON(). The correct way of handling it is to not set h->sdev to NULL in alua_bus_detach(), and call rcu_synchronize() before the final delete to ensure that all concurrent threads have left the critical section. Then we can get rid of the BUG_ON() and replace it with a simple if condition.

I don't get it.

In the new version, h->sdev will never be NULL, because it is never set to NULL. It is will be valid up-to the point when h is freed...

synchronize_rcu() should prevent race with alua_rtpg(), but BUG_ON()s should stay, to catch any bogosity... Or maybe the if (!h->sdev) tests should be simply removed. But it does not make sense to silently continue.

Best regards,
Pavel

Quoted 31 lines

+++ b/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c

drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c +4 -4
@@ -672,8 +672,8 @@ static int alua_rtpg(struct scsi_device *sdev, struct alua_port_group *pg)
 					rcu_read_lock();
 					list_for_each_entry_rcu(h,
 						&tmp_pg->dh_list, node) {
-						/* h->sdev should always be valid */
-						BUG_ON(!h->sdev);
+						if (!h->sdev)
+							continue;
 						h->sdev->access_state = desc[0];
 					}
 					rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -719,7 +719,8 @@ static int alua_rtpg(struct scsi_device *sdev, struct alua_port_group *pg)
 			pg->expiry = 0;
 			rcu_read_lock();
 			list_for_each_entry_rcu(h, &pg->dh_list, node) {
-				BUG_ON(!h->sdev);
+				if (!h->sdev)
+					continue;
 				h->sdev->access_state =
 					(pg->state & SCSI_ACCESS_STATE_MASK);
 				if (pg->pref)
@@ -1160,7 +1161,6 @@ static void alua_bus_detach(struct scsi_device *sdev)
 	spin_lock(&h->pg_lock);
 	pg = rcu_dereference_protected(h->pg, lockdep_is_held(&h->pg_lock));
 	rcu_assign_pointer(h->pg, NULL);
-	h->sdev = NULL;
 	spin_unlock(&h->pg_lock);
 	if (pg) {
 		spin_lock_irq(&pg->lock);

drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c static void alua_bus_detach(struct scsi_device *sdev) · line 1175

Quoted 7 lines
drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c +1 -0
@@ -1169,6 +1169,7 @@ static void alua_bus_detach(struct scsi_device *sdev)
 		kref_put(&pg->kref, release_port_group);
 	}
 	sdev->handler_data = NULL;
+	synchronize_rcu();
 	kfree(h);
 }
 

--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany

author maintainer
#47 lore raw

PATCH 43/101 iommu/amd: Increase interrupt remapping table limit to 512 entries

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suravee Suthikulpanit <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 73db2fc595f358460ce32bcaa3be1f0cce4a2db1 ]

Certain device drivers allocate IO queues on a per-cpu basis. On AMD EPYC platform, which can support up-to 256 cpu threads, this can exceed the current MAX_IRQ_PER_TABLE limit of 256, and result in the error message:

AMD-Vi: Failed to allocate IRTE

This has been observed with certain NVME devices.

AMD IOMMU hardware can actually support upto 512 interrupt remapping table entries. Therefore, update the driver to match the hardware limit.

Please note that this also increases the size of interrupt remapping table to 8KB per device when using the 128-bit IRTE format.

---
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h +5 -1
index 859b06424e5c4..df6f3cc958e5e 100644
@@ -410,7 +410,11 @@ extern bool amd_iommu_np_cache;
 /* Only true if all IOMMUs support device IOTLBs */
 extern bool amd_iommu_iotlb_sup;
 
-#define MAX_IRQS_PER_TABLE	256
+/*
+ * AMD IOMMU hardware only support 512 IRTEs despite
+ * the architectural limitation of 2048 entries.
+ */
+#define MAX_IRQS_PER_TABLE	512
 #define IRQ_TABLE_ALIGNMENT	128
 
 struct irq_remap_table {
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#48 lore raw

PATCH 44/101 s390/smp: move rcu_cpu_starting() earlier

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Qian Cai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit de5d9dae150ca1c1b5c7676711a9ca139d1a8dec ]

The call to rcu_cpu_starting() in smp_init_secondary() is not early enough in the CPU-hotplug onlining process, which results in lockdep splats as follows:

WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
-----------------------------
kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3497 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

other info that might help us debug this:

RCU used illegally from offline CPU!
rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
no locks held by swapper/1/0.

 Call Trace:
 show_stack+0x158/0x1f0
 dump_stack+0x1f2/0x238
 __lock_acquire+0x2640/0x4dd0
 lock_acquire+0x3a8/0xd08
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xc0/0xf0
 clockevents_register_device+0xa8/0x528
 init_cpu_timer+0x33e/0x468
 smp_init_secondary+0x11a/0x328
 smp_start_secondary+0x82/0x88

This is avoided by moving the call to rcu_cpu_starting up near the beginning of the smp_init_secondary() function. Note that the raw_smp_processor_id() is required in order to avoid calling into lockdep before RCU has declared the CPU to be watched for readers.

---
 arch/s390/kernel/smp.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/s390/kernel/smp.c +2 -1
index 8e31dfd85de32..888f247c9261a 100644
@@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ void __init smp_detect_cpus(void)
  */
 static void smp_start_secondary(void *cpuvoid)
 {
-	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
 
 	S390_lowcore.last_update_clock = get_tod_clock();
 	S390_lowcore.restart_stack = (unsigned long) restart_stack;
@@ -844,6 +844,7 @@ static void smp_start_secondary(void *cpuvoid)
 	set_cpu_flag(CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY);
 	set_cpu_flag(CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY);
 	cpu_init();
+	rcu_cpu_starting(cpu);
 	preempt_disable();
 	init_cpu_timer();
 	vtime_init();
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#49 lore raw

PATCH 45/101 vfio: platform: fix reference leak in vfio_platform_open

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhang Qilong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bb742ad01961a3b9d1f9d19375487b879668b6b2 ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() will increment pm usage counter even it failed. Forgetting to call pm_runtime_put will result in reference leak in vfio_platform_open, so we should fix it.

---
 drivers/vfio/platform/vfio_platform_common.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/vfio/platform/vfio_platform_common.c +1 -2
index c0cd824be2b76..460760d0becfe 100644
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static int vfio_platform_open(void *device_data)
 
 		ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(vdev->device);
 		if (ret < 0)
-			goto err_pm;
+			goto err_rst;
 
 		ret = vfio_platform_call_reset(vdev, &extra_dbg);
 		if (ret && vdev->reset_required) {
@@ -290,7 +290,6 @@ static int vfio_platform_open(void *device_data)
 
 err_rst:
 	pm_runtime_put(vdev->device);
-err_pm:
 	vfio_platform_irq_cleanup(vdev);
 err_irq:
 	vfio_platform_regions_cleanup(vdev);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#50 lore raw

PATCH 46/101 selftests: proc: fix warning: _GNU_SOURCE redefined

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f3ae6c6e8a3ea49076d826c64e63ea78fbf9db43 ]

Makefile already contains -D_GNU_SOURCE, so we can remove it from the *.c files.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-loadavg-001.c  | 1 -
 tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-self-syscall.c | 1 -
 tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-uptime-002.c   | 1 -
 3 files changed, 3 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-loadavg-001.c +0 -1
index fcff7047000da..8edaafc2b92fd 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 /* Test that /proc/loadavg correctly reports last pid in pid namespace. */
-#define _GNU_SOURCE
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <sched.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-self-syscall.c +0 -1
index 5ab5f4810e43a..7b9018fad092a 100644
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
  * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
-#define _GNU_SOURCE
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <sys/syscall.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-uptime-002.c +0 -1
index 30e2b78490898..e7ceabed7f51f 100644
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
  */
 // Test that values in /proc/uptime increment monotonically
 // while shifting across CPUs.
-#define _GNU_SOURCE
 #undef NDEBUG
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#51 lore raw

PATCH 47/101 tpm_tis: Disable interrupts on ThinkPad T490s

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jerry Snitselaar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b154ce11ead925de6a94feb3b0317fafeefa0ebc ]

There is a misconfiguration in the bios of the gpio pin used for the interrupt in the T490s. When interrupts are enabled in the tpm_tis driver code this results in an interrupt storm. This was initially reported when we attempted to enable the interrupt code in the tpm_tis driver, which previously wasn't setting a flag to enable it. Due to the reports of the interrupt storm that code was reverted and we went back to polling instead of using interrupts. Now that we know the T490s problem is a firmware issue, add code to check if the system is a T490s and disable interrupts if that is the case. This will allow us to enable interrupts for everyone else. If the user has a fixed bios they can force the enabling of interrupts with tpm_tis.interrupts=1 on the kernel command line.

---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c +27 -2
index f08949a5f6785..5a3a4f0953910 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/of.h>
 #include <linux/of_device.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/dmi.h>
 #include "tpm.h"
 #include "tpm_tis_core.h"
 
@@ -53,8 +54,8 @@ static inline struct tpm_tis_tcg_phy *to_tpm_tis_tcg_phy(struct tpm_tis_data *da
 	return container_of(data, struct tpm_tis_tcg_phy, priv);
 }
 
-static bool interrupts = true;
-module_param(interrupts, bool, 0444);
+static int interrupts = -1;
+module_param(interrupts, int, 0444);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(interrupts, "Enable interrupts");
 
 static bool itpm;
@@ -67,6 +68,28 @@ module_param(force, bool, 0444);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(force, "Force device probe rather than using ACPI entry");
 #endif
 
+static int tpm_tis_disable_irq(const struct dmi_system_id *d)
+{
+	if (interrupts == -1) {
+		pr_notice("tpm_tis: %s detected: disabling interrupts.\n", d->ident);
+		interrupts = 0;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct dmi_system_id tpm_tis_dmi_table[] = {
+	{
+		.callback = tpm_tis_disable_irq,
+		.ident = "ThinkPad T490s",
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "ThinkPad T490s"),
+		},
+	},
+	{}
+};
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_PNP) && defined(CONFIG_ACPI)
 static int has_hid(struct acpi_device *dev, const char *hid)
 {
@@ -196,6 +219,8 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_info *tpm_info)
 	int irq = -1;
 	int rc;
 
+	dmi_check_system(tpm_tis_dmi_table);
+
 	rc = check_acpi_tpm2(dev);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#52 lore raw

PATCH 48/101 tick/common: Touch watchdog in tick_unfreeze() on all CPUs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Chunyan Zhang <[email protected]>

commit 5167c506d62dd9ffab73eba23c79b0a8845c9fe1 upstream.

Suspend to IDLE invokes tick_unfreeze() on resume. tick_unfreeze() on the first resuming CPU resumes timekeeping, which also has the side effect of resetting the softlockup watchdog on this CPU.

But on the secondary CPUs the watchdog is not reset in the resume / unfreeze() path, which can result in false softlockup warnings on those CPUs depending on the time spent in suspend.

Prevent this by clearing the softlock watchdog in the unfreeze path also on the secondary resuming CPUs.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

---
 kernel/time/tick-common.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
kernel/time/tick-common.c +2 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/hrtimer.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/nmi.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/profile.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
@@ -520,6 +521,7 @@ void tick_unfreeze(void)
 		trace_suspend_resume(TPS("timekeeping_freeze"),
 				     smp_processor_id(), false);
 	} else {
+		touch_softlockup_watchdog();
 		tick_resume_local();
 	}
 
author maintainer
#53 lore raw

PATCH 49/101 mfd: sprd: Add wakeup capability for PMIC IRQ

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Baolin Wang <[email protected]>

commit a75bfc824a2d33f57ebdc003bfe6b7a9e11e9cb9 upstream.

When changing to use suspend-to-idle to save power, the PMIC irq can not wakeup the system due to lack of wakeup capability, which will cause the sub-irqs (such as power key) of the PMIC can not wake up the system. Thus we can add the wakeup capability for PMIC irq to solve this issue, as well as removing the IRQF_NO_SUSPEND flag to allow PMIC irq to be a wakeup source.

---
 drivers/mfd/sprd-sc27xx-spi.c |   28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mfd/sprd-sc27xx-spi.c +27 -1
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int sprd_pmic_probe(struct spi_de
 	}
 
 	ret = devm_regmap_add_irq_chip(&spi->dev, ddata->regmap, ddata->irq,
-				       IRQF_ONESHOT | IRQF_NO_SUSPEND, 0,
+				       IRQF_ONESHOT, 0,
 				       &ddata->irq_chip, &ddata->irq_data);
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(&spi->dev, "Failed to add PMIC irq chip %d\n", ret);
@@ -228,9 +228,34 @@ static int sprd_pmic_probe(struct spi_de
 		return ret;
 	}
 
+	device_init_wakeup(&spi->dev, true);
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
+static int sprd_pmic_suspend(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct sprd_pmic *ddata = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+	if (device_may_wakeup(dev))
+		enable_irq_wake(ddata->irq);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sprd_pmic_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct sprd_pmic *ddata = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+	if (device_may_wakeup(dev))
+		disable_irq_wake(ddata->irq);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(sprd_pmic_pm_ops, sprd_pmic_suspend, sprd_pmic_resume);
+
 static const struct of_device_id sprd_pmic_match[] = {
 	{ .compatible = "sprd,sc2731", .data = &sc2731_data },
 	{},
@@ -242,6 +267,7 @@ static struct spi_driver sprd_pmic_drive
 		.name = "sc27xx-pmic",
 		.bus = &spi_bus_type,
 		.of_match_table = sprd_pmic_match,
+		.pm = &sprd_pmic_pm_ops,
 	},
 	.probe = sprd_pmic_probe,
 };
author maintainer
#54 lore raw

PATCH 50/101 pinctrl: intel: Set default bias in case no particular value given

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f3c75e7a9349d1d33eb53ddc1b31640994969f73 ]

When GPIO library asks pin control to set the bias, it doesn't pass any value of it and argument is considered boolean (and this is true for ACPI GpioIo() / GpioInt() resources, by the way). Thus, individual drivers must behave well, when they got the resistance value of 1 Ohm, i.e. transforming it to sane default.

In case of Intel pin control hardware the 5 kOhm sounds plausible because on one hand it's a minimum of resistors present in all hardware generations and at the same time it's high enough to minimize leakage current (will be only 200 uA with the above choice).

