libproxy: fix CVE-2020-26154
PATCH 1/4 libproxy: fix CVE-2020-26154
From: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
--- .../libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch | 98 +++++++++++++++++++ .../libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 99 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch
meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch new file +98 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +From 4411b523545b22022b4be7d0cac25aa170ae1d3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fei Li <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 02:18:37 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer overflow when PAC is enabled + +The bug was found on Windows 10 (MINGW64) when PAC is enabled. It turned +out to be the large PAC file (more than 102400 bytes) returned by a +local proxy program with no content-length present. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libproxy/libproxy/commit/6d342b50366a048d3d543952e2be271b5742c5f8] +CVE: CVE-2020-26154 +Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <[email protected]> + +--- + libproxy/url.cpp | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- + 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libproxy/url.cpp b/libproxy/url.cpp +index ee776b2..8684086 100644 +--- a/libproxy/url.cpp ++++ b/libproxy/url.cpp +@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ using namespace std; + #define PAC_MIME_TYPE_FB "text/plain" + + // This is the maximum pac size (to avoid memory attacks) +-#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 102400 ++#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 0x800000 + // This is the default block size to use when receiving via HTTP + #define PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE 512 + +@@ -478,15 +478,13 @@ char* url::get_pac() { + } + + // Get content +- unsigned int recvd = 0; +- buffer = new char[PAC_MAX_SIZE]; +- memset(buffer, 0, PAC_MAX_SIZE); ++ std::vector<char> dynamic_buffer; + do { + unsigned int chunk_length; + + if (chunked) { + // Discard the empty line if we received a previous chunk +- if (recvd > 0) recvline(sock); ++ if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) recvline(sock); + + // Get the chunk-length line as an integer + if (sscanf(recvline(sock).c_str(), "%x", &chunk_length) != 1 || chunk_length == 0) break; +@@ -498,21 +496,41 @@ char* url::get_pac() { + + if (content_length >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) break; + +- while (content_length == 0 || recvd != content_length) { +- int r = recv(sock, buffer + recvd, +- content_length == 0 ? PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE +- : content_length - recvd, 0); ++ while (content_length == 0 || dynamic_buffer.size() != content_length) { ++ // Calculate length to recv ++ unsigned int length_to_read = PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ if (content_length > 0) ++ length_to_read = content_length - dynamic_buffer.size(); ++ ++ // Prepare buffer ++ dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() + length_to_read); ++ ++ int r = recv(sock, dynamic_buffer.data() + dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read, length_to_read, 0); ++ ++ // Shrink buffer to fit ++ if (r >= 0) ++ dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read + r); ++ ++ // PAC size too large, discard ++ if (dynamic_buffer.size() >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) { ++ chunked = false; ++ dynamic_buffer.clear(); ++ break; ++ } ++ + if (r <= 0) { + chunked = false; + break; + } +- recvd += r; + } + } while (chunked); + +- if (content_length != 0 && string(buffer).size() != content_length) { +- delete[] buffer; +- buffer = NULL; ++ if (content_length == 0 || content_length == dynamic_buffer.size()) { ++ buffer = new char[dynamic_buffer.size() + 1]; ++ if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) { ++ memcpy(buffer, dynamic_buffer.data(), dynamic_buffer.size()); ++ } ++ buffer[dynamic_buffer.size()] = '\0'; + } + } +
meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ DEPENDS = "glib-2.0" SRC_URI = "https://github.com/${BPN}/${BPN}/releases/download/${PV}/${BP}.tar.xz \ file://0001-get-pac-test-Fix-build-with-clang-libc.patch \ file://CVE-2020-25219.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-26154.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f6b1d2a1e17a99cd3debaae6d04ab152" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "654db464120c9534654590b6683c7fa3887b3dad0ca1c4cd412af24fbfca6d4f"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH 2/4 python3: fix CVE-2020-27619
From: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
--- .../python/python3/CVE-2020-27619.patch | 69 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.9.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2020-27619.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2020-27619.patch new file +69 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +From b664a1df4ee71d3760ab937653b10997081b1794 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Miss Skeleton (bot)" <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 05:37:36 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] bpo-41944: No longer call eval() on content received via HTTP + in the CJK codec tests (GH-22566) + +(cherry picked from commit 2ef5caa58febc8968e670e39e3d37cf8eef3cab8) + +Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/b664a1df4ee71d3760ab937653b10997081b1794] +CVE: CVE-2020-27619 +Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <[email protected]> + +--- + Lib/test/multibytecodec_support.py | 22 +++++++------------ + .../2020-10-05-17-43-46.bpo-41944.rf1dYb.rst | 1 + + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Tests/2020-10-05-17-43-46.bpo-41944.rf1dYb.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/test/multibytecodec_support.py b/Lib/test/multibytecodec_support.py +index cca8af67d6d1d..f76c0153f5ecf 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/multibytecodec_support.py ++++ b/Lib/test/multibytecodec_support.py +@@ -305,29 +305,23 @@ def test_mapping_file(self): + self._test_mapping_file_plain() + + def _test_mapping_file_plain(self): +- unichrs = lambda s: ''.join(map(chr, map(eval, s.split('+')))) ++ def unichrs(s): ++ return ''.join(chr(int(x, 16)) for x in s.split('+')) ++ + urt_wa = {} + + with self.open_mapping_file() as f: + for line in f: + if not line: + break +- data = line.split('#')[0].strip().split() ++ data = line.split('#')[0].split() + if len(data) != 2: + continue + +- csetval = eval(data[0]) +- if csetval <= 0x7F: +- csetch = bytes([csetval & 0xff]) +- elif csetval >= 0x1000000: +- csetch = bytes([(csetval >> 24), ((csetval >> 16) & 0xff), +- ((csetval >> 8) & 0xff), (csetval & 0xff)]) +- elif csetval >= 0x10000: +- csetch = bytes([(csetval >> 16), ((csetval >> 8) & 0xff), +- (csetval & 0xff)]) +- elif csetval >= 0x100: +- csetch = bytes([(csetval >> 8), (csetval & 0xff)]) +- else: ++ if data[0][:2] != '0x': ++ self.fail(f"Invalid line: {line!r}") ++ csetch = bytes.fromhex(data[0][2:]) ++ if len(csetch) == 1 and 0x80 <= csetch[0]: + continue + + unich = unichrs(data[1]) +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Tests/2020-10-05-17-43-46.bpo-41944.rf1dYb.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Tests/2020-10-05-17-43-46.bpo-41944.rf1dYb.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000000..4f9782f1c85af +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Tests/2020-10-05-17-43-46.bpo-41944.rf1dYb.rst +@@ -0,0 +1 @@ ++Tests for CJK codecs no longer call ``eval()`` on content received via HTTP.
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.9.0.bb +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.python.org/ftp/python/${PV}/Python-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://0001-Makefile-do-not-compile-.pyc-in-parallel.patch \ file://0020-configure.ac-setup.py-do-not-add-a-curses-include-pa.patch \ file://0001-Lib-sysconfig.py-use-libdir-values-from-configuratio.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27619.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_class-native = " \
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH 3/4 python3: whitelist CVE-2020-15523
In reply to Lee Chee YangFrom: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
This CVE is issue on _Py_CheckPython3 uses uninitialized dllpath when embedder sets module path with Py_SetPath. Since it is .dll issue (on windows only), hence whitelist it.
https://bugs.python.org/issue29778
--- meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.9.0.bb | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.9.0.bb +3 -0
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ CVE_PRODUCT = "python" # This is not exploitable when glibc has CVE-2016-10739 fixed. CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2019-18348" +# This is windows only issue. +CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-15523" + PYTHON_MAJMIN = "3.9" S = "${WORKDIR}/Python-${PV}"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH 4/4 qemu: fix CVE-2020-24352
In reply to Lee Chee YangFrom: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
--- meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 1 + .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-24352.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-24352.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +1 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://find_datadir.patch \ file://usb-fix-setup_len-init.patch \ file://0001-target-mips-Increase-number-of-TLB-entries-on-the-34.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-24352.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-24352.patch new file +52 -0
52 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Thanks for helping with CVE fixes!
This first patch is also appropriate for dunfell, so I will cherry-pick it when it hits master.
Do you plan to do dunfell versions of the other 3 patches?