Fixes e57725eabf87 ("pinctrl: intel: Add support for hardware debouncer")
---
 drivers/pinctrl/intel/pinctrl-intel.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/pinctrl/intel/pinctrl-intel.c +8 -0
index 89ff2795a8b55..5e0adb00b4307 100644
@@ -621,6 +621,10 @@ static int intel_config_set_pull(struct intel_pinctrl *pctrl, unsigned pin,
 
 		value |= PADCFG1_TERM_UP;
 
+		/* Set default strength value in case none is given */
+		if (arg == 1)
+			arg = 5000;
+
 		switch (arg) {
 		case 20000:
 			value |= PADCFG1_TERM_20K << PADCFG1_TERM_SHIFT;
@@ -643,6 +647,10 @@ static int intel_config_set_pull(struct intel_pinctrl *pctrl, unsigned pin,
 	case PIN_CONFIG_BIAS_PULL_DOWN:
 		value &= ~(PADCFG1_TERM_UP | PADCFG1_TERM_MASK);
 
+		/* Set default strength value in case none is given */
+		if (arg == 1)
+			arg = 5000;
+
 		switch (arg) {
 		case 20000:
 			value |= PADCFG1_TERM_20K << PADCFG1_TERM_SHIFT;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#55 lore raw

PATCH 51/101 ARM: 9019/1: kprobes: Avoid fortify_panic() when copying optprobe template

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Andrew Jeffery <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9fa2e7af3d53a4b769136eccc32c02e128a4ee51 ]

Setting both CONFIG_KPROBES=y and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y on ARM leads to a panic in memcpy() when injecting a kprobe despite the fixes found in commit e46daee53bb5 ("ARM: 8806/1: kprobes: Fix false positive with FORTIFY_SOURCE") and commit 0ac569bf6a79 ("ARM: 8834/1: Fix: kprobes:
optimized kprobes illegal instruction").

arch/arm/include/asm/kprobes.h effectively declares
the target type of the optprobe_template_entry assembly label as a u32 which leads memcpy()'s __builtin_object_size() call to determine that the pointed-to object is of size four. However, the symbol is used as a handle for the optimised probe assembly template that is at least 96 bytes in size. The symbol's use despite its type blows up the memcpy() in ARM's arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe() with a false-positive fortify_panic() when it should instead copy the optimised probe template into place:

```
$ sudo perf probe -a aspeed_g6_pinctrl_probe
[  158.457252] detected buffer overflow in memcpy
[  158.458069] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  158.458283] kernel BUG at lib/string.c:1153!
[  158.458436] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ARM
[  158.458768] Modules linked in:
[  158.459043] CPU: 1 PID: 99 Comm: perf Not tainted 5.9.0-rc7-00038-gc53ebf8167e9 #158
[  158.459296] Hardware name: Generic DT based system
[  158.459529] PC is at fortify_panic+0x18/0x20
[  158.459658] LR is at __irq_work_queue_local+0x3c/0x74
[  158.459831] pc : [<8047451c>]    lr : [<8020ecd4>]    psr: 60000013
[  158.460032] sp : be2d1d50  ip : be2d1c58  fp : be2d1d5c
[  158.460174] r10: 00000006  r9 : 00000000  r8 : 00000060
[  158.460348] r7 : 8011e434  r6 : b9e0b800  r5 : 7f000000  r4 : b9fe4f0c
[  158.460557] r3 : 80c04cc8  r2 : 00000000  r1 : be7c03cc  r0 : 00000022
[  158.460801] Flags: nZCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment none
[  158.461037] Control: 10c5387d  Table: b9cd806a  DAC: 00000051
[  158.461251] Process perf (pid: 99, stack limit = 0x81c71a69)
[  158.461472] Stack: (0xbe2d1d50 to 0xbe2d2000)
[  158.461757] 1d40:                                     be2d1d84 be2d1d60 8011e724 80474510
[  158.462104] 1d60: b9e0b800 b9fe4f0c 00000000 b9fe4f14 80c8ec80 be235000 be2d1d9c be2d1d88
[  158.462436] 1d80: 801cee44 8011e57c b9fe4f0c 00000000 be2d1dc4 be2d1da0 801d0ad0 801cedec
[  158.462742] 1da0: 00000000 00000000 b9fe4f00 ffffffea 00000000 be235000 be2d1de4 be2d1dc8
[  158.463087] 1dc0: 80204604 801d0738 00000000 00000000 b9fe4004 ffffffea be2d1e94 be2d1de8
[  158.463428] 1de0: 80205434 80204570 00385c00 00000000 00000000 00000000 be2d1e14 be2d1e08
[  158.463880] 1e00: 802ba014 b9fe4f00 b9e718c0 b9fe4f84 b9e71ec8 be2d1e24 00000000 00385c00
[  158.464365] 1e20: 00000000 626f7270 00000065 802b905c be2d1e94 0000002e 00000000 802b9914
[  158.464829] 1e40: be2d1e84 be2d1e50 802b9914 8028ff78 804629d0 b9e71ec0 0000002e b9e71ec0
[  158.465141] 1e60: be2d1ea8 80c04cc8 00000cc0 b9e713c4 00000002 80205834 80205834 0000002e
[  158.465488] 1e80: be235000 be235000 be2d1ea4 be2d1e98 80205854 80204e94 be2d1ecc be2d1ea8
[  158.465806] 1ea0: 801ee4a0 80205840 00000002 80c04cc8 00000000 0000002e 0000002e 00000000
[  158.466110] 1ec0: be2d1f0c be2d1ed0 801ee5c8 801ee428 00000000 be2d0000 006b1fd0 00000051
[  158.466398] 1ee0: 00000000 b9eedf00 0000002e 80204410 006b1fd0 be2d1f60 00000000 00000004
[  158.466763] 1f00: be2d1f24 be2d1f10 8020442c 801ee4c4 80205834 802c613c be2d1f5c be2d1f28
[  158.467102] 1f20: 802c60ac 8020441c be2d1fac be2d1f38 8010c764 802e9888 be2d1f5c b9eedf00
[  158.467447] 1f40: b9eedf00 006b1fd0 0000002e 00000000 be2d1f94 be2d1f60 802c634c 802c5fec
[  158.467812] 1f60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 80c04cc8 006b1fd0 00000003 76f7a610 00000004
[  158.468155] 1f80: 80100284 be2d0000 be2d1fa4 be2d1f98 802c63ec 802c62e8 00000000 be2d1fa8
[  158.468508] 1fa0: 80100080 802c63e0 006b1fd0 00000003 00000003 006b1fd0 0000002e 00000000
[  158.468858] 1fc0: 006b1fd0 00000003 76f7a610 00000004 006b1fb0 0026d348 00000017 7ef2738c
[  158.469202] 1fe0: 76f3431c 7ef272d8 0014ec50 76f34338 60000010 00000003 00000000 00000000
[  158.469461] Backtrace:
[  158.469683] [<80474504>] (fortify_panic) from [<8011e724>] (arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe+0x1b4/0x1f8)
[  158.470021] [<8011e570>] (arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe) from [<801cee44>] (alloc_aggr_kprobe+0x64/0x70)
[  158.470287]  r9:be235000 r8:80c8ec80 r7:b9fe4f14 r6:00000000 r5:b9fe4f0c r4:b9e0b800
[  158.470478] [<801cede0>] (alloc_aggr_kprobe) from [<801d0ad0>] (register_kprobe+0x3a4/0x5a0)
[  158.470685]  r5:00000000 r4:b9fe4f0c
[  158.470790] [<801d072c>] (register_kprobe) from [<80204604>] (__register_trace_kprobe+0xa0/0xa4)
[  158.471001]  r9:be235000 r8:00000000 r7:ffffffea r6:b9fe4f00 r5:00000000 r4:00000000
[  158.471188] [<80204564>] (__register_trace_kprobe) from [<80205434>] (trace_kprobe_create+0x5ac/0x9ac)
[  158.471408]  r7:ffffffea r6:b9fe4004 r5:00000000 r4:00000000
[  158.471553] [<80204e88>] (trace_kprobe_create) from [<80205854>] (create_or_delete_trace_kprobe+0x20/0x3c)
[  158.471766]  r10:be235000 r9:be235000 r8:0000002e r7:80205834 r6:80205834 r5:00000002
[  158.471949]  r4:b9e713c4
[  158.472027] [<80205834>] (create_or_delete_trace_kprobe) from [<801ee4a0>] (trace_run_command+0x84/0x9c)
[  158.472255] [<801ee41c>] (trace_run_command) from [<801ee5c8>] (trace_parse_run_command+0x110/0x1f8)
[  158.472471]  r6:00000000 r5:0000002e r4:0000002e
[  158.472594] [<801ee4b8>] (trace_parse_run_command) from [<8020442c>] (probes_write+0x1c/0x28)
[  158.472800]  r10:00000004 r9:00000000 r8:be2d1f60 r7:006b1fd0 r6:80204410 r5:0000002e
[  158.472968]  r4:b9eedf00
[  158.473046] [<80204410>] (probes_write) from [<802c60ac>] (vfs_write+0xcc/0x1e8)
[  158.473226] [<802c5fe0>] (vfs_write) from [<802c634c>] (ksys_write+0x70/0xf8)
[  158.473400]  r8:00000000 r7:0000002e r6:006b1fd0 r5:b9eedf00 r4:b9eedf00
[  158.473567] [<802c62dc>] (ksys_write) from [<802c63ec>] (sys_write+0x18/0x1c)
[  158.473745]  r9:be2d0000 r8:80100284 r7:00000004 r6:76f7a610 r5:00000003 r4:006b1fd0
[  158.473932] [<802c63d4>] (sys_write) from [<80100080>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54)
[  158.474126] Exception stack(0xbe2d1fa8 to 0xbe2d1ff0)
[  158.474305] 1fa0:                   006b1fd0 00000003 00000003 006b1fd0 0000002e 00000000
[  158.474573] 1fc0: 006b1fd0 00000003 76f7a610 00000004 006b1fb0 0026d348 00000017 7ef2738c
[  158.474811] 1fe0: 76f3431c 7ef272d8 0014ec50 76f34338
[  158.475171] Code: e24cb004 e1a01000 e59f0004 ebf40dd3 (e7f001f2)
[  158.475847] ---[ end trace 55a5b31c08a29f00 ]---
[  158.476088] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[  158.476375] CPU0: stopping
[  158.476709] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G      D           5.9.0-rc7-00038-gc53ebf8167e9 #158
[  158.477176] Hardware name: Generic DT based system
[  158.477411] Backtrace:
[  158.477604] [<8010dd28>] (dump_backtrace) from [<8010dfd4>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[  158.477990]  r7:00000000 r6:60000193 r5:00000000 r4:80c2f634
[  158.478323] [<8010dfb4>] (show_stack) from [<8046390c>] (dump_stack+0xcc/0xe8)
[  158.478686] [<80463840>] (dump_stack) from [<80110750>] (handle_IPI+0x334/0x3a0)
[  158.479063]  r7:00000000 r6:00000004 r5:80b65cc8 r4:80c78278
[  158.479352] [<8011041c>] (handle_IPI) from [<801013f8>] (gic_handle_irq+0x88/0x94)
[  158.479757]  r10:10c5387d r9:80c01ed8 r8:00000000 r7:c0802000 r6:80c0537c r5:000003ff
[  158.480146]  r4:c080200c r3:fffffff4
[  158.480364] [<80101370>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<80100b6c>] (__irq_svc+0x6c/0x90)
[  158.480748] Exception stack(0x80c01ed8 to 0x80c01f20)
[  158.481031] 1ec0:                                                       000128bc 00000000
[  158.481499] 1ee0: be7b8174 8011d3a0 80c00000 00000000 80c04cec 80c04d28 80c5d7c2 80a026d4
[  158.482091] 1f00: 10c5387d 80c01f34 80c01f38 80c01f28 80109554 80109558 60000013 ffffffff
[  158.482621]  r9:80c00000 r8:80c5d7c2 r7:80c01f0c r6:ffffffff r5:60000013 r4:80109558
[  158.482983] [<80109518>] (arch_cpu_idle) from [<80818780>] (default_idle_call+0x38/0x120)
[  158.483360] [<80818748>] (default_idle_call) from [<801585a8>] (do_idle+0xd4/0x158)
[  158.483945]  r5:00000000 r4:80c00000
[  158.484237] [<801584d4>] (do_idle) from [<801588f4>] (cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x2c)
[  158.484784]  r9:80c78000 r8:00000000 r7:80c78000 r6:80c78040 r5:80c04cc0 r4:000000d6
[  158.485328] [<801588cc>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<80810a78>] (rest_init+0x9c/0xbc)
[  158.485930] [<808109dc>] (rest_init) from [<80b00ae4>] (arch_call_rest_init+0x18/0x1c)
[  158.486503]  r5:80c04cc0 r4:00000001
[  158.486857] [<80b00acc>] (arch_call_rest_init) from [<80b00fcc>] (start_kernel+0x46c/0x548)
[  158.487589] [<80b00b60>] (start_kernel) from [<00000000>] (0x0)
```
Fixes e46daee53bb5 ("ARM: 8806/1: kprobes: Fix false positive with FORTIFY_SOURCE")
Fixes 0ac569bf6a79 ("ARM: 8834/1: Fix: kprobes: optimized kprobes illegal instruction")
Cc Luka Oreskovic <[email protected]>
Cc Juraj Vijtiuk <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kprobes.h    | 22 +++++++++++-----------
 arch/arm/probes/kprobes/opt-arm.c | 18 +++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/kprobes.h +11 -11
index 82290f212d8e7..e1eb662e0f9e0 100644
@@ -52,20 +52,20 @@ int kprobe_exceptions_notify(struct notifier_block *self,
 			     unsigned long val, void *data);
 
 /* optinsn template addresses */
-extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_entry;
-extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_val;
-extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_call;
-extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_end;
-extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_sub_sp;
-extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_add_sp;
-extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_restore_begin;
-extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_restore_orig_insn;
-extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_restore_end;
+extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_entry[];
+extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_val[];
+extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_call[];
+extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_end[];
+extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_sub_sp[];
+extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_add_sp[];
+extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_restore_begin[];
+extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_restore_orig_insn[];
+extern __visible kprobe_opcode_t optprobe_template_restore_end[];
 
 #define MAX_OPTIMIZED_LENGTH	4
 #define MAX_OPTINSN_SIZE				\
-	((unsigned long)&optprobe_template_end -	\
-	 (unsigned long)&optprobe_template_entry)
+	((unsigned long)optprobe_template_end -	\
+	 (unsigned long)optprobe_template_entry)
 #define RELATIVEJUMP_SIZE	4
 
 struct arch_optimized_insn {
arch/arm/probes/kprobes/opt-arm.c +9 -9
index 0dc23fc227ed2..cf08cb7267670 100644
@@ -98,21 +98,21 @@ asm (
 			"optprobe_template_end:\n");
 
 #define TMPL_VAL_IDX \
-	((unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_val - (unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_entry)
+	((unsigned long *)optprobe_template_val - (unsigned long *)optprobe_template_entry)
 #define TMPL_CALL_IDX \
-	((unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_call - (unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_entry)
+	((unsigned long *)optprobe_template_call - (unsigned long *)optprobe_template_entry)
 #define TMPL_END_IDX \
-	((unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_end - (unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_entry)
+	((unsigned long *)optprobe_template_end - (unsigned long *)optprobe_template_entry)
 #define TMPL_ADD_SP \
-	((unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_add_sp - (unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_entry)
+	((unsigned long *)optprobe_template_add_sp - (unsigned long *)optprobe_template_entry)
 #define TMPL_SUB_SP \
-	((unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_sub_sp - (unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_entry)
+	((unsigned long *)optprobe_template_sub_sp - (unsigned long *)optprobe_template_entry)
 #define TMPL_RESTORE_BEGIN \
-	((unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_restore_begin - (unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_entry)
+	((unsigned long *)optprobe_template_restore_begin - (unsigned long *)optprobe_template_entry)
 #define TMPL_RESTORE_ORIGN_INSN \
-	((unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_restore_orig_insn - (unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_entry)
+	((unsigned long *)optprobe_template_restore_orig_insn - (unsigned long *)optprobe_template_entry)
 #define TMPL_RESTORE_END \
-	((unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_restore_end - (unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_entry)
+	((unsigned long *)optprobe_template_restore_end - (unsigned long *)optprobe_template_entry)
 
 /*
  * ARM can always optimize an instruction when using ARM ISA, except
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ int arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe(struct optimized_kprobe *op, struct kprobe *or
 	}
 
 	/* Copy arch-dep-instance from template. */
-	memcpy(code, (unsigned long *)&optprobe_template_entry,
+	memcpy(code, (unsigned long *)optprobe_template_entry,
 			TMPL_END_IDX * sizeof(kprobe_opcode_t));
 
 	/* Adjust buffer according to instruction. */
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#56 lore raw

PATCH 52/101 pinctrl: aspeed: Fix GPI only function problem.

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Billy Tsai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9b92f5c51e9a41352d665f6f956bd95085a56a83 ]

Some gpio pin at aspeed soc is input only and the prefix name of these pin is "GPI" only.
This patch fine-tune the condition of GPIO check from "GPIO" to "GPI" and it will fix the usage error of banks D and E in the AST2400/AST2500 and banks T and U in the AST2600.

Fixes 4d3d0e4272d8 ("pinctrl: Add core support for Aspeed SoCs")
---
 drivers/pinctrl/aspeed/pinctrl-aspeed.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/pinctrl/aspeed/pinctrl-aspeed.c +4 -3
index aefe3c33dffd8..8dec302dc067a 100644
@@ -458,13 +458,14 @@ int aspeed_pinmux_set_mux(struct pinctrl_dev *pctldev, unsigned int function,
 static bool aspeed_expr_is_gpio(const struct aspeed_sig_expr *expr)
 {
 	/*
-	 * The signal type is GPIO if the signal name has "GPIO" as a prefix.
+	 * The signal type is GPIO if the signal name has "GPI" as a prefix.
 	 * strncmp (rather than strcmp) is used to implement the prefix
 	 * requirement.
 	 *
-	 * expr->signal might look like "GPIOT3" in the GPIO case.
+	 * expr->signal might look like "GPIOB1" in the GPIO case.
+	 * expr->signal might look like "GPIT0" in the GPI case.
 	 */
-	return strncmp(expr->signal, "GPIO", 4) == 0;
+	return strncmp(expr->signal, "GPI", 3) == 0;
 }
 
 static bool aspeed_gpio_in_exprs(const struct aspeed_sig_expr **exprs)
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#57 lore raw

PATCH 53/101 nbd: fix a block_device refcount leak in nbd_release

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2bd645b2d3f0bacadaa6037f067538e1cd4e42ef ]

bdget_disk needs to be paired with bdput to not leak a reference on the block device inode.