Steve
Quoted 132 lines · Lee Chee Yang
From: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>--- .../libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch | 98 +++++++++++++++++++ .../libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 99 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patchmeta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch new file +98
-0@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +From 4411b523545b22022b4be7d0cac25aa170ae1d3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fei Li <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 02:18:37 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer overflow when PAC is enabled + +The bug was found on Windows 10 (MINGW64) when PAC is enabled. It turned +out to be the large PAC file (more than 102400 bytes) returned by a +local proxy program with no content-length present. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libproxy/libproxy/commit/6d342b50366a048d3d543952e2be271b5742c5f8] +CVE: CVE-2020-26154 +Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <[email protected]> + +--- + libproxy/url.cpp | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- + 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libproxy/url.cpp b/libproxy/url.cpp +index ee776b2..8684086 100644 +--- a/libproxy/url.cpp ++++ b/libproxy/url.cpp +@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ using namespace std; + #define PAC_MIME_TYPE_FB "text/plain" + + // This is the maximum pac size (to avoid memory attacks) +-#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 102400 ++#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 0x800000 + // This is the default block size to use when receiving via HTTP + #define PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE 512 + +@@ -478,15 +478,13 @@ char* url::get_pac() { + } + + // Get content +- unsigned int recvd = 0; +- buffer = new char[PAC_MAX_SIZE]; +- memset(buffer, 0, PAC_MAX_SIZE); ++ std::vector<char> dynamic_buffer; + do { + unsigned int chunk_length; + + if (chunked) { + // Discard the empty line if we received a previous chunk +- if (recvd > 0) recvline(sock); ++ if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) recvline(sock); + + // Get the chunk-length line as an integer + if (sscanf(recvline(sock).c_str(), "%x", &chunk_length) != 1 || chunk_length == 0) break; +@@ -498,21 +496,41 @@ char* url::get_pac() { + + if (content_length >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) break; + +- while (content_length == 0 || recvd != content_length) { +- int r = recv(sock, buffer + recvd, +- content_length == 0 ? PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE +- : content_length - recvd, 0); ++ while (content_length == 0 || dynamic_buffer.size() != content_length) { ++ // Calculate length to recv ++ unsigned int length_to_read = PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ if (content_length > 0) ++ length_to_read = content_length - dynamic_buffer.size(); ++ ++ // Prepare buffer ++ dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() + length_to_read); ++ ++ int r = recv(sock, dynamic_buffer.data() + dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read, length_to_read, 0); ++ ++ // Shrink buffer to fit ++ if (r >= 0) ++ dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read + r); ++ ++ // PAC size too large, discard ++ if (dynamic_buffer.size() >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) { ++ chunked = false; ++ dynamic_buffer.clear(); ++ break; ++ } ++ + if (r <= 0) { + chunked = false; + break; + } +- recvd += r; + } + } while (chunked); + +- if (content_length != 0 && string(buffer).size() != content_length) { +- delete[] buffer; +- buffer = NULL; ++ if (content_length == 0 || content_length == dynamic_buffer.size()) { ++ buffer = new char[dynamic_buffer.size() + 1]; ++ if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) { ++ memcpy(buffer, dynamic_buffer.data(), dynamic_buffer.size()); ++ } ++ buffer[dynamic_buffer.size()] = '\0'; + } + } +meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb +1
-1@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ DEPENDS = "glib-2.0" SRC_URI = "https://github.com/${BPN}/${BPN}/releases/download/${PV}/${BP}.tar.xz \ file://0001-get-pac-test-Fix-build-with-clang-libc.patch \ file://CVE-2020-25219.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-26154.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f6b1d2a1e17a99cd3debaae6d04ab152" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "654db464120c9534654590b6683c7fa3887b3dad0ca1c4cd412af24fbfca6d4f" --2.17.1
Yes, will send separate patch series for dunfell and gatesgarth.
Quoted 170 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] <openembedded- [email protected]> On Behalf Of Steve Sakoman
Sent: Wednesday, 18 November, 2020 10:44 PM
To: Lee, Chee Yang <[email protected]>
Cc: Patches and discussions about the oe-core layer <openembedded- [email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core] [PATCH 1/4] libproxy: fix CVE-2020-26154Thanks for helping with CVE fixes!
This first patch is also appropriate for dunfell, so I will cherry-pick it when it hits master.
Do you plan to do dunfell versions of the other 3 patches?