Fixes 08ba91ee6e2c ("nbd: Add the nbd NBD_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE config flag.")
---
 drivers/block/nbd.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/block/nbd.c +1 -0
index 706115ecd9bee..517318bb350cf 100644
@@ -1448,6 +1448,7 @@ static void nbd_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
 	if (test_bit(NBD_DISCONNECT_ON_CLOSE, &nbd->config->runtime_flags) &&
 			bdev->bd_openers == 0)
 		nbd_disconnect_and_put(nbd);
+	bdput(bdev);
 
 	nbd_config_put(nbd);
 	nbd_put(nbd);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#58 lore raw

PATCH 54/101 xfs: fix flags argument to rmap lookup when converting shared file rmaps

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ea8439899c0b15a176664df62aff928010fad276 ]

Pass the same oldext argument (which contains the existing rmapping's unwritten state) to xfs_rmap_lookup_le_range at the start of xfs_rmap_convert_shared. At this point in the code, flags is zero, which means that we perform lookups using the wrong key.

Fixes 3f165b334e51 ("xfs: convert unwritten status of reverse mappings for shared files")
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap.c +1 -1
index 245af452840ef..ab3e72e702f00 100644
@@ -1387,7 +1387,7 @@ xfs_rmap_convert_shared(
 	 * record for our insertion point. This will also give us the record for
 	 * start block contiguity tests.
 	 */
-	error = xfs_rmap_lookup_le_range(cur, bno, owner, offset, flags,
+	error = xfs_rmap_lookup_le_range(cur, bno, owner, offset, oldext,
 			&PREV, &i);
 	if (error)
 		goto done;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#59 lore raw

PATCH 55/101 xfs: set the unwritten bit in rmap lookup flags in xchk_bmap_get_rmapextents

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5dda3897fd90783358c4c6115ef86047d8c8f503 ]

When the bmbt scrubber is looking up rmap extents, we need to set the extent flags from the bmbt record fully. This will matter once we fix the rmap btree comparison functions to check those flags correctly.

Fixes d852657ccfc0 ("xfs: cross-reference reverse-mapping btree")
---
 fs/xfs/scrub/bmap.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/xfs/scrub/bmap.c +2 -0
index f84a58e523bc8..b05d65fd360b3 100644
@@ -120,6 +120,8 @@ xchk_bmap_get_rmap(
 
 	if (info->whichfork == XFS_ATTR_FORK)
 		rflags |= XFS_RMAP_ATTR_FORK;
+	if (irec->br_state == XFS_EXT_UNWRITTEN)
+		rflags |= XFS_RMAP_UNWRITTEN;
 
 	/*
 	 * CoW staging extents are owned (on disk) by the refcountbt, so
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#60 lore raw

PATCH 56/101 xfs: fix rmap key and record comparison functions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6ff646b2ceb0eec916101877f38da0b73e3a5b7f ]

Keys for extent interval records in the reverse mapping btree are supposed to be computed as follows:

(physical block, owner, fork, is_btree, is_unwritten, offset)

This provides users the ability to look up a reverse mapping from a bmbt record -- start with the physical block; then if there are multiple records for the same block, move on to the owner; then the inode fork type; and so on to the file offset.

However, the key comparison functions incorrectly remove the fork/btree/unwritten information that's encoded in the on-disk offset. This means that lookup comparisons are only done with:

(physical block, owner, offset)

This means that queries can return incorrect results. On consistent filesystems this hasn't been an issue because blocks are never shared between forks or with bmbt blocks; and are never unwritten. However, this bug means that online repair cannot always detect corruption in the key information in internal rmapbt nodes.

Found by fuzzing keys[1].attrfork = ones on xfs/371.

Fixes 4b8ed67794fe ("xfs: add rmap btree operations")
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap_btree.c | 16 ++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap_btree.c +8 -8
index f79cf040d7450..77528f413286b 100644
@@ -247,8 +247,8 @@ xfs_rmapbt_key_diff(
 	else if (y > x)
 		return -1;
 
-	x = XFS_RMAP_OFF(be64_to_cpu(kp->rm_offset));
-	y = rec->rm_offset;
+	x = be64_to_cpu(kp->rm_offset);
+	y = xfs_rmap_irec_offset_pack(rec);
 	if (x > y)
 		return 1;
 	else if (y > x)
@@ -279,8 +279,8 @@ xfs_rmapbt_diff_two_keys(
 	else if (y > x)
 		return -1;
 
-	x = XFS_RMAP_OFF(be64_to_cpu(kp1->rm_offset));
-	y = XFS_RMAP_OFF(be64_to_cpu(kp2->rm_offset));
+	x = be64_to_cpu(kp1->rm_offset);
+	y = be64_to_cpu(kp2->rm_offset);
 	if (x > y)
 		return 1;
 	else if (y > x)
@@ -393,8 +393,8 @@ xfs_rmapbt_keys_inorder(
 		return 1;
 	else if (a > b)
 		return 0;
-	a = XFS_RMAP_OFF(be64_to_cpu(k1->rmap.rm_offset));
-	b = XFS_RMAP_OFF(be64_to_cpu(k2->rmap.rm_offset));
+	a = be64_to_cpu(k1->rmap.rm_offset);
+	b = be64_to_cpu(k2->rmap.rm_offset);
 	if (a <= b)
 		return 1;
 	return 0;
@@ -423,8 +423,8 @@ xfs_rmapbt_recs_inorder(
 		return 1;
 	else if (a > b)
 		return 0;
-	a = XFS_RMAP_OFF(be64_to_cpu(r1->rmap.rm_offset));
-	b = XFS_RMAP_OFF(be64_to_cpu(r2->rmap.rm_offset));
+	a = be64_to_cpu(r1->rmap.rm_offset);
+	b = be64_to_cpu(r2->rmap.rm_offset);
 	if (a <= b)
 		return 1;
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#61 lore raw

PATCH 57/101 xfs: fix brainos in the refcount scrubbers rmap fragment processor

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 54e9b09e153842ab5adb8a460b891e11b39e9c3d ]

Fix some serious WTF in the reference count scrubber's rmap fragment processing. The code comment says that this loop is supposed to move all fragment records starting at or before bno onto the worklist, but there's no obvious reason why nr (the number of items added) should increment starting from 1, and breaking the loop when we've added the target number seems dubious since we could have more rmap fragments that should have been added to the worklist.

This seems to manifest in xfs/411 when adding one to the refcount field.

Fixes dbde19da9637 ("xfs: cross-reference the rmapbt data with the refcountbt")
---
 fs/xfs/scrub/refcount.c | 8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/scrub/refcount.c +3 -5
index e8c82b026083e..76e4f16a9fab2 100644
@@ -180,7 +180,6 @@ xchk_refcountbt_process_rmap_fragments(
 	 */
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&worklist);
 	rbno = NULLAGBLOCK;
-	nr = 1;
 
 	/* Make sure the fragments actually /are/ in agbno order. */
 	bno = 0;
@@ -194,15 +193,14 @@ xchk_refcountbt_process_rmap_fragments(
 	 * Find all the rmaps that start at or before the refc extent,
 	 * and put them on the worklist.
 	 */
+	nr = 0;
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(frag, n, &refchk->fragments, list) {
-		if (frag->rm.rm_startblock > refchk->bno)
-			goto done;
+		if (frag->rm.rm_startblock > refchk->bno || nr > target_nr)
+			break;
 		bno = frag->rm.rm_startblock + frag->rm.rm_blockcount;
 		if (bno < rbno)
 			rbno = bno;
 		list_move_tail(&frag->list, &worklist);
-		if (nr == target_nr)
-			break;
 		nr++;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#62 lore raw

PATCH 58/101 lan743x: fix "BUG: invalid wait context" when setting rx mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sven Van Asbroeck <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2b52a4b65bc8f14520fe6e996ea7fb3f7e400761 ]

In the net core, the struct net_device_ops -> ndo_set_rx_mode() callback is called with the dev->addr_list_lock spinlock held.

However, this driver's ndo_set_rx_mode callback eventually calls lan743x_dp_write(), which acquires a mutex. Mutex acquisition may sleep, and this is not allowed when holding a spinlock.

Fix by removing the dp_lock mutex entirely. Its purpose is to prevent concurrent accesses to the data port. No concurrent accesses are possible, because the dev->addr_list_lock spinlock in the core only lets through one thread at a time.

Fixes 23f0703c125b ("lan743x: Add main source files for new lan743x driver")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c | 12 +++---------
 drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h |  3 ---
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c +3 -9
index 208341541087e..085fdceb3821b 100644
@@ -672,14 +672,12 @@ clean_up:
 static int lan743x_dp_write(struct lan743x_adapter *adapter,
 			    u32 select, u32 addr, u32 length, u32 *buf)
 {
-	int ret = -EIO;
 	u32 dp_sel;
 	int i;
 
-	mutex_lock(&adapter->dp_lock);
 	if (lan743x_csr_wait_for_bit(adapter, DP_SEL, DP_SEL_DPRDY_,
 				     1, 40, 100, 100))
-		goto unlock;
+		return -EIO;
 	dp_sel = lan743x_csr_read(adapter, DP_SEL);
 	dp_sel &= ~DP_SEL_MASK_;
 	dp_sel |= select;
@@ -691,13 +689,10 @@ static int lan743x_dp_write(struct lan743x_adapter *adapter,
 		lan743x_csr_write(adapter, DP_CMD, DP_CMD_WRITE_);
 		if (lan743x_csr_wait_for_bit(adapter, DP_SEL, DP_SEL_DPRDY_,
 					     1, 40, 100, 100))
-			goto unlock;
+			return -EIO;
 	}
-	ret = 0;
 
-unlock:
-	mutex_unlock(&adapter->dp_lock);
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static u32 lan743x_mac_mii_access(u16 id, u16 index, int read)
@@ -2679,7 +2674,6 @@ static int lan743x_hardware_init(struct lan743x_adapter *adapter,
 
 	adapter->intr.irq = adapter->pdev->irq;
 	lan743x_csr_write(adapter, INT_EN_CLR, 0xFFFFFFFF);
-	mutex_init(&adapter->dp_lock);
 
 	ret = lan743x_gpio_init(adapter);
 	if (ret)
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h +0 -3
index 2d6eea18973e8..77273be2d1ee0 100644
@@ -702,9 +702,6 @@ struct lan743x_adapter {
 	struct lan743x_csr      csr;
 	struct lan743x_intr     intr;
 
-	/* lock, used to prevent concurrent access to data port */
-	struct mutex		dp_lock;
-
 	struct lan743x_gpio	gpio;
 	struct lan743x_ptp	ptp;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#63 lore raw

PATCH 59/101 xfs: fix a missing unlock on error in xfs_fs_map_blocks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2bd3fa793aaa7e98b74e3653fdcc72fa753913b5 ]

We also need to drop the iolock when invalidate_inode_pages2 fails, not only on all other error or successful cases.

Fixes 527851124d10 ("xfs: implement pNFS export operations")
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_pnfs.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_pnfs.c +1 -1
index f44c3599527d0..1c9bced3e8601 100644
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ xfs_fs_map_blocks(
 		goto out_unlock;
 	error = invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping);
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(error))
-		return error;
+		goto out_unlock;
 
 	end_fsb = XFS_B_TO_FSB(mp, (xfs_ufsize_t)offset + length);
 	offset_fsb = XFS_B_TO_FSBT(mp, offset);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#64 lore raw

PATCH 60/101 of/address: Fix of_node memory leak in of_dma_is_coherent

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Evan Nimmo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a5bea04fcc0b3c0aec71ee1fd58fd4ff7ee36177 ]

Commit dabf6b36b83a ("of: Add OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT & select it on powerpc") added a check to of_dma_is_coherent which returns early if OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT is enabled. This results in the of_node_put() being skipped causing a memory leak. Moved the of_node_get() below this check so we now we only get the node if OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT is not enabled.

Fixes dabf6b36b83a ("of: Add OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT & select it on powerpc")
---
 drivers/of/address.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/of/address.c +3 -1
index c42aebba35ab8..30806dd357350 100644
@@ -975,11 +975,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(of_dma_get_range);
  */
 bool of_dma_is_coherent(struct device_node *np)
 {
-	struct device_node *node = of_node_get(np);
+	struct device_node *node;
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT))
 		return true;
 
+	node = of_node_get(np);
+
 	while (node) {
 		if (of_property_read_bool(node, "dma-coherent")) {
 			of_node_put(node);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#65 lore raw

PATCH 61/101 cosa: Add missing kfree in error path of cosa_write

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Hai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 52755b66ddcef2e897778fac5656df18817b59ab ]

If memory allocation for 'kbuf' succeed, cosa_write() doesn't have a corresponding kfree() in exception handling. Thus add kfree() for this function implementation.

---
 drivers/net/wan/cosa.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/wan/cosa.c +1 -0
index f6b000ddcd151..b7bfc0caa5dc8 100644
@@ -902,6 +902,7 @@ static ssize_t cosa_write(struct file *file,
 			chan->tx_status = 1;
 			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cosa->lock, flags);
 			up(&chan->wsem);
+			kfree(kbuf);
 			return -ERESTARTSYS;
 		}
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#66 lore raw

PATCH 62/101 perf: Fix get_recursion_context()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ce0f17fc93f63ee91428af10b7b2ddef38cd19e5 ]

One should use in_serving_softirq() to detect SoftIRQ context.

Fixes 96f6d4444302 ("perf_counter: avoid recursion")
---
 kernel/events/internal.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/events/internal.h +1 -1
index 6dc725a7e7bc9..8fc0ddc38cb69 100644
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static inline int get_recursion_context(int *recursion)
 		rctx = 3;
 	else if (in_irq())
 		rctx = 2;
-	else if (in_softirq())
+	else if (in_serving_softirq())
 		rctx = 1;
 	else
 		rctx = 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
author maintainer
#67 lore raw

PATCH 63/101 ext4: correctly report "not supported" for {usr,grp}jquota when !CONFIG_QUOTA

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kaixu Xia <[email protected]>

commit 174fe5ba2d1ea0d6c5ab2a7d4aa058d6d497ae4d upstream.

The macro MOPT_Q is used to indicates the mount option is related to quota stuff and is defined to be MOPT_NOSUPPORT when CONFIG_QUOTA is disabled. Normally the quota options are handled explicitly, so it didn't matter that the MOPT_STRING flag was missing, even though the usrjquota and grpjquota mount options take a string argument. It's important that's present in the !CONFIG_QUOTA case, since without MOPT_STRING, the mount option matcher will match usrjquota= followed by an integer, and will otherwise skip the table entry, and so "mount option not supported" error message is never reported.

[ Fixed up the commit description to better explain why the fix
works. --TYT ]

Fixes 26092bf52478 ("ext4: use a table-driven handler for mount options")
---
 fs/ext4/super.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/super.c +2 -2
@@ -1748,8 +1748,8 @@ static const struct mount_opts {
 	{Opt_noquota, (EXT4_MOUNT_QUOTA | EXT4_MOUNT_USRQUOTA |
 		       EXT4_MOUNT_GRPQUOTA | EXT4_MOUNT_PRJQUOTA),
 							MOPT_CLEAR | MOPT_Q},
-	{Opt_usrjquota, 0, MOPT_Q},
-	{Opt_grpjquota, 0, MOPT_Q},
+	{Opt_usrjquota, 0, MOPT_Q | MOPT_STRING},
+	{Opt_grpjquota, 0, MOPT_Q | MOPT_STRING},
 	{Opt_offusrjquota, 0, MOPT_Q},
 	{Opt_offgrpjquota, 0, MOPT_Q},
 	{Opt_jqfmt_vfsold, QFMT_VFS_OLD, MOPT_QFMT},
author maintainer
#68 lore raw

PATCH 64/101 ext4: unlock xattr_sem properly in ext4_inline_data_truncate()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>

commit 7067b2619017d51e71686ca9756b454de0e5826a upstream.

It takes xattr_sem to check inline data again but without unlock it in case not have. So unlock it before return.

---
 fs/ext4/inline.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/ext4/inline.c +1 -0
@@ -1921,6 +1921,7 @@ int ext4_inline_data_truncate(struct ino
 
 	ext4_write_lock_xattr(inode, &no_expand);
 	if (!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) {
+		ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand);
 		*has_inline = 0;
 		ext4_journal_stop(handle);
 		return 0;
author maintainer
#69 lore raw

PATCH 65/101 btrfs: ref-verify: fix memory leak in btrfs_ref_tree_mod

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

commit 468600c6ec28613b756193c5f780aac062f1acdf upstream.

There is one error handling path that does not free ref, which may cause a minor memory leak.

---
 fs/btrfs/ref-verify.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/btrfs/ref-verify.c +1 -0
@@ -854,6 +854,7 @@ int btrfs_ref_tree_mod(struct btrfs_root
 "dropping a ref for a root that doesn't have a ref on the block");
 			dump_block_entry(fs_info, be);
 			dump_ref_action(fs_info, ra);
+			kfree(ref);
 			kfree(ra);
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
author maintainer
#70 lore raw

PATCH 66/101 btrfs: dev-replace: fail mount if we dont have replace item with target device

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

commit cf89af146b7e62af55470cf5f3ec3c56ec144a5e upstream.

If there is a device BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID without the device replace item, then it means the filesystem is inconsistent state. This is either corruption or a crafted image. Fail the mount as this needs a closer look what is actually wrong.

As of now if BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID is present without the replace item, in __btrfs_free_extra_devids() we determine that there is an extra device, and free those extra devices but continue to mount the device.
However, we were wrong in keeping tack of the rw_devices so the syzbot testcase failed:

  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3612 at fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1166 close_fs_devices.part.0+0x607/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1166
  Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
  CPU: 1 PID: 3612 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
   dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
   panic+0x347/0x7c0 kernel/panic.c:231
   __warn.cold+0x20/0x46 kernel/panic.c:600
   report_bug+0x1bd/0x210 lib/bug.c:198
   handle_bug+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:234
   exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:254
   asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:536
  RIP: 0010:close_fs_devices.part.0+0x607/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1166
  RSP: 0018:ffffc900091777e0 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000040000 RBX: ffffffffffffffff RCX: ffffc9000c8b7000
  RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff83097f47 RDI: 0000000000000007
  RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8880988a187f
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88809593a130
  R13: ffff88809593a1ec R14: ffff8880988a1908 R15: ffff88809593a050
   close_fs_devices fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1193 [inline]
   btrfs_close_devices+0x95/0x1f0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1179
   open_ctree+0x4984/0x4a2d fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3434
   btrfs_fill_super fs/btrfs/super.c:1316 [inline]
   btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x14/0x165 fs/btrfs/super.c:1672

The fix here is, when we determine that there isn't a replace item then fail the mount if there is a replace target device (devid 0).

---
 fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 fs/btrfs/volumes.c     |   26 +++++++-------------------
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c +24 -2
@@ -54,6 +54,17 @@ int btrfs_init_dev_replace(struct btrfs_
 	ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, dev_root, &key, path, 0, 0);
 	if (ret) {
 no_valid_dev_replace_entry_found:
+		/*
+		 * We don't have a replace item or it's corrupted.  If there is
+		 * a replace target, fail the mount.
+		 */
+		if (btrfs_find_device(fs_info->fs_devices,
+				      BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID, NULL, NULL, false)) {
+			btrfs_err(fs_info,
+			"found replace target device without a valid replace item");
+			ret = -EUCLEAN;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		ret = 0;
 		dev_replace->replace_state =
 			BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_ITEM_STATE_NEVER_STARTED;
@@ -107,8 +118,19 @@ no_valid_dev_replace_entry_found:
 	case BTRFS_IOCTL_DEV_REPLACE_STATE_NEVER_STARTED:
 	case BTRFS_IOCTL_DEV_REPLACE_STATE_FINISHED:
 	case BTRFS_IOCTL_DEV_REPLACE_STATE_CANCELED:
-		dev_replace->srcdev = NULL;
-		dev_replace->tgtdev = NULL;
+		/*
+		 * We don't have an active replace item but if there is a
+		 * replace target, fail the mount.
+		 */
+		if (btrfs_find_device(fs_info->fs_devices,
+				      BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID, NULL, NULL, false)) {
+			btrfs_err(fs_info,
+			"replace devid present without an active replace item");
+			ret = -EUCLEAN;
+		} else {
+			dev_replace->srcdev = NULL;
+			dev_replace->tgtdev = NULL;
+		}
 		break;
 	case BTRFS_IOCTL_DEV_REPLACE_STATE_STARTED:
 	case BTRFS_IOCTL_DEV_REPLACE_STATE_SUSPENDED:
fs/btrfs/volumes.c +7 -19
@@ -974,22 +974,13 @@ again:
 			continue;
 		}
 
-		if (device->devid == BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID) {
-			/*
-			 * In the first step, keep the device which has
-			 * the correct fsid and the devid that is used
-			 * for the dev_replace procedure.
-			 * In the second step, the dev_replace state is
-			 * read from the device tree and it is known
-			 * whether the procedure is really active or
-			 * not, which means whether this device is
-			 * used or whether it should be removed.
-			 */
-			if (step == 0 || test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_REPLACE_TGT,
-						  &device->dev_state)) {
-				continue;
-			}
-		}
+		/*
+		 * We have already validated the presence of BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID,
+		 * in btrfs_init_dev_replace() so just continue.
+		 */
+		if (device->devid == BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID)
+			continue;
+
 		if (device->bdev) {
 			blkdev_put(device->bdev, device->mode);
 			device->bdev = NULL;
@@ -998,9 +989,6 @@ again:
 		if (test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE, &device->dev_state)) {
 			list_del_init(&device->dev_alloc_list);
 			clear_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE, &device->dev_state);
-			if (!test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_REPLACE_TGT,
-				      &device->dev_state))
-				fs_devices->rw_devices--;
 		}
 		list_del_init(&device->dev_list);
 		fs_devices->num_devices--;
author maintainer
#71 lore raw

PATCH 67/101 thunderbolt: Fix memory leak if ida_simple_get() fails in enumerate_services()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>

commit a663e0df4a374b8537562a44d1cecafb472cd65b upstream.

The svc->key field is not released as it should be if ida_simple_get() fails so fix that.

Fixes 9aabb68568b4 ("thunderbolt: Fix to check return value of ida_simple_get")
---
 drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c +1 -0
@@ -774,6 +774,7 @@ static void enumerate_services(struct tb
 
 		id = ida_simple_get(&xd->service_ids, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (id < 0) {
+			kfree(svc->key);
 			kfree(svc);
 			break;
 		}
author maintainer
#72 lore raw

PATCH 68/101 thunderbolt: Add the missed ida_simple_remove() in ring_request_msix()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jing Xiangfeng <[email protected]>

commit 7342ca34d931a357d408aaa25fadd031e46af137 upstream.

ring_request_msix() misses to call ida_simple_remove() in an error path. Add a label 'err_ida_remove' and jump to it.

Fixes 046bee1f9ab8 ("thunderbolt: Add MSI-X support")
---
 drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c |   19 +++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c +15 -4
@@ -408,12 +408,23 @@ static int ring_request_msix(struct tb_r
 
 	ring->vector = ret;
 
-	ring->irq = pci_irq_vector(ring->nhi->pdev, ring->vector);
-	if (ring->irq < 0)
-		return ring->irq;
+	ret = pci_irq_vector(ring->nhi->pdev, ring->vector);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto err_ida_remove;
+
+	ring->irq = ret;
 
 	irqflags = no_suspend ? IRQF_NO_SUSPEND : 0;
-	return request_irq(ring->irq, ring_msix, irqflags, "thunderbolt", ring);
+	ret = request_irq(ring->irq, ring_msix, irqflags, "thunderbolt", ring);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_ida_remove;
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_ida_remove:
+	ida_simple_remove(&nhi->msix_ida, ring->vector);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void ring_release_msix(struct tb_ring *ring)
author maintainer
#73 lore raw

PATCH 69/101 uio: Fix use-after-free in uio_unregister_device()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]>

commit 092561f06702dd4fdd7fb74dd3a838f1818529b7 upstream.

Commit 8fd0e2a6df26 ("uio: free uio id after uio file node is freed") triggered KASAN use-after-free failure at deletion of TCM-user backstores [1].

In uio_unregister_device(), struct uio_device *idev is passed to uio_free_minor() to refer idev->minor. However, before uio_free_minor() call, idev is already freed by uio_device_release() during call to device_unregister().

To avoid reference to idev->minor after idev free, keep idev->minor value in a local variable. Also modify uio_free_minor() argument to receive the value.

[1]

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in uio_unregister_device+0x166/0x190
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888105196508 by task targetcli/49158

CPU: 3 PID: 49158 Comm: targetcli Not tainted 5.10.0-rc1 #1
Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X10SRL-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xae/0xe5
 ? uio_unregister_device+0x166/0x190
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x210
 ? uio_unregister_device+0x166/0x190
 ? uio_unregister_device+0x166/0x190
 kasan_report.cold+0x37/0x7c
 ? kobject_put+0x80/0x410
 ? uio_unregister_device+0x166/0x190
 uio_unregister_device+0x166/0x190
 tcmu_destroy_device+0x1c4/0x280 [target_core_user]
 ? tcmu_release+0x90/0x90 [target_core_user]
 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xd6/0x5d0
 target_free_device+0xf3/0x2e0 [target_core_mod]
 config_item_cleanup+0xea/0x210
 configfs_rmdir+0x651/0x860
 ? detach_groups.isra.0+0x380/0x380
 vfs_rmdir.part.0+0xec/0x3a0
 ? __lookup_hash+0x20/0x150
 do_rmdir+0x252/0x320
 ? do_file_open_root+0x420/0x420
 ? strncpy_from_user+0xbc/0x2f0
 ? getname_flags.part.0+0x8e/0x450
 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7f9e2bfc91fb
Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 9d ec 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 54 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 6d ec 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffdd2baafe8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9e2beb44a0 RCX: 00007f9e2bfc91fb
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007f9e1c20be90
RBP: 00007ffdd2bab000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9e2bdf2440
R10: 00007ffdd2baaf37 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffff9c
R13: 000055f9abb7e390 R14: 000055f9abcf9558 R15: 00007f9e2be7a780

Allocated by task 34735:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0
 __uio_register_device+0xeb/0xd40
 tcmu_configure_device+0x5a0/0xbc0 [target_core_user]
 target_configure_device+0x12f/0x760 [target_core_mod]
 target_dev_enable_store+0x32/0x50 [target_core_mod]
 configfs_write_file+0x2bb/0x450
 vfs_write+0x1ce/0x610
 ksys_write+0xe9/0x1b0
 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Freed by task 49158:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
 kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30
 __kasan_slab_free+0x110/0x150
 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x5a/0x170
 kfree+0xc6/0x560
 device_release+0x9b/0x210
 kobject_put+0x13e/0x410
 uio_unregister_device+0xf9/0x190
 tcmu_destroy_device+0x1c4/0x280 [target_core_user]
 target_free_device+0xf3/0x2e0 [target_core_mod]
 config_item_cleanup+0xea/0x210
 configfs_rmdir+0x651/0x860
 vfs_rmdir.part.0+0xec/0x3a0
 do_rmdir+0x252/0x320
 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888105196000
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 1288 bytes inside of
 2048-byte region [ffff888105196000, ffff888105196800)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:0000000098e6ca81 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x105190
head:0000000098e6ca81 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x17ffffc0010200(slab|head)
raw: 0017ffffc0010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888100043040
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff ffff88810eb55c01
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

page->mem_cgroup:ffff88810eb55c01

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888105196400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff888105196480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff888105196500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                      ^
 ffff888105196580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff888105196600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes 8fd0e2a6df26 ("uio: free uio id after uio file node is freed")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/uio/uio.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/uio/uio.c +6 -4
@@ -413,10 +413,10 @@ static int uio_get_minor(struct uio_devi
 	return retval;
 }
 
-static void uio_free_minor(struct uio_device *idev)
+static void uio_free_minor(unsigned long minor)
 {
 	mutex_lock(&minor_lock);
-	idr_remove(&uio_idr, idev->minor);
+	idr_remove(&uio_idr, minor);
 	mutex_unlock(&minor_lock);
 }
 
@@ -988,7 +988,7 @@ err_request_irq:
 err_uio_dev_add_attributes:
 	device_del(&idev->dev);
 err_device_create:
-	uio_free_minor(idev);
+	uio_free_minor(idev->minor);
 	put_device(&idev->dev);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1002,11 +1002,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__uio_register_device)
 void uio_unregister_device(struct uio_info *info)
 {
 	struct uio_device *idev;
+	unsigned long minor;
 
 	if (!info || !info->uio_dev)
 		return;
 
 	idev = info->uio_dev;
+	minor = idev->minor;
 
 	mutex_lock(&idev->info_lock);
 	uio_dev_del_attributes(idev);
@@ -1019,7 +1021,7 @@ void uio_unregister_device(struct uio_in
 
 	device_unregister(&idev->dev);
 
-	uio_free_minor(idev);
+	uio_free_minor(minor);
 
 	return;
 }
author maintainer
#74 lore raw

PATCH 70/101 usb: cdc-acm: Add DISABLE_ECHO for Renesas USB Download mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Chris Brandt <[email protected]>

commit 6d853c9e4104b4fc8d55dc9cd3b99712aa347174 upstream.

Renesas R-Car and RZ/G SoCs have a firmware download mode over USB. However, on reset a banner string is transmitted out which is not expected to be echoed back and will corrupt the protocol.

---
 drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c +9 -0
@@ -1738,6 +1738,15 @@ static const struct usb_device_id acm_id
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0870, 0x0001), /* Metricom GS Modem */
 	.driver_info = NO_UNION_NORMAL, /* has no union descriptor */
 	},
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x045b, 0x023c),	/* Renesas USB Download mode */
+	.driver_info = DISABLE_ECHO,	/* Don't echo banner */
+	},
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x045b, 0x0248),	/* Renesas USB Download mode */
+	.driver_info = DISABLE_ECHO,	/* Don't echo banner */
+	},
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x045b, 0x024D),	/* Renesas USB Download mode */
+	.driver_info = DISABLE_ECHO,	/* Don't echo banner */
+	},
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0e8d, 0x0003), /* FIREFLY, MediaTek Inc; [email protected] */
 	.driver_info = NO_UNION_NORMAL, /* has no union descriptor */
 	},
author maintainer
#75 lore raw

PATCH 71/101 xhci: hisilicon: fix refercence leak in xhci_histb_probe

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhang Qilong <[email protected]>

commit 76255470ffa2795a44032e8b3c1ced11d81aa2db upstream.

pm_runtime_get_sync() will increment pm usage at first and it will resume the device later. We should decrease the usage count whetever it succeeded or failed(maybe runtime of the device has error, or device is in inaccessible state, or other error state). If we do not call put operation to decrease the reference, it will result in reference leak in xhci_histb_probe. Moreover, this device cannot enter the idle state and always stay busy or other non-idle state later. So we fixed it by jumping to error handling branch.

Fixes c508f41da0788 ("xhci: hisilicon: support HiSilicon STB xHCI host controller")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-histb.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/host/xhci-histb.c +1 -1
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static int xhci_histb_probe(struct platf
 	/* Initialize dma_mask and coherent_dma_mask to 32-bits */
 	ret = dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32));
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto disable_pm;
 
 	hcd = usb_create_hcd(driver, dev, dev_name(dev));
 	if (!hcd) {
author maintainer
#76 lore raw

PATCH 72/101 mei: protect mei_cl_mtu from null dereference

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Alexander Usyskin <[email protected]>

commit bcbc0b2e275f0a797de11a10eff495b4571863fc upstream.

A receive callback is queued while the client is still connected but can still be called after the client was disconnected. Upon disconnect cl->me_cl is set to NULL, hence we need to check that ME client is not-NULL in mei_cl_mtu to avoid
null dereference.

---
 drivers/misc/mei/client.h |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/mei/client.h +2 -2
@@ -138,11 +138,11 @@ static inline u8 mei_cl_me_id(const stru
  *
  * @cl: host client
  *
- * Return: mtu
+ * Return: mtu or 0 if client is not connected
  */
 static inline size_t mei_cl_mtu(const struct mei_cl *cl)
 {
-	return cl->me_cl->props.max_msg_length;
+	return cl->me_cl ? cl->me_cl->props.max_msg_length : 0;
 }
 
 /**
author maintainer
#77 lore raw

PATCH 73/101 futex: Dont enable IRQs unconditionally in put_pi_state()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

commit 1e106aa3509b86738769775969822ffc1ec21bf4 upstream.

The exit_pi_state_list() function calls put_pi_state() with IRQs disabled and is not expecting that IRQs will be enabled inside the function.

Use the _irqsave() variant so that IRQs are restored to the original state instead of being enabled unconditionally.

---
 kernel/futex.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/futex.c +3 -2
@@ -856,8 +856,9 @@ static void put_pi_state(struct futex_pi
 	 */
 	if (pi_state->owner) {
 		struct task_struct *owner;
+		unsigned long flags;
 
-		raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
+		raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock, flags);
 		owner = pi_state->owner;
 		if (owner) {
 			raw_spin_lock(&owner->pi_lock);
@@ -865,7 +866,7 @@ static void put_pi_state(struct futex_pi
 			raw_spin_unlock(&owner->pi_lock);
 		}
 		rt_mutex_proxy_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex, owner);
-		raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
+		raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock, flags);
 	}
 
 	if (current->pi_state_cache) {
author maintainer
#78 lore raw

PATCH 74/101 ocfs2: initialize ip_next_orphan

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wengang Wang <[email protected]>

commit f5785283dd64867a711ca1fb1f5bb172f252ecdf upstream.

Though problem if found on a lower 4.1.12 kernel, I think upstream has same issue.

In one node in the cluster, there is the following callback trace:

   # cat /proc/21473/stack
   __ocfs2_cluster_lock.isra.36+0x336/0x9e0 [ocfs2]
   ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested+0x121/0x520 [ocfs2]
   ocfs2_evict_inode+0x152/0x820 [ocfs2]
   evict+0xae/0x1a0
   iput+0x1c6/0x230
   ocfs2_orphan_filldir+0x5d/0x100 [ocfs2]
   ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk+0x490/0x4f0 [ocfs2]
   ocfs2_dir_foreach+0x29/0x30 [ocfs2]
   ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x1b6/0x9a0 [ocfs2]
   ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x1de/0x5c0 [ocfs2]
   process_one_work+0x169/0x4a0
   worker_thread+0x5b/0x560
   kthread+0xcb/0xf0
   ret_from_fork+0x61/0x90

The above stack is not reasonable, the final iput shouldn't happen in ocfs2_orphan_filldir() function. Looking at the code,

  2067         /* Skip inodes which are already added to recover list, since dio may
  2068          * happen concurrently with unlink/rename */
  2069         if (OCFS2_I(iter)->ip_next_orphan) {
  2070                 iput(iter);
  2071                 return 0;
  2072         }
  2073

The logic thinks the inode is already in recover list on seeing ip_next_orphan is non-NULL, so it skip this inode after dropping a reference which incremented in ocfs2_iget().

While, if the inode is already in recover list, it should have another reference and the iput() at line 2070 should not be the final iput (dropping the last reference). So I don't think the inode is really in the recover list (no vmcore to confirm).

Note that ocfs2_queue_orphans(), though not shown up in the call back trace, is holding cluster lock on the orphan directory when looking up for unlinked inodes. The on disk inode eviction could involve a lot of IOs which may need long time to finish. That means this node could hold the cluster lock for very long time, that can lead to the lock requests (from other nodes) to the orhpan directory hang for long time.

Looking at more on ip_next_orphan, I found it's not initialized when allocating a new ocfs2_inode_info structure.

This causes te reflink operations from some nodes hang for very long time waiting for the cluster lock on the orphan directory.

Fix: initialize ip_next_orphan as NULL.

---
 fs/ocfs2/super.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/ocfs2/super.c +1 -0
@@ -1747,6 +1747,7 @@ static void ocfs2_inode_init_once(void *
 
 	oi->ip_blkno = 0ULL;
 	oi->ip_clusters = 0;
+	oi->ip_next_orphan = NULL;
 
 	ocfs2_resv_init_once(&oi->ip_la_data_resv);
 
author maintainer
#79 lore raw

PATCH 75/101 btrfs: fix potential overflow in cluster_pages_for_defrag on 32bit arch

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>

commit a1fbc6750e212c5675a4e48d7f51d44607eb8756 upstream.

On 32-bit systems, this shift will overflow for files larger than 4GB as start_index is unsigned long while the calls to btrfs_delalloc_*_space expect u64.

Fixes df480633b891 ("btrfs: extent-tree: Switch to new delalloc space reserve and release")
[ define the variable instead of repeating the shift ]
---
 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c |   10 ++++------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +4 -6
@@ -1239,6 +1239,7 @@ static int cluster_pages_for_defrag(stru
 	u64 page_start;
 	u64 page_end;
 	u64 page_cnt;
+	u64 start = (u64)start_index << PAGE_SHIFT;
 	int ret;
 	int i;
 	int i_done;
@@ -1255,8 +1256,7 @@ static int cluster_pages_for_defrag(stru
 	page_cnt = min_t(u64, (u64)num_pages, (u64)file_end - start_index + 1);
 
 	ret = btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space(inode, &data_reserved,
-			start_index << PAGE_SHIFT,
-			page_cnt << PAGE_SHIFT);
+			start, page_cnt << PAGE_SHIFT);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	i_done = 0;
@@ -1346,8 +1346,7 @@ again:
 		btrfs_mod_outstanding_extents(BTRFS_I(inode), 1);
 		spin_unlock(&BTRFS_I(inode)->lock);
 		btrfs_delalloc_release_space(inode, data_reserved,
-				start_index << PAGE_SHIFT,
-				(page_cnt - i_done) << PAGE_SHIFT, true);
+				start, (page_cnt - i_done) << PAGE_SHIFT, true);
 	}
 
 
@@ -1374,8 +1373,7 @@ out:
 		put_page(pages[i]);
 	}
 	btrfs_delalloc_release_space(inode, data_reserved,
-			start_index << PAGE_SHIFT,
-			page_cnt << PAGE_SHIFT, true);
+			start, page_cnt << PAGE_SHIFT, true);
 	btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(BTRFS_I(inode), page_cnt << PAGE_SHIFT);
 	extent_changeset_free(data_reserved);
 	return ret;
author maintainer
#80 lore raw

PATCH 76/101 selinux: Fix error return code in sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Chen Zhou <[email protected]>

commit c350f8bea271782e2733419bd2ab9bf4ec2051ef upstream.

Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling case instead of 0 in function sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(), as done elsewhere in this function.

Fixes 409dcf31538a ("selinux: Add a cache for quicker retreival of PKey SIDs")
---
 security/selinux/ibpkey.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/selinux/ibpkey.c +3 -1
@@ -161,8 +161,10 @@ static int sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(u64 subn
 	 * is valid, it just won't be added to the cache.
 	 */
 	new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!new)
+	if (!new) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	new->psec.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
 	new->psec.pkey = pkey_num;
author maintainer
#81 lore raw

PATCH 77/101 gpio: pcie-idio-24: Fix irq mask when masking

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Arnaud de Turckheim <[email protected]>

commit d8f270efeac850c569c305dc0baa42ac3d607988 upstream.

Fix the bitwise operation to remove only the corresponding bit from the mask.

Fixes 585562046628 ("gpio: Add GPIO support for the ACCES PCIe-IDIO-24 family")
---
 drivers/gpio/gpio-pcie-idio-24.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpio/gpio-pcie-idio-24.c +1 -1
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ static void idio_24_irq_mask(struct irq_
 
 	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&idio24gpio->lock, flags);
 
-	idio24gpio->irq_mask &= BIT(bit_offset);
+	idio24gpio->irq_mask &= ~BIT(bit_offset);
 	new_irq_mask = idio24gpio->irq_mask >> bank_offset;
 
 	if (!new_irq_mask) {
author maintainer
#82 lore raw

PATCH 78/101 gpio: pcie-idio-24: Fix IRQ Enable Register value

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Arnaud de Turckheim <[email protected]>

commit 23a7fdc06ebcc334fa667f0550676b035510b70b upstream.

This fixes the COS Enable Register value for enabling/disabling the corresponding IRQs bank.

Fixes 585562046628 ("gpio: Add GPIO support for the ACCES PCIe-IDIO-24 family")
---
 drivers/gpio/gpio-pcie-idio-24.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/gpio/gpio-pcie-idio-24.c +4 -4
@@ -360,13 +360,13 @@ static void idio_24_irq_mask(struct irq_
 	unsigned long flags;
 	const unsigned long bit_offset = irqd_to_hwirq(data) - 24;
 	unsigned char new_irq_mask;
-	const unsigned long bank_offset = bit_offset/8 * 8;
+	const unsigned long bank_offset = bit_offset / 8;
 	unsigned char cos_enable_state;
 
 	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&idio24gpio->lock, flags);
 
 	idio24gpio->irq_mask &= ~BIT(bit_offset);
-	new_irq_mask = idio24gpio->irq_mask >> bank_offset;
+	new_irq_mask = idio24gpio->irq_mask >> bank_offset * 8;
 
 	if (!new_irq_mask) {
 		cos_enable_state = ioread8(&idio24gpio->reg->cos_enable);
@@ -389,12 +389,12 @@ static void idio_24_irq_unmask(struct ir
 	unsigned long flags;
 	unsigned char prev_irq_mask;
 	const unsigned long bit_offset = irqd_to_hwirq(data) - 24;
-	const unsigned long bank_offset = bit_offset/8 * 8;
+	const unsigned long bank_offset = bit_offset / 8;
 	unsigned char cos_enable_state;
 
 	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&idio24gpio->lock, flags);
 
-	prev_irq_mask = idio24gpio->irq_mask >> bank_offset;
+	prev_irq_mask = idio24gpio->irq_mask >> bank_offset * 8;
 	idio24gpio->irq_mask |= BIT(bit_offset);
 
 	if (!prev_irq_mask) {
author maintainer
#83 lore raw

PATCH 79/101 gpio: pcie-idio-24: Enable PEX8311 interrupts

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Arnaud de Turckheim <[email protected]>

commit 10a2f11d3c9e48363c729419e0f0530dea76e4fe upstream.

This enables the PEX8311 internal PCI wire interrupt and the PEX8311 local interrupt input so the local interrupts are forwarded to the PCI.

Fixes 585562046628 ("gpio: Add GPIO support for the ACCES PCIe-IDIO-24 family")
---
 drivers/gpio/gpio-pcie-idio-24.c |   52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpio/gpio-pcie-idio-24.c +51 -1
@@ -28,6 +28,47 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
+/*
+ * PLX PEX8311 PCI LCS_INTCSR Interrupt Control/Status
+ *
+ * Bit: Description
+ *   0: Enable Interrupt Sources (Bit 0)
+ *   1: Enable Interrupt Sources (Bit 1)
+ *   2: Generate Internal PCI Bus Internal SERR# Interrupt
+ *   3: Mailbox Interrupt Enable
+ *   4: Power Management Interrupt Enable
+ *   5: Power Management Interrupt
+ *   6: Slave Read Local Data Parity Check Error Enable
+ *   7: Slave Read Local Data Parity Check Error Status
+ *   8: Internal PCI Wire Interrupt Enable
+ *   9: PCI Express Doorbell Interrupt Enable
+ *  10: PCI Abort Interrupt Enable
+ *  11: Local Interrupt Input Enable
+ *  12: Retry Abort Enable
+ *  13: PCI Express Doorbell Interrupt Active
+ *  14: PCI Abort Interrupt Active
+ *  15: Local Interrupt Input Active
+ *  16: Local Interrupt Output Enable
+ *  17: Local Doorbell Interrupt Enable
+ *  18: DMA Channel 0 Interrupt Enable
+ *  19: DMA Channel 1 Interrupt Enable
+ *  20: Local Doorbell Interrupt Active
+ *  21: DMA Channel 0 Interrupt Active
+ *  22: DMA Channel 1 Interrupt Active
+ *  23: Built-In Self-Test (BIST) Interrupt Active
+ *  24: Direct Master was the Bus Master during a Master or Target Abort
+ *  25: DMA Channel 0 was the Bus Master during a Master or Target Abort
+ *  26: DMA Channel 1 was the Bus Master during a Master or Target Abort
+ *  27: Target Abort after internal 256 consecutive Master Retrys
+ *  28: PCI Bus wrote data to LCS_MBOX0
+ *  29: PCI Bus wrote data to LCS_MBOX1
+ *  30: PCI Bus wrote data to LCS_MBOX2
+ *  31: PCI Bus wrote data to LCS_MBOX3
+ */
+#define PLX_PEX8311_PCI_LCS_INTCSR  0x68
+#define INTCSR_INTERNAL_PCI_WIRE    BIT(8)
+#define INTCSR_LOCAL_INPUT          BIT(11)
+
 /**
  * struct idio_24_gpio_reg - GPIO device registers structure
  * @out0_7:	Read: FET Outputs 0-7
@@ -92,6 +133,7 @@ struct idio_24_gpio_reg {
 struct idio_24_gpio {
 	struct gpio_chip chip;
 	raw_spinlock_t lock;
+	__u8 __iomem *plx;
 	struct idio_24_gpio_reg __iomem *reg;
 	unsigned long irq_mask;
 };
@@ -481,6 +523,7 @@ static int idio_24_probe(struct pci_dev
 	struct device *const dev = &pdev->dev;
 	struct idio_24_gpio *idio24gpio;
 	int err;
+	const size_t pci_plx_bar_index = 1;
 	const size_t pci_bar_index = 2;
 	const char *const name = pci_name(pdev);
 
@@ -494,12 +537,13 @@ static int idio_24_probe(struct pci_dev
 		return err;
 	}
 
-	err = pcim_iomap_regions(pdev, BIT(pci_bar_index), name);
+	err = pcim_iomap_regions(pdev, BIT(pci_plx_bar_index) | BIT(pci_bar_index), name);
 	if (err) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map PCI I/O addresses (%d)\n", err);
 		return err;
 	}
 
+	idio24gpio->plx = pcim_iomap_table(pdev)[pci_plx_bar_index];
 	idio24gpio->reg = pcim_iomap_table(pdev)[pci_bar_index];
 
 	idio24gpio->chip.label = name;
@@ -520,6 +564,12 @@ static int idio_24_probe(struct pci_dev
 
 	/* Software board reset */
 	iowrite8(0, &idio24gpio->reg->soft_reset);
+	/*
+	 * enable PLX PEX8311 internal PCI wire interrupt and local interrupt
+	 * input
+	 */
+	iowrite8((INTCSR_INTERNAL_PCI_WIRE | INTCSR_LOCAL_INPUT) >> 8,
+		 idio24gpio->plx + PLX_PEX8311_PCI_LCS_INTCSR + 1);
 
 	err = devm_gpiochip_add_data(dev, &idio24gpio->chip, idio24gpio);
 	if (err) {
author maintainer
#84 lore raw

PATCH 80/101 mmc: renesas_sdhi_core: Add missing tmio_mmc_host_free() at remove

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yoshihiro Shimoda <[email protected]>

commit e8973201d9b281375b5a8c66093de5679423021a upstream.

The commit 94b110aff867 ("mmc: tmio: add tmio_mmc_host_alloc/free()") added tmio_mmc_host_free(), but missed the function calling in the sh_mobile_sdhi_remove() at that time. So, fix it. Otherwise, we cannot rebind the sdhi/mmc devices when we use aliases of mmc.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c +1 -0
@@ -764,6 +764,7 @@ int renesas_sdhi_remove(struct platform_
 
 	tmio_mmc_host_remove(host);
 	renesas_sdhi_clk_disable(host);
+	tmio_mmc_host_free(host);
 
 	return 0;
 }
author maintainer
#85 lore raw

PATCH 81/101 dont dump the threads that had been already exiting when zapped.

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Al Viro <[email protected]>

commit 77f6ab8b7768cf5e6bdd0e72499270a0671506ee upstream.

Coredump logics needs to report not only the registers of the dumping thread, but (since 2.5.43) those of other threads getting killed.

Doing that might require extra state saved on the stack in asm glue at kernel entry; signal delivery logics does that (we need to be able to save sigcontext there, at the very least) and so does seccomp.

That covers all callers of do_coredump(). Secondary threads get hit with SIGKILL and caught as soon as they reach exit_mm(), which normally happens in signal delivery, so those are also fine most of the time. Unfortunately, it is possible to end up with secondary zapped when it has already entered exit(2) (or, worse yet, is oopsing). In those cases we reach exit_mm() when mm->core_state is already set, but the stack contents is not what we would have in signal delivery.

At least on two architectures (alpha and m68k) it leads to infoleaks - we end up with a chunk of kernel stack written into coredump, with the contents consisting of normal C stack frames of the call chain leading to exit_mm() instead of the expected copy of userland registers. In case of alpha we leak 312 bytes of stack. Other architectures (including the regset-using ones) might have similar problems - the normal user of regsets is ptrace and the state of tracee at the time of such calls is special in the same way signal delivery is.

Note that had the zapper gotten to the exiting thread slightly later, it wouldn't have been included into coredump anyway - we skip the threads that have already cleared their ->mm. So let's pretend that zapper always loses the race. IOW, have exit_mm() only insert into the dumper list if we'd gotten there from handling a fatal signal[*]

As the result, the callers of do_exit() that have *not* gone through get_signal() are not seen by coredump logics as secondary threads. Which excludes voluntary exit()/oopsen/traps/etc. The dumper thread itself is unaffected by that, so seccomp is fine.

[*] originally I intended to add a new flag in tsk->flags, but ebiederman pointed out that PF_SIGNALED is already doing just what we need.

Fixes d89f3847def4 ("[PATCH] thread-aware coredumps, 2.5.43-C3")

History-tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git

---
 kernel/exit.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/exit.c +4 -1
@@ -517,7 +517,10 @@ static void exit_mm(void)
 		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
 
 		self.task = current;
-		self.next = xchg(&core_state->dumper.next, &self);
+		if (self.task->flags & PF_SIGNALED)
+			self.next = xchg(&core_state->dumper.next, &self);
+		else
+			self.task = NULL;
 		/*
 		 * Implies mb(), the result of xchg() must be visible
 		 * to core_state->dumper.
author maintainer
#86 lore raw

PATCH 82/101 drm/gma500: Fix out-of-bounds access to struct drm_device.vblank[]

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>

commit 06ad8d339524bf94b89859047822c31df6ace239 upstream.

The gma500 driver expects 3 pipelines in several it's IRQ functions. Accessing struct drm_device.vblank[], this fails with devices that only have 2 pipelines. An example KASAN report is shown below.

  [   62.267688] ==================================================================
  [   62.268856] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in psb_irq_postinstall+0x250/0x3c0 [gma500_gfx]
  [   62.269450] Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880012bc6d0 by task systemd-udevd/285
  [   62.269949]
  [   62.270192] CPU: 0 PID: 285 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G            E     5.10.0-rc1-1-default+ #572
  [   62.270807] Hardware name:  /DN2800MT, BIOS MTCDT10N.86A.0164.2012.1213.1024 12/13/2012
  [   62.271366] Call Trace:
  [   62.271705]  dump_stack+0xae/0xe5
  [   62.272180]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x17/0xf0
  [   62.272987]  ? psb_irq_postinstall+0x250/0x3c0 [gma500_gfx]
  [   62.273474]  __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38
  [   62.273989]  ? psb_irq_postinstall+0x250/0x3c0 [gma500_gfx]
  [   62.274460]  kasan_report+0x3a/0x50
  [   62.274891]  psb_irq_postinstall+0x250/0x3c0 [gma500_gfx]
  [   62.275380]  drm_irq_install+0x131/0x1f0
  <...>
  [   62.300751] Allocated by task 285:
  [   62.301223]  kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
  [   62.301731]  __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0
  [   62.302293]  drmm_kmalloc+0x55/0x100
  [   62.302773]  drm_vblank_init+0x77/0x210

Resolve the issue by only handling vblank entries up to the number of CRTCs.

I'm adding a Fixes tag for reference, although the bug has been present since the driver's initial commit.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/psb_irq.c |   34 ++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/psb_irq.c +12 -22
@@ -350,6 +350,7 @@ int psb_irq_postinstall(struct drm_devic
 {
 	struct drm_psb_private *dev_priv = dev->dev_private;
 	unsigned long irqflags;
+	unsigned int i;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&dev_priv->irqmask_lock, irqflags);
 
@@ -362,20 +363,12 @@ int psb_irq_postinstall(struct drm_devic
 	PSB_WVDC32(dev_priv->vdc_irq_mask, PSB_INT_ENABLE_R);
 	PSB_WVDC32(0xFFFFFFFF, PSB_HWSTAM);
 
-	if (dev->vblank[0].enabled)
-		psb_enable_pipestat(dev_priv, 0, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE);
-	else
-		psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, 0, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE);
-
-	if (dev->vblank[1].enabled)
-		psb_enable_pipestat(dev_priv, 1, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE);
-	else
-		psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, 1, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE);
-
-	if (dev->vblank[2].enabled)
-		psb_enable_pipestat(dev_priv, 2, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE);
-	else
-		psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, 2, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE);
+	for (i = 0; i < dev->num_crtcs; ++i) {
+		if (dev->vblank[i].enabled)
+			psb_enable_pipestat(dev_priv, i, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE);
+		else
+			psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, i, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE);
+	}
 
 	if (dev_priv->ops->hotplug_enable)
 		dev_priv->ops->hotplug_enable(dev, true);
@@ -388,6 +381,7 @@ void psb_irq_uninstall(struct drm_device
 {
 	struct drm_psb_private *dev_priv = dev->dev_private;
 	unsigned long irqflags;
+	unsigned int i;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&dev_priv->irqmask_lock, irqflags);
 
@@ -396,14 +390,10 @@ void psb_irq_uninstall(struct drm_device
 
 	PSB_WVDC32(0xFFFFFFFF, PSB_HWSTAM);
 
-	if (dev->vblank[0].enabled)
-		psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, 0, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE);
-
-	if (dev->vblank[1].enabled)
-		psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, 1, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE);
-
-	if (dev->vblank[2].enabled)
-		psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, 2, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE);
+	for (i = 0; i < dev->num_crtcs; ++i) {
+		if (dev->vblank[i].enabled)
+			psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, i, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE);
+	}
 
 	dev_priv->vdc_irq_mask &= _PSB_IRQ_SGX_FLAG |
 				  _PSB_IRQ_MSVDX_FLAG |

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel

author maintainer
#87 lore raw

PATCH 83/101 pinctrl: amd: use higher precision for 512 RtcClk

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Coiby Xu <[email protected]>

commit c64a6a0d4a928c63e5bc3b485552a8903a506c36 upstream.

RTC is 32.768kHz thus 512 RtcClk equals 15625 usec. The documentation likely has dropped precision and that's why the driver mistakenly took the slightly deviated value.

---
 drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c +1 -1
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static int amd_gpio_set_debounce(struct
 			pin_reg |= BIT(DB_TMR_OUT_UNIT_OFF);
 			pin_reg &= ~BIT(DB_TMR_LARGE_OFF);
 		} else if (debounce < 250000) {
-			time = debounce / 15600;
+			time = debounce / 15625;
 			pin_reg |= time & DB_TMR_OUT_MASK;
 			pin_reg &= ~BIT(DB_TMR_OUT_UNIT_OFF);
 			pin_reg |= BIT(DB_TMR_LARGE_OFF);
author maintainer
#88 lore raw

PATCH 84/101 pinctrl: amd: fix incorrect way to disable debounce filter

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Coiby Xu <[email protected]>

commit 06abe8291bc31839950f7d0362d9979edc88a666 upstream.

The correct way to disable debounce filter is to clear bit 5 and 6 of the register.

---
 drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c +2 -2
@@ -167,14 +167,14 @@ static int amd_gpio_set_debounce(struct
 			pin_reg |= BIT(DB_TMR_OUT_UNIT_OFF);
 			pin_reg |= BIT(DB_TMR_LARGE_OFF);
 		} else {
-			pin_reg &= ~DB_CNTRl_MASK;
+			pin_reg &= ~(DB_CNTRl_MASK << DB_CNTRL_OFF);
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 		}
 	} else {
 		pin_reg &= ~BIT(DB_TMR_OUT_UNIT_OFF);
 		pin_reg &= ~BIT(DB_TMR_LARGE_OFF);
 		pin_reg &= ~DB_TMR_OUT_MASK;
-		pin_reg &= ~DB_CNTRl_MASK;
+		pin_reg &= ~(DB_CNTRl_MASK << DB_CNTRL_OFF);
 	}
 	writel(pin_reg, gpio_dev->base + offset * 4);
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
author maintainer
#89 lore raw

PATCH 85/101 erofs: derive atime instead of leaving it empty

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Gao Xiang <[email protected]>

commit d3938ee23e97bfcac2e0eb6b356875da73d700df upstream.

EROFS has _only one_ ondisk timestamp (ctime is currently documented and recorded, we might also record mtime instead with a new compat feature if needed) for each extended inode since EROFS isn't mainly for archival purposes so no need to keep all timestamps on disk especially for Android scenarios due to security concerns. Also, romfs/cramfs don't have their own on-disk timestamp, and squashfs only records mtime instead.

Let's also derive access time from ondisk timestamp rather than leaving it empty, and if mtime/atime for each file are really needed for specific scenarios as well, we can also use xattrs to record them then.

[ Gao Xiang: It'd be better to backport for user-friendly concern. ]
Fixes 431339ba9042 ("staging: erofs: add inode operations")
Cc stable <[email protected]> # 4.19+
[ Gao Xiang: Manually backport to 4.19.y due to trivial conflicts. ]
---
 drivers/staging/erofs/inode.c |   21 +++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/erofs/inode.c +11 -10
@@ -53,11 +53,9 @@ static int read_inode(struct inode *inod
 		i_gid_write(inode, le32_to_cpu(v2->i_gid));
 		set_nlink(inode, le32_to_cpu(v2->i_nlink));
 
-		/* ns timestamp */
-		inode->i_mtime.tv_sec = inode->i_ctime.tv_sec =
-			le64_to_cpu(v2->i_ctime);
-		inode->i_mtime.tv_nsec = inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec =
-			le32_to_cpu(v2->i_ctime_nsec);
+		/* extended inode has its own timestamp */
+		inode->i_ctime.tv_sec = le64_to_cpu(v2->i_ctime);
+		inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec = le32_to_cpu(v2->i_ctime_nsec);
 
 		inode->i_size = le64_to_cpu(v2->i_size);
 	} else if (__inode_version(advise) == EROFS_INODE_LAYOUT_V1) {
@@ -83,11 +81,9 @@ static int read_inode(struct inode *inod
 		i_gid_write(inode, le16_to_cpu(v1->i_gid));
 		set_nlink(inode, le16_to_cpu(v1->i_nlink));
 
-		/* use build time to derive all file time */
-		inode->i_mtime.tv_sec = inode->i_ctime.tv_sec =
-			sbi->build_time;
-		inode->i_mtime.tv_nsec = inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec =
-			sbi->build_time_nsec;
+		/* use build time for compact inodes */
+		inode->i_ctime.tv_sec = sbi->build_time;
+		inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec = sbi->build_time_nsec;
 
 		inode->i_size = le32_to_cpu(v1->i_size);
 	} else {
@@ -97,6 +93,11 @@ static int read_inode(struct inode *inod
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
+	inode->i_mtime.tv_sec = inode->i_ctime.tv_sec;
+	inode->i_atime.tv_sec = inode->i_ctime.tv_sec;
+	inode->i_mtime.tv_nsec = inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec;
+	inode->i_atime.tv_nsec = inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec;
+
 	/* measure inode.i_blocks as the generic filesystem */
 	inode->i_blocks = ((inode->i_size - 1) >> 9) + 1;
 	return 0;
author maintainer
#90 lore raw

PATCH 86/101 swiotlb: fix "x86: Dont panic if can not alloc buffer for swiotlb"

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stefano Stabellini <[email protected]>

commit e9696d259d0fb5d239e8c28ca41089838ea76d13 upstream.

kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:swiotlb_init gets called first and tries to allocate a buffer for the swiotlb. It does so by calling

  memblock_alloc_low(PAGE_ALIGN(bytes), PAGE_SIZE);

If the allocation must fail, no_iotlb_memory is set.

Later during initialization swiotlb-xen comes in (drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c:xen_swiotlb_init) and given that io_tlb_start is != 0, it thinks the memory is ready to use when actually it is not.

When the swiotlb is actually needed, swiotlb_tbl_map_single gets called and since no_iotlb_memory is set the kernel panics.

Instead, if swiotlb-xen.c:xen_swiotlb_init knew the swiotlb hadn't been initialized, it would do the initialization itself, which might still succeed.

Fix the panic by setting io_tlb_start to 0 on swiotlb initialization failure, and also by setting no_iotlb_memory to false on swiotlb initialization success.

Fixes ac2cbab21f31 ("x86: Don't panic if can not alloc buffer for swiotlb")
---
 kernel/dma/swiotlb.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/dma/swiotlb.c +5 -1
@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ int __init swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *t
 		io_tlb_orig_addr[i] = INVALID_PHYS_ADDR;
 	}
 	io_tlb_index = 0;
+	no_iotlb_memory = false;
 
 	if (verbose)
 		swiotlb_print_info();
@@ -270,9 +271,11 @@ swiotlb_init(int verbose)
 	if (vstart && !swiotlb_init_with_tbl(vstart, io_tlb_nslabs, verbose))
 		return;
 
-	if (io_tlb_start)
+	if (io_tlb_start) {
 		memblock_free_early(io_tlb_start,
 				    PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_nslabs << IO_TLB_SHIFT));
+		io_tlb_start = 0;
+	}
 	pr_warn("Cannot allocate buffer");
 	no_iotlb_memory = true;
 }
@@ -376,6 +379,7 @@ swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, un
 		io_tlb_orig_addr[i] = INVALID_PHYS_ADDR;
 	}
 	io_tlb_index = 0;
+	no_iotlb_memory = false;
 
 	swiotlb_print_info();
 
author maintainer
#91 lore raw

PATCH 87/101 IPv6: Set SIT tunnel hard_header_len to zero

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Oliver Herms <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ef9ba4d666614497a057d09b0a6eafc1e34eadf ]

Due to the legacy usage of hard_header_len for SIT tunnels while already using infrastructure from net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c the calculation of the path MTU in tnl_update_pmtu is incorrect. This leads to unnecessary creation of MTU exceptions for any flow going over a SIT tunnel.

As SIT tunnels do not have a header themsevles other than their transport (L3, L2) headers we're leaving hard_header_len set to zero as tnl_update_pmtu is already taking care of the transport headers sizes.

This will also help avoiding unnecessary IPv6 GC runs and spinlock contention seen when using SIT tunnels and for more than net.ipv6.route.gc_thresh flows.

---
 net/ipv6/sit.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/sit.c +0 -2
@@ -1087,7 +1087,6 @@ static void ipip6_tunnel_bind_dev(struct
 	if (tdev && !netif_is_l3_master(tdev)) {
 		int t_hlen = tunnel->hlen + sizeof(struct iphdr);
 
-		dev->hard_header_len = tdev->hard_header_len + sizeof(struct iphdr);
 		dev->mtu = tdev->mtu - t_hlen;
 		if (dev->mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
 			dev->mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
@@ -1377,7 +1376,6 @@ static void ipip6_tunnel_setup(struct ne
 	dev->priv_destructor	= ipip6_dev_free;
 
 	dev->type		= ARPHRD_SIT;
-	dev->hard_header_len	= LL_MAX_HEADER + t_hlen;
 	dev->mtu		= ETH_DATA_LEN - t_hlen;
 	dev->min_mtu		= IPV6_MIN_MTU;
 	dev->max_mtu		= IP6_MAX_MTU - t_hlen;
author maintainer
#92 lore raw

PATCH 88/101 net/af_iucv: fix null pointer dereference on shutdown

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ursula Braun <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4031eeafa71eaf22ae40a15606a134ae86345daf ]

syzbot reported the following KASAN finding:

BUG: KASAN: nullptr-dereference in iucv_send_ctrl+0x390/0x3f0 net/iucv/af_iucv.c:385
Read of size 2 at addr 000000000000021e by task syz-executor907/519

CPU: 0 PID: 519 Comm: syz-executor907 Not tainted 5.9.0-syzkaller-07043-gbcf9877ad213 #0
Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 701 (KVM/Linux)
Call Trace:
 [<00000000c576af60>] unwind_start arch/s390/include/asm/unwind.h:65 [inline]
 [<00000000c576af60>] show_stack+0x180/0x228 arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c:135
 [<00000000c9dcd1f8>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 [<00000000c9dcd1f8>] dump_stack+0x268/0x2f0 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 [<00000000c5fed016>] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x5e/0x218 mm/kasan/report.c:383
 [<00000000c5fec82a>] __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:517 [inline]
 [<00000000c5fec82a>] kasan_report+0x11a/0x168 mm/kasan/report.c:534
 [<00000000c98b5b60>] iucv_send_ctrl+0x390/0x3f0 net/iucv/af_iucv.c:385
 [<00000000c98b6262>] iucv_sock_shutdown+0x44a/0x4c0 net/iucv/af_iucv.c:1457
 [<00000000c89d3a54>] __sys_shutdown+0x12c/0x1c8 net/socket.c:2204
 [<00000000c89d3b70>] __do_sys_shutdown net/socket.c:2212 [inline]
 [<00000000c89d3b70>] __s390x_sys_shutdown+0x38/0x48 net/socket.c:2210
 [<00000000c9e36eac>] system_call+0xe0/0x28c arch/s390/kernel/entry.S:415

There is nothing to shutdown if a connection has never been established. Besides that iucv->hs_dev is not yet initialized if a socket is in IUCV_OPEN state and iucv->path is not yet initialized if socket is in IUCV_BOUND state.
So, just skip the shutdown calls for a socket in these states.

Fixes eac3731bd04c ("[S390]: Add AF_IUCV socket support")
Fixes 82492a355fac ("af_iucv: add shutdown for HS transport")
[jwi: correct one Fixes tag]
---
 net/iucv/af_iucv.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/iucv/af_iucv.c +2 -1
@@ -1571,7 +1571,8 @@ static int iucv_sock_shutdown(struct soc
 		break;
 	}
 
-	if (how == SEND_SHUTDOWN || how == SHUTDOWN_MASK) {
+	if ((how == SEND_SHUTDOWN || how == SHUTDOWN_MASK) &&
+	    sk->sk_state == IUCV_CONNECTED) {
 		if (iucv->transport == AF_IUCV_TRANS_IUCV) {
 			txmsg.class = 0;
 			txmsg.tag = 0;
author maintainer
#93 lore raw

PATCH 89/101 net: Update window_clamp if SOCK_RCVBUF is set

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mao Wenan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 909172a149749242990a6e64cb55d55460d4e417 ]

When net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1 and syn flood is happened, cookie_v4_check or cookie_v6_check tries to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack or tcp_v6_send_synack did, rsk_window_clamp will be changed if SOCK_RCVBUF is set, which will make rcv_wscale is different, the client still operates with initial window scale and can overshot granted window, the client use the initial scale but local server use new scale to advertise window value, and session work abnormally.

Fixes e88c64f0a425 ("tcp: allow effective reduction of TCP's rcv-buffer via setsockopt")
---
 net/ipv4/syncookies.c |    9 +++++++--
 net/ipv6/syncookies.c |   10 ++++++++--
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/syncookies.c +7 -2
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock
 	__u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1;
 	struct sock *ret = sk;
 	struct request_sock *req;
-	int mss;
+	int full_space, mss;
 	struct rtable *rt;
 	__u8 rcv_wscale;
 	struct flowi4 fl4;
@@ -391,8 +391,13 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock
 
 	/* Try to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack did. */
 	req->rsk_window_clamp = tp->window_clamp ? :dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_WINDOW);
+	/* limit the window selection if the user enforce a smaller rx buffer */
+	full_space = tcp_full_space(sk);
+	if (sk->sk_userlocks & SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK &&
+	    (req->rsk_window_clamp > full_space || req->rsk_window_clamp == 0))
+		req->rsk_window_clamp = full_space;
 
-	tcp_select_initial_window(sk, tcp_full_space(sk), req->mss,
+	tcp_select_initial_window(sk, full_space, req->mss,
 				  &req->rsk_rcv_wnd, &req->rsk_window_clamp,
 				  ireq->wscale_ok, &rcv_wscale,
 				  dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_INITRWND));
net/ipv6/syncookies.c +8 -2
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock
 	__u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1;
 	struct sock *ret = sk;
 	struct request_sock *req;
-	int mss;
+	int full_space, mss;
 	struct dst_entry *dst;
 	__u8 rcv_wscale;
 	u32 tsoff = 0;
@@ -246,7 +246,13 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock
 	}
 
 	req->rsk_window_clamp = tp->window_clamp ? :dst_metric(dst, RTAX_WINDOW);
-	tcp_select_initial_window(sk, tcp_full_space(sk), req->mss,
+	/* limit the window selection if the user enforce a smaller rx buffer */
+	full_space = tcp_full_space(sk);
+	if (sk->sk_userlocks & SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK &&
+	    (req->rsk_window_clamp > full_space || req->rsk_window_clamp == 0))
+		req->rsk_window_clamp = full_space;
+
+	tcp_select_initial_window(sk, full_space, req->mss,
 				  &req->rsk_rcv_wnd, &req->rsk_window_clamp,
 				  ireq->wscale_ok, &rcv_wscale,
 				  dst_metric(dst, RTAX_INITRWND));
author maintainer
#94 lore raw

PATCH 90/101 net/x25: Fix null-ptr-deref in x25_connect

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Martin Schiller <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 361182308766a265b6c521879b34302617a8c209 ]

This fixes a regression for blocking connects introduced by commit 4becb7ee5b3d ("net/x25: Fix x25_neigh refcnt leak when x25 disconnect").

The x25->neighbour is already set to "NULL" by x25_disconnect() now, while a blocking connect is waiting in x25_wait_for_connection_establishment(). Therefore x25->neighbour must not be accessed here again and x25->state is also already set to X25_STATE_0 by x25_disconnect().

Fixes 4becb7ee5b3d ("net/x25: Fix x25_neigh refcnt leak when x25 disconnect")
---
 net/x25/af_x25.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/x25/af_x25.c +1 -1
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ static int x25_connect(struct socket *so
 	sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
 	rc = 0;
 out_put_neigh:
-	if (rc) {
+	if (rc && x25->neighbour) {
 		read_lock_bh(&x25_list_lock);
 		x25_neigh_put(x25->neighbour);
 		x25->neighbour = NULL;
author maintainer
#95 lore raw

PATCH 91/101 tipc: fix memory leak in tipc_topsrv_start()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Hai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fa6882c63621821f73cc806f291208e1c6ea6187 ]

kmemleak report a memory leak as follows:

unreferenced object 0xffff88810a596800 (size 512):
comm "ip", pid 21558, jiffies 4297568990 (age 112.120s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):

    00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00  .....N..........
    ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 83 60 b0 ff ff ff ff  ..........`.....
  backtrace:
    [<0000000022bbe21f>] tipc_topsrv_init_net+0x1f3/0xa70
    [<00000000fe15ddf7>] ops_init+0xa8/0x3c0
    [<00000000138af6f2>] setup_net+0x2de/0x7e0
    [<000000008c6807a3>] copy_net_ns+0x27d/0x530
    [<000000006b21adbd>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0xa30
    [<00000000bb169746>] unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xa1/0x1d0
    [<00000000fe2e42bc>] ksys_unshare+0x39c/0x780
    [<0000000009ba3b19>] __x64_sys_unshare+0x2d/0x40
    [<00000000614ad866>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
    [<00000000a1b5ca3c>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

'srv' is malloced in tipc_topsrv_start() but not free before leaving from the error handling cases. We need to free it.

Fixes 5c45ab24ac77 ("tipc: make struct tipc_server private for server.c")
---
 net/tipc/topsrv.c |   10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/tipc/topsrv.c +8 -2
@@ -671,12 +671,18 @@ static int tipc_topsrv_start(struct net
 
 	ret = tipc_topsrv_work_start(srv);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		return ret;
+		goto err_start;
 
 	ret = tipc_topsrv_create_listener(srv);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		tipc_topsrv_work_stop(srv);
+		goto err_create;
 
+	return 0;
+
+err_create:
+	tipc_topsrv_work_stop(srv);
+err_start:
+	kfree(srv);
 	return ret;
 }
 
author maintainer
#96 lore raw

PATCH 92/101 vrf: Fix fast path output packet handling with async Netfilter rules

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Martin Willi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9e2b7fa2df4365e99934901da4fb4af52d81e820 ]

VRF devices use an optimized direct path on output if a default qdisc is involved, calling Netfilter hooks directly. This path, however, does not consider Netfilter rules completing asynchronously, such as with NFQUEUE. The Netfilter okfn() is called for asynchronously accepted packets, but the VRF never passes that packet down the stack to send it out over the slave device. Using the slower redirect path for this seems not feasible, as we do not know beforehand if a Netfilter hook has asynchronously completing rules.

Fix the use of asynchronously completing Netfilter rules in OUTPUT and POSTROUTING by using a special completion function that additionally calls dst_output() to pass the packet down the stack. Also, slightly adjust the use of nf_reset_ct() so that is called in the asynchronous case, too.

Fixes dcdd43c41e60 ("net: vrf: performance improvements for IPv4")
Fixes a9ec54d1b0cd ("net: vrf: performance improvements for IPv6")
---
 drivers/net/vrf.c |   92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/net/vrf.c +69 -23
@@ -336,8 +336,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t vrf_xmit(struct sk_bu
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int vrf_finish_direct(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
-			     struct sk_buff *skb)
+static void vrf_finish_direct(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct net_device *vrf_dev = skb->dev;
 
@@ -356,7 +355,8 @@ static int vrf_finish_direct(struct net
 		skb_pull(skb, ETH_HLEN);
 	}
 
-	return 1;
+	/* reset skb device */
+	nf_reset(skb);
 }
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -435,15 +435,41 @@ static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip6_out_redir
 	return skb;
 }
 
+static int vrf_output6_direct_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	vrf_finish_direct(skb);
+
+	return vrf_ip6_local_out(net, sk, skb);
+}
+
 static int vrf_output6_direct(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
 			      struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
+	int err = 1;
+
 	skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
 
-	return NF_HOOK_COND(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
-			    net, sk, skb, NULL, skb->dev,
-			    vrf_finish_direct,
-			    !(IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_REROUTED));
+	if (!(IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_REROUTED))
+		err = nf_hook(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, net, sk, skb,
+			      NULL, skb->dev, vrf_output6_direct_finish);
+
+	if (likely(err == 1))
+		vrf_finish_direct(skb);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int vrf_ip6_out_direct_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = vrf_output6_direct(net, sk, skb);
+	if (likely(err == 1))
+		err = vrf_ip6_local_out(net, sk, skb);
+
+	return err;
 }
 
 static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip6_out_direct(struct net_device *vrf_dev,
@@ -456,18 +482,15 @@ static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip6_out_direc
 	skb->dev = vrf_dev;
 
 	err = nf_hook(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, net, sk,
-		      skb, NULL, vrf_dev, vrf_output6_direct);
+		      skb, NULL, vrf_dev, vrf_ip6_out_direct_finish);
 
 	if (likely(err == 1))
 		err = vrf_output6_direct(net, sk, skb);
 
-	/* reset skb device */
 	if (likely(err == 1))
-		nf_reset(skb);
-	else
-		skb = NULL;
+		return skb;
 
-	return skb;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip6_out(struct net_device *vrf_dev,
@@ -649,15 +672,41 @@ static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip_out_redire
 	return skb;
 }
 
+static int vrf_output_direct_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
+				    struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	vrf_finish_direct(skb);
+
+	return vrf_ip_local_out(net, sk, skb);
+}
+
 static int vrf_output_direct(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
 			     struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
+	int err = 1;
+
 	skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
 
-	return NF_HOOK_COND(NFPROTO_IPV4, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
-			    net, sk, skb, NULL, skb->dev,
-			    vrf_finish_direct,
-			    !(IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_REROUTED));
+	if (!(IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_REROUTED))
+		err = nf_hook(NFPROTO_IPV4, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, net, sk, skb,
+			      NULL, skb->dev, vrf_output_direct_finish);
+
+	if (likely(err == 1))
+		vrf_finish_direct(skb);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int vrf_ip_out_direct_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
+				    struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = vrf_output_direct(net, sk, skb);
+	if (likely(err == 1))
+		err = vrf_ip_local_out(net, sk, skb);
+
+	return err;
 }
 
 static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip_out_direct(struct net_device *vrf_dev,
@@ -670,18 +719,15 @@ static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip_out_direct
 	skb->dev = vrf_dev;
 
 	err = nf_hook(NFPROTO_IPV4, NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, net, sk,
-		      skb, NULL, vrf_dev, vrf_output_direct);
+		      skb, NULL, vrf_dev, vrf_ip_out_direct_finish);
 
 	if (likely(err == 1))
 		err = vrf_output_direct(net, sk, skb);
 
-	/* reset skb device */
 	if (likely(err == 1))
-		nf_reset(skb);
-	else
-		skb = NULL;
+		return skb;
 
-	return skb;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip_out(struct net_device *vrf_dev,
author maintainer
#97 lore raw

PATCH 93/101 r8169: fix potential skb double free in an error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cc6528bc9a0c901c83b8220a2e2617f3354d6dd9 ]

The caller of rtl8169_tso_csum_v2() frees the skb if false is returned. eth_skb_pad() internally frees the skb on error what would result in a double free. Therefore use __skb_put_padto() directly and instruct it to not free the skb on error.

Fixes b423e9ae49d7 ("r8169: fix offloaded tx checksum for small packets.")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c +2 -1
@@ -6274,7 +6274,8 @@ static bool rtl8169_tso_csum_v2(struct r
 		opts[1] |= transport_offset << TCPHO_SHIFT;
 	} else {
 		if (unlikely(rtl_test_hw_pad_bug(tp, skb)))
-			return !eth_skb_pad(skb);
+			/* eth_skb_pad would free the skb on error */
+			return !__skb_put_padto(skb, ETH_ZLEN, false);
 	}
 
 	return true;
author maintainer
#98 lore raw

PATCH 94/101 random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: George Spelvin <[email protected]>

commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.

Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm, given a small sample of their output. An LFSR like prandom_u32() is particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.

It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable. Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack. Oops.

This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits of strong random key. (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted about this abuse of their algorithm.) Speed is prioritized over security; attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.

Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix. Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it is an open question.

Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution. This patch replaces it.

Cc Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Cc Marc Plumb <[email protected]>
Fixes f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")

[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal; inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4 members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]

[wt: backported to 4.19 -- various context adjustments]
---
 drivers/char/random.c   |    1 
 include/linux/prandom.h |   36 +++
 kernel/time/timer.c     |    7 
 lib/random32.c          |  462 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 4 files changed, 317 insertions(+), 189 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +0 -1
@@ -1257,7 +1257,6 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, i
 
 	fast_mix(fast_pool);
 	add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
-	this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, fast_pool->pool[cycles & 3]);
 
 	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
 		if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
include/linux/prandom.h +34 -2
@@ -16,12 +16,44 @@ void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nby
 void prandom_seed(u32 seed);
 void prandom_reseed_late(void);
 
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+/*
+ * The core SipHash round function.  Each line can be executed in
+ * parallel given enough CPU resources.
+ */
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+	v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13),  v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
+	v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32),  v3 ^= v2,                     \
+	v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21),  v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
+	v3 ^= v0,                      v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32)  \
+)
+
+#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
+#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
+
+#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+/*
+ * On 32-bit machines, we use HSipHash, a reduced-width version of SipHash.
+ * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
+ * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
+ */
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+	v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1,  5),  v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3,  8), \
+	v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16),  v3 ^= v2,                     \
+	v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3,  7),  v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
+	v3 ^= v0,                      v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16)  \
+)
+#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
+#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
+
+#else
+#error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
+#endif
+
 struct rnd_state {
 	__u32 s1, s2, s3, s4;
 };
 
-DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state);
-
 u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state);
 void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t nbytes);
 void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state);
kernel/time/timer.c +0 -7
@@ -1655,13 +1655,6 @@ void update_process_times(int user_tick)
 	scheduler_tick();
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
 		run_posix_cpu_timers(p);
-
-	/* The current CPU might make use of net randoms without receiving IRQs
-	 * to renew them often enough. Let's update the net_rand_state from a
-	 * non-constant value that's not affine to the number of calls to make
-	 * sure it's updated when there's some activity (we don't care in idle).
-	 */
-	this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, rol32(jiffies, 24) + user_tick);
 }
 
 /**
lib/random32.c +283 -179

503 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#99 lore raw

PATCH 95/101 x86/speculation: Allow IBPB to be conditionally enabled on CPUs with always-on STIBP

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Anand K Mistry <[email protected]>

commit 1978b3a53a74e3230cd46932b149c6e62e832e9a upstream.

On AMD CPUs which have the feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON, STIBP is set to on and

spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED

At the same time, IBPB can be set to conditional.

However, this leads to the case where it's impossible to turn on IBPB for a process because in the PR_SPEC_DISABLE case in ib_prctl_set() the

spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED

condition leads to a return before the task flag is set. Similarly, ib_prctl_get() will return PR_SPEC_DISABLE even though IBPB is set to conditional.

More generally, the following cases are possible:

1. STIBP = conditional && IBPB = on for spectre_v2_user=seccomp,ibpb
2. STIBP = on && IBPB = conditional for AMD CPUs with X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON

The first case functions correctly today, but only because spectre_v2_user_ibpb isn't updated to reflect the IBPB mode.

At a high level, this change does one thing. If either STIBP or IBPB is set to conditional, allow the prctl to change the task flag. Also, reflect that capability when querying the state. This isn't perfect since it doesn't take into account if only STIBP or IBPB is unconditionally on. But it allows the conditional feature to work as expected, without affecting the unconditional one.

[ bp: Massage commit message and comment; space out statements for
better readability. ]

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +33 -19
@@ -1240,6 +1240,14 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_str
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool is_spec_ib_user_controlled(void)
+{
+	return spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+		spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
+		spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+		spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
+}
+
 static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 {
 	switch (ctrl) {
@@ -1247,17 +1255,26 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_stru
 		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
 		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
 			return 0;
-		/*
-		 * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
-		 * mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled
-		 * by a  previous prctl call.
 
+		/*
+		 * With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction
+		 * code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead,
+		 * unconditionally run the instruction. However, STIBP and IBPB
+		 * are independent and either can be set to conditionally
+		 * enabled regardless of the mode of the other.
+		 *
+		 * If either is set to conditional, allow the task flag to be
+		 * updated, unless it was force-disabled by a previous prctl
+		 * call. Currently, this is possible on an AMD CPU which has the
+		 * feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON. In this case, if the
+		 * kernel is booted with 'spectre_v2_user=seccomp', then
+		 * spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP and
+		 * spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED.
 		 */
-		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
-		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
-		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ||
+		if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled() ||
 		    task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
 			return -EPERM;
+
 		task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
 		task_update_spec_tif(task);
 		break;
@@ -1270,10 +1287,10 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_stru
 		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
 		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
 			return -EPERM;
-		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
-		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
-		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+
+		if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled())
 			return 0;
+
 		task_set_spec_ib_disable(task);
 		if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE)
 			task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task);
@@ -1336,20 +1353,17 @@ static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_stru
 	if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
 	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
 		return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
-	else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
-	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
-	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
-		return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
-	else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
-	    spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
-	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
-	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP) {
+	else if (is_spec_ib_user_controlled()) {
 		if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
 			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
 		if (task_spec_ib_disable(task))
 			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
 		return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
-	} else
+	} else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+		return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+	else
 		return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
 }
 
author maintainer
#100 lore raw

PATCH 96/101 perf scripting python: Avoid declaring function pointers with a visibility attribute

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

commit d0e7b0c71fbb653de90a7163ef46912a96f0bdaf upstream.

To avoid this:

util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c: In function 'python_start_script':
util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c:1595:2: error: 'visibility' attribute ignored [-Werror=attributes]

   1595 |  PyMODINIT_FUNC (*initfunc)(void);
        |  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

That started breaking when building with PYTHON=python3 and these gcc versions (I haven't checked with the clang ones, maybe it breaks there as well):

  # export PERF_TARBALL=http://192.168.86.5/perf/perf-5.9.0.tar.xz
  # dm  fedora:33 fedora:rawhide
     1   107.80 fedora:33         : Ok   gcc (GCC) 10.2.1 20201005 (Red Hat 10.2.1-5), clang version 11.0.0 (Fedora 11.0.0-1.fc33)
     2    92.47 fedora:rawhide    : Ok   gcc (GCC) 10.2.1 20201016 (Red Hat 10.2.1-6), clang version 11.0.0 (Fedora 11.0.0-1.fc34)
  #

Avoid that by ditching that 'initfunc' function pointer with its:

    #define Py_EXPORTED_SYMBOL _attribute_ ((visibility ("default")))
    #define PyMODINIT_FUNC Py_EXPORTED_SYMBOL PyObject*

And just call PyImport_AppendInittab() at the end of the ifdef python3 block with the functions that were being attributed to that initfunc.

---
 tools/perf/util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c |    7 ++-----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c +2 -5
@@ -1493,7 +1493,6 @@ static void _free_command_line(wchar_t *
 static int python_start_script(const char *script, int argc, const char **argv)
 {
 	struct tables *tables = &tables_global;
-	PyMODINIT_FUNC (*initfunc)(void);
 #if PY_MAJOR_VERSION < 3
 	const char **command_line;
 #else
@@ -1508,20 +1507,18 @@ static int python_start_script(const cha
 	FILE *fp;
 
 #if PY_MAJOR_VERSION < 3
-	initfunc = initperf_trace_context;
 	command_line = malloc((argc + 1) * sizeof(const char *));
 	command_line[0] = script;
 	for (i = 1; i < argc + 1; i++)
 		command_line[i] = argv[i - 1];
+	PyImport_AppendInittab(name, initperf_trace_context);
 #else
-	initfunc = PyInit_perf_trace_context;
 	command_line = malloc((argc + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t *));
 	command_line[0] = Py_DecodeLocale(script, NULL);
 	for (i = 1; i < argc + 1; i++)
 		command_line[i] = Py_DecodeLocale(argv[i - 1], NULL);
+	PyImport_AppendInittab(name, PyInit_perf_trace_context);
 #endif
-
-	PyImport_AppendInittab(name, initfunc);
 	Py_Initialize();
 
 #if PY_MAJOR_VERSION < 3
author maintainer
#101 lore raw

PATCH 97/101 perf/core: Fix race in the perf_mmap_close() function

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>

commit f91072ed1b7283b13ca57fcfbece5a3b92726143 upstream.

There's a possible race in perf_mmap_close() when checking ring buffer's mmap_count refcount value. The problem is that the mmap_count check is not atomic because we call atomic_dec() and atomic_read() separately.

  perf_mmap_close:
  ...
   atomic_dec(&rb->mmap_count);
   ...
   if (atomic_read(&rb->mmap_count))
      goto out_put;

<ring buffer detach>
free_uid

out_put:
ring_buffer_put(rb); /* could be last */

The race can happen when we have two (or more) events sharing same ring buffer and they go through atomic_dec() and then they both see 0 as refcount value later in atomic_read(). Then both will go on and execute code which is meant to be run just once.

The code that detaches ring buffer is probably fine to be executed more than once, but the problem is in calling free_uid(), which will later on demonstrate in related crashes and refcount warnings, like:

refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
...

  RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x6d/0xf
  ...
  Call Trace:
  prepare_creds+0x190/0x1e0
  copy_creds+0x35/0x172
  copy_process+0x471/0x1a80
  _do_fork+0x83/0x3a0
  __do_sys_wait4+0x83/0x90
  __do_sys_clone+0x85/0xa0
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Using atomic decrease and check instead of separated calls.

---
 kernel/events/core.c |    7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +4 -3
@@ -5475,11 +5475,11 @@ static void perf_pmu_output_stop(struct
 static void perf_mmap_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	struct perf_event *event = vma->vm_file->private_data;
-
 	struct ring_buffer *rb = ring_buffer_get(event);
 	struct user_struct *mmap_user = rb->mmap_user;
 	int mmap_locked = rb->mmap_locked;
 	unsigned long size = perf_data_size(rb);
+	bool detach_rest = false;
 
 	if (event->pmu->event_unmapped)
 		event->pmu->event_unmapped(event, vma->vm_mm);
@@ -5510,7 +5510,8 @@ static void perf_mmap_close(struct vm_ar
 		mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
 	}
 
-	atomic_dec(&rb->mmap_count);
+	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&rb->mmap_count))
+		detach_rest = true;
 
 	if (!atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(&event->mmap_count, &event->mmap_mutex))
 		goto out_put;
@@ -5519,7 +5520,7 @@ static void perf_mmap_close(struct vm_ar
 	mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
 
 	/* If there's still other mmap()s of this buffer, we're done. */
-	if (atomic_read(&rb->mmap_count))
+	if (!detach_rest)
 		goto out_put;
 
 	/*
author maintainer
#102 lore raw

PATCH 98/101 Revert "kernel/reboot.c: convert simple_strtoul to kstrtoint"

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Matteo Croce <[email protected]>

commit 8b92c4ff4423aa9900cf838d3294fcade4dbda35 upstream.

Patch series "fix parsing of reboot= cmdline", v3.

The parsing of the reboot= cmdline has two major errors:

- a missing bound check can crash the system on reboot

- parsing of the cpu number only works if specified last

Fix both.

This patch (of 2):

This reverts commit 616feab753972b97.

kstrtoint() and simple_strtoul() have a subtle difference which makes them non interchangeable: if a non digit character is found amid the parsing, the former will return an error, while the latter will just stop parsing, e.g. simple_strtoul("123xyx") = 123.

The kernel cmdline reboot= argument allows to specify the CPU used for rebooting, with the syntax s#### among the other flags, e.g. "reboot=warm,s31,force", so if this flag is not the last given, it's silently ignored as well as the subsequent ones.

Fixes 616feab75397 ("kernel/reboot.c: convert simple_strtoul to kstrtoint")
Cc Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Cc Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Pavel Tatashin <[email protected]>
Cc Robin Holt <[email protected]>
Cc Fabian Frederick <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[sudip: use reboot_mode instead of mode]
---
 kernel/reboot.c |   21 +++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
kernel/reboot.c +7 -14
@@ -539,22 +539,15 @@ static int __init reboot_setup(char *str
 			break;
 
 		case 's':
-		{
-			int rc;
-
-			if (isdigit(*(str+1))) {
-				rc = kstrtoint(str+1, 0, &reboot_cpu);
-				if (rc)
-					return rc;
-			} else if (str[1] == 'm' && str[2] == 'p' &&
-				   isdigit(*(str+3))) {
-				rc = kstrtoint(str+3, 0, &reboot_cpu);
-				if (rc)
-					return rc;
-			} else
+			if (isdigit(*(str+1)))
+				reboot_cpu = simple_strtoul(str+1, NULL, 0);
+			else if (str[1] == 'm' && str[2] == 'p' &&
+							isdigit(*(str+3)))
+				reboot_cpu = simple_strtoul(str+3, NULL, 0);
+			else
 				reboot_mode = REBOOT_SOFT;
 			break;
-		}
+
 		case 'g':
 			reboot_mode = REBOOT_GPIO;
 			break;
author maintainer
#103 lore raw

PATCH 99/101 reboot: fix overflow parsing reboot cpu number

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Matteo Croce <[email protected]>

commit df5b0ab3e08a156701b537809914b339b0daa526 upstream.

Limit the CPU number to num_possible_cpus(), because setting it to a value lower than INT_MAX but higher than NR_CPUS produces the following error on reboot and shutdown:

    BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff90ab1bb0
    #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    PGD 1c09067 P4D 1c09067 PUD 1c0a063 PMD 0
    Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
    CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.9.0-rc8-kvm #110
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
    RIP: 0010:migrate_to_reboot_cpu+0xe/0x60
    Code: ea ea 00 48 89 fa 48 c7 c7 30 57 f1 81 e9 fa ef ff ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 53 8b 1d d5 ea ea 00 e8 14 33 fe ff 89 da <48> 0f a3 15 ea fc bd 00 48 89 d0 73 29 89 c2 c1 e8 06 65 48 8b 3c
    RSP: 0018:ffffc90000013e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: ffff88801f0a0000 RBX: 0000000077359400 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000077359400 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffffffff81c199e0
    RBP: ffffffff81c1e3c0 R08: ffff88801f41f000 R09: ffffffff81c1e348
    R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 00007f32bedf8830 R14: 00000000fee1dead R15: 0000000000000000
    FS:  00007f32bedf8980(0000) GS:ffff88801f480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: ffffffff90ab1bb0 CR3: 000000001d057000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
    DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
    DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
    Call Trace:
      __do_sys_reboot.cold+0x34/0x5b
      do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
Fixes 1b3a5d02ee07 ("reboot: move arch/x86 reboot= handling to generic kernel")
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Fabian Frederick <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc Pavel Tatashin <[email protected]>
Cc Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc Robin Holt <[email protected]>
[sudip: use reboot_mode instead of mode]
---
 kernel/reboot.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
kernel/reboot.c +7 -0
@@ -546,6 +546,13 @@ static int __init reboot_setup(char *str
 				reboot_cpu = simple_strtoul(str+3, NULL, 0);
 			else
 				reboot_mode = REBOOT_SOFT;
+			if (reboot_cpu >= num_possible_cpus()) {
+				pr_err("Ignoring the CPU number in reboot= option. "
+				       "CPU %d exceeds possible cpu number %d\n",
+				       reboot_cpu, num_possible_cpus());
+				reboot_cpu = 0;
+				break;
+			}
 			break;
 
 		case 'g':
author maintainer
#104 lore raw

PATCH 100/101 net: sch_generic: fix the missing new qdisc assignment bug

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

When commit 2fb541c862c9 ("net: sch_generic: aviod concurrent reset and enqueue op for lockless qdisc") is backported to stable kernel, one assignment is missing, which causes two problems reported by Joakim and Vishwanath, see [1] and [2].

So add the assignment back to fix it.

1. https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg693916.html
2. https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg695131.html

Fixes 749cc0b0c7f3 ("net: sch_generic: aviod concurrent reset and enqueue op for lockless qdisc")
---
 net/sched/sch_generic.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/sched/sch_generic.c +3 -0
@@ -1116,10 +1116,13 @@ static void dev_deactivate_queue(struct
 				 void *_qdisc_default)
 {
 	struct Qdisc *qdisc = rtnl_dereference(dev_queue->qdisc);
+	struct Qdisc *qdisc_default = _qdisc_default;
 
 	if (qdisc) {
 		if (!(qdisc->flags & TCQ_F_BUILTIN))
 			set_bit(__QDISC_STATE_DEACTIVATED, &qdisc->state);
+
+		rcu_assign_pointer(dev_queue->qdisc, qdisc_default);
 	}
 }
 
author maintainer
#105 lore raw

PATCH 101/101 Convert trailing spaces and periods in path components

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Boris Protopopov <[email protected]>

commit 57c176074057531b249cf522d90c22313fa74b0b upstream.

When converting trailing spaces and periods in paths, do so for every component of the path, not just the last component. If the conversion is not done for every path component, then subsequent operations in directories with trailing spaces or periods (e.g. create(), mkdir()) will fail with ENOENT. This is because on the server, the directory will have a special symbol in its name, and the client needs to provide the same.

---
 fs/cifs/cifs_unicode.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/cifs/cifs_unicode.c +7 -1
@@ -501,7 +501,13 @@ cifsConvertToUTF16(__le16 *target, const
 		else if (map_chars == SFM_MAP_UNI_RSVD) {
 			bool end_of_string;
 
-			if (i == srclen - 1)
+			/**
+			 * Remap spaces and periods found at the end of every
+			 * component of the path. The special cases of '.' and
+			 * '..' do not need to be dealt with explicitly because
+			 * they are addressed in namei.c:link_path_walk().
+			 **/
+			if ((i == srclen - 1) || (source[i+1] == '\\'))
 				end_of_string = true;
 			else
 				end_of_string = false;
maintainer Tested-by on the v1 series
#106 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.158 release. There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 19 Nov 2020 12:20:51 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.158-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v4.19:

    15 builds:	15 pass, 0 fail
    22 boots:	22 pass, 0 fail
    38 tests:	38 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 4.19.158-rc1-g1d674327c1b7
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Jon

Tested-by on the v1 series
#107 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.158 release. There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 19 Nov 2020 12:20:51 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.158-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

Tested-by Linux Kernel Functional Testing on the v1 series
#108 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.158 release. There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 19 Nov 2020 12:20:51 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.158-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.19.158-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.19.y
git commit: 1d674327c1b7a5243fc8f01e52e226736f6f987f
git describe: v4.19.157-102-g1d674327c1b7
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-4.19.y/build/v4.19.157-102-g1d674327c1b7

No regressions (compared to build v4.19.157)

No fixes (compared to build v4.19.157)

Ran 46869 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- juno-r2-compat
- juno-r2-kasan
- nxp-ls2088
- qemu-arm64-clang
- qemu-arm64-kasan
- qemu-x86_64-clang
- qemu-x86_64-kasan
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_arm64-compat
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- qemu_x86_64-compat
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
- x86-kasan

Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* v4l2-compliance
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* network-basic-tests
* perf
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kvm-unit-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none

Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
Reviewed-by on the v1 series
#109 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.158 release. There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 19 Nov 2020 12:20:51 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 155 pass: 155 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 417 pass: 417 fail: 0

Guenter