Steve
Quoted 71 lines · Lee Chee Yang
From: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>--- .../libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch | 98 +++++++++++++++++++ .../libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 99 insertions(+) create mode 100644
meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patchdiff --git
a/meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patchb/meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patchnew file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ccb99da81meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch new file +52
-0@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +From 4411b523545b22022b4be7d0cac25aa170ae1d3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 +2001 +From: Fei Li <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 02:18:37 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer overflow when PAC is enabled + +The bug was found on Windows 10 (MINGW64) when PAC is enabled. It +turned out to be the large PAC file (more than 102400 bytes) returned +by a local proxy program with no content-length present. + +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://github.com/libproxy/libproxy/commit/6d342b50366a048d3d543952 +e2be271b5742c5f8] +CVE: CVE-2020-26154 +Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <[email protected]> + +--- + libproxy/url.cpp | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- + 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libproxy/url.cpp b/libproxy/url.cpp index +ee776b2..8684086 100644 +--- a/libproxy/url.cpp ++++ b/libproxy/url.cpp +@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ using namespace std; #define PAC_MIME_TYPE_FB +"text/plain" + + // This is the maximum pac size (to avoid memory attacks) -#define +PAC_MAX_SIZE 102400 ++#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 0x800000 + // This is the default block size to use when receiving via HTTP + #define PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE 512 + +@@ -478,15 +478,13 @@ char* url::get_pac() { + } + + // Get content +- unsigned int recvd = 0; +- buffer = new char[PAC_MAX_SIZE]; +- memset(buffer, 0, PAC_MAX_SIZE); ++ std::vector<char> dynamic_buffer; + do { + unsigned int chunk_length; + + if (chunked) { + // Discard the empty line if we received a previous chunk +- if (recvd > 0) recvline(sock); ++ if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) ++ recvline(sock); + + // Get the chunk-length line as an integer + if (sscanf(recvline(sock).c_str(),meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch line 62
Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch new file +10
-0+"%x", &chunk_length) != 1 || chunk_length == 0) break; @@ -498,21 ++496,41 @@ char* url::get_pac() { + + if (content_length >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) break; + +- while (content_length == 0 || recvd != content_length) { +- int r = recv(sock, buffer + recvd, +- content_length == 0 ? PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE +- : content_length - recvd, 0); ++ while (content_length == 0 || dynamic_buffer.size() !=
content_length) {Quoted 31 lines
meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch new file +31
-0++ // Calculate length to recv ++ unsigned int length_to_read = PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ if (content_length > 0) ++ length_to_read = ++ content_length - dynamic_buffer.size(); ++ ++ // Prepare buffer ++ ++ dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() + length_to_read); ++ ++ int r = recv(sock, ++ dynamic_buffer.data() + dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read, ++ length_to_read, 0); ++ ++ // Shrink buffer to fit ++ if (r >= 0) ++ ++ dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read + r); ++ ++ // PAC size too large, discard ++ if (dynamic_buffer.size() >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) { ++ chunked = false; ++ dynamic_buffer.clear(); ++ break; ++ } ++ + if (r <= 0) { + chunked = false; + break; + } +- recvd += r;meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch
Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch new file +10
-0+ } + } while (chunked); + +- if (content_length != 0 && string(buffer).size() != content_length) { +- delete[] buffer; +- buffer = NULL; ++ if (content_length == 0 || content_length == dynamic_buffer.size()) { ++ buffer = new char[dynamic_buffer.size() + 1]; ++ if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) { ++ memcpy(buffer, dynamic_buffer.data(),
dynamic_buffer.size());meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb DEPENDS = "glib-2.0" · line 11
Quoted 12 lines
++ }
++ buffer[dynamic_buffer.size()] = '\0';meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy/CVE-2020-26154.patch new file +3
-0+ } + } +meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb +0
-0@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ DEPENDS = "glib-2.0" SRC_URI ="https://github.com/${BPN}/${BPN}/releases/download/${PV}/${BP}.tar.xz \
meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb DEPENDS = "glib-2.0"
Quoted 6 lines
meta/recipes-support/libproxy/libproxy_0.4.15.bb +1
-0file://0001-get-pac-test-Fix-build-with-clang-libc.patch \ file://CVE-2020-25219.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-26154.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f6b1d2a1e17a99cd3debaae6d04ab152" SRC_URI[sha256sum] ="
654db464120c9534654590b6683c7fa3887b3dad0ca1c4cd412af24fbfca6d4f"Quoted 6 lines
--
2.17.